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LIBRARY 

'ut.iv.rsitY  ol  <Ulitom»_ 

IRVINE^ 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

IRVINE 

GIFT  OF 


J.    A.    C.    Grant 


i 


! 

i 


THE 


American  State  Reports, 

COMTAimNO  THB 

CASES  OF  GENERAL  VALUE  AND  AUTHORITY 

SUBSEQUENT  TO  THOSE   CONTAINED   IN  THE  "AMERICAN 
DECISIONS"  AND  THE  "AMERICAN  REPORTS," 

DXCIDSD  IV  THB 

COURTS  OF  LAST  RESORT 

.     OP   THE    SEVERAL    STATES.* 

By  a.  C.  freeman, 
amd  thb  associatb  kdit0b8  07  thb  -amesicah  dbcisiolia'* 


Vol.  LXX 


SAN  FRANCISOOt 
BANCROFT-WHITNEY    COMPANY, 

IiAir  PSBUSBBBa  AND  LAW  BOOKMIil.BBfc 

1900. 


Xntored  Moording  to  Act  of  Congress  In  the  year  1900,  by  tti» 

BANCROFT -WHITNEY  COMPANJ. 

Id  tfa*  0£So«  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Bah  Fkakcisoo; 

TVt  PTLinnt-ROLLINS   KLKCTROrm  COlffAXT, 
lYKKJUAPUBBS  AND  STKSBOTYPKBa. 


AMERICAN  STATE  REPORTS. 


VOL.  LXX. 


SCHEDULE 

showing  the  original  volumes  of  reports  in  which  the 
cases  herein  selected  and  re-reported  may  be  found, 
and  the  pages  of  this  volume  devoted  to  each  stkte. 


Georgia  Reports    .    .    ,    ,    , 

.    Vol.105. 

17-  84 

Illinois  Reports 

.    Vol.  179. 

85-142 

Iowa  Reports    ...... 

.    Vol.  107. 

143-231 

Massachusetts  Reports     •    , 

.    Vol.  172. 

232-308 

Minnesota  Reports     .    •    •    • 

.    Vol.  71. 

309-365 

Nebraska  Reports     .    .    .    . 

.    Vol.55. 

366-423 

New  York  Reports      .    .    .    , 

.    .    Vols.  158,  159. 

424-573 

North  Carolina  Reports    .    . 

.    Vol.  124. 

674-622 

Pennsylvania  State  Reports  . 

.    Vol.  190. 

623-649 

Tennessee  Reports     .    .    .    . 

.    Vol.  101. 

650-718 

Texas  Criminal  Reports    •    , 

.    Vol.38. 

719-766 

Utah  Reports    .....    i 

.    Vol.  17. 

767-824 

ViRaiNiA  Reports  .    •    •    .    • 

.    Vol.96. 

826-893 

Wisconsin  Reports    .    •    .    . 

.    Vol.  101. 

894-944 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/americanstaterep70freeiala 


SCHEDULE 


8H0WINO   IN   WHAT    VOLUMES    OP   THIS    SERIES   THE   OASES 

REPORTED  IN  THE   SEVERAL  VOLUMES  OF  OFFICIAL 

REPORTS  MAY  BE  FOUND. 


lute  report!  are  In  parentheses,  and  the  numbers  of  this  series  In  bold-faced  figures 

Alabama.  ->  (83)  3;  (84)  6;  (85)  7;  (86)  11;  (87)  13;  (88)  16;  (89)  18;  (90, 

91)  24;  (92)  85;  (93)  30;  (94)  33;  (95)  36;  (96,  97)  38;  (98)  39;  (99) 

42;  (100,   101)  46;  (102)  48;  (103)  49;  (104,  105)  53:  (106. 107,  108)  64; 

(109,  110)  66;  (111)  66;  (112)  57;  (113)  59;  (114)  62;  (115.  116)  67. 
Abkansas.  —  (48)  3;   (49)  4;  (50)  7;    (51)   14;  (62)  20;  (63)  22;  (54)  26; 

(55)  29;  (56)  36;    (57)  38;   (68)  41;    (59)  43;    (60)  46;   (61.  62)  64; 

(63)  58;  (64)  62;  (65)  67. 
Oaluorota.  — (72)  1;  (73)  2;  (74)  5;  (75)  7;  (76)  9;  (77)  U;  (78,  79)  12;  (80) 

13;  (81)  15;  (82)  16;  (83)  17;  (84)  18;  (85)  20;   (86)  21;   (87,  88)  22| 

(89)  23;  (90,  91)  26;  (92,  93)  27;  (94)  28;  (95)  29;   (96)  31;  (97)  33; 

(98)  36;   (99)  37;    (100)  38;   (101)  40;    (102)  41;    (103)  42;  (104)  43; 

(105)45;  (106)46;   (107)  48;  (108)49;   (109)  60;  (110.  Ill)  62;   (112) 

63;  (113)  54;  (114)  66;  (115)  56;  (116)  58;  (117)  59;  (118)  62;  (U9)  63; 

(120)  65;  (121)  66;  (122)  68;  (123)  69. 
Ck>LOBADO.  —  (10)  3;   (11)  7;  (12)  13;   (13)  16;   (14)  20;   (15)  22;   (16)  26} 

(17)  31;  (18)  36;  (19)  41;  (20)  46;  (21)  62;  (22)  66;  (23)  58;  (24)  66. 
CJOHNECTICUT.  — (54)  1;  (55)    8;  (56)  7;    (57)  14;  (58)  18;  (59)  21;  (60)  26; 

(61)  29;  (62)  36;  (63)  38;  (64)  42;  (65)  48;   (66)  60;  (67)  52;  (68)  67; 

(69)  61;  (70)  66. 
DsLAWARB.— (5  Houst.)  1;  (6  Houst.)  22;    (7  Honst)  40;  (9  Hoast.)  48; 

(1  Marv.)  66;  (2  Marv.)  69. 
Florida.  — (22)  1;  (23)  11;  (24)  12;  (25,  26)  23;  (27)  26;  (28)  29;  (29)  30; 

(30)  32;  (31)  34;  (32)  37;  (33)  39;  (34)  43;  (35)  48;  (30)  61;  (37)  53; 

(38)  66;  (.39)  63. 
Oborgia.  —  (76)  2;  (77)  4;  (78)  6;  (79)  11;  (80,  81)  12;  (82)  14;  (83,  84)  20| 

(85)  21;  (86)  22;  (87)  27;  (88)  30;  (89)  32;   (90)  35;  (91,  92.  93)  44; 

(94)  47;   (95,   96)  61;   (97)  64;    (98)  68;  (99)  69;  (100)  62;  (101)  66; 

(102)  66;  (103)  68;  (104)  69;  (105)  70. 
Idaho.  —  (2)  35. 
Illinois.— (121)  2;   (122)  8;  (123)  5;  (124)  7;  (125)  8;  (126)  9;  (127)  11; 

(128)16;  (129)16;  (1.30)   17;  (131)   19;  (132)   22;   (133,    134)  23;   (135) 

25;    (136)  29;    (137)  31;  (138,   139)  32;  (140,    141)  33;   (142)  34;  (143, 

144,  145)  36;  (146,   147)  37;  (148)  39;  (149,  150)41;  (151)  42;  (152)  43; 

(154)46;   (153,155)46;    (156)47;   (157)48;   (158)49;   (159)50;   (160. 

161)  52;  (162)53;  (163)54;  (164,  165)56;  (166)67;  (167)59;  (168.  169) 

61;   (170)  62;    (171)  63;   (172,   173)  64;   (174)  66;  (175)  67;  (176)  68; 

(177,  178)  69;  (179)  70. 
Ihdiana.  — (112)  2;  (113)  3;  (114)  5;   (115)  7;  (116)  9;  (117,  118)  10;  (119) 

12;  (120,  121)  16;  (122)  17;  (123)  18;  (124)  19;  (125)  21;  (126,  127)  22; 

a) 


8  Schedule. 

028)  85;  (129)  S8;  (ISO)  30;   (131)  31;  (132)  3S;  (133)  36;  (134)  39; 
(136)  41;  (136)  43;   (137)  45;    (138)  46;  (139)  47;   (140)  49;  (1,  2,  3, 
Ind.  App.;  141)  50;  (4,  6,  6,  lad.  App.;  142)  51;  (7,  8,  Ind.  App.;  143)  52; 
(9,  10  Ind.  App.)  53;  (11  lud.  App.)  54;  (13  Ind.  App,;  144)  55;  (14 
Ind.  App.)  56;  (15  lud.  App.;  145)  57;  (146)  58;  (16  Ind.  App.)  59;  (17 
Ind.   App.)  60;   (147,    148)  62;  (18  Ind.   App.;  149)  63;  (150,  19  lud. 
App.)  65;  (20  Ind.  App.)  67;  (151)  68;  (21  lud.  App.)  69. 
Iowa.— (72)  2;  (73)  5;  (74)  7;  (75)  9;  (76,  77)  14;  (78)  16;  (79)  18;  (80)  20; 
(81)  25;  (82)  31;  (83)  32;  (84)  35;  (85)  39;  (86)  41;  (87)  43;  (88)  45 
(89,  90),  48;  (91)  51;  (92)  54;  (93)  57;  (94,  95)  58;  (96,  97)  59;  (98)  60 
(99)  61;  (100)  62;  (101,  102)  63;  (103)  64;  (104)  65;  (105)  67;  (106)  68 

(107)  70. 

Kansas.  — (37)  1;  (38)  5;  (39)  7;  (40)  10;  (41)  13;  (42)  16;  (43)  19;  (44)  21; 

(45)  23;  (46)  26;  (47)  27;  (48)  30;  (49)  33;  (50)  34;  (51)  37;  (52)  39; 

(53)  42;  (54)  45;  (55)  49;  (56)  54;  (57)  57;  (58)  62;  (59)  68. 
Kkntuckt.  —  (83,  84)  4;  (85)  7;  (86)  9;  (87)  12;  (88)  21;  (89)  25;  (90)  29; 

(91)  34;  (92)  36;  (93)  40;  (94)  42;  (95)  44;  (96)  49;  (97)  53;   (98)  56; 

(99)  59;  (100)  66. 
Louisiana.  —  (39  La.  Ann.)  4;  (40  La.  Ann.)  8;  (41  La.  Ann.)  17;  (42  La. 

Ann.)  21;   (43  La.  Ann.)  26;   (44  La.  Ann.)  32;   (45  La.  Ann.)  40;    (46, 

47  La.  Ann.)  49;  (48  La.  Ann.)  55;  (49  La.  Ann.)  62;  (50  La.  Ann,)  69. 
Mains.  — (79)  1;  (80)  6;  (81)  10;  (82)  17;  (83)23;  (84)  30;  (85)35;  (86)  41; 

(87)  47;  (88)  51;  (89)  56;  (90)  60;  (91)  64;  (92)  69. 
Maryland.  — (67)  1;  (68)  6;  (69)  9;  (70)  14;  (71)  17;  (72)  20;  (73)  25;  (74) 

28;  (75)  32;  (76)  35;  (77)39;  (78)  44;  (80)  45;  (79)47;  (81)48;  (82)51; 

(83)  65;  (84)  57;  (85)  60;  (86)  63;  (87)  67. 
MASSACHUSSriTS.— (145)1;  (146)4;  (147)9;  (148)12;  (149)14;  (150)15;  (151) 

21;  (152)  23;  (153)  25;  (154)  26;  (155)  31;  (156)  32;  (157)  34;  (158)  35; 

(169)  38;  (160)  39;  (161)  42;  (162)  44;  (163)  47;  (164)  49;  (165)  52; 

(166)  56;  (167)  57;  (168)  60;  (169)  61;  (170)  64;  (171)  68;  (172)  70. 
Michigan.  —  (60,  61)  1;  (62)  4;  (63)  6;  (64,  65)  8;  (66,  67)  11;  (68,  69,  75)  13; 

(70)  14;  (71,  76)  15;  (72,  73,  74)  16;  (77,  78)  18;  (79)  19;  (80)  20;  (81, 

82,  83)  21;  (84)  22;  (85.  86,  87)  24;  (88)  26;  (89)  28;  (90.  91)  30;  (92) 

31;  (93)  32;  (94)  34;  (95,  96)  35;  (97)  37:  (98)  39;  (99)  41;  (100)  43; 

(101)  45;  (102)  47;  (103)  50;   (104)  53;  (105)  66;  (106)  58;  (107)  61; 

(108)  62;   (109)  63;  (110)  04;  (111)  66;  (112.  113)  67;  (114)  68;  (115) 
69. 

MiMMKsoTA.  —  (36)  1;  (.37)  6;  (.38)  8;  (39,  40)  12;  (41)  16;  (42)  18;  (43)  19) 
(44)  20;  (45)  22;  (46)  24;  (47)  28;  (48)  31;  (49)  32;  (50)  36;  (51,  52) 
38;  (53)  39;  (54)  40;  (55)  43;  (56)  45;  (57)  47;  (58)  49;  (59)  50;  (60)  51; 
(61)  52;  (62)  54;  (63)  56;  (64)  58;  (65)  60;  (66)  61;  (67,  68)  64;  (69) 
65;  (70)  68;  (71)  70. 

MissLssiPPi.  — (65)  7;  (66)  14;  (67)  19;  (68)  24;  (69)  30;  (70)  35;  (71)  42; 
(72)  48;  (73)  66;  (74)  60;  (75)  65. 

Missouri.- (92)  1;  (93)  3;  (94)  4;  (95)  6;  (96)  9;  (97)  10;  (98)  14;  (99)  17 
(100)18;  (101)20;  (102)22;  (103)  23;  (104,  105)  24;  (106)27;  (107)  28 
(lOS.  109)82;  (110,  111)33;  (112)34;  (113,  114)  35;  (115)37;  (116,  117 
88;  (118)  40;  (119,  120)  41;  (121)  42;  (122)  43;  (12.3)  45;  (124,  125)  46 
(126)  47;  (127)  48;  (128)  49;  (129)  50;  (130)  51;  (131)  52;  (132)  53, 
(13.3)  64;  (134)  66;  (1:^5.  136)  58;  (137)  59;  (1.38)  60;  (139)  61;  (140) 
62;  (141,  142)  64;  (143)  65;  (144)  66;  (145)  68;  (146)  69. 


Schedule.  9 

Montana.  — (9)  18;   (10)  84;  (11)  S8;  (12)  83;  (13)  40;  (14)  48;  (15)48; 

(16)  60;  (17)  52;  (18)  56;  (19)  61;  (20)  63;  (21)  69. 
Nmkaska.  —  (22)  3;  (23,  24)  8;  (25)  13;  (26)  18;  (27)  20;  (28,  29)  26;  (30) 

27;  (31)  28;  (32,  33)  29;  (34)  33;  (35)  37;  (36)  38;  (37)  40;   (38)  41; 

(39,  40)  42;  (41)  43;  (42,  43)  47;  (44)  48;  (45,  46)  50;  (47)  63;  (47,  48, 

58;  (49)  59;  (50)  61;  (51,  52)  66;  (53)  68;  (54)  69;  (55)  70. 
NlVADA.  —  (19)  3;  (20)  19;  (21)  37;  (22)  58;  (23)  62. 
Nkw  Hahpshxbk.  —  (64)  10;  (62)  13;  (65)  23;  (66)  49;  (67)  68. 
New  Jkrsbt.  — (43  N.  J.  Eq.)  3;  (44  N.  J.  Eq.)  6;  (60  N.  J.   L.)  7;   (51 

N.  J.  L.;  46  N.  J.  Eq.)  14;  (46  N.  J.  Eq.;  52  N.  J.  L.)  19;  (47  N.  J. 

Eq.)  24;   (53  N.  J.  L.)  26;   (48  N.  J.  Eq.)  27;    (49  N.  J.  Eq.)  31;  (54 

N.  J.  L.)  33;  (50  N.  J.  Eq.)  35;  (55  N.  J.  L.)  39;  (51  N.  J.  Eq.)  40;  (56 

N.  J.  L.)  44;  (52  N.  J.  Eq.)  46;  (57  N.  J.  L.;  53  N.  J.  Eq.)  51;  (54  N.  J. 

Eq.;  (58  N.  J.  L.)  65;  (59  N.  J.  L.)  69;  (55  N,  J.  Eq.)62;  (60  N.  J.  L.) 

64;  (56  N.  J.  Eq.)  67;  (61  N.  J.  L.)  68. 
Niw  York.  — (107)  1;  (108)  2;  (109)  4;  (110)  6;  (111)  7;  (112)  8;  (113)  10; 

(114)  11;  (115)  12;  (116,  117)  15;  (118,  119)  16;  (120)  17;  (121)  18;  (122) 

19;  (123)  20;  (124,  125)   21;  (126)  22;    (127)  24;   (128,  129)  26;  (130, 

131)  27;  (132, 133)  28;  (134)  30;  (135)  31;  (136)  32;  (137)  33;  (138)  34; 

(139)  36;  (140)  37;  (141)  38;  (142)  40;  (143)  42;    (144)  43;  (145)  45; 

(146)  48;    (147)  49;    (148)  51;   (149)  52;    (150)  55;    (151)  56;    (152)  57; 

(153)  60;  (154)  61;  (155)  63;  (156)  66;  (157)  68;  (158,  159)  70. 
North  Carolina.  —  (97,  98)  2;  (99,  100)  6;  (101)9;  (102)  11;  (103)  14;  (104) 

17;  (105)18;  (106)19;  (107)22;  (108)23;  (109)26;  (110)28;  (111)32; 

(112)  34;  (113)  37;  (114)  41;  (115)  44;  (116)  47;  (117)  53;  (118)  54; 

(119)  56;  (120)  58;  (121)  61;  (122)  65;  (123)  68;  (124)  70. 
North  Dakota.  —(1)  26;  (2)  33;  (3)  44;  (4)  50;  (5)  57;  (6,  7)  66. 
Ohio.  —(45  Ohio  St.)  4;  (46  Ohio  St.)  15;  (47  Ohio  St.)  21;  (48  Ohio  St.)  29; 

(49  Ohio  St.)  34;  (50  Ohio  St.)  40;  (51  Ohio  St.)  46;   (52  Ohio  St.)  49; 

(53  Ohio  St.)  53;  (54  Ohio  St.)  56;  (55,  56  Ohio  St.)  60;  (57  Ohio  St.)  63; 

(58  Ohio  St.)  65;  (59  Ohio  St.)  69. 
Oregon.  — (15)  3;  (16)  8;  (17)  11;  (18)  17;  (19)  20;   (20)  23;  (21)  28;  (22) 

29;  (23)  37;  (24)  41;  (25)  42;  (26)  46;  (27)  50;  (28)  52;   (29)  64;   (30) 

60;  (31)  65;  (32)  67. 
PENNSYLVANIA.- (115,  116,  117  Pa.  St.)  2;  (118,  119  Pa.  St.)  4;  (120,  121 

Pa.  St)  6;  (122  Pa.  St.)  9;  (12.3,  124  Pa.  St.)  10;  (125  Pa.  St.)  11;  (126 

Pa.  St.)  12;  (127  Pa.  St.)  14;  (128,  129  Pa.  St.)  15;  (130,  131  Pa.  St.)  17; 

(132,  133,  134  Pa.  St.)  19;  (135.  136  Pa.  St.)  20;  (137,  133  Pa.  St.)  21; 

(139,  140,  141  Pa.  St.)  23;  (142,  143  Pa.  St.)  24;  (144,  145  Pa.  St.)  27; 

(146  Pa.  St.)  28;  (147,  150  Pa.  St.)  30;  (151  Pa.  St.)  31;  (148  Pa.  St.) 

83;  (149.  152.  153  Pa.  St.)  34;  (154,  155  Pa.  St.)  35;  (156  Pa.  St)  36; 

(157  Pa.  St)  37;  (158  Pa.  St)  38;  (159  Pa.  St)  39;  (160  Pa.  St)  40; 

(161  Pa.  St)  41;  (162  Pa.  St)  42:  (163  Pa.  St)  43;  (164,  165  Pa.  St)  44; 

(166  Pa.  St)  45;  (167  Pa.  St)  46;  (168,  169  Pa.  St)  47;  (170,  171  Pa. 

St)  60;  (172,  173  Pa.  St)  51;  (174,  175  Pa.  St)  62;  (176  Pa.  St)  63; 

(177  Pa.  St)  66;  (178  Pa.  St)  66;  (179.  180  Pa.  St)  57;  (181  Pa.  St) 

59;  (182  Pa.  St)  61;  (183,  184  Pa.  St.)  63;  (185  Pa.  St)  64;  (186  Pa. 

St)  66;  (187  Pa.  St)  67;  (188  Pa.  St)  68;  (189  Pa.  St)  69;  (190  Pa. 

St.)  70. 
Bhodk  Island.  — (15)  2;  C16)  27;  (17)  38;  (18)  49;  (19)  61. 


10  Schedule. 

SoTTTH  Casollva.  — (26)  4;  (27,  28,  29)  13;    (30)  14;  (31,  32)  17;   (33)  28; 

(34)  27;  (35)  28;  (36)  31;  (37)  34;  (38)  37;  (39)  39;  (40)  42;  (41)  44; 

(42)  46;  (43)  49;  (44)  61;  (45)  66;  (46)57;  (47)  68;  (48)  69;  (49)  61; 

(50)  62;  (51)  64;  (52)  68;  (53)  69. 
South  Dakota.  — (1)  36;  (2)  39;  (3)  44;  (4)  46;  (5)  49;  (6)  65;  (7)  68; 

(8)  69;  (9)  62;  (10)  66. 
Tennessex.— (85)  4;  (86)  6;  87)  10;  (88)  17;   (89)  24;  (90)  26;   (91)  30; 

(92)  36;  (93)  42;  (94)  46;  (95  )49;  (96)  64;  (97)  66;  (98)  60;  (99)  63; 

(100)  66;  (101)  70. 
Tecas.  — (68)  2;  (69;  24  Tex.  App.)  5;  (70;  25,  26  Tex.  App.)  8;   (71)  10; 

(27  Tex.  App.)  11;   (72)  13;  (73,  74)  15;  (75)  16;  (76)  18;  (77;  28  Tex. 

App.)  19;  (78)  22;  (79)  23;   (29  Tex.  App.)  25;  (80,  81)  26;  (82)  27; 

(30  Tex.  App.)  28;  (83)  29;  (84)  31;  (85)  34;  (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.;  86)  37; 

(86;  32  Tex,    Cr.   Rep.)  40;  (87;  33  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.)  47;  (34  Tex.  Cr. 

Rep.;  88)  53;  (89,  90)  59;   (35  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.)  60;   (36  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.) 

61;  (91;  37  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.)  66,  (38  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.)  70. 
Utah.— (13)  57;  (14)  60;  (15)  62;  (16)  67;  (17)  70. 
VxBMOirr.  — (60)  6;   (61)  15;  (62)  22;   (63)  26;  (64)  33;  (65)  36;  (66)  44} 

(67)  48;  (68)  54;  (69)  60;  (70)  67. 
ViEGiNiA-  — (82)3;   (83)6;   (84)10;   (85)17;  (86)19;  (87)24;  (88)29;  (89) 

37;  (90)  44;  (91)  50;  (92)  53;  (93)  67:  (94,  95)  64;  (96)  70. 
Washingtoit.- (1)  22;  (2)  26;  (3)  28;  (4)  31;  (5)34;   (6)  36;   (7)  38;  (8) 

40;  (9)  43;  (]0)  46;  ^1)  48;  (12)  50;  (13)  62;  (14)  63;  (15)  65;  (16)  68; 

(17)  61;  (18)  63;  (19)  67. 
West  Vibginia.  —  (29)  6;   (30)  8;    (31)  13;   (32,  33)  26;   (34)  26;   (.36)  29; 

(36)  32;  (37)  38;  (38,  39)  45;  (40)  62;  (41)  66;  (42)  67;  (43)  64;  (44> 

67. 
Wisconsin.  —(69)  2;  (70,  71)  6;  (72)  7;  (73)  9;  (74,  75)  17;  (76,  77)  20;  (78; 

23;  (79)  24;  (80)  27;  (81)  29;  (82)  33;  (83)  36;  (84)  36;  (85,  86)  39; 

(87)  41;  (88)  43;   (89)  46;  (90)  48;   (91)  61;  (92)  53;  (93)  67;  (94)  69; 

(95)  60;  96,  (97)  66;  (98,  99)  67;  (100)  69;  (101)  70. 
Wtoxino.  — (3)  31;  (4)  62;  (5)  63. 


AMERICAN  STATE  REPORTS. 

VOL.  LXX. 


CASES  REPORTED. 


Kaio.  Subject.  Ripobt.        Pass. 

Anderson  ▼.  Hayes LandVd  and  Tenant.  101  Wis.  638 ....  930 

Austin  V.  State Interstate  Commerce.  101  Tenn.  663. . . .  70S 

Avery  v.^  Monroe &amwAm«n<. ...  ...172  Mass.  132...  250 

Balk  V.  Harris AUachmeni 124  N.  C.  467 606 

Bastrup  v.  Prendergast Mechanics'  Liens  ...  179  III.  553 1 28 

Bear  v.  Commissioners Schools— Mandamus.  124  N.  C.  204 ....  585 

Bergner  etc.  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreytaa-Corporationa 172  Mass.  154  . . .  251 

Bloorafield  State  Bank  v.  Miller. .  .Statute  of  Frauds  . .  55  Neb.  243  ... .  381 

Broadfoot  V.  Fayetteville Municipal  Bonds. .  .12^  "S.  C.  478....  610 

Brown  v.  Brown Husband  and  Wife.Ui  N,  C.  19 674 

Brown  ▼.  Electric  Ry.  Co. Master  arid  Servant.  101  Tenn.  252....  666 

Brown  V.  Bose Attachment 55  Neb.  200  . . . .  370 

Buchanan  v.  TUden Husband  and  W\fe.\b%  N.  Y.  109  .. .  454 

Burdis  V.  Burdis Devise 96  Va.  81 ..  825 

Bush  V.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  K-^^ jgg  N.  Y.  212...  63» 

Orange  County ( 

Camp  V.Bruce Contracts 96  Va.  621 875 

Casey  v.  Casey Cotenancy 107  Iowa,  192  . . .  190 

Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes  •  Eminent  Domain  ...  1 05  Ga.  1 17 

Clement  v.  Insurance  Co Life  Insurance 101  Tenn.  22  ... .  650 

Commonwealth  v.  Hnbley Police  Power 1 72  Mass.  68 242 

Commonwealth  v.  Wireback. Homicide 190  Pa.  St.  138  . .  625 

Cooper  V.  Hay  ward Ex'ra  and  Adm'rs  . .  71  Minn.  374 . . .  330 

Coupe  V.  Piatt Landl'd and  TenanL\12  liaLsa.  458  ...  293 

Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  )  ^^^, 17  ^tah,  444  .. .  810 

Mm.  Co ) 

CuUiford  v.  Walser Suretyship 168  N.  Y.  65 437 

DeCamp  V.  Thomson Setoff 159  N.  Y.  444  ...  670 

Delafield  v.  Smith Brokers 101  Wis.  664  ....  938 

(U) 


743 

740 


12  Cases  Reported. 

Namb.  SnBjBor.  Rbpoht.      Pasb. 

Dorr  V.  Life  Insurance  Clearing  Co. Corporations 71  Minn.  38....  309 

Dorsey  v.  State Police  Povotr—Food \      ^     '  gg;  f  •  •  ''62 

Ellsbury  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co .  Railroads 172  Mass.  130  .. .  248 

Eayard  v.  Enyard Dower 190  Pa.  St.  114  ..   623 

Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Garis Insane  Persons 190  Pa.  St.  544  . .  644 

Ex  parte  Brown    Police  Power j      Rep!  29*5  j 

r.          *    XT                                              p  •;  i  38  Tex.  Cr.  \ 

Ex  parte  Newman Bail ^      j^^p    j^jg  ^ 

Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson ....  WUnesses 158  N.  Y.  150  . . .  466 

Feder  v.^Iowa  State  etc.  Assn Insurance 107  Iowa,  538  . ..  212 

First  Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Bank.. 5anis  and  Banhing.lOl  Iowa,  543...  216 

Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co Negligence 71  Minn.  438  .. .  341 

Foster  v.  Commonwealth Rape 96  Va.  306 846 

Oannv.  Railroad Negligence 101  Tenn.  380....  687 

Oarvey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R,  Co. .  .Eminent  Domain. .  .159  N.  Y.  323  .. .  550 

Gay  V.  State Criminal  Law. 105  Ga.  599 68 

German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautter Attachment.  „„,,....  55  Neb.  103. . . .  37 1 

Gouce  V.  McCoy Execution 101  Tenn.  587....  714 

Ooralski  V.  Kosiuski Cotenancy 179  III.  177 98 

Oorrell  v.  Water  Supply  Co Water  Companies  . .  124  N.  C.  328 598 

Oration  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wing Neg.  Instruments.  ..112  Mass.  513  ...  303 

Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co Polluted  Water 101  Wis.  258 911 

Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis Evidence 172  Mass.  39  ... .  232 

Hardiman  v.  WhoUey Animals 172  Mass.  411  ...  292 

Harrison  v.  Harrison Devise 105  Ga.  517 60 

Hasbrouck  v.  Western  Union  T.  Co.Tel.  Companies  ....107  Iowa,  160....  181 

Hayden  v.  Barrett Wills 172  Mass.  472  ...  295 

Herter  V.  Mullen Landl'd  and  Tenant.}  59  l!f.  Y.  28....   517 

HoflFv.  Olson Equity  Jurisdiction  .101  Wis.  118 903 

HoUman  v.  Platteville Cemeteries 101  Wis.  94 899 

Howard  v.  Cassels Ouard'n  and  H^arrf.  105  Ga.  412 44 

Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King.. Railroads 179111.  91 93 

In  re  Assignment  Mut.  etc.  Ins.  Co.Insurance 107  Iowa,  143....   149 

In  re  Christensen JUa}-.  and  Divorce..   17  Utah,  412  ...  794 

In  re  Fauton Habeas  Corpus 55  Neb.  703  ... .  418 

Iowa  Savings  and  Loan  Assn.  v.  J  Building  and  J  m-r  t         nni  m-r 

Heidt \  LoanAssn.  }  107  Iowa,  297 ... .  197 

Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbnt.... Camera 158  N.  Y.  34  ....  432 

Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.Railroads 71  Minn.  519  .. .  358 

Jonesv.  State Homicide I  ^^ 'S'""  ^^7  ^ 

(        Rep.  87  S 


719 
761 


Kendriok  T.  Life  In*.  Co. Insurance 124  N.  0.  315....  692 


Cabes  Bbpobteo.  13 

Kaio.                                    BiTBjKcr.  Brpobt.      Pags. 

Latimer  ▼.  State .' Criminal  Law 65  Neb.  609  ....  403 

^Felfc.!!T.?.*\^'!:.^!;.^^^  j^^*" 96Va.337 861 

^fH-THn"";  S'*^*"'^*''"  ^^"*"°  I  Master  and  Servant.m  Maw.  89  ....  244 
Liignting  Co ( 

McMahoD  V.  Dubuque Damage* 107  Iowa,  62  ....  143 

McPeek  V.  Weateru  Union  T.  Co. . .  TeL  Companies  ....  107  Iowa,  356  .. .  205 

Maufull  V.  Graham Judgments. 55  Neb.  646  ....  412 

Matter  of  Stryker Wages 158  N.  Y.  526  ...  489' 

Maxwell  v.  Bank  of  New  'RSchmonA .  Attachment 101  Wis.  286  ... .  926 

Mercautile Nat.  Bank  V.  Macfarlaue./n«o/vency 71  Minn.  497...  352 

Merrill  V.  Security  Trust  Co Dower 71  Minn.  61 312 

Mofifett  V.  Parker Mortgages 71  Minn.  139...  319 

Mohrman  V.  State Social  Clubs 105  Ga.  709 74 

Moore  ▼.  Triplett Judicial  Sales 96  Va.  603 882 

Morrison  v.  Willard Mechanic's  Lien. ...   17  Utah,  306  .. .  784 

Munro  V.  Callahan Judgments 55  Neb.  75    ....  366 

Murphy  v.  Commonwealth Ex  Post  FactoLaws.  172  Mass.  264  . . .  266 

Murphy  V.  Moyle Mar.  and  Divoice..  17  Utah,  113...  767 

^7ssn.°v.*Re^d?!^^?^.*!^  ^!',\  Husband  and  Wife..  96  Va.  345 858 


^Turnlr  G^!'. .?T^, , !['J'!l^'.  {(^orporati^ 71  Minn.  413. 


334 


Pain  V.  Societe  St.  Jean  Baptiste. .  .Benefit  Societies. ...  172  Mass.  319  .. .  287 

Parmenter  Mfg  Co.  t.  Hamilton. . . Bankruptcy 172  Mass.  178  .. .  258 

Parsons  T.  Parsons Adoption. 101  Wis.  76 894 

Payne  T.  State Bape )  ^^Rep^"  494  f  ' '  "^^^ 

People  V.  Fielding Trial 158  N.  Y.  542...  495 

People  T.  Kennedy Murder 159  N.  Y.  346...  557 

Perkins  V.  Heert Statutes 158  N.  Y.  306...  483 

Portance  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co. Master  and  Servani.\Q\  Wis.  574 932 

Rogers  r.  Burr Corpwations 105  Ga.  432 60 

Scanlan  T.  Grimmer Nanus 71  Minn.  351. ..  326 

Scottv.  Hawk Wills 107  Iowa,  723...  228 

Shane  v.  Lyons. Husband  and  Wife. 112  Mass.  199  .. .  261 

Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  eta  Mfg.  Co. .  .CorporaCn  Meetings.  17  Utah,  143  .. .  773 

Snyder  v.  Grandstafif Vendor  and  Purch'r.  96  Va.  473 863 

Spade  V.  Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co. Bailroads 172  Mass.  488  .. .  298 

Spiller  V.  Wells Jurisdiction 96  Va.  598 878 

Staines  V,  Burton Wills 17  Utah,  331  ...  788 

Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock Insurance 1 68  N.  Y.  24  ... .  424 

Steinmeyer  V.  Siebert Specific  Per/orm'ce.. 190  Fsl.  St.  471..  641 

Stoddard  v.  Lnm Corporations 159  N.  Y.  265  ...  641 

Supreme  Lodge  E.  of  P.  v.  Kntscher .  i5«n«/tt  Societies 179  111.  340 116 

Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trehhe . Benefit  Societies.. . .  179  111.  348 120 

Swope  V.  Donnelly Wilb 190  Pa.  St.  417..  637 


14  Cases  Reported. 

Vaio.                               SuBJScti  BspoB*.       ?4en» 

Telegram  ete.    Co.  ▼.   Common- J ^^^^^ .....172  Mass.  294  ...  280 

Tidioute  Sav.  Bank  v.  Libbey Omranty  , 101  Wis.  193 907 

Troxler  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co Master  and  Servant. 124  N.  C.  189  .. .  580 

TarcottT.  Railroad Lmitat'nao/Actions.lOl  Tenn.  102....  661 

United  States  Nat.  Bank  ▼.  Geer  ..NegoCbleliutrumenU  65  Neb.  462....  390 

Van  Norman  r.  Gordon Judgment. 172  Mass.  676  .   .  304 

Walker  y.  Warner..... »,,.. Mortgages 179111.  16 85 

Weeks  ▼.  McNulty Innkeepers 101  Teun.  495....  693 

Wehn  V.  Fall Corporations 55  Neb.  547  . . . .  397 

Welton  r.  Atkinson Notaries  Public. ...  55  Neb.  674  ... .  416 

Weston  T.  Syracuso Mun.  Corporations..  158  N.  T.  274  . . .  472 

Whiting  T.  Price Fraud 172  Mass.  240  .. .  262 

WikoT.  Garner Homestead 179111.  257 102 

'Wilcoxen  T.  Smith \  ^"^^^L^m  Assn.  [  107  Iowa,  555....  220 

Williamar.  State Larceny 105  Ga.  814. 82 

Wilson  T.Hnndley | '^''■"' ^S»pa„i«.  f  »6  Va.  96 837 

Witherow  T.  Slaybaok Corporations 158  N.  Y.  649...  607 

Wolf ord  r.  Cook Limitat'ns  qf  Actions.  71  Minn.  77 ... .  315 

Wright  V.  Independence  Nat.  Bank .  ConiracU 96  Va.  728 889 

Wymany.  Eaton Receivers... 107  Iowa,  214...  193 

WyattT.  Rome Mun.  Corporations.. 105  Qa.  312. 41 

Yancey's  Case Devise 124  N.  C.  161  ...  677 

Young  Men's  0.  A.  ete.  Oo.  r.  {  Negotiable               )i7otii  koq  ibk 

Eockford  Nat.  Bank i  JtutnumUa.  \"^  "^  ^^ ** 


AMERICAN  STATE  REPORTS. 

VOL.  LXX. 


CASES 

IN  THB 

SUPREME   COURT 

or 

GEORGIA. 

Chableston  &  Western  Carolina  Railway  Com- 
pany V.  Hughes. 

[105  Gkorqia,  1.] 

EMINENT  DOMAIN,— THB  AWARD  OF  APPRAISERS 
in  condemnation  proceedings  operates  as  a  Judgment  between  the 
parties,  and  Is  governed  by  the  same  rules  that  are  ordinarily  ap- 
plied to  judgments  of  courts.  Such  an  award,  or  a  verdict  and 
judgment  on  appeal  therefrom,  has  the  same  force  as  an  ordinary 
judgment  rendered  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  It  is  con- 
clusive upon  the  parties  and  privies,  but  Is  not  binding  upon  stran- 
gers. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS— 
CONCLUSIVENESS  OF— LIFE  ESTATE  AND  REMAINDER.— If, 
at  the  time  condemnation  proceedings  were  had,  there  were  two 
estates  in  the  property,  one  a  life  estate,  and  the  other  a  contingent 
remainder,  the  fact  that  it  was  impossible  to  ascertain  the  persona 
who  would  eventually  take  as  remaindermen  does  not  authorize 
the  conclusion  that  the  Interest  of  such  remaindermen  was  acquired 
by  proceedings  against  the  life  tenant,  who  cannot  be  held  to  rep- 
resent them. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS- 
<;ONCLUSIVENESS  AGAINST  UNKNOWN  OWNERS— If  the  con- 
dition of  the  title  to  property  at  the  time  of  condemnation  proceed- 
ings is  such  that  notice  cannot  be  given  to  all  interested,  notice 
to  such  as  are  definitely  linown  to  be  Interested  Is  not  sufficient  to 
-deprive  of  their  rights  othera  whose  identity  is  unknown,  but  whose 
interest  in  the  property  is  ascertainable. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN-JURISDICTION.- ONE  WHO  CAN- 
NOT BE  AND  IS  NOT  NOTIFIED,  is  not  bound  by  the  award  or 
Judgment. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN.— A  RAILROAD  COMPANY,  by  con- 
demnation proceedings,  acquires  whatever  interest  the  person  against 
^vhom  such  proceedings  are  had  has  In  the  land,  and  no  more. 

AM.  St.  Rkp.,  \ou  LXX.— 2  (17 


18  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS 
ARE  NO  MORE  THAN  A  COMPULSORY  SALE  of  all  the  owner's 
interest  in  the  property,  and  no  one  can  be  thus  compelled  to  sell 
who  is  not  a  party  to  the  judgment  rendered  by  the  tribunal  which 
is  erected  for  this  purpose. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— INTEREST  ACQUIRED  BY  RAIL- 
ROAD COMPANY, — A  railroad  company  which  constructs  its  road 
over  land,  the  title  to  which  is  not  fixed  and  determined,  acquires 
the  interest  of  all  those  with  whom  it  deals  by  negotiation  or  against 
whom  it  proceeds  by  condemnation,  but  takes  the  risk  of  other 
persons  making  claims  in  the  future,  whether  they  are  left  out  of 
the  negotiations  or  proceedings  by  mistake  or  from  necessity. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— ESTOPPEL^CONDEMNATION  PRO- 
CEEDINGS against  the  assignee  of  a  life  tenant,  to  whom  the 
entire  amount  awarded  as  damages  has  been  paid,  cannot  be  pleaded 
in  bar  of  the  right  of  the  remainderman  in  the  same  property  to 
have  compensation  for  his  interest  after  the  termination  of  the  life 
estate. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— ENTRY  ON  LAND  BY  CON- 
SENT—ESTOPPEL AGAINST  LANDOWNER.— If  a  railroad  com- 
pany enters  upon  land  with  the  consent  of  the  owner,  or  under 
license  from  him,  and  the  property  thus  taken  possession  of  become* 
such  a  component  part  of  its  railroad  that  to  surrender  its  possession 
would  interfere  seriously  with  the  interests  of  the  company  or  of 
the  public,  the  landowner,  though  entitled  to  compensation  for  hi» 
property,  is  estopped  from  asserting  against  the  company  the  legal 
title  to  the  property  by  an  action  of  ejectment. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  ENTRY  ON  LAND— EJECT- 
MENT.—If  a  railroad  company  enters  upon  land  and  constructs  it» 
road  either  with  the  consent  of  the  owner  or  without  lawful  author- 
ity, and  the  landowner  acquiesces  in  the  appropriation  of  the  prop- 
erty to  a  great  public  use  until  it  has  become  a  necessary  component 
part  of  the  property  acquired  by  the  railroad  to  perform  its  public 
duties,  the  landowner  must  be  held  to  have  waived  his  right  to 
retake  the  property  in  ejectment,  and  must  be  remitted  to  such  other 
remedies  for  the  wrong  done  him  as  will  not  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  the  public  to  have  the  railroad  maintained  and  operated. 

INTERVENTION  IN  EQUITY.— One  who  intervenes  In  a  suit 
In  equity,  and  prays  for  relief,  both  legal  and  equitable,  is  bound 
to  admit  and  provide  for  all  the  equitable  rights,  claims,  and  de- 
mands justly  belonging  to  the  adversary  party,  and  growing  out  of, 
or  necessarily  involved  in,  the  subject  matter  of  the  controversy. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— ENTRY  ON  LAND— RIGHT  TO 
IMPROVEMENTS.— If  a  railroad  company  lawfully  enters  upon 
land  under  conveyance  from  a  tenant  for  life,  and  makes  improve- 
ments necessary  to  its  business,  it  has  a  right,  upon  abandoning 
the  premises  at  the  expiration  of  the  life  estate,  to  remove  such 
improvements,  and,  If  it  continues  in  possession  thereafter,  the  value 
of  such  improvements  should  not  be  considered  in  assessing  the 
damages  to  which  the  remaiuderman  Is  entitled.  The  amount  which 
the  latter  is  entitled  to  recover  is  the  market  value  of  the  property 
at  the  time  the  life  estate  terminated,  with  interest,  the  value  of 
such  Improvements  placed  on  the  property  at  the  expense  of  th& 
company  and  necessary  to  Its  business  not  being  considered  In  ascer- 
taining such  market  value. 

S.  J.  Simpson,  B.  Gumming  and  H.  Crawford,  for  the  plain- 
tiff in  error. 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.  19 

W.  K.  Miller  and  J.  E.  Ijamar,  for  the  defendants  in  error. 

*  COBB,  J.  The  last  will  of  Charles  De  Laigle  was  duly  pro- 
hated  and  admitted  to  record  in  the  court  of  ordinary  of  Eich- 
mond  county  on  May  3,  1866.  By  the  ninth  item  he  made  the 
following  devise :  "To  my  son  Louis  I  give,  devise,  and  bequeath 
three  other  such  parts  [meaning  three-fourths  of  his  estate  after 
tlio  payment  of  his  debts]  to  be  held  by  him  in  trust  for  the 
sole  and  separate  use  of  my  daughters,  Martha,  Mary,  and  Emma, 
one  part  to  each  respectively  for  and  during  the  terms  of  their 
natural  lives,  with  remainders  to  such  child  or  children  of  my 
said  daughters  respectively  as  may  be  living  at  the  time  of  their 
respective  deaths,  and,  in  default  of  such  child  or  children,  then 
to  the  right  heirs  of  each  of  my  said  daughters  respectively." 
After  paying  the  testator's  debts,  his  executors,  on  April  17, 
1867,  assented  to  the  devise  and  allotted  the  property  in  which 
Emma  De  Laigle  was  interested  to  Louis  De  Laigle  as  trustee  for 
her  during  her  natural  life,  with  remainder  and  executory  devise 
over  as  mentioned  above.  At  that  time  Emma  De  Laigle,  the 
life  tenant,  was  a  minor  and  unmarried,  Louis  De  Laigle,  the 
original  trustee,  died  in  1867  ^  after  the  division  of  the  testa- 
tor's estate,  and  on  October  14,  1868,  while  Emma  De  Laigle  was 
still  a  minor  and  unmarried,  Andrew  W.  Walton,  upon  her  ap- 
plication, was  appointed  as  trustee  for  her  alone  by  the  judge  of 
the  superior  court  of  Bichmond  county.  She  attained  her  ma- 
jority on  March  9,  1869,  being  still  single.  Walton  resigned 
as  trustee  on  March  5,  1869;  and  on  the  next  day  E.  F.  Verdery 
was  appointed  trustee  for  her  alone,  upon  her  application,  by 
the  judge  of  the  superior  court.  No  bond  was  required  of  Ver- 
dery, and  none  was  given  by  him.  In  1870,  while  Emma  De 
Laigle  was  still  unmarried,  upon  the  joint  petition  of  herself 
and  Verdery,  an  order  was  granted  authorizing  Verdery  to  sell 
the  fee  in  certain  property  for  reinvestment,  and  it  was  sold 
by  him  under  sucb  order  in  that  year.  After  the  passage  of 
this  order  Emma  De  Laigle  married,  and  died  on  January  13, 
1894,  leaving  one  child  surviving  her,  who  was  bom  on  March 
17,  1872,  and  who  intermarried  with  one  Hughes.  After  the 
passage  of  the  order  above  referred  to  Verdery,  the  trustee,  sold 
the  property  to  Alfred  C.  Holt  for  the  sum  of  four  thousand 
dollars  and  conveyed  the  same  to  him  in  fee  simple  by  a  deed 
dated  September  9,  1870.  Verdery  resigned  as  trustee  after 
Mrs.  Hughes  was  born.  Thereafter,  in  proceedings  regularly 
had   in  which   Mrs.  Hughes  was  a  party,  represented   by   her 


20  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  HuanEs.     [Georgia, 

mother  as  her  next  friend,  Joseph  B.  Harris,  her  father,  was  ap- 
pointed trustee  in  the  place  of  Verdery  and  ordered  to  give  a 
bond  in  the  sum  of  four  thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  and  upon 
the  giving  of  such  bond  Yerdery  was  directed  to  turn  over  to 
him  all  the  trust  property  he  held  as  trustee  for  Mrs.  Harris 
and  her  child.     Harris,  as  trustee,  gave  the  bond  required.     In 

1872,  the  Port  Royal  Railroad  Company,  a  corporation  of  this 
state,  located  its  line  of  road  across  the  land  which  had  been 
acquired  by  Holt  under  the  deed  from  Verdery,  trustee.  The 
company  not  being  able  to  agree  with  Holt  as  to  the  compensa- 
tion to  be  paid  to  him  for  the  acquisition  of  the  strip  required 
for  its  purposes,  condemnation  proceedings  were  instituted 
against  Holt  to  have  the  value  of  the  same  assessed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  the  company's  charter.  The  only 
parties  to  these  proceedings  were  the  railroad  company  and 
Holt.  The  amount  fixed  *  by  the  appraisers  not  being  satiS' 
factory  to  the  railroad  company,  an  appeal  was  entered  to  the 
superior  court,  and  on  the  trial  there  a  verdict  in  favor  of  Holt 
for  the  sum  of  eleven  hundred  dollars  was  the  result.  N'o  judg- 
ment was  entered  upon  this  verdict.  The  amount  specified  was 
subsequently  paid  to  Holt,  who  conveyed  the  property  in  fee 
simple  to  the  railroad  company  by  a  warranty  deed  dated  May  8, 

1873.  The  railroad  company  entered  into  possession  and  placed 
thereon  a  part  of  its  tracks  which  were  necessary  to  a  complete 
construction  and  operation  of  the  railroad  which  it  was  author- 
ized by  its  charter  to  build.  The  Port  Royal  Railroad  Company 
having  mortgaged  its  entire  property,  including  the  strip  ac- 
quired from  Holt,  to  secure  a  large  issue  of  negotiable  bonds, 
and  default  in  payment  of  the  same  having  been  made,  in  1878 
a  decree  of  foreclosure  was  made  by  the  circuit  courts  of  the 
United  States  for  the  district  of  South  Carolina  and  the  south- 
em  district  of  Georgia;  and  under  such  decree  a  sale  was  had, 
at  which  certain  persons  representing  the  creditors  of  the  cor- 
poration became  the  purchasers,  and  afterward  conveyed  the 
same  to  a  new  corporation  created  by  the  laws  of  the  states  of 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  and  called  the  Port  Royal  &  Au- 
gusta Railway  Company.  The  latter  company  executed  two 
mortgages  upon  its  entire  property  to  secure  a  large  issue  of 
bonds,  and  in  1893  default  in  payment  upon  these  bonds  was 
made.  Thereafter  a  proceeding  in  equity  was  instituted  in  the 
superior  court  of  Richmond  county,  to  foreclose  the  mortgages 
executed  by  the  railroad  company  to  secure  the  issue  of  bonds 
above  referred  to,  and  a  receiver  was  appointed  to  take  charge 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  t;.  Hughes.  21 

of  the  property  and  assets  of  the  company.  The  strip  of  land 
which  had  been  acquired  by  the  Port  Eoyal  Railroad  Company 
from  Holt  passed  into  the  possession  of  the  receiver. 

On  August  20,  1896,  Mrs.  Hughes,  W.  K.  Miller,  and  J.  E. 
Lamar  presented  a  petition  to  the  judge  of  the  superior  court, 
setting  forth  that  they  were  the  owners  of  the  land  in  the  pos- 
session of  the  receiver,  which  was  described  in  the  deed  from 
Holt  to  the  Port  Royal  Railroad  Company;  that  upon  the  same 
there  had  been  erected  six  railroad  tracks  which  were  now  in 
the  possession  of  the  receiver  and  in  use  by  him  as  a  part  of  the 
^  railroad  yard  and  terminals  in  the  city  of  Augusta;  that  Mrs. 
Hughes  acquired  title  to  the  property  under  the  will  of  Charles 
De  Laigle,  and  became  entitled  to  possession  on  the  death  of 
her  mother,  Emma  De  Laigle  Harris,  which  occurred  on  Janu- 
ary 13,  1894;  that  she  had  conveyed  an  undivided  half-interest 
in  the  same  to  W.  K.  Miller  and  J.  R.  Lamar;  that  the  property 
is  of  great  value,  to  wit,  five  thousand  dollars  or  other  large 
sum,  and  that  the  railroad  iron  laid  upon  the  same  is  the  prop- 
erty of  petitioners  and  is  of  the  value  of  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  dollars,  and  the  yearly  rental  value  of  the  property  is  six 
hundred  dollars  or  other  large  sum;  that  the  company  is  in- 
solvent, in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  and  its  assets  in  the  state  of 
South  Carolina  are  also  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  and  its  prop- 
erty is  about  to  be  sold  under  a  final  decree  in  that  state,  which 
sale  is  advertised  to  take  place  on  the  first  Tuesday  in  Septem^ 
ber,  1896;  that  petitioners  cannot  obtain  payment  for  the  use 
of  their  land  nor  eject  the  receiver  therefrom  without  the  per- 
mission of  the  court.  They  pray  that  they  be  allowed  to  sue  the 
receiver,  and  for  mesne  profits  from  January  13,  1894,  and  that, 
unless  arrangements  can  be  made  for  the  purchase  of  the  same, 
the  receiver  be  ejected  and  possession  be  surrendered  by  the 
court  to  them;  that  pending  the  final  determination  of  the  is- 
sue, the  receiver  be  enjoined  from  surrendering  possession  of 
the  property  in  Georgia  and  the  assets  and  income  in  his  hands, 
until  the  final  order  of  this  court;  and  that  the  receiver  hold 
up  sufficient  money  to  pay  the  judgment  that  may  be  rendered. 
On  this  petition  the  presiding  judge  passed  the  following  order: 
"Read  and  sanctioned.  Let  this  petition  be  filed.  Petitioners 
are  allowed  to  intervene  in  said  cause,  and  to  sue  J.  H.  Averill, 
receiver  of  the  Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Company;  and 
he  and  the  said  company  are  required  to  show  cause  before  me 
on  the  thirty-first  day  of  August,  1896,  in  the  superior  court 
room  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  why  the  prayer  of  the  petitioners 


22  Chableston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

should  not  be  granted.  In  the  meantime,  he  and  the  said  com- 
pany are  restrained  from  changing  the  existing  status  of  the 
said  property  or  permitting  the  same  to  be  sold  in  the  state  of 
South  Carolina,  as  advertised,  until  the  further  order  of  this 
court.  August  20,  1896."  On  August  31,  1896,  the  receiver  « 
filed  an  answer  to  the  petition  of  the  intervenors,  in  which 
some  of  the  allegations  were  denied,  and  others  were  neither  ad- 
mitted nor  denied,  for  the  alleged  reason  that  the  receiver  was 
not  informed  as  to  the  matter.  It  was  alleged  that  when  he 
was  appointed  receiver  he  found  the  Port  Royal  &  Augusta 
Railway  Company  in  possession  of  the  property,  and  the  same 
passed  into  his  possession,  and  he  is  informed  and  believes  that 
the  railway  company  had  been  for  many  years  in  open  and 
peaceable  possession  of  the  same,  claiming  it  as  its  own,  in  good 
faith,  adversely  to  the  claims  of  all  others.  The  prayer  of  the 
answer  was  that  the  intervenors  be  required  to  make  strict,  proof 
of  their  allegations;  and  that  if  it  be  shown  to  the  court  that 
they  are  the  owners  and  entitled  to  possession,  he  be  allowed 
a  reasonable  opportunity  to  ascertain  what  will  be  a  fair  and 
reasonable  price  at  which  to  acquire  the  lot  and  negotiate  for 
the  purchase  thereof,  subject  to  the  final  approval  of  the  court; 
and  that,  in  the  event  the  intervenors  and  the  receiver  fail  to 
oome  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  price  to  be  paid,  the  question 
be  submitted  to  a  jury,  and  if  the  amount  found  in  favor  of  the 
intervenors  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  court,  he  have  the 
option  of  acquiring  the  same  at  the  price  so  found;  that  if,  in 
the  meanwhile,  the  property  of  the  railway  company  shall  have 
been  sold  in  pursuance  of  the  orders  of  the  court,  the  purchasers 
have  the  option  of  acquiring  the  lot  at  such  price.  Thereafter 
on  the  same  day  the  receiver  filed  an  amendment  to  his  answer, 
in  which  it  was  alleged  that  Charles  De  Laigle  devised  a  certain 
parcel  of  land  to  trustees  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  his  daugh- 
ter, Emma  De  Laigle;  that  Verdery  was  appointed  successor  to 
the  trustee  named  in  the  will,  and  by  an  order  of  court  made 
a  deed  to  Holt,  undertaking  to  convey  the  fee  simple  title;  and 
that  he  is  informed  and  believes  that  both  Verdery,  trustee, 
and  Holt  believed  that  the  fee  in  the  land  was  acquired  by  Holt, 
under  the  conveyance;  that  thereafter  Holt  executed  a  deed  un- 
dertaking to  convey  to  the  Port  Royal  Railroad  Company  a  fee 
simple  estate  in  the  land  described  in  the  petition  of  the  inter- 
veners, which  is  a  portion  of  the  tract  which  Holt  acquired  un- 
der the  deed  from  Verdery,  trustee;  that  Holt  and  the  company 
believed  that  the  fee  simple   title   had  been  acquired;  ''  that 


July,  1898.]    Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v,  Hughes.  23 

"thereafter  the  property  of  the  Port  Eoyal  Railroad  Company 
vas  sold  and  a  deed  to  the  same  was  made,  including  the  land 
in  dispute,  to  the  Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Company; 
that  by  virtue  of  the  several  conveyances,  and  in  the  belief  that 
it  had  acquired  a  fee  simple  estate  in  the  strip  of  land,  the 
Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Company  entered  upon  and  took 
possession  of  the  same,  and  as  its  receiver  respondent  took  con- 
trol of  it  as  the  property  of  such  company.  It  is  further  alleged 
that  the  first  information  that  the  receiver  ever  had  that  inter- 
veners claimed  title  to  the  land  in  controversy  was  wheal  their 
petition  was  served  upon  him. 

On  April  28,  1897,  the  receiver  filed  another  amendment  to 
his  answer,  in  which  it  was  set  up  that  the  Port  Royal  Railroad 
Company  acquired  a  right  of  way  over  and  through  the  premises 
sued  for,  by  virtue  of  condemnation  proceedings  had  in  accord- 
ance with  the  powers  conferred  upon  such  company  in  its  char- 
ter, as  will  fully  appear  by  the  record  of  the  court  in  which 
the  present  case  was  pending,  and  that  the  receiver  is  the  suc- 
cessor to  the  right  so  acquired  by  the  Port  Royal  Railroad  Com- 
pany. On  the  same  day  the  following  order  was  passed:  "The 
Charleston  &  Western  Carolina  Railway  Company  having  pur- 
chased the  property  of  the  Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Com- 
pany, and  being  in  possession  of  the  said  property  and  that  sued 
for  by  B.  H.  Hughes  et  al.,  ordered  that  the  said  Charleston  & 
Western  Carolina  Railway  Company  be  allowed  to  defend  the 
claim  filed  by  B,  H.  Hughes  et  al.,  and  to  file  the  pleas  this  day 
presented."  The  pleas  of  the  Charleston  &  Western  Carolina 
Railway  Company  which  were  referred  to  in  the  order  were,  in 
substance,  as  follows:  It  denies  that  the  petitioners,  or  either  of 
them,  have  any  right,  title,  or  interest,  at  law  or  in  equity,  in 
or  to  the  premises  in  dispute.  It  admits  that  the  main  line  and 
tracks  of  the  Port  Royal  Railroad  Compainy  were  located  and 
constructed  over  the  strip  of  land  sued  for,  about  the  year  1873, 
and  that  ever  since  that  time  the  land  and  the  tracks  thereon 
have  constituted  an  indispensable  portion  of  the  main  right  of 
way  and  railroad  of  that  company  and  now  of  the  defendant, 
and  that  the  same  has  been  operated  continuously  as  a  part  of 
the  public  highway  from  Port  Royal  to  the  city  of  Augusta 
for  **  more  than  twenty  years.  It  admits  that  Mrs.  Hughes  was 
the  only  surviving  child  of  Emma  De  Laigle  Harris,  and  that 
the  latter  died  on  the  date  alleged;  the  land  sued  for  was  once 
owned  by  Charles  De  Laigle,  and  passed  under  his  will  to  Louis 
De  Laigle  as  trustee  for  Emma  De  Laigle  and  her  children;  that 


24  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia^ 

Walton  was  appointed  trustee  to  succeed  Louis  DeLaigle,  and 
that  Verdery  was  appointed  to  succeed  Walton;  that  on  Sep- 
tember 9,  1870,  upon  the  joint  petition  of  Verdery,  trustee,  and 
Emma  De  Laigle,  the  sale  of  the  property  was  authorized,  Emma 
De  Laigle  at  that  time  being  the  only  beneficiary  of  the  trust 
in  esse;  that  in  accordance  with  the  order  the  land  was  sold 
to  Holt,  the  trustee  conveying  to  him  in  fee  simple;  that  the 
purchase  money  (four  thousand  dollars)  was  paid  in  cash  to  the 
trustee,  who  invested  it  for  the  benefit  of  the  trust  estate;  that 
subsequently  Verdery  resigned  the  trust  after  Mrs.  Hughes,  the 
petitioner,  was  bom,  and  that  on  the  petition  presented  by  Mrs. 
Hughes  on  her  own  behalf  and  as  next  friend  of  her  daughter, 
Joseph  B.  Harris  was  appointed  trustee;  that  Verdery  fully  ac- 
counted for  the  amount  received  by  him  and  paid  the  same  over 
to  Harris,  trustee,  after  the  execution  by  Harris  of  a  bond  re- 
quired by  the  order  of  court;  that  Mrs.  Hughes  has  never  repu- 
diated or  disaffirmed  the  petition  that  was  filed  in  her  behalf, 
or  restored  the  money  paid  for  her  use;  that  the  Port  Royal 
Railroad  Company  had  acquired  the  premises  in  dispute  as  a 
right  of  way  under  condemnation  proceedings  which  were  au- 
thorized by  its  charter;  that  under  such  proceedings  it  acquired 
title  and  went  into  possession,  and  at  great  cost  proceeded  to 
construct  the  main  track  of  its  railroad,  placing  thereon  divers 
sidetracks  which  were  necessary  for  its  use,  and  completed  the 
construction  of  its  entire  railroad  from  Augusta  to  Port  Royal, 
South  Carolina;  that  the  property  passed  from  the  Port  Royal 
Railroad  Company  to  the  Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Com- 
pany by  virtue  of  the  decree  rendered  in  the  foreclosure  pro- 
ceedings brought  by  the  bondholders  of  the  former  company; 
that  in  1893,  in  the  foreclosure  proceedings  had  against  the 
Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Company,  under  authority  of 
the  orders  of  court  passed  therein,  receiver's  certificates  to  the 
amount  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  were  *  issued,  and  de- 
clared to  be  a  first  lien  upon  the  entire  line  of  railroad  in  the 
possession  of  the  receiver;  that  none  of  such  certificates  were 
ever  paid,  and  that  the  entire  property  of  the  railroad  was  sold 
because  of  the  nonpayment  of  the  same,  together  with  a  large 
amount  of  the  other  indebtedness  of  the  receiver,  amounting 
to  not  less  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars;  that 
the  defendant  became  the  purchaser  of  the  Port  Royal  &  Au- 
gusta Railway  Company  at  such  sale,  and  received  a  conveyance 
of  the  same  from  the  master;  that  under  the  law  of  Georgia 
the  trustee  of  such  a  trust  as  was  created  by  the  will  of  Charlea 


July,  1898.]    Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.  26 

De  Laigle  was  not  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  life  tenant,  but 
was  to  preserve  the  contingent  remainders,  and  that  Mrs. 
Hughes  and  her  grantees  are  concluded;  and  especially,  under 
the  sale  of  the  trustee  to  Holt,  that  Mrs.  Hughes  elected  to 
ratify  and  affirm  the  sale  when  she  applied  for  the  appointment 
of  Joseph  B.  Harris  as  trustee,  under  which  order  the  purchase 
money  received  by  Verdery,  trustee,  was  recognized  as  repre- 
senting the  entire  estate  in  the  property  and  turned  over  to 
Harris,  trustee,  as  such;  that  Mrs.  Hughes  well  knew  all  of  the 
facts,  and  when  she  became  of  age  did  not  disaffirm  such  trans- 
action or  undertake  to  avoid  the  condemnation  proceedings  un- 
til August,  1896,  and  stood  by  and  allowed  the  railroad  com- 
pany to  occupy  that  portion  of  its  right  of  way,  many  times  a 
day  using  the  same  for  the  handling  thereon  of  trains  carrying 
passengers,  freight,  and  mails;  that  petitioners  are  not  entitled 
to  maintain  an  action  of  ejectment  or  destroy  the  unity  of  the 
property  as  maintained  and  enjoyed  for  more  than  twenty  years, 
and  thus  deprive  the  public  of  the  benefit  of  a  completed  and 
operated  railroad. 

The  court  sustained  a  deiflurrer  to  the  plea  of  the  Charleston 
&  Western  Carolina  Railway  Company,  and  this  ruling  is  the 
basis  of  one  of  the  assignments  of  error  in  the  main  bill  of  ex- 
ceptions. Thereafter  the  Charleston  &  Western  Carolina  Rail- 
way Company  offered  the  following  amendment  to  its  pleading: 
"Now  comes  the  Charleston  &  Western  Carolina  Railway  Com- 
pany, admitted  to  defend  against  the  intervention  of  B.  H. 
Hughes  and  others,  and  presents  for  refiling  under  the  sanction 
of  the  court  its  original  answer,  and  protesting  against  any  judg- 
ment or  decree  against  ***  it,  and  reserving  the  right  to  except! 
thereto,  and  reserving  also  all  exceptions  heretofore  made  and 
the  right  to  insist  thereon,  for  an  amendment  to  the  original 
prayer  of  the  answer  prays  that  the  court  order  that  if  any  ver- 
dict or  decree  is  rendered  against  this  defendant,  the  Charleston 
&  Western  Carolina  Railway  Company,  that  it  be  not  one  of 
ejectment,  but  a  money  verdict  for  the  value  of  the  land,  upon 
the  payment  of  which  this  defendant  may  retain  the  premises 
in  dispute."  The  presiding  judge  refused  to  allow  the  original 
answer  to  be  refiled  with  the  amendment,  and  this  is  assigned 
as  error.  While  the  original  answer  of  the  defendant  was 
stricken  on  demurrer,  it  appears  from  the  record  that  at  the 
trial  of  the  case  all  of  the  evidence  which  would  have  been  ad- 
missible under  such  an  answer  was  admitted,  and  the  facts  ap- 
pearing in  such  evidence  are  set  forth  in  the  first  part  of  this 


'2Q  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

statement.  After  all  the  evidence  was  submitted,  the  judge  di- 
rected the  jury  to  find  for  the  plaintiffs  the  premises  in  dispute, 
hut  that  the  railroad  iron  thereon  was  the  property  of  the  de- 
fendant. Upon  this  verdict  a  judgment  was  entered  for  the 
plaintiffs  against  the  defendant  for  the  land  in  dispute,  direct- 
ing a  writ  of  possession  to  issue,  and  authorizing  the  sheriff, 
on  demand  of  the  plaintiffs,  to  put  defendant,  its  agents  and 
servants,  out  of  possession.  Thereupon  the  defendant  excepted, 
and  the  plaintiffs  by  cross-bill  complained  of  rulings  which  will 
he  hereafter  referred  to.  The  errors  assigned  in  the  main  bill 
■of  exceptions  were:  1.  The  court  erred  in  sustaining  the  demur- 
rer to  the  original  answer  of  the  defendant;  2.  The  court  erred 
in  refusing  to  allow  the  defendant  to  refile  its  answer  with  the 
amendment  so  as  to  have  a  money  verdict  against  the  receiver, 
because,  if  under  the  evidence  petitioners  show  a  title  in  them 
which  would  ordinarily  authorize  a  recovery  in  ejectment,  there 
should  in  the  present  case  be  a  finding  for  a  sum  of  money,  or 
a  decree  authorizing  the  receiver  to  acquire  the  premises  by  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  domain  enjoyed  by  the  Port 
Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Company.  The  assignment  of  error 
in  the  cross-bill  of  exceptions  was,  that  the  court  erred  in  di- 
recting the  jury  to  find  for  the  defendants  the  iron  rails  and 
other  improvements  located  upon  and  permanently  attached  to 
the  railroad,  **  it  being  insisted  that  such  rails  and  other  im- 
provements, being  permanently  attached  to  the  railroad,  should 
pass  with  the  real  estate. 

1.  The  item  of  the  will  of  Charles  De  Laigle  under  which  the 
petitioners  derived  title  was  construed  by  this  court  in  the  case 
of  Fleming  v.  Hughes,  99  Ga.  444.  It  was  there  held  that  the 
legal  title  passed  to  the  trustee  as  to  the  life-estate  only;  that 
the  remainder  created  was  a  legal  and  not  an  equitable  estate, 
and  that  therefore  the  order  of  sale  which  was  granted  on  the 
application  of  Verdery,  trustee,  did  not  authorize  the  sale  of 
any  other  interest  in  the  land  than  the  life  estate  of  Emma 
De  Laigle.  The  only  interest  acquired  by  Holt  under  such  sale 
being  the  life  estate,  that  was  all  that  he  could  convey.  By 
the  terms  of  this  decision  the  title  to  the  fee  vested  in  Mrs. 
Hughes  upon  the  death  of  her  mother  on  January  13,  1894.  It 
appears,  therefore,  that  all  the  issues  raised  in  the  present  case 
involving  the  question  of  title  are  conclusively  settled  by  the 
case  cited. 

2.  The  Port  Royal  Railroad  Company  was  incorporated  by  an 
act  of  the  general  assembly,  approved  December  19,  1859;  and 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Hughes.  27 

by  its  charter  it  was  declared  that  "the  said  company  shall  pos- 
sess and  enjoy  the  same  privileges  as  to  right  of  way  as  are 
■vested  in,  and  enjoyed  by,  the  Central  Railroad  &  Banking 
Company  of  Georgia":  Acts  1859,  p.  324.  In  the  charter  of  the 
Central  Railroad  &  Banking  Company  it  was  provided  that  that 
company  should  have  power  to  construct  a  railroad,  "paying 
to  the  owners  of  lands  through  which  the  same  may  pass  a  just 
indemnity"  for  the  value  of  the  land  covered  by  the  railway  and 
the  right  of  way  on  either  side  thereof.  If  the  company  could 
not  acquire  the  title  to  the  right  of  way  by  purchase,  it  was 
provided  that  the  amount  of  damage  or  injury  occasioned  by  the 
construction  and  maintenance  of  the  road  should  be  ascertained 
And  determined  by  the  award  of  three  appraisers,  one  to  be 
chosen  by  the  company,  one  by  the  "owner,"  and  one  by  the 
inferior  court  of  the  county  where  the  land  lay;  and  if  the  "own- 
er," should  decline  to  appoint  an  appraiser,  then  two  were  to 
be  appointed  by  the  inferior  court,  the  finding  of  the  appraisers 
to  operate  as  a  judgment  for  the  amount  against  the  company, 
*^  either  party  having  the  right  to  appeal  from  the  award  of 
the  appraisers  to  a  special  jury  in  the  superior  court.  It  was 
provided  that  "the  decision  shall  vest  in  the  company  the  fee 
simple  of  the  land  in  question,  and  in  the  other  party  a  judg- 
ment for  its  value."  In  making  the  valuation  the  appraisers, 
and  in  case  of  appeal  the  jury,  should  take  into  consideration 
the  loss  or  damage  which  may  occur  to  "the  owner**  or  "owners" 
in  consequence  of  the  land  being  taken,  and  also  the  benefit 
and  advantage  to  be  received  from  the  construction  of  the  rail- 
road: Prince's  Digest,  331,  332;  Acts  1835,  p.  217.  It  will  be 
seen  that,  under  the  charter  above  quoted  from,  it  was  contem- 
plated that  the  right  of  way  should  be  acquired  by  purchase  from 
the  "owner**  of  the  land,  and  that  upon  failure  of  the  company 
and  the  owner  to  agree  upon  the  amount  to  be  paid,  condemna- 
tion proceedings  could  be  had  in  the  manner  above  referred  to, 
and  that  the  persons  against  whom  such  condemnation  proceed- 
ings must  be  instituted  were  the  owners  of  the  property — that 
is,  the  same  persons  with  whom  the  company  would  be  required 
to  negotiate  for  the  purchase  of  the  property.  The  persons, 
•therefore,  who  are  the  owners  and  who  would  have  to  be  con- 
sulted if  a  purchase  at  private  sale  was  desired,  are  ones  wlio 
should  be  made  parties  to  the  condemnation  proceedings.  If 
the  person  in  possession  of  the  property  was  not  clothed  with 
the  power  to  make  a  conveyance  of  the  interest  of  another  in 
the  same  property,  then  such  person  could  not  acquire  the  right 


28  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.      [Georgia, 

to  dispose  of  the  interest  of  the  other  party  by  submitting  to 
condemnation  proceedings  to  which  the  other  person  at  interest 
was  not  a  party,  nor  deprive  the  other  of  his  right  to  assert 
his  interest,  whatever  it  may  be,  against  the  corporation  in- 
stituting the  condemnation  proceedings.  If  a  life-tenant  could 
not  convey  to  a  railroad  company  for  a  right  of  way  the  interest 
of  a  remainderman,  the  most  solemn  judgment  that  could  be 
rendered  in  condemnation  proceedings,  to  which  the  railroad 
company  and  the  life  tenant  alone  were  parties,  could  not  ope- 
rate as  an  estoppel  upon  the  remainderman.  It  becomes  neces- 
sary in  the  present  case  to  determine  whether,  in  condemnation 
proceedings  instituted  under  the  provisions  of  the  charter  re- 
ferred to  against  a  person  who  was  the  assignee  of  the  ^^  life 
tenant,  the  interest  of  a  contingent  remainderman,  who  was 
not  in  esse  when  the  proceedings  were  had,  passed  to  the  rail- 
road company.  The  award  of  appraisers  in  such  proceedings 
•  operates  as  a  judgment  between  the  parties,  and  is  governed  by 
the  same  rules  that  would  ordinarily  be  applied  to  judgments 
of  courts;  and  such  an  award,  or  a  verdict  and  judgment  on 
appeal  from  the  same,  has  the  same  force  as  an  ordinary  judg- 
ment rendered  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction.  It  is  con- 
clusive upon  the  parties  and  privies,  but  is  not  binding  upon 
strangers.  If  at  the  time  the  condemnation  proceedings  were 
had  there  were  two  estates  in  the  property,  one  a  life  estate, 
and  the  other  a  contingent  remainder,  the  fact  that  it  was  im- 
possible to  ascertain  the  persons  who  would  eventually  take  as 
remainderman  upon  the  happening  of  the  contingency  provided 
for  in  the  will  would  not  authorize  the  conclusion  that  the  in- 
terest of  such  remaindermen  was  acquired  by  proceedings 
against  the  life  tenant,  who  under  no  circumstances  could  be 
held  to  represent  them.  If  the  condition  of  the  title  to  the 
property  at  the  time  of  the  condemnation  proceedings  is  such 
that  notice  cannot  be  given  to  all  interested,  notice  to  such  as 
are  definitely  known  to  be  interested  would  not  be  held  to  be 
sufficient  to  deprive  of  their  rights  others  whose  identity  was 
unknown,  but  whose  interest  in  the  property  was  ascertainable. 
Condemnation  proceedings  pass  title  to  whatever  interest  the 
parties  who  took  part  in  the  proceedings  have  in  the  property, 
and  a  party  who  could  not  be  notified  is  not  bound  by  the  award 
or  judgment.  In  such  cases  the  railroad  company  would  fail  to 
acquire  a  perfect  title  to  the  property;  and  this  imposes  no 
greater  hardship  upon  a  railroad  company  than  it  does  upon  any 
other  person  who  desires  to  purchase  property  in  which  there 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  t>.  Hughes.  29 

is  a  contingent  interest  outstanding  in  some  one  whose  identity 
cannot  be  determined  at  the  time  of  the  purchase.  The  con- 
demnation proceedings  are  no  more  than  a  compulsory  sale  of 
All  the  owner's  interest  in  the  property,  and  no  one  can  be  thus 
■compelled  to  sell  who  is  not  a  party  to  the  judgment  rendered 
by  the  tribunal  which  is  erected  for  this  purpose.  Therefore 
a  railroad  company  which  sees  proper  to  construct  its  railway 
over  land  where  the  title  is  in  the  condition  above  **  referred 
to  acquires  the  interest  of  all  those  with  whom  it  deals  by  nego- 
tiation, or  against  whom  it  proceeds  by  condemnation,  but  takes 
the  risk  of  other  persons  interested  making  claims  in  the  fu- 
ture, whether  they  be  left  out  of  the  negotiations  or  the  con- 
demnation proceedings  by  mistake  or  from  necessity.  In  the 
present  case,  condemnation  proceedings  against  the  assignee  ot 
the  life  tenant,  to  whom  the  entire  amount  awarded  as  damages 
was  paid,  is  pleaded  in  bar  of  the  right  of  the  remainderman 
in  the  same  property  to  have  compensation  for  her  interest  after 
the  termination  of  the  life  estate.  This  cannot  be  the  law.  For 
if  so,  the  right  of  the  legislature  to  confiscate  in  the  interest 
of  public  improvements  under  the  guise  of  condemnation  pro-» 
ceedings  would  be  complete,  it  being  only  necessary  that  one 
person  who  was  interested  in  the  property  should  have  notice, 
and  by  such  notice  the  interest  of  every  other  person  would  be 
held  to  pass,  although  ignorant  of  the  proceedings  under  which 
their  property  was  taken.  Under  the  ruling  made  in  the  case 
of  Fleming  v.  Hughes,  99  Ga.  444,  Emma  De  Laigle  had  only 
&  life  estate  in  the  property,  and  this  was  the  only  estate 
acquired  by  Holt  under  the  purchase  from  Verdery,  trustee. 
Holt,  therefore,  represented  no  one  but  himself,  and  in  the 
condemnation  proceedings  instituted  against  him  his  interest 
in  the  land  was  all  that  could  be  affected  by  the  judgment.  As 
he  did  not  acquire  the  interest  of  Mrs.  Hughes,  and  as  it  is  not 
pretended  that  any  part  of  the  money  paid  to  him  by  the  rail- 
road company  was  ever  paid  over  to  Mrs.  Hughes,  or  to  any  one 
authorized  to  represent  her,  or  was  ever  used  for  her  benefit  in 
any  way,  the  condemnation  proceedings,  if  they  had  terminated 
in  a  regular  judgment,  instead  of  a  conve5'ance  voluntarily  exe- 
cuted by  Holt  in  accordance  with  the  verdict  of  the  jury,  could 
not  be  used  against  Mrs.  Hughes  to  raise  either  an  estoppel  by 
record  or  any  other  estoppel  which  would  have  the  effect  of  pre- 
venting her  from  asserting  her  rights  in  the  property.  Under 
this  view  of  the  case,  it  is  unnecessary  to  determine  whether 
the  condemnation  proceedings  were  invalid  on  account  of  one 


30  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

of  the  arbitrators  not  having  been  regularly  appointed,  or 
whether  the  railroad  company  waived  its  rights  under  the  con- 
demnation proceedings  by  taking  the  deed  from  ^^  Holt.  Holt 
was  lawfully  in  possession  of  the  life  estate  under  the  convey- 
ance made  to  him  by  Yevderj,  trustee,  and  he  had  a  right  to 
sell  that  interest,  and  the  same  passed  to  the  railroad  company 
under  the  deed  which  he  executed  to  it  after  the  verdict  had 
been  rendered  in  the  condemnation  proceedings.  In  the  case  of 
Bentonville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stroud,  45  Ark.  278,  it  was  held  that  it 
was  incumbent  on  the  railroad  company  which  was  seeking  a 
condemnation  of  a  right  of  way  to  ascertain  the  owners  of  the 
land  and  make  them  parties  to  the  proceedings,  and  by  select- 
ing the  parties  against  whom  it  proceeded  it  admitted  their  own- 
ership. In  the  opinion,  Cockrell,  C.  J.,  referring  to  the  rule 
above  stated,  says:  "The  company  alone  can  start  the  proceed- 
ings, and  when  it  does  so  it  must  proceed  against  the  owner,  and 
it  selects  the  parties  to  be  proceeded  against  at  its  peril,  because, 
by  starting  the  proceedings  against  them,  it  admits  that  they 
are  the  owners.  This  is  no  hardship  on  the  company.  The  rec- 
•ords  and  other  means  of  information  are  open  to  it,  and  if  the 
title  to  the  land  to  be  taken  is  uncertain  or  in  dispute,  it  may 
bring  all  persons  who  appear  to  be  owners  or  part  owners  into 
court,  and,  when  the  damages  are  assessed  and  paid  into  court, 
leave  the  contending  claimants  to  settle  among  themselves  their 
controversy  as  to  the  fund  awarded." 

3.  When  a  railroad  company,  without  warrant  or  authority, 
enters  upon  the  land  of  another,  it  is,  as  a  general  rule,  no  less 
a  trespasser  than  any  other  person  who  is  guilty  of  an  act  of  a 
similar  nature.  If,  however,  a  railroad  company  enters  upon 
the  land  with  the  consent  of  the  owner,  or  under  license  from 
him,  and  the  property  thus  taken  possession  of  becomes  such  a 
necessary  component  part  of  its  railroad  that  to  surrender  its 
possession  would  interfere  seriously  with  the  interests  of  the 
company,  the  landowner,  although  entitled  to  compensation  for 
his  property,  might,  by  his  conduct  in  allowing  the  entry  upon 
his  land  and  permitting  the  company  to  so  use  it  as  that  it  could 
not  be  abandoned  without  great  prejudice  to  its  rights,  estop 
himself  from  asserting  against  the  company  the  legal  title  to 
the  property  by  an  action  of  ejectment.  The  propositions  above 
stated  are  simply  the  application  of  familiar  principles  of  law 
^"  which  govern  in  all  transactions  of  the  character  above 
referred  to,  whether  the  controversy  be  between  natural  persons 
elone,  or  between  such  persons  and  corporations,  and  whether 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v,  Hughes.  31 

the  corporation  be  public  or  private.    A  railroad  corporatioiv 
being  one  charged  by  the  law  with  the  performance  of  certain, 
duties  to  the  public,  is  allowed,  under  some  circumstances,  to- 
set  up  rights  connected  with  the  land  over  which  it  operates  its- 
line  of  railway,  of  which  an  individual  or  an  ordinary  private 
corporation  would  not  generally  be  allowed  to  avail  itself.    Con- 
troversies in  reference  to  the  possession  of  land,  where  the  rights 
of  individuals  only  are  involved,  are  purely  matters  of  private- 
concern.    Controversies  in  which  a  corporation  charged  with  the 
duties  incumbent  upon  carriers  of  passengers,  freight,  and  mails, 
in  which  an  effort  is  made  by  private  individuals  or  others  to- 
take  away  from  such  corporation  a  part  of  the  property  in  ita 
possession  which  is  absolutely  essential  to  its  complete  perform- 
ance of  the  public  duties  required  of  it,  become  matters  of  more 
than  private  concern,  and  in  which  the  public  is  deeply  and 
seriously  interested.    For  this  reason  it  has  become  settled  law 
that  the  harsh  remedies  which  would  be  allowed  to  one  indi- 
vidual against  another  in  reference  to  the  possession  of  land 
will  not  be  allowed  to  one  who  is  seeking  to  recover  such  prop- 
erty from  a  railroad  company,  when  exact  justice  can  be  done 
to  such  owner  by  giving  him  remedies  which  are  less  severe  in 
their  nature,  and  by  which  he  would  secure  substantially  the 
same  rights,  thereby  saving  to  the  public  the  right  to  require 
a  performance  of  the  public  duties  incumbent  upon  the  corpo- 
ration whose  property  is  the  subject  matter  of  the  controversy. 
That  a  railroad  corporation  has  a  right  to  deprive  a  person  of 
his  property  for  its  uses  by  doing  acts  which  in  an  individual 
would  be  dealt  with  as  a  trespass  is  not  contended  for;  but  when 
a  railroad  company  enters  upon  land  and  constructs  its  road 
without  lawful  authority,  and  the  landowner  acquiesces  in  the 
wrongful  act  and  the  consequent  appropriation  of  the  property 
to  a  great  public  use  until  the  same  has  become  a  necessary 
component  part  of  the  property  required  by  the  railroad  to  per- 
form its  public   duties,  such   landowner  will  be  held  to  have 
waived  his  right  to  retake  the  property,  and  will  be  remitted  to- 
such  *''  other  remedies  for  the  wrong  done  him  as  will  not  inter- 
fere with  the  rights  of  the  public  to  have  the  railroad  main- 
tained and  operated.    If  this  is  the  case  in  reference  to  unlawful 
entry,  for  a  stronger  reason  the  same  result  would  follow  if  the 
entry  by  the  railroad  company  in  the  first  instance  was  by  the 
authority  or  consent  of  the  landowner,  even  though  it  be  under 
a  parol  license  and  the  legal  title  to  the  land  still  remain  in  the 
landowner.    The  current  of  modem  authority  sustains  the  prop- 


32  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

osition  that  when  a  railroad  company  is  in  possession  of  land, 
using  it  as  a  right  of  way,  although  not  having  acquired  the 
legal  title  thereto,  the  landowner  would  be  estopped  from  eject- 
ing the  company  from  the  premises  if  it  was  shown  either  that 
the  original  entry  was  with  his  consent,  or  that  the  entry  without 
his  consent  was  so  long  acquiesced  in  that  to  allow  the  company 
to  be  ejected  would  either  dismember  the  property  of  the  com- 
pany, or  essentially  interfere  with  its  ability  to  discharge  the 
public  duties  incumbent  upon  it.  This,  however,  is  subject  to 
the  qualification  that  the  landowner  is  entitled  to  compensation 
for  his  property  and  this  must  be  ascertained  and  paid  to  him 
before  the  corporation  is  vested  with  a  complete  right  to  hold 
and  enjoy  his  property  as  its  own. 

In  the  case  of  Indiana  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Allen,  113  Ind.  581,  the 
general  rule  is  stated  to  be,  that  when  land  is  seized  by  a  rail- 
road company  without  right  the  owner  may  maintain  eject- 
ment; but  where  there  has  been  an  acquiescence  on  the  part  of 
the  owner  until  public  rights  have  intervened,  such  action  will 
not  lie,  but  the  landowner  will  be  confined  to  a  recovery  of  com- 
pensation. In  Louisville  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beck,  119  Ind.  124,  it 
was  held  that:  "A  landowner  who  stands  by  without  demanding 
-compensation,  until  a  railroad  company  has  so  far  completed 
^nd  put  in  operation  its  road  over  his  land  as  to  involve  the  pub- 
lic interest,  can  neither  enjoin  the  company  nor  maintain  eject- 
ment to  recover  his  land.  The  only  remedy  left  to  the  land- 
owner, in  such  a  case,  is  to  proceed  within  the  proper  time  to 
have  his  damages  assessed  and  enforced  against  the  railroad 
company."  In  the  case  of  Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co,  v.  Pfeuffer, 
56  Tex.  66,  it  was  held  that  where  land  was  appropriated  by  a 
railroad  company  without  authority  the  right  of  the  owner  to  *** 
•compensation  was  not  waived  by  his  standing  by  and  permitting 
the  company  to  construct  its  road  over  his  land,  nor  was  his 
right  to  recover  the  land  lost  if  the  company  refused  to  make 
•compensation.  In  the  case  of  McAulay  v.  Western  etc.  R.  R. 
-Co.,  33  Vt.  311,  78  Am.  Dec.  627,  it  was  held,  where  a  land- 
owner acquiesced  in  the  occupation  of  his  land  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  railroad,  without  requiring  prepayment  of  damages 
\ipon  a  contract  for  future  payment  by  the  company,  and  the 
road  was  constructed  and  put  in  operation,  that  he  could  not 
afterward,  on  failure  to  obtain  payment,  maintain  ejectment  or 
trespass  for  the  land :  See,  also,  Roberts  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R. 
€o.,  158  U.  S.  1;  3  Elliott  on  Railroads,  sec.  1049.  In  those 
<;ase8  where  it  has  been  held  that  the  landowner  would  be  en- 


July,  1898.]     Chableston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Eughix.  53 

titled  to  bring  suit  against  the  company  in  ejectment,  and 
where  a  judgment  in  ejectment  was  allowed  to  be  rendered,  it 
was  also  held  that  upon  appropriate  pleadings  the  issuing  of  a 
writ  of  possession  would  be  stayed  until  the  company  could  be 
allowed  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to  acquire  title  to  the  prop- 
erty, either  by  purchase  or  condemnation,  or  that  the  enforce- 
ment of  such  a  judgment  in  ejectment  would  be  enjoined  for  a 
similar  reasoa:  Pittsburg  etc.  K.  E.  Co.  v.  Bruce,  102  Pa.  St. 
23;  Pittsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  59  Pa.  St.  433;  Conger  v. 
Burlington  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  41  Iowa,  419;  Jacksonville  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Adams,  33  Fla.  608,  In  the  case  of  Yonng  v.  McKenzie,  3 
Ga.  31,  it  was  held  that  an  action  of  ejectment  against  a  bridge 
company  to  recover  property  in  its  possession,  and  necessary  for 
the  purpose  of  building  the  bridge,  but  to  which  the  title  had 
not  been  acquired  either  by  purchase  or  condemnation,  should 
be  enjoined  until  the  bridge  company  should  have  a  reasonable 
time  to  comply  with  the  terms  of  its  charter  in  reference  to 
<;ondemning  the  property  for  its  use.  In  this  case  there  had 
been  an  attempt  to  acquire  the  land  by  condemnation,  which 
failed  for  the  reason  that  the  proceedings  before  the  appraisers 
were  recorded  in  the  wrong  place.  Under  color  of  this  author- 
ity the  land  was  entered  upon  and  the  bridge  built,  and  this 
was  one  of  the  reasons  which  brought  the  court  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  in  equity  the  company  should  not  be  ejected  until  an 
opportunity  had  been  afforded  it  to  acquire  the  land  by  con- 
demnation. 

■^*  It  is  contended  however,  in  the  present  case,  as  the  title 
acquired  by  the  railroad  company  under  the  deed  from  Holt 
was  for  the  life  estate  of  Emma  DeLaigle  only,  that  upon  her 
death  the  title  immediately  vested  in  Mrs.  Hughes,  and  that 
the  possession  of  the  railroad  company,  relatively  to  Mrs. 
Hughes,  became  wrongful  and  unauthorized,  and  that  therefore 
she  is  entitled  to  treat  it  as  a  naked  trespasser  upon  her  prop- 
erty, she  having  done  nothing  which  would  amount  to  a  con- 
sent on  her  part  to  the  appropriation  of  the  property  by  the 
company^  and  the  lapse  of  time  between  the  death  of  her  mother 
and  the  filing  of  the  suit  not  being  sufficient  to  have  amounted 
to  such  an  acquiescence  as  would  deprive  her  of  the  right  to 
maintain  an  action  of  ejectment  against  the  company.  Noth- 
ing appears  in  the  record  which  would  amount  to  an  estoppel 
against  her.  There  was  no  evidence  that  she  received  any  part 
of  the  money  which  was  paid  to  Verdery,  trustee,  when  the 
property  was  sold  to  Holt,  nor  that  any  part  of  the  same  was 
Am.  St.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— 3 


84  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v,  Hughes.     [Georgia^ 

ever  used  for  her  benefit;  nor  has  tHere  been  any  ratification  of 
the  acts  of  those  persons  who  attempted  to  convey  to  the  rail- 
road company  her  interest  in  the  property;  nor  has  the  time- 
which  has  elapsed  since  her  right  of  entry  been  of  snch  dura- 
tion as  to  show  an  acquiescence  in  the  wrongful  appropriation  of 
her  property.  The  case  should  be  treated  as  one  in  which  the 
owner  of  the  land  who  is  asserting  title  against  the  railroad 
company  never  consented  to  its  occupation  by  the  company^ 
either  by  herself  or  by  anyone  authorized  to  represent  her.  But 
while  this  is  true,  we  think  that,  under  the  circumstances  of  this 
case,  Mrs.  Hughes  should  not  be  allowed  to  treat  the  company 
as  a  naked  trespasser.  Its  entry  upon  the  property  in  the  life- 
time of  Emma  De  Laigle  was  lawful  and  authorized.  At  the 
time  of  its  entry,  and  so  far  as  the  record  shows,  up  to  the  time 
of  the  claim  now  set  up  by  Mrs.  Hughes,  it  and  its  successors 
believed  that  they  had  acquired  a  fee  simple  title  to  the  prop- 
erty, the  deeds  under  which  they  claimed  purporting  to  convey 
such  an  estate.  Their  right  to  possession  after  the  death  of 
Emma  De  Laigle  was  at  least  colorable.  It  has  been  said  that 
"an  original  entry  by  the  consent  of  a  tenant  for  life  is  lawful, 
and  will  not  subject  the  party  enjoining  to  an  action  for  dam- 
ages ^®  on  the  part  of  the  remainderman,  although  damages 
have  not  been  paid" :  Mills  on  Eminent  Domain,  see.  142.  The 
statement  above  made  was  quoted  approvingly  and  followed  in 
the  case  of  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Goodwin,  111  111.  273;  53 
Am.  Rep.  623.  In  the  case  of  Austin  v.  Rutland  R.  R.  Co.,  45- 
Vt.  215,  it  was  held  that  where  a  railroad  company  had  entered 
into  possession  of  property  with  the  consent  of  the  life  tenant 
and  continued  to  use  and  possess  the  same  after  the  termina- 
tion of  the  life  estate,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  remainderman, 
and  without  appraisal  or  payment  of  damages,  the  remainder- 
man could  not  maintain  ejectment  against  the  company. 
Even  if  we  were  disposed  to  do  so,  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to 
go  to  the  length  of  the  decisions  just  cited.  We  are  of  opin- 
ion that  the  petitioners  in  the  present  case  have  waived  their 
right,  if  any  they  had,  to  insist  in  the  first  instance  upon  a 
judgment  in  ejectment  against  the  railroad  company,  not  by 
anything  they  have  done  before  they  instituted  their  suit,  but. 
by  the  way  in  which  they  have  brought  their  suit  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  same  and  of  the  relief  prayed  in  the  original  peti- 
tion. The  assets  of  the  Port  Royal  &  Augusta  Railway  Com- 
pany were  in  the  custody  of  a  court  of  equity  through  the  me- 
dium of  a  receiver,  and  he  had  possession  of  the  property  now 


July,  18S8.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  HuaHES.  35 

in  controversy.  The  petitioners  did  not  apply  to  this  court  for 
leave  to  go  into  a  common-law  court  and  assert  there  a  strict 
and  technical  common-law  right;  but  they  applied  to  this  court 
of  equity  to  be  allowed  to  come  in  and  make  themselves  par- 
ties to  the  pending  suit,  and  set  up  their  right  in  such  suit 
against  the  receiver  and  the  company  which  was  represented  by 
him;  and  they  prayed  for  a  judgment  declaring  them  to  be  the 
owners  of  the  property  described  in  their  petition,  and  that  they 
be  placed  in  possession  of  the  same,  if  the  court  should  decide 
in  their  favor;  and  distinct  prayers  were  made  for  an  order  in 
the  nature  of  an  injunction  against  the  receiver  to  prevent  him 
from  delivering  any  of  the  property  in  Georgia  to  those  who 
might  become  purchasers  under  the  order  of  court  in  the  state 
of  South  Carolina  until  the  issues  raised  by  them  should  be  de- 
termined; and,  further,  that  the  receiver  should  be  required  to 
retain  in  his  hands  a  sufficient  sum  of  money  to  pay  the  judg- 
ment that  might  be  rendered  in  favor  of  petitioners.  **  On 
this  petition  the  court  passed  an  order  allowing  the  petitioners 
to  intervene  in  the  cause,  and  granted  an  order  restraining  the 
receiver  from  changing  the  existing  status  of  the  property,  or 
permitting  the  same  to  be  sold  in  the  state  of  South  Carolina, 
as  petitioners  alleged  was  about  to  be  done.  The  petitioners 
have  not  only  resorted  to  a  court  of  equity  to  set  up  their  claim, 
but  they  have  come  in  praying  in  their  behalf  distinct  equita- 
ble relief.  They  practically  concede  that  a  contingency  may 
arise  in  which  the  parties  in  possession  of  the  land  claimed  by 
them  would  be  authorized  to  purchase  the  same,  such  being  the 
inevitable  inference  to  be  drawn  from  the  prayer  asking  that  a 
snm  of  money  be  impounded  in  the  hands  of  the  receiver  for 
their  benefit. 

"He  who  would  have  equity  must  do  equity,  and  give  effect 
to  all  equitable  rights  in  the  other  party  respecting  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  suit":  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3924.  The  meaning  of 
this  maxim  is,  "that  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  controversy 
between  two  definite  parties,  and  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the 
remedy  demanded,  the  court  will  not  confer  its  equitable  relief 
upon  the  party  seeking  its  interposition  and  aid  unless  he  has 
acknowledged  and  conceded,  or  will  admit  and  provide  for,  all 
the  equitable  rights,  claims,  and  demands  justly  belonging  to 
the  adversary  party,  and  growing  out  of  or  necessarily  involved 
in  the  subject  matter  o^  the  controversy.  It  says,  in  effect,  that 
the  court  will  give  the  plaintiff  the  relief  to  which  he  is  entitled, 
only  upon  condition  that  he  has  given,  or  consents  to  give,  the 


36  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

defendant  such  corresponding  rights  as  he  also  may  he  entitled 
to  in  respect  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit":  1   Pomeroy's 
Equity  Jurisprudence,  sec.  385.     Anyone  going  into  a  court  of 
equity  and  asking  its  aid,  whether  that  aid  he  such  as  could  he 
obtained  in  a  court  of  law,  or  whether  it  be  of  a  character  ob- 
tainable only  in  a  court  of  equity,  submits  himself  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court,  and  in  asking  its  aid  subjects  himself  to 
the  imposition  of  such  terms  as  well-established  equitable  prin^ 
ciples  would  require.     Especially  would  this  be  true  where  the 
relief  sought  by  the  party  applying  to  the  court  is  both  legal 
and  equitable  in  its  nature.     No  one  can  read  the  facts  of  the 
present  case  without  being  impressed  that   there   is    an    over- 
whelming equity  in  favor  of  this  railroad  ^^  company  being  al- 
lowed to  purchase  from  the  petitioners  the  property  owned  by 
them,  and  which  is  so  necessary  to  the  complete  operation  and 
maintenance  of  the  company's  road  in  the  discharge  of  its  publie 
duties.     Whatever    might    have    been    Mrs.    Hughes'    rights 
against  the  company  if  she  had  sued  at  law,  or  if  she  had  ob- 
tained leave  of  this  court  of  equity  to  have  maintained  at  law 
an  independent  suit  against  the  receiver  or  other  persons  in  pos- 
session, under  the  remedy  which  she  has  elected  she  is  bound 
to  submit  the  subject  matter  of  the  litigation  to  the  adjudica- 
tion of  the  court  upon  equitable  principles.     Her  right  to  insist 
upon  a  judgment  of  ouster  in  the  first  instance  is  therefore  gone, 
if  the  defendant  desires  to  insist  upon  its  right  to  purchase  the 
properi;y;  and  the  pleas  of  the  defendant,  which  set  up  its  right 
to  have  the  value  of  the  property  passed  upon  by  a  jury,  that 
they  might  be  given  an  opportunity  to  purchase  and  pay  for 
the  same,  were  good  in  substance,  and  should   not   have   been 
stricken.     It  is  contended,  however,  that  as  the  defendant  is  a 
foreign  corporation,  and  as  it  has  no  authority  under  the  laws 
of  this  state  to  acquire  property  by  condemnation,   it  had   no 
right  to  come  into  court  and  file  a  plea  asking  that   what  was 
equivalent   to  a  condemnation   be  had   in   the   pending   suit. 
While  it  is  not  a  corporation  organized  under  the  laws  of  this 
state,  by  comity  it  is  permitted  to  come  into  this  state,  and  is 
here  discharging  public  duties  of  the  nature  usually  performed 
by  corporations  of  that  character,  and  it  is  as  fully  under  the 
control  of  the  laws  of  this  state  in  regard  to  the  discharge  of 
such  public  duties  as  if  it  had  been  incorporated  under  our  laws. 
As  a  foreign  corporation  it  has  the  right,  until  stopped  by  the 
state,  to  maintain  and  operate  its  railroad  within  the  limits  of 
this  state.     In  order  to  exercise  this  right,  the  property  in  con- 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  HuaHES.  37 

troversy  is  an  essential  part  of  its  right  of  way  and  terminals. 
Such  being  the  case,  the  equity  in  its  favor,  requiring  that  the 
court  of  equity  to  which  petitioners  have  applied  should  accord 
to  it  the  right  to  acquire  by  purchase  the  possession  of  the  prop- 
erty before  a  harsh  judgment  of  ouster  should  be  rendered 
against  it,  is  just  as  strong  as  if  it  had  authority  to  acquire  pos- 
session of  the  property  under  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  emi- 
nent domain.  The  equity  in  favor  of  *^  a  railroad  company, 
in  such  a  case,  does  not  grow  out  of  the  right  it  might  have  under 
the  law  to  acquire  title  to  the  property  in  which  it  happens  to 
be  in  possession,  but  it  grows  out  of  the  fact  that  it  is  in  pos- 
session of  the  property;  that  the  entry  of  its  predecessor  in  title 
was  lawful  and  authorized ;  and  that  the  same  has  become  a  nec- 
essary component  part  of  the  property  of  the  corporation,  which 
is  discharging  duties  of  a  public  nature.  The  court  should 
have  allowed  the  pleas  filed;  and,  after  the  damages  had  been 
assessed  by  a  jury,  a  decree  should  have  been  entered,  allowing 
the  defendant  a  reasonable  time,  to  be  stated  in  the  decree,  to 
pay  the  damages  so  assessed,  and,  upon  its  failure  to  pay  the 
same  within  the  time  specified,  that  the  petitioners  recover  the 
land  and  writ  of  possession  issue. 

4.  The  judge  of  the  superior  court  directed  the  jury  to  re- 
turn a  verdict  in  favor  of  petitioners  for  the  land  in  dispute; 
and  directed  them  also  to  find  that  the  railroad  iron  thereon 
was  the  property  of  the  defendant.  This  latter  ruling  is  the  one 
complained  of  in  the  cross-bill  of  exceptions.  It  appears  from 
the  record  that  the  railroad  iron  referred  to  in  the  verdict  was 
the  tracks  which  had  been  placed  upon  the  land  in  controversy 
by  the  railroad  company  as  a  part  of  its  main  track  between  its 
terminal  points,  and  also  sidetracks  used  as  a  part  of  its  ter- 
minals in  the  city  of  Augusta.  It  is  apparent  that  these  im- 
provements were  made  upon  the  property  with  no  intention  on 
the  part  of  the  railroad  company  to  improve  the  value  of  the 
estate,  but  solely  for  its  uses  and  purposes  in  its  business  as  a 
common  carrier  of  freight  and  passengers.  Upon  the  termina- 
tion of  the  life  estate  which  the  railroad  company  acquired  un- 
der the  conveyance  from  Holt,  did  the  title  to  these  improve- 
ments vest  in  the  remainderman  at  the  same  time  that  the  title 
to  the  land  vested?  In  the  case  of  Elwes  v.  Maw,  3  East,  38, 
Lord  Ellenborough  reached  the  conclusion,  after  an  elaborate 
examination  of  authority,  that  buildings  and  the  like,  erected 
by  a  tenant  upon  the  leased  premises  for  the  purposes  of  agricul- 
ture and  necessary  for  the  occupation  of  the  farm  and  the  im- 


88  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.     [Georgia, 

mediate  profits  of  the  land,  were  not  remoTable  by  the  tenant 
even  during  his  term;  but  that  such  improvements  as  were 
placed  by  the  tenant  upon  the  premises-for  purposes  of  ^^  trade 
were  not  governed  by  the  same  rules,  and  were  removable  by  the 
tenant  at  any  time  before  the  expiration  of  his  term.  This  de- 
cision was  followed  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States 
in  the  case  of  Van  Ness  v.  Paoard,  2  Pet.  137.  The  same  doc- 
trine is  recognized  in  the  case  of  Can  v.  Georgia  E.  R.  Co.,  74 
Ga.  73,  though  what  is  said  in  that  case  is  merely  obiter.  In 
Meigs'  Appeal,  62  Pa.  St.  28,  1  Am.  Rep.  372,  it  appeared  that 
during  the  Civil  War  the  United  States  authorities  erected  cer- 
tain buildings  used  as  military  barracks  and  hospitals  in  the  bor- 
ough of  York.  After  the  war  had  ended  and  the  buildings  were 
no  longer  used  by  the  government,  they  were  offered  for  sale, 
the  purchaser  to  have  the  privilege  of  removing  the  same  from 
the  premises.  The  authorities  of  the  borough  applied  for  an 
injunction  to  prevent  the  removal  of  the  buildings,  alleging  that 
they  were  of  a  permanent  nature,  attached  to  the  realty,  and 
therefore  became  the  property  of  the  borough,  and  could  not  be 
removed  after  the  government  had  abandoned  the  use  of  them 
for  the  purposes  for  which  they  were  erected.  It  was  held  that 
the  buildings  thus  erected  being  placed  there  at  the  time  when 
the  necessities  of  the  government  required  the  same  for  mili- 
tary purposes,  when  the  conditions  requiring  their  use  ceased 
to  exist  the  government  had  a  right  to  remove  the  same  from 
the  premises.  In  the  case  of  Wagner  v.  Cleveland  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  22  Ohio  St.  563,  10  Am.  Rep.  770,  it  was  held  that  stone 
piers  built  by  a  railroad  company  as  a  part  of  its  railroad,  on 
lands  over  which  it  had  acquired  a  right  of  way  for  its  road,  did 
not,  though  firmly  imbedded  in  the  earth,  become  the  property 
of  the  owner  of  the  lands  as  part  of  the  realty;  and  that  when 
the  railroad  company  abandoned  the  purpose  of  completing  the 
railroad  it  had  a  right  to  remove  such  structures  from  the  prem- 
ises as  personal  property;  and  the  fact  that  the  landowner  had 
been  allowed  to  take  possession  of  the  land  embraced  in  the 
right  of  way  and  hold  it  for  a  term  of  years  less  than  is  required 
to  extinguish  the  easement,  did  not,  in  itself,  imply  a  relinquish- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  railroad  company  of  its  right  to  enter 
and  remove  the  piers.  In  the  case  of  Toledo  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Dunlap,  47  Mich.  456,  it  was  held  that  a  railway  track,  or  other 
improvement  wrongfully  placed  upon  ^**  land  by  a  railway  com- 
pany, and  not  abandoned  to  the  owner  of  the  premises,  cannot 
be  treated  as  a  part  of  the  realty  for  the  purpose  of  increasing 


July,  1898.]     Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes.  39 

its  value  in  estimating  the  damages  due  to  the  owner  in  subse- 
quent proceedings  to  condemn  the  land  for  the  use  of  the  com- 
pany. In  Justice  v.  Nesquehoning  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  87  Pa.  St. 
28,  it  was  held  that  where  a  railroad  company  was  a  trespasser 
«nd  its  entry  upon  land  not  in  conformity  to  law,  stfucturea 
placed  upon  the  property,  for  use  by  the  company  in  its  business 
did  not  pass  to  the  landowners,  and  their  value  was  not  to  be 
included  in  an  assessment  of  damages  in  proceedings  afterwards 
instituted  to  acquire  the  property.  In  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
<Joodwin,  111  111.  273,  53  Am.  Rep.  622,  it  was  held  that  a  rail- 
road company  which  had  entered  upon  land  and  constructed  its 
road  over  the  same  under  a  license  from  the  life  tenant  would 
not  be  required  to  pay  to  the  person  entitled  to  the  property, 
after  the  termination  of  the  life  estate,  the  value  of  the  struc- 
tures which  had  been  placed  upon  the  property  at  its  own  ex- 
pense: See,  also,  Elliott  on  Railroads,  sees,  997,  998, 

In  the  present  case,  at  the  termination  of  the  life  estate,  if 
the  railway  company  had  abandoned  the  possession  of  the  prop- 
erty without  removing  the  improvements  which  it  had  placed 
thereon,  such  improvements  would  probably  have  passed  to  the 
remainderman;  but  under  the  facts  of  this  case,  where  it  re- 
mained in  possession,  using  the  same  in  discharging  public  dutie3 
which  were  incumbent  upon  it,  although  its  possession  would 
be,  in  some  sense,  wrongful  as  against  the  remainderman,  it  ia 
not  to  be  treated,  as  has  been  shown,  as  a  naked  trespasser.  It 
would  have  had  the  undoubted  right,  under  the  authorities 
above  referred  to,  to  remove  from  the  premises  the  structures 
which  it  had  placed  thereon  at  any  time  during  the  existence 
of  the  life  estate.  As  it  had  a  right  to  remain  upon  the  prem- 
ises and  have  their  value  ascertained  in  order  to  acquire  a  com- 
plete title  to  the  same,  the  mere  fact  that  at  the  time  of  the 
assessment  these  improvements  were  still  upon  the  property 
does  not  require  that  they  shall  be  dealt  with  as  the  property 
of  the  land  owner.  Therefore,  the  petitioners  having  gone  into 
a  court  of  equity,  in  assessing  the  damages  which  should  be  paid 
to  them  the  value  of  the  improvements  should  not  be  consid- 
ered. The  '^  amount  which  the  plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to 
recover  would  be  the  market  value  of  the  property  at  the  time 
the  life  estate  terminated,  with  interest  from  that  time  to  the 
date  of  the  verdict,  the  value  of  the  improvements  placed  on  the 
property  not  being  considered  in  ascertaining  such  market  value. 

5.  Under  the  rulings  we  have  made,  the  only  question  to  be 
determined  upon  another  trial  of  this  case  would  be,  what  com- 


40  Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hoghes.     [Georgia,. 

pensation  shoTild  be  paid  to  the  petitioners  for  the  interest  of 
the  remainderman  in  the  property  ?  As  all  other  questions  are 
finally  settled  by  this  decision,  direction  is  given  that  this  single 
issue  be  submitted  to  a  jury,  and  that  they  determine  it  in  ac- 
cordance with  instructions  given  by  the  trial  judge,  following 
the  rulings  we  have  made.  When  the  amount  to  be  paid  to  the 
petitioners  is  thus  ascertained,  a  decree  should  be  entered,  al- 
lowing the  railway  company  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to  pay 
the  amount  thus  found,  and  upon  payment  of  the  same,  the  title 
to  the  property  to  vest  in  the  railway  company.  Upon  a  failure 
to  pay  the  same  within  the  time  limited,  the  right  of  the  com- 
pany to  acquire  the  property  should  be  decreed  to  be  lost,  and 
a  writ  of  possession  should  issue  to  enforce  the  judgment  in 
ejectment  already  rendered  in  the  case. 

Judgment  on  main  bill  of  exception  reversed  with  direction; 
on  cross-bill  affirmed. 

.    All  the  justices  concurring. 


EMINENT     DOMAIN  —  CONDEMNATION     PROCEEDINGS  — 

CONCLUSIVENESS.— A  judgment  of  a  court  having  jurisdiction  to 
award  damages  In  a  proceeding  to  condemn  lands  for  railroad  pur- 
poses is  conclusive  upon  the  parties  thereto  as  to  all  questions 
therein  actually  litigated,  as  well  as  all  matters  necessarily  withia 
the  issue  joined,  although  not  formally  litigated:  Atchison  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Boerner,  34  Neb,  240;  33  Am.  St.  Ry.  637;  Atchison  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Forney,  35  Neb.  607;  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  450.  Concluslvenesa 
where  the  damages  are  assessed  by  commissioners:  Aldrich  v. 
Cheshire  R.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  H.  359;  53  Am.  Dec.  212. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN  —  CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS  — 
"WHO  BOUND.— A  bona  fide  purchaser  of  land  is  not  affected  by 
proceedings  for  its  condemnation  to  public  use,  pending  at  the  time 
of  the  purchase,  if  he  had  no  notice  of  such  proceedings,  and  no 
notice  of  lis  pendens  had  been  filed:  Bensley  v.  Mountain  Lake 
Water  Co.,.  13  Cal.  306:  73  Am.  Dec.  575.  The  owner  of  a  limited 
interest  in  property  Is  entitled  to  compensation:  Ex  parte  Jennings, 
6  Cow.  518;  16  Am.  Dec.  447.  A  railway  company,  authorized  to 
condemn  lands  for  a  right  of  way,  cannot  condemn  a  temporary  use, 
Dor  a  use  contingent  on  the  happening  of  a  future  event:  Hibernia 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  De  Camp,  47  N.  J.  L.  518;  54  Am.  Rep.  197. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN  — CONDEMNATION  PR0CE:EDTNGS — 
CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT.— Bona  fide  effort  to  agree  for  the  pur- 
chase of  property  acquired  for  a  railroad  crossing  is  a  condition, 
precedent  to  a  resort  to  proceedings  for  the  condemnation  thereof, 
and  must  be  alleged  in  the  petition  of  the  company  Instituting  such 
proceedings:  Toledo  etc.  Ry.  Oa  v.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Mich. 
564;  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  875. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN— TAKING  PROPERTY  BY  CONSENT. 
The  consent  of  owners  of  land  taken  for  public  use  by  a  statute 
may  be  subsequent,  presumed,  and  tacit,  as  well  as  previous  and 
positively  expressed;  Wellington,  Petitioners,  16  Pick.  87;  26  Am. 
Dec.  631. 


July,  1898.]  Wyatt  v.  Rome.  41 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— ENTRY  ON  LAND— EJECTMENT. 
Where  a  railroad  .company  relies  only  upon  a  grant  of  a  right  of 
way  from  an  alleged  owner  In  entering  upon  land  to  construct  its 
road,  the  subsequent  grantee  of  the  real  owner  may  maintain  eject- 
ment against  the  company.  Where  the  company  knew  the  true 
owner,  the  true  owner  may  maintain  ejectment,  and  is  not  estopped 
by  the  fact  that  he  was  present  when  the  grant  was  made,  and 
encouraged  Its  execution  by  his  words  or  his  silence,  and  afterward 
permitted  the  company  to  construct  and  operate  its  road  for  eleven 
years  without  objection:  Richards  v.  Buffalo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  137  Pa. 
St.  524;  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  892.  When  ejectment  cannot  be  main- 
tained: McAulay  v.  Western  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  33  Vt.  311;  78  Am.  Dec. 
627. 

INTERVENTION— RIGHTS  OP  INTER VENORS:  See  Clapp  v. 
Phelps,  19  La.  Ann.  461;  92  Am.  Dec.  545;  Thompson  v.  Chauveau, 
7  Mart.,  N.  S.,  331;  18  Am.  Dec.  246. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— ENTRY  ON  LAND— RIGHT  TO  IM- 
PROVEMENTS.—Where  a  railroad  company  takes  possession  of 
land  and  constructs  a  track  on  it  with  the  consent  of  the  person  In 
possession,  under  claim  and  color  of  title,  and  the  paramount  owner 
afterward  sues  for  damages,  the  railroad  company  cannot  be  com- 
pelled to  pay  for  improvements  made  by  itself:  Cohen  v.  St.  Louis 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Kan.  158;  55  Am.  Rep.  242;  LouIsvUle  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Dickson,  63  Miss.  380;  56  Am.  Rep.  809;  Mississippi  etc.  R.  R. 
Go.  T.  Devaney,  42  Miss.  555;  2  Am.  Rep.  608. 


Wyatt  v.  Eomb. 

[105  Georgia,  812.] 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— ENFORCEMENT  OF  VAC- 
CINATION ORDINANCE— LIABILITY  FOR  DAMAGES.— A  mu- 
nicipal corporation  Is  not  liable  to  a  citizen  who  may  sustain  dam- 
age on  account  of  Impure  vaccine  matter  administered  to  him  by  the 
ofQcer  or  agent  of  such  corporation  In  the  enforcement  of  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  citizens  of  the  city  to  submit  to  vaccination, 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  ARE  NOT  LIABLE  FOR 
THE  NEGLIGENCE  OF  ITS  OFFICERS  or  agents  In  executing 
sanitary  regulations  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the 
spread  of  contagious  disease. 

Action  to  recover  damages  for  injury  alleged  to  have  been 
caused  by  the  use  of  impure  virus  in  the  vaccination  of  plain- 
tiff.   Judgment  for  the  defendant,  and  plaintiff  appealed. 

C.  A.  Thomwell  and  Fouche  &  Fouche,  for  the  plaintiff. 

^^'^  LEWIS,  J.  The  right  to  prescribe  regulations  looking 
to  the  preservation  of  the  public  health  is  one  of  those  sover- 
eign powers  that  belong  to  the  state.  This  power  can  be  dele- 
gated by  the  state  to  any  of  its  subdivisions  of  government,  such 
as  a  municipality  or  a  county,  and  in  the  use  of  it  by  such  sub- 


42  Wyatt  v.  Kome.  [Georgia, 

divisions  they  are  in  tlie  exercise  of  a  function  purely  govern- 
mental.    As  a  general  rule,  a  subordinate  branch  of  the  govern- 
ment is  not  liable  for  injuries  sustained  by  anyone  growing  out 
of  negligence,  misfeasance,  or  nonfeasance  of   its    officers   and 
agents  who  are  charged  with  the  duty  of  enforcing  laws  or  or- 
dinances enacted  for  the  public  good  in  the  exercise  of  a  govern- 
mental **^*  function,  and  not  in  the  exercise  of  a  private  fran- 
<3hise.     The  exceptions  to  this  general  rule  are  not  founded  so 
much  upon  principle  as  judicial  precedents.     The  rule  itself  is 
based  upon  a  principle  as  old  as  English  law,  that  "the  king  can 
do  no  wrong."     It  is  upon  this  idea  that  the  sovereignty  of  a 
state  protects  it  against  suits  by  its  subjects,  no  one  having  a 
Tight  to  hold  it  liable  for  any  act  of  its  officers  or  agents,  unless 
fiuch  right  is  expressly  granted  by  the  state  itself.     When  a  mu- 
nicipality exercises  a  governmental  power  conferred  upon  it  by 
the  state,  it  is  just  as  if  the  state  itself  were  in  the  exercise  of  the 
iunction  thus  conferred.     Among   the  precedents  which  have 
been  established  by  courts  of  last  resort  that  are  apparently  ex- 
€eptions  to  this  general  rule,  we  have  been  able  to  find  none  that 
would  hold  a  city  liable  for  any  injury  that  may  be  sustained 
as  the  result  of  enforcing  measures  legally  enacted  for  the  pro- 
motion and  preservation  of  the  public  health.     On  the  contrary, 
authority  is  abundant  and  almost  limitless  establishing  the  non- 
liability of  a  municipality  in  such  cases.     We  do  not  think  this 
is  an  open  question  in  this  state,  for  it  has  practically  been  de- 
cided in   the  case  of  Love  v.  Atlanta,  95  Ga.  129;  51  Am.  St. 
Eep.  64.     The  reasoning  for  the  decision  in  that  case  given  in 
the  lucid  opinion  of  Justice  Atkinson  follows  the  uniform  trend 
of  judicial  expression,  and  is  especially  applicable  to  the  case  at 
bar.     On  page  133  he  says:  "If  the  state  delegate  to  a  munici- 
pal corporation,  either  by  general  law  or  by  particular  statute, 
this  power,  aild  impose  upon  it  within  its  limits  the  duty  of 
taking  such  steps  and  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  to  the 
preservation  of  the  public  health,   the   municipal    corporation 
likewise,  in  the  discharge  of  such  duty,  is  in  the  exercise  of  a 
purely  governmental  function,  affecting  the  welfare  not  only  of 
the  citizens  resident  within  its  corporation,  but  of  the  citizens 
of  the  commonwealth  generally,  all  of  whom  have  an  interest 
in  the  prevention  of  infectious  or  contagious   diseases   at   any 
point  within  the  state,  and  in  the  exercise  of  such  powers  is  en- 
titled to  the  same  immunity  against  suit  as  the  state  itself  en- 
joys."    Upon  the  same  line,  and  practically  in  point,  we  cite 
the  following  as  a  few  of  the  many  decisions  and  authorities  on 


July,  1898.]  Wyatt  v.  Rome.  43 

this  subject:  15  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  1164,  1165,  with 
citations;  2  Dillon  on  ^^'^  Municipal  Corporations,  sec.  977; 
Tiedeman  on  Municipal  Corporations,  sec.  332;  Sherbourne  v. 
Yuba  County,  21  Cal.  113;  81  Am.  Dec.  151;  Summers  v.  Com- 
missioners, 103  Ind.  262;  53  Am.  Rep.  512;  in  which  it  is  de- 
cided that  "counties  are  instrumentalities  of  government,  and 
are  not  liable  for  injuries  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  com- 
missioners in  the  selection  of  an  unskillful  or  incompetent  phy- 
sician for  the  care  of  the  poor";  Ogg  v.  Lansing,  35  Iowa,  495, 
14  Am.  Rep.  499,  in  which  it  is  ruled  that  "a  city  is  not  liable 
for  the  negligence  of  its  officers  or  agents  in  executing  sanitary 
regulations,  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  spread  of 
contagious  disease,  or  in  taking  the  care  and  custody  of  persons 
afflicted  with  such  disease,  or  the  houses  in  which  such  persons 
are  kept."  The  city  in  the  present  case  was  in  the  exercise  of 
a  most  important  function  of  government,  in  which  not  only 
the  inhabitants  of  the  city  but  the  public  at  large  were  inter- 
ested. The  measure  in  question  which  it  adopted  looked  to  the 
prevention  of  the  spread  of  a  contagious  and  serious  malady 
with  which  it  was  at  the  time  perhaps  threatened.  To  allow 
any.  citizen  a  right  of  action  on  account  of  injuries  real  or  sup- 
posed that  he  may  have  suffered  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
good  would  be  to  paralyze  the  arm  of  the  municipal  government, 
and  either  render  it  incapable  of  acting  for  the  public  weal,  or 
would  render  such  action  so  dangerous  that  the  possible  evil 
consequences  to  it,  resulting  from  the  multiplicity  of  suits, 
might  be  as  great  as  the  smallpox  itself.  Hence  the  wisdom  of 
the  law  in  exempting  it  from  liability  on  such  an  alleged  injury 
as  is  set  forth  in  the  petition.  It  was  not  contended,  either  in 
the  pleadings  or  argument,  that  the  city  of  Rome  did  not  have 
the  right  to  pass  the  ordinance  requiring  its  citizens  and  resi- 
dents to  submit  to  vaccination.  On  the  contrary,  the  suit  was 
not  based  on  any  alleged  want  of  authority  in  the  city  to  legis- 
late on  the  subject,  but  solely  on  the  negligent  manner  in  which 
the  city,  through  its  officers  and  agents,  enforced  this  ordinance. 
Judgment  affirmed. 

All  the  justices  concurring. 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY  FOR  ACTS  OP 
OFFICERS.— A  city  while  acting,  not  In  the  managemept  of  Its 
private  or  corporate  affairs,  but  In  the  Interest  of  the  public,  and 
as  the  guardian  of  the  health,  peace,  convenience,  and  welfare  of 
the  public.  Is  not  liable  for  the  negligent  acts  of  Its  officers  or  em- 
ployes engaged  in  the  execution  of  Its  ordinances:  Whitfield  v.  Paris, 


44  Howard  v.  Cassels.  [Georgia, 

84  Tex.  431;  31  Am,  St.  Rep.  69.  A  municipal  corporation  Is  not 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  a  physician  for  the  poor,  unless  the 
corporation  is  shown  to  have  been  negligent  in  his  selection:  Sum- 
mers y.  Board  of  Commrs.,  103  Ind.  262;  53  Am.  Hep.  512. 


Howard  v,  Cassels. 

[105  Georgia,  412.] 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD— PARTIES.— If  a  testamentary 
guardian  enters  into  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of  land,  pays  part 
of  the  purchase  money  with  the  funds  of  his  minor  wards,  and  gives 
a  note  in  his  representative  capacity  for  the  balance,  such  wards 
are  not  necessary  parties,  and  cannot  complain  that  they  are  not 
made  parties  to  a  suit  by  the  vendor  to  recover  on  such  note. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD— CONTRACT  FOR  PURCHASE 
OF  LAND— PARTIES.— If  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of  land  en- 
tered into  by  a  testamentary  guardian,  under  which  part  of  the 
purchase  price  Is  paid  with  funds  of  his  wards,  is  authorized  by 
law  or  the  terms  of  the  will,  the  guardian,  as  the  legal  representa- 
tive of  the  wards,  is  the  only  necessary  party  to  a  suit  by  the  vendor 
to  recover  the  balance  of  the  purchase  price,  and  judgment  against 
him  binds  the  property  of  the  wards  in  his  hands,  and,  if  such  con- 
tract is  not  within  the  power  of  the  guai*dian  to  malie,  it  binds  him 
In  his  Individual  capacity  only,  and  does  not  bind  the  property  of 
the  wards. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD  —  MISAPPROPRIATION  OF 
FUNDS.— If  an  unauthorized  purchase  is  made  by  a  guardian  with 
the  funds  of  his  ward,  the  guardian,  and  all  other  persons  who, 
with  a  knowledge  of  such  illegal  use,  participate  in  the  conversion 
of  such  money,  are  liable  to  the  ward. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD— RATIFICATION  OF  UNAU- 
THORIZED CONTRACT.— If  a  guardian  enters  into  an  unauthor- 
ized contract  for  the  purchase  of  land,  pays  part  of  the  purchase 
money  with  the  funds  of  his  ward,  and  gives  a  note  In  his  represen- 
tative capacity  for  the  balance,  the  ward  cannot  claim  the  fruits 
of  such  contract,  and  deny  the  right  of  the  vendor  to  proceed  against 
the  property  for  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money.  If  the  ward 
ratifies  the  Illegal  act,  such  ratification  relates  to  the  contract  of 
purchase,  and  he  must  ratify  the  contract  as  an  entirety.  He  can- 
not take  the  part  only  which  is  favorable  to  him,  but  he  must  also 
take  that  other  part  which  makes  the  land  liable  for  the  balance  of 
the  purchase  money. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD.— RATIFICATION  by  a  ward,  by 
claiming  the  fruits  of  his  guardian's  unauthorized  investment,  pre- 
cludes a  denial  of  the  vendor's  right  to  proceed  against  the  property 
purchased  according  to  the  contract  to  recover  the  balance  due.  The 
ward  must  adopt  and  ratify  the  whole  contract  or  none  of  It. 

Townes  &  Nicholes,  for  the  plaintiffs. 

Arnold  &  Arnold,  for  the  defendant. 

***  LITTLE,  J.     The  plaintiffs  seek  to  set  aside  a  iiidj:;Tnent 
In  favor  of  Inman  v.  George  W.  Howard,   their  testamentary 


July,  1898.]  Howard  v.  Cassels.  45 

guardian.  They  allege  that  they  were  not  made  parties  to  the 
action;  that  they  had  a  good  defense  to  it,  which  was  that  the 
note  sued  on  was  given  by  Howard,  their  guardiaji,  in  his  ac- 
pacity  as  such,  and  did  not  bind  the  plaintiffs,  nor  should  such 
judgment  be  a  lien  on  their  property,  because  the  testamentary 
guardian  did  not  have  the  power  to  encumber  the  estate  of  the 
minors  in  any  manner;  and,  referring  to  the  judgment,  they 
pray  that  it  be  declared  null  and  void  as  against  them  and  their 
property,  and  that  it  be  set  aside.  We  cannot  see  the  necessity 
for  the  decree  prayed  for.  If  it  be  true  that  the  guardian  ^^'^ 
had  no  legal  power  to  enter  into  a  contract  which  would  bind 
the  property  of  his  wards,  then  they  were  not  bound  by  such 
■contract,  nor  would  it  be  necessary  for  their  protection  that 
they  should  be  made  parties,  and  urge  a  defense  in  a  suit  on 
a  contract  which  did  not  include  them  in  its  obligations.  If 
the  guardian  alone  was  sued  on  the  note,  and  the  minors  were 
not  parties,  they  would  not  be  bound  by  the  judgment  rendered. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  the  guardian  had  the  power  to  bind  the 
property  of  his  wards  by  his  promise  to  pay,  then  the  property 
of  the  wards  would  be  bound  by  virtue  of  the  power  he  had  to 
make  the  contract;  but  in  neither  event  would  it  be  necessary 
to  make  the  minor  wards  parties  defendant  in  such  an  action. 
The  suit  in  which  the  judgment  was  rendered  was  based  on  a 
promissory  note  executed  by  the  guardian.  This  note  he  was 
personally  bound  to  pay.  There  was,  as  we  understand  it,  no 
effort  made  to  obtain  a  judgment  binding  the  property  of  the 
wards;  but  a  judgment  by  default  was  rendered  against  the 
guardian,  his  contract  being  unconditional.  No  judgment  is 
«et  out  in  the  pleadings,  and  of  course  we  have  no  means  of 
ascertaining  its  character.  It  makes  no  difference  that  the 
judgment  rendered  designates  him  as  the  guardian  of  the  plain- 
tiffs; it  is,  nevertheless,  only  a  personal  judgment.  "A  judg- 
ment against  a  party,  as  guardian,  is  no  more  than  a  judgment 
against  him  without  the  addition,  that  being  only  a  descriptio 
personae":  Tobin  v.  Addison,  2  Strob.  3.  Our  Civil  Code,  sec- 
tion 2555,  declares:  "The  guardian  cannot  ....  by  any  con- 
tract other  than  those  specially  allowed  by  law,  bind  his  ward's 
property,  or  create  any  lien  thereon."  In  Story  on  Promissory 
Notes  the  rule  governing  the  question  is  laid  down  as  follows: 
*'And  as  to  trustees,  guardians,  executors,  and  administrators, 
and  other  persons  acting  en  autre  droit,  they  are  by  our  law 
generally  held  personally  liable  on  promissory  notes,  because 
they  have  no  authority  to  bind  ex  directo  the  persons  for  whom. 


46  Howard  v.  Cassels.  [Georgia, 

or  for  whose  benefit,  or  for  whose  estate  they  act;  and  hence  to 
give  any  validity  to  a  note  they  must  be  deemed  personally 
bound  as  makers" :  See  Lovelace  v.  Smith,  39  Ga.  130.  In  Mc- 
Farlin  v.  Stinson,  56  Ga.  396,  this  court  ruled  that  an  executor 
could  not  bind  the  estate  of  his  testator  by  a  promissory  note 
**"  executed  by  him  and  signed  as  executor;  and  in  Gaudy  v. 
Babbitt,  56  Ga.  641,  it  was  in  terms  held  that  this  rule  has  not 
been  relaxed  as  to  executors,  administrators,  or  guardians;  and 
in  Harrison  v.  McClelland,  57  Ga.  531,  it  was  held  that  a  note 
signed  as  administrator  bound  the  maker  individually.  So  that, 
if  our  reasoning  be  correct,  the  promissory  note  given  by  How- 
ard as  guardian  bound  him  individually;  and  if  no  power  was 
conferred  on  him  by  the  will  which  created  him  guardian  to  so 
bind  the  estate  of  his  wards,  then  while  the  judgment  rendered 
became  a  lien  on  his  property,  it  did  not  create  any  lien  on  the 
property  of  the  latter.  We  do  not  mean  to  say  that  there  are 
no  contracts  entered  into  by  guardians  which  can  be  enforced 
against  the  property  of  the  wards;  there  may  be,  but  where  such 
is  the  case,  it  is  brought  about  generally,  not  by  virtue  of  the 
contract  alone,  but  as  a  result  of  an  equity  in  favor  of  the  prom- 
isee. In  all  such  cases,  however,  the  pleadings  and  proof  must 
show  the  subsisting  equity.  As  a  matter  of  law,  guardians  of 
the  property  of  wards  are  trustees,  whose  powers  over  the  prop- 
erty of  their  cestui  que  trusts  are  defined  by  law.  Among  these 
powers  are  not  included  the  execution  of  a  contract  binding  the 
estate  of  his  wards;  hence,  where  such  a  contract  was  sought  to 
be  enforced  against  him,  it  was  not  necessary  that  the  wards 
should  be  made  parties  to  the  suit;  and  inasmuch  as  the  judg- 
ment rendered  on  such  contract  created  no  lien  on  the  property 
of  the  wards,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  entertaining  the  peti- 
tion on  their  part  to  set  aside  such  judgment.  In  this  case  the 
guardian  was  invested  with  his  power  by  will.  It  was  entirely 
competent  for  the  testator  to  fix  his  powers,  and  it  was  also  com- 
petent for  the  testator  to  confer  on  the  guardian  the  power  ta 
contract,  and  by  his  contracts  bind  the  estate  of  the  wards.  If 
this  power  was  conferred  by  the  will,  then  the  contract  made  by 
the  guardian  depends  for  its  validity  on  that  instrument,  and 
the  effect  of  the  judgment  rendered  on  such  a  contract  is  deter- 
mined, not  by  the  law  regulating  the  powers  of  guardians,  but 
by  the  powers  given  him  by  the  will.  But  if  we  admit  that  in 
this  case  power  was  given  to  him  to  bind  the  property  of  his 
wards  by  his  contract  as  guardian,  even  in  that  case  the  wards 
are  not  necessary  parties  in  **''  a  suit  to  enforce  such  contract^ 


July,  1898.]  Howard  v.  Cassels.  47 

because  the  contract  of  the  guardian  is  authorized  to  be  made, 
and,  when  made,  to  bind  the  estate  of  the  ward,  by  the  term* 
of  the  will  of  the  donor  who  had  the  power  to  annex  such  condi- 
tions. 

2.  The  petition  alleges  that  the  guardian  of  the  plaintiffs 
purchased  a  described  tract  of  land  for  the  sum  of  two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars;  that  he  only  paid  two  thousand  dollars  of 
the  purchase  price,  and  gave  his  promissory  note  for  the  remain- 
ing five  hundred  dollars,  signed  by  the  maker  as  guardian.  It 
further  alleges  that  the  guardian  had  sufficient  property  belong- 
ing to  the  wards  ^o  pay  the  entire  purchase  money  for  the  land, 
but  that  he  did  not  do  so.  It  alleges  that  the  note  was  traded 
to  Inman;  that  it  was  sued  to  judgment,  and  that  the  execution 
issuing  on  such  judgment  was  levied  on  the  land  so  purchased, 
which  was  sold  under  the  execution  and  bought  by  Caseels,  who 
was  put  in  possession.  It  further  alleges  that  Howard,  the 
guardian,  at  the  time  of  the  purchase  received  a  bond  from  Pen- 
dleton, conditioned  to  make  title  to  him  as  guardian  on  pay- 
ment of  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money  as  expressed  in  the 
note.  The  plaintiffs  allege  that  they  have  tendered  to  Pendle- 
ton the  balance  of  the  purchase  money  as  expressed,  and  have 
demanded  a  deed  to  the  land  and  possession ;  and  they  pray  that 
the  sheriff's  deed  to  Cassels  be  canceled,  that  Pedleton  pay  ta 
Cassels  the  amount  paid  out  by  the  latter,  and  that  Pendleton 
be  required  to  make  a  deed  conveying  the  land  to  the  plaintiffs. 
In  other  words,  the  plaintiffs  allege  that  it  was  an  illegal  act  for 
their  guardian  to  make  the  purchase,  but  that  he  did  make  it, 
and  paid  two  thousand  dollars  of  money  belonging  to  them  as 
part  of  the  purchase  money.  Under  these  circumstances,  they 
claim  the  benefit  of  the  purchase,  and  insist  that  they  have  the 
right,  on  payment  of  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money,  te 
have  a  title  to  the  property  and  possession.  Thus  they  seek  ta 
ratify  a  part  of  the  transaction;  but  at  the  same  time  they  re- 
pudiate that  part  of  the  contract  which  reserved  title  to  the  land 
in  Pendleton,  with  the  right  in  the  latter  to  proceed  against  the 
land  for  the  collection  of  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money. 
We  think  this  cannot  be  done  after  suit  for  balance  of  purchase 
money  and  a  sale  of  the  land  under  the  judgment  ■**®  therein 
obtained.  Conceding  the  purchase  made  with  the  funds  of  the 
wards  to  have  been  illegal,  then  the  guardian  is  liable  to  the 
wards  for  the  money  so  illegally  used;  and  this  is  true  not  only 
of  the  guardian,  but  of  all  other  persons  who,  with  a  knowledge 
of  such  illegal   use,   participated  in  the   conversion   of   their 


48  Howard  v.  Cassels.  [Georgia, 

money.  Fnder  well-settled  principles,  the  wards  can  follow  the 
money,  so  paid,  into  the  hands  of  anyone  who  received  it  with 
&  knowledge  of  their  rights  and  of  the  illegality  of  the  trans- 
faction;  but  it  is  not  consistent  to  ratify  an  illegal  investment 
made  by  the  guardian  and  repudiate  a  part  of  the  contract  by 
which  the  guardian  undertook  to  pay  the  balance  of  the  pur- 
chase money  before  he  received  a  title.  The  rule  is,  that  the 
principal  cannot  ratify  a  part  and  repudiate  a  part.  He  must 
adopt  the  whole  contract  or  none:  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3021.  And 
a  ratification  relates  back  to  the  act  ratified:  Civ.  Code,  sec. 
-3019.  See  also.  Hunter  v.  Stembridge,  17  Gfa.  243;  Perry  v. 
Mulligan,  58  Ga.  479;  Barclay  v.  Hopkins,  59  Ga.  566.'  So 
that  if  the  plaintiffs  claim  this  land,  such  claim  must  be  based, 
■either  on  a  ratification  of  the  action  of  their  guardian  in  mak- 
ing the  purchase,  or  because  their  money  went  into  the  pur- 
chase. If  they  ratify  the  illegal  act,  such  ratification  extends 
back  to  the  contract  of  purchase  and  they  must  ratify  the  con- 
tract as  an  entirety.  If  it  be  contended  that  they  are  follow- 
ing their  funds  and  are  attempting  to  recover  the  land  because 
their  funds  went  into  its  purchase,  as  a  resulting  trust,  then, 
Tinder  the  doctrine  of  such  trusts,  they  might  have  a  right  to 
have  the  land  for  which  their  money  paid;  but  in  this  case 
the  land  is  not  alleged  to  be  in  the  possession  of  the  person  who 
received  the  money  belonging  to  them.  The  guardian  did  not 
«,cquire  a  title  to  the  land,  but  under  the  contract  it  remained 
in  the  original  vendor;  and  while  it  may  be  true  that  the  wards 
had  an  equitable  interest  in  the  land  to  the  extent  of  the  amount 
of  their  funds  which  went  toward  its  purchase,  it  is  a  question 
■whether  the  equity  so  possessed  by  them  attaches  to  the  land 
while  in  the  hands  of  a  purchaser  at  judicial  sale,  by  which  sale 
title,  under  the  terms  of  the  contract,  first  passed  out  of  the 
•vendor.  If  the  allegations  in  the  petition  be  true,  it  is  certain 
that  Pendleton  could  not  now  convey  title  to  the  land.  In  our 
"***  opinion,  the  wards  are  not  entitled  to  have  a  decree  vesting 
in  them  title  to  the  land  on  the  simple  tender  to  Pendleton  of 
the  balance  of  the  purchase  money  contracted  to  be  paid  by  the 
guardian.  It  is  too  late,  after  a  sale  of  the  land  has  been  made 
tinder  a  judgment  rendered  on  a  note  given  for  the  balance  of 
the  purchase  money  under  the  terms  of  a  contract,  to  demand 
of  the  original  vendor  of  the  land  that  he  make  a  title  on  pay- 
ment of  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money  originally  con- 
tracted to  be  paid.  If  the  wards  stand  on  the  contract  made  by 
their  guardian,  they   must  not   only  take  that    part  which  is 


July,  1898.]  Howard  v.  Cassels.  49 

favorable  to  them,  but  that  other  part  also  which  made  the  land 
subject  to  be  sold  for  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money. 

It  is  a  matter  of  regret  that  the  record  does  not  contain  more 
of  the  facts.  We  cannot  determine  to  whom  Pendleton  con- 
veyed the  title  to  the  land,  if  he  ever  conveyed  it  to  anyone. 
We  do  not  know  from  this  record  whether,  when  Pendleton 
traded  the  note  to  Inman,  he  gave  to  the  latter  title  so  as  ta 
comply  with  the  terms  of  the  bond  which  he  had  executed  to 
the  guardian.  These  are  pregnant  questions  which,  in  our  view 
of  the  case,  materially  affect  the  rights  of  the  plaintiffs.  We 
only  deal  with  the  case  as  it  is  brought  to  our  attention.  The 
plaintiffs,  under  the  statement  of  facts  made  in  the  petition,  are 
not  remediless.  Certainly,  if  the  stated  facts  are  true,  the 
guardian  would  be  liable  to  them  for  the  value  of  their  property 
which  he  misapplied.  Whether  this  liability  extends  to  those 
who  received  it,  and  to  the  purchaser  of  the  land,  are  questions 
to  be  governed  by  faicts  not  shown  in  the  record.  But  under 
any  view  which  we  take  of  the  case  the  plaintiffs  are  not  en- 
tilled,  under  the  facts  alleged  in  the  petition,  to  a  decree  for 
the  land;  and  the  court  committed  no  error  in  sustaining  a  de- 
murrer to  th^  petition. 

Judgment  affirmed. 

All  the  justices  concurring. 


GUARDIAN  AND  WARD  —  PERSONAL  LIABILITY  OP 
CUARDIAN.— Tlio  guardian  is  personally  bound  to  third  persons 
for  all  contracts  he  makes  on  behalf  of  his  ward.  Note  to  Fessenden 
V.  .Jones,  75  Am.  Dec.  450.  Where  one  gave  a  promissory  uote  as 
puariiian  to  efTcct  the  release  of  his  ward  from  an  execution.  It  was 
held  that  he  was  personally  liable  for  its  payment:  Forster  v.  Fuller, 
6  Mass.  58;  4  Am.  Dec.  87. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD— UNAUTHORIZED  CONTRACTS- 
RATIFICATION.— Heirs  who,  with  knowledge,  accept  the  procoe<ls 
of  an  unauthorized  sale  of  their  lands,  are  estopped  from  disiiutinj? 
the  validity  of  the  sale.  They  cannot  retain  the  purchase  money 
and  also  recover  the  land:  Wilmore  v.  Stetler,  137  Ind.  127;  45  Am. 
St.  Rep.  1G9,  and  note;  Tracy  v.  Roberts,  88  Me.  310;  51  Am.  St.  Rep. 
394.  The  assent  of  a  ward  to  a  purchase  by  a  puardian  need  not 
be  express,  but  may  l>e  implied  from  circumstances,  one  of  the 
strongest  of  which  is  the  failure  to  take  immediate  steps,  on  cominp: 
of  ajre,  to  have  the  sale  set  aside,  provided  the  party  knew  It:  Scott 
V.  Freeland,  7  Smedes  &  M.  400;  45  Am.  Dec.  310. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD-THIRD  PERSONS  PURCHASING 
WARD'S  PROPER  ry.—A  person  receiving  property  of  a  ward  from 
the  guardian  will  be  deemed  a  trustee  for  the  amount.  If  he  took 
wiih  notice  of  the  trust:  Hill  v.  Mclntire,  39  N.  H.  410;  75  Am.  Dec. 
229;  McDuffie  v.  Mclntyre,  11  S.  0.  551;  32  Am.  Hep.  500. 
AtL  bT.  iisr..  Vol.  LXX.-4 


50  Rogers  v.  Burr.  [Georgia, 


EoGERS  V.  Burr. 

[105  Geobgia,  432.] 

CORPORATIONS— STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS— VALIDITY 
OF  GUARANTY— CONSIDERATION.— If  a  number  of  persons,  in 
order  to  induce  another  to  subscribe  to  tlae  capital  stock  of  a  manu- 
facturing corporation  in  wliich  they  are  all  interested,  execute  a 
joint  agreement  guaranteeing  the  payment  of  an  annual  dividend 
of  eight  per  cent  for  three  years  on  such  stock  to  subscribers  who 
take  enough  stock  for  the  successful  organization  of  the  corporation, 
and  also  agreeing  that  if.  at  the  expiration  of  such  three  years,  the 
holders  of  such  stock  do  not  desire  to  carry  It  any  longer,  "We 
hereby  agree,  with  thirty  days'  notice  from  any  or  all  of  them,  to 
pay  each  holder  par  value,  or  fifty  dollars,  for  each  share  of  stock 
held  by  tliem,  their  heirs  or  assigns,"  such  agreement  of  guaranty 
is  valid  and  based  upon  a  sufficient  consideration,  where  the  guar- 
antors are  residents  of  the  town  in  which  the  manufacturing  cor- 
poration is  to  be  located,  are  interested  in  its  growth  and  develop- 
ment, and  jointly  interested  with  the  subscribers  in  the  furtherance 
of  the  undertaking. 

CORPORATIONS  —  STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS  —  STATUTE 
OF  FRAUDS.— It  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  contract  of 
subscription  to  shares  of  stock  in  a  manufacturing  corporation  that 
it  be  reduced  to  writing.  Shares  of  stock  in  joint  stock  companies 
are  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds. 

CORPORATIONS— CONTRACT  FOR  STOCK  SUBSCRIP- 
TION—CONSTRUCTION.— A  contract  made  to  induce  stock  sub- 
scriptions, whereby  the  promisors  agree  to  repurchase  the  stock 
at  the  end  of  three  years,  upon  receiving  thirty  days'  notice  that  the 
subscriber  desires  to  return  the  stock,  is  conditional,  and  liability 
thereunder  does  not  exist  in  favor  of  a  particular  promisee,  unless, 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  expiration  of  the  three  years, 
the  thirty  days'  notice  is  given  by  him  to  the  promisors  of  his  elec- 
tion to  carry  the  stock  no  longer. 

CORPORATIONS— STOCK— SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONSTRUC- 
TION OF  CONTRACT.— If  several  persons,  in  order  to  Induce  a 
promisee  to  subscribe  for  stock,  jointly  agree  to  buy  such  stock 
back  at  the  end  of  three  years,  upon  receiving  a  specified  notice 
from  the  promisee  of  his  election  to  sell,  notice  to  one  or  more 
joint  promisors  of  an  election  by  the  promisee  to  sell  his  stock  is  not 
notice  to  the  others,  and  this,  though  one  of  them,  as  agent  for  the 
others,  has  procured  stock  subscriptions  under  the  contract. 

CORPORATIONS-STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONTRACT 
OF  GUARANTY— CONSTRUCTIQN.—If  joint  promisors,  to  induce 
stock  subscriptions,  guarantee  the  payment  of  eight  per  cent  divi- 
dends to  subscribers  for  three  years,  and,  at  the  expiration  of  that 
time,  on  receiving  a  specified  notice,  to  purchase  the  stock  at  its 
par  value,  the  guaranty  as  to  the  dividends  is  imconditlonal  and 
binding  without  notice,  and  covers  a  period  of  three  years,  although 
the  guaranty  as  to  purchasing  the  stock  becomes  Inoperative  for 
want  of  notice. 

J.  S.  Boynton,  It.  L.  Berner,  and  Estes  &  Jones,  for  the  plain- 
tifts  in  error. 

.T.  F.  Redding   and   S.  N.  Woodward,  for  the   defendant  in 
error. 


July,  1898.]  TloGERS  t;.  Bubb.  61 

480  LITTLE,  J.  There  are  two  main  facts  on  whicli  the 
parties  are  at  issue,  and  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  recover  de- 
pends upon  the  determination  of  both  in  her  favor,  to  wit:  1. 
Did  the  plaintiff's  intestate  contract  for  sixty  shares  of  the  capi- 
tal stock  of  the  Barnesville  Manufacturing  Company  on  the 
faith  of  a  written  agreement  signed  by  the  defendants,  condi- 
tioned that  the  defendants  guaranteed  to  her  intestate  the  pay- 
ment of  an  annual  dividend  amounting  to  eight  per  cent  on  the 
shares  subscribed,  and  also  by  which  they  undertook,  after  the 
expiration  of  three  years  from  the  date  of  the  agreement  and  on 
thirty  days'  notice,  to  pay  him  the  par  value  of  the  stock  for 
which  he  had  subscribed;  and  2.  If  the  plaintiff's  intestate  did 
so  subscribe  *^*  did  he  or  his  personal  representative  so  comply 
with  the  terms  of  such  agreement  as  to  notice,  as  would  entitle 
the  plaintiff  to  recover?  This  case  has  heretofore  been  before 
this  court,  and  is  reported  in  Rogers  v.  Burr,  97  Ga.  10.  Con- 
struing the  contract,  this  court  there  held  that  if  the  intestate 
did  so  subscribe,  he  or  his  personal  representative  had  the  right, 
at  the  expiration  of  three  years  from  the  time  stated,  to  elect 
whether  he  would  keep  the  stock,  or  turn  it  over  to  the  defend- 
ants and  require  them  to  pay  him  par  value  for  such  stock. 
The  court  further  held  that  such  election  could  not  be  made 
until  after  November  30,  1892,  and  it  was  further  held  that  the 
petition  now  under  consideration  set  out  a  good  cause  of  action 
against  the  defendants.  To  determine  whether  the  verdict 
which  is  sought  to  be  set  aside  is  unsupported  by  evidence  in 
the  record,  it  is  necessary  to  ascertain  the  obligations  imposed 
by  the  contraet  on  each  of  the  parties  thereto,  as  well  as  to  re- 
view such  portions  of  the  evidence  as  bear  on  the  questions  pre- 
sented. The  contract  upon  which  the  suit  was  brought  was  an 
original  undertaking  by  the  makers  with  such  persons  as  would 
subscribe  for  any  portion  of  the  balance  of  the  capital  stock  of 
the  Barnesville  Manufacturing  Company  which  remained  un- 
taken  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  instrument,  that  such 
makers  would  guarantee  to  such  subscribers  the  payment  of  an 
annual  dividend  on  the  amount  of  stock  so  taken,  equal  to  eight 
per  cent  per  annum  on  the  money  paid  into  said  company  on 
said  stock.  So  that  the  obligation  of  the  makers  of  the  con- 
tract was  to  pay  to  these  subscribers  annually  such  a  sum  as, 
when  added  to  any  dividends  which  might  be  declared  by  the 
manufacturing  company,  would  equal  the  amount  of  eight  per 
cent  per  annum  on  the  amount  which  such  subscribers  had  ac- 
tually paid  into  the  company  on  the  stock  for  which  they  sub- 


52  Rogers  v.  Burr.  [Georgia^ 

scribed,  and  this  guaranty  was  to  he  in  force  for  the  term  of 
three  years  from  December  1,  1889.  The  makers  further  con- 
tracted with  the  subscribers,  that  at  the  expiration  of  said  three- 
years,  if  the  holder  or  holders  of  the  stock  so  subscribed  should 
so  desire,  and  did  not  wish  to  carry  the  stock  any  longer,  they 
would,  with  thirty  days'  notice  given  by  any  or  all  of  such  sub- 
scribers, pay  to  each  holder  of  the  stock  fifty  dollars  (being  the 
par  value)  for  every  share  of  stock  so  subscribed.  **^  So  that 
the  stipulations  of  the  agreement  bound  the  makers  to  pay  the 
subscribers,  as  dividends  on  their  stock  for  three  years,  eight 
per  cent  per  annum  on  the  money  such  subscribers  had  paid 
for  the  stock,  less  such  a  sum  as  might  be  paid  by  the  company 
as  dividends  thereon.  Also,  if,  after  three  years  from  Decem- 
ber 1,  1889,  any  or  all  of  such  subscribers  did  not  desire  to 
hold  the  stock  subscribed  for,  the  makers,  after  thirty  days 
notice  from  such  of  them  as  did  not  desire  to  carry  the  stock, 
would  pay  to  such  subscribers  fifty  dollars  for  each  share  of  such 
stock,  upon  a  transfer  of  the  same.  The  theory  of  the  plain- 
tiff's case,  as  set  out  in  her  petition,  is  that  her  intestate,  H.  E. 
Chambers,  in  his  lifetime,  under  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the 
agreement  aforesaid,  subscribed  to  sixty  shares  of  such  capital 
stock,  of  the  aggregate  par  value  of  three  thousand  dollars. 
The  evidence  does  not  show  the  date  at  which  the  alleged  sub- 
scription was  made,  nor  whether  the  same  was  in  writing.  But 
the  petition  alleges  that  before  her  intestate  had  paid  for  the 
stock  he  died,  and  that  K.  J.  Powell,  his  administrator,  know- 
ing that  the  intestate  had  contracted  and  subscribed  for  the 
stock,  carried  out  such  contract  and  paid  the  subscription  there- 
for and  received  a  certificate.  It  was,  of  course,  a  question  of 
fact  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  whether  such  contract  had 
been  entered  into  by  the  plaintiff's  intestate  with  the  manufac- 
turing company. 

1.  It  was  insisted  by  counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error  that  even 
if  Chambers  had  contracted  for  the  sixty  shares  of  stock,  the 
plaintiffs  in  error  were  not  bound,  because  there  was  no  consid- 
eration moving  them  in  the  execution  of  the  instrument  sued 
on,  and  also  that  the  contract  of  subscription  was  not  in  writ- 
ing, and  did  not,  therefore,  become  a  binding  contract  of  sub- 
scription. A  reference  to  the  instrument  shows  that  the 
makers  of  it  were  residents  of  the  town  in  which  it  was  pro- 
posed to  erect  and  put  in  operation  a  manufacturing  plant  in 
which  the  promisors  and  promisees  were  jointly  interested,  and 
the  subscription  to  the  stock  invited  to  be  made  was  in  further- 


July,  1898.]  Rogers  v.  Burk.  58 

ance  of  the  undertaking:  See  6  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  704; 
Bryan  v.  Dyer,  28  111.  188.  In  the  opinion  of  the  makers,  the 
•establishment  of  such  plant  would  add  to  the  prosperity  of  the 
town,  and  thus  directly  to  their  own.  Undoubtedly,  such  a 
-consideration  is  sufficient  to  support  '*'**  the  undertaking  en- 
tered into;  for  a  consideration  is  valid  if  any  benefit  accrues  to 
him  who  makes  the  promise:  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3657. 

2.  We  also  think  it  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  con- 
tract of  subscription  to  the  shares  of  stock  in  a  manufacturing 
company  that  such  contract  should  be  reduced  to  writing. 
Shares  of  joint  stock  companies  are  neither  goods,  wares,  nor 
merchandise,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute  of  frauds:  1 
Thompson  on  Corporations,  sec.  1068,  and  authorities  cited  in 
notes  11  and  12  on  page  858,  and  note  1  on  page  859.  In  the 
same  volume,  section  1147,  this  author  says:  "It  is  neither  nec- 
essary that  there  should  be  a  contract  in  writing  to  take  and  pay 
for  shares,  nor  an  actual  receipt  of  them,  or,  what  is  tanta- 
mount, a  receipt  of  their  symbol,  a  stock  certificate,  in  order 
to  constitute  one  a  shareholder.  It  has  accordingly  been  held 
that  one  may  become  a  shareholder  without  signing  the  stock- 
book  or  any  agreement  to  take  shares,  and  that  a  parol  agree- 
ment made  with  the  directors  of  the  corporation  to  take  stock 
can  be  enforced,  when  neither  the  governing  statute,  nor  the 
charter,  requires  such  contract  to  be  in  writing";  and  in  notes 
2  and  3  cases  are  cited  to  support  the  doctrine  laid  own.  The 
contract  of  subscription  for  shares  of  stock  in  an  incorporated 
company  may  be  entered  into  in  various  ways.  Whenever  an 
intention  to  become  a  subscriber  is  manifest,  the  courts  incline, 
without  particular  reference  to  formality,  to  hold  that  the  con- 
tract of  subscription  subsists.  It  is,  as  in  the  case  of  other 
contracts,  very  much  a  question  of  intention.  Formal  rules 
are  for  the  most  part  disregarded,  and,  in  general,  a  contract 
of  subscription  may  be  made  in  any  way  in  which  other  con- 
tracts may  be  made.  Any  agreement  by  which  a  person  shows 
an  intention  to  become  a  stockholder  is  sufficient  to  bind  him 
and  the  corporation:  1  Cook  on  Stock  and  Stockholders,  sec. 
52,  note  1. 

3.  In  the  present  case,  the  plaintiff  testified  that  her  intestate 
■entered  into  a  contract  with  the  corporation  for  sixty  shares  of 
its  capital  stock,  in  addition  to  the  forty  shares  theretofore  sub- 
flcribed;  and  a  receipt  was  introduced  in  evidence  showing  the 
payment  by  the  administrator  to  the  company  of  the  amount 
due  for  such  stock  at  its  par  value.     The  plaintiff  further  testi- 


54  Rogers  v.  Burr.  [Georgia, 

fied  '*^^  that  such  subscription  was  made  to  that  part  of  the 
capital  stock  which  the  defendants  in  error  referred  to  in  their 
written  agreement,  and  that  such  stock  was  taken  under  the 
terms  and  on  the  faith  thereof;  and  we  must  rule  as  a  matter 
of  law  that  the  consideration  shown  was  sufficient  to  support 
the  contract,  and  the  evidence  that  the  stock  was  subscribed 
under  the  terms  of  the  instrument  sued  on  was  sufficient  to  au- 
thorize the  finding  by  the  jury  that  a  valid  contract  for  stock 
had  been  made  by  the  intestate  under  the  defendants'  agree- 
ment. The  jury  having  determined  that  a  subscription  to  sixty 
shares  of  stock  had  been  made  by  the  intestate  under  the  terms 
of  the  agreement  executed  by  the  defendants,  the  question  then 
arises,  under  the  evidence,  whether  the  plaintiff  had  so  com- 
plied with  the  other  terms  of  the  agreement  as  to  entitle  her  to 
recover.  As  we  have  seen,  the  obligation  that  the  plaintiff 
should  receive  eight  per  cent  per  annum  for  three  years  on  the 
money  which  her  intestate,  or  any  other  representative  of  his 
estate,  had  paid  into  the  company  under  the  subscription,  was 
absolute,  depending  on  no  condition.  But  the  agreement  that 
the  makers  of  the  instrument  would  pay,  at  the  expiration  of 
three  years,  to  the  holders  of  stock  subscribed  under  such  agree- 
ment, the  par  value  thereof,  was  conditional.  The  holders  of 
such  stock  were  under  no  obligation,  at  the  end  of  three  years, 
to  sell  their  stock  to  the  defendants  for  fifty  dollars  per  share, 
but  it  was  optional  with  them  whether  they  would  do  so  Or  not. 
If  any  holder  so  desired  and  would  indicate  such  desire  by  notice 
as  stipulated,  then  the  makers  agreed  to  make  the  purchase.  It 
was  therefore  necessary  in  any  event,  at  the  expiration  of  such 
term,  if  any  holder  desired  to  sell  his  stock,  that  notice  be  given 
to  the  makers  of  the  instrument  that  he  elected  to  exercise 
his  right  of  option  and  call  on  them  to  purchase  the  stock.  The 
pregnant  clause  in  the  agreement  was:  "And  if,  at  the  expira- 
tion of  said  three  years,  the  holder  or  holders  of  said  stock  de- 
sire and  wish  not  to  carry  the  same  any  longer,  we  hereby  agree, 
with  thirty  days'  notice  from  any  or  all  of  them,  to  pay  each 
holder  par  value  of  fifty  dollars  for  each  share  of  stock  held  by 
them."  This  contract,  therefore,  so  far  as  it  imposed  liability 
on  the  defendants  to  purchase  the  stock,  was,  as  has  been  said, 
conditional;  and  if  a  holder  desired,  *^  under  its  terms,  ta 
eell  his  stock,  he  was  bound  to  give  to  the  makers  of  the  in- 
strument, within  a  reasonable  time  after  November  30,  1892 
(Rogers  v.  Burr,  97  Ga.  10),  thirty  days'  notice  of  the  exercise 
of  his  option  and  of  his  wish  to  sell  them  his  stock;  and  until 


July,  1898.]  Rogers  v.  Burr.  55 

such  notice  was  given,  there  was  no  obligation  on  the  part  of 
the  makers  to  purchase  the  stock  of  any  holder;  and  if  no  such 
obligation  existed  until  notice  was  given  and  no  liability  to 
purchase  in  the  absence  of  such  notice,  then  no  right  of  action 
accrued  to  the  plaintiff  against  the  defendants  to  recover  the 
purchase  money  of  the  stock  until  such  a  notice  had  been  given. 
The  notice  required  by  the  contract  was  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  liability  of  the  defendants  to  purchase  the  stock.  If,  by 
the  express  terms  of  a  contract,  notice  be  a  condition  precedent 
to  performance,  or  be  implied  from  the  nature  of  the  contract, 
such  notice  must  be  averred  and  proved:  2  Story  on  Contracts, 
5th  ed.,  sec.  1332,  and  authorities  cited  in  note  1  on  page  504. 
Clark,  in  his  work  on  Contracts,  page  667,  says:  "A  promise 
may  be  conditional  in  the  sense  that  its  operation  awaits  the 
performance  of  some  act  to  be  done  by  the  promisee.  If  no 
time  is  specified  in  which  the  act  is  to  be  done,  the  nonfulfill- 
ment of  the  condition  merely  suspends  and  does  not  discharge 
the  rights  of  the  promisee.  Common  illustrations  of  such  con- 
ditions are  furnished  by  cases  of  promises  conditional  upon  de- 
mand or  notice.  If  a  person  promises  another  to  do  something 
upon  demand,  he  cannot  be  sued  until  demand  has  been  made; 
or  if  he  promises  to  do  something  upon  the  happening  of  an 
event,  and  stipulates  that  notice  shall  be  given  him  of  the  event 
having  happened,  he  cannot  be  sued  until  such  notice  has  been 
given."  Apply  this  rule  to  the  contract  under  consideration. 
It  will  be  found  that  no  time  was  specified  in  which  the  makers 
of  the  instrument  obligated  themselves  to  purchase  this  stock, 
except  that  it  was  not  to  be  done  until  after  three  years  from  a 
given  date.  The  instrument  contained  a  promise  that  if  it 
should  so  happen  that  the  holder  desired,  after  a  given  time,  to 
sell  his  stock  for  a  given  price,  then  the  defendants  agreed  to 
purchase  it  at  that  price,  upon  thirty  days'  notice  of  such  de- 
sire being  given  to  them.  It  must,  therefore,  be  held  that, 
until  such  notice  was  given,  the  defendants  were  under  no  ^^'^ 
obligation  to  purchase  the  stock  held  by  the  plaintiff,  although 
it  had  been  taken  under  the  terms  of  the  agreement.  Whether 
or  not  the  notice  was  given  was  a  question  of  fact.  The  plaintiff 
avers  that  it  was  so  given.  The  defendants  in  their  answer 
deny  it.  The  plaintiff,  in  her  testimony  on  the  subject  of  no- 
tice, says:  "I  never  made  any  demand  of  the  defendants  for 
the  eight  per  cent  interest;  nor  did  I  make  demand  of  them  to 
take  the  stock  off  of  my  hands.  The  only  demands  that  ever 
were  made  were  made  by  Mr.  Burr,  my  husband,  and  they  re- 


56  Rogers  v.  Burr.  [Georgia, 

fused.    Mr.  Butt,  foT  me,  demanded  that  the  parties  should  take 
the  stock.     This  was  done  by  a  demand  on  Mr.  Eogers.     I  never 
did  make  any  demand  personally.     I  never  did  give  any  per- 
sonal notice  that  I  wanted  them  to  take  the  stock  and  to  pay  the 
interest."     Burr  in  his  testimony  says:  "I  served  each  of  the 
defendants  on  June  5,  1893,  with   a  copy  of   the  notice  (writ- 
ten demand).     I  mailed  a  copy  to  each  one."     So  far  as  the  rec- 
ord discloses,  this  written  demand  constituted  the  only  notice 
which  was  ever  given.     Some  of  the  defendants  admitted  hav- 
ing received  this  notice  at  a  given  date.     Others  of  them  denied 
that  they  had  ever  received  any  notice  prior  to  the  bringing  of 
the  suit.     It  is  fair  to  treat  Mr.  Burr,  in  giving  the  notice,  as 
the  agent  of  his  wife  and  as  acting  for  her.     Of  course,  such  of 
the  defendants  as  received  this  written  demand  before  the  in- 
sitution  of  the  suit  must  be  affected  with  the  notice  referred  to 
in  the  agreement  as  of  the  date  of  the  receipt  thereof,  if  the 
same  was  given  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  expiration 
of  the  time  when  the  plaintiff  had  a  right  to  exercise  the  option ; 
but  can  those  defendants  who  deny  that  they  received  the  writ- 
ten demand  be  affected  with  the  notice  required  by  the  terms  of 
the  agreement?     It  will  be  noted  that  while  Mr.  Burr  says  he 
served  each  of  the  defendants  with  a  copy  of  the  notice  on  June 
5,  1893,  he  explains  this  by  saying  that  he  mailed  a  copy  to 
each  one.     The  notice  required  by  the  terms  of  the  contract  as 
fixing  a  right  in  the  plaintiff  to  demand  of  the  defendants  the 
purchase  of  her  stock  could  only  be  met  by  showing  actual  per- 
sonal notice  to  the  defendants.     The  notice  required  is  equiva- 
lent to  demand.     If  it  was  a  condition  precedent  to  the  institu- 
tion of  her  suit  that  thirty  days'  notice  should  be  given  that  she 
'**"  desired  to  sell  her  stock,  in  order  to  render  the  defendants 
legally  liable  to  purchase  it,  then  such  notice  must  be  a  demand 
that  the  defendants  purchase  the  stock;  because  it  is  only  on 
the  failure  or  refusal  to  so  purchase  that  the  right  of  action  ac- 
crues.    The  notice  required  being  actual,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
requirement  is  not  met  by  simply  mailing  to  the  address  of  each 
of  the  defendants  a  statement  that  she   exercised  her  right  of 
option  and  demanded  that  they  purchase  the  stock,  where  the 
defendants  or  any  of  them  deny  that  they  received  such  notice, 
unless  it  be  further  shown  that  such  written  notice  was  in  fact 
received  by  them.     The  evidence  is  uncontradicted,  therefore, 
that   some  of  the   defendants   received  no   notice  prior  to  the 
bringing  of  the  suit.     In  our  opinion,  before  the  plaintiff  could 
maintain  the  action  and  recover  against  the  defendants,  on  this 


July,  1898.]  RoQERS  v.  Burr.  67 

branch  of  the  case,  it  was  necessary  that  the  requisite  notice 
ehould  have  been  given  to  each  of  the  makers.  The  contract 
was  a  joint  obligation;  and  as  to  any  particular  undertaking 
therein  set  forth  all  must  be  shown  to  be  liable,  or  none  are. 

4.  In  the  next  place,  we  do  not  think  that  the  contention  of 
the  defendant  in  error,  that  notice  to  one  or  more  of  the  defend- 
ants was,  in  law,  notice  to  each  and  every  one  of  them,  because 
of  the  fact  that  they  are  joint  contractors,  is  sound.  We  are 
aware  that  in  the  case  of  Cox  v.  Bailey,  9  Ga.  467,  54  Am.  Deo. 
358,  it  was  held  that  a  payment  made  by  one  of  two  or  more 
joint  contractors,  within  the  statute,  and  before  its  bar  had  at- 
tached, constituted  a  new  starting  point  for  the  staitute,  and 
bound  all  of  such  joint  contractors;  and  the  ruling  there  made 
was  adhered  to  in  the  case  of  Tillinghast  v.  Nourse,  14  Ga.  641. 
The  principle  upon  which  those  cases  were  decided  was,  that  the 
same  rule  applied  to  joint  contractors  or  joint  promisors  as  did 
to  partners  (for  wliich  as  it  now  exists  see  section  3791  of  the 
Civil  Code).  Such  joint  contractors  or  joint  promisors  were 
regarded  as  partners  with  reference  to  the  particular  joint  obli- 
gation. In  the  latter  of  the  cases  cited  above,  however,  Lump- 
kin, J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  after  stating  that, 
owing  to  disqualification,  he  did  not  preside  in  the  former  case, 
says:  "We  know  that  the  correctness  of  the  principle,  that  the 
admission  of  one  joint  contractor  or  partner  binds  the  other,  has 
^^'^  been  frequently  doubted  and  sometimes  denied.  The  doc- 
trine was  first  laid  down  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  Whitcomb  v. 
Whiting,  Doug.  652,  and  it  is  founded  upon  the  idea  that  the 
bar  created  by  the  statute  rests  entirely  upon  the  presumption 
that  the  debt  has  been  paid,  and  that  such  an  acknowledgment 
or  payment  removes  the  presumption  and  revives  the  original 
promise.  And  the  conclusion  is,  that  in  this,  as  in  other  cases, 
an  acknowledgment  by  one  of  many  who  are  jointly  concerned 
is  evidence  against  all,  sufficient  to  remove  the  presumption  of 
payment."  He  further  says:  "But  I  must  say  that  this  prin- 
ciple has  not  only  been  questioned  in  England  (Brandram  v. 
Wharton,  1  Barn.  &  Aid.  467),  but  from  the  examination  by  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  in  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Pet. 
363,  the  foundation  on  which  it  rests  found  to  be  altogether  un- 
satisfactory. In  Pennsylvania  and  some  of  the  other  states  it 
has  been  utterly  exploded":  Citing  Levy  v.  Cadet,  17  Serg.  &  R. 
126;  17  Am.  Dec.  650;  Leavitt  v.  Leavitt,  4  Me.  161;  also  cases 
collected  in  Hunt  v.  Bridgham,  2  Pick.,  2d.  ed.,  583,  note  1.  In 
the  case  of  Hunter  v.  Robertson,  30  Ga.  479,  the  court,  in  declin- 


58  Rogers  v.  Bubb.  [Georgia^ 

ing  to  extend  the  principle  announced  in  the  cases  from  9  Geor- 
gia and  14  Georgia,  supra,  so  35  to  prevent  the  statute  of  lim- 
itations from  attaching  as  against  the  indorser  or  surety  by  rea- 
Bon  of  a  payment  on  a  note  made  by  the  principal  or  maker,  said 
that  the  correctess  of  the  principle,  even  as  to  joint  contractors 
and  partners,  was  gravely  doubted  by  this  court,  but  as  the  ques- 
tion was  no  longer  open,  but  an  adjudicated  one,  the  principle 
was  adhered  to,  although  a  contrary  holding  would  have  been 
the  better  policy.  The  court  further  said,  Lyon,  J.,  delivering 
the  opinion:  "If  the  principle  is  wrong  when  applied  to  joint 
makers — and  there  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  but  that  it  is — shall 
we  extend  it  to  an  indorser  on  the  same  fallacious  reason?" 
AYe  think  the  true  law  is  enunciated  in  the  case  of  Coleman  v. 
Fobes,  22  Pa.  St.  156,  60  Am.  Dec.  75,  where  it  was  held  that 
partial  payment  by  one  of  several  joint  debtors,  not  partners 
at  the  time,  was  not  such  an  act  as  justifies  an  inference  of  a 
new  promise  by  the  others,  so  as  to  remove  the  bar  of  the  stat- 
ute of  limitations;  and  that  joint  debtors,  as  such,  are  not 
agents  of  each  other.  In  that  case,  Lowrie,  J.,  delivering  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  after  commenting  upon  the  case  of  '*^* 
Whitcomb  v.  Whiting,  Doug.  652,  and  charging  to  it,  for  the 
most  part,  the  confusion  which  exists  in  the  decisions,  both  in 
England  and  in  this  country,  on  this  subject,  says:  "It  is  not 
true  that  joint  debtors,  as  such  merely,  are  the  agents  of  each 
other.  Partners  are  so  while  the  relation  continues,  and  this 
is  part  of  the  law  and  essence  of  that  relation,  but  not  of  that 
of  joint  debtors.  The  distincticn  is  palpable,  when  it  is  noticed 
that  a  joint  contract  by  persons  not  partners  can  have  no  incep- 
tion, and  cannot  be  changed  in  time,  amount,  subject,  form,  or 
substance,  without  the  several  act  of  each  of  the  joint  con- 
tractors. Their  interests  are  joined  only  in  so  far  as  the  con- 
tract joins  them.  Their  contract  or  understanding  by  which 
Ihey  agree  together  to  enter  into  the  joint  liability  to  the  cred- 
itor is  one  thing,  and  the  joint  contract  with  the  creditor 
another  thing.  Their  relations  to  each  other  are  defined  by  the 
former,  and  their  joint  relations  to  their  creditor  by  the  latter; 
and  their  joint  relations  in  one  aspect  in  no  sense  define  those 
in  the  other.  Whether,  as  among  themselves,  one  is  to  pay  all 
or  half  or  none  depends,  not  upon  the  contract  with  the  cred- 
itor, but  on  their  own  arrangement.  One  alone  may  be  the 
real  debtor,  and  may  be  so  abundantly  able  to  pay  that  the 
others  may  be  said  to  have  no  real  interest  in  the  matter.  And 
even  if  they  are,  as  among  themselves,  equal  debtors,  there  is 


July,  1898.]  Rogers  v.  Burr.  6^ 

no  real  community  of  interest,  for  by  enforcing  contributiop^. 
each  is  made  to  answ  er  for  his  true  share.'* 

It  cannot  be  seriously  contended  that,  under  the  evidence^ 
service  of  a  notice  to  purchase  the  stock  on  Rogers  was  notice 
to  the  other  promisors.  It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  Mr. 
Rogers  procured  the  makers  to  execute  the  agreement  which 
after  execution  was  left  with  him  to  procure,  under  its  terms, 
the  desired  amount  of  subscription.  His  agency  could,  under 
this,  extend  no  further  than  to  procure  subscribers;  when  this 
was  done  his  agency  ceased. 

What  has  been  said  in  reference  to  notice  or  demand  does- 
not  apply  to  the  question  of  recovering  the  dividends  contracted 
to  be  paid.  That  right,  so  far  as  it  is  stipulated  in  the  contract, 
is  absolute:  Rogers  v.  Burr,  97  Ga.  14;  and  if  any  legal  reason- 
exists  why  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover  the  amount 
of  the  dividends  contracted  to  be  paid  during  the  period  '*^®' 
of  three  years,  such  reason  must  be  founded  on  causes  other 
than  the  want  of  notice. 

In  the  view  we  take  of  the  law  applicable  to  the  case,  we  are 
constrained  to  rule  that  as  some  of  the  defendants  in  this  case 
were  without  notice,  prior  to  the  bringing  of  the  suit,  and  there- 
fore no  right  of  action  as  to  them  accrued  to  the  plaintiff  upo» 
the  obligation  to  purchase  the  stock  in  her  hands,  it  must  follow 
that  the  verdict  in  her  favor,  requiring  the  defendants  to  pay 
over  to  her  the  par  value  of  this  stock,  was  contrary  to  law,  and 
should  be  set  aside.  As  above  stated,  the  contract  on  which  the 
suit  was  brought  was  joint,  not  several,  and  was  an  obligation  of 
the  promisors  jointly  to  purchase  the  stock,  and  not  an  under- 
taking on  the  part  of  anyone  severally  to  do  so.  The  action,, 
therefore,  was  not,  as  to  this  particular  stipulation,  maintain- 
able, unless  each  and  all  of  the  promisors,  who  were  in  life  and 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  were  not  only  made  parties 
but  shown  to  be  liable:  Booher  v.  Worrill,  43  Ga.  587;  Graham 
V.  Marks,  95  Ga.  38.  We  have  shown  there  could  be  no  re- 
covery against  all  for  a  breach  of  this  stipulation,  and  there- 
fore, because  of  the  joint  character  of  the  obligation,  there  could 
have  been  no  recovery  against  any. 

Judgment  reversed. 

All  the  justices  concurring,  except  Simmons,  C.  J.,  disquali- 
fied. 


CORPORATIONS-STOCK    SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONDITIONAL. 
A  conditional  subscription  to  stock  is  a  continuing  oCFei,  which  1» 


CO  Harrison  v.  Harrison.  [Georgia, 

final  and  absolute  when  accepted,  and  is  not  contrary  to  public  pol- 
icy, for  all  subscriptions  thus  ultimately  become  unconditional  and 
absolute:  Taggart  v.  Western  etc.  R.  it.  Co.,  24  Md.  563;  89  Am. 
Dec.  7G0;  See  note  to  Parljer  v.  Thomas,  81  Am.  Dec.  398.  Contra, 
Morrow  v.  Nashville  Iron  etc.  Co.,  87  Tenn,  262;  10  Am.  St.  Rep. 
t)58.  An  agreement  exacted  by  a  subscriber  to  stocli  of  a  coi-pora- 
tion  from  the  other  subscribers,  to  the  effect  that  if,  at  the  end  of 
one  year,  he  should  desire  to  sell  the  shares  subscribed  for,  they 
will  purchase  the  same,  and  pay  the  amount  paid  by  him,  with 
Interest,  is  valid  and  enforceable:  Meyer  v.  Blair,  109  N.  Y.  600;  4 
Am.  St.  Rep.  500. 

CORPORATIONS-STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS— STATUTE  OP 
FRAUDS.— A  subscription  for  stoclj  in  a  corporation  is  not  a  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  goods,  wares,  or  merchandise,  and  Is  not  within 
the  statute  of  frauds:  Webb  v.  Baltimore  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  77  Md.  92; 
S9  Am.  St.  Rep.  896. 


Harrison  v.  Harrison. 

[105  Georgia,  517.] 

DEVISE  —  CONSTRUCTION  —  COTENANCY.  —  A  will  by 
•which  land  is  devised  to  specified  legatees,  to  have  and  to  hold  in 
common  for  a  home  and  support  so  long  as  they  remain  together, 
and  should  one  ormore  leave  they  can  take  such  as  given  them 
Individually  in  this~will,  but  have  no  share  or  control  of  this  that  is 
given  in  common  without  the  consent  and  signature  of  those  that 
remain'on  the  place,"  with  restriction  on  the  right  of  either  to  alien- 
ate or  lease  any  part  of  the  land  without  the  consent  of  all,  con- 
stitxates  such  legatees  cotenants  in  the  lands  devised,  with  a  con- 
dition subsequent  that  the  whole  must  be  used  for  the  support  of 
«uch  of  the  legatees  as  choose  to  remain  on  the  place. 

DEVISE— RE.IECTION  OF  CONDITION  INCAPABLE  OF 
PERFORMANCE.— A  devise  of  land  to  specified  legatees,  "to  have 
and  to  hold  in  common  for  a  home  and  support  as  long  as  they 
remain  together,  and  should  one  or  more  leave  they  can  take  such 
as  given  them  individually  in  this  will,  but  have  no  share  or  control 
of  this  that  is  given  in  common,  without  the  consent  and  signature 
of  those  that  remain  on  the  place,"  imposes  a  condition  subsequent 
that  the  whole  land  be  used  for  the  support  of  such  legatees  as 
choose  to  reside  thereon,  but  if  such  condition  becomes  incapable  of 
performance,  it  must  be  rejected  and  the  devise  held  to  be  absolute. 
Hence,  if  one  of  the  legatees  is  forced  to  remove  from  the  land  by 
the  cruel  treatment  of  another,  the  former  is  entitled  to  his  share 
of  the  estate,  and  the  full  and  absolute  use  thereof  freed  of  the 
condition.  He  is  also  entitled  to  the  immediate  possession  of  his 
share  of  the  estate,  and  can  exercise  the  right  of  partition  or  seek 
any  other  remedy  afforded  to  a  cotenant. 

Evans  &  Evans  and  J.  A.  Harley,  for  the  plaintiff. 

R.  H,  Lewis  and  J.  K.  Hines,  for  the  defendants. 

518  LITTLE,  J.     Mary  J.  Harrison  filed  her  petition  in  the 
•uperior  court  of  Washington  county,  making  in  brief  the  fol- 


Oct.  1898.]  Harrison  v.  Harrison.  61 

lowing  case:  In  July,  1877,  the  will  of  her  father,  William  D. 
Harrison,  was  admitted  to  probate  and  letters  testamentary 
were  issued  to  William  T.  Harrison  and  Seleta  L,  Harrison. 
After  providing  for  a  number  of  specific  legacies  to  several  of 
his  children,  the  thirteenth  item  of  the  will  is  in  the  following 
language:  "That  all  of  my  lands  and  other  property,  after  the 
above-named  bequests  have  been  settled,  I  give  and  bequeath 
to  my  five  children  that  remain  to  me,  to  wit,  Seleta  L,,  Emma 
S.,  Martha  W.,  Mary  J.,  and  William  T.,  to  have  and  to  hold  in 
common  for  a  home  and  support  so  long  as  they  remain  together. 
Should  one  or  more  leave,  they  can  take  such  83  is  given  them  in- 
dividually in  this  will,  but  have  no  share  or  control  of  this  that 
is  given  in  common,  without  the  consent  and  signature  of  those 
that  remain  on  the  place.  No  one  or  more  shall  sell,  lease, 
rent,  or  in  any  way  convey  to  any  other  than  those  that  re- 
main on  the  place,  without  the  signature  of  the  five  named  irk 
this  item."  The  petition  alleges  that  the  realty  on  which  item 
13  operated  consisted  of  a  tract  of  land  lying  in  Washington 
county,  containing  four  hundred  acres  (fully  described),  and 
also  another  tract  of  land  in  Johnson  county,  containing  two 
hundred  acres  (also  fully  described),  and  that  the  personal  prop- 
erty was  of  the  value  of  fifteen  hundred  dollars.  The  petition 
also  sets  out  as  a  fact  that  W.  T.  Harrison  has  had  the  exclusive 
management  and  control  of  the  property  referred  to  in  item  13 
since  his  qualification  as  executor  in  July,  1877,  and  that  he 
has  made  no  annual  returns.  It  also  alleges  that  W.  T.  Harri- 
son has  received  from  the  property  referred  to  in  item  13  the 
sum  of  twelve  hundred  dollars,  which  he  has  invested  for  his 
own  use  and  benefit,  and  denies  to  petitioner  the  right  of  partici- 
pating therein.  It  also  alleges  that  William  T.  Harrison,  from 
the  rents  and  profits  of  the  property  referred  to  in  item  13,  has 
purchased  two  tracts  of  land  in  Hancock  county,  and  that  at  the 
request  of  W.  T.  she  and  her  sisters  who  are  named  in  the  thir- 
teenth item,  in  1894,  empowered  said  W.  T.  to  sell  the  Johnson 
county  land,  which  he  did  for  five  hundred  dollars,  but  has  not 
accounted  to  her  for  any  of  the  purchase  money.  It  is  also 
alleged  that  the  affairs  of  the  testator  have  long  since  been  *^*'* 
settled  and  there  is  no  legal  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  final  dis- 
tribution. The  petitioner  also  alleges  that  she  lived  on  the  land 
named  in  this  item,  which  was  the  W.  D.  Harrison  home  place, 
with  the  said  W.  T.  Harrison  and  her  sisters,  Seleta  L.  and 
Emma,  from  the  death  of  her  father  until  July,  1895;  that  her 
treatment  by  her  brother,  W.  T.,  was  so  cruel  and  unpleasant 


62  Harrison  v.  Harrison.  [Georgia, 

that  she  was  forced  to  leave  said  land  and  reside  with  her  sister,- 
and  that  since  her  removal  the  defendants  have  set  up  an  ad- 
verse claim  to  the  home  place,  and  pretend  that  petitioner  for- 
ieited  her  interest  in  that  portion  of  the  land  known  as  the  home 
place  by  her  removal  therefrom.  The  petitioner  makes  W.  T. 
Harrison  and  Seleta  L.  Harrison  defendants,  and  prays  that  they 
come  to  a  full  and  complete  accounting  of  the  rents,  issues,  and 
profits  of  the  property  embraced  in  the  thirteenth  item  of  the 
will,  and  the  court  decree  that  the  defendants  pay  over  to  peti- 
tioner her  share  of  such  rents  and  profits;  and  she  prays  that 
she  have  a  special  lien  for  said  sum  on  the  land  lying  in  Han- 
cock county,  purchased  by  the  defendant  "W.  T.  with  the  funds 
arising  from  the  estate  of  W.  D.  Harrison.  Petitioner  also  prays 
to  recover  her  share  of  the  home  place,  with  reasonable  rents 
since  July,  1895. 

To  this  petition  the  defendants  demurred  on  the  following 
grounds:  The  petition  sets  out  no  cause  of  action.  The  petition 
shows  that  the  petitioner  has  no  interest  in  the  land  and  other 
property  devised  and  bequeathed  in  the  thirteenth  item  of  the 
will.  Because  Martha  W.  Duggan  and  Emma  S.  Harrison,  sis- 
ters of  the  petitioner,  named  in  the  thirteenth  item,  are  not 
made  parties  defendant.  Because  petitionerdoesnot  set  out  any 
definite  sum  due  her  by  defendants.  Because  petitioner  having 
assented  to  the  terms  of  the  thirteenth  item  from  the  probate  of 
the  will  until  July,  1895,  she  is  now  estopped  from  claiming 
contrary  thereto.  The  demurrer  was  sustained  and  the  petition 
was  dismissed.  At  the  September  term,  1897,  by  leave  of  the 
court  the  petition  was  amended,  and  at  the  same  term  the  de- 
fendants also  by  leave  of  the  court  amended  their  demurrer. 
Petitioner  excepted,  and  assigned  as  error  the  ruling  of  the  court 
in  allowing  the  demurrer  to  be  amended  and  in  sustaining  the 
demurrer  to  the  petition. 

1.  Questions  affecting  the  construction  of  this  will  were  be- 
fore ^'"^  this  court  in  the  case  of  Duggan  v.  Harrison,  97  Ga. 
738.  That  decision  grew  out  of  an  application  on  the  part  of 
Martha  W.  Duggan,  one  of  the  legatees  named  in  the  will,  to 
bring  W.  T.  and  Seleta  Harrison,  as  executors,  to  a  settlement 
before  the  ordinary.  The  decision  in  that  case  ruled  the  fol- 
lowing propositions:  1.  The  executor  and  executrix,  by  living 
upon  the  land  and  pennitting  the  other  devisees  to  do  so,  as- 
scntcfl  to  the  legacy  in  so  far  as  the  income  was  concerncrl,  and 
all  of  these  parties  accepted  the  legacy  to  this  extent;  2.  If 
Mrs.  Duggan  was  entitled  to  any  of  the  rents  and  profits  which 


Oct.  1898.]  Harrison  v,  Harrison.  63 

accrued  during  the  period  of  her  voluntary  absence  from  the 
land,  her  claim  is  not  against  the  estate,  but  against  the  other 
four  as  individuals;  3.  The  case  did  not  involved  a  ruling  on 
the  question  as  to  whether  the  other  legatees  were  liable  to 
her.  On  the  latter  point  Mr.  Justice  Lumpkin,  who  delivered 
the  opinion  of  the  court,  says:  "The  terms  of  the  will,  so  far 
as  it  relates  to  this  land,  are  peculiar,  and  it  is  quite  a  difficult 
matter  to  determine  what  is  the  precise  interest  of  Mrs.  Dug- 
gan,  either  in  the  land  itself  or  in  its  income  during  the  period 
whilst  she  was  absent  from  the  premises  and  the  other  devisees 
remained  upon,  used,  and  enjoyed  the  property  in  common.  "We 
are  quite  certain,  however,  she  has  no  right  to  demand  of  W.  T. 
Harrison  and  Seleta,  in  their  representative  capacity,  an  account- 
ing as  to  the  income  of  the  land  during  the  time  she  was  ab- 
sent." 

Under  the  case  made  here,  we  are  called  on  to  determine  the 
rights  of  the  plaintiff  in  this  land  under  the  terms  of  the  will, 
as  affected  by  the  allegations  made  in  the  petition.  It  will  be 
seen  by  reference  to  the  petition  that  the  action  is  brought 
against  the  persons  named  as  executor  and  executrix  of  the  will, 
but  not  in  their  representative  capacity.  Indeed,  while  Selefa 
L.  Harrison  is  made  formally  a  party  defendant,  no  specific 
prayer  for  relief  is  made  as  against  her..  As  said  by  Mr.  Justice 
Lumpkin,  the  language  of  the  thirteenth  item  of  the  will  is  pe- 
culiar, and  it  is  difficult  to  carry  into  effect  the  evident  inten- 
tion and  wish  of  the  testator,  and  at  the  same  time  preserve 
to  the  legatees  their  absolute  legal  rights  under  the  instrument. 
It  would  seem  that  some  of  the  language  used  in  making  the 
devise  evidences  an  intention  to  create  an  estate  in  joint  ten- 
ancy. This  estate  only  '^^^  exists  when  the  tenants  have  one 
and  the  same  interest  arising  by  the  same  conveyance,  com- 
mencing at  the  same  time,  and  held  by  one  and  the  same  undi- 
vided possession:  2  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  180.  So  far 
these  incidents  are  present.  But  the  principal  incident  to  an 
estate  in  joint  tenancy  is  the  right  of  survivorship,  which  under 
no  fair  constructon  of  this  item  can  be  found  to  be  present. 
However,  we  will  not  enter  into  a  discussion  to  determine 
whether  the  will  created  an  estate  in  joint  tenancy,  for  while 
we  do  not  think  it  does,  yet  if  it  could  be  construed  to  do  =o,. 
such  estates  are  abolished  by  our  statute  and  must  be  held  to 
be  tenancies  in  common:  Civ.  Code,  sec.  3142.  By  reference 
tv)  the  will  as  a  whole,  it  will  be  found  that  the  expressed  inten- 
tion of  the  testator,  as  set  out  in  the  preamble,  was  to  divide 


64  Harrison  v.  Harrison.  [Georgia, 

tlie  property  "among  my  children  as  equitably  as  the  nature 
of  the  case  will  admit,  some  having  received  more  than  others^ 
and  some  having  been  with  me  longer  and  some  having  done 
more  for  me  than  others.''    Again,  in  item  2  of  the  will,  the 
testator  directs  "that  my  property  and  effects  be  divided  among 
my  children  in  the  following  order."    Coming  now  to  the  point 
of  difficulty,  the  thirteenth    item,  the    words  preceding  those 
which  fix  the  character  of  the  estate  devised  are,  "that  all  of 
my  lands  and  other  property,  after  the  above-named  bequests 
have  been  settled,  I  give  and  bequeath  to  my  five  children  that 
remain  with  me,  to  wit";  so  that  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  testator  to  give  to  each  of  the  children 
named  in  the  thirteenth  item  of  his  will  equal  shares  in  the  prop- 
erty therein  described.    It  is  true  that  the  words  used  in  fixing 
the  estate  of   each  limits  the  use  of   the  property  so  devised. 
Each  of  said  children  is  "to  have  and  to  hold  in  common  for 
a  home  and  support  so  long  as  they  remain  together.    Should 
one  or  more  leave,  they  can  take  such  as  is  given  them  individ- 
ually, ....  but  have  no  share  or  control  of  this  that  is  given 
in  common,  without  the  consent  and  signature  of  those  that 
remain  on  the  place."    If  it  be  contended  from  this  language 
that  when  one  or  more  of  the  legatees  remove  from  the  place, 
the  removal  works  a  forfeiture  of  their  estate  in  the  land  there- 
tofore devised,  the  reply  iy,  that  forfeitures  are  not  favored,  and 
while  it  is  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  give  effect  to  the  intention 
**^^  of  the  testator,  a  forfeiture  will  not  be  decreed  unless  ex- 
pressed in  plain  and  unambiguous  language.     We  do  not  con- 
strue this  language  to  work  a  forfeiture  by  removal  from  the 
place.    The  property  is  given  to  the  children  "to  have  and  to 
hold  ....  for  a  home  and  support  so  long  as  they  remain  to- 
gether."   Suppose  all  of  the  children  should  remove  from  the 
land,  it  would  hardly  be  claimed  that  the  last  one  to  re- 
move took  an  estate  in  fee  in  the  whole  of  the  land;  and  yet 
6uch  would  be  the  only  logical  conclusion  of  the  contention 
that  the  removal  by  one  from  the  land  forfeited  all  his  in- 
terest therein;  because  when  all  had  removed  save  one,  that 
one,  under  the  contention,  would  have  the  whole  land,  and  title 
would  vest  in  him,  and,  as  there  is  no  limitation  over,  the  right 
of  disposition  would  rest  in  him.    As  we  construe  this  item,  it 
vests  in  the  five  children  named  equal  interests  in  the  land  and 
other  property  covered  by  this  item,  as  tenants  in  common.    So 
long  as  any  of  the  named  children  remain  on  the  home  place, 
the  rents,  issues,  and  profits  of  the  place  are  to  be  used  exclu- 


Oct.  1898.]  Harrison  v.  Harrison,  65 

sively  for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  those  who  remain. 
When  the  place  is  abandoned  by  all,  the  property  is  relieved 
from  this  charge  and  the  .devisees  are  entitled  as  tenants  in  com- 
mon to  its  control  and  disposition. 

It  is  not  an  uncommon  thing  for  devises  to  be  made  on  a 
condition  requiring  residence  in  some  particular  place  or  some 
particular  house.  The  rule  is,  that  all  such  conditions  are  to 
be  reasonably  interpreted  if  possible,  or  else  pronounced  void  as. 
unreasonable  of  themselves  and  obnoxious  to  public  policy. 
This  latter  view  is  tenable  where  the  restraint  must  so  operate 
as  to  involve  the  donee  in  some  breach  of  permanent  duty;  as, 
for  example,  in  compelling  married  persons  to  live  apart.  On 
this  subject  it  is  said  in  Schouler  on  "Wills,  second  edition,  sec- 
tion G04:  "Ordinarily,  one  who  is  to  be  supported  under  a  pro- 
vision in  a  will  is  not  limited  to  live  in  a  particular  place,  es- 
pecially if  there  be  good  reason  for  leaving  it.  But  a  condition 
that  an  infant  shall  live  during  minority  with  a  suitable  person 
named  as  sole  guide  and  guardian,  may  be  upheld  under  most 
circumstances";  and  that  "a  condition  not  uncertain  or  ambigu- 
ous happens  to  be  injudicious  is  an  insufficient  reason  for  setting 
it  aside,  but  all  conditions  should  be  justly  and  reasonably  con- 
strued." If  the  '^^^  terms  of  this  will  are  to  be  so  construed 
as  that  the  condition  of  residence  was  required  in  order  for  the 
estate  to  vest,  even  then  such  condition  would  be  liberally  con- 
strued. In  the  case  of  Fillingham  v.  Broumley,  Turn.  &  R.  530, 
Lord  Eldon  said:  "Suppose  the  devisee  had  been  a  member  of 
parliament,  and  had  had  a  house  in  London,  would  you  say  that 
ho  did  not  live  and  reside  at  J.?"  "Even  should  the  devisee 
be  required  to  reside  in  the  house  during  a  defined  period,  or  to 
make  it  his  principal  or  usual  place  of  abode,  the  condition  may 
still  be  frustrated,  for  personal  presence  in  a  specified  place  for 
any  part  of  a  day  is  sufficient  residence  for  that  day;  and  it  is 
not  necessary  to  pass  the  night  of  that  day  there":  Jarman  on 
Wilis,  *901;  citing  Walcot  v.  Botfield,  Kay,  534;  Wynne  v. 
Fletcher,  24  Bcav.  430;  Warner  v.  Moir,  L.  R.  25  Ch.  Div.  605. 
But,  as  we  have  before  said,  we  do  not  construe  the  terms  of  this 
•will  as  vesting  an  estate  in  these  children  on  condition  that 
they  live  on  the  place,  which  is  to  be  forfeited  by  removal.  As 
we  construe  its  terms,  it  vests  an  absolute  estate  in  each  of  these 
children,  but  while  any  one  or  more  of  the  five  remain  on  the 
land  the  profits  arising  therefrom  shall  be  devoted  to  the  support 
of  those  who  so  remain.  For  the  testator's  intention  to  quaHfv 
reasonably  what  he  chooses  to  dispose  of  is  not  incapable  of  tak- 

AM.  ST.  Bkp.,  You  LXX.— 6 


66  Harbison  v.  Harrison.  [Georgia, 

ing  effect  when  not  contrary  to  law,  and  a  devise  absolute  in 
terms  may  be  modified  in  effect  by  other  clauses  of  the  will  and 
restrict  the  gift  in  accordance  with  his  intentions:  Schouler  on 
Wills,  sees.  599-602. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  plaintiff  alleges  she  lived  on  the 
home  place  with  her  brother  and  sisters  from  the  death  of  her 
father  until  July,  1895,  and  that  her  treatment  by  her  brother 
W.  T.  was  so  cruel  and  unpleasant  that  she  was  forced  to  leave 
the  land  and  reside  elsewhere.  If  these  allegations  be  true, 
then  such  forced  removal  is  not  to  be  counted  against  her.  She 
had  the  same  right  under  the  will  to  reside  on  the  land  as  her 
brother  had,  and  he  as  much  right  as  she  had,  and  if  the  con- 
duct of  either  toward  the  other  was  such  as  with  due  regard 
to  personal  comfort  required  one  to  remove,  then  it  may  well  be 
held  that  the  use  contemplated  by  the  testator  was  impossible 
of  performance,  and  in  that  event  the  devisees  would  be  entitled 
to  immediate  possession  of  the  estate,  divested  of  the  right  of 
use  as  prescribed  in  the  will.  Conditions  subsequent  are  con- 
strued beneficially,  ^^"^  in  order  to  save,  if  possible,  the  vested 
estate  or  interest,  and  if  such  condition  prove  illegal  or  inca- 
pable of  performance,  whether  as  against  good  morals  or  as  im- 
possible under  any  circumstances,  or  is  rendered  impossible  in 
a  particular  case  and  under  existing  circumstances,  the  gift, 
whether  of  real  or  personal  property,  relieved  of  the  condition, 
becomes  absolute  in  effect:  Jarman  on  Wills,  *848-850,  Collett 
v.  Collett,  35  Beav.  312;  Harvey-Bathurst v.  Stanley,  L.  R.  4  Ch. 
Div.  272;  Conrad  v.  Long,  33  Mich.  78;  4  Kent's  Commentaries, 
130.  And  Professor  Schouler,  in  his  work  on  Wills,  says,  that 
"public  policy  may  constitute  an  element  in  such  cases  besides; 
and  as  conditions  are  here  construed  into  conditions  subsequent 
rather  than  precedent — for  conditions  precedent  are  never  fa- 
vored in  the  construction  of  wills — the  impossible,  illegal,  or 
impolitic  condition  being  rejected,  the  gift  stands  absolute"; 
and  he  further  says  that  "a  will,  of  all  writings,  deserves  the 
most  flexible  interpretation  which  can  lay  open  the  mind  of  its 
maker":  Schouler  on  Wills,  sec.  600. 

The  testator  devised  this  property  in  equal  interests  to  his 
named  children,  but  intended  that  those  of  them  who  chose  to 
do  so  should  reside  on  the  land  and  receive  an  equal  part  of  the 
rents  and  profits  of  the  property  devised.  This  right  vested 
equally  in  each  of  these  named  children,  under  the  will.  If,  by 
disagreement  among  themselves,  it  became  impossible  for  the 
use  to  continue,  if  by  the  conduct  of  one  any  other  of  them 


Oct.  1898.]  Harbison  v.  Harrison.  67 

was  forced  to  leave,  possessing  an  equal  right  with  the  others, 
that  one  could  not  be  legally  deprived  of  the  benefit  which  the 
testator  intended  him  to  enjoy.  It  will  not  do  to  say  that  the 
one  so  compelled  to  leave  would  have  a  right  of  action  to  re- 
cover his  damages  against  that  other  for  his  eviction;  because 
he  was  entitled  to  live  on  that  place  and  have  a  home  there,  and 
the  deprivation  of  this  right  is  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  tes- 
tator; and  that  intention  being  thus  impossible  of  performance, 
such  devisee  is  entitled  then  to  have  the  full  and  absolute  use 
of  the  estate  devised  to  him.  For  such  right  the  only  method 
of  enforcement  is  to  have  his  estate  free  from  the  condition  im- 
posed; and  if  it  is  found  to  be  true  that  the  petitioner  was  sub- 
jected to  annoyance  and  bad  treatment  on  the  part  of  one  of  the 
other  devisees  having  equal  but  no  more  rights  than  hers,  she 
is  entitled  to  her  estate  free  of  the  condition.  Indeed,  we 
might  go  further  and  say  '^"^  that  the  provision  for  home  and 
support  was  intended  by  the  testator  to  be  a  reasonable  one; 
and  if  such  could  not  be  afforded  from  any  cause — the  unpro- 
ductiveness of  the  land,  the  incapacity  of  the  dwelling-house  to 
afford  suitable  shelter,  or  other  similar  causes — the  condition 
would  be  held  to  be  impossible  of  performance  and  be  therefore 
defeated. 

Sufficient  averments  are  made  in  this  case,  if  proved,  to  de- 
feat the  condition  attached  to  the  devise,  that  is,  that  the  prop- 
erty devised  should  be  used  for  a  home  and  support  for  the  five 
children  named.  In  that  event  the  petitioner  would  have  the 
right  to  immediate  possession  of  that  portion  of  the  estate  de- 
vised to  her,  and  could  exercise  the  right  of  partition,  or  seek 
any  other  remedy  afforded  to  a  tenant  in  common.  She  could 
not,  however,  have  any  partition  under  the  proceeding  institut- 
ed in  this  case,  if  for  no  other  cause  than  for  the  want  of  par- 
ties. She,  however,  alleges  in  the  petition  that  one  of  the  de- 
fendants, W.  T.  Harrison,  has  received  the  sum  of  five  hundred 
dollars  for  the  sale  of  the  Johnson  county  land,  sold  by  the  con- 
sent of  all  the  devisees,  and  in  which  she  alleges  she  has  a  fifth 
interest.  She  also  alleges  that  he  has  received  the  rents  and 
profits  of  the  home  place,  in  which  she  has  an  interest.  The  alle- 
gations in  the  petition  are  sufficient  to  allow  it  to  be  held  in 
court,  at  least  to  recover  such  of  these  items  as  she  is  entitled 
to  receive  from  the  defendant ;  and  limited  as  it  may  be  in  this 
respect,  the  petition  sets  forth  a  leiral  cause  of  action  to  recover 
such  interests,  and  the  court  erred  in  sustaining  the  demurrer 
thereto. 


63  Gay  v.  State.  [Georgia, 

Judgment  reversed. 

All  the  justices  concurring.    . 

DEVISE— COTENANCY— A  devise  to  several  persons  equally, 
and  when  either  dies  his  share  to  be  divided  among  the  rest,  vests 
the  property  in  the  devisees  as  tenants  in  common,  with  cross- 
remainders  between  them,  and  the  ultimate  limitation  to  the  last 
survivor.  The  heirs  of  the  devisees  other  than  of  the  last  survivor 
acquire  no  title  to  the  property:  Reber  v.  Bowling,  65  Miss.  259;  7 
Am.  St.  Rep.  651;  Simmons  v.  Hendricks,  8  Ired.  Eq.  85;  55  Am. 
Dec.  439.  For  a  good  statement  as  to  what  constitutes  cotenancy, 
see  Metcalfe  v.  Miller.  96  Mich.  459;  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  617. 

DEVISE.— A  DISTURBANCE  OF  THE  ARRANGEMENTS  OF 
A  WILL  is  to  be  justified  oiily  where  the  testator's  schemes  prove 
Impracticable,  and  the  interests  of  all  his  legatees  require  a  de- 
parture from  the  prescriptions  of  the  will:  Drayton  v.  Eose,  7  Rich. 
Bq.  828;  64  Am.  Dec.  731. 


Gay  v.  State. 

[105  Georgia,  699.] 

CRIMINAL  LAW— ABANDONMENT  OF  CHILD.— Under  a 
statute  providing  that  "if  any  father  shall  willfully  and  voluntarily 
abandon  his  child,  leaving  it  In  dependent  and  destitute  condition, 
he  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  in  order  to  constitute  the  of- 
fense of  abandonment,  there  must  be  an  actual  desertion,  followed 
by  a  refusal  to  support,  and  the  absence  of  either  of  such  elements 
prevents  the  offense  from  being  made  out. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— ABANDONMENT  OF  CHILD,— If,  after 
a  completed  act  of  desertion,  a  father  has  been  convicted  under  a 
statute  making  it  a  misdemeanor  for  "any  father  to  willfully  and 
voluntarily  abandon  his  child,  leaving  it  in  a  dependent  and  desti- 
tute condition,"  there  can  be  no  new  act  of  abandonment  until  a  re- 
turn to  the  discharge  of  the  parental  obligation,  and  no  new  offense 
of  abandonment  until  such  a  return,  followed  by  another  act  of  de- 
sertion, and  this  although  the  original  abandonment  is  willfully  and 
voluntarily  continued  and  the  child  remains  dependent  and  destitute. 

T.  L.  Bishop  and  G.  P.  Roberts,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

J.  F.  O'Neill,  solicitor,  for  the  state. 

*^^  COBB,  J.  Alexander  Gay  was  tried  in  the  criininal' 
court  of  Atlanta  upon  an  accusation  charging  him  with  the  of- 
fense of  abandoning  his  child,  leaving  her  in  a  dependent  and 
destitute  condition.  The  accused  filed  pleas  of  former  convic- 
tion and  not  guilty,  and  the  issues  thus  arising  were,  by  con- 
Bent,  submitted  to  the  decision  of  the  judge  without  a  jury, 
upon  an  agreed  statement  of  facts,  which  was,  in  substance,  as 
follows:  Accused  is  the  husband  of  Sally  Gay.     They  have  one 


Oct.  1898.]  Gay  v.  State.  69 

cliild,  Lillian,  bom  in  1896.  Neither  has  any  property  from 
which  the  child  can  derive  a  support.  The  accused  has  for  some 
years  had  good  paying  employment  as  a  laborer,  but  he  refuses 
now,  and  has  constantly  refused  since  the  begetting  of  the  child, 
to  pay  anything  to  the  maintenance  or  support  of  either  his 
wife  or  child.  He  abandoned  his  wife  and  child  before  the  birth 
of  the  latter,  and  has  refused  to  live  with  the  wife  or  support 
the  child  since  its  birth.  The  wife  has  no  means  of  support  ex- 
cept her  manual  labor,  and  she  lives  with  her  father,  who  is 
forced  to  assist  her,  otherwise  the  child  would  be  thrown  upon 
the  charity  of  the  public,  The  child  was  abandoned  by  the 
father  and  'left  in  a  dependent  and  destitute  condition"  before 
its  birth.  On  February  2,  1897,  the  accused  was  convicted  in 
the  criminal  court  of  Atlanta  for  the  abandonment  of  his  child, 
which  had  taken  place  prior  to  that  date,  and  he  paid  the  fine 
which  was  then  imposed  upon  him.  He  has  never  returned  to 
his  family,  or  provided  for  it  or  for  the  child  in  any  way  since 
the  abandonment  which  was  the  foundation  of  the  conviction 
above  referred  to.  The  court  entered  judgment  refusing  to 
sustain  the  plea  of  former  conviction,  and  adjudging  the  ac- 
cused guilty  of  the  offense  charged  in  the  accusation.  To  this 
judgment  the  accused  excepted. 

The  accusation  in  the  former  aase,  as  well  as  in  the  present 
case,  was  brought  under  section  114  of  the  Penal  Code.  This 
section  had  its  origin  in  an  act  of  the  general  assembly,  ap- 
proved December  13,  1866,  which  was  as  follows:  "An  act  to 
add  an  additional  section  to  the  fourth  division,  part  4,  title  1, 
of  the  Penal  Code.  4.  Section  1.  Be  it  enacted,  et  cetera, 
that  if  *****  any  father  shall  willfully  and  voluntarily  abandon 
his  child  or  children,  leaving  them  in  a  dependent  and  destitute 
condition,  such  father  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  on 
conviction  thereof  shall  be  punished  as  for  other  misdemean- 
ors": Acts  1866,  p.  151.  In  1879  an  act  was  passed  making 
the  wife  a  competent  witness  in  prosecutions  under  the  act  just 
quoted :  Acts  1878-79,  p.  66.  The  original  act  as  thus  amended 
now  appears  in  the  Penal  Code  in  the  following  language: 
*^f  any  father  shall  willfully  and  voluntarily  abandon  his  child, 
leaving  it  in  a  dependent  and  destitute  condition,  he  shall  be 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor.  The  wife  shall  be  a  competent  wit- 
ness in  such  cases  to  testify  for  or  against  her  husband."  The 
accused  having  been  convicted  and  punished  under  this  section, 
and  being  a  second  time  placed  upon  trial  for  what  is  claimed 
to  be  the  same   offense,   it    becomes   necessary   to    determino 


70  Gay  v.  State.  [Georgia, 

whether  the  word  "ahandon,"  in  the  statute,  refers  to  one.  com- 
pleted act  of  desertion,  continuously  persisted  in,  and  therefore' 
constituting  only  one  offense,  or  whether  the  desertion  will- 
fully continued  in  from  day  to  day  constitutes  each  day  a  sepa- 
rate act  of  abandonment.  In  other  words,  does  the  actual  de- 
sertion of  a  child  by  a  father  under  circumstances  which  would 
render  him  liable  to  punishment  under  the  law  consititute  the 
offense;  and  when  this  actual  desertion  is  once  punished  is  the 
law  satisfied;  or  does  an  actual  desertion,  once  taken  place  and 
willfully  persisted  in,  make  a  separate  and  distinct  case  of 
abandonment  for  each  day  it  continues?  If  the  former  is  cor- 
rect, the  accused  was  improperly  convicted  in  the  present  case. 
If  the  latter  position  is  sound,  the  judgment  of  conviction  was 
right.  In  order  to  determine  this  question,  it  is  necessary  to 
ascertain  what  was  meant  by  the  general  assembly  when  they 
nsed  the  word  '"abandon"  in  this  statute.  The  word  "aban- 
don," in  its  ordinary  sense,  means  to  forsake  entirely;  to  re- 
nounce and  forsake;  to  leave  with  a  view  never  to  return;  to 
give  over  entirely;  to  forsake  or  renounce  utterly:  See  Webster's 
and  Standard  Dictionaries.  When  referring  to  the  desertion 
of  a  wife  by  a  husband,  the  word  has  been  defined  to  mean,  "the 
act  of  a  husband  in  voluntarily  leaving  his  wife  with  an  inten- 
tion to  forsake  her  entirely — tiever  to  return  to  her,  and  never 
to  resume  ^^^  his  marital  duties  toward  her  or  to  claim  his  mari- 
tal rights.  Such  neglect  as  either  leaves  the  wife  destitute  of 
the  common  necessaries  of  life,  or  would  leave  her  destitute  but 
for  the  charity  of  others":  Anderson's  Law  Dictionary,  4.  The 
word  "abandonment,"  when  referring  to  the  act  of  one  consort 
in  leaving  the  other,  is  defined  to  mean,  "the  act  of  a  husband 
or  wife  who  leaves  his  or  her  consort  willfully,  and  with  an  in- 
tention of  causing  perpetual  separation":  Bouvier's  Law  Dic- 
tionary. And  as  "the  willful  departure  of  the  husband  or  wife 
from  the  society  of  the  other  and  the  common  home,  with  an 
intention  never  to  return  or  to  resume  the  marital  relation": 
Rapalje  &  Lawrence's  Law  Dictionary.  In  Schouler  on  Domes- 
tic Relations,  fifth  edition,  ffection  219,  it  is  declared  that 
"abandonment  by  either  spouse  consists  in  leaving  the  other 
willfully  and  with  the  intention  of  causing  their  perpetual  sepa- 
ration." In  the  case  of  State  v.  Davis,  70  Mo.  467,  where  the 
court  had  under  consideration  the  meaning  of  the  word  "aban- 
don" in  a  statute  which  punished  a  father  who  should  abandon 
his  child  or  children,  and  fail,  neglect  or  refuse  to  maintain  and 
provide  for  them,  Henry,  J.,  in  the  opinion,  says:  "Abandon- 


Oct.  1898.]  Gay  v.  State.  71 

ment  does  not  mean  a  mere  temporary  absence  from  home,  or 
temporary  neglect  of  parental  duty."  In  the  case  of  Stan- 
brough  V.  Stanbrough,  60  Ind.  275,  the  court  had  under  consid- 
erajtion  a  statute  which  provided  for  the  relief  and  support  of 
married  women  when  deserted  by  the  husbands,  and  it  became 
necessary  to  determine  what  the  word  "abandonment"  meant 
when  used  in  such  a  connection.  Niblack,  C.  J.,  in  the  opinion, 
says:  "Abandonment,  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  the 
statute  under  which  this  proceeding  was  commenced,  may  be 
defined  as  the  act  of  willfully  leaving  the  wife,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  causing  a  palpable  separation  between  the  parties,  and 
implies  an  actual  desertion  of  the  wife  by  the  husband."  In  the 
case  of  Moore  v.  Stevenson,  27  Conn.  14,  the  court  had  under 
consideration  the  meaning  of  the  word  "abandon"  in  a  statute 
which  authorized  a  married  woman  abandoned  by  her  husband 
to  transact  business  as  a  feme  sole,  and  the  conclusion  was 
reached  that  in  such  a  statute  the  abandonment  is  complete 
when  the  husband  "voluntarily  left  the  wife  with  an  intention 
to  forsake  her  entirely,  and  never  to  return  to  her,  and  never  to 
resume  his  marital  duties  toward  ^^^  her,  or  to  claim  his  marital 
rights."  Appl3dng  to  the  word  "abandon,"  as  found  in  this 
statute,  the  meaning  which  is  to  be  drawn  from  the  definitions 
above  given,  it  seems  clear  that,  to  constitute  the  abandonment 
of  a  child  by  a  father,  there  must  be  an  actual  desertion,  accom- 
panied with  an  intention  to  entirely  sever,  so  far  as  it  is  possible 
to  do  so,  the  parental  relation,  and  throw  off  all  obligations 
growing  out  of  the  same;  that  when  the  effect  of  this  separation 
is  to  leave  the  child  in  a  dependent  and  destitute  condition,  the 
offense  under  the  statute  is  complete,  and  nothing  less  than  this 
will  constitute  the  offense.  The  act  of  desertion  and  the  at- 
tempt to  throw  off  all  parental  obligation  are  necessary  com- 
ponent parts  of  the  offense.  The  continued  refusal  to  provide 
for  the  support  of  the  child  after  the  actual  desertion  takes  place 
is  necessary  to  complete  the  offense,  but  it  alone  is  not  an  offense 
under  the  statute.  It  follows  that  if  a  father  desert  and  forsake 
his  child,  and  the  consequence  of  such  desertion  is  that  the 
child  is  left  in  a  dependent  and  destitute  condition,  the  father 
becomes  amenable  to  the  law,  and  may  be  punished  for  that  of- 
fense; but  persistent  refusal  to  provide  for  the  support  of  the 
child  will  not  constitute  a  new  offense,  unless  it  is  accompanied 
by  another  act  of  desertion.  Applying  these  principles  to  the 
present  case,  the  accused  was  entitled  to  a  discharge  on  his  plea 
of  former  conviction.    When  he  deserted   his  child  before  its 


72  Gay  v.  State.  [Georgia, 

birth,  and  persisted  in  the  refusal  to  maintain  and  support  it 
after  its  birth,  the  offense  of  abandonment  became  complete,  the 
two  elements  necessary  being  present.  He  cannot,  however,  be 
again  convicted  of  abandonment,  under  this  statute,  until  he 
shall  return  to  the  discharge  of  his  parental  duties  and  be  guilty 
of  another  act  of  desertion.  That  such  is  the  case  is  to  be  re- 
gretted, but  the  meaning  of  words  contained  in  the  statute  re- 
quires this  ruling.  The  statute  is  not  a  remedial  measure  in 
the  interest  of  the  child,  providing  for  its  maintenance.  It  is 
a  punitive  measure,  intended  in  its  enforcement  to  deter  parents 
from  deserting  their  children  and  leaving  them  in  the  condi- 
tion described  in  the  statute.  While  abandonment  of  a  child 
by  a  father  is  a  misdemeanor,  it  is  possible  for  the  court  to  im- 
pose such  a  penalty,  when  the  case  is  clearly  made  out,  as  would 
have  the  effect  of  ****^  deterring  parents  from  abandoning  their 
children,  if  it  should  not  have  the  effect  of  making  the  delin- 
quent father  return  to  the  discharge  of  his  parental  duties. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  decisions  of  this  court  bearing  direct- 
ly upon  the  question  here  involved.  In  McDaniel  v.  Camp- 
bell, 78  Ga.  188,  it  was  held  that  an  indictment  which  failed  to 
allege  that  the  abandonment  was  willful,  and  that  the  child  was 
left  in  a  destitute  condition,  was  fatally  defective.  .In  Benne- 
field  V.  State,  80  Ga.  107,  it  was  held  that,  while  a  father  may 
have  been  unable  to  live  in  peace  with  the  mother  of  his  chil- 
dren, and  compelled  by  her  conduct  to  separate  from  her,  he 
was,  notwithstanding,  under  a  legal  obligation  to  support  the 
children  begotten  of  her,  although  on  account  of  the  tender 
years  of  the  children,  in  order  to  support  them,  it  was  necessary 
to  support  the  adulterous  mother;  and  where  the  father  had 
caused  his  wife  and  children  to  be  removed  to  another  county, 
where  the  children  became  dependent  and  destitute,  the  father 
was  guilty  of  the  crime  of  abandonment  in  the  latter  county. 
An  examination  of  this  case,  we  think,  will  show  that  the  act 
of  desertion  which  was  necessary  to  make  out  the  offense  of 
abandonment  under  the  statute  was  completed  in  the  latter 
county,  by  the  father's  voluntary  removal  of  the  wife  and  chil- 
dren to  that  place  and  leaving  them  there  in  such  a  position 
that  the  children  became  dependent  and  destitute.  While  the 
case  of  Jemmeraon  v.  State,  80  Ga.  Ill,  is  not  directly  in  poini, 
the  ruling  made,  and  some  of  the  language  used  by  the  present 
chief  justice  in  the  opinion,  tend  to  support  the  conclusion 
reached  in  the  present  case.  There  the  act  of  desertion  took 
place  in  the  state  of  Alabama.     The  wife  and  child  subsequent- 


Oct.  1898.]  Gay  v.  State.  78 

ly  came  to  this  state,  the  child  being  then  in  a  dependent  and 
destitute  condition.     It  was  held  that    there   was   no    offense 
against  the  laws  of  this  state,  notwithstanding  that  the  child  waa 
then  dependent  and  destitute  within  its  limits,  because  the  act 
of   desertion,,  which   was  a  necessary  part  of  the  offense,  was 
committed  beyond  the  limits  of  the  state.     In  the  opinion  we 
find  this  language :  "Before  the  state  can  convict  of  this  offense, 
two  things  must  affirmatively  appear:  1.  The  willful  and  vol- 
untary abandonment  of  a  child  by  its  father;  2.  The  leaving 
***'  of  the  child  in  a  dependent  and  destitute  condition.     It  is 
not  only  necessary  that   these  two  things  should  affirmatively 
appear,  but  it  also  must  appear  that  they  occurred  in  this  state. 
It  appears  from  the  testimony  in  this  case  that  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  children  took  place  in  Alabama,  five  or  six  years 
before  the  finding  of  this  indictment.     That  is  one  of  the  main 
ingredients  of  the  offense  charged;  but  of  that  part  of  the  of- 
fense the  courts  of  this  state  had  no  jurisdiction.     And  we  do 
not  think  that  the  refusal  of  the  father  to  support  the  children 
when  notified  of  their  condition  by  the  mother,  in  this  state, 
subsequent  to  the  abandonment  in  Alabama,  and  the  removal 
of  the  mother  to  this  state,  would  be  such  an  abandonment  as 
contemplated  by  the  code:  Code,  sec.  4373.     The  abandonment 
is  something  more  than  'leaving  them  in  a  dependent  and  des- 
titute condition.'    It  means  the  forsaking  and  desertion  of  the 
children;  the  refusal  of  the  father  to  live  where  they  are  domi- 
ciled, and  to  perform  the  duties  of  a  parent  to  his  offspring.     If 
he  abandons  them  in  this  manner  in  this  state,  and  leaves  them 
dependent  and  destitute,  the  offense  is  complete."    In  Bull  v. 
State,  80  Ga.  704,  it  was  held,  that  a  father  who  within  this 
state   willfully   and   voluntarily  abandons  his  child  before  its 
birth,  and  persists  in  the  abandonment  afterward,  leaving  it  in 
a  dependent  and  destitute  condition,  is  guilty  of  a  violation  of 
the  section  under  consideration.     In  Crow  v.  State,  96  Ga.  297, 
it  was  held  that  when,  in  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  the  of- 
fense of  abandonment,  the  evidence  showed  that  the  father  had 
deserted  the  child  before  its  birth,  and  notwithstanding  such 
desertion  made  from  time  to  time  suitable  provision  for  its  sup- 
port, and  never  at  any  time  refused  to  make  adequate  provision 
therefor,  a  verdict  of  guilty  was  unwarranted  by  the  evidence. 
Construing  the  statute  in  the  light  of  these  decisions,  it  seems 
to  be  settled  that,  to  constitute  the  offense   of   abandonment, 
there  must  be  an  actual  desertion,  followed  by  a  refusal  to  sup- 
port; and  that  the  absence  of  either  would  prevent  the  offense 


74  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  [Georgia, 

from  being  made  out.  As,  after  a  completed  act  of  desertion, 
there  cannot  be  a  new  act  of  abandonment  until  a  return  to  the 
discharge  of  the  parental  obligation,  there  can  be  no  new  offense 
of  abandonment  until  such  a  return,  followed  by  **^^  another 
act  of  desertion.  The  plea  of  former  conviction  should  have 
been  sustained,  and  the  accused  should  have  been,  discharged 
from  custody. 

Judgment  reversed. 

All  the  justices  concurring. 


CRIMINAL  LAW— FAILURE  TO  PROVIDE  FOR  CHILD— NE- 
GLECT OF  CHILD,— The  neglect  of  a  parent  to  provide  for  his  in- 
fant child  of  lender  years  is  an  indictable  misdemeanor:  Matter  of 
Ryder,  11  Paige,  1S5;  42  Am.  Dee.  109.  The  authoritative  head  of 
an  asylum  for  cliildi'en  may  be  criminally  liable  for  the  neglect  of  a 
child  in  the  asylum,  under  a  statute  providing  that  "whoever,  hav- 
ing the  care  or  custody  of  any  child,  shall  willfully  cause  or  permit 
the  life  of  it  to  be  endangered,  or  the  health  of  it  to  be  injured," 
et  cetera,  should  be  guiltv  of  a  misdemeanor:  Cowley  v.  People,  83 
N.  Y.  464;  38  Am.  Rep.  464. 


MoHRMAN  V.  State. 

[105  Georgia,  709.] 

SOCIAL  CLUBS— TIPPLING-HOUSE.— Although  the  selling 
and  drinking  of  liquor  in  a  social  club  is  merely  incidental  to  the 
main  purposes  of  the  club,  it  is  none  the  less  a  tippling-house  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  on  the  Sab- 
bath day  of  houses  whei'e  liquor  is  furnished  and  drank. 

SOCIAL  CLUBS  -  TIPPLING-HOUSE  —  LIABILITY  OP 
MANAGER.— The  mannger  of  a  social  club,  who  is  also  a  member 
and  officer  therein,  and  who  exercises  general  superintendence  over 
a  bar  therein  from  which  Intoxicating  liquors  are  sold,  is  amenable 
to  a  statute  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of  tippling-houses  on  Sun- 
day. 

SOCIAL  CLUBS— TIPPLING-HOUSE.— A  social  club  which 
furnishes  intoxicating  liquors  to  its  meml>ers  only,  to  be  drunk  by 
thom  on  the  premises  where  sold,  is  a  tippling-house  within  the 
meaning  of  a  statue  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of  tippling-houses 
on  Sunday. 

E.  B.  Baxter,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

C.  H.  Cohen,  solicitor  for  the  state. 

'■**"  COBB,  J.  Mohrman  was  arraigned  in  the  city  court  of 
Richmond  county,  charged  with  the  offense  of  keeping  open  a 
tippling-house  on  the  Sabbath  day.  At  the  trial  the  following 
facts  were  agreed  to:  "1.  The  rooms  for  keeping  open  which 


Nov.  1898.]  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  75 

the  defendant  was  indicted  were  kept  open  on  the  day  named 
in  the  indictment.  2.  Said  rooms  were  used  as  a  rendezvous 
where  the  'Grabemax  Social  Club'  did  gather  on  the  Sabbath 
day  named  in  the  indictment,  and  other  days,  and  drink,  from 
a  bar  kept  in  the  said  rooms,  intoxicating  liquors.  3.  They 
were  kept  open  with  the  defendant's  knowledge,  on  the  Sabbath 
day  as  alleged.  4.  Said  rooms  were  rented  by  'The  Grabemax 
■^^^  Social  Club,'  which  is  incorporated,  and  which  is  an  organi- 
zation composed  of  some  one  hundred  citizens  of  Augusta.  All 
that  is  in  them  belongs  to  said  corporation,  which  pays  taxes^ 
thereon.  The  stock  of  liquors  therein  is  the  property  of  said 
club,  and  drinks  therefrom  were  sold  to  members  of  said  club 
on  the  days  mentioned  in  the  indictment.  The  selling  of  liquor 
on  Sunday  [was]  only  an  incident  and  not  the  main  object  of 
the  organization.  5.  Defendant  is  manager  of  "the  said  club, 
and  receives  a  salary  for  his  services.  He  was  an  employ^  and 
officer  of  the  said  club,  with  designated  duties,  one  of  which 
was  to  see  that  the  bar  in  the  club  was  properly  conducted,  and 
kept  open  for  the  use  of  the  members,  from  which  drinks  were- 
sold.  It  was  his  business  to  look  after  the  general  conduct  and 
running  of  the  club,  but  he  was  in  no  sense,  other  than  the 
above,  the  proprietor  or  owner  of  said  rooms;  nor  had  he  any 
authority  or  control  over  them.  He  acted  under  orders,  and 
was  strictly  amenable  to  the  governing  board  of  the  said  club. 
His  authority  to  do  all  that  he  did  do  flowed  wholly  from  his 
employment,  and  only  members  are  permitted  in  the  said  club- 
rooms  on  Sunday  or  any  other  day."  On  the  above  facts  the 
presiding  judge,  sitting  without  a  jury,  found  the  accused  guil- 
ty. His  motion  for  a  new  trial  on  the  general  grounds  wa» 
overruled,  and  he  excepted. 

An  examination  of  the  statement  of  facts  above  quoted  will 
show  that  the  "Grabemax  Social  Club"  was  distinguished  from, 
an  ordinary  tippling-house  in  three  particulars:  1.  The  selling- 
of  liquor  on  Sunday  was  incidental  to,  and  not  the  main  object 
of,  the  organization.  2.  The  accused  was  an  employ^  and  offi- 
cer of  the  club,  and  not  the  owner  thereof.  It  was  his  duty, 
acting  under  orders  of  the  governing  board  of  the  club,  to  see 
that  the  bar  was  properly  conducted  and  kept  open  for  the  use 
of  the  members,  and  to  exercise  a  general  superintendence  over 
the  club.  3.  "Only  members  are  permitted  in  the  said  club- 
rooms  on  Sunday  or  any  other  day."  We  are  called  upon  to  de- 
cide whether  these  three  distinguishing  characteristics  of  thia 


76  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  [Georgia, 

social   organization   take   it  out  of  that  class  of  liquor-selling 
establishments  commonly  denominated  "tippling-houses." 

1.  We  are  of  opinion  that  the  incidental  selling  of  liquors 
will  make  a  place  none  the  less  a  tippling-house  than  if  that  was 
the  "^^^  main  object  of  its  establishment.  The  evil  intended  to 
be  corrected  by  the  statute  is  the  keeping  open  on  the  Sabbath 
<ilay  of  houses  where  liquor  is  furnished  and  drunk;  and  it  makes 
no  difference,  we  think,  for  what  purpose  the  house  is  being 
operated,  if  tlie  fact  remains  that  intoxicating  liquors  are  fur- 
nished on  the  Sabbath  day,  to  be  drunk  on  the  premises  where 
they  are  supplied.  It  certainly  can  be  no  reply  to  the  statute 
that  the  persons  guilty  of  keeping  open  a  house  where  liquors 
are  sold  and  drunk  had  some  other  business  in  view  as  the  pri- 
mary object  of  its  operation,  and  that  the  selling  of  such  liquors 
is  merely  an  incident  to  this  object.  A  person  keeping  a  gro- 
cery store,  but  who  kept,  as  incidental  to  his  grocery  business, 
■a  bar  in  one  corner  of  the  store,  at  which  his  friends  were  accus- 
tomed to  gather  on  the  Sabbath  day  and  partake  with  him  of 
•intoxicating  drinks,  might  as  well  make  this  plea  as  the  plain- 
tiff in  error.  The  fact  that  the  main  purpose  of  the  one  was 
social  pleasure,  and  of  the  other  the  realization  of  profit  from 
his  grocery  business,  can  make  no  difference.  In  both  the  sell- 
ing was  merely  incidental  to,  and  not  the  main  object  of,  the 
business.  In  the  case  of  Harris  v.  People,  1  Colo.  App.  289,  the 
accused  was  convicted  of  "keeping  open  a  tippling-house  on  the 
Sabbath."  It  appeared  from  the  evidence  that  he  was  a  grocer, 
and  kept  the  usual  stock  of  goods  in  that  line  of  business,  and 
in  addition  kept  on  hand  intoxicating  liquors.  Eeed,  J.,  in  the 
opinion,  uses  this  language:  "The  object  of  the  statute,  evi- 
dently, was  to  prevent  places  where  intoxicating  liquors  were 
sold  from  keeping  open  and  pursuing  their  traffic  upon  the  Sab- 
bath. It  requires  such  places  to  be  closed,  and  parties  cannot 
•evade  the  law  by  carrying  on  two  kinds  of  business  in  the  same 
room,  and  claiming  that  the  sale  of  groceries  was  the  principal, 
and  the  sale  of  liquors  only  an  incident."  In  Williams  v.  State, 
100  Ga.  511,  it  was  held  that  where  a  person  "in  her  dwelling- 
house,  sold  whisky  by  retail  to  different  persons,  and  on  each 
occasion  permitted  the  same,  or  a  portion  thereof,  to  be  drunk 
on  the  premises,"  she  was  guilty  of  keeping  open  a  tippling- 
house.  The  selling  of  whisky  was  only  incidental  to  the  pur- 
pose for  which  she  occupied  the  house.  And  yet  the  fact  that 
it  was  her  dwelling  did  not  shield  her:  See,  also,  Harvey  v. 
State,  65  Ga.  668.     '^^^  While  furnishing  intoxicating  drinks 


Nov.  1898.]  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  77 

might  have  been  a  mere  incident  to  the  purposes  for  which  the 
Grabemax  Social  Club  was  established,  it  does  not  appear  but 
that  its  members,  or  some  of  them,  went  to  the  rooms  of  the 
club  for  the  sole  purpose  of  procuring  and  drinking  intoxicants. 
A  person  who  carries  on,  in  connection  with  some  other  em- 
ployment, a  business  which  is  a  violation  of  the  law,  is  just  as 
guilty  as  he  who  carries  on  such  business  alone. 

2.  The  second  point  is  controlled  by  the  principle  announced 
in  the  case  of  Cochran  v.  State,  102  Ga.  631.  It  was  there  held 
that:-  ''Evidence  showing  that  the  accused  was  an  officer  of  a 
social  club,  that  gaming  with  cards  for  money  was  carried  on  in 
a  room  thereof,  that  portions  of  the  losses  in  the  games  played 
were  appropriated  to  the  use  of  the  club,  and  that  the  accused, 
knowing  these  facts,  collected  and  received  the  same  for  its  bene- 
fit, was  sufficient  to  warrant  a  verdict  finding  him  guilty  of 
keeping  a  gaming-house":  See,  also.  State  v.  Mercer,  33  Iowa, 
405. 

3.  Is  a  social  club  which  furnishes  intoxicating  liquors  to  its 
members  only,  to  be  drunk  by  them  on  the  premises  where  sold, 
a  tippling-house  within  the  meaning  of  section  390  of  the  Penal 
Code,  which  provides  that  "any  person  who  shall  be  guilty  of 
open  lewdness,  or  any  notorious  acts  of  public  indecency,  tending 
to  debauch  the  morals,  or  of  keeping  open  tippling-houses  on  the 
Sabbath  day,  or  Sabbath  night,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemean- 
or"? Keepers  of  tippling-houses  have  sought  in  various  ways 
to  evade  the  effect  of  this  statute,  and  escape  the  punishment 
which  it  prescribes.  Some  of  the  methods  resorted  to  are  strik- 
ingly unique;  and  this  court  has  not  looked  with  favor  upon 
violators  of  this  law,  and  has,  in  every  instance  where  it  could 
possibly  do  so,  upheld  convictions  thereunder.  It  has  been  held 
that  "it  makes  no  difference  as  to  whether  any  liquors  be  sold 
or  not;  the  offense  consists  in  its  being  open,  not  in  selling,  or 
offering  to  sell,  or  giving  it  away":  Harvey  v.  State,  65  Ga. 
568.  See,  also,  Klug  v.  State,  77  Ga.  734;  Menses  v.  State,  78 
Ga.  110;  Seyden  v.  State,  78  Ga.  105.  In  the  case  of  Hussey  v. 
State,  69  Ga.  54,  no  authoritative  ruling  was  made  on  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  a  club  which  ''*^  furnished  liquors  to  its  mem- 
bers only  was  a  tippling-house,  within  the  meaning  of  the  stat- 
ute. True,  the  court  uses  this  language:  "It  makes  no  difference 
in  law  whether  the  place  be  called  a  bar-room,  or  a  glee-club  re- 
sort, or  a  parlor,  or  a  restaurant;  if  it  be  a  place  where  liquor  is 
retailed  and  tippled  on  the  Sabbath  day,  with  a  door  to  get  into 
it,  so  kept  that  anybody  can  push  it  open  and  go  in  and  drink. 


78  MoHBMAN  V.  State.  [Georgia, 

the  proprietor  of  it  is  guilty  of  keeping  open  a  tippling-house 
on  Sunday.  It  makes  no  difference  if  the  drinking  be  done 
standing  or  sitting — at  a  bar  or  around  a  table — it  is  tippling, 
and  the  place  where  it  is  done  is  a  tippling-house;  and  if  any- 
body wishing  to  drink  can  have  access  thereto — if  ingress  and 
egress  be  free  to  all  comers — it  is  a  tippling-house  kept  open  on 
Sunday."  The  court  was  in  that  case  dealing  with  a  public  re- 
sort, and  in  so  far  as  any  language  in  the  headnotes  or  the  opin- 
ion indicates  that  any  other  character  of  resort  would  not  be 
a  .tippling-house,  it  is,  of  course,  merely  obiter.  We  think^  how- 
ever, that  the  first  part  of  the  language  quoted  will  show  that, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  a  house  of  the  character  now  under 
consideration  would  be  a  tippling-house.  In  the  case  of  Minor 
V.  State,  63  Ga.  318,  an  organization  known  as  the"Albany  Glee 
€lub"  was  under  investigation.  Resolutions  and  by-laws  for  the 
government  of  the  club  were  in  evidence.  From  these  it  ap- 
peared tliat  the  main  and  controlling  purpose  of  the  organiza- 
tion was  to  engage  in  selling  and  drinking  liquors  on  the  Sab- 
bath day.  It  was  not  in  a  strict  sense  a  public  resort,  for  it  was 
provided  that,  "no  member  shall  invite  an  outsider  that  Ijas  not 
paid  his  quota  to  the  benefit  of  the  club,  without  the  consent  of 
two-thirds  of  the  members  present."  This  club  was  held  to  be 
a  tippling-house.  We  can  see,  however,  some  difference  be- 
tween the  Albany  club  and  the  club  under  consideration  in  the 
present  case,  for  the  latter  club,  according  to  the  evidence,  was 
thoroughly  exclusive,  and  under  no  circumstances  could  per- 
sons other  than  those  enjoying  membership  therein  partake  of 
its  benefits.  It  does  not  appear,  however,  from  the  evidence, 
that  any  limitation  was  put  upon  its  membership. 

The  object  of  the  general  assembly  in  passipg  this  statute,  as 
was  said  by  Warner,  J,  in  Hall  v.  State,  3  Ga.  18,  "was  to  re- 
move ''*'*  all  temptation  to  idle  and  dissolute  persons  who  might 
de  disposed  to  congregate  at  such  places,  and  violate  the  Sabbath 
by  any  improper  conduct."  It  was  said  in  Sanders  v.  State,  74 
Ga.  88,  that  "the  purpose  of  the  act  was  not  only  to  close  up 
such  establishments  on  Sunday,  in  deference  to  the  finer  and 
better  feelings  of  orderly  and  well-disposed  people,  but  to  re- 
move this  incitement  to  graver  and  more  dangerous  violations 
of  the  law." 

It  is  rather  difficult  to  embrace  within  ons  comprehensive 
definition  every  class  of  resort  which  could  properly  be  called  a 
tipplinir-honse.  Judge  "Rlrrklfv.  in  i\finor  v.  State,  fi3  Ga.  318, 
Bays  that  "it  is  something  easier  for  an  offender  to  baffle  the  die- 


Nov.  1898.]  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  79 

tionary  than  the  Penal  Code,  for  the  former  is  perplexed  with 
verbal  niceties  and  shades  of  meaning,  while  the  latter  grasps 
in  a  broad,  practical  way  at  the  substantial  transactions  of  men. 
The  code  offers  no  definition  of  a  tippling-house.  It  deals  with 
them  as  establishments  too  well  known  to  need  description,  and 
simply  prescribes  a  penalty  for  keeping  them  open  on  the  Sab- 
bath day  or  Sabbath  night."  According  to  Black's  Law  Dic- 
tionary, a  tippling-house  is  "a  place  where  intoxicating  drinks 
are  sold  in  drams  of  small  quantities  to  be  drunk  on  the  prem- 
ises." Anderson  says  it  is  "a  place  of  public  resort  where  spiiv 
ituous,  fermented,  or  other  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold  or 
drunk  in  small  quantities  without  a  license  therefor."  Also, 
"a  public  drinking-house — where  intoxicating  liquor  is  either 
sold  by  drams  to  the  public,  or  else  given  away  and  imbibed": 
Anderson's  Law  Dictionary,  "tippling-house."  The  house  un- 
der consideration  in  the  present  case  comes  within  the  letter  of 
the  definition  first  quoted,  and  within  the  spirit,  at  least,  of  the 
last :  See,  also.  Black  on  Litoxicating  Liquors,  sec.  20.  But,  as 
Judge  "Warner,  quoting  from  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  says  in 
Hall  V.  Slate,  3  Ga.  18,  "although  penal  laws  are  to  be  construed 
strictly,  they  are  not  to  be  construed  so  strictly  as  to  defeat  the 
obvious  intention  of  the  legislature."  And  in  Sanders  v.  State, 
74  Ga.  82,  we  find  the  following:  "Courts  are  not  very  astute 
in  shielding  violators  of  this  provision  from  punishment  by  re- 
sorting to  niceties  of  verbal  criticism,  such  as  would  be  intelli- 
gible only  to  grammarians  and  fastidious  scholars,  but  would 
utterly  fail  to  impress  less  "^^^  cultivated  minds  and  tastes,  in 
order  to  provide  for  them  a  way  to  escape." 

Even  if  a  sale  is  necessary  before  a  place  where  liquors  are  fur- 
nished can  be  characterized  as  a  tippling-house,  the  weight  of 
modem  authority  seems  to  be,  that  such  a  furnishing  as  the  evi- 
dence in  the  present  case  discloses  is  a  sale.  In  the  case  of 
State  V.  Lockyear,  95  N.  C.  633,  59  Am.  Eep.  287,  a  number  of 
persons  organized  a  club  for  social  and  literary  purposes,  and  be- 
came duly  incorporated.  Incidental  to  the  main  purpose  of  the 
organization,  the  members,  but  no  other  persons,  were  permit- 
ted to  purchase  from  the  defendant,  its  steward,  liquors  and 
other  articles,  which  were  furnished  by  the  club  at  a  price  fixed 
by  its  officers,  sufficient  to  cover  the  cost,  but  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  profit.  It  was  there  held  that  the  furnishing  of  liquors 
to  the  members  of  the  club,  under  these  circumstances,  was  a 
sale,  in  violation  of  the  local  option  act.  In  the  opinion  Chief 
Justice  Smith  uses  this  language:  "There  can  be  no  question 


80  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  [Georgia, 

that  in  a  strict  legal  sense  the  transaction  described  in  the  ver- 
dict is  a  sale  of  spirituous  liquors.  All  the  elements  of  an  exe- 
cuted contract  are  present.  The  corporate  body,  a  legal  entity, 
and  the  owner  of  the  liquor,  through  its  servant,  the  defendant, 
delivers  it  to  the  purchaser  at  his  call,  and  receives  a  fixed  com- 
pensation in  money  therefor.  The  property  in  the  goods  passes 
and  vests  in  the  purchaser,  and  the  money  paid  is  received  for 
and  becomes  the  property  of  the  club.  Can  there  be  any  doubt 
that  a  corporation  may  make  contracts  and  deal  with  a  corpora- 
tor, precisely  as  with  a  stranger,  and  valid  obligations,  capable 
of  enforcement,  be  thus  formed  between  the  parties?  And  is 
not  this  dealing  with  the  prohibited  subject  directly  within  the 
terms  of  the  statute,  and  does  it  not  open  the  door  to  the  mis- 
chiefs intended  to  be  suppressed?  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
vendor  should  be  authorized  to  sell  to  any  applicant,  as  an  ordi- 
nary retailer.  He  is  not  allowed  to  sell  to  anyone,  and  the  fact 
that  customers  must  be  members  of  the  association  does  not  re- 
lieve him  from  criminal  responsibility  under  the  mandatory 
statute."  In  the  opinion  will  be  found  several  citations  of 
authority  supporting  the  ruling  there  made:  See,  also,  State  v. 
Keis,  108  N.  C.  787.  ''^^  Substantially  the  same  ruling  has 
been  made  in  New  York:  People  v.  Sinell,  58  Hun,  607;  12 
K  Y.  Supp.  40;  People  v.  Bradley,  58  Hun,  601;  11  N.  Y.  Supp. 
594.  At  the  conclusion  of  his  opinion  in  State  v.  Essex  Club, 
53  N.  J.  L.  99,  Van  Syckel,  J.,  says  that:  "It  is  wholly  imma- 
terial whether  the  sale  is  made  in  open  view  to  all  who  apply, 
or  in  the  most  secluded  place,  to  which  only  the  trusted  few  can 
gain  admittance.  The  penalty  of  the  statute  is  denounced 
against  the  sale  without  license,  whether  in  public  or  private. 
The  prohibited  act  is  the  sale  without  license,  and,  in  my  opin- 
ion, the  admitted  facts  show  that  such  sale  was  made  by  the 
defendant  below  in  contravention  of  the  law":  See,  also,  Martin 
V.  State,  59  Ala.  34;  People  v.  Soule,  74  Mich.  250;  Kentucky 
Club  V,  Louisville,  92  Ky.  309;  State  v.  Horacek,  41  Kan.  87. 
There  are  cases  which  hold  that  the  furnishing  of  liquors  under 
circumstances  similar  to  those  in  the  present  case  is  not  a  sale, 
and  we  do  not  attempt  to  reconcile  thera.  We  think,  however, 
that  the  better  view  is  the  one  supported  by  the  authorities 
above  cited,  the  reasoning  of  which  seems  to  be  conclusive. 

In  this  state,  a  sale  is  not  necessary,  as  has  been  shown,  to 
make  out  the  offense  of  keeping  open  a  tippling-house  on  the 
Sabbath.    Does  the  statute,  fairly  construed,  embrace  within  its 


Nov.  1898.]  MoHRMAN  V.  State.  81 

terms  a  house  of  the  character  described  in  the  present  case? 
We  think  so.  The  statute  intended  that  all  places  where  per- 
sons are  accustomed  to  congregate  and  drink  intoxicating  liq- 
uors should  be  closed  on  the  Sabbath  day.  The  fact  that  liquors 
are  furnished  to  a  hundred  designated  persons,  and  no  others, 
makes  the  place  where  such  liquors  are  supplied  none  the  less 
a  tippling-house.  It  is  still  a  place  where  men  congregate  for 
the  purpose  of  drinking  intoxicants.  There  is  no  limitation 
placed  upon  the  membership  of  the  club  over  which  the  plaintiff 
in  error  exercised  a  general  superintendence;  it  is  one  hundred 
now,  and  next  year  mpy  be  five  hundred.  It  is  not  unfair  to 
assume  that  some,  at  least,  of  its  membership  are  accustomed  to 
congregate  at  the  club-rooms  on  the  Sabbath  day  for  the  sol© 
purpose  of  procuring  intoxicating  drinks.  To  hold  that  such  a 
place  was  not  a  tippling-house  would  be  doing  violence  to  the 
''*'"  statute,  and  would  defeat,  in  a  large  measure,  the  very  ob- 
ject for  which  it  was  enacted;  that  is,  to  prevent  persons  congre- 
gating and  imbibing  intoxicants  on  the  Sabbath  day.  It  was 
claimed  by  counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error,  in  his  brief,  that  the 
Grabemax  Social  Club  of  Augusta  was  "a  respectable  place  to 
which  the  public  has  not  access,  in  which  members  of  a  club 
owning  the  resort  meet  for  social  ends,  and  merely  drink  as  an 
incident  of  being  there."  This  may  be  true,  but  it  is  neverthe- 
less a  tippling-house  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and 
must  be  closed  on  the  Sabbath  day. 
Judgment  affirmed. 

All  the  justices  concurring,   except  Simmons,   C.  J.,   and 
Lumpkin,  P.  J.,  absent. 

SOCIAL  CLUBS-SALE  OP  LIQUOR— CRIMINAL  LIABILITY. 
The  question  whether  or  not  the  furnishing  of  intoxicating  or  fer- 
mented liquor  by  a  social  or  literary  club  to  its  members  constitutes 
a  sale  in  violation  of  laws  prohibiting  sales,  or  whether  or  not  it 
constitutes  a  sale  within  the  meaning  of  a  law  requiring  a  iiconsw 
before  one  can  engnge  In  retailing  such  liquor,  has  been  the  subject 
of  various  and  conflicting  decisions  by  the  courts.  While  the  cases 
cannot  be  reconciled,  the  current,  as  well  as  the  weight  of  author- 
ity is  undoubtedly  in  favor  of  the  rule  that  the  distribution  antl 
consumption  of  liquors  In  a  club  by  its  members  is  a  sale,  and  a 
violation  of  the  laws  of  the  nature  stated:  Monographic  note  ta 
Barden  v.  Montana  Clubj  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  So-.'O,  where  the  cases  are 
collected.  Thef  doctrine  of  the  principal  case  lb  Alao  sustained  by 
State  v.  Ixjckyear,  95  N.  C.  0.^3:  ."9  Am.  Rep.  2S7.  As  holding  a 
contrary  doctrine,  that  a  social  club  is  not  within  the  meaning  of 
statiites  restraining  or  regulating  the  sale  of  Intoxicating  liquors, 
see  Klein  v.  Livingston  Club.  177  Pa.  St.  224;  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  717; 
People  V.  AdelphI  Club.  149  N.  Y.  5;  52  Am.  St  Rep.  700;  Columbia 
Au.  St.  Kkp.,  Vol.  LXX.-« 


82  Williams  v.  State.  [Georgia, 

Club  V.  McMaster,  35  S.  C.  1;  28  Am.  St  Rep.  826;  Barden  v.  Mon- 
tana Club,  10  Mont.  330;  24  Am,  St.  Rep.  27;  Commonwealtb  v.  Pom- 
phret,  137  Mass.  564;  50  Am.  Rep.  340.  As  holding  that  the  officei-s 
of  a  social  club  are  not  criminally  liable  for  selling  liquors  on  Sun- 
day in  violation  of  a  statute,  see  Seim  v.  State,  55  Md.  566;  39  Am. 
Rep.  419. 


Williams  v.  State. 

[105  Georgia,  814.] 

LARCENY.— HOUSE— WHAT  IB.— A  structure  eight  feet 
high,  stationary,  inclosed  with  wire  and  covered  with  shingles,  and, 
maintained  for  the  safekeeping  of  birds  and  fowls,  is  a  house  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  defining  larceny  from  a  house  or  any  build- 
ing. 

C.  J.  Thornton  and  A.  E.  Thornton,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

E.  J.  W)'nn,  solicitor  for  the  state. 

^^'*'  LITTLE,  J.  An  accusation  was  preferred  in  the  city 
court  of  Columbus  against  the  plaintiff  in  error,  charging  him 
with  the  offense  of  larceny  from  the  house.  The  specific  details 
of  the  charge  made  are,  that  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  August, 
1898,  Esau  Williams,  unlawfully  and  with  force  and  arms, 
certain  pigeons  of  the  value  of  one  dollar,  the  property  of  Frank 
Kirven,  in  the  chicken-house  of  one  R.  M.  Kirven,  feloniously 
and  wrongfully,  with  intent  to  steal  said  pigeons,  did  take  and 
carry  away,  et  cetera.  The  defendant  entered  a  plea  of  not 
guilty;  and  at  the  trial  one  of  the  questions  was  whether  or  not 
the  pigeons  were  taken  from  a  house.  The  prosecutor  testified 
that  he  had  a  large  number  of  pigeons  in  a  coop,  from  which 
a  number  were  stolen.  In  describing  the  coop  he  testified  that 
it  was  a  chicken-house;  that  the  house  was  made  of  wire,  and 
was  about  eight  feet  tall,  two  stories,  covered  with  shingles;  that 
while  he  called  it  a  coop,  it  was  really  a  chicken-house;  that  it 
was  nailed  to  the  fence;  it  could  not  be  moved  about;  that  the 
posts  that  held  it  were  not  in  the  ground,  but  that  the  structure 
was  stationary.  That  is  all  the  testimony  that  related  to  the 
house  from  which  it  was  alleged  that  the  property  was  stolen. 
There  was  other  evidence  which  tended  to  show,  that  the  plain- 
tiff in  error  privately  took  the  pigeons  from  this  structure;  and 
when  the  state  closed  its  testimony  the  defendant  moved  the 
court  to  order  a  discharge  of  the  prisoner,  upon  the  ground  that 
**°  the  accusation  charged  the  pigeons  to  have  been  stolen  from 
a  chicken-house  and  the  proof  showed  that  it  was  not  a  chicken- 


Nov.  1898.]  Williams  v.  Statb.  83 

house,  but  a  chicken-coop;  and  that  the  probata  did  not  follow 
the  allegata.  The  court  refused  the  motion,  and  the  plaintiff 
in  error  excepted. 

Assuming'  that  the  judg'e  has  the  right  to  direct  a  verdict  at 
the  close  of  the  evidence  introduced  by  the  state,  whenever  the 
same  is  plainly  insufficient  to  sustain  a  verdict  of  guilty,  then 
the  only  question  which  we  are  to  decide  is,  whether  the  evi- 
dence establishes  the  fact  that  the  pigeons  were  stolen  from  a 
house.  Section  179  of  the  Penal  Code  provides  that:  "Any  per- 
son who  shall,  in  any  dwelling-hous'e,  store,  shop,  warehouse,  or 
any  other  building,  privately  steal  any  money,  or  any  other 
thing,  under  the  value  of  fifty  dollars,  shall  be  punished  as  for 
&  misdemeanor."  The  language  of  this  section  is  very  broad; 
and  a  punishment  is  not  only  prescribed  for  a  larceny  from  the 
dwelling-house,  store,  shop,  or  warehouse,  but  from  any  other 
building.  A  building  is  defined  to  be  "an  edifice  for  any  use; 
that  which  is  built,  as  a  dwelling-house,  barn,  et  cetera" :  Stand- 
ard Dictionary.  The  structure  from  which  the  pigeons  were 
taken,  as  shown  by  the  evidence  in  this  case,  was  about  eight 
feet  high,  stationary,  inclosed  with  wire  and  covered  with  shin- 
gles. The  fact  that  it  was  inclosed  with  wire  instead  of  other 
material,  in  our  judgment,  makes  no  difference;  and  it  comes 
plainly  under  the  definition  of  a  house,  as  used  in  our  statute. 

Speaking  for  myself,  I  am  not  aware  of  any  law  in  this  state 
which  either  requires  or  allows  a  trial  judge,  on  motion,  to  or- 
der the  discharge  of  the  accused  during  trial  and  before  verdict, 
for  the  want  of  evidence  to  convict.  It  is  the  province  of  the 
jury  to  determine,  under  instructions  from  the  court,  whether 
the  evidence  sufficiently  shows  the  guilt  of  the  accused  to  au- 
thorize a  conviction.  If,  for  any  reason,  a  conviction  is  had  un- 
der insufficient  evidence,  the  person  convicted  has  his  remedy 
under  the  provisions  of  law  to  have  such  verdict  set  aside.  In 
the  trial  of  a  criminal  case,  as  I  understand  the  law  of  this  state, 
the  weight  of  the  evidence,  in  the  first  instance,  is  to  be  passed 
upon  by  the  jury  exclusively,  and  the  jury  is  the  tribunal  created 
by  law  to  say  whether  the  accused  is  or  is  not  guilty  of  the  crime. 
*****  I  cannot  sanction  the  practice  which  has  grown  up  in  this 
state  for  judges  who  preside  at  the  trial  of  criminal  cases,  in  ad- 
vance of  a  verdict,  to  pass  upon  the  evidence  in  the  case.  And 
this  without  any  regard  to  the  practice  which  obtains  in  other 
jurisdictions.  Section  5331  of  the  Civil  Code,  which  authorises 
the  judge,  in  certain  instances,  to  direct  a  verdict,  applies  ex- 
clusively to  civil  cases,  and  was  codified  from  the  opinion  of  this 


84  Williams  v.  State,  [Georgia, 

court  rendered  in  the  case  of  Hooks  v.  Frick,  76  Ga.  715;  and 
while  I  fully  recognize  the  rule  there  laid  down  as  being  th& 
established  law  of  this  state,  such  rule,  even  in  civil  cases,  ought 
not  to  be  extended  beyond  the  plain  and  literal  meaning  of  the 
words  used  in  the  section. 

We  are  all  of  the  opinion  that  no  error  was  committed  by  tho 
presiding  judge  in  his  ruling;  and  the  judgment  is  aflBrmed. 

All  the  justices  concurring,  except  Simmons,  C.  J.,  and  Lump- 
kin, P.  J.,  absent. 

BURGLARY— BUILDING— WHAT  IS.— Under  the  Wlsconsia 
statute  relative  to  burglary,  a  building  Is  a  structure  "which  has 
capacity  to  contain,  and  is  designed  for  the  habitation  of,  man  or 
animals,  or  the  sheltering  of  property.  It  need  not  be  completed, 
if  it  is  in  condition  to  hold  tools  or  other  articles  of  personal  prop- 
erty: Clarli  V.  State,  69  Wis.  203;  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  732.  A  building 
may  be  within  the  statutory  definition,  althongh  when  the  statutei 
■was  passed  no  such  building  was  linown;  Monographic  note  to 
People  T,  Richards,  2  Am.  St  Rep.  391, 


CASES 

IN  THB 

SUPREME   COURT 

ILLINOIS. 


Walker  v.  Warner. 

[179  Illinois,  16.] 

MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION  BY 
GRANTEE  OP  MORTGAGOR.— By  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  sale 
of  the  premises,  and  master's  deed  thereunder,  the  legal  title  be- 
comes vested  in  the  grantee,  leaving  nothing  In  the  mortgagor  or 
his  grantee  to  whom  he  has  conveyed  before  the  commencement 
of  the  foreclosure  proceeding,  but  to  which  the  latter  Is  not  made 
a  party,  except  the  right  of  redemption,  which  must  be  asserted  In 
a  court  of  equity. 

MORTGAGES  — FORECLOSURE-  REDEMPTION- 
LACHES.— Whether  an  equitable  right  to  redeem  from  a  foreclos- 
nre  sale  has  been  lost  by  laches  must  be  determined  with  reference 
to  the  date  of  the  amended  petition  praying  redemption,  when  the 
original  petition  seei^s  to  establish  a  fee  simple  title  in  the  com- 
plainant. 

MORTGAGES- FORECLOSURE -RE  DEMPTION— 
LACHES.— An  equitable  right  to  redeem  from  a  foreclosure  sale 
may  be  lost  by  laches  unless  asserted  within  a  reasonable  time, 
and  before  the  situation  of  the  parties  has  changed,  and  the  righta 
of  others  have  intervened,  or  Improvements  have  been  made. 

MORTGAGES  — FORECLOSURE  — REDEMPTION- 
LACHES— LIMITATIONS.— In  determining  whether  there  has  been 
laches  In  exercising  a  right  of  redemption  from  a  mortgage  fore- 
closure, a  court  of  equity  is  not  necessarily  controlled  by  the  per- 
iod of  limitations  as_ fixed  in  actions  at  law.  A  delay  for  a  much 
less  time  than  that  "prescribed  by  the  statute  of  limitations  may, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  be  held  to  be  laches, 
and  a  bar  to  the  right  of  redemption. 

MORTGAGES— F  ORECLOSURB  —REDEMPTION— 
LACHES.— An  equity  of  redemption  from  a  mortgage  foreclosure 
cannot  be  enforced  when  all  parties  have  supposed  that  the  fore- 
closure was  good,  and  the  holder  of  the  equity  of  redemption  has 
abandoned  the  premises  and  all  claim  to  them,  never  paying  any 
taxes  or  offering  to  redeem,  until  after  a  series  of  years,  when  the 
property  had  passed  through  many  hands  and  had  become  valuable. 


86  Walker  v.  Warner.  [Illinois^ 

MORTGAGES— PAYMENTS— LIMITATIONS.— The  effect  of 
payments  upon  a  mortgage  debt  must  be  determined  by  the  stat- 
ute in  force  at  tlie  time  they  were  made,  with  reference  to  the  toll- 
ing of  the  statute  of  limitations,  although  the  mortgage  was  exe- 
cuted prior  to  such  time. 

Wilson^  Moore  &  Mcllvaine,  for  the  appellant. 

L.  F.  English,  C.  V.  Gwin,  J.  Fentress,  E.  Dunlap,  and  E.  D. 
Kenna,  for  the  appellees. 

22  MAGEUDER,  J.  The  original  petition  in  this  case  al- 
leges that  appellant  is  the  owner  in  fee  simple  of  the  premises 
claimed  by  him,  and  asks  that  his  title  as  such  owner  be  estab- 
lished and  confirmed.  The  amended  petition  is  so  framed  a? 
to  be  a  bill  to  redeem  from  the  foreclosure  sale.  The  prayer  of 
the  amended  petition  is,  that  if  the  purchaser  at  the  foreclosure 
sale,  or  his  assigns,  have  any  lien  or  charge  upon  said  premises, 
the  amount  thereof  may  be  ascertained,  and  appellant  may  b& 
permitted  to  pay  the  samel 

Samuel  J.  Walker  wa^  the  mortgagor,  who  executed  the  Stew- 
art mortgage.  On  August  27,  1873,  he  sold  and  conveyed  a  part 
of  the  premises  subject  to  that  mortgage  to  George  J.  Sher- 
man. When  the  Stewart  mortgage  was  foreclosed,  Samuel  J. 
Walker,  the  mortgagor,  was  made  a  party  defendant,  but  his 
grantee,  Sherman,  was  not  made  a  party  defendant.  Sherman 
acquired  his  interest  by  deed  from  'W'alker  more  than  five  years 
before  the  foreclosure  proceeding  was  begun,  the  foreclosure  bill 
having  been  filed  on  January  6,  1879. 

2^  It  is  contended  by  the  appellant  that,  as  Sherman  was  not 
made  a  party  to  the  foreclosure  proceeding,  the  sale  thereunder 
was  utterly  void  as  to  him,  and  as  to  appellant,  his  grantee. 
Appellant  does  not  allege  in  his  petition  that  either  Samuel  J. 
Walker,  or  Sherman,  or  he  himself,  paid  the  Stewart  mortgage 
or  any  part  thereof,  or  that  he  or  Sherman  has  offered  to  redeem 
from  the  sale  under  the  Stewart  mortgage,  but  insists  that  the 
purchaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale  acquired  only  a  right  of  subroga- 
tion, which  right  has  been  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations; 
and  that,  by  reason  of  such  bar  and  also  by  reason  of  the  alleged 
satisfaction  of  the  Stewart  mortgage  by  the  foreclosure  sale,  ap- 
pellant's title  has  ripened  into  an  absolute  fee  simple  title.  Un- 
doubtedly, Sherman,  as  the  grantee  of  the  equity  of  redemp- 
tion, should  have  been  m'ade  a  party  to  the  foreclosure  suit. 
His  rights  could  not  be  cut  off  by  that  proceeding,  unless  he 
was  made  a  party  thereto.    But  the  decree  of  foreclosure  wa» 


April,  1899.]  Walker  v.  Warner.  87 

not,  for  that  reason,  a  void  decree.  Sherman  was  still  the 
owner  of  the  equity  of  redemption.  As  the  court  obtained  no 
jurisdiction  over  him  in  the  foreclosure  suit,  his  rights  remained 
unaffected  by  it.  The  right,  however,  which  thus  remained  un- 
affected, was  simply  a  right  to  redeem :  Cutter  v.  Jones,  52  111, 
84;  2  Jones  on  Mortgages,  5th  ed.,  sec.  1048. 

Samuel  J.  Walker  could  invest  his  grantee,  Sherman,  with  no 
greater  title  than  he  himself  possessed.  The  purchaser  of  the 
mortgaged  premises  from  the  mortgagor  stands  in  the  shoes  of 
the  mortgagor,  and  is  charged  with  notice  of  the  mortgage  and 
its  legal  effect.  He  merely  succeeds  to  the  rights  of  the  mort- 
gagor. The  failure  to  make  him  a  party  to  the  proceeding  to 
foreclose  the  mortgage  does  not  affect  the  validity  of  the  decree, 
but  simply  leaves  his  right  of  redemption  unimpaired.  The 
original  mortgagor,  Samuel  J.  Walker,  was  a  party  to  the  fore- 
closure decree,  and,  as  there  is  no  claim  that  the  sale  was  not 
fair  and  regular,  the  purchaser  at  the  sale  and  his  **  grantees 
should  be  protected.  The  purchaser  at  the  sale  under  the  de- 
cree of  foreclosure  takes  the  interests  of  the  defendants,  and 
also  of  the  mortgagee,  divested  of  any  equity  of  redemption  on 
the  part  of  all  persons  who  are  parties.  Although  the  grantee 
of  the  mortgagor,  who  is  not  a  party,  is  not  affected,  yet  his  in- 
terest, which  remains  the  same,  is  only  a  right  to  redeem.  By 
the  foreclosure  and  sale  and  the  master's  deed  thereunder,  the 
legal  title  becomes  vested  in  the  grantee  in  such  deed,  and 
leaves  nothing  in  the  mortgagor,  or  his  grantees,  who  are  not 
parties  to  the  proceeding,  except  the  right  to  redeem  in  equity. 
Inasmuch  as  the  interest  of  the  grantee  of  the  mortgagor,  who 
is  not  made  a  party  to  the  foreclosure,  is  merely  a  right  of  re- 
demption, the  right  which  he  has  is  an  equitable  one,  and  must 
be  asserted  in  a  court  of  equity.  The  views  thus  expressed  are 
sustained  by  the  following  authorities:  Carroll  v.  Ballance,  26 
111.  9;  79  Am.  Dec.  354;  Oldham  v.  Pfleger,  84  111.  102;  Taylor 
V.  Adams,  115  111.  570;  Rose  v.  Walk,  149  111.  60;  Cutter  v. 
Jones,  52  111.  84;  Kelgour  v.  Wood,  64  HI.  345;  Kenyon  v. 
Shreck,  52  111.  382;  West  v.  Reed,  55  111.  242;  Seaman  v.  Bisbee, 
163  111.  91;  Barrett  v.  Hinckley,  124  111.  32;  7  Am.  St.  Rep. 
331;  Mulvey  v.  Gibbons,  87  111.  367;  Bryan  v.  Kales,  162  U.  S. 
411 ;  Bryan  v.  Brasius,  162  U.  S.  415. 

•  By  the  foreclosure  sale  to  McCoy,  and  the  execution  of  the 
master's  deed  to  Steele,  who  obtained  the  certificate  of  sale  from 
McCoy  by  assignment,  the  legal  title  passed  to  Steele,  subject 


88  Walker  v.  Warner.  [Illinois, 

only  to  a  right  of  redemption  in  Sherman,  who  w&s  not  made  a 
party  to  the  foreclosure  proceeding. 

Inasmuch  aa  the  only  right  which  Sherman  had  after  the 
foreclosure  sale  was  a  right  of  redemption,  the  question  arises 
whether  or  not  that  right  was  barred  or  lost  when  the  amended 
and  engrossed  petition  was  filed  in  this  case  on  May  8,  1897. 
It  is  a  difficult  question  to  determine,  and  is  left  in  much  un- 
certainty by  the  authorities,  as  to  when  an  equitable  right  of 
redemption  is  barred,  especially  where  the  redemption  is  to  be 
made  from  a  mortgage,  or  a  sale  under  the  foreclosure  thereof, 
where  ^^  the  claimant  of  the  right  of  redemption  has  not  been 
made  a  party  to  the  proceeding.  In  determining  whether,  in 
this  case,the  right  has  been  barred  the  time  of  filing  the  amended 
petition,  to  wit,  May  8,  1897,  and  not  the  time  of  filing  the 
original  petition,  to  wit,  May  21,  1896,  is  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration. The  original  petition  was  not  a  bill  to  redeem,  but 
a  bill  to  establish  title.  There  was  no  prayer  asking  for  the 
exercise  of  the  right  of  redemption,  until  the  filing  of  the 
amended  petition.  The  appellant  abandoned  the  case  made  by 
his  original  bill  or  petition,  and  made  a  new  and  different  case 
by  way  of  amendment,  thus  making  use  of  the  privilege  of 
amending,  in  order  to  make  an  entirely  new  bill:  Shields  v. 
Barrow,  17  How.  130.  As,  therefore,  the  amendment  to  the 
original  petition  transformed  it  into  a  bill  to  redeem,  we  must 
regard  the  date  of  the  filing  of  the  amended  petition  as  the  date 
when  the  prayer  for  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  redemption  was 
first  made.  Whatever  may  be  the  period  of  time  within  which 
the  appellant  ought  to  have  exercised  his  right  of  redemption, 
that  period  must  be  calculated  with  reference  to  the  date  of 
filing  the  amended  petition. 

The  right  of  redemption  being  a  purely  equitable  estate,  a 
court  of  chancery  will  not  protect  and  enforce  it  unless  equita- 
ble considerations  require  it  to  do  so.  As  the  right  is  the  crea- 
tion of  a  court  of  chancery,  it  can  only  be  asserted  in  such 
court  when  its  assertion  is  plainly  equitable:  West  v.  Reed,  55 
111.  242;  Kenyon  v.  Shreck,  52  111.  382.  It  may,  therefore,  be 
lost,  unless  it  is  asserted  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  before 
the  situation  of  the  parties  has  changed,  and  the  rights  of  others 
have  intervened,  or  improvements  have  been  made.  In  other 
words,  the  right  may  be  lost  by  laches.  In  the  recent  case  of ' 
McDearmon  v.  Burnham,  158  111.  65,  62,  we  said:  '^^en  a 
court  of  equity  is  asked  to  lend  its  aid  in  the  enforcement  of  a 
demand  that  has  become  stale,  there  must  be  some  cogent  and 


April,  1899.]  Walker  v.  Warner.  89 

weighty  reasons  presented  why  it  has  been  permitted  *^  to  be- 
come so.  Good  faith,  conscience,  and  reasonable  diligence  of 
the  party  seeking  its  relief  are  the  elements  that  call  a  court 
of  equity  into  activity.  In  the  absence  of  these  elements,  the 
court  remains  passive,  and  declines  to  extend  its  relief  or  aid.** 

In  determining  whether  there  has  been  laches  in  the  matter 
of  exercising  a  right  of  redemption,  a  court  of  equity  is  not  nec- 
essarily controlled  by  the  period  of  limitation  as  fixed  in  actions 
at  law.  A  delay  for  a  much  less  period  than  that  prescribed  by 
the  statute  of  limitations  will,  according  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  be  held  to  be  laches  and  a  bar  to  the  right  of  re- 
demption: Williams  v.  Rhodes,  81  111.  571.  Where  there  has 
been  a  defective  foreclosure,  the  equity  of  redemption  will  not 
be  permitted  to  be  asserted  against  a  superior  equity,  or  an 
equity  still  stronger:  Mulvey  v.  Gibbons,  87  111.  367. 

In  the  present  case,  the  debt  secured  by  the  mortgage  to 
Stewart  was  due  on  December  1,  1866.  When  the  present  bill 
to  redeem  was  filed  on  May  8,  1897,  more  than  thirty  years  had 
elapsed  since  the  maturity  of  the  debt  secured  by  the  Stewart 
mortgage.  More  than  twenty-three  years  had  elapsed  since  the 
last  partial  payment  on  September  30,  1873,  had  been  made 
upon  that  mortgage.  More  than  eighteen  years  had  elapsed  since 
the  proceeding  to  foreclose  the  mortgage  was  instituted,  to  wit, 
January  6,  1879;  nearly  sixteen  years  had  elapsed  since  the  de- 
cree of  foreclosure  was  entered  on  December  12,  1881.  Sher- 
man obtained  his  deed  from  Samuel  J,  Walker  on  August  27, 
1873.  He  held  the  title  for  twenty  years  until  August  18,  1893, 
when  he  made  a  deed  to  the  present  appellant.  Sherman  was 
affected  with  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  mortgage  when  he 
obtained  his  deed  from  Walker.  For  a  period  of  twenty  years 
he  held  the  title  without  making  any  payment  whatever  upon 
the  mortgage  debt.  The  appellant  waited  nearly  four  years 
after  obtaining  his  deed  from  Sherman  before  he  filed  this  peti- 
tion or  bill  to  redeem.  When  the  bill  was  filed  *''  more  than 
fifteen  years  had  elapsed  since  the  property  was  sold  under  the 
foreclosure  decree  by  the  master  in  chancery  on  January  28, 
1882.  The  master's  deed  to  Steele  was  executed  on  April  9, 
1887,  and  more  than  ten  years  had  elapsed  after  that  date  before 
the  filing  of  the  bill  to  redeem.  Neither  Sherman,  nor  the  ap- 
pellant, paid  any  taxes  upon  the  land  after  January  6,  1879, 
when  the  bill  to  foreclose  was  filed,  nor,  so  far  as  appears,  did 
Sherman  pay  any  taxes  prior  to  the  filing  of  the  bill  to  fore- 
close.   In  the  meantime,  Nelson  A.  Steele,  who  obtain'n'  the 


9J  Walker  v.  Warner.  [Illinois, 

master's  deed,  had  parted  with  his  interest  to  the  appellees  here- 
in. The  appellees,  who  are  railroad  companies,  had  acquired  a 
right  of  way  through  the  property  in  question,  and  laid  down 
their  tracks  about  six  years  before  the  present  bill  was  filed. 
The  failure  of  the  appellant  and  his  grantor,  Sherman,  to  pay 
taxes  or  make  any  payments  upon  the  mortgage  would  indicate 
an  abandonment  of  the  property  on  their  part.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  would  be  inequitable  to  allow  a  redemption. 
The  equity  of  redemption  cannot  be  enforced  where  there  has 
been  an  attempted  foreclosure,  and  all  parties  have  supposed 
that  the  foreclosure  was  good,  and  the  holder  of  the  equity  of 
redemption  has  abandoned  the  premises  and  all  claim  to  them, 
never  paying  any  taxes  or  offering  to  redeem  until  after  a  series 
of  years,  when  the  property  has  passed  through  many  hands  for 
full  value,  and  has  become  valuable:  Mulvey  v.  Gibbons,  87  111. 
367. 

In  some  cases,  it  is  said  that  the  right  to  redeem  and  the 
right  to  foreclose  are  mutual  and  reciprocal,  and  that  when  the 
one  is  barred  the  other  is  barred.  This  proposition,  rightly 
understood,  only  means  that,  if  the  instrument  be  a  mortgage 
with  one  party,  it  must  be  a  mortgage  with  both;  that  it  can- 
not be  a  mortgage  on  one  side  only,  but  must  be  a  mortgage 
with  both  parties:  Bradley  v.  ISTorris,  63  Minn.  156;  Locke  v. 
Caldwell,  91  111.  417;  Jackson  v.  Lynch,  129  111.  72;  Green  v. 
Capps,  142  111.  286.  So  long  as  the  relation  of  mortgagee  and 
mortgagor  exists  the  right  ^^  of  redemption  exists.  It  seems 
to  be  assumed  by  counsel  for  appellant  that,  as  the  appellees 
eucceeded  to  the  rights  of  the  mortgagees  by  reason  of  holding 
under  the  purchaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale,  the  relation  of  the 
appellees,  as  such  mortgagees,  to  the  appellant,  as  mortgagor, 
or  as  holding  under  the  mortgagor,  continued  to  exist  by  rea- 
son of  the  fact  that  appellees  took  possession  of  the  property 
in  1891,  a  little  more  than  five  years  before  the  filing  of  the 
amended  petition.  It  is  true  that,  after  condition  broken,  the 
mortgagee  has  two  methods  of  enforcing  the  security  for  the 
debt;  one  of  these  methods  is  by  bill  in  equity  for  the  sale  of 
the  mortgaged  property;  the  other  is  by  entry  and  possession 
of  the  property  by  the  mortgagee  and  the  application  by  him 
of  '^he  rents  and  profits  to  the  payment  of  the  debt  and  interest. 
When  the  mortgagee  enters  and  takes  possession  after  condition 
broken,  and  before  the  debt  is  paid  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing 
his  security,  the  relation  of  mortgagee  and  mortgagor  continues 
to  exist  and   the  mortgagee   occupies  a  position  of   trust  with 


April,  1899.]  Walker  v.  Wauner.  91 

reference  to  the  mortgagor.  But  in  the  present  case,  x'osses- 
sion  was  not  taken  by  the  purchaser  at  the  foreclosure  sale,  or 
any  of  his  grantees,  until  the  proceeding  by  foreclosure  had 
been  completed,  and  a  sale  had  been  made  and  a  master's  deed 
had  been  executed.  The  initiation  of  the  forclosure  proceed- 
ings may  have  operated  to  acknowledge  the  outstanding  right 
of  redemption  at  that  time,  but  the  culmination  of  the  proceed- 
ings and  the  deed  of  the  master  must  be  recognized  as  evidence 
of  the  assertion,  on  the  part  of  the  mortgagee  or  the  purchasers 
at  the  sale,  of  an  extinguishment  of  the  equity  of  redemption: 
Harter  v.  Twohig,  158  U.  S.  448.  The  possession  taken  in 
1891  was  not  under  the  mortgage,  but  was  adverse  to  the  rights 
of  the  mortgagor  and  his  grantees.  Such  possession  was  taken 
in  assertion  of  the  rights  of  the  purchaser  and  his  grantees,  as 
acquired  by  virtue  of  the  mortgage  sale  and  the  master's  deed. 
Even  if  the  *®  limitation  upon  the  right  to  redeem  be  re- 
garded by  analogy  as  the  same  as  the  statutory  limitation  on 
foreclosure  by  suit,  here  the  master's  deed,  executed  on  April  9, 
1887,  to  Steele  was  so  executed  more  than  ten  years  before  the 
present  bill  to  redeem  was  filed.  Under  the  limitation  law, 
suits  to  foreclose  mortgages  are  barred  within  ten  years  after 
the  right  of  action,  or  the  right  to  make  sale,  accrues.  The 
amended  petition  may  be  fairly  construed  to  allege  that  a  pay- 
ment was  made  upon  the  Steele  mortgage  as  late  as  September 
30,  1873.  This  payment  was  made  after  the  limitation  law  of 
1872  went  into  force.  Hence,  the  payment  of  September  30, 
1873,  relied  upon  as  constituting  a  new  promise  and  as  reviving 
the  debt,  revived  the  debt  for  a  period  only  of  ten  years  from 
that  date:  Drury  v.  Henderson,  143  HI.  315.  Although  this 
mortgage  was  executed  when  the  statute  of  limitations  of  1849, 
barring  the  debt  in  sixteen  years,  was  in  force,  yet,  inasmuch 
as  a  payment  was  made  after  the  act  of  1872  went  into  force, 
that  act  governed  as  to  the  time  of  the  extension  created  by  the 
payment.  It  follows  that,  even  if  Sherman  or  the  appellant  wa» 
entitled  to  redeem  from  the  mortgage  sale  for  ten  years  after 
the  execution  of  the  master's  deed,  ten  years  had  expired  before 
the  amended  bill  or  petition  in  this  case  was  filed. 

One  of  the  counsel  has  suggested  another  view  of  the  matter, 
and  that  is,  that  under  section  15  of  the  limitation  law  of  1872, 
"all  civil  actions  not  otherwise  provided  for  shall  be  commenced 
within  five  years  next  after  the  cause  of  action  accrued.'*  It  is 
urged  that  a  proceeding  to  enforce  the  right  of  redemption  i» 
a  civil  action,  and  should,  therefore,  be  commenced  within  five 


52  Walker  v.  Warner.  [Illinois, 

years  after  the  right  to  redeem  has  accrued.  If  this  view  be 
adopted,  the  five  years  had  elapsed  after  the  taking  out  of  the 
master's  deed  on  April  9,  1887,  before  May  8,  1897,  the  time 
■of  the  filing  of  the  present  bill  or  petition. 

It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  whether  we  apply  to  the  facts 
of  this  case  the  doctrine  of  laches  as  enforced  in  ^^  equity — 
which  does  not  fix  any  particular  period  for  the  termination  of 
the  right  of  redemption,  but  leaves  it  to  depend  upon  the 
equitable  circumstances  developed  in  each  case — or  the  doctrine 
that  the  limitation  of  the  right  to  redeem  in  equity  must  be 
governed,  by  analogy,  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  as  enforced 
in  actions  at  law,  or  as  applied  to  the  right  of  foreclosure,  in 
either  view,  the  appellant's  right  of  redemption  was  gone  when 
the  amended  bill  or  petition  was  filed. 

We  are,  therefore,  of  the  opinion  that  the  court  below  com- 
mitted no  error  in  sustaining  the  demurrer  to  the  petition 
filed  by  the  appellant.  Accordingly,  the  decree  of  the  circuit 
<;ourt,  dismissing  the  petition,  is  affirmed. 

MR.  JUSTICE  BOGGS  dissented  and  said:  "I  do  not  concur  In 
the  view  a  decree  of  foreclosure,  sale,  and  master's  deed  there-  • 
under  leave  nothing  in  the  grantee  of  the  mortgagor  holding  under 
a.  recorded  deed,  who  was  not  a  party  to  the  foreclosure  proceed- 
ing, except  a  right  to  redeem  in  equity.  Such  a  grantee,  by  the 
conveyance  from  the  mortgagor,  became  vested  with  the  title  to 
the  mortgaged  land  subject  to  the  lien  of  the  mortgage.  His  rlglit 
and  title  are  in  nowise  affected  by  a  decree  in  a  proceeding  to 
which  he  was  not  a  party:  Ohling  v.  Luitjens,  32  111.  23;  Duulap 
V.  Wilson,  32  111.  517;  9  Ency.  of  PI.  &  Pr.  305.  Prior  to  the  filing 
of  a  bill  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  the  grantee  of  the  mortgagor 
might  discharge  the  mortgage  lien  by  making  payment  of  the  prin- 
cipal and  interest  of  the  mortgage  debt.  The  rendition  of  a  decree 
to  which  he  is  not  a  party  has  no  efficacy  to  deprive  him  of  that 
Tight." 

MORTGAGES— FORECLOSURE— EFFECT  ON  TITLE.— A  fore- 
closure sale  divests  the  title  of  all  the  parties  to  the  suit,  and  hence 
the  mortgagor  plaintiff  therein  cannot  assert  against  the  purchaser 
tax  titles  held  by  him  prior  to  such  sale:  Ames  v.  Storer,  98  Wis. 
372;  G7  Am.  St.  Rep.  813.  Upon  a  foreclosure  sale,  the  purchaser 
takes  the  title  of  the  mortgagor  as  of  the  time  when  the  mort- 
gage lien  was  created:  Batterman  v,  Albright,  122  N.  Y.  484;  19  Am. 
St.  Rep.  510.  See,  also,  Norris  v.  He,  152  111.  190;  43  Am.  St.  Rep. 
233;  Hokanson  v.  Gunderson,  54  Minn.  499;  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  354. 

MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION  —  LIMITA- 
TIONS.— The  equity  of  redemption  is  a  creature  of  the  courts  of 
chancery,  and  is  impliedly  reserved  by  the  mortgagor.  This  re- 
served estate  belongs  to  the  mortgagor,  Is  regarded  as  an  estate 
distinct  from  the  right  vested  In  the  mortgagee,  and  is  indefinite  in 
it»  duration:  Beverly  v.  Barnitz,  55  Kan.  466;  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  257; 


April,  1899.]     Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King.  93 

Toule  V.  Richards,  1  N.  J.  Eq.  534;  23  Am.  Dec.  722.  The  time 
within  which  the  right  to  redeem  must  be  exercised  may  be  regu- 
lated by  statute,  and  In  such  a  case  the  statutory  time  is  conclu- 
sive: Whitney  v.  Hlgglns,  10  Cal.  547;  70  Am.  Dec.  748;  Cunning- 
ham V.  Hawkins,  24  Cal.  403;  85  Am.  Dec.  73. 

MORTGAGES— LIMITATIONS— EFFECT  OP  PAYMENT.— The 
bar  of  limitations  does  not  attach  to  a  mortgage  paid  in  part  un- 
til the  statutory  period  has  run  from  such  payment:  Stump  v. 
Henry,  6  Md.  201;  61  Am.  Dec.  300. 


Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company  v.  King. 

[179  Illinois,  91.] 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS.— A 
person  stealing  a  ride  on  a  railroad  train  Is  a  trespasser  and  gaina 
no  rights;  but  It  is  the  duty  of  the  railroad  company  and  Its  em- 
ployes not  to  Injure  him  willfully  or  intentionally. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES-DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS— EVI- 
DENCE OF  WILFULNESS.— Evidence  that  a  brakeman  pulled  a 
person  who  was  stealing  a  ride  on  a  railroad  train  from  under  the 
train  while  It  was  in  motion,  and  manifested  his  feeling  and  will- 
ingness to  inflict  needless  injury  by  cursing  him  and  throwing  a 
stone  at  him,  is  evidence  that  the  act  of  the  brakeman  was  willful. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS- 
LIABILITY  FOR  ACT  OP  BRAKEMAN.— A  railroad  company  is 
liable  for  the  willful  act  of  Its  brakeman  within  the  scope  of  his 
authority  in  putting  a  trespasser  off  Its  train. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  WILLFUL 
INJURY  TO  TRESPASSER.— The  negligence  of  a  trespasser  In  tak- 
ing a  position  under  the  cars  to  steal  a  ride  upon  a  train  is  not  an 
issue  In  an  action  to  recover  for  Injury  received  while  he  was  be- 
ing dragged  from  such  position  by  the  willful  act  of  a  brakeman 
while  the  train  was  In  motion. 

NEGLIGENCE.— ALTHOUGH  A  PERSON  IS  BOUND  TO 
USE  ORDINARY  CARE  to  protect  himself  against  the  known  dan- 
gers of  his  situation,  he  need  not  exercise  care  to  protect  himself 
against  an  intentional  injury  by  another  of  which  he  has  no  no- 
tice. 

TRIAL-ERRONEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.-It  is  not  ground 
for  reversal  of  a  judgment  that  an  instruction  assumes  as  proven 
a  fact  established  by  the  evidence  without  contradiction. 

W.  H.  Green  and  J.  Fentress,  for  the  appellant. 

Vemor  &  Carson  and  J.  A.  Watts,  for  appellee. 

»a  CARTWRIGHT,  J.  On  September  7,  1897,  appellee,  a 
colored  boy  thirteen  years  old,  was  stealing  a  ride  on  a  freight 
train  of  appellant  running  south  from  Ashley,  Illinois.  His 
home  was  in  Jackson,  Mississippi,  and  he  was  making  his  way 
to  said  place  in  that  way.     He  got  under  the  car  between  the 


94  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King.       [Illinois, 

box  and  the  running  gear  and  laid  down  on  the  iron  rods  which 
rnn  lengthwise  under  the  car,  and  was  nearly  midway  between 
the  ends  of  the  car.  After  the  train  started  a  brakeman 
climbed  down  from  the  side  of  the  car  further  forward,  and 
as  the  train  was  running  six  or  eight  miles  an  hour  he  ran 
along  by  the  side  of  the  car  where  appellee  was,  cursing  him, 
and  reached  under  the  car  and  caught  appellee  by  the  coat 
collar  and  pulled  him  out  and  threw  a  stone  at  him.  In  doing 
the  act,  the  right  foot  of  appellee  was  run  over  and  crushed 
so  that  it  had  to  be  amputated,  and  he  brought  this  suit  to  re- 
cover damages  for  his  injury.  In  the  first  and  third  counts  of 
his  declaration  he  alleged  that  the  servant  of  defendant  wan- 
tonly, maliciously,  and  willfully  threw  him  from  the  train  to 
the  ground,  and  in  the  second  charged  that  while  he  was  on  the 
train,  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  servants  of  the  de- 
fendant, they  forcibly  pushed  and  pulled  him  from  the  train  of 
cars  to  the  ground.  The  general  issue  was  pleaded,  and  there 
was  a  trial,  which  resulted  in  a  verdict  for  two  thousand  dollars, 
upon  which  judgment  was  entered.  The  appellate  court  af- 
firmed the  judgment. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  evidence  the  defendant  asked  the 
court  to  instruct  the  jury  to  return  a  verdict  of  not  guilty, 
and  it  is  argued  that  this  instruction  should  have  ®^  been 
given  because  there  was  a  want  of  evidence  tending  to  prove 
these  essential  facts:  1.  That  the  act  of  the  brakeman  was  will- 
ful; 2.  That  it  was  within  the  scope  of  the  duties  intrusted  to 
him  by  defendant,  so  as  to  make  defendant  liable  for  his  act. 
It  is  further  contended  the  negligence  of  plaintiff  was  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  injury. 

The  liability  of  defendant  to  plaintiff  for  his  injury  is  not 
founded  upon  any  duty  or  obligation  imposed  by  law  arising 
out  of  the  relations  of  the  parties.  Duties  may  arise  from  con- 
tracts or  from  relative  situations  in  which  parties  are  brought 
where  they  have  relative  rights,  and  here  there  was  no  right  or 
corresponding  duty  arising  out  of  such  relation.  Plaintiff  was 
a  trespasser,  and  defendant  owed  him  no  duty  other  than  such 
as  it  owed  to  any  stranger.  But  although  he  was  a  trespasser 
he  did  not  forfeit  the  right  which  inheres  in  every  person  as 
against  every  other  person,  in  all  conditions,  that  defendant 
should  not  willfully  and  intentionally  inflict  an  injury  upon 
him.  The  violation  of  the  corresponding  duty  not  to  inflict  a 
willful  or  intentional  injury  is  usually  punished  as  a  public 
wrong,  and  the  person  injured  may  also  recover  for  the  private 


April,  1899.]      Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kino.  95 

injury.  Although  plaintiff  gained  no  right  by  being  upon  de- 
fendant's train  as  trespasser,  and  was  wrongfully  there,  it  waa 
the  duty  of  defendant  not  to  injure  him  willfully  or  intention- 
ally: Illinois  Cent.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Godfrey,  71  111.  500;  23  Am. 
Eep.  112. 

There  was  evidence  tending  to  prove  that  the  act  of  the 
brakeman  was  willful.  He  pulled  the  plaintiff  from  under  the 
cars  when  the  train  was  running  at  a  speed  of  six  or  eight  miles 
an  hour,  and  manifested  his  feeling  and  willingness  to  inflict  a 
needless  injury  upon  plaintiff  by  cursing  him  and  throwing  a 
stone  at  him. 

The  liability  of  defendant  rests  upon  the  further  question 
whether  the  act  of  the  brakeman  was  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment and  authority  as  a  servant  of  the  defendant.  If  he 
was  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  duty  ®^  and  employment, 
the  defendant  would  be  liable  for  his  act,  although  willful  and 
malicious:  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  McMahon,  103  111.  485;  43 
Am.  Rep.  29.  There  was  no  want  of  evidence  to  show  that  the 
brakeman  did  the  act  within  the  scope  of  his  duty.  He  testi- 
fied as  follows:  "Our  instructions  are  to  stop  and  put  them  off 

if  we   find  someone   beating   their  way No,  sir;  when 

you  put  a  man  off  the  train  you  do  not  mean  that  you  jerk  him 
off — kick  him  off.  It  means  that  when  we  find  a  man  on  the 
train  we  instruct  him  that  he  can't  ride,  and  he  gets  off.  That 
is  as  far  as  our  directions  run  as  brakeman."  This  evidence 
shows  conclusively  that"  it  was  within  the  scope  of  his  direc- 
tions and  duties  to  put  trespassers  off  the  train. 

The  other  question,  whether  plaintiff  was  negligent,  was  not 
relevant  to  the  inquiry.  If  he  bad  been  injured  in  consequence 
of  the  very  dangerous  position  in  which  he  placed  himself,  his 
negligence  would  have  barred  a  recovery.  But  his  injury  was 
not  in  consequence  of  the  dangers  of  his  position  on  the  rods, 
but  because  of  the  willful  act  of  the  brakeman  in  pulling  him 
off  while  the  train  was  running.  A  person  is  bound  to  use  ordi- 
nary care  to  protect  himself  against  the  known  dangers  of  hia 
situation,  but  the  law  does  not  exact  of  him  the  exercise  of  care 
to  protect  himself  against  an  intentional  injury  by  another  of 
which  he  has  no  notice.  No  one  is  bound  to  anticipate  and 
guard  against  a  willful  and  intentional  wrong  such  as  was  com» 
mitted  in  this  case.  The  motion  for  the  peremptory  instruc- 
tion was  properly  denied. 

The  remaining  complaint  mride  is,  thnt  the  court  rave  to  f1ie 
jury  the  first  instruction  asked  by  the  plaintiff,  as  follows:  **The 


96  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King.      [Illinois, 

court  instructs  you  that  if  you  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that 
the  injury  complained  of  was  wantonly  and  willfully  inflicted, 
as  charged  in  the  declaration,  then  the  plaintiff  will  be  entitled 
to  recover,  although  you  may  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that 
plaintiff  was  guilty  of  some  negligence." 

^®  This  instruction  is  objected  to  because  it  purported  to 
etate  to  the  jury  the  conditions  under  which  plaintiff  would  be 
entitled  to  recover  and  under  which  they  should  return  a  ver- 
dict for  him,  and  omitted  the  requirement  of  proof  that  the 
brakeman  was  acting  within  the  line  of  his  duty  or  within  the 
scope  of  his  employment.  The  law  cannot  assume,  at  least  as  to 
a  subordinate  employe  on  a  train  who  is  not  intrusted  with  the 
general  management  and  control  of  it,  that  he  has  control  over 
passengers  or  persons  attempting  to  ride,  or  that  he  is  intrusted 
by  his  employer  with  authority  in  respect  to  them  or  to  eject 
them,  and  it  was  necessary  to  make  the  proof:  3  Elliott  on 
Railroads,  sec.  1255;  Farber  v,  Missouri  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  116 
Mo.  81 ;  Corcoran  v.  Concord  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Fed.  Rep.  1014. 
The  requirement  of  such  proof  was  omitted  from  the  statement 
of  what  would  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  in  the  instruction. 
There  were  instructions  given  on  the  part  of  defendant  which 
stated  the  correct  rule,  but  they  did  not  serve  to  cure  admis- 
sions in  this  instruction,  which  purported  to  contain  all  the  ele- 
ments necessary  to  a  recovery.  In  such  a  case,  the  jury  may 
follow  either  instruction,  and  if  they  find  all  the  facts  proved 
which  are  recited  in  an  instruction  purporting  to  give  all  the 
grounds  of  a  recovery,  they  would  be  bound  to  return  a  verdict 
according  to  its  directions  without  proof  of  the  omitted  fact. 
The  instruction  referred  the  jury  to  the  declaration,  which  la 
eaid  to  be  specific  enough  to  obviate  this  objection.  We  have 
not  held  it  error  to  refer  to  the  declaration  by  an  instruction 
which  requires  proof  of  all  its  allegations,  and  the  practice  of 
making  such  reference  is,  perhaps,  not  infrequent,  but  it  is  not 
to  be  commended.  In  Thompson  on  Trials,  section  1027,  the 
learned  author,  in  defining  the  province  of  the  court  and  jury, 
says:  "The  construction  of  the  pleadings  is,  of  course,  always 

a  question  for  the  court It  is,  therefore,  the  duty  of  the 

court  to  state  the  issues  to  the  jury,  without  referring  them  to 

the  pleadings  to  ^*  ascertain  what  the  issues  are It  is 

error  to  leave  the  jury  to  construe  and  determine  the  effect  of 
the  pleadings."  Again,  in  discussing  the  requirements  of  the 
law  respecting  instructions,  he  says  (section  2314):  "It  is  the 
duty  of  the  court  to  determine  what  are  the  issues,  and  to  state 


April,  1899.]      Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kino.  97 

them  to  the  juTj,  and  it  is  error  to  refer  them  to  the  pleadings 
to  determine  the  issues,  in  whole  or  in  part."  Again  (section 
2582):  "Properly,  the  jury  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  plead- 
ings, and  argument  directed  to  the  pleadings  is  addressed  to  the 
court The  pleadings  are  often  drawn  in  technical  lan- 
guage, which  might  not  be  correctly  understood  by  persons  un- 
learned in  the  law."  In  11  Encyclopedia  of  Pleading  and 
Practice,  151,  it  is  said:  "The  clear  weight  of  authority  is,  that 
it  is  the  province  and  duty  of  the  court  to  state  specifically  to 
llie  jury  what  issues  are  raised  by  the  pleadings,  and  that  it  is 
erroneous  to  refer  to  the  pleadings  to  ascertain  what  the  issues 
^vere;  that  the  construction  of  the  pleadings  and  the  issues 
raised  thereby  are  questions  for  the  court  alone,  and  not  for  the 
jury." 

It  is  a  proper  office  of  an  instruction  to  explain  the  issues  and 
to  state  to  the  jury  the  facts  from  which  a  conclusion  of  law  is 
to  be  drawTi,  and  that  is  undoubtedly  the  better  practice.  But 
the  reference  here  to  the  declaration  could  not  supply  the  de- 
fects, both  because  there  is  no  averment  in  the  declaration  that 
the  brakcman  was  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  employment 
or  duty  or  had  authority  to  do  the  act,  and  also  because  the 
reference  embraces  nothing  except  the  willful  and  wanton 
character  of  the  act.  All  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  the 
jur}'  to  find  would  be  that  the  injury  was  wanton  and  willful, 
as  the  declaration  alleged  it  to  have  been.  The  defect  in  the 
instruction  was  not  cured  in  any  way,  but  we  do  not  think  the 
judgment  should  be  reversed  on  account  of  it,  because  defend- 
ant was  not  prejudiced  by  the  omission.  The  brakeman  testi- 
fied as  to  his  authority  and  directions,  and  there  was  no  con- 
tradictory evidence.  It  is  not  ground  **''  for  reversal  than  an 
instruct iou  assumes  as  proven  a  fact  conclusively  established  by 
the  evidence  without  contradiction:  Gerke  v.  Fancher,  158  111. 
375;  11  Ency.  of  PI.  &  Pr.  132. 

The  judgment  of  the  appellate  court  is  affirmed. 


RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS.— A  rail- 
road company  Is  not  answerable  to  a  trespasser  on  a  train  for  neg- 
ligence, and  owes  liim  no  duty  otlier  than  that  of  doing  hlni  no 
wanton  or  willful  injury:  Riclimond  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Burnsed.  70 
Mls-s.  437;  35  Am.  St.  Rop.  650,  and  note;  Chicaffo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mehls.ick.  131  111.  Gl;  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  17,  an>l  note.  Duty  of  a  rail- 
road company  toward  trespassers  upon  the  track  of  a  railroad: 
Lake  Shore  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bodemer.  1.39  III.  506;  32  Am.  St.  Rep. 
218;  Central  R.  R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Vaughan,  93  Ala.  209;  30  Am.  St  Rep. 
50,  and  extended  note  thereto. 
AM,  ST.  rkp..  You  lxx.— 7 


98  GoRALSKi  V.  KosTusKi.  [Illinois, 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS— WILL- 
FUL ACT  OF  SERVANT— A  railroad  company  is  liable  for  the 
willful  WTODg  of  its  employSs  in  expelling  a  trespasser  from  its 
freight  train  while  in  motion,  to  his  injury,  only  upon  clear  proof 
that  the  act  was  done  by  such  employs  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment and  within  the  scope  of  his  authority:  Bess  v.  Chesa- 
peake etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  492;  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  820.  A  rail- 
road company  Is  liable  for  the  willful  and  wanton  acts  of  a  brake- 
man  in  ejecting  a  trespasser  from  a  train  while  it  is  in  motion: 
Alabama  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Frazier,  93  Ala.  45;  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  28. 

NEGLIGENCE.— THE  MERE  FAILURE  to  ward  against  a  re- 
sult which  could  not  reasonably  have  been  expected  is  not  negli- 
gence: Davis  V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  93  Wis.  470;  57  Am.  St.  Rep. 
935. 

TRIAL—INSTRUCTIONS— ASSUMPTION  OF  FACTS.- Where 
there  is  no  conflict  in  the  evidence,  the  court  may,  in  Instructing 
the  jury,  assume  it  to  be  true,  and  charge  upon  it  directly  without 
any  hypothesis:  Bynon  v.  State,  117  Ala.  80;  67  Am.  St  Rep.  163, 
and  aote;  State  r.  Jackson,  36  S.  C.  487;  31  Am.  St  Bep.  890. 


GoRALSKI    V.    KOSTUSKL 
[179  Illinois,  177.] 

COTENANCY— PRIVATE  ALLEY.— Owners  of  lots  abutting 
upon  a  private  alley,  established  for  their  common  benefit  and  ap- 
purtenant to  each  lot,  have  a  unity  of  possession  and  are  eotenamts 
therein. 

COTENANCY— DUTY  OF  COTENANT  TO  PAY  TAXES.— A 
widow  entitled  to  unassigned  homestead  and  dower  in  property  on 
which  she  resides,  and  holding  with  her  children  in  cotenancy,  is 
bound,  in  order  to  protect  their  common  interest,  to  contribute  to- 
ward the  taxes  upon  a  private  alley  constituting  part  of  the  com- 
mon property. 

COTENANCY— TAX  TITLES.— While  cotenants  remain  In  the 
actual  possession  of  the  common  property  and  maintain  the  unity 
of  possession  by  actual  common  use,  neither,  as  against  his  fel- 
low tenants,  by  purchasing  a  tax  title  upon  the  common  premises 
can  obtain  a  title  that  is  not  subject  to  the  election  of  the  cotenants, 
within  a  reasonable  time,  to  avail  themselves  of  the  purchase  by 
contributing  their  proper  proportion  to  reimburse  the  purchasing 
tenant. 

E.  J.  Price,  for  the  appellants. 

King  &  Gross  and  J.  Stelk,  for  the  appellees. 

***®  BOGGS,  J.  Lot  5  was  the  homestead  of  Stephen 
Malinowski,  deceased.  Section  2  of  the  homestead  exemption 
act  operated  to  continue  a  right  of  homestead  therein  for 
the  benefit  of  his  widow  Barbara  and  their  minor  children. 
Barbara  was  also  entitled  to   dower  in  the  premises.     Neither 


April,  1899.]  Goralski  v.  Kostuskl  99 

homestead  nor  dower  had  been  assigned.  The  widow  and 
children  remained  in  possession  of  the  premises,  and  having 
unity  of  possession  the.ir  relation  to  each  other  was  that  of 
tenants  in  common,  the  mother,  by  reason  of  the  parental  re- 
lation, having  the  superior  right  of  control:  ***  Montague  v. 
Selb,  106  111.  49;  Freeman  on  Cotenancy,  2d  ed.,  sec.  108. 

The  alley  was  established  for  the  common  use  and  benefit  of 
the  owners  and  occupants  of  lots  1,  2,  3,  4,  and  5.  It  waa 
highly  convenient  and  beneficial  to  the  full  and  complete  en- 
joyment of  said  lots  by  the  owners  and  persons  in  possession. 
It  was  an  appurtenant  to  each  of  said  lots,  and  the  right  of  pos- 
session thereof  was  common  to  all  occupants  and  owners  of  each 
of  said  lots.  Such  occupants  and  owners,  including  said  Bar- 
bara, had  unity  of  possession  of  the  alley  and  were  tenants  in 
common  therein.  Tenancy  in  common  requires  but  one  unity 
— that  of  possession:  Freeman  on  Cotenancy,  2d  ed.,  sec.  86. 
The  possession  of  said  lot  5,  held  by  said  Barbara  for  herself 
and  her  said  minor  children,  carried  with  it,  as  incident  thereto, 
the  right  to  use  the  alley  in  common  with  the  owners  and  oc- 
cupants of  the  other  lots.  She  realized  the  value  of  the  alley 
as  an  appurtenance  to  said  lot  5  and  insisted  on  all  her  rights 
therein.  She  invoked  the  aid  of  a  court  of  chancery  to  pre- 
vent others  from  closing  it  up  or  obstructing  it.  Her  cotenants 
in  lot  5  had  common  interest  with  her  in  the  alley.  It  was 
private  property  and  was  subject  to  taxation.  It  was  essential 
the  taxes  should  be  paid  in  order  to  preserve  it  for  her  use  and 
the  use  of  her  children  who  had  their  home  with  her  on  said 
lot  5  and  whose  rights  and  interests  were  in  her  charge.  She 
received  the  entire  income  from  the  flats  on  lot  5  and  enjoyed 
the  use  of  the  other  building  thereon  as  a  home.  Her  duty 
to  her  children  and  her  own  interest  required  she  should  have 
contributed  to  the  payment  of  the  taxes  upon  the  alley.  She 
recognized  her  duty  and  obligation  to  pay  taxes  on  said  lot  5. 
It  was  equally  important  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  her  chil- 
dren, her  cotenants,  taxes  should  also  be  paid  on  the  alley,  and, 
as  we  think,  equally  her  duty  to  contribute  to  the  payment  of 
the  taxes  on  the  alley  as  to  pay  the  taxes  on  the  lot.  She  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  also  *^^  tenant  in  common  in  the  alley  with 
the  appellees,  the  owners  of  lots  1  to  4  inclusive,  and  enjoyed, 
in  common  with  them,  the  poss'ession  and  benefit  of  the  alley. 

Mr.  Freeman,  in  his  work  on  Cotenancy  and  Partition,  says 
it  is  the  general  rule  a  cotenant  will  not  be  permitted  to  assert 
against  his  cotenants  a  title  acquired  by  purchase  at  a  tax  sale 


100  GoRALSKi  V.  KosTUSKi.  [Illinois^ 

for  taxes  imposed  on  the  common  property  during  the  joint 
ownership,  and  that  where  the  cotenant  purchasing  at  a  tax 
sale  is  in  fault  for  not  making  payment  on  his  own  moiety,  there 
is  no  doubt  that  his  purchase  cannot  he  enforced  against  his 
companions  except  as  a  basis  for  compelling  them  to  reimburse 
him  for  their  pro  rata  of  the  sum  paid  to  relieve  the  common 
property  from  a  common  burden:  Freeman  on  Cotenancy  and 
Partition,  sec.  158.  In  Blackwell  on  Tax  Titles,  section  571, 
it  is  said:  "It  is  a  general  principle  that  no  person  can  be  al- 
lowed to  purchase  [at  a  tax  sale]  who  is  in  a  situation  of  trust 
or  confidence  with  respect  to  the  subject  of  the  purchase,  or 
where  he  has  a  duty  to  perform  inconsistent  with  the  character 
of  purchaser.  But  where  a  joint  tenant  or  tenant  in  common 
buys  an  outstanding  title  which  is  adverse  to  the  common  title, 
the  purchase  is  not  void  but  subject  to  the  election  of  the  co- 
owners,  who  must,  within  a  reasonable  time,  elect  to  avail  them- 
selves of  the  purchase  and  offer  to  contribute  their  share 'of  the 
purchase  money." 

ISTo  objection  is  urged  to  the  tax  deed  in  this  case  other  than 
the  relation  of  Mrs.  Malinowski  to  the  property  purported  to 
be  conveyed  by  it  forbade  her  from  buying  it  except  for  the 
benefit  of  all  interested  with  her  in  the  alley.  The  position 
of  counsel  for  appellants  is  that  it  is  to  be  considered  the 
deed  is  otherwise  effective  and  valid,  and  that  it  operated  to 
vest  the  title  to  the  alley  in  Baird,  the  purchaser  at  the  tax 
sale,  and  that  Baird,  by  force  and  effect  of  the  tax,  deed,  be- 
same  seised  of  the  absolute  title  in  fee  to  the  alley,  and  that 
the  relation  of  tenants  in  common  which  formerly  existed  was 
thereby  destroyed,  ***^  and  those  who  had  formerly  sustained 
that  relation  were  absolved  from  all  further  duty  pertaining 
to  it.  Black  on  Tax  Titles,  section  284,  and  cases  cited  by 
that  author,  seem  to  support  this  view.  Mr.  Freeman,  in  his 
work  on  Cotenancy  and  Partition,  section  159,  says  the  cases 
relied  upon  to  support  the  position  "do  not  represent  the  true 
state  of  the  law,  because  they  are  directly  in  conflict  with  the 
well-settled  rule  that  a  person  under  any  legal  or  moral  obliga- 
tion to  pay  the  taxes  cannot,  by  neglecting  to  pay  the  same  and 
allowing  the  land  to  be  sold  in  consequence  of  such  neglect, 
add  to  or  strengthen  his  title  by  purchasing  at  the  sale  himself 
or  by  subsequently  buying  from  a  stranger  who  purchased  at 
the  sale,  otherwise  he  would  be  allowed  to  gain  an  advantage 
from  his  own  fraud  or  negligence  in  failing  to  pay  the  taxes. 
•  ...  If  a  long  period  elapses  after  the  creation  of  a  tax  title^ 


April,  1899.]  Gorai.ski  v.  Kostuski.  101 

and  the  purchaser  is  regarded  and  treated  by  the  late  cotenants 
AS  the  true  owner,  and  the  latter,  on  their  part,  have  abandoned 
all  pretensions  to  the  property,  then  it  may  be  that  either  of 
them  is  at  liberty  to  disregard  his  former  relations  and  to  pur- 
chase the  whole  property  for  himself."  Each  of  these  authors 
cites  adjudged  cases  in  support  of  the  position  assumed. 

Without  adverting  further  to  this  conflict  of  authority,  it  ia 
sufficient  for  all  the  purposes  of  this  case  we  should  hold,  as  we 
do,  that  while  cotenants  remain  in  the  actual  possession  of  the 
common  property  and  maintain  the  unity  of  possession  by  actual 
common  use,  neither,  as  against  his  fellow  tenants,  by  purchas- 
ing a  tax  title  based  upon  a  sale  of  the  common  premises  for 
the  unpaid  taxes  in  the  payment  whereof  said  purchaser  was  in 
part  in  default,  can  obtain  a  title  that  is  not  subject  to  the  elec- 
tion of  the  cotenants,  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  avail  them- 
selves of  the  benefit  of  the  purchase  by  contributing  their 
proper  proportion  to  reimburse  the  purchasing  tenant  for  re- 
lieving the  common  property  from  a  common  burden.  In  the 
case  at  bar,  the  relation  of  tenants  ***  in  common  actually 
existed   when   said   Barbara   received   a  conveyance    from  the 

Jlder  of  the  title,  and  the  rule  that  the  purchase  inured  to  the 

>mmon   benefit  of  all   cotenants  was  properly  applied  by  the 

)ancellor. 
The  decree  is  affirmed. 


a 


COTENANCY— WHO  ARE  COTENANTS.— Persons  ownmg  nn- 

ivided  Interests  In  real  property  are  tenants  in  common,  though 

heir  titles  were  acquired  by  separate  conveyances  and  at  different 

imes:  Stevens  v.  Reynolds,  143  Ind.  467;  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  422;  Met- 

alfe  V.  Miller,  96  Mich.  459;  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  617. 

COTENANCY— PURCHASE  OP  TAX  TITLE  BY  COTENANT.— 

cotenant  in  possession  cannot  acquire  title  as  against  his  coten- 

nt  by  purchasing  a  tax  title  to  the  common  property:  Thompson 

V.    McCorkle,    136    Ind.    4S4;  43    Am.    St.    Rep.    334.    A    cotenant, 

whether  in  or  out  of  possession,  cannot  buy  and  hold  a  tax  title 

against  the  other  cotenants:  Cohea  v.  Hemingway,  71  Miss.  22;  42 

Am.  St.  Rep.  449;  Tanney  v.  Tanney,  159  Pa.  St.  277;  39  Am.  St. 

Rep.  678,  and  note.     But  when  the  interests  of  several  cotenants 

are  assessed,  neither  is  under  obligation  to  pay  the  taxes  due  from 

the  other,  and  tlierefore,  either  may  purchase  the  Interest  of  the 

other  at  a  tax  sale  thereof  and  assert  any  title  acquired  from  such 

sale:  Bennett  v.  North  Colorado  etc.  Co.,  23  Colo.  470;  58  Am.  St. 

Rep.  281,  and  note. 

COTENANCY— TAXES-CONTRIBUTION.— A  tenant  in  common 
•who  pays  the  taxes  against  the  whole  of  the  common  property  is 
entitled  to  contribution  from  his  cotenants  to  the  amount  of  the 
taxes  due  bv  each  on  his  Interest:  Cocks  v.  Simmons.  55  Ark.  104; 
29  Am.  St.  Rep.  28.  and  note;  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  90  Wis.  516;  48 
Am.  St  Rep.  949;  Tanney  v.  Tanney,  159  Pa.  St  277;  39  Am.  St  Eep. 
678. 


102  WiKE  V.  Gaeneb.  [IllinoiB, 


WiKE  V.  Garner. 

[179  Illinois,  257.] 

HOMESTEADS— HEAD  OF  FAMILY— WHO  IS.— A  bache- 
lor brother  residing  on  premises  with  his  two  sisters,  who  are  de- 
pendent upon  him  for  soipport,  is  a  householder  having  a  family^ 
Of  which  he  is  the  head  and  entitled  to  a  homestead  exemption. 

HOMESTEADS— COTENA NTS  RIGHT  TO.— An  undlvidecl 
Interest  in  land,  accompanied  by  the  exclusive  possession,  manage- 
ment, and  control  in  consideration  of  maintenance  of  his  cotenant. 
Is  sufficient  to  support  a  right  of  homestead  in  the  occupying  co- 
tenant. 

HOMESTEADS  — OCCUPANCY  WITHIN  EEASONABLB 
TIME. — If  a  person  buys  a  lot  for  a  home,  and  erects  a  house 
thereon,  a  creditor  cannot  acquire  a  lien  on  the  property,  if,  withio 
a  reasonable  time,  the  purchaser  moves  on  the  property  and  oc- 
cupies it  as  a  homestead. 

HOMESTEADS.— RIGHTS  OP  CREDITORS  as  to  property 
occupied  by  their  debtor  as  his  homestead,  after  filling  a  bill 
to  cancel  a  previous  satisfaction  of  their  judgment  to  enjola 
the  sale  of  the  property  and  subject  it  to  such  judgment,  attach 
from  the  date  of  the  decree  and  not  from  the  time  of  the  filing 
of  the  bill,  if  the  court  does  not  cancel  the  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment,  but  enters  a  money  decree  and  directs  execution  to  Issue. 

W.  E.  Williams,  for  the  appellant. 

W.  L,  Coley,  for  the  appellee. 

*®^  CRAIG,  J.  This  is  a  writ  of  error  sued  out  to  reverse  a 
decree  of  the  circuit  court  of  Pike  county.  It  appears  from  the 
record  that  plaintiffs  in  error,  John  and  George  Wike,  on  the 
eleventh  day  of  September,  1893,  obtained  a  judgment  before 
a  justice  of  the  peace  against  defendant  in  error,  Jonathan 
Garner,  for  the  sum  of  one  hundred  and  fifty-three  dollars  and 
costs.  On  the  sixteenth  day  of  the  same  month,  on  the  oath  of 
plaintiffs,  an  execution  was  issued  on  the  judgment  and  deliv- 
ered to  a  constable.  On  the  eighteenth  day  of  the  same  month 
the  execution  was  returned  nulla  bona,  and  on  the  same  day  a 
transcript  of  the  judgment  was  made  out  and  filed  in  the  office 
of  the  clerk  of  the  circuit  court.  Thereafter,  on  the  twenty- 
fifth  day  of  August,  1894,  an  execution  was  issued  on  the  judg- 
ment and  delivered  to  the  sheriff.  The  sheriff  levied  on  real  es- 
tate, which  was  advertised  and  sold  to  plaintiffs  in  error  on  the 
22d  of  September,  1894,  for  the  amount  of  the  judgment  and 
costs,  and  the  execution  was  returned  satisfied.  Upon  the  ex* 
piration  of  the  time  allowed  by  law  for  redemption,  December 
24,  1895,  the  sheriff  made  plaintiffs  a  deed  for  the  land  sold. 
Upon  obtaining  the  deed  plaintiffs  in  error  discovered  that  de- 
fendant in  error  never  owned  or  had  any  title  to  the  land  which 


April,  1899.]  Wike  v.  Garner.  108 

had  been  sold.  Thereupon  they  filed  this  bill  to  vacate  the  sat- 
isfaction *^*^  of  their  judgment  and  to  enjoin  the  defendant  in 
error  from  selling  a  certain  house  and  lot  in  the  town  of  El 
Dara,  which  it  was  alleged  he  owned,  and  to  subject  the  prop- 
erty to  sale  in  payment  of  the  judgment. 

The  defendant  answered  denying  the  allegations  of  the  bill 
and  alleging  "that  the  deed  to  such  property  was  taken  in  his 
name  together  with  that  of  his  sister,  Susan  Gamer,  and  the 
said  property  was  paid  for  by  him  and  the  said  Susan  Garner, 
and  was  bought  by  them  with  the  intention  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  using  the  same  as  and  for  a  home  for  him,  the  defend- 
ant, and  his  sister  Susan  Garner  and  his  sister  Emma  Gamer, 
who  then  was,  and  for  a  long  time  prior  thereto  had  been  and 
now  is,  a  distracted  person  and  dependent  upon  him  for  care 
and  support,  and  he,  together  with  the  two  sisters  aforesaid, 
as  soon  thereafter  as  a  house  could  be  erected  upon  the  prem- 
ises, did  occupy  the  same  as  a  home,  and  since  then  have  and 
now  do  occupy  the  same,  which  said  above  described  property 
does  not  exceed  in  value  one  thousand  dollars;  that  he  is  the 
head  of  the  family,  consisting  of  himself  and  his  sisters,  Susan 
and  Emma  Garner  aforesaid,  and  that  they,  the  said  sisters, 
now  are,  and  since,  to  wit,  November  20,  1889  (at  which  time 
his  father  died),  have  been  dependent  upon  him  for  support, 
and  he  has  since  that  time  supported  them  and  taken  upon  him- 
self the  duty  so  to  support  and  care  for  them." 

On  the  hearing  the  defendant  in  error  testified  as  follows:  'T. 
am  postmaster  at  El  Dara.  I  am  thirty-three  years  of  age. 
Parents  are  not  living.  Father  died  in  1889  and  mother  in 
1896.  I  live  with  two  sisters.  One  sister  is  a  year  older  than 
myself — a  distracted  porson.  Has  been  since  she  was  fifteen 
years  of  age.  My  other  sister  is  thirty  years  old,  and  she  keeps 
house  for  us.  We  have  lived  together  since  mother  died,  and 
I  have  supported  and  cared  for  the  two  girls  since  that  time. 
I  bear  all  the  expenses.  I  own  no  property  at  El  Dara  except 
the  house  and  lot — the  same  property  described  ^*^  in  the  bill. 
I  bought  the  property  in  June  of  this  year  (1897).  The  title 
to  the  property  is  in  myself  and  sister  Susan.  That  is  the  sister 
that  is  not  distracted.  We  proceeded  to  build  a  residence  at 
once.  We  moved  into  the  residence  and  now  occupy  it.  We 
bought  the  lot  for  a  home.  The  house  and  lot  was  six  hundred 
dollars.  Paid  one  hundred  and  thirty  dollars  for  the  lot.  The 
building  cost  about  four  hundred  and  fifty  dollars.  I  claim  to 
be  the  head  of  the  family  and  to  occupy  the  house  as  a  home- 


104  WiKE  V.  Garner.  [Illinois, 

stead."  On  cross-examination,  the  witness  further  testified  that 
at  the  time  the  injunction  was  served  he  had  contracted  to  sell 
the  place  for  six  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  and  intended  to  in- 
vest the  money  in  another  home.  The  testimony  of  this  witness 
was  not  contradicted  nor  were  the  facts  disclosed  hy  him  con- 
troverted. 

Among  other  facts  found  by  the  court  and  incorporated  in 
the  final  decree  are  the  following:  "The  court  further  finds  that 
the  said  Jonathan  Garner  and  his  sister,  Susan  Garner,  pur- 
chased said  property  and  erected  a  residence  thereon  for  the 
purpose  and  with  the  intention  of  making  the  same  a  homestead; 
that  he  is  a  single  man,  residing  with  a  family  consisting  of  two 
sisiters,  and  that  he  is  the  head  of  the  same.  The  court  further 
finds  that  at  the  time  of  service  of  the  writ  of  injunction  herein 
and  the  commencement  of  this  suit  said  property  was  the  home- 
stead of  the  defendant,  and  that  the  same  was  exempt  from 
execution  and  sale  and  that  the  same  was  not  subject  to  the 
lien  of  any  judgment  obtained  by  complainants,  and  that  the 
injunction  should  be  dissolved.'* 

Three  questions  are  raised  in  the  argument  of  counsel  for 
plaintiffs  in  error:  1.  Will  the  undivided  interest  of  the  defend- 
ant, under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  support  a  homestead 
right;  2.  Will  the  mere  intention  to  occupy  property  as  a  home- 
stead, not  carried  into  effect  by  subsequent  actual  occupancy, 
support  a  homestead  right;  and  3.  Will  the  homestead  right  at- 
tach by  the  voluntary  act  of  the  claimant  moving  into  and  ^^^ 
occupying  the  property  and  claiming  the  same  as  a  homestead, 
pending  the  injunction  proceedings? 

Section  1  of  the  homestead  act  provides  "that  every  house- 
holder having  a  family  shall  be  entitled  to  an  estate  of  home- 
stead, to  the  extent  in  value  of  one  thousand  dollars,  in  the 
farm  or  lot  of  land  and  buildings  thereon  owned  or  rightly  pos- 
sessed, by  lease  or  otherwise,  and  occupied  by  him  or  her  as  a 
residence."  In  Holnback  v.  Wilson,  159  111.  148,  154,  in  con- 
sidering the  question  who  might  be  regarded  as  a  householder, 
we  said:  "A  bachelor  or  a  widower  who  occupies  a  home,  as  the 
head  of  a  family,  on  land  which  he  desires  to  sot  apart  as  a 
homestead,  who  has  living  with  him  a  mother,  father,  sisters, 
or  brothers  who  ar^dependent  upon  him  for  support,  and  where 
there  is  a  corresponding  duty  of  support  resting  on  him,  might 
properly  be  regarded  as  a  householder  having  a  family  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute."  The  defendant  in  error,  Jonathan 
Garner,  occupied  a  house  with  two  sisters.    He  and  they  consti- 


April,  1899.]  Wike  v.  Gabnbu.  106 

tuted  the  family.  He,  as  appears  from  the  evidence,  was  the 
head  of  the  family  and  the  two  sisters  were  supported  by  him. 
We  think,  therefore,  under  the  facts  as  they  appeared  in  evi- 
dence, the  defendant  in  error  was  a  householder  having  a  family, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute. 

By  purchasing  the  loi;  which  plaintiffs  in  error  seek  to  suhject 
to  the  payment  of  their  debt  against  Jonathan  Gamer,  it  is  ap- 
parent that  if  he  had  taken  the  title  in  his  own  name  he  would 
be  entitled  to  claim  the  benefit  of  the  homestead  exemption  act. 
But  the  title  to  the  lot  was  conveyed  to  Jonathan  Garner  and 
Susan  Garner,  his  sister,  and  it  is  claimed  that  as  Jonathan  Gar- 
ner held  only  an  undivided  one-half  interest  in  the  property  he 
could  not  claim  the  benefit  of  the  .homestead  act.  This  ques- 
tion arose  in  Brokaw  v.  Ogle,  170  111.  115,  and  it  was  there  held 
that  an  undivided  interest  in  land,  accompanied  by  exclusive 
possession,  will  support  a  right  of  homestead  in  one  of  the  co- 
tenants.  Here  Jonathan  Garner  ^^^  was  in  the  undisputed  pos- 
session of  the  entire  property.  While  Susan  Garner  owns  the 
fee  to  an  undivided  half  of  the  lot,  she  accords  to  Jonathan 
Gamer  the  sole  possession,  management,  and  control  of  the 
property.  Tlic  statute  does  not  require  the  householder  to  own 
the  fee  to  enable  him  to  claim  the  benefit  of  the  homestead  act. 
On  the  contrary,  the  statute  expressly  provides  that  the  house- 
holder shall  be  entitled  to  an  estate  of  homestead  in  the  property 
owned  or  rightly  possessed,  by  a  lease  or  otherwise.  Under  this 
statute,  if  defendant  in  error  owned  an  undivided  half  and  had 
a  lease  of  the  other  half,  no  reason  is  perceived  why  he  might 
not  claim  the  benefit  of  the  statute,  and  that  was,  in  effect,  his 
position,  as  he  owned  one-half  and  occupied  the  whole  property 
with  the  consent  and  agreement  of  the  owner  of  the  other  half, 
and  she  in  turn  received  her  support.  Indeed,  we  are  inclined 
to  the  opinion  that  where  a  householder  is  in  the  exclusive  pos- 
session of  a  lot  of  land  occupied  by  him  as  a  residence,  it  does 
not  concern  the  judgment  creditor  -whether  such  householder 
possesses  the  fee,  an  estate  for  life  or  for  years,  or  what  title  he 
may  have.  Here  the  controversy  is  solely  between  plaintiffs  in 
error,  as  judgment  creditors,  and  defendant  in  error,  and  as 
against  his  judgment  creditors  defendant  in  error  is  entitled  to 
claim  the  exemption  of  the  statute. 

It  is  next  claimed  that  there  was  a  mere  intention  to  occupy 
the  property  as  a  homestead,  which  was  abandoned,  and  hence 
no  right  of  homestead  existed  in  favor  of  the  defendant  in  error. 
The  evidence  shows  that  the  defendant  in  error  purchased  the 


106  WiKE  V.  Garner.  [Illinois, 

lot  for  a  home,  and  that  he  proceeded  at  once  to  erect  a  house 
thereon  for  a  residence.  When  the  house  was  about  completed 
defendant  in  error  had  an  offer  for  the  place,  and  concluded  to 
sell  and  invest  the  money  in  another  place,  but  after  the  bill 
was  filed  he  abandoned  the  sale  and  moved  into  the  house,  and 
since  that  time  occupied  it  as  a  homestead.  We  do  not  think 
the  fact  that  the  defendant  in  error  made  up  ^*^  his  mind  to 
sell  the  property  but  did  not  consummate  the  sale  deprived  him 
of  the  right,  when  he  saw  proper  to  move  in  and  occupy  the 
property  as  a  residence,  to  claim  it  as  a  homestead.  The  prop- 
erty was  worth  less  than  one  thousand  dollars,  and  if  the  lot 
was  purchased  and  the  house  erected  for  a  residence,  and  was 
followed  by  actual  occupancy  by  defendant  in  error  without  un- 
reasonable delay,  as  the  evidence  shows  was  the  case,  it  was  not 
liable  to  be  seized  and  sold  by  plaintiffs  in  error  on  anyjudginent 
or  decree  they  might  obtain.  Where  a  person  buys  a  lot  for  a 
home,  as  was  the  case  here,  and  erects  a  house  on  the  lot,  a 
creditor  cannot  acquire  a  lien  on  the  property,  if,  within  a  rea- 
sonable time,  the  purchaser  moves  on  the  property  and  occupies 
it  as  a  homestead.  The  rule  laid  down  in  Crawford  v.  Richeson, 
101  111.  351,  applies  here. 

It  is  finally  claimed  that  defendant  in  error,  by  moving  into 
and  occupying  the  property,  claiming  it  as  a  homestead,  could 
not  defeat  the  intervening  rights  of  plaintiffs  in  error — in  other 
words,  it  is  claimed  that  defendant  in  error  coilld  acquire  no 
rights  by  moving  in  property  after  the  bill  was  filed.  The 
bill  was  filed  to  enjoin  defendant  in  error  from  selling  the  prop- 
erty, but  he  was  not  enjoined  from  moving  into  the  prop- 
erty or  using  it  as  he  might  desire.  When  the  bill  was  filed 
plaintiffs  in  error  had  no  lien  on  the  property.  Indeed,  they 
had  no  judgment  against  defendant  in  error.  Their  judgment 
had  been  satisfied,  and  one  object  of  the  bill  was  to  vacate  the 
satisfaction  and  reverse  the  judgment.  Plaintiffs  in  error,  so 
far  as  the  property  was  concerned,  had  no  intervening  rights 
to  be  defeated.  •  Section  1  of  chapter  77  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
provides  "that  a  judgment  of  a  court  of  record  shall  be  a  lien 
on  the  real  estate  of  the  person  against  whom  it  is  obtained, 
situated  within  the  county  for  which  the  court  is  held,  from  the 
time  the  same  is  rendered  or  revived,  for  the  period  of  seven 
years,  and  no  longer."  It  will  be  observed  that  the  court,  by 
its  decree,  did  not  cancel  or  set  aside  the  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment,  **""  but  entered  a  money  decree  and  directed  execu- 
tion to  issue.    Under  such  circumstances,  as  is  suggested  in  ar- 


April,  1899.]  Wike  v.  Garner.  107 

gument  of  defendant,  the  rights  of  .plaintiffs  in  error  to  sub- 
ject any  property  of  the  defendant  to  the  payment  of  their  de- 
mand dates  from  the  time  their  decree  was  rendered,  which  was 
July  2,  1898.  When  the  decree  was  rendered,  and  for  a  long' 
time  previous  to  that  date,  defendant  in  error  was  occupying  th& 
house  and  lot  in  question  as  a  homestead. 

.  We  think  the  court  properly  held  that  the  property  in  ques- 
tion was  the  homestead  of  the  defendant  in  error,  and  the  de- 
cree will  be  afiSrmed. 


HOMESTEAD— COTENANT'S  RIGHT  TO.— A  tenant  In  commoa 
Is  entitled  to  a  homestead  In  the  common  estate:  See  note  to  Arendt 
V.  Mace,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  209;  contra.  Bishop  v.  Hubbard,  23  Cal. 
514;  83  Am.  Dec.  132.  See  note  to  Wolf  v.  Fleischacker.  63  Am. 
Dec.  122. 

HOMESTEAD— OCCUPANCY.— Homestead  rights  attach  to  a  lot 
which  has  been  purchased  for  a  homestead,  and  which  the  pur- 
chaser intends  to  use  as  such,  though  he  has  not  yet  occupied  it, 
and  It  is  not  fit  for  such  occupancy  until  be  can  have  a  residence 
built  thereon,  if  he  is  proceeding  in  good  faith  to  secure  the  erec- 
tion of  such  residence  for  the  purpose  of  us.ing  it  as  his  homer 
Cameron  v.  Gebhard,  85  Tex.  610;  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  832,  and  note. 

As  to  whether  actual  occupancy  is  necessary  in  order  to  stamp^ 
property  with  the  character  of  a  homestead,  see  Mason  v.  Columbia 
Finance  etc.  Co.,  99  Ky.  117;  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  451. 

Homesteads— Head  of  Family -Who  Is.* 
The  head  of  a  family,  within  the  meaning  of  exemption  and  home- 
stead statutes.  Is  one  who  controls,  supervises,  and  manages  the- 
affalrs  about  a  home;  but  Is  not  necessarily  a  father  or  husband. 
A  family  Is  generally  understood  to  be  a  collective  body  of  per- 
sons who  live  In  one  house,  under  one  head  or  manager:  Ridenour- 
Baker  Grocery  Co.  v.  Monroe,  142  Mo,  165.  Any  individual  of 
either  sex  may  be  the  head  of  a  family.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
he  or  she  should  be  married;  Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  8  Cal.  66;  68  Am. 
Dec.  304.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  relation  of  husband  and 
wife,  or  of  parent  and  child  should  exist.  In  order  to  constitute  a 
family  having  a  head  within  the  meaning  of  the  homestead  law. 
The  exemption  extends  to  one  who  has  residing  with  him  those- 
so  connected  with  him  by  blood,  or  ties  of  residence  and  associa- 
tion, as  to  become  part  of  his  household,  and  who  have  no  residence- 
but  that  which  they  enjoy  under  his  favor,  and  whom  he  is  under 
a  legal  or  moral  duty  to  support:  Moyer  v.  Drummond,  32  S.  C. 
165;  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  850.  "The  whole  theory  and  policy  of  the 
homestead  law  is  founded  upon  the  principle  that  there  Is  a  natural 
and  moral  obligation  on  the  head  of  a  family,  to  provide  for  the 
support  of  his  wife  and  children,  and  other  persons  dependent  upon 
him  toward  whom  he  stands  almost  in  loco  parentis,  which  is,  if 
not  paramount,  equal  to  his  obligations  to  pay  his  debts,  and  the 
family  may  consist  of  a  wife  and  children,  or  of  other  person» 


•bfferknce  to  monographic  not*. 
Head  of  {amily,  who  is:  61  Am.  Dec.  586-698. 


108  WiKE  V.  Garner.  [Illinois, 

"Who  may  stand  In  a  state  of  dependence  In  the  family  relation,  or 
it  may  consist  of  persons  standing  In  either  of  these  relations, 
whether  the  father  or  mother,  or  a  brother  or  sister,  or  other  re- 
lation is  the  head;  but  they  must  be  persons  who  are  dependent,  la 
«ome  measure,  on  the  head  for  support,  and  who  have  an  inter- 
est in  his  holding  his  property,  and  would  be  prejudiced  by  its 
seizure  and  sale  imder  execution  or  other  process,  and  who  would 
be  benefited  by  its  exemption":  Calhoun  v.  Williams,  32  Gratt.  18; 
34  Am.  Rep.  759. 

The  leading  idea  of  the  homestead  laws  is  doubtless  to  secure  to 
such  persons  as  constitute  a  family,  primarily  considering  the  hus- 
band or  father  as  the  head  thereof,  in  contradistinction  to  single  per- 
sons, a  home,  and  to  foster  and  upbuild  the  family  interest,  upon 
which,  mainly,  society  depends.  The  idea  of  a  family  cannot  be 
■disassociated  from  the  idea  of  an  assemblage  of  persons  among 
whom  some  are  dependents  and  over  whom  some  one  of  their  num- 
■ber  has  and  legally  exercises  control.  This  one  is  their  head,  and 
the  only  one  who  is  entitled  to  claim  a  homestead  exemption  in 
their  behalf.  To  constitute  a  family  with  a  head  within  the  mean- 
ing of  such  laws,  there  must  be  a  state  of  dependence  In  law,  If 
cot  in  fact,  upon  the  part  of  some  of  those  who  constitute  the 
family,  or  some  other  member  of  the  family  whom  the  law  desig- 
nates as  the  head  thereof,  and  this  dependence  may  result,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  from  the  relationship  existing  between  the  parties, 
whether  they  be  parent  and  minor  child,  husband  and  wife,  guar- 
•dian  and  ward,  or  master  and  servant  or  other  relation.  Or  it  may 
result,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  from  the  head  of  the  family  control- 
ling the  homestead  property,  in  which  the  dependent  has  either  a 
present  or  prospective  interest.  This  state  of  dependence  necessa- 
rily implies,  upon  the  part  of  the  person  whom  the  law  designates 
as  the  head  of  the  family,  not  only  a  control  of  the  dependent,  or 
of  the  property  In  which  the  dependent  has  an  Interest,  either 
present  or  prospective,  but  also  implies  a  legal  right  to  such  con- 
trol. There  must  be  a  mutual  obligation  between  the  parties 
which  entitles  the  one  to  control,  and  which  imposes  upon  the  other 
the  duty  of  submitting  to  such  control,  and  there  must  be  also  not 
only  a  dependence,  but  also,  upon  the  part  of  the  head  of  the  fam- 
ily, a  corresponding  obligation  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  de- 
pendent, let  that  obligation  result  from  whatever  fact  it  may. 

Husband.— Any  man  who  has  a  wife  Is,  while  the  marriage  de 
Jure  exists,  the  head  of  a  family,  within  the  meaning  of  homestead 
or  exemption  statutes,  although  he  has  no  children:  Whitehead  v. 
Tapp,  69  Mo.  415;  Cox  v.  Stafford,  14  How.  Pr.  519;  Brown  v. 
Brown,  G8  Mo,  388;  and  it  makes  no  difference  that  his  wife  may 
have  deserted  him  and  may  be  residing  in  another  state,  and  that 
he  may  be  living  In  improper  relations  with  another  woman:  White- 
head V.  Tapp,  G9  Mo.  415;  Brown  v.  Brown,  68  Mo,  389,  A  hus- 
l)aDd  who  has  his  children  at  school  away  from  home,  or  tempo- 
rarily separated  from  him  In  any  way,  while  his  relation  to  them 
as  his  family  continues,  and  while  he  stipports  them,  is  still  their 
bead,  and  may  declare  a  homestead  in  their  favor:  Seaton  v.  Mar- 


April,  1899.]  Wike  v.  Garneb.  109 

Bhall,  6  Bush.  429;  99  Am.  Dec.  683;  Robinson's  Case.  3  Abb.  Pr. 
466.  But  a  husband  In  one  state,  with  a  family  in  another,  cannot 
be  considered  the  head  of  a  family  in  the  former,  though  he  shows 
that  during  his  residence  In  the  former  state  he  was  accompanied 
by  his  son.  He  must  also  show  that  his  son  is  depen<ient  upon 
him  for  support:  Allen  v.  Manasse,  4  Ala.  554. 

Unmarried  Man.— Anj  individuals  of  either  sex  may  be  the  head 
of  a  family,  and  it  Is  not  necessary  that  such  head  should  be  a  mar- 
ried man;  there  must,  however,  be  some  dependence  upon  such  head 
in  order  to  enable  him  to  declare  a  homestead:  Revalk  v.  Kraemer, 
8  Cal.  72;  68  Am.  Dec.  304.    Thus,  an  unmarried  man  whose  indi- 
gent mother  and  sisters  live  with,  and  are  supported  by,  him.  Is  the 
head  of  a  family  within  the  meaning  of  the  homestead  statute: 
Marsh  v.  Lazenby,  41  Ga.  153.    A  bachelor,  for  whom  a  sister  keeps 
house,  and  whom  he  supports.  Is  the  head  of  a  family:  Bailey  v.  Com- 
ings, 16  Bank  Keg.  382,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  733.    And  a  brother  who  re- 
sides with  his  sister  In  her  house,  the  rental  value  of  which  Is  in- 
sufficient to  support  her,  and  who  supports  her  and  manages   the 
household,  is  the  head  of  a  family,  and  entitled  to  the  chattel  ex- 
emption allowed  by  the  homestead  law:  Moyer  v.  Drummond,  32 
S.  C.  165;  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  850.    A  widower  without  children,  whose 
mother  is  the  sole  member  of  his  family,  is  Its  head  If  he  supports 
her,  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  exempting  from  forced  sale 
the  homestead  of  every  head  of  a  family:  Parsons  v.  Livingston, 
11  Iowa,  104;  77  Am.  Dec.  135.    A  father  living  with  his  Indigent 
widowed  daughter  and  her  children,  dependent  upon  him,  Is  en- 
titled to  a  homestead  as  the  head  of    the  family:    Blackwell    v. 
Broughton,  56    Ga.  390.     A    father  and    his  illegitimate  children 
living  with  him  constitute  such  a  family  as  may  assert  homestead 
rights,  and  such  rights  cannot  be  defeated  by  the  fact  that  such 
father  permits  a  woman  with  whom  he    unlawfully    cohabits    to 
dwell  on  the  land:  Lane  v.  Philips,  69  Tex.  240;  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  41. 
A  son  is  in  legal  contemplation  the  head  of  a  family,  if  he  is  of 
fuU  age  and  assumes  the  obligation  of  providing  for  a  widowed 
mother  and  her  children,  with  whom  he  lives,  and  who  are  depend- 
ent on  him:  Conuaughton  v.  Sands.  32  Wis.  387;  and  If  a  man  and 
his  sister  live  together,  both  owning  some  personal  property,  and 
contributing  toward  their  household  expenses,  the  brother  direct- 
ing and  controlling  the  affairs  of  the*  household,   he   is  a   house- 
holder and  entitled  to  an  exemption:  Graham  v.  Crockett,  18  Ind. 
119. 

To  constitute  a  family  within  the  meaning  of  the  homestead 
laws,  a  mere  aggregate  of  individuals  in  the  same  house  is  not  suffi- 
cient. There  must  also  be  an  obligation,  legal  or  moral,  upon  the 
head  of  the  house  to  supiwrt  the  others,  or  some  of  them,  and  on 
their  part,  a  corresponding  state  of  dependence:  Bosquett  v.  Hall, 
90  Ky.  566;  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  404;  Harbison  v.  Vaughn,  42  Ark.  539. 
Hence,  when  the  persons  residing  with  a  debtor,  though  children,  are 
strangers  in  blood  to  him,  and  he  is  under  no  legal  or  natural  olv 
ligation  to  support  them,  he  Is  not  the  head  of  a  family  so  as  to 
be  entitled  to  a  homestead  exemption:  Bosquett  v.  HaJI,  90  Ky, 


ilO  WiKE  V.  Garner.  [Illinois, 

666;  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  404.  It  has  been  held  that  a  family  composed 
of  persons  neither  related  by  blood  nor  connected  by  marriage  can- 
not have  a  head  who  is  entitled  to  declare  a  homestead  exemption: 
Howard  v.  Marshall,  48  Tex.  471.  Hence,  a  widower  cannot  thus 
exempt  his  property  by  voluntarily  taking  upon  himself,  for  some 
temporary  or  indefinite  period,  the  support  of  persons  having  no 
•claim  upon  him  in  law  or  morals.  Such  a  union  of  persons  in  one 
household,  directing  their  attention  to  a  common  object,  does  not 
•constitute  a  family:  Whitehead  v.  Niclielson,  48  Tex.  517.  An  un- 
married man,  with  whom  his  brother  and  sister-in-law  reside,  and 
for  whom  they  keep  house,  he  furnishing  the  necessaries  of  life, 
is  not  the  head  of  a  family:  Whalen  v.  Cadman,  11  Iowa,  226.  A 
widower  without  children  or  otheis  dependent  upon  him  is  not  enh 
titled  to  a  homestead  exemption:  Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  8  Cal.  G6; 
€»8  Am.  Dec.  304.  A  father  residing  with  his  adult  daughter,  who 
has  been  married  and  separated  from  her  husband,  and  whom  the 
father  is  under  no  obligation  to  support,  is  not  the  head  of  a  fam- 
ily: Walker  v.  Thomason,  77  Ga.  682.  And  it  has  been  held  that 
an  indigent  sister  and  her  children,  though  mainly  dependent  on 
their  brother  for  support,  and  living  with  him,  do  not  constitute 
a  family  for  whose  benefit  he  can  take  a  homestead,  because  he 
is  not  legally  bound  to  support  them.  "If  the  applicant  could  ob- 
tain a  homestead  as  the  head  of  a  family  of  persons  whom  he 
is  not  legally  bound  to  support,  then  he  might  enjoy  it  for  his 
own  benefit  exclusively,  and  refuse  with  impunity  to  support  those 
for  whose  benefit  be  claimed  to  have  obtained  it":  Dendy  v.  Gam- 
ble, 64  Ga.  528.  A  man  and  woman  living  together  in  adultery- 
do  not  constitute  a  family  within  the  meaning  of  the  law  exempt- 
ing the  homestead  of  the  head  of  a  family  from  forced  sale  under 
execution:  Lane  v.  Phillips,  69  Tex.  240;  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  41. 

A  bachelor  having  no  children  or  other  persons  dependent  upon 
him,  and  no  one  residing  with  him  except  servants  and  employfis, 
Is  not  the  "head  of  a  family,"  though  he  is  a  householder  and 
keeps  house,  in  the  sense  that  such  term  is  used  in  constitutional 
and  statutory  provisions,  with  reference  to  homestead  exemptions: 
Calhoun  v.  Williams,  32  Gratt.  18;  34  Am.  Rep.  759;  Garaty  v.  Du 
Bose,  5  S.  C.  493.  Consequently,  a  man  with  no  family  of  his  own, 
but  renting  a  house,  in  which  he  resides  with  a  number  of  per- 
sons whom  he  Is  under  no  obligation  to  support  and  to  whom  he 
Is  In  no  manner  related,  Is  not  entitled  to  a  homestead  exemption: 
Holnback  v.  Wilson,  159  111.  148.  "A  collection  of  individuals 
occupying  a  house,  In  no  manner  related  or  connected  with  each 
other,  no  obligation  resting  on  the  head  of  the  household  to  sup- 
port the  others  and  no  dependence  existing  on  their  part  upon  the 
head  of  the  family,  cannot,  In  our  opinion,  be  regarded  as  a  fam- 
ily, within  the  meaning  of  the  homestead  act.  But  we  do  not  think 
that  it  was  Intended  by  the  legislature  to  restrict  the  operation  of 
the  statute  to  a  married  man  with  a  family.  A  bachelor  or  a 
widower  who  occupies  a  house  as  the  head  of  a  family,  on  land 
which  ho  desires  to  set  npnrt  as  a  homestead,  who  has  living  with 
bim  a  mother,  father,  sisters  or   brothers  who  are  dependent  upon 


April,  1899.]  Wike  v.  Garner.  lit 

him  for  support,  and  where  there  Is  a  corresponding  duty  of  sup- 
port resting  on  him,  might  properly  be  regarded  as  a  householder 
having  a  family,  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute":  Holnback  v. 
Wilson,  159  111.  148.  154. 

Wi/e.— Whether  a  wife  may,  while  her  husband  Is  living,  be  con- 
sidered the  head  of  the  family  for  the  purpose  of  declaring  a  • 
homestead,  even  in  her  separate  property,  Is  a  much  disputed  ques- 
tion, but  the  conflict  arising  In  the  authorities  may,  to  a  great  de- 
gree, be  reconciled  by  reason  of  the  different  phraseology  employed 
in  the  homestead  statutes  of  the  several  states. 

The  majority  of  the  cases  hold  that  the  statutory  homestead  or 
exemption  cannot  be  talien  in  property  which  does  not  belong  to 
the  head  of  the  family,  and  that  a  wife  living  with  her  husband 
and  children  Is  not  the  head  of  the  family.  Hence,  she  is  not 
entUled  to  have  property,  the  title  to  which  Is  in  herself,  exempted 
from  levy  and  sale,  for  the  benefit  of  herself  and  her  minor  chil- 
dren. In  an  early  case  in  California  It  was  doubted  whether  the 
separate  property  of  a  wife  could  become  a  homestead:  Revalk  v. 
Kraemer,  8  Cal.  66;  68  Am.  Dec.  304.  While  in  Rosenberg  v.  Jett, 
72  Fed.  Rep.  90,  It  was  held  that  during  coverture,  and  while  the 
husband  and  wife  are  living  together,  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  a  separate  homestead  of  a  wife,  distinct  from  that  of  her  hus- 
band. 

A  married  woman  living  with  her  minor  children  and  with  her 
husband  as  a  member  of  his  family  is  not  entitled,  even  under 
the  most  liberal  statutes,  to  have  a  homestead  set  apart  to  her  as 
the  head  of  a  family  out  of  her  separate  estate,  although  her  hus- 
band may  be  physically  weah:  and  unable  to  work,  and  possessed 
of  no  property,  nor  means  of  support:  Johnson  v.  Little,  90  Ga. 
781.  A  wife  is  not  the  head  of  the  family  and  cannot  take  a  home- 
stead in  her  separate  property  for  the  benefit  of  herself,  her 
minor  children  by  a  former  marriage,  and  a  minor  child  by  her 
present  husband,  with  whom  she  lives:  Neal  v.  Sawyer,  02  Ga. 
352.  The  law  does  not  confer  the  privilege  of  a  homestead  upon 
a  married  woman  for  the  reason  that  during  the  marriage  her  hus- 
band Is  the  head  of  the  family,  upon  whom  devolves  Its  support, 
and  whether.  In  exceptional  cases,  the  wife  may  have  to  contribute 
to  the  support  of  the  family  or  not  cannot  affect  the  Interpreta- 
tion of  an  unambiguous  statute:  Fuselier  v.  Buckner,  28  La.  Ann. 
694.  A  wife  who  has  no  family  individually  dependent  on  her  for 
support,  and  whose  husband  Is  able  to  work  and  support  her,  and 
who  owns  more  land  than  Is  exempt  from  seizure,  cannot  claim 
the  benefit  of  a  homestead  statute:  Taylor  v.  McElvin,  31  La.  Ann. 
283. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Thompson  v.  King,  54  Ark,  11,  It  was  held 
that  the  expressions  "married  or  the  head  of  a  family,"  used  in  a 
homestead  statute  as  designating  who  might  declare  a  homestead, 
are  not  synonymous,  or  mere  equivalents  the  one  for  the  other,  and 
that  all  of  either  sex,  who  are  either  married  or  the  heads  of  fami- 
lies, are  entitled  to  the  exemption.  The  object  of  the  statute  "is 
to  protect  the  home  of  the  married  and  the  family  against  selx- 


112  WiKE  V.  Garner.  [Illinois, 

ure  and  sale,  and  no  reason  can  be  advanced  why  the  land  of  the 
wife  occupied  as  the  home  of  the  husband  and  his  family  should 
not  be  protected  as  well  as  the  land  of  the  husband  should  be 
when  it  is  a  homestead":  Thompson  v.  King,  54  Arlj.  11.  In  Mis- 
issippi,  the  /law  gives  a  homestead  to  every  owner  of  land  being 
a  householder  and  head  of  a  family.  In  that  state,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  married  woman  owning  separate  estate,  and  residing 
thereon  as  a  domicile  with  her  family,  Is  entitled  to  a  homestead 
therein,  although  a  husband  is  the  head  of  the  family  in  the  sense 
that  the  wife  and  children  are  subject  to  his  marital  and  paternal 
control;  yet  he  has  no  authority  or  control  over  the  separate  prop- 
erty of  the  wife  or  the  application  of  it  to  the  support  of  the  fam- 
ily.   Hence,  the  wife  may  declaxe  a  homestead  therein. 

In  a  late  case  In  Illinois,  It  was  decided  that  a  statutory  ex- 
pression that  every  householder  having  a  family  is  entitled  to  a 
liomestead  exemption  does  not  require  such  householder  to  be  the 
head  of  a  family,  and  a  wife  is  entitled  to  the  exemption  in  her 
separate  property  when  occupied  as  a  homestead  by  herself,  hus- 
band, and  children:  Zander  v.  Scott,  165  111.  51.  Under  the  Colorado 
statute,  a  wife  has  the  character  of  the  head  of  the  family,  while 
occupying  with  her  husband  her  property  as  a  home,  so  as  to  en- 
able her  to  designate  and  affect  It  with  the  character  of  a  home- 
stead, and  thus  exempt  it  from  seizure  and  sale  for  the  joint  debt 
of  herself  and  husband:  McPhee  v.  O'Rourke,  10  Ck)lo.  301,  3  Am. 
St.  Rep.  579;  Norton  v.  Bradham,  21  S.  C.  375;  and  under  the 
South  Carolina  statute  the  right  of  a  homestead  exemption,  as 
against  her  own  debts,  is  extended  to  a  wife  living  with  her  hus- 
band who  has  no  property:  Norton  v.  Bradham,  21  S.  0.  375. 
Under  the  California  statutes,  a  husband  is  designated  as  the  head 
of  the  family  for  the  purpose  of  declaring  a  homestead  exemption, 
but  upon  his  failure  to  declare  it  the  wife  Is  given  the  right  to  de- 
clare a  homestead  on  their  property  for  their  joint  benefit:  Cali- 
fornia Civ.  Code,  sees.  1261,  1202.  After  the  husband  has  declared 
a  homestead  In  his  property,  the  wife  cannot  declare  another  In 
her  separate  property:  Neal  v.  Sawyer,  62  Ga.  352. 

Widow  or  Unmarried  Woman.— \t  Is  a  well-settled  rule  that  a 
widow  as  the  head  of  a  family,  consisting  of  herself  and  minor 
child  or  children,  Is  entitled  to  a  homestead  out  of  his  or  her 
estate:  Groover  v.  Brown,  CO  Ga.  60;  Smith  v.  Wright,  13  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  480;  Wood  v.  Wheeler,  7  Tex.  13;  Norrls  v.  Moulton,  34 
N.  H.  392.  When  a  widow,  who  Is  the  step-mother  of  her  de- 
ceased husband's  minor  children,  undertakes  to  keep  together,  care 
for,  and  support  them,  she  has  a  right,  as  the  head  of  a  family,  to 
take  a  homestead  In  his  real  estate:  HoUoway  v.  Holloway,  86  Ga. 
57G;  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  484;  Sauderlln  v.  Sanderlin,  1  Swan.  442; 
Brlgham  v.  Bush,  33  Barb.  596.  Upon  the  death  of  a  husband,  his 
widow  takes  the  capacity  as  head  of  the  family,  with  all  tlie  inci- 
dents, privileges,  and  responsibilities  attached  to  It;  and  if  she  aiwJ 
her  children  continue  to  reside  together  In  the  house  of  her  deceased 
husband,  and  constitute  a  family,  she  Is  entitled  to  a  homestead 
exemption  as  the  bead  of  a  family:  Becker  v.  Becker,  47  Barb.  497. 


April,  1899.]  Wjke  v.  Garner.  113 

If  a  widow,  with  her  children,  resides  In  the  house,  and  on  the 
land  of  her  aged  father,  she  has  been  held  to  be  the  head  of  a 
family:  Bachman  v.  Crawford,  3  Humph.  214;  39  Am.  Dec.  163; 
and  if  a  widow  keeps  house  upon  land  allotted  to  her  in  dower 
without. children  of  her  own,  but  with  five  orphan  children  of  a 
deceased  sister  who  have  been  members  of  the  family  during  the 
husband's  life,  and  with  two  orphan  children  of  her  late  husbaud's 
sister,  she  is  the  head  of  a  family:  Ex  parte  Brien,  2  Tenn.  Cb. 
33.  A  widow  occupying  a  house  and  lot  as  her  homestead,  with 
two  adult  children  living  with  her,  has  been  held  to  be  a  house- 
keeper and  head  of  a  family:  Brooks  v.  Collins,  11  Bush,  022.  But 
it  has  been  held  under  the  North  Carolina  statute,  that  a  widow 
cannot  have  a  homestead  laid  oti  to  her  and  her  minor  children 
after  the  death  of  the  husband,  when  he  dies  without  leaving 
debts:  Hager  v.  Nixon,  C9  N.  C.  108.  And  it  has  also  been  held 
that  a  widow  who  lias  no  children  living  with  her  dependent  ou 
her  for  support,  is  not  entitled  to  a  homestead  out  of  the  property 
of  her  deceased  husband  as  the  head  of  a  family:  Kidd  v.  Lester, 
4G  Ga.  231. 

An  unmarried  woman,  keeping  house,  and  bringing  up  two  chil- 
dren of  her  deceased  sister,  is  the  head  of  a  family  and  entitled  to 
a  homestead  exemption:  Arnold  v.  Waltz,  53  Iowa,  700;  30  Am. 
Itep.  248.  So  is  a  single  woman,  who  supports  an  invalid  sister 
who  resides  with  her  and  has  no  other  means  of  support:  Cham- 
berlain V.  Brown,  33  S.  C.  597.  An  unmarried  woman  who  has  the 
care  and  custody  of  her  minor  bastard  child  Is  entitled  to  a  home- 
stead as  the  head  of  a  family:  Ellis  v.  White,  47  Cal.  73.  But  a 
woman  who  has  never  been  married,  and  who  has  no  children,  is 
not  entitled  to  a  homestead  under  the  Massachusetts  statute, 
though  she  lives  with  her  mother:  Woodworth  v.  Comstock.  10 
Allen,  425.  Although  an  adult  daughter  owns  part  of  the  premises 
in  which  her  parents  reside,  while  she  lives  elsewhere  and  aids 
her  brother  in  supporting  such  parents,  does  not  constitute  her 
,  the  head  of  a  family  so  as  to  entitle  her  to  claim  such  premises  as 
a  homestead:  Ilidenour-Baker  Co.  v.  Monroe,  142  Mo.  105. 

Separation  or  Divorce— A  husband  does  not  cease  to  be  the  head 
of  the  family,  in  the  eyes  of  the  law,  by  reason  of  his  desertion  by 
his  wife.  As  such  head  he  retains  the  home  until  and  to  which 
she  may  return.  While  the  marriage  relation  exists  he  is  the 
head  of  the  family,  although  he  has  no  family  but  his  wife,  and 
she  has  left  the  home:  Brown  v.  Brown,  68  Mo.  388;  Gladnoy  v. 
Berkley,  75  Mo.  App.  98;  Gates  v.  Steele,  48  Ark.  539.  Although 
his  wife  may  have  deserted  him,  and  may  be  residing  in  another 
state,  and  he  himself  may  be  living  In  Improper  relations  with  an- 
other woman,  he  is  still  regarded  as  the  head  of  the  family  witliia 
the  meaning  of  the  homestead  law:  Whitehead  v.  Tapp,  69  Mo. 
415.  A  husband  who  lives  with  his  family  remains  the  head 
thereof,  although  he  falls  to  support  such  family,  quarrels  wUh 
his  wife,  and  occupies  a  separate  bed:  Barry  v.  Western  Assur. 
Ck).,  19  Mont.  571;  01  Am.  St.  Rep.  530.  But  a  husband  who  has 
AM.  St.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— « 


114  WiKE  V.  Garner.  [Illinois, 

voluntarily  allowed  his  family  to  separate,  and  has  abandoned  the 
maintainance  of  a  family  home,  cannot  set  up  a  homestead  exemp- 
tion: Cooper  V.  Cooper,  24  Ohio  St.  488. 

The  protection  of  a  homestead  exemption  is  still  retained  by  the 
wife  and  minor  children  of  a  man  who  has  left  the  state  and  de- 
sires them  to  follow  him,  so  long  as  they  remain  upon  the  home- 
stead left  by  him.  Upon  the  husband's  leaving  the  state,  the  wife 
becomes  the  head  of  the  family,  and  she  cannot  be  prevented  from 
remaining  in  the  state  and  continuing  the  occupancy  of  the  home, 
whatever  may  be  the  purposes  or  desires  of  the  husband  after  leav- 
ing the  state:  McDannell  v.  Ragsdale,  71  Tex,  23;  10  Am.  St.  Rep. 
729.  A  vpife  permanently  separated  from  her  husband  by  agree- 
ment, after  his  neglect  to  support  her,  may  acquire  a  homestead 
as  a  householder  and  head  of  a  family:  Kenley  v.  Hudelson,  99 
111.  493;  39  Am.  Rep.  31.  And  where  a  married  woman  has  been 
abandoned  by  her  husband,  but  is  living  with  and  supporting  her 
child,  she  is  the  head  of  a  family:  Nash  v.  Norment,  5  Mo.  App. 
545.  The  fact  that  a  husband  has  absconded  and  left  the  state, 
leaving  his  family  to  care  for  themselves,  is  an  abandonment  of 
them,  entitling  the  wife  to  declare  a  homestead,  no  matter  wh.Tt 
the  motive  of  such  abandonment  was,  whether  fear  of  criminal 
prosecution  or  dissatisfaction  with  his  family:  People  v.  Stitt,  7 
111.  App,  294.  In  Alabama,  it  is  held  that  a  married  woman,  hav- 
ing no  children,  whose  husband  resides  out  of  the  state,  is  not 
entitled  to  claim  the  benefit  of  a  homestead  exemption:  KeifiCer  v. 
Barne.v.  31  Ala.  192. 

A  divorce  obtained  by  a  wife  does  not  deprive  her  of  her  home- 
stead rights  acquired  during  coverture  In  her  husband's  land,  when 
she  comiuues  to  reside  upon  it  with  her  minor  children,  and  is  the 
head  of  the  family.  This  is  especially  true  where  the  husband  has 
first  abandoned  the  wife  before  she  secures  the  divorce,  and  he 
has  not  acquired  a  homestead  elsewhere:  Blandy  v.  Asher,  72  Mo. 
27;  Bonnell  v.  Smith,  53  111.  375. 

The  gxiardian  of  a  minor  child  is  entitled  to  a  homestead  as  the 
head  of  a  family:  Roundtree  v.  Dennard,  59  Ga.  629;  27  Am.  Rep. 
401.  And  an  adopted  child  occupies  the  same  place  in  the  family 
under  homestead  exemption  laws  as  a  child  of  the  blood.  Hence 
a  landowner  who,  together  with  his  adopted  daughter  and  her 
husband,  resides  on  the  land  forming  one  household,  is  the  head  of  a 
family:  Wagener  v.  Parrott,  51  S.  C.  489;  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  095.  It 
has  been  held,  however,  that  the  adoption  of  another's  child  by  an 
unmarried  man,  and  the  maintenance  of  servants  and  a  house- 
hold, does  not  constitute  such  man  the  head  of  a  family  entitled 
to  a  homestead:  In  re  Lambson,  2  Hughes.  233. 

A  trnant,  by  renting  and  occupying  the  premises  of  the  owner, 
cannot  deprive  the  latter  of  such  control  over  the  property  as  to 
forfeit  his  right  of  homestead,  where  the  owner  boards  and  lodges 
In  the  house.  The  tenant  cannot  thus  be  made  the  head  of  the 
family:  Brown  v.  Brown,  68  Mo.  388. 

A  partnership  cannot  be  the  head  of  a  family,  and  the  members 
of  a  firm  cannot  claim  a  homestead  exemption  In  the  partnership 


April,  1899.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscheb.         115 

property,  one  of  the  reasons  therefor  being  that  a  partnership  can- 
not be  the  head  of  a  family  as  required  by  statute:  State  v.  Spen- 
cer, 64  Mo.  355,  356;  27  Am.  Rep.  244;  and  the  general  rule  is, 
that  the  members  of  a  partnership  cannot  jointly  or  severally  claim 
an  exemption  in  partnership  property:  Kingsley  v.  Kingsley.  39 
Cal.  665;  Guptil  v.  McFee,  9  Kan.  30;  In  re  Handlin,  3  Dill.  290; 
Pond  V.  Kimball,  101  Mass.  105;  In  re  Hafer,  1  Bank.  Reg.  547;  Fed. 
Cas.  No.  5,896;  In  re  Price,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,410,  6  Bank.  Reg.  400; 
In  re  Blodgett,  10  Bank  Reg.  145,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  1,555;  Terry  v. 
Berry,  13  Nev.  515;  Wright  v,  Pratt,  31  Wis.  99;  Gaylord  v.  Imhoff, 
26  Ohio  St  317;  20  Am.  Rep.  762;  Drake  v.  Moore,  66  Iowa,  58; 
Hoyt  V.  Hoyt,  69  Iowa,  174. 

Children  of  a  deceased  owner  cannot  claim,  each  for  himself,  as 
the  head  of  a  family,  a  separate  homestead  out  of  the  lands  of  the 
deceased  debtor  against  his  debt,  but  collectively  they  are  entitled 
to  one  homestead,  whether  they  are  minors  or  adults:  National 
Bank  y.  Senn,  25  S.  C.  572. 


Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  Pythias  v.  Kutscher. 

[179  ILIINOIS,  840.] 

ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  —  DELEGATION 
OF  POWER.— The  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society  cannot  dele- 
gate to  a  subordinate  lodge  the  power  to  enact  a  by-law  forfeiting 
the  certificate  of  membership  and  all  claims  thereunder  of  any 
member  whose  death  results  from  self-destruction,  voluntary  or 
involuntary,  whether  sane  or  insane. 

ASSOCIATIONS-  BENEFIT  SOCIETIES—  CONSTRUC- 
TION OF  CERTIFICATE.— A  certificate  of  membership  in  a  benefit 
society  which  binds  the  member  to  comply  with  all  the  laws  gov- 
erning the  endowment  rank  which  are  in  force  when  he  becomes  a 
member,  or  which  may  thereafter  be  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge 
or  the  board  of  control,  binds  him  to  comply  with  such  laws  only  as 
such  board  or  the  supreme  lodge  may  lawfully  enact  and  adopt. 

ASSOCIATION— BENEFIT!  SOCIETY— ADOPTION  OF  BY- 
LAW.—The  adoption  by  the  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society  of  an 
unauthorized  by-law  passed  by  a  subordinate  lodge  renders  such 
by-law  effective,  and  binds  members  of  such  subordinate  lodge  who 
have  agreed  to  comply  with  the  by-laws  now  "in  force  or  that  may 
be  hereafter  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge." 

ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES.— THE  CONSTI- 
TUTION OF  A  BENEFIT  SOCIETY,  if  no  part  of  Its  charter,  has 
■only  the  eft'ect  of  a  by-law,  and  cannot  take  from  the  rightfully 
coustltuted  authorities  of  the  society  their  inherent  power  to  adopt, 
from  time  to  time,  such  other  by-laws  as  its  charter  permits  or 
necessity  requires. 

ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES— EFFECT  OF  BY- 
LAW.—A  by-law  of  a  benefit  society  forfeiting  claims  of  a  member 
for  suicide  is  binding  on  one  who  joins  the  society  before  its  p.is- 
sage,  and  whose  contract  requires  compliance  with  the  by-laws  in 
force  or  "hereinafter  enacted." 

H.  H.  Field  and  Greene  &  Humphrey,  for  the  appellajit. 


116  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  KutscBeb.      [Illinois, 

Connolly,  Mather  &  Snigg,  for  the  appellee. 

8*1  PER  CUEIAM.  The  appellate  court  has  affirmed  a 
judgment  of  the  Sangamon  circuit  court  in  favor  of  appellee^ 
against  appellant,  on  a  certificate  of  membership  issued  by  ap- 
pellant to  William  C.  Henry,  payable  to  Louisa  M.  Henry,  hia 
wife.  While  in  a  drunken  frenzy,  Henry  killed  his  wife  and 
the^i  himself,  and  the  suit  was  brought  by  the  administrator  of 
her  estate. 

The  applications  of  Henry  for  the  certificate  contained  this 
clause:  "I  hereby  agree  that  I  will  punctually  pay  all  dues  and 
assessments  for  which  I  may  become  liable,  and  that  I  will  be 
governed  and  this  contract  shall  be  controlled  by  all  the  laws, 
rules,  and  regulations  of  the  ^*^  order  governing  this  rank  now 
in  force  or  that  may  hereafter  be  enacted  by  the  Supreme  Lodge 
Knights  of  Pythias  of  the  World,  or  submit  to  the  penalties 
therein  contained,  to  all  of  which  I  willingly  and  freely  sub- 
scribe." They  were  made,  respectively,  June  4,  1889,  and  April 
26,  1892.  The  certificate  was  issued  to  him  July  19,  1892,  and 
it  certified  thai  Henry  received  the  obligation  of  the  endowment 
rank  of  the  order  and  was  a  member  in  good  standing  in  said 
rank,  and  contained  the  following  provisions:  "And  in  consid- 
eration of  the  representations  and  declarations  made  in  his  ap- 
plications, ....  which  applications  are  made  a  part  of  this 
contract,  and  the  payment  of  the  prescribed  admission  fee,  and 
in  consideration  of  the  payment  hereafter  to  said  endowment 
rank  of  all  assessments  as  required,  and  the  full  compliance  with 
all  the  laws  governing  this  rank  now  in  force  or  that  may  here- 
after be  enacted  by  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  Pythias  of 
the  World,  or  the  board  of  control  of  the  endowment  rank,  and 
shall  be  in  good  standing  undter  said  laws,  the  sum  of  three 
thousand  dollars  will  be  paid  by  the  board  of  control  of  the 
endowment  rank  Knights  of  Pythias  of  the  World  to  Louisa  M. 
Henry,  his  wife,  as  directed  by  said  brother  in  his  application, 

or  to  such  other  person And  it  is  understood  and  agreed 

that  any  violation  of  the  within-mentioned  conditions  or  the 
requirements  of  the  laws  in  force  governing  this  rank  shall  ren- 
der this  certificate  and  all  claims  null  and  void,  and  that  the 
said  endowment  rank  shall  not  be  liable  for  the  above  sum  or 
any  part  thereof." 

The  by-laws  of  the  order,  called  its  "constitution,"  empowered 
the  board  of  control  to  establish  sections  of  the  endowment  rank,, 
and  to  enact,  alter,  and  amend,  from  time  to  time,  all  laws  and 
regulations  necessary  to  govern  the  same.     Acting  under  thia^ 


A.pril,  1899.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutschbb.         117 

authority,  the  board  of  control  on  January  13,  1893,  passed  the 
following  alleged  law  for  the  government  of  the  members  of  the 
endowment  rank:  "If  the  death  of  any  member  of  the  endow- 
ment ^*^  rank  heretofore  admitted  into  the  first,  second,  third, 
or  fourth  classes,  or  hereafter  admitted,  shall  result  from  self- 
destruction,  either  voluntary  or  involuntary,  whether  such  mem- 
ber shall  be  sane  or  insane  at  the  time,  or  if  such  death  shall  be 
caused  or  superinduced  by  the  use  of  intoxicating  liquors,  nar- 
cotics, or  opiates,  or  in  consequence  of  a  duel,  or  at  the  hands 
of  justice,  or  in  violation  or  attempted  violation  of  any  criminal 
law,  then  in  such  case  the  certificate  issued  to  such  member 
and  all  claims  against  said  endowment  rank  on  account  of  such 
membership  shall  be  forfeited."  The  board  of  control  reported 
its  action  in  passing  this  law,  with  a  copy  thereof,  to  the  su- 
preme lodge  at  its  regular  session  held  in  August  and  Septem- 
ber, in  1894,  where  said  report  was  by  the  action  of  that  body 
referred  to  one  of  its  committees,  which  committee  reported  to 
the  supreme  lodge  in  session  approving  the  action  of  the  board 
of  control  in  adopting  said  law  and  recommending  the  adoption 
of  the  report.  After  the  report  had  been  printed  it  was  adopted 
by  the  supreme  lodge  September  7,  1894.  This  by-law  was 
published  as  one  of  the  laws  of  the  order. 

These  facts  appear  from  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  defend- 
ant under  the  issues.  The  trial  court  excluded  the  evidence  of 
the  defendant  and  instructed  the  jury  to  find  for  the  plaintiff 
and  to  assess  the  damages  at  the  amount  specified  in  the  cer- 
tificate. 

"We  regard  the  question  as  settled  that  the  supreme  lodge 
could  not  delegate  to  a  subordinate  body  the  power  to  enact 
laws  of  this  character,  and  that  said  board  of  control  had  no 
power  to  enact  said  law:  Suprem?  Lodge  v.  McLennan,  171  111. 
417;  Supreme  Lodge  v.  La  Malta,  95  Tenn.  157.  There  are, 
then,  but  two  questions  to  be  considered:  1.  Was  said  alleged 
law  binding  upon  Henry  and  his  beneficiaries  by  virtue  of  his 
contract  to  comply  with  all  the  laws  governing  the  endowment 
rank  which  were  in  force  when  he  became  a  member  or  which 
might  thereafter  be  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge  or  the  board 
^**  of  control;  and  2.  If  he  was  not  bound  by  a  law  of  the 
board  of  control  which  it  had  no  power  to  enact,  was  the  action 
of  the  supreme  lodge  adopting  the  report  of  its  committee  ap- 
proving the  action  of  the  board  of  control  and  recommending 
the  adoption  of  its  report  a  sufficient  adoption  itself  of  said  law, 
80  as  to  make  it  a  law,  legally  enacted,  of  said  order  ? 


118  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscher.      [Illinois, 

After  a  further  consideration  of  the  case  upon  rehearing,  we 
have  reached  the  conclusion  that,  as  a  law  of  this  character  could 
be  enacted  only  by  the  supreme  lodge,  it  would  be  a  strained 
construction  of  the  contract  to  hold  that  the  parties  to  it,  by  th& 
terms  employed,  intended  that  the  members  of  the  order  should. 
be  bound  by  it  though  enacted  by  a  subordinate  body  having 
no  lawful  authority  to  do  so.  The  board  of  control  had  power, 
by  the  laws  of  the  order,  to  pass  certain  laws  and  regulations 
for  the  government  of  members  of  the  endowment  rank  to  which 
Henry  belonged,  but  not  of  the  character  of  the  law  in  question, 
and  the  terms  of  the  contract  should  not  be  construed  to  extend 
farther  than  to  such  laws  and  regulations,  and  to  embrace  others 
of  a  general  character  which  the  board  of  control  could  not  law- 
fully enact.  It  is  no  answer  to  say  that  appellee  is  bound  by 
Henry's  contract  with  appellant,  and  that  Henry  had  the  right 
and  power  to  stipulate  that  the  certificate  should  be  forfeited 
in  case  he  violated  any  law  which  the  board  of  control  might 
thereafter  enact,  whether  it  had  power  to  enact  it  or  not.  The 
question  here  is,  not  the  power  of  Henry  to  make  such  a  con- 
tract, but  what  is  the  meaning  of  the  contract  which  he  did 
make.  It  will  be  noticed  that  there  is  a  difference  between  the 
terms  of  the  applications  and  those  of  the  certificate  in  the  re- 
spect mentioned.  The  certificate  makes  the  applications  a  part 
of  the  contract,  but  also  binds  Henry  to  a  "full  compliance  with 
all  laws  governing  this  rank  now  in  force  or  that  may  hereafter 
be  enacted  by  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  Pythias  of  the 
"World,  or  the  board  of  control  of  ^^^  the  endowment  rank.'*^ 
This  is  the  language  of  appellant  in  its  certificate,  and  should 
be  construed  more  strictly  against  it  than  against  the  insured. 
To  confine  it  to  laws  which  the  board  of  control  had  power  and 
could  lawfully  enact  will  give  it  all  the  force  it  is  reasonably 
entitled  to.  To  extend  it  further  would  be  to  construe  it  more 
strictly  against  the  insured  and  his  beneficiary.  The  by-law  is 
a  reasonable  and  wholesome  one,  and  if  properly  enacted  should 
be  enforced. 

It  is  contended  that  the  action  of  the  supreme  lodge  in  adopt- 
ing said  report  did  not,  under  the  constitution  of  said  supreme 
lodge,  have  the  effect  of  adopting  or  passing  said  by-law  by  the 
supreme  lodge  itself.  This  contention  is  based  on  provisions  of 
Buch  constitution,  the  most  pertinent  of  which  are  as  follows: 

"Sec.  15.  No  proposition  shall  become  a  statute  until  it  shall 
have  passed  three  successive  readings,  the  second  and  third  of 
which  shall  not  be  had  on  the  same  calendar  day. 


April,  1S99.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscheb.         119 

"Sec.  16.  The  afSnnative  vote,  by  yeas  and  nays,  of  a  majority 
of  all  the  members  of  the  supreme  lodge  shall  be  required  for 
the  final  passage  of  a  proposition. 

"Sec.  18.  The  enacting  clause  of  every  proposition  shall  be 
as  follows:  Be  it  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge  Knights  of 
Pythias,'  and  shall  precede  or  be  a  part  of  the  first  section  of 
such  proposition." 

By-laws  of  the  general  character  of  the  one  in  question  were 
by  the  constitution  designated  "statutes,"  and  when  merely  pro- 
posed for  enactment,  "propositions."  It  is  apparent  that  the 
supreme  lodge  did  not  observe  these  provisions  of  its  constitu- 
tion in  adopting  this  by-law,  if  it  did  adopt  it,  but  the  appel- 
lant contends  that  the  by-law  was  lawfully  adopted,  although 
not  in  the  manner  provided  in  the  constitution.  In  this  view 
we  concur.  The  constitution  was  no  part  of  the  charter  of  the 
corporation,  and  was  but  a  by-law  under  another  name,  and 
could  not  take  from  the  lawfully  constituted  authorities  ^'^  of 
the  corporation  the  power  inherent  in  it  as  a  corporate  body  to 
adopt,  from  time  to  time,  such  other  by-laws  as  its  charter  per- 
mitted and  its  necessities  required.  The  same  body  that  enacted 
the  by-laws  called  the  "constitution"  had  the  power  to  alter, 
amend  or  repeal  them,  and  to  do  so  in  any  lawful  manner.  The 
majority  of  the  corporate  authorities  cannot  at  one  meeting  pass 
a  by-law  taking  away  from  their  successors,  acting  within  the 
charter  and  by  a  majority,  the  power  to  repeal  or  amend  the 
by-laws  of  the  corporation  or  to  enact  new  ones.  They  may 
make  rules  and  by-laws  regulating  their  own  proceedings  and  for 
their  convenience,  but  a  by-law  otherwise  lawfully  adopted,  of  a 
general  character  like  the  one  in  question,  is  not  rendered  in- 
valid because  in  adopting  it  the  corporate  authorities  violated 
certain  rules  of  procedure  which  they  had  previously  prescribed. 
This  precise  question,  involving  the  same  by-law  in  controversy 
here,  was  fully  considered  by  the  supreme  court  of  Mississippi 
in  Domes  v.  Supreme  Lodge  etc.,  75  Miss.  466,  and  the  same 
conclusion  reached.  See,  also,  Supreme  Lodge  v.  Knight,  117 
Ind.  495;  Commonwealth  v.  Mayor,  5  Watts,  152;  Angell  and 
Ames  on  Corporations  459 ;  Christ  Church  v.  Pope,  8  Gray,  140 ; 
Sayre  v.  Louisville  etc.  Assn.,  85  Am.  Dec.  618,  note;  5  Am.  & 
Am.  Ency.  of  Law,  2d  ed.,  88;  1  Thompson  on  Corporations, 
sec.  943. 

William  C.  Henry,  the  insured,  committed  suicide  on  October 
3,  1895 — ^more  than  a  year  after  this  by-law  was  adopted  by  the 
Bupreme  lodge.    By  force  of  his  contract  he  and  his  beneficiaries 


120  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe.         [Illinois, 

were  bound  by  it,  although  it  was  adopted  after  lie  became  a 
member  and  received  his  certificate.  The  trial  court  erred  in  in- 
structing the  jury  to  return  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff. 

The  judgments  of  the  circuit  and  appellate  courts  are  both 
reversed,  and  the  cause  will  be  remanded  to  the  circuit  court 
for  further  proceedings  not  inconsistent  with  the  views  herein 
expressed. 


ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES-DELEGATION  OP 
POWEItS.— The  supreme  lodge  of  a  beneficial  association,  sucli  as 
the  Knights  of  Pythias,  cannot  delegate  to  a  subordinate  managing 
committee  the  legislative  power  vested  by  the  charter  in  the  su- 
preme lodge  alone.  Hence,  a  by-law  or  regulation  adopted  by  such 
committee  undertaking  to  forfeit  a  member's  rights  in  the  event  of 
his  suicide  is  inoperative:  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Stein,  75  Miss. 
107;  65  Am.  St.  Itep.  589.  See  monographic  note  to  Lalje  v.  Minne- 
sota etc.  Assn.,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  556;  on  the  entire  question. 

ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES— ADOPTION  OF  BY- 
LAWS.—Under  a  contract  of  insurance,  issued  by  a  mutual  com- 
pany, conditioned  to  be  subject  to  any  laws  thereafter  to  be  en- 
acted, the  insured  is  bound  by  a  subsequent  by-law  forfeiting  the 
policy  on  account  of  suicide:  Daughtry  v.  Knights  of  Pythias,  48 
La.  Ann.  1203;  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  310,  and  note. 

ASSOCIATIONS-BENEFIT  SOCIETIES.-THE  CONSTITU- 
TION AND  BY-LAWS  of  a  voluntary  association  stand  on  the  same 
footing.  No  provision  in  either  is  binding,  unless  it  be  in  accord- 
ance with  the  law  of  the  land  and  with  public  policy:  See  note  to 
Austin  v.  Searing,  69  Am.  Dee.  672.  But  see  the  note  to  Lake  v. 
Minnesota  etc.  Assn..  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  556. 


Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  Pythias  v.  Trebbe. 

[179  Illinois,  348.] 

ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS— REPEAL.— The  valid  passage 
of  a  by-law  by  the  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society  in  any  mode 
not  prohibited  by  its  charter  or  general  law  is  necessarily  a  repeal 
of  any  other  mode  previously  prescribed  by  the  same  supreme  lodge. 

ASSOCIATIONS-BY-LAWS.— THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  A 
VOLUNTARY  ASSOCIATION  is  nothing  more  than  a  b.v-law 
which  may  be  altered,  abrogated,  or  repealed  by  the  power  enact- 
ing it.  unless  some  higher  rule  restrains  or  prohibits  a  change  or 
repeal. 

ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  —  ENACTMENT 
OF  BY-LAWS.— The  adoption  by  the  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  so- 
ciety, by  a  viva  voce  vote,  of  a  by-law  passed  by  a  subordinate 
lodge  or  board  of  control  without  authority,  is  a  valid  enactment  of 
such  law,  although  the  constitution  of  such  supreme  lodge  pro- 
vides another  method  of  enacting  by-laws.  The  by-law  thus  en- 
acted binds  members  whose  contracts  require  compliance  with  all 
by-laws  "now  In  force  or  hereafter  enacted  by  such  supreme  lodge." 

W.  M.  Hough,  for  the  appellant. 


April,  1899.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe.  121 

M.  Millard  and  F.  C.  Smith,  for  the  appellee. 

348  PHILLIPS,  J.  The  appellee  recovered  a  judgment  for 
three  thousand  dollars  against  the  appellant  in  the  city  court 
of  East  St.  Louis,  which,  on  appeal  to  the  appellate  court  for 
the  fourth  district,  was  affirmed,  and  an  appeal  is  prosecuted 
to  this  court. 

The  order  of  Knights  of  Pythias  was  incorporated  in  1870  un- 
der the  laws  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  as  "The  Supreme 
Lodge  of  the  Knights  of  Pythias  of  the  World."  By  an  amend- 
ment to  its  certificate  of  incorporation  in  October,  1875,  it  was 
provided  the  supreme  lodge  should  be  and  remain  a  body  cor- 
porate for  the  term  of  twenty  years.  A  further  amendment, 
dated  in  March,  1883,  authorized  the  establishment  of  the  en- 
dowment rank,  to  be  governed  by  such  laws  as  to  the  said  su- 
preme lodge  may  seem  proper.  Subsiequently,  in  June,  1894,  by 
a  special  ^®  act  of  Congress  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of 
Pythias  was  incorporated  as  a  fraternal  and  benevolent  associa- 
tion. The  endowment  rank  was  the  insurance  branch  of  the 
order,  and  it  was  provided  that  it  should  be  governed  by  such 
laws  as  the  supreme  lodge  may  enact  or  authorize.  The  supreme 
lodge  created  the  board  of  control,  which  was  given  entire  charge 
of  the  endowment  rank,  and  that  board  was  authorized  to  estab- 
lish a  table  of  rates  for  insurance  of  its  members,  to  make  special 
assessments  when  necessary,  and  to  make,  alter,  and  amend  all 
laws  pertaining  to  the  endowment  rank,  and  to  issue  certificates 
therein. 

At  the  eighteenth  convention  of  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights 
of  Pythias,  held  at  Washington,  D.  C,  August  28  to  September 
8,  1894,  the  board  of  control  made  a  report  of  having  adopted 
for  the  government  of  the  endowment  rank  a  law  with  reference 
to  the  suicide  of  one  holding  a  certificate  of  insurance  in  the 
order.  The  law  passed  by  the  board  was  substantially  as  follows: 
"If  the  death  of  any  member  of  the  endowment  rank  hereto- 
fore admitted  into  the  first,  second,  third,  or  fourth  classes,  or 
hereafter  admitted,  shall  result  from  self-destruction,  either  vol- 
untary or  involuntary,  whether  such  member  shall  be  sane  or 
insane  at  the  time,  or  if  such  death  shall  be  superinduced  by  the 
use  of  intoxicating  liquors,  narcotics,  or  opiates,  or  in  conse- 
quence of  a  duel,  or  at  the  hands  of  justice,  or  in  violation  or 
attempted  violation  of  any  criminal  law,  then,  in  such  case,  the 
certificate  issued  to  such  member,  and  all  claims  against  said 
endowment  rank  on  account  of  such  membership,  shall  be  for- 


122  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe.         [Illinois, 

feited."  The  report  was  referred  to  a  committee  of  the  endow- 
ment  rank,  who  reported  they  had  "given  the  same  careful  con- 
sideration in  every  respect,  and  fully  concur  and  approve  of  the 
legislation,  in  all  details,  enacted  by  said  board  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  endowment  rank."  That  report  was  subsequently 
adopted  by  the  supreme  lodge  on  a  viva  voce  vote. 

350  rpjjg  |)oard  of  control  was  in  existence  prior  to  the  first 
day  of  January,  1889.  On  the  nineteenth  day  of  August,  1889, 
G.  H.  Trebbe  filed  an  application  to  become  a  member  of  the 
endowment  rank,  and  his  application  contained  the  following 
provision : 

''I  hereby  agree  that  I  will  punctually  pay  all  dues  and  assess- 
ments for  which  I  may  become  liable,  and  that  I  will  be  gov- 
erned and  this  contract  shall  be  controlled  by  all  the  laws,  rules, 
and  regulations  for  the  order  governing  this  rank  now  in  force 
or  that  may  hereafter  be  enacted  by  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights 
of  Pythias  of  the  World,  or  submit  to  the  penalties  therein  con- 
tained.   To  all  of  which  I  willingly  and  freely  subscribe. 

"Dated  at  East  St.  Louis  this  the  nineteenth  day  of  August, 
1889. 

«G.  H.  TREBBE.'* 

The  president  of  the  board  of  control,  on  that  application,  is- 
sued a  certificate,  which  contained  the  following  provisions: 

"This  certifies  that  brother  G.  H,  Trebbe  received  the  obli- 
gation of  the  endowment  rank  of  the  Order  of  Knights  of  Pyth- 
ias in  section  No.  324  on  September  6,  18S9,  and  is  a  member 
in  good  standing  in  said  rank,  and  in  consideration  of  the  repre- 
sentations and  declarations  made  in  his  application,  bearing  date 
of  August  19,  1889  (which  application  is  made  a  part  of  this 
contract),  and  the  payment  of  the  prescribed  admission  foe,  and 
in  consideration  of  the  payment  hereafter  to  said  endowment 
rank  of  all  assessments  as  required,  and  the  full  compliance  with 
all  laws  governing  this  rank  now  in  force  or  that  may  hereafter 
be  enacted,  and  shall  be  in  good  standing  under  said  laws,  the 
sum  of  $3,000  will  be  paid  by  the  Supreme  Lodge  of  Knights 
of  Pythias  of  the  World  to  Matilda  Trebbe,  his  wife,  as  directed 
by  said  brother  in  his  application,  or  to  such  other  person  or 
persons  as  he  may  subsequently  direct  by  change  oi  beneficiary 
entered  upon  the  records  of  the  supreme  secretary  of  the  endow- 
ment rank,  upon  due  notice  of  proof  of  death  and  good  standing 
in  the  rank  at  the  time  of  death  and  surrender  of  this  certificate; 
provided,  however,  that  the  interest  of  any  beneficiary,  as  desig- 


April,  1899.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Tbebbe.  125 

nated  by  said  brother,  or  in  the  interest  of  his  or  her  heirs,  shall 
ceaee  and  determine  in  case  of  the  death  of  said  beneficiary  dur- 
ing the  lifetime  of  such  member,  and  in  that  case  the  benefit 
accruing  under  this  certificate  shall  be  paid  as  provided  for  in 
article  12,  section  1,  of  the  endowment  '"^^  rank  cons'titution;. 
provided  further,  that  if,  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  said  brother,, 
the  proceeds  of  one  assessment  on  all  members  of  the  endow- 
ment rank  shall  not  be  sufficient  to  pay  in  full  the  maximum 
amount  of  endowment  held  under  this  certificate,  then  there- 
shall  be  paid  an  amount,  less  ten  per  cent  for  expenses,  equal 
to  the  proceeds  of  one  full  assessment  on  all  remaining  mem- 
bers of  the  endowment  rank,  and  the  payment  of  such  sum  to 
the  beneficiary  or  beneficiaries  mentioned  shall  be  in  full  of  all 
claims  and  demands  under  and  by  virtue  of  this  certificate. 
And  it  is  understood  and  agreed  that  any  violation  of  the  within- 
mentioned  conditions,  or  the  requirements  of  the  law  in  forc& 
governing  this  rank,  shall  render  this  certificate  and  all  claims 
null  and  void,  and  that  the  said  supreme  lodge  shall  not  be  liable 
for  the  above  sum  or  any  part  thereof. 

"In  witness  whereof  we  have  hereunto  subscribed  our  namea 
and  affixed  the  seal  of  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  Pythia* 
of  the  World.  Issued  this  17th  day  of  September,  1889,  pp. 
xxvi,  at  Chicago,  Illinois,  and  registered  in  book  2,  folio  168. 

[Seal]  "J.  A.  HINSEY, 

Pres.  Board  of  Control. 

"Attest: 

"W.  B.  Kennedy, 

"Supreme  Sec.  Endowment  Rank." 

And  the  certificate  was  accepted  by  the  applicant,  as  follows  t 

'T.  hereby  accept  this  certificate  of  membership  subject  to  all 
the  conditions  therein  contained. 

«G.  H.  TREBBB. 

"Attest: 

"Frank  Martin, 

"Sec.  Section  No.  .  .  .,  E.  R." 

The  endowment  rank  was  the  insurance  branch  of  the  order, 
and  the  board  of  control  was  created  by  the  supreme  lodge  and 
given  entire  charge  of  the  endowment  rank.  It  was  authorised 
to  make  rates  for  insurance,  make  special  assessments,  and 
make,  alter,  and  amend  all  laws  pertaining  to  the  endowment 
rank  and  to  issue  certificates  therein.  G.  H.  Trebbe  had  knowl- 
edge of  that  board  and  its  powers  when  he  applied  for  insurancft 


124  ScPBEME  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe.      [Illinois, 

and  took  a  certificate  from  its  president.  The  application  by 
him  contained  this  provision:  "This  contract  shall  be  controlled 
by  all  the  laws,  rules,  and  regulations  for  the  order  governing, 
this  rank  now  in  force  or  that  may  hereafter  be  enacted 
by  the  Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  ^^^  Pythias  of  the  World,'* 
et  cetera.  By  the  terms  of  the  certificate  of  insurance  it  was 
provided  that  if  compliance  should  be  had  with  all  laws  "gov- 
erning this  rank  now  in  force  or  that  may  hereafter  be  enacted,'* 
-et  cetera,  payment  was  to  be  made,  et  cetera.  Under  the  by-laws 
the  J)oard  of  control  had  the  right  to  make,  alter,  and  amend 
the  law  governing  the  endowment  rank,  and  it  being  necessarily 
assumed  that  Trebbe  had  knowledge  of  the  powers  of  that  board, 
he  took  his  certificate  with  notice  of  its  powers. 

Long  after  the  issue  of  this  certificate,  and  whilst  the  enact- 
ment of  the  board  of  control  was  in  force,  G.  H.  Trebbe  did,  on 
the  seventh  day  of  September,  1896,  commit  suicide.  The  bene- 
ficiary in  the  policy  brought  suit  on  the  certificate,  and,  on  trial 
before  a  jury,  the  court  refused  instructions,  asked  by  the  de- 
fendant, that  if  they  believed  from  the  evidence  that  the  death 
of  G.  H.  Trebbe  resulted  from  self-destruction,  whether  sane 
or  insane  at  the  time,  they  must  find  for  the  defendant,  and 
gave  an  instruction  for  the  plaintiff  that  the  jury  must  find  the 
issue  for  the  plaintiff  and  assess  her  damage  at  three  thousand 
dollars.  To  the  refusal  to  instruct  as  asked  by  the  defendant, 
«nd  giving  the  instruction  asked  by  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant 
excepted. 

It  is  apparent  that  in  the  organization  of  this  association  a 
provision  was  made  for  the  organization  of  a  constitution  regu- 
latingN  and  governing  the  order  itself.  By  the  organization  of 
the  endowment  rank  it  embodied  and  embraced  the  insurance 
part  of  this  order.  The  board  of  control  was  given  control  of 
the  endowment  rank  with  reference  to  insurance  and  with  ref- 
€rnce  to  rates  of  insurance,  and  had  the  right  to  amend,  change, 
or  make  additional  laws  for  the  government  of  the  same.  When 
the  board  of  control  enacted  a  statute  under  the  terms  and  pro- 
visions of  the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the  supreme  lodge, 
■and  the  supreme  lodge  at  a  meeting  had  presented  to  it  a  re- 
port of  the  committee  of  the  endowment  rank,  stating  that  it, 
the  board  of  control,  liad  ^^"*  enacted  a  statute  for  the  govern- 
ment of  the  endowment  rank,  and  the  supreme  lodge  adopted 
and  approved,  by  a  viva  voce  vote,  the  report  of  the  committee 
of  the  endowment  rank  which  showed  the  adoption  of  the  re» 


April,  1899.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  t;.  Trebbb.  125 

port  of  that  committee,  it  was  the  enactment  by  the  supreme 
lodge  of  a  statute  for  the  government  of  that  body. 

In  Domes  v.  Supreme  Lodge  Knights  of  Pythias,  75  Miss. 
466,  it  was  held:  "The  valid  passage  of  a  law  by  the  supreme 
lodge  in  anymode  not  prohibited  byits  charter  or  the  general  law 
of  the  land  is  necessarily  a  repeal  of  any  other  mode  previously 
prescribed  by  the  same  supreme  lodge — the  same  source  of  power. 
The  authorities  make  this  perfectly  clear.  In  Supreme  Lodge 
V.  Knight,  117  Ind.  495,  it  is  said:  'Charters  are  not  created 
by  the  act  of  the  corporation  or  association,  but  are  granted  by 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  state.  A  constitution  of  a  voluntary 
association  or  a  corporation  is  nothing  more  than  a  by-law  under 
an  inappropriate  name.  The  power  that  can  enact  a  by-law, 
whether  called  a  constitution  or  not,  can  alter  or  abrogate  it, 
unless  some  higher  rule  restrains  or  prohibits  a  change  or  re- 
peal. "When  the  authorities  speak  of  a  charter  they  mean  an 
essentially  different  thing  from  a  law  or  constitution  of  the  as- 
sociation's own  creation.  "What  counsel  call  a  charter  is  nothing 
more  than  a  code  of  laws  established,  not  by  the  sovereign  power 
of  the-  government,  but  by  the  creature  of  that  power — ^the  cor- 
poration or  association.  The  most  that  can  be  justly  said  is, 
that  the  later  by-laws  are  in  conflict  with  the  earlier.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  clashing  between  corporate  utterances  and  charter 
provisions.'  And  this  was  said  by  Elliott,  C.  J.,  speaking  of 
provisions  of  the  supreme  constitution  of  the  order  itself.  In 
Kichardson  v.  Union  Congregational  Soc,  58  N.  H.  188,  the 
court  say:  'Complaint  is  made  that  the  amendment  of  by-law 
13,  requiring  a  two-thirds  vote  for  the  admission  of  new  mem- 
bers, was  not  properly  and  legally  enacted  because  its  passage 
was  not  obtained  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  those  present,  *** 
according  to  by-law  12,  requiring  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the 
members  present  to  alter  or  amend  the  by-laws  of  the  society. 
....  By-law  12  was  not  part  of  the  charter  or  constitution 
of  the  society  and  not  a  law  for  the  guidance  of  its  officers  and 
agents.  It  was  an  enactment  made  by  one  meeting  of  the  so- 
ciety to  govern  the  proceedings  of  future  meetings,  and  was  in- 
operative beyond  the  pleasure  of  the  society  acting  by  a  majority 
vote  at  any  regular  meeting.  The  power  of  the  society,  derived 
from  its  charter  and  the  laws  under  which  it  was  organized,  to 
enact  by-laws  is  continuous,  residing  in  all  regular  meetings  of 
the  society  so  long  as  it  exists.  Any  meeting  could,  by  a  ma- 
jority vote,  modify  or  repeal  the  law  of  a  previous  meeting,  and 


126  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe.        [Illinois, 

no  meeting  conld  bind  a  subsequent  one  by  irrepealable  acts  05 
rules  of  procedure.  The  power  to  enact  is  a  power  to  repeal,  and 
a  by-law  requiring  a  two-thirds  vote  of  members  present  to  alter 
or  amend  the  laws  of  the  society  may  itself  be  altered,  amended, 
or  repealed  by  the  same  power  which  enacted  it:  Angell  and 
Ames  on  Corporations,  450;  Commonwealth  v.  Mayor  etc.,  5 
Watts,  152,  155;  Christ  Church  v.  Pope,  8  Gray,  140,  142.  The 
society,  by  a  majority  vote,  might  amend  or  repeal  by-law  12. 
By  a  like  vote  they  might  adopt  any  mode  for  the  admission  of 
members.'  This  is  directly  in  point.  Mr.  Thompson  in  Com« 
mentaries  on  the  Law  of  Corporations,  volume  1,  sec.  943,  lays 
down  the  same  rule,  saying:  'If  the  charter  is  silent  as  to  the 
formalities  to  be  observed,  a  by-law  may  be  adopted  by  acts  as 
well  as  by  words.' " 

It  was  held  in  State  v.  Grand  Lodge  A.  0.  TJ.  W.,  70  Mo.  App. 
456:  "The  ruling  in  the  Davenport  case,  and  its  approval  and 
adoption  by  the  grand  lodge  and  the  subsequent  recognition 
of  the  rule  by  the  grand  lodge,  can  be  taken  in  no  other  light 
or  be  reconciled  upon  any  other  hypothesis  than  the  adoption 
of  the  ruling  as  a  rule  of  the  order.  This  conduct  and  these  acts 
of  the  grand  lodge  are  irrefragable  proof  of  the  adoption  ^^'^ 
of  the  law,  which  it  might  do  as  well,  by  acts  and  conduct  as  by  a 
formal  and  express  adoption  of  the  by-law:  (Angell  and  Ames 
on  Corporations,  sec.  328;  Lockwood  v.  Mechanics'  Bank,  9  E.  I. 
308;  11  Am.  Rep.  253.)  This  law  having  been  adopted,  the  sec- 
ond question  is.  Was  the  defendant,  he  having  become  a  mem- 
ber of  the  order  and  received  his  beneficiary  certificate  prior 
to  its  adoption,  amenable  to  it?  The  right  to  amend  its  by- 
laws is  necessarily  inherent  in  a  corporation  of  this  kind,  and  its 
members  might  reasonably  expect  that  they  would  be  amended : 
Ellerbe  v.  Faust,  119  Mo.  653;  Schrick  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Build- 
ing Co.,  34  Mo.  423;  Allen  v.  Life  Assn.  of  America,  8  Mo.  App. 
S2." 

In  Supreme  Lodge  etc.  v.  McLennan,  171  111.  417,  the  ques- 
tion was  presented  on  demurrer  to  a  plea,  and  it  was  held  that 
the  provisions  of  the  application  for  certificate  by  which  it  was 
provided  that  the  applicant  would  be  bound  by  all  laws  then  in 
force  or  which  might  be  thereafter  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge 
would  be  binding,  could  not  be  pleaded,  as  the  agreement 
averred  that  the  *T3oard  of  control  of  the  endowment  rank  of 
the  supreme  lodge  adopted  the  by-law  so  relied  upon." 

The  board  of  control  having  enacted  a  law  for  thcgovernment 
of  the  endowment  rank,  which  was  reported  to  the  supreme 


April,  1899.]     Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe.  127 

lodge  by  a  committee  of  the  endowment  rank,  and  the  supreme 
lodge  having  adopted  the  report  and  approved  the  law,  it  must 
be  held  that  the  statute  thus. reported  by  the  board  of  control 
was  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge.  To  hold  otherwise  would  be 
to  hold  that  one  legislative  body  might  limit  the  power  of  an- 
other legislative  body  with  equal  powers,  and  prevent  the  enact- 
ment of  laws  by  a  body  of  equal  authority. 

We  hold  that  the  exercise  of  the  power  conferred  on  the  board 
of  control  for  the  governnient  of  the  endowment  rank,  author- 
izing them  to  enact,  amend,  and  annul  laws,  when  acted  on  by 
that  board  and  reported  to  the  supreme  lodge  and  approved  by 
it,  was  the  enactment  of  the  particular  provision  involved,  in  this 
case  with  reference  to  ^'®  a  bar  of  a  right  of  action  where  death 
resulted  from  self-destruction,  either  voluntary  or  involuntary, 
whether  such  member  shall  be  sane  or  insane  at  the  time,  or  if 
such  death  shall  be  superinduced  by  the  use  of  intoxicating  liq- 
uors, narcotics,  or  opiates,  or  at  the  hands  of  justice. 

Under  the  replications  to  the  pleas  and  under  the  evidence 
appearing  in  this  record  no  question  is  presented  for  the  consid- 
eration of  this  court  as  to  whether  the  character  of  insanity 
was  such  that  the  deceased,  at  the  time  of  committing  suicide, 
was  unconscious  of  the  act,  or  whether  the  degree  of  insanity 
would  in  any  manner  cause  this  by-law  to  be  of  no  effect  in 
barring  the  right  of  recovery.  As  tried,  the  case  presented  to 
this  court  is  simply  the  case  of  the  certificate  and  the  by-law 
and  an  act  of  self-destruction. 

It  was  error  in  the  trial  court  to  refuse  the  instructions  asked 
by  the  defendant,  and  it  was  also  error  to  give  the  instruction 
asked  by  the  plaintiff. 

The  appellate  court  erred  in  affirming  the  judgment  of  the 
city  court  of  East  St.  Louis,  The  judgment  of  the  city  court 
of  East  St.  Louis  and  the  judgment  of  the  appellate  court  for 
the  fourth  district  are  each  reversed  and  the  cause  is  remanded 
for  further  proceedings. 

ASSOCIATIONS,  BENEFIT— BY-LAWS.— THE  CONSTTTr- 
TION  of  a  benefit  society,  If  no  part  of  Its  charter,  has  only  the  «'f- 
fect  of  a  by-law,  and  cannot  take  from  the  rightfully  constituted  au- 
thorities of  the  society  their  inherent  power  to  adopt,  from  time  to 
time,  such  other  by-laws  as  its  charter  permits  or  necosslty  require^: 
Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscher,  179  111.  340;  ante,  p.  115,  and 
uote  thereto  collecting  former  cases.  See  especially  the  niouo- 
graphic  note  to  Lake  v.  Minnesota  etc.  Assn.,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  556. 


128  Basteup  v.  Pbendeeqast.  [Illinoiik, 


Bastrup  V.  Prendergast. 

[179  Illinois,  663.] 

MECHANICS'  LIENS— ESTOPPEL  AGAINST  WIFE.— If  a 
wife,  with  knowledge  that  her  husband  has  made  false  representa- 
tions as  to  the  ownership  of  property  and  has  contracted  In  his 
own  name  for  the  erection  of  buildings  thereon,  assists  in  procur- 
ing the  worli  to  be  done  under  the  contracts,  without  disclosing  to 
the  contractor  her  title  to  the  property,  which  is  of  record,  she  is 
estopped  to  assert  her  title  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  a  mechan- 
ic's lien  arising  out  of  such  contract. 

MECHANICS'  LIENS-WANT  OF  DESCRIPTION  OF 
PROPERTY  IN  CONTRACT.— The  mere  omission  of  a  description 
or  designation  of  the  property  in  a  building  contract  cannot  defeat 
a  mechanic's  lien  otherwise  established  when  the  notice,  or  claim  of 
lien,  filed  for  record  properly  describes  the  property,  and  all  of  the 
interested  parties  understood  what  property  was  referred  to  In  the 
contract,  and  the  material  was  furnished  and  the  building  erected 
upon  that  understanding. 

MECHANICS'  LIENS— FLATS  AS  ONE  BUILDING.— Flats 
built  on  adjacent  lots  belonging  to  the  same  owner  are  one  build- 
ing, for  the  purpose  of  a  mechanic's  lien,  although  the  division  wall 
rises  above  the  roof,  and  there  are  separate  entrances,  if  they  are 
erected  as  one  structure,  under  one  contract,  at  the  same  time, 
heated  with  one  furnace,  and  a  porch  extends  across  the  entire  rear 
of  the  structure  with  one  continuous  and  unbroken  roof. 

K.  Prendergast  and  Bastrup  &  O'Neill,  for  'the  appellants. 

Masterson  &  Haft,  F.  A.  and  H.  F.  Pennington,  G.  Langhenry, 
and  J.  F.  Dillon,  for  appellees. 

'^'^  CAETER,  C.  J.  With  proceedings  to  enforce  mechanics* 
liens  instituted  by  the  appellees  and  others  in  the  circuit  court 
of  Cook  county,  a  bill  afterward  filed  by  the  appellants  in  the 
superior  court  was  consolidated,  and  the  two  causes  proceeded 
to  final  decree  in  the  circuit  court  as  one  case.  In  the  final  de- 
cree, it  was  found  that  as  to  the  claims  of  the  appellees  in  con- 
troversy here  appellees  were  not  entitled  to  any  lien,  but  that 
appellants  had  a  lien  on  the  property  to  the  extent  of  their 
mortgage  debt.  The  appellees  took  their  appeal  to  the  api)el- 
late  court,  where  the  decree  was  reversed  and  the  cause  re- 
manded, with  directions  to  enter  a  decree  in  accordance  with  the 
prayer  of  the  pleadings  of  the  claimants  of  mechanics'  liens  for 
the  amount  found  due  them  and  of  the  dates  found  by  the  cir- 
cuit court,  thus  establishing  their  liens  which  had  been  denied 
by  the  circuit  court  and  fixing  the  amounts  due  as  found  by 
that  court.  The  effect  of  this  judgment  '***"  is  to  give  appellees 
precedence  over  the  mortgage  lien  of  the  appellants. 

If  appellees  were  entitled  to  a  lien  at  all,  they  were  entitled 


June,  1899.]  Bastrup  v.  Prendebgast.  129 

to  a  preference  over  appellants,  inasmuch  as  the  mortgage  was 
given  after  the  mechanics'  liens  attached.  Appellants,  there- 
fore, have  the  right  to  insist,  on  this  their  appeal,  that  appellees 
have  no  lien.  These  mortgagees  are  the  only  appellants  here, 
the  owners  of  the  property  having  acquiesced  in  the  judgment 
of  reversal. 

Catherine  MeNally  was  the  owner  of  the  property,  which  con- 
sisted of  two  lots  in  Chicago,  together  having  a  frontage  of 
forty-eight  feet  and  seven  and  three-fourths  inches  on  Fifty-fifth 
street  and  extending  back  on  Wright  street  one  hundred  and 
forty  feet,  and  the  public  records  showed  title  in  fee  in  her. 
She  and  her  husband,  John  McNally,  resided  in  a  frame  house 
on  these  lots  as  their  home.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1893 
appellee  Norton  prepared  plans,  at  the  request  of  John  McNall)', 
for  a  building  covering  both  lots,  to  be  used  as  stores  below 
and  flats  above.  These  plans  were  shown  and  explained  to  Cath- 
erine McNally  by  Norton,  the  architect,  at  the  request  of  John 
lilcNally.  She  decided  that  the  building  would  be  too  expensive, 
and  the  plans  were  afterward,  in  January.  1894,  changed  to  meet 
her  views,  so  as  to  provide  for  a  smaller  building  covering  the 
front  part  of  the  lots  and  extending  back  only  fifty-five  feet  and 
six  inches.  For  the  construction  of  this  building  John  McNally 
entered  into  contracts  under  seal  in  his  own  name  with  various 
contractors  and  mechanics,  including  the  appellees,  except  Nor- 
ton, in  which  contracts  McNally  described  himself  as  owner,  but 
the  property  was  not  therein  in  any  way  described  or  located. 
Before  the  construction  of  the  building  was  entered  upon,  and 
on  February  13,  1894,  Catherine  McNally  made  a  written  ap« 
plication  to  Loeb  &  Gatzert  for  a  loan  of  thirteen  thousand  dol- 
lars, to  be  secured  by  a  deed  of  trust  on  the  premises,  the  money 
to  be  used  in  the  erection  of  the  building,  and  stating  that  tho 
money  might  be  paid  out  by  Loeb  &  Gatzert,  at  their  option, 
for  '^'^^  labor,  materials,  et  cetera,  and  if  the  amount  should 
prove  insufficient  for  the  erection  of  the  building  she  would  sup- 
ply the  deficiency  from  her  own  funds.  In  this  application  she 
described  in  detail  the  character  of  the  building  to  be  erected, 
stating  also  that  it  was  to  be  used  as  a  residence  for  hers^elf  and 
her  husband.  The  holders  of  the  obligations  for  this  loan  were 
not  parties  to  the  suit,  and  it  does  not  appear  what  amount  of 
money  was  advanced  upon  it,  except  that  they  advanced  one 
thousand  dollars  to  Burkhardt  &  Sons  and  about  four  hundred 
dollars  to  Norton,  and  this  loan,  or  the  application  for  it,  is 

Am.  8r.  Rkp.,  Vou  LXX.— 9 


130  Bastrup  v.  Pbendergast.  [Illinois, 

important  here  only  as  tending  to  connect  Catherine  Morally 
with  the  construction  of  the  building,  and  as  hearing  upon  the 
allegation  that  she  is  estopped  by  her  conduct  from  claiming 
that  her  said  property  is  not  subject  to  the  liens  sought  to  be 
established  and  enforced.  The  frame  dwelling  occupied  by 
Catherine  and  John  McNally  was  mored  to  the  rear  of  the  lots 
and  faced  on  Wright  street,  and  was  occupied  by  them  during 
the  construction  of  the  building  in  front.  Without  rehearsing 
the  evidence,  it  shows  that  she  observed  the  progress  of  the 
work,  frequently  inspecting  it;  that  important  changes  were  made 
and  contracts  entered  into  in  accordance  with  her  directions, 
and  there  can  be  no  doubt,  when  all  the  evidence  is  considered, 
that  she  fully  understood  and  authorized  all  that  was  being 
done  by  the  appellees  in  doing  the  work  and  furnishing  the 
materials  for  w^hich  the  liens  are  claimed.  John  McNally  was 
insolvent,  and  she  knew  it,  and  knew  the  building  could  be  paid 
for  in  no  other  way  than  by  moneys  secured  by  liens  upon  the 
property  But  while  the  evidence  shows  that  appellees  did  not 
in  fact  know  that  she,  and  not  her  husband,  was  the  owner  of 
the  lots,  it  does  show  that  she  was  such  owner  and  that  it  so 
appeared  from  the  records  of  deeds  in  the  recorder's  office  of 
Cook  county,  and  that  appellees  made  no  examination  of  such 
records  until  after  the  work  was  done.  Inasmuch  as  the  con- 
tracts were  with  John  McNally  only,  and  under  his  seal,  the 
only  question,  ^^"^  as  we  view 'the  case,  is  whether  or  not 
Catherine  McNally  is  estopped  from  claiming  title  in  herself, 
as  against  appellees'  right  to  liens  on  the  property. 

The  contracts  disclosed  no  question  of  agency,  and  Catherine 
McNally  was  not  in  any  way  mentioned  in  them.  She  could 
not  sue  or  be  sued  on  them  as  an  undisclosed  principal,  and 
as  the  law  in  force  when  these  liens  are  claimed  to  have  attached 
required  that  the  contract,  whether  expressed  or  implied,  should 
be  made  with  the  owner  of  the  property,  her  property  was  not 
liable,  under  the  contracts,  on  proof  merely  that  she  was  princi- 
pal and  that  her  husband  acted  as  her  agent:  Walsh  v.  Murphy, 
167  111.  228,  and  cases  there  cited.  The  proof  given  was  in- 
admissible to  show  that  in  making  the  sealed  contracts  with 
appellees  John  McNally  acted  as  the  agent  of  his  wife,  the 
owner  of  the  property,  for  the  purpose  of  holding  her  liable  as 
principal,  but  in  so  far  as  it  tended  to  prove  that  she  aided  and 
abetted  John  McNally  in  holding  himself  out  to  appellees  as 
the  owner  of  the  property  and  induced  them  to  act  upon  that 


June,  1899.]  Bastrup  v.  Prenderqast.  181 

representation,  thus  operating  to  estop  her  from  claiming  title 
as  against  appellees,  it  was  admi&sible.  But  the  mere  fact  that 
she  stood  by  and  permitted  her  husband  to  construct  the  build- 
ing on  her  property,  and  to  enter  into  contracts  for  the  pur- 
pose in  his  own  name  without  objection  on  her  part  and  without 
informing  appellees  that  she  was  the  owner  of  the  lots,  would 
not,  of  itself,  if  she  did  not  know  that  he  represented  himself 
as  owner,  show  any  fraudulent  conduct  on  her  part  from  which 
a,n  estoppel  would  arise:  Campbell  v.  Jacobson,  145  111.  389. 
Her  title  was  of  record,  and  if  the  appellees  saw  proper  to  im- 
prove her  property  under  contracts  with  her  husband  without 
examining  the  records  or  without  inquiring  of  her  as  to  the  title, 
she  would  not  be  estopped  from  asserting  her  title  as  against 
their  claim  for  a  lien  for  the  improvements,  unless  her  conduct 
was  such  as  to  amount  to  a  fraud,  actual  or  constructive,  upon 
appellees  in  claiming  ^^^  title  in  herself  after  the  work  was 
done.  Thus,  in  Campbell  v.  Jacobson,  145  111.  389  (a  case 
similar,  in  many  respects,  to  this  except  as  to  allegations  of 
fraud,)  where  it  was  held  that  no  lien  attached  to  the  wife's 
land,  it  was  said  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  conduct  of  Mrs. 
Jaoobson  which  called  for  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of 
estoppel,  and  that  "if  she  had  withheld  her  deed  from  record 
until  after  the  contract  had  been  entered  into,  as  was  the  case 
in  Schwartz  v.  Saunders.  46  111.  17,  thus  placing  it  in  the  power 
of  her  husband  to  hold  himself  out  to  the  world  as  the  owner 
of  the  property,  or  if  she  had  fraudulently  permitted  her  hus- 
band to  represent  himself  as  such  owner,  as  appeared  to  be  the 
case  in  Oglesby  Coal  Co.  v.  Pasco,  79  111.  164,  the  case  would 
doubtless  have  been  different.  But  nothing  of  that  kind  ia 
shown."  In  that  case  there  was  nothing  in  the  pleadings  or 
the  evidence  under  which  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  could  be  ap- 
plied, and  in  this  respect  that  case  is  different  from  this.  Here 
it  was  a  question  of  fact  pertinent  in  the  case  whether  or  not 
she  had  knowledge  that  John  McNally  held  himself  out  to  the 
appellees  as  the  owner  of  the  property,  and  permitted  him  to 
contract  as  own-er  with  appellees  for  the  work  and  materials  to 
be  used  in  constructing  the  building  on  her  property.  Both 
husband  and  wife  resided  upon  the  premises,  and  we  are  of  the 
opinion  that  the  evidence  is  sufficient  to  charge  her  with  knowl- 
edge that  in  making  his  contracts  with  the  builders  her  husband 
represented  himself  as  owner  of  the  property  and  that  they  re- 
lied upon  that  repres^entation  in  doing  their  work  and  furnish- 


182  Bastrup  v.  Prenderqast.  [Illinois^ 

ing  the  materials.  While  an  examination  of  the  public  records 
would  have  disclosed  that  the  title  of  record  stood  in  her,  still 
it  cannot  be  doubted  that  had  she  informed  appellees  that  her 
husband  was  the  owner  of  the  property  they  would  have  been 
justified,  as  against  her,  in  relying  upon  her  statement  with- 
out examining  the  records,  and  she  would  have  been  estopped, 
after  the  work  was  done,  from  asserting  her  own  title  as  against 
her  claim  for  a  lien.  ^^^  It  was  a  fraud  upon  a^ellees  for  John 
McNally  to  obtain  their  work  and  materials  in  the  construction 
of  the  building  upon  his  wife's  land  under  representations  that 
he  was  the  owner,  and  if  sihe,  with  knowledge  of  such  false 
representations  of  ownership,  assisted  in  procuring  the  work  to 
be  done  under  the  contracts  without  disclosing  to  appellees  her 
title  to  the  property,  she  was  as  much  a  party  to  the  fraud  a& 
if  she  had  falsely  stated  to  them  that  her  husband  was  the  owner 
of  the  property. 

Appellants  say  that  appellees  should  have  examined  the  rec- 
ords or  inquired  of  Catherine  McNally  as  to  the  ownership  of 
the  property.  This  would  ordinarily  be  correct,  but  in  this 
case  such  action  was  rendered  unnecessary  by  the  false  repre- 
sentations of  McNally,  connived  at  by  his  wife.  If  husband 
and  wife  are  in  possession  of  land,  the  title  whereof  is  in  the 
wife,  and  a  third  person  is  about  to  purchase  from  the  husband 
upon  his  representation  that  he  is  the  owner,  and  the  wife,^ 
knowing  this,  stands  by  and  encourages  the  sale  and  urges  the 
purchaser  to  buy,  and  the  purchaser,  relying  upon  such  repre- 
sentations, buys  and  takes  title  from  the  husband  without  know- 
ing the  title  is  in  his  wife,  she  would  B*  estopped  from  setting 
up  her  own  title  against  the  purchaser,  for  otherwise  she  would 
be  perpetrating  a  fraud  upon  him,  and  this  would  be  so  even  if 
her  title  appeared  of  record.  Thus  it  is  said  in  2  Herman  on 
Estoppel  and  Ees  Judicata,  section  964:  "When  a  title  has  been 
once  duly  recorded  no  responsibility  will  arise  from  a  failure  ta 
take  further  or  immediate  steps  to  warn  subsequent  purchasers, 
who  may  fairly  be  presumed  to  have  taken  the  means  pointed 
out  by  law  and  acquired  all  the  knowledge  which  it  is  import- 
ant for  them  to  have.  But  this  is  applicable  only  in  the  case- 
where  the  foundation  of  the  estoppel  is  in  silence  or  acqui- 
escence, for  where  the  owner  concurs  in  a  sale  by  participating 
in  it  at  the  time,  it  becomes  his  own  act,  and  he  certainly  cannot 
be  allowed  to  make  his  own  good  faith  a  reason  for  throwing  hia 
*<*"  lofifi  upon  third  persons  who  are  equally  innocent."    And 


June,  1899.]  Basteup  v.  Pbenderqast.  138 

the  ease  is,  of  course,  stronger  where  the  owner  is  guilty  of  fraud, 
actual  or  constructive.  And  in  Fisher  v.  Mossman,  11  Ohio  St. 
42,  it  was  said  if  a  mortgagee  of  real  estate  whose  mortgage  was 
of  record  stood  by  at  a  sheriff's  sale  of  the  property  and  kept 
silent  as  to  his  lien  he  would  not  be  estopped,  but  the  case 
would  have  been  different  if  he  had  said  or  done  anything  to 
deceive  or  mislead  the  purchaser.  Also  in  Hill  v.  Blackwelder, 
113  111.  283,  this  court  said  that  the  rule  that  the  estoppel  would 
not  arise  where  the  title  of  the  party  sought  to  be  estopped  ap- 
peared of  record,  applies  "only  in  cases  where  the  foundation 
of  the  estoppel  is  in  silence,  and  omission  to  give  notice  of  one's 
right,  and  not  in  a  case  where  the  landowner  has  actively  en- 
couraged and  induced  the  injured  party  to  act.'* 

In  Anderson  v.  Armstead,  69  111.  452,  this  court  said:  "The 
law  is  familiar  that  where  the  owner  of  property  holds  out 
another,  or  allows  him  to  appear,  as  the  owner  of,  or  as  having 
full  power  of  disposition  over,  the  property,  and  innocent  parties 
are  thus  led  into  dealing  with  such  apparent  owner  or  person 
having  the  apparent  power  of  disposition,  they  will  be  protected. 
Their  rights  in  such  cases  do  not  depend  upon  the  actual  title  or 
authority  of  the  party  with  whom  they  have  directly  dealt,  but 
they  are  derived  from  the  act  of  the  real  owner,  which  precludes 
him  from  disputing,  as  against  them,  the  existence  of  the  title' 
or  power  he  caused  or  allowed  to  appear  to  be  vested  in  the  party 
upon  the  faith  of  whose  title  of  power  they  dealt."  It  is  true, 
as  said  by  appellants,  that  the  principal  ground  on  which  it  was 
held  in  that  case  that  the  wife  was  estopped  was  that  her  deed, 
dated  shortly  before  the  contract  for  the  work,  was  not  filed 
for  record  until  four  days  after  the  contract  was  made,  and  that 
she  did  not  disclose  her  title,  although  she  knew  of  the  work 
as  it  progressed  and  received  the  benefit  of  it,  while  in  the  case 
at  bar  Catherine  McNally  ^^^  had  owned  the  property  for  many 
years  and  it  so  appeared  from  the  public  records.  It  need  not 
be  stated  that  estoppel  by  conduct  does  not  rest  on  any  specific 
fact  or  facts,  but  will  arise  from  any  act  of  conduct  of  the  party 
sought  to  be  estopped  which  justifies  the  application  of  the 
general  principle. 

It  is  contended,  however,  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  Cath- 
erine McNally  knew  that  her  husband  held  himself  out  as  owner, 
but  we  are  of  a  different  opinion.  It  is  said,  also,  that  the 
evidence  shows  that  at  least  one  of  the  appellants  testified  that 
he  did  not  rely  on  her  for  payment  but  relied  upon  her  husband. 


134  Bastrup  v.  Pbendergast.  [Illinois, 

If  he  relied  on  ownership  in  the  husband,  as  the  contract  repre- 
sented, it  would  not  be  expected  that  he  would  rely  on  the  wife, 
and  there  was  no  testimony  that  appellants  did  not  rely  upon 
their  right  to  a  statutory  lien  upon  the  property. 

It  is  next  said  that  the  property  was  not  described  or  located 
by  the  contract,  and  the  right  to  a  lien  must  fail  for  that  reason. 
It  was  alleged  in  the  pleadings  that  the  contract  was  made  with 
reference  to  the  lots  in  question,  and  the  evidence  supports  th& 
allegations.  There  was  no  contention  to  the  contrary,  either 
in  the  pleadings  or  in  the  evidence.  All  the  parties  in  interest 
BO  understood,  and  the  material  was  furnished  and  the  house 
was  built  on  the  strength  of  that  understanding,  and  the  notice 
or  claim  for  a  lien  filed  for  record  properly  described  the  prop- 
erty. We  cannot  hold,  under  the  circumstances,  that  the  mere 
omission  of  a  description  or  designation  of  the  property  in  the 
contract  can  defeat  a  lien  otherwise  established.  All  the  parties 
in  interest  interpreted  the  contract  as  referring  to  this  property 
where  the  McKally  lived  and  of  which  John  McNally  claimed 
to  be  the  owner.  The  case,  in  this  respect,  is  distinguishable 
from  Wendt  v.  Martin,  89  111.  139,  and  the  view  we  have  taken 
finds  support  in  Martin  v.  Eversal,  36  111.  222,  Power  v.  McCord, 
36  111.  214,  and  Clark  v.  Manning,  90  111.  380. 

663  rpj^g  jjg^^  point  made  by  appellants  is,  that  the  lien  can- 
not be  established  or  enforced  because  the  labor  was  done  and 
materials  furnished  on  two  different  buildings,  each  under  a 
different  roof,  located  on  a  different  lot  from  the  other  and 
divided  by  a  partition  wall  rising  above  the  roof,  there  being; 
no  apportionment  in  the  claims  for  hens,  nor  in  the  pleadings 
and  evidence,  as  to  the  amount  due  on  the  separate  buildings. 
The  so-called  '^buildings"  were  erected  as  one  structure,  located 
on  the  comer  of  Fifty-fifth  and  Wright  streets.  The  work  on 
the  whole  progressed  together  under  the  same  contract,  with  the 
same  materials.  The  side  on  Wright  street  was  more  expen- 
sively and  elaborately  finished  than  the  other.  There  were 
separate  entrances  in  front.  There  was  a  door  in  the  partition 
wall  in  the  basement,  and  through  this  opening  steam  pipes 
passed  so  as  to  heat  the  entire  structure  with  one  furnace.  At 
the  second  floor  there  was  a  jog  in  the  partition  wall  (which 
wall  so  far  was  upon  the  lot  line  between  the  two  lots)  so  as  to 
form  a  small  court,  into  which  windows  opened  from  each  side. 
There  wfts  a  rear  porch  extending  across  the  entire  structure 
with  one  continuous  and  unbroken  roof.    Under  this  evidence 


June,  1899.]    Y.  M.  C.  A.  etc.  Co.  v.  Rockford  Nat.  Bank.    135 

we  are  of  the  opinion  that  no  apportionment  was  necessary, 
and  that  the  structure  must  be  regarded  as  one  building,  and 
not  two  separate  and  distinct  buildings. 

We  find  no  substantial  defects  in  the  statements  for  lier, 
filed  by  the  respective  claimants  and  their  verification,  and  can 
not  hold  with  the  contention  of  appellants  that  appellees  failed 
to  comply  with  the  statute  in  this  respect. 

We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  judgment  of  the  appellate 
court  is  correct,  and  it  will  therefore  be  affirmed. 


MECHANICS'  LIENS— ESTOPPEL  AGAINST  WIFE.— If  a 
husbaud  euters  into  a  contract  for  the  erection  of  a  building  on  his 
wife's  land,  with  her  linowledge,  she  participating  in  conversatious 
between  her  husband  and  the  contractors  relative  to  the  work  dur- 
ing the  time  It  is  being  done,  and  making  no  objection  at  any  time, 
such  land  is  liable  for  mechanics'  liens  arising  out  of  the  work 
done:  Jobe  v.  Hunter,  165  Pa.  St.  5;  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  639;  Spears  v. 
Lawrence,  10  Wash.  368;  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  789;  Bodey  v.  Thackara, 
143  Pa.  St.  171;  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  526;  Bevan  v.  Thackara,  143  Pa.  St. 
182;  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  529.  Contra,  Santa  Cruz  Rock  Pavement  Co. 
V.  Lyons,  117  Cal.  212;  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  174;  Hoffman  v.  McFadden, 
56  Ark.  217;  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  101. 

MECHANICS'  LIENS— DESCRIPTION  OP  PROPERTY.— A  de- 
scription of  property  sufficient  for  identification  is  indispensable  to 
a  mechanic's  lien:  Maynard  v.  East,  13  Ind.  App.  432;  55  Am.  St. 
Rep.  238,  and  note.  But  the  insufficiency  of  the  description  of  the 
property  in  one  part  of  a  mechanic's  lien  claim  is  cured  by  a  de- 
scription in  correct  form  in  a  subsequent  part  of  such  claim:  Whit- 
tier  V.  Stetson  etc.  Co.,  6  Wash.  190;  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  149. 

MECHANICS'  LIENS— DISCONNECTED  BUILDINGS.— A 
claim  of  lien  can  be  filed  and  asserted  upon  several  disconnected 
buildings  without  there  being  any  account  of  the  amount  of  mate- 
rial furnished  each:  Salt  Lake  etc.  Co.  v.  Ibex  Mine  etc.  Co.,  15 
Utah,  440;  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  944,  and  note.  The  contract  must  be 
single  and  entire  in  such  a  case:  Maryland  Brick  Co.  v.  Spilman,  76 
Md.  337;  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  431.  But  see  Wilcox  v.  Woodruff,  61  Conn. 
578;  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  for  a  contrary  rule.  See,  also,  Chapin  v. 
Persse  etc.  Works,  30  Conn.  401;  79  Am.  Dec.  263,  and  extend©* 
note  thereto. 


Young  Men's  Christian  Assootation  Gymnasium 
Company  v.  Kockford  National  Bank. 

[179  ILUNOIS,  599.] 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— PURCHASE  OP  OVER- 
DUE NOTES  INDORSED  IN  BLANK— PROTECTION  AGAINST 
THIRD  PARTIES.— A  bank  advancing  money  to  the  holder  of 
overdue  negotiable  notes  Indorsed  in  blank  by  he  payee  without 
notice  that  they  are  held  as  collateral  securitj  is  protected  against 
latent  equities  In  third  parties. 


136       Y.  M.  C.  A.  ETC.  Co.  v.  Rockfobd  Nat.  Bank.     [Illinois, 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— NOTICE  THAT  NOTES 
ARE  HELD  AS  COLLATERAL— The  mere  fact  that  negotiable 
notes  Indorsed  in  blanl£  by  the  payee  are  overdue  is  not  sufficient  to 
charge  a  banlc  advancing  money  thereon  to  the  holder  with  con- 
structive notice  that  the  notes  are  held  merely  as  collateral  security. 

A.  D.  Early,  W.  Lathrop,  and  Fisher  &  North,  for  the  appel- 
lants. 

E.  K.  Welsh  and  "Works  &  Hyer,  for  the  appellee. 

<^^  WILKIN,  J.  The  circuit  court  of  Winnebago  county 
granted  the  prayer  of  a  bill  by  the  Young  Men's  Christian 
Association  Gymnasium  Company,  and  of  a  cross-bill  by  War- 
ren Gilmore,  against  appellee,  for  an  injunction  restraining 
it  from  collecting  certain  promissory  notes  and  to  compel  it 
to  pay  over  money  received  on  a  certain  other  note.  Tl\e  ap- 
pellate court  reversed  that  decree  and  remanded  the  cause  with 
directions,  and  to  reverse  that  judgment  this  appeal  is  prose- 
cuted. 

There  is  no  dispute  as  to  the  facts.  The  gymnasium  com- 
pany, having  arranged  with  Marcus  S.  Parmele,  of  the  firm  of 
Ivnapp  &  Parmele,  for  a  loan  of  four  thousand  dollars,  executed 
its  five  promissory  notes,  dated  September  3,  1891,  due  three 
years  after  date,  with  interest  at  seven  per  **"^  cent  per  annum, 
payable  semi-annually  at  the  office  of  Knapp  &  Parmele — one 
for  two  thousand  dollars,  payable  to  the  order  of  Warren  Gil- 
more;  one  for  six  hundred  dollars,  to  the  order  of  Elizabeth  L. 
Stires;  and  one  for  six  hundred  dollars  and  twx)  for  four  hun- 
dred dollars  each,  to  Knapp  &  Parmele  or  bearer.  The  pay- 
ment of  each  of  these  notes  was  guaranteed  by  William  H. 
Worthington,  E.  M.  Aikin,  Marcus  S.  Parmele,  Charles  E.  Shel- 
don, and  F.  G.  Hogland,  officers  and  stockholders  in  the  gym- 
nasium company,  and  the  notes  were  placed  in  the  hands  of 
Parmele  with  twenty  other  promissory  notes,  each  for  two  hun- 
dred dollars,  dated  August  5,  1891,  due  three  years  after  date, 
•with  seven  per  cent  interest,  payable  semi-annually  to  the  order 
of  the  gymnasium  company,  six  of  which  were  severally  signed 
by  John  G.  Penfield,  P.  R.  Walker,  C.  R.  Wise,  H.  H.  Robinson, 
Charles  E.  Sheldon  and  Anton  Neumeister,  stockholders  in  said 
company,  the  remaining  fourteen  being  executed  by  other  per- 
sons, also  stockholders.  Each  of  these  two  hundred  dollax  notes 
was  indorsed  by  the  payee,  the  gymnasium  company,  in  blank, 
and  a  receipt  taken  from  Knapp  &  Parmele  therefor,  as  follows : 


June,  1899.]    Y.  M.  C.  A.  etc.  Co.  v.  Rockfobd  Nat.  Bank.    137 

*Tlockford,  111.,  Sept.  3,  1891. 
''Eeceived  of  the  Young  Men's  Christian  Association  Gym- 
nasium Company  notes  as  follows:  [Here  follows  a  description 
of  each  of  the  twenty  not€s]  indorsed  by  William  H.  Worthing- 
ton,  president,  and  E.  M.  Aikin,  secretary  and  treasurer.  Above 
notes  held  by  undersigned  as  collateral  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  notes  as  follows:  [Here  follows  a  description  of  the 
five  notes.]  When  said  notes  last  mentioned  are  paid  and  this 
receipt  returned,  said  collateral  security  will  be  delivered  up. 

"KNAPP  &  PARMELE." 

The  six  hundred  dollar  note  payable  to  Knapp  &  Parmele  was 
indorsed  by  them  to  Mrs.  Katherine  Scott  and  one  of  the  four 
hundred  dollar  notes  to  Mary  R.  Tanner,  the  other  being  re- 
tained by  Parmele.  With  these  notes  the  desired  four  thou- 
sand dollar  loan  was  obtained  and  the  money  paid  over  to  the 
gjminasium  company  by  Parmele.  Although  the  name  of  the 
firm  of  Knapp  &  Parmele  appears  in  connection  with  the  pro- 
curement of  this  loan,  the  transaction  throughout  was  ®^*^  with 
Marcus  S.  Parmele  individually,  and  he  retained  possession  of 
both  the  principal  and  collateral  notes  until  September,  1896, 
when  he  delivered  the  six  first  described,  for  two  hundred  dol- 
lars each,  indorsed  in  blank,  as  above  stated,  to  the  defendant 
bank  as  security  for  a  loan  procured  by  him.  These  notes  were 
then  past  due  and  unpaid  except  as  to  the  interest,  which  was 
indorsed  upon  each  as  paid  to  August  5,  1896.  The  bank  had 
no  actual  notice  of  the  capacity  in  which  Parmele  held  them, 
and  received  them  in  the  usual  course  of  business  without 
inquiry. 

On  October  2,  1896,  Parmele  made  a  general  assignment  for 
the  benefit  of  his  creditors  to  Joel  B.  Whitehead,  as  assignee, 
and  turned  over  to  him  the  four  hundred  dollars  principal  note 
remaining  in  his  hands  and  all  the  collaterals  except  the  six 
transferred  to  the  bank.  On  October  6,  1896,  the  bank  collected 
of  Neumeister  two  hundred  and  two  dollars  and  ninety-two 
cents — the  amount  then  due  on  his  note — and  afterward  brought 
suit  against  John  G.  Penfield  on  his  note.  The  five  principal 
notes  and  each  of  the  collateral  notes,  except  the  one  collected, 
remain  wholly  unpaid.  Both  the  original  and  cross-bills  seek 
to  restrain  the  defendant  from  collecting  the  five  remaining 
notes  in  its  hands  and  to  require  it  to  pay  to  the  gymnasium 
company  the  amount  of  the  one  collected.  The  right  to  this 
relief  is  predicated  upon  the  theory  that  the  assignment  of  said 


138       Y.  M.  C.  A.  ETC.  Co.  v.  Rockford  Nat.  Bank.     [Illinois, 

notes  to  the  defendant  by  Parmele  was  without  authority,  and 
vested  in  it  no  title  as  against  complainants. 

The  proposition  that  a  pledgee  or  holder  of  negotiable  paper 
as  collaterals,  in  the  absence  of  express  authority,  has  no  legal 
right  to  negotiate  the  same,  may,  as  a  general  rule,  be  granted; 
but  unless  the  bank,  when  it  took  the  notes  in  question,  was 
chargeable  with  notice  that  they  were  held  by  Parmele  merely 
as  collaterals,  the  rule  cannot  affect  the  decision  of  this  case. 
If  it  was  so  chargeable,  it  must  be  upon  the  ground  that,  hav- 
ing required  them  after  due,  it  was  bound  to  take  notice  of 
the  rights  of  complainants,  which  is  the  principal  ®®*  question 
upon  which  the  decision  must  turn  and  to  be  hereafter  con- 
sidered. 

That  class  of  cases  cited  by  counsel  for  appellants  in  which 
the  assignor  of  commercial  paper  obtained  possession  without 
any  right  or  legal  title  thereto,  as  by  theft,  finding,  or  fraud, 
are  not  in  point  here.  In  those  cases,  the  rule  that  an  owner 
cannot  be  deprived  of  his  property  without  his  consent  obtains, 
subject,  however,  to  the  exception  in  favor  of  the  negotiability 
of  such  instruments,  that  if  they  are  transferred  to  an  innocent 
purchaser  for  value  before  due,  without  any  notice  of  the  absence 
of  title  in  the  assignor,  the  transferee  will  obtain  the  legal  title 
even  against  the  true  owner,  but  if  the  transfer  is  after  maturity 
no  title  whatever  will  pass,  no  matter  how  innocently  or  with 
what  good  faith  the  assignee  acquires  the  instrument.  In  the 
one  case  the  purchaser  gets  a  better  title  than  his  assignor  had, 
while  in  the  other  he  does  not.  And  it  had  been  held  in  cases 
falling  within  the  latter  rule  that  the  assignee  takes  the  over- 
due paper  subject  not  only  to  the  equities  of  the  maker,  but  also 
of  those  of  the  true  owner  or  othe  third  parties  having  an  in- 
terest therein,  the  question  in  such  cases  being  not  one  of  nego- 
tiability but  of  legal  title.  Henderson  v.  Case,  31  La.  Ann.  215, 
cited  and  quoted  from  in  the  argument,  was  a  case  of  that  kind, 
and  the  court  said:  "We  do  not  think  that  the  authorities  cited 
by  the  defendant,  to  the  effect  that  no  collateral  equities  can 
effect  an  assignment  of  commercial  paper  transferred  after 
maturity,  can  be  applied  to  the  case  where  there  is  a  total  want 
of  right  in  the  transferrer."  The  same  distinction  exists  in  the 
other  cases  of  this  class  referred  to  by  counsel. 

In  the  case  at  bar,  the  six  notes  in  suit  were  placed  in  the 
hands  of  Parmele,  bearing  the  indorsement  of  the  payee,  with- 
out any  evidence  whatever  indorsed  thereon  or  attached  there- 


June,  1899.]    Y.  M.  C.  A.  etc.  Co.  v.  Rockford  Nat.  Bank.     13& 

to  that  they  were  to  be  held  by  him  otherwise  than  as  absolute 
owner.  He  was  thus  clothed  with  every  indicia  of  the  legal 
title  and  absolute  ownership  ^*^^  by  the  party  to  whom  they 
were  made  payable.  It  is  well  settled  that  such  instruments 
indorsed  in  blank  pass  by  delivery,  the  indorsement  being  treated 
as  made  to  each  subsequent  transferee;  also,  that  the  negotia- 
bility of  commercial  paper  does  not  cease  with  its  maturity,  but 
may  still  be  negotiated  by  indorsement.  We  are  unable  to  find 
any  fact  in  this  record  with  which  appellee  was  chargeable  when 
it  obtained  these  notes,  or  any  principle  of  law  which  can  be  said 
to  distinguish  it  from  the  ordinary  assignee  of  negotiable  bills 
and  notes  after  maturity. 

The  inquiry  then  must  be,  Is  the  fact  that  such  paper  is  past 
due  when  transferred,  sufficient,  of  itself,  to  charge  the  taker 
with  notice  of  the  latent  equities  of  third  parties?  Our  stat- 
ute fixes  the  rights  of  the  maker  in  such  cases  upon  clear  prin- 
ciples of  justice,  without  materially  affecting  the  negotiability 
of  commercial  instruments;  but  to  extend  the  same  protection 
to  whoever  may  have  acquired  some  collateral  interest  in  the 
paper,  in  the  absence  of  actual  notice  of  the  same  to  a  trans- 
feree, would  be  to  charge  him  with  knowledge  of  a  fact  not 
within  his  power  of  ascertainment  and  practically  destroy  the 
negotiability  of  overdue  instruments.  While  the  question  has 
never  been  before  us  in  the  present  form,  it  is  not  altogether  a 
new  one.  We  have  frequently  held  that  the  assignee  of  a  mort- 
gage holds  it,  and  the  indebtedness  secured  by  it,  subject  to  the 
same  defenses  which  might  have  been  urged  against  the  mort- 
gagee. In  Olds  V.  Cummings,  31  111.  188,  it  was  held  that  such 
an  assignee  was,  nevertheless,  protected  against  the  latent  equi- 
ties of  third  persons,  and  in  Silverman  v.  Bullock,  98  111.  10,  20. 
we  said:  "The  rule  in  Olds  v.  Cummings,  31  111.  188,  is  a  rea- 
sonable one,  and  can  readily  be  observed.  Persons  dealing  in 
such  securities  can,  without  difficulty,  inquire  of  the  makers  if 
any  defenses  exist  against  them,  but  more  than  that  it  is  not 
practicable  to  do.  Of  course,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  dis- 
cover, even  by  the  utmost  diligence,  all  persons  that  might  have 
equitable  rights  in  the  subject  matter  of  *®*  the  assignment, 
and  the  adoption  of  a  rule  that  would  let  in  latent  equities  to 
prevail  against  the  assignee  would  be  to  ensnare  dealers  in  such 
securities."  To  the  same  effect  are  the  cases  of  Himrod  v.  Gil- 
man,  147  111.  293,  and  Humble  v.  Curtis,  160  111.  193. 

Other  courts  and  text- writers  have,  so  far  as  we  can  ascertain^ 


140       Y.  M.  C.  A.  ETC.  Co.  V.  Rockfokd  Nat.  Bank.     [IllinoiB, 

Applied  the  same  rule  to  negotiable  securities  assigned  after  due. 
In  National  Bank  of  Washington  v.  Texas,  20  Wall.  89,  the  su- 
preme court  of  the  United  States  says:  "The  transferee  of  over- 
due negotiable  paper  takes  it  liable  to  all  the  equities  to  which 
it  was  subject  in  the  hands  of  the  payee.  But  those  equities 
must  attach  to  the  paper  itself,  and  not  arise  from  any  collateral 
transaction."  And  again :  "The  position  of  the  transferee  must 
be. at  least  as  favorable  as  that  of  the  assignee  of  a  chose  in  ac- 
tion. There  the  assignee  takes  subject  to  the  equity  residing 
in  the  debtor,  but  not  to  an  equity  residing  in  a  third  person 
against  the  assignor."  And  in  support  of  the  doctrine  thus  an- 
nounced the  language  of  Chancellor  Kent  is  cited,  as  follows: 
"The  assignee  can  always  go  to  the  debtor  and  ascertain  what 
<;laims  he  may  have  against  the  bond  or  other  chose  in  action 
which  he  is  about  purchasing  from  the  obligee,  but  he  may  not 
be  able,  with  the  utmost  diligence,  to  ascertain  the  latent  equity 
of  some  third  person  against  the  obligee.  He  has  not  any  ob- 
ject to  which  he  can  direct  his  inquiries,  and  for  this  reason 
the  assignee,  without  notice,  of  a  chose  in  action  was  preferred 
in  the  late  case  of  Eedfearn  v.  Ferrier,  1  Dow,  50,  to  that  of  a 
third  party  setting  up  a  secret  equity  against  the  assignor. 
Lord  Eldon  observed  in  that  case  that  if  this  were  no't  so  no 
^assignment  could  ever  be  taken  with  safety." 

Upon  the  contention  of  appellants  that  appellee  could  take  no 
better  title  than  Parmele  himself  had,  Lee  v.  Turner,  89  Mo. 
494;  Hill  v.  Shields,  81  N.  C.  253;  31  Am.  Eep.  499;  Bradford 
y.  Williams,  91  N.  C.  7,  and  McNeil  v.  Tenth  Nat.  Bank,  46 
N.  Y.  329;  7  Am.  Rep.  341,  cited  by  counsel  for  appellee 
against  the  position,  ^^"^  are  in  point.  In  the  first  case  the 
supreme  court  of  Missouri  said:  "But  we  do  not  see  that  the 
■doctrine  that  the  transferee  of  negotiable  paper,  to  whom  it  is 
transferred  after  maturity,  acquires  nothing  but  the  actual 
right  and  title  of  the  transferrer,  should  control  the  disposition 
of  this  case.  The  note  is  assignable.  If  the  true  owner  of  a 
negotiable  note  overdue,  or  of  a  nonnegotiable  note,  clothes 
another  with  the  usual  evidences  of  ownership,  ....  and  third 
persons  are  led  into  dealing  with  such  apparent  owner,  they 
will  be  protected  in  their  dealings."  And  in  the  McNeil  mse, 
passing  upon  the  same  question,  the  court  used  this  language: 
■"It  must  be  conceded  that,  as  a  general  rule  applicable  to  prop- 
•erty  other  than  negotiable  securities  (meaning,  of  course,  be- 
fore maturity),  the   vendor  or  pledgor  can  convey  no  greater 


June,  1899.]    Y.  M.  C.  A.  etc.  Co.  t>.  Rockfoed  Nat.  Bank.    141 

right  or  title  than  he  has.  But  this  is  a  truLsm  predicable  of  a 
simple  transfer  from  one  party  to  another  where  no  other  ele- 
ment intervenes.  It  does  not  interfere  with  the  well-estab- 
lished principle  that  where  the  true  owner  holds  out  another  or 
allows  him  to  appear  as  the  owner  of  or  as  having  full  power  of 
disposition  over  the  property,  and  innocent  third  parties  are 
thus  led  into  dealing  with  such  apparent  owner,  they  will  be 
protected.  Their  rights  in  such  cases  do  not  depend  upon  the 
actual  title  or  authority  of  the  party  with  whom  they  deal  di- 
recth',  but  are  derived  from  the  act  of  the  real  owner,  which 
precludes  him  from  disputing,  as  against  them,  the  existence  of 
the  title  or  power  which,  through  negligence  or  mistaken  confi- 
dence, he  caused  or  allowed  to  appear  to  be  vested  in  the  party 
making  the  conveyance." 

Story  on  Promissory  Notes,  section  178,  states  what  we  con- 
ceive to  be  the  law  of  this  case,  as  follows:  "In  general,  it  may 
be  stated  that  a  transfer  may  be  made  any  time  while  the  note 
remains  a  good,  subsisting,  unpaid  note,  whether  it  be  before 
or  after  it  has  arrived  at  maturity.  But  the  rights  of  the  holder 
against  the  antecedent  parties  may  be  most  materially  affected 

by  the  time  *****  of  transfer If  the  transfer  is  after  the 

maturity  of  the  note,  the  holder  takes  it  as  a  dishonored  note, 
and  it  is  affected  by  all  the  equities  between  the  original  par- 
ties, whether  he  has  any  notice  thereof  or  not.  But  when  we 
speak  of  equities  between  the  parties,  it  is  not  to  be  understood 
by  this  expression  that  all  sorts  of  equities  existing  between  the 
parties  from  other  independent  transactions  between  them  are 
intended,  but  only  such  equities  as  attach  to  the  particular 
note,  and,  as  between  those  parties,  would  be  available  to  con- 
trol, qualify,  or  extinguish  any  rights  arising  thereon.  (The 
true  test  to  determine  whether  a  note  is  subject  to  an  equity 
set  up  by  the  maker  is  this:  Could  the  payee,  at  the  time  he 
transferred  the  note,  have  maintained  a  suit  upon  it  against 
the  maker  if  it  had  then  been  mature.)  Still,  however,  sub- 
ject to  such  equities,  the  holder,  by  indorsement  after  the  ma- 
turity of  the  note,  will  be  clothed  with  the  same  rights  and  ad- 
vantages as  were  possessed  by  the  indorser,  and  may  avail  him- 
self of  them  accordingly."  To  the  same  effect  are  2  Randolph 
on  Commercial  Paper,  sec.  675;  Daniel  on  Negotiable  Instru- 
ments, sec.  726b;  2  Parsons  on  Bills  and  Notes,  42,  et  seq.; 
Tiedeman  on  Commercial  Paper,  sec.  295. 

In  Eversole  v.  Maull,  50  Md.  95,  the  appellant,  Eversole,  be- 


142       Y.  M.  C.  A.  ETC.  Co.  v,  Rockford  Nat.  Bank.     [Illinois. 

ing  the  payee  of  a  proinissory  note  made  by  Caskey,  indorsed  it 
generally  and  delivered  it  to  one  Frame,  an  attorney,  for  col- 
lection. Frame  transferred  it  to  the  appellee,  Maull,  after  ma- 
turity, for  value,  without  notice  of  the  purpose  for  which  he 
held  it.  The  court  sustained  the  title  of  Maull  against  the 
claim  of  Eversole  on  the  authority  of  the  foregoing  text  by 
Judge  Story  and  its  own  former  decisions  based  thereon.  The 
case  seems  to  have  received  careful  consideration,  and  the 
opinion  of  the  court  ably  disposes  of  every  substantial  question 
raised  in  this  case. 

We  have  duly  considered  the  cases  referred  to  and  quoted 
from  by  counsel  in  their  extended  argument  on  behalf  of  appel- 
lants, and  we  find  them  distinguishable  *^^  from  this  case 
either  in  the  fact  that  the  controversy  arose  between  the  maker 
of  the  instrument  sued  on  and  a  transferee,  or  that  the  assignor 
had  not  the  legal  title  to  the  paper  when  he  transferred  it.  But 
if  this  were  not  so,  we  are  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  the  claim 
of  the  appellee  bank  that  it  took  these  notes  without  becoming 
chargeable  with  notice  of  the  rights  of  the  complainants  below 
is  abundantly  sustained  by  authority  and  is  in  consonance  with 
our  own  decisions.  As  was  said  by  the  supreme  court  of  Mary- 
land in  Eversole  v.  Maull,  50  Md.  95:  "The  equitable  principle 
which  underlies  this  doctrine  and  which  is  universally  admitted 
to  be  just  and  sound,  is,  that  if  a  loss  occurs  by  which  one  of 
two  innocent  persons  must  suffer,  that  one  should  sustain  the 
loss  who  has  most  trusted  the  party  through  whom  the  loss 
came." 

The  judgment  of  the  appellate  court  will  be  affirmed. 


NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— RIGHTS  OP  PURCHASER 
OF  OVERDUE  NOTES— If  a  negotiable  note  Is  transferred  after 
It  becomes  due,  the  assignee  takes  it  subject  to  all  equities  and  de- 
fenses as  between  the  maker  and  payee,  but  in  such  case  it  is  only 
subject,  in  the  hands  of  the  indorsee,  to  such  equities  and  de- 
fenses as  are  connected  with  the  note  Itself,  and  not  such  as  grow 
out  of  transactions  disconnected  therewith:  Kelly  v.  S-taed,  136  Mo. 
430;  .58  Am.  St.  Rep.  648.  and  note;  Davis  v.  Noll,  88  W.  Va.  66;  45 
Am.  St.  Rep.  841;  and  note;  Carpenter  v.  Greenop,  74  Mich.  664;  16 
Am.  St.  Rep.  662,  and  note.  See,  also,  Lodwen  v.  Porsee,  137  Mo. 
29;  59  Am.  St  Rep.  489. 


OASES 

VX  THI 

SUPREME  COURT 

IOWA. 


MoMahon  v.  Dubuque. 

[107  Iowa,  62.] 

DAMAGES— MEASURE  OF— DESTRUCTION  OF  PROP- 
ERTY HAVING  NO  MARKET  VALUE.— For  the  destructian  of 
household  goods  and  wearing  apparel  having  no  recognized  market 
value,  the  measure  of  damages  is  their  actual  value,  which  may  be 
determined  by  evidence  of  their  original  cost,  the  extent  of  their  use, 
and  their  condition  at  the  time  of  destruction. 

WITNESSES— MATTERS  OF  OPINION.— In  determining, 
the  condition  of  a  house  at  the  time  of  its  destruction,  whether  or 
not  It  was  in  good  repair,  a  witness  may  describe  the  house  In  de- 
tail, but  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  testify  whether  or  not  the 
house  was  in  good  repair,  such  testimony  being  merely  an  opinion. 

DAMAGES— MEASURE  OP-DESTRUCTION  OF  DWELL- 
ING-HOUSE.—The  measure  of  damages  for  the  destruction  of  a 
dwelling-house  by  fire  Is  Its  actual  and  not  necessarily  its  market 
value. 

WITNESSES— TESTIMONY  OF  EXPERTS.— In  an  action 
for  damages  occasioned  by  fire  ignited  from  sparks  escaping  from  a 
road-roller  engine,  it  being  alleged  that  the  defendant  was  negligont 
in  failing  to  provide  such  engine  with  a  spark  arrester,  expert  wit- 
nesses, in  testifying,  may  be  allowed  to  exhibit  a  model  of  a  loco- 
motive engine  to  the  jury  to  Illustrate  the  use  of  a  spark  arrester, 
and  to  Indicate  how  it  could  be  applied  to  the  roller-engine  in  ques- 
tion, but  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  use  such  models  for  any  fur- 
ther pui-pose. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— NEGLIGEN*CE-WOIi  K 
DONE  FOR  PRIVATE  CORPORATE  BENEFIT.— Where  a  city, 
having  been  empowered  to  improve  its  streets  and  assess  the  cost 
of  improvements  to  abutting  owners,  owns  and  operates  a  steam 
roller  and  retains  compensation  for  rolling  streets  when  macadam- 
ized, its  liability  for  injuries  resulting  from  fire  started  through  the 
negligent  operation  of  the  roller  is  similar  to  that  of  an  Individual 
engaged  In  doing  the  same  work.  It  cannot  escape  such  liability  by 
pleading  that  the  work  was  done  for  the  public  benefit. 

(1*3) 


144  McMahon  v.  Dubuque.  [Iowa, 

Action  for  damages  occasioned  by  a  fire  set  out  from  sparks 
escaping  from  the  smokestack  of  a  steam  road  roller,  owned  and 
being  operated  by  the  city  of  Dubuque  in  rolling  newly-laid 
macadam  on  one  of  its  streets  on  which  the  lots  of  plaintift 
abutted.  The  house  thereon,  and  its  contents,  were  destroyed. 
The  plaintiff  had  judgment  at  the  trial  and  defendant  appeals. 

Duffy  &  Maguire,  for  the  appellant. 

Longueville,  McCarthy  &  Kenline,  for  the  respondent. 

***  LADD,  J.  The  household  goods  and  wearing  apparel  of 
the  plaintiff  and  his  family  were  destroyed.  Thes:e  had  been 
used,  were  worn  and  somewhat  out  of  style.  Such  property  has 
no  recognized  market  value,  and  recovery  must  be  based  on  its 
actual  value:  Gere  v.  Council  Bluffs  Ins.  Co.,  67  Iowa,  272; 
Clements  v.  Burlington  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  74  Iowa,  442.  To  ascer- 
tain the  actual  value,  it  was  proper  to  take  into  consideration 
the  original  cost  of  the  articles,  the  extent  of  their  use,  whether 
worn  or  out  of  date,  their  condition  at  the  time,  and  from  all 
these  determine  what  they  are  fairly  worth.  The  cost  alone 
would  not  be  the  correct  criterion  for  the  present  value,  but  it 
would  be  difficult  to  estimate  the  value  of  such  goods  except  by 
reference  to  the  former  price,  in  connection  with  wear,  depre- 
ciation, change  in  style,  and  present  condition:  Luse  v.  Jones, 
39  N.  J.  L.  707;  International  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nicholson,  61 
Tex.  550;  Mouat  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wilmore,  15  Colo.  136;  Printz 
V.  People,  42  Mich.  144;  36  Am.  Eep.  437;  State  v.  Hathaway, 
100  Iowa,  225;  Latham  v.  Shipley,  86  Iowa,  548.  The  cross- 
examination  of  Lizzie  McMahon  indicated  that  she  spoke  only 
of  the  actual  value,  and  not  of  the  market  price. 

2.  A  witness  was  not  permitted  to  testify  whether  the  house 
destroyed  was  in  good  repair,  because  merely  an  opinion.  The 
value  of  the  house  was  in  controversy.  The  condition  of  a 
dwelling-house  as  a  whole  is  not  observable,  except  upon  exam- 
ination, and  for  this  reason  does  not  come  within  the  rule  of 
Kelleher  v.  Keokuk,  60  Iowa,  474,  that  testimony  of  matters 
within  the  observation  of  all  are  to  be  treated  of  as  facts  rather 
than  opinion.  There  might  well  be  wide  differences  of  opinion 
as  to  what  would  constitute  good  repair,  and  the  court  rightly 
held  that  the  house  might  be  described  in  detail,  and  from  such 
evidence  the  jury  determine  its  condition. 

3.  Evidence  was  received,  over  the  defendant's  objection, 
•Lowing  the  actual  value  of  the  house  at  the  time  **"  of  the 


Dec.  1898.]  McMahon  v.  Dubuque.  lib 

fire,  and  it  is  said  this  does  not  furnish  the  true  basis  of  recov- 
ery. The  fundamental  principle  in  all  actions  for  damages  is 
that  just  compensation  be  made  to  him  who  has  suffered  injury 
from  another  in  his  person  or  property,  and,  in  order  to  give 
satisfaction,  measured  in  money,  such  rules  are  formulated  as 
are  thought  best  adopted  to  accomplish  this  purpose.  A  dis- 
tinction has,  for  this  reascJn,  been  made  between  growing  crops, 
shrubs,  and  trees,  wliose  chief  value  is  because  of  their  connec- 
tion with  the  soil  and  their  incidental  enhancement  of  the  value 
of  the  land,  and  those  improvements  which  may  be  replaced  at 
will,  and  whose  value  may  readily  be  determined,  apart  from 
the  ground  on  which  they  rest.  It  is  thus  put  by  Mr.  Suther- 
land in  his  work  on  Damages,  volume  3,  page  368:  "If  the  thing 
destroyed,  although  it  is  a  part  of  the  realty,  has  a  value  which 
can  be  accurately  measured  and  ascertained  without  reference 
to  the  soil  on  which  it  stands,  or  out  of  which  it  grows,  the  re- 
covery may  be  the  value  of  the  thing  thus  destroyed,  and  net 
for  the  difference  in  value  of  the  land  before  and  after  such  de- 
struction." In  Drake  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  63  Iowa,  310, 
60  Am.  Eep.  746,  crops  were  destroyed  by  overflow  caused  by 
en  embankment,  and  the  measure  was  held  to  be  the  difference 
between  the  market  value  of  the  land  immediately  before  and 
after  the  injury.  This  rule  was  approved  in  Sullens  v.  Chicago 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  74  Iowa,  660,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  501,  and  applied 
Avhere  growing  trees  were  burned,  in  Greenfield  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  83  Iowa,  276,  and  Brooks  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  73 
Iowa,  182:  See  Smith  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Iowa,  518; 
Striegel  v.  Moore,  55  Iowa,  88.  In  Rowe  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  102  Iowa,  288,  the  court  said:  "Appellant's  contention  re- 
sults in  fixing  the  value  of  each  tree  destroyed  or  damaged  by 
the  fire,  and  the  aggregate  of  such  values  would  be  the  measure 
of  plaintiff's  recovery.  Such  a  rule  may  well  be  held  applicable 
to  the  destruction  by  fire  of  buildings,  fences,  and  other  im- 
provements, which  may  at  once  be  replaced,  where  the  exact 
cost  of  restoring  the  property  destroyed  is  capable  of  definite 
ascertainment,  and  where-  there  is  no  damage  of  the  ***  realty 
itself."  It  is  apparent  that  growing  crops,  small  trees,  and  or- 
chards are  of  little  or  no  use  separated  from  the  soil,  and  that 
their  value  must  necessarily  be  determined  in  connection  with 
the  land  on  which  they  stand.  This  is  not  true  of  improve- 
ments which  may  be  replaced  at  will.  In  Graessle  v.  Carpenter, 
70  Iowa,  167,  the  defendant,  by  digging  trenches  and  laying 

AM.  8r.  KKP..  Vou  LXX  — u 


146  McMahon  v.  DuBUtiUB.  [Iowa, 

water-pipes,  injured  the  plaintiff's  fences,  walks,  house,  and 
shrubs.  It  was  not  shown  the  acts  were  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
permanently  injure  the  real  estate,  or  that  it  could  not  be  re- 
stored to  its  condition  before  the  fire.  The  court,  through 
Beck,  J.,  announced  the  rule  to  be  that  which  will  "give  the 
plaintiff  just  and  full  compensation  ....  In  the  case  before  us, 
the  familiar  and  simple  rule  applicable  to  such  cases  would  per- 
fectly attain  that  end.  That  rule  is  this :  The  plaintiff  may  re- 
cover as  damage  the  sum  which,  expended  for  the  purpose, 
would  put  the  property  in  as  good  condition  as  it  was  in  before 
the  injury,  with  the  additional  sums  which  would  compensate 
the  plaintiff  for  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  the  property,  should 
he  be  deprived  thereof  of  the  injury,  and  the  value  of  such  prop- 
erty, as  trees,  buildings,  and  the  like,  which  have  been  wholly 
destroyed,  and  cannot  be  restored  to  the  condition  they  were  in 
before  the  injury."  We  take  it  the  trees  and  shrubs  were  of  a 
character  which  might  be  replaced  by  others  of  the  same  ac- 
tual value;  otherwise  the  case  is  not  in  harmony  with  those 
cited.  In  Frecland  v.  Muscatine,  9  Iowa,  465,  the  defendant, 
in  changing  the  gi*ade,  dug  away  the  dirt,  and  caused  the  plain- 
tiff's house  to  fall,  and  it  was  held:  "The  cost  of  rebuilding  or 
repairing  was  properly  taken  into  consideration,  if  we  under- 
stand it  as  having  reference  to  the  quality  and  condition  of  the 
building  before  the  accident,  and  the  instruction  cannot  be 
taken  in  any  other  sense.  It  is  the  cost  of  rebuilding  and  re- 
pairing, which  implies  the  restoring  it  to  as  good  condition  as 
before,  and  not  the  putting  a  new  and  firm  building  in  the  place 
of  an  old  and  decayed  one."  To  prove  the  market  value  of  the 
land  immediately  before  and  after  ^"^  the  fire  would  be  accom- 
plishing, by  circumlocution,  what  might  be  directly  ascertained, 
for  such  difference  would  be  the  value  of  the  house.  True,  lo- 
cation may  sometimes  hare  a  bearing,  as  where  a  building  is  so 
situated  as  not  to  be  useful  for  the  purpose  of  its  construction. 
In  such  cases  this  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in  fixing  the 
real  value.  But  it  could  be  as  readily  done  in  estimating  this 
separate  from  as  with  the  land.  Simplicity  and  directness  are 
particularly  favored  in  modern  jurisprudence.  True,  such 
property  may  have  no  market  value.  It  does,  however,  have 
actual  value,  and  this  is,  then,  the  measure  of  recovery.  The 
ruling  was  right. 

4,  The  alleged  negligence  of  the  defendant  was  the  failure 
to  use  any  device  such  as  a  spark-arrester,  to  prevent  the  escape 


Dec.  1898.]  McMahon  v.  Dubuque.  147 

of  cinders,  coals,  and  sparks  from  the  engine.  No  other  issue 
as  to  negligence  was  submitted,  and  the  state  of  repair  of  the 
-engine  was  not  material.  Experts,  in  testifying,  were  allowed 
to  use  a  model  of  a  locomotive  engine  to  illustrate  the  use  of  a 
spark-arrester,  and  to  indicate  how  it  could  be  applied  to  the 
roller-engine,  and  for  no  other  purpose.  The  court  was  careful 
to  caution  the  witnesses  that,  "in  so  far  as  the  different  parts 
of  this  model  are  shown  to  be  similar  in  this  model  to  the  steam 
roller,  you  may  call  attention  to  them,  but  the  other  parts  of 
the  model  you  are  not  to  mention."  We  discover  no  error  in 
this.  This  model  was  used  to  better  bring  to  the  understand- 
ing of  the  jury  a  mechanical  device.  It  was  like  the  use  of  a 
plat  or  sketch  by  a  witness  to  indicate  relative  locations  or  di- 
rections. 

5.  The  appellant  asserts  that  in  operating  the  steam  roller  ifc 
acted  solely  for  the  public,  and  not  for  any  private  corporate 
benefit.  It  may  be  observed  that  the  defendant  is  incorporated 
under  a  special  charter,  and  that  by  chapter  210  of  the  acts  of 
the  sixth  general  assembly  it  was  given  the  power  and  made 
its  duty  to  grade,  pave,  and  otherwise  improve  its  streets,  and 
for  this  purpose  it  may  levy  a  special  tax  on  any  lot  or  lots,  or 
the  owner  thereof,  for  ®®  the  purpose  of  grading,  paving,  or 
macadamizing  the  same,  and  is  authorized  to  collect  it  under 
the  regulations  prescribed  by  ordinances.  That  such  powers 
and  duties  are  peculiarly  municipal,  and  injuries  occasioned  by 
the  negligence  of  the  corporation  in  carrying  out  or  performing 
them  may  be  redressed  in  actions  against  the  city,  is  not  an  open 
question  in  this  state:  Wallace  v.  Muscatine  City,  4  G.  Greene, 
373,  61  Am.  Dec.  131;  Creal  v.  Keokuk,  4  G.  Greene,  47; 
Cotes  V.  Davenport,  9  Iowa,  227;  Ross  v.  Clinton,  46  Iowa,  606, 
26  Am.  Rep.  169.*  See  collection  of  authorities  generally  in 
note  to  Goddard  v.  Harpswell,  84  Me.  499,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  373. 
Though"  the  city  might  have,  under  its  charter,  contracted  with 
others  to  properly  roll  its  streets,  when  macadamized,  at  the  cost 
of  the  abutting  lotowners,  it  chose  to  do  this  work  itself  and  re- 
tain compensation  therefor.  Contractors  were  required,  in 
making  bids,  to  include,  for  Telford  macadam,  "five  cents  per 
square  yard,  the  price  charged  by  the  city  of  Dubuque,  for  the 
use  of  the  roller  and  for  rolling  the  street."  The  contract  with 
Tibey  did  this,  and  that  amount  was  detained  from  the  price 
for  such  work.  It  was  when  rolling  the  street  he  had  improved 
that  the  fire  was  set  out.    Had  Tibey  been  employed  to  do  this, 


148  McMahon  v.  Dubuque.  [lowa^ 

as  he  might  have  been,  and  through  his  negligence,  like  that  of 
the  city,  fire  has  escaped  and  burned  the  property  of  citizens,, 
would  anyone  question  the  right  of  recovery?  Upon  what 
theory,  then  will  the  municipality  escape  liability?  There  are 
two  very  satisfactory  reasons  why  it  must  be  held  to  answer  in 
damages  for  its  negligence:  1.  It  was  engaged  in  doing,  with 
its  own  instrumentality,  that  which  it  was  authorized  to  con- 
tract with  another  to  do  at  the  expense  of  the  abutting  lot 
owners;  and  2.  The  work  was  voluntarily  assumed  and  carried 
on  for  compensation.  Mr.  Dillon  thus  states  the  rule:  "The 
liability  of  the  corporation  for  its  own  negligence,  or  that  of  it* 
servants,  is  especially  clear,  and  in  fact  indisputable,  where  it 
has  received  a  consideration  for  the  duties  performed,  or  where, 
under  permissive  authority  from  the  legislature  ®®  it  volun- 
tarily assumes  and  carries  on  a  work  or  undertaking  from  which 
it  receives  tolls  or  derives  a  profit" :  2  Dillon  on  Municipal  Cor- 
porations, sec.  881.  The  city  was  authorized  to  make  the  im- 
provement, but  was  not  bound  to  undertake  it  with  its  own  in- 
strumentalities. Having  done  so,  it  incurred  the  same  liability 
an  individual  would  have  done  in  performing  like  work.  W& 
have  found  no  authorities  precisely  in  point,  but  the  principle 
is  so  just  that  none  are  required.  It  finds  analogy  in  the  casea 
holding  municipalities,  owning  and  operating  water  and  gas 
works,  docks,  piers,  and  other  property,  to  the  same  liability  as 
individuals  or  private  corporations  with  similar  ownership  and 
performing  like  duties.  In  operating  the  steam  roller,  the  city 
was  acting  peculiarly  for  the  benefit  of  the  municipality,  and  in 
a  way  to  enable  it  to  exact  compensation  from  property  owners 
within  its  limits.  Its  liability,  similar  to  that  of  an  individual 
if  engaged  in  doing  the  same  work,  is  .within  the  principle  ap- 
proved by  the  authorities  generally. 
Affirmed. 


DAMAGES— MEASURE  OF-DESTRUCTION  OF  PROPERTY 
HAVING  NO  MARKET  VALUE.— If  property  situated  at  a  place 
where  it  has  no  mariiet  value  is  destroyed  by  the  negligence  of  an- 
otlier,  its  owner  having  no  immediate  use  for  It,  the  damages  for 
which  the  wrongdoer  is  answorable  are  to  be  ascertained  by  find- 
ing the  value  of  the  hay  at  the  nearest  place  where  it  has  a  market 
value  and  deducting  therefrom  the  cost  of  putting  it  in  a  market- 
able shape  and  transporting  it  to  that  place:  Watt  v.  Nevada  etc. 
R.  R,  Co.,  23  Nev.  154.  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  772,  This  rule  is  severely 
crltlclzod  In  the  extended  monographic  note  which  follows  the  case, 
where  it  is  shown  that  market  value  is  only  one  of  the  tests  of  real 
value,  and  that  other  tests  may  be  applied  and  sometimes  must  be- 
applied  in  order  to  accomplish  Justice. 


Jan.  1899.]     In  ek  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  149 

WITNESSES— MATTERS  OF  OPINION.— Opinions  of  witnesses 
are  sometimes  admissible  from  necessity,  and  to  prevent  the  failure 
of  justice;  but  when  the  facts  upon  which  the  opinion  is  formed  can 
be  stated  and  described,  they  must  be,  and  the  jury  be  left  to  form 
their  own  opinion:  Whittler  v.  Franklin,  46  N,  H.  23,  88  Am.  Dec. 
185;  Clark  v.  Fisher,  1  Paige,  171,  19  Am.  Dec.  402;  Hurt  v.  St. 
Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  &4  Mo.  255,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  374. 

WITNESSES— EXPERTS.— When  the  testimony  of  experts  Is  ad- 
missible: First  etc.  Church  v.  Holyoke  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  158  Mass.  475, 
35  Am.  St.  Rep.  508;  O'Neil  v.  Dry  Dock  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  129  N.  Y. 
125,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  512. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY  FOR  NEGLI- 
GENCE.—Municipal  corporations,  acting  within  the  purview  of  their 
authority,  and  in  their  ministerial  or  corporate  character,  in  the 
management  of  property  for  their  own  benefit,  or  In  the  exercise  of 
powers,  assumed  voluntarily  for  their  own  advantage,  are  Impliedly 
liable  for  damage  caused  by  the  negligence  of  their  officers  and 
agents,  though  they  may  be  engaged  in  some  work  that  will  Inure 
to  the  general  benefit  of  the  municipality.  Grading  streets,  cleans- 
ing sewers,  or  keeping  wharves  in  safe  condition,  from  which  a 
profit  i^  derived,  are  duties  of  this  character:  Moffitt  v.  Asheville, 
103  N.  C.  237,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  810;  Hitchlns  v.  Mayor  etc.,  68  Md. 
100,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  422;  Gibson  v.  Huntington,  38  W.  Va.  177,  45 
Am.  St.  Rep.  853;  Helgel  v.  Wichita  County,  84  Tex.  392,  31  Am.  St. 
Rep.  63. 


In  be  Assignment   Mutual  Guaranty   Fire 
Insurance  Company. 

[107  Iowa,  143.] 

INSURANCE  COMPANIES— MUTUAI^WHEN  DO  NOT 
BECOME  STOCK  COMPANIES.— A  mutual  Insurance  company  or- 
ganized under  a  statute  authorizing  an  association  of  persons  mak- 
ing mutual  pledges  and  giving  valid  obligations  to  each  other  for 
their  own  insurance  on  the  assessment  plan,  does  not  become  a 
stcck  company  by  the  Issuance  of  shares  to  the  subscribers  of  a  guar- 
anty fund,  which  shares  are  secured  by  obligations  of  the  holders, 
and  are  subject  to  assessment  from  time  to  time  to  meet  any  de- 
ficiency that  might  arise  in  the  advancements,  assessments,  and 
pledges  made  to  pay  losses  and  expenses.  Therefore  it  cannot  do 
business  on  the  stock  plan,  cannot  write  a  policy  for  a  fixed  amount, 
Accept  premiums  as  such,  nor  declare  dividends. 

INSURANCE  COMPANIES— MUTUAI^WHO  ARE  NOT 
MEMBERS.— One  who  insures  his  property  in  a  mutual  company 
in  a  stated  amount,  for  a  specific  premium,  does  not  become  a  mem- 
ber of  the  company  so  as  to  be  liable  for  future  assessments. 

INSURANCE  COMPANIEJS— POWERS— ASSURED  MUST 
TAKE  NOTICE  OF.— One  who  takes  out  a  policy  In  a  mutual  in- 
surance company  which  the  latter  has  no  power  under  Its  charter 
to  make  must  take  notice  of  the  laws  of  the  state  and  the  articles 
of  Incorporation  adopted  thereunder,  and  cannot  recover  upon  OxQ 
policy  unless  enabled  to  do  so  upon  the  ground  of  estoppel. 

INSURANCE  COMPANIES— ULTRA  VIRES— POLICY  FOR- 
BIDDEN  BY  STATUTE.— Where  a  mutual  insurance  company 
issues  a  policy  which  it  Is  prohibited  by  law  to  issue,  the  policy  is 
illegal  and  void,  and  the  fact  that  premiums  have  been  paid  thereon. 


150  In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  [Iowa, 

and  used  by  the  company,  will  not  estop  it  from  pleading  ultra 
vires  as  a  defense  to  a  suit  upon  the  policy. 

INSURANCE  COMPANIES— MUTUAL— LIABILITY  OF 
MEMBERS  TO  A  PERSON  ILLEGALLY  INSURED.— While  the 
officers  or  directors  of  a  mutual  insurance  company  may  be  held  in- 
diividually  liable  for  a  wrong  done  to  a  person  to  whom  they  have 
Issued  an  illegal  and  void  policy,  no  liability  for  such  wrong  can 
be  enforced  against  the  members  of  the  company  as  partners. 

Chase  &  Seaman  and  Eldred  S.  James,  for  the  appellant. 

A.  P.  Barker  and  F.  "W.  &  L.  A.  Ellis,  for  the  appellees. 

144  DEEMEE,  J.  The  Mutual  Guaranty  Fire  Insurance 
Company  was  organized  in  the  year  1888.  On  the  ninth  day  of 
August  of  that  year,  it  filed  its  articles  of  incorporation,  which 
stated,  in  substance,  that  certain  persons,  naming  them,  and  all 
others  who  might  associate  with  them  and  become  members 
thereof,  organized  under  the  name  hereinbefore  stated,  "fo  make 
insurance  upon  ....  property  against  loss  or  damage  by  fire, 
....  upon  the  plan  of  mutual  insurance.'*  A  guaranty  fund 
of  fifty  thousand  dollars,  consisting  of  shares  of  one  hundred 
dollars  each,  was  also  provided  for,  which  was  subject  to  in- 
crease, and  which  was  to  be  secured  by  the  obligations  of  the 
shareholders  in  such  form  as  the  board  of  directors  should  ap- 
prove, and  be  subject  to  assessment  from  time  to  time  to  meet 
any  deficiency  that  might  arise  in  the  advancements,  assess- 
ments, and  pledges  made  to  pay  losses  and  expenses.  These 
assessments  were  to  be  treated  as  advancements  to  be  repaid 
from  the  funds  of  the  association.  The  articles  further  pro- 
vided that  the  fund  to  pay  losses  and  expenses  should  consist 
exclusively  of  moneys  raised  by  advancements  and  assessments 
given  by  the  members  for  their  insurance,  such  assessments  to 
be  made  by  the  board  of  directors  or  executive  committee,  and 
apportioned  pro  rata  among  the  members  insured.  They  also 
provided  that  all  persons  insured  should  be  members  ^'^  of 
the  company  during  the  life  of  their  policies,  and  that  charges 
for  insurance  should  be  regulated  by  the  directors.  Further 
provision  was  made  for  the  adoption  of  by-laws,  such  as  the- 
directors  might  deem  expedient  for  the  conduct  of  the  affairs  of 
the  company.  The  notice  of  incorporation  stated  that  it  was  a 
corporation  for  pecuniary  profit,  organized  under  the  laws  of  tha 
state,  to  insure  the  property  of  its  members  by  mutual  pledges 
or  obligations  against  loss  or  damage  by  fire,  et  cetera.  The 
by-laws  provided  for  the  issuance  of  one  and  five-year  policies^ 
premiums  for  the  one-year  policies  to  be  in  cash,  and  for  tha 


Jan.  1899.]     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         J  51 

five-year  policies  a  note  for  five  times  the  annual  premium,  to 
be  paid  in  installments  of  not  more  than  one-fifth  of  the  amount 
in  any  one  year,  at  such  time  or  times  as  the  board  of  directors 
or  executive  committee  might  order.  But  one  full  annual 
premium  was  required  to  be  paid  in  cash  upon  the  delivery  of 
all  policies.  Assessments  were  to  be  equitably  levied  upon  the 
notes  to  pay  losses  and  expenses,  and  notice  of  these  assessments 
was  required.  Another  article  of  the  by-laws  provided  for  the 
cancellation  of  policies,  and  return  of  such  part  of  the  cash 
premiums  as  were  unearned,  based  upon  the  usual  short  rates. 
Subscribers  to  the  guaranty  fund  were  to  be  allowed  five  per 
cent  of  the  amount  of  their  shares  as  compensation  for  the  re- 
sponsibility assumed  by  them,  which  amount  was  to  be  charged 
to  the  expense  account  of  the  company.  The  policy  in  suit 
was  issued  by  this  corporation,  insuring  the  Ness  County  Sugar 
Company,  of  Ness  county,  Kansas,  against  loss  or  damage  by 
fire  upon  its  plant  in  said  Ness  county,  loss,  if  any,  to  be  paid 
to  A.  E.  Alvord,  mortgagee.  The  policy  was  for  one  year,  and 
the  sugar  company  paid  the  premium  (twenty-five  dollars)  in 
cash.  It  was  called  a  "nonparticipating  policy,"  and  pro- 
vided for  cancellation  at  customary  short  rates.  This  condition 
also  appears  therein:  "In  consideration  of  the  issuance  of  this 
policy  for  the  amount  of  premium  before  stated,  the  holder  of 
this  policy  hereby  releases  any  and  all  claims  for  dividends, 
earnings,  or  profits  of  this  company."  The  only  *^®  thing  on 
the  face  of  the  policy  to  indicate  that  it  was  issued  by  a  mutual 
company  or  upon  the  mutual  plan  is  the  name  "Mutual  Guar- 
anty Fire  Insurance  Company."  On  the  twenty-third  day  of 
August,  1890,  and  during  the  life  of  the  policy,  the  property  in- 
sured was  totally  destroyed  by  fire.  Proper  notice  and  proofs 
of  loss  were  given  the  company,  but  the  loss  was  not  paid;  and 
on  the  second  day  of  January,  1891,  the  company  made  a  gen- 
eral assignment  for  the  benefit  of  its  creditors.  A.  P.  Barker 
was  made  assignee  and  he  makes  the  objections  which  are  inter- 
posed to  appellant'^  claim. 

The  record  presents  two  questions  for  our  determination:  1. 
Was  the  policy  issued  without  authority  by  the  officers  of  the 
company  ?  2.  Is  the  policy  invalid  because  made  in  contraven- 
tion of  the  statutes  of  the  state?  Some  other  questions  are  ar- 
gued which  will  be  considered  during  the  course  of  the  opinion, 
but  these  are  the  controlling  ones  in  the  case. 

At  the  time  the  company  was  organized,  the  law  authorized 


152  In  KE  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

two  kinds  of  mutual  insurance  companies — one  to  do  business 
on  the  plan  of  mutual  insurance,  under  sections  1123  and  1159, 
inclusive,  of  the  code  of  1873;  and  the  other  an  association  of 
persons  making  mutual  pledges  and  giving  valid  obligations  to 
each  other  for  their  own  insurance  on  the  assessment  plan, 
under  section  1160.  The  company  which  issued  the  policy  in 
suit  had  no  stock,  except  the  shares  issued  to  the  subscribers  of 
the  guaranty  fund.  The  issuance  of  these  shares  and  the  crea- 
tion of  this  fund  did  not  make  it  a  stock  company,  however:. 
Corey  v.  Sherman,  96  Iowa,  114.  The  idea  of  the  incorporators, 
no  doubt,  was  to  organize  under  section  1160  of  the  code;  and 
we  shall  treat  the  company  as  organized  under  that  section,  our 
authority  for  so  doing  being  the  Corey-Sherman  case,  to  which 
we  have  just  referred,  and  which  is  in  many  respects  much  like 
the  case  at  bar.  Under  such  articles  of  incorporation,  the  per- 
sons becoming  members  ^^"^  of  the  company  may  make  mutual 
pledges,  and  give  valid  obligations  to  each  other  for  their  own 
insurance,  but  cannot  insure  property  not  owned  by  one  of 
their  number,  nor  can  they  receive  premiums  or  make  dividends : 
Code  1873,  sec.  1160.  Another  provision  of  the  law  is  to  this 
effect:  "No  company  organized  upon  the  mutual  plan  shall  do 
business  or  take  risks  upon  the  stock  plan.  Neither  shall  a 
company  organized  as  a  stock  company  do  business  upon  the 
plan  of  a  mutual  insurance  company."  Eeferring  back  to  the 
articles  of  incorporation  which  we  have  heretofore  quoted,  and 
we  find  that  the  company  was  to  do  business  upon  the  mutual 
plan,  and  that  the  funds  for  the  payment  of  the  losses  and  ex- 
penses were  to  consist  of  moneys  raised  by  advancements  and 
assessments  on  mutual  pledges  given  by  the  members  of  the 
company.  Now,  it  may  be  that  the  company  was  authorized 
to  accept  an  advance  payment  of  money  as  a  pledge  against 
which  assessments  might  be  levied  from  time  to  time;  but  it  is 
clear  that  it  was  not  permitted  to  accept  premiums  as  such,  not 
could  it  declare  dividends.  It  had  no  power  to  write  a  policy 
for  a  stated  and  definite  amount  of  insurance.  Neither  could 
it  do  business  on  the  stock  plan.  That  it  undertook  to  insure 
the  sugar  company  for  a  definite  and  specific  amount,  in  consid- 
eration of  a  fixed  and  stated  premium,  is  too  plain  for  success- 
ful contradiction.  The  assured  was  not  a  member  of  the  com- 
pany, except  in  name,  and  there  was  no  mutuality  between  him 
and  the  other  policy  holders.  It  has  been  held,  and  with  good 
reason,  that  one  who  insures  his  property  in  a  mutual  company 


Jan.  1899.]     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  153 

in  a  stated  amount,  for  a  specific  premium,  does  not  become 
a  member  of  the  company,  so  as  to  be  liable  for  future  assess- 
ments: Farmers'  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith,  63  111.  187;  Illinois 
etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stanton,  67  111.  354;  Given  v.  Eettew,  1G3  Ta. 
St.  638.  Certainly  there  was  no  liability  on  the  part  of  the 
sugar  company  or  the  appellant  to  pay  assessments  for  losses. 
The  cash  premium  demanded  by  the  company  was  paid,  and  the 
company  agreed  to  pay  a  definite  and  certain  amount  in  **** 
case  of  loss.  There  was  no  mutuality  between  the  members  of 
the  company  who  were  insured  on  the  assessment  plan  and  those 
who  paid  cash  premiums  in  full.  The  contract  was  one  which 
the  company  had  no  power  to  make;  and,  as  the  assured  must 
take  notice  of  the  laws  of  the  state  and  the  articles  of  incorpora- 
tion adopted  thereunder,  it  follows  that  appellant  cannot  re* 
cover,  unless  it  be  on  the  theory  of  estoppel. 

The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires,  as  applied  to  corporations,  is  one 
of  the  most  difficult  with  which  courts  have  to  deal,  and  the 
rules  are  not  as  definitely  settled  as  we  might  wish.  "Were  it 
not  for  the  statutes  prohibiting  mutual  companies  organized 
under  section  1160  from  taking  premiums  and  from  doing  busi- 
ness on  the  stock  plan,  we  would  be  inclined  to  hold  that  as  the 
corporation  had  accepted  and  used  the  premium  paid  for  the 
policy  in  suit,  it  should  be  estopped  from  pleading  ultra  vires  as 
a  defense.  Indeed,  the  modern  authorities  seem  to  sustain  that 
rule:  Thompson  v.  Lambert,  44  Iowa,  239.  See  Denver  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  V.  McClelland,  9  Colo.  11,  59  Am.  Eep.  134;  Matt  v. 
Roman  Catholic  etc.  Soc,  70  Iowa,  455;  Beach  on  Private  Cor- 
porations, sec.  423,  and  cases  cited.  But  where,  as  in  this  case, 
the  act  is  prohibited  by  statute,  the  contract  is  illegal  and  void, 
and  cannot  be  enforced.  The  rule  as  stated  by  Taylor  in  his 
work  on  Corporations,  sec.  299,  is  as  follows:  "If  a  statute  ex- 
pressly forbids  a  corporation  to  make  a  certain  contract,  the  con- 
tract is  void  even  though  not  expressly  declared  to  be  so,  and 
is  incapable  of  ratification;  and  that  the  contract  is  void,  as 
unlawful,  may  be  pleaded  by  anyone  to  an  action  founded  di- 
rectly and  exclusively  on  such  contract;  unless:  1.  The*  stat- 
utes expressly  state  what  the  consequences  of  violating  it  shall 
be,  and  those  consequences  are  other  than  that  the  contract, 
shall  be  void:  or  2.  Unless  the  statutory  prohibition  was  evi- 
dently imposed  for  the  protection  of  a  certain  class  of  persons, 
who  may  alone  take  advantage  of  it;  or  3.  Unless  to  adjudge 
the  contract  void  and  incapable  of  forming  the  basis  of  a  right 


154  In  ee  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

of  action  *■**  would  clearly  frustrate  the  evident  purposes  of 
the  prohibition  itself."  Sustaining  his  conclusions  are  the  fol- 
lowing, among  other  cases :  New  York  etc.  Trust  Co.  v.  Helmer, 

77  N.  Y.  64;  Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scott,  19  Johns.  1;  Lester  v. 
Howard  Bank,  33  Md.  558,  3  Am.'Eep.  211;  Beecher  v.  Mar- 
quette etc.  Mill  Co.,  45  Mich.  103;  McPherson  v.  Foster,  43 
Iowa,  48,  22  Am.  Eep.  215.  Such  a  contract  will  not  be  en- 
forced, although  it  may  have  been  executed  by  one  of  the  par- 
ties. Nor  can  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  be  invoked  to  bind  the 
corporation  to  a  forbidden  act:  Kent  v.  Quicksilver  Min.  Co., 

78  N.  Y.  159;  Miller  v.  Insurance  Co.,  92  Tenn.  167.  Section 
1160  of  the  code  of  1873  provides  that  companies  organized 
thereunder  shall  not  accept  premiums.  This  the  appellant 
knew,  or  ought  to  have  known,  as  he  was  charged  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  law.  His  position  is  not  such  as  appeals  very 
strongly  to  a  court  of  equity.  He  paid  his  money  knowing  that 
the  company  had  no  right  to  accept  it,  and  ought  not  to  be  al- 
lowed to  base  an  estoppel  thereon.  Again,  the  company  was  ex- 
pressly prohibited  from  issuing  such  a  policy  as  the  one  in  suit. 

Appellant  further  contends  that,  if  the  corporation  was  not 
permitted  to  do  the  business  in  which  it  was  engaged,  no  corpo- 
ration existed,  and  that  the  incorporators  became  liable  as  a 
partnership  for  the  business  done  under  the  articles.  The 
difficulty  with  this  contention  is  that  the  corporation  was  not 
organized  to  do  an  illegal  or  unlawful  business:  See  Corey  v. 
Sherman,  96  Iowa,  114.  Its  articles  clearly  provide  that  it  is 
to  do  business  under  section  1160  of  the  Code,  and,  if  it  did  not 
do  so,  the  promoters  thereof  are  not  liable  as  partners.  They 
took  the  necessary  steps  to  incorporate,  and,  if  the  officers  or 
directors  thereafter  proceeded  to  do  an  illegal  business,  they 
may  be  individually  liable  for  the  wrong  done,  but  the  other 
members  of  the  corporation  will  not  be  held  liable  as  partners. 
These  propositions  are  elementary,  and  require  no  citation  of 
authorities  in  their  support.  See,  as  sustaining  our  conclusions 
on  the  whole  case,  Rockhold  v.  Canton  etc.  Soc,  129  111.  440; 
*»"  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Keokuk  etc.  Bridge  Co.,  131  U.  S. 
371;  Miller  v.  Insurance  Co.,  92  Tenn.  167;  O'Neil  v.  Pleasant 
-Prairie  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  71  Wis.  621;  Eddy  v.  Merchants'  etc.  Ins. 
Co.,  72  Mich.  651 ;  Lucas  v.  White  Line  Transfer  Co.,  70  Iowa, 
641,  69  Am.  Eep.  449. 

The  case  differs  essentially  from  Beach  v.  Wakefield,  107  Iowa, 
667.    In  that  case  the  corporation  had  power  to  make  contracts 


Jan.  1899.]     In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co,  155 

like  the  one  upon  which  it  was  sued.  The  prohihition  wa& 
against  an  indebtedness  exceeding  two-thirds  of  its  capital  stock. 
In  this  case  the  insurance  company  had  no  power  to  make  a  con- 
tract of  insurance  on  the  stock  plan  and  it  was  absolutely  in- 
hibited from  receiving  premiums.  Again,  in  that  case  the  cor- 
poration had  the  benefit  of  the  money  borrowed,  and  was  asked 
to  repay  it.  To  a  plea  of  ultra  vires  we  quoted  the  following 
rule  from  Morawetz  on  Corporations :  "If  an  agreement  is  legally 
void  and  noneniorceable  by  reason  of  s6me  statutory  or  com- 
mon-law prohibition,  either  party  to  the  agreement  who  has  re- 
ceived anything  from  the  other  party,  and  has  failed  to  perform 
the  agreement  on  his  part,  must  account  to  the  latter  for  what 
he  has  received.  Under  these  circumstances  the  court  will  grant 
relief,  irrespective  of  the  invalid  agreement,  unless  it  involves 
some  positive  immorality,  or  there  are  other  reasons  of  public 
policy  why  the  courts  should  refuse  to  grant  relief'*:  See,  also,. 
Heuer  v.  Carmichael,  83  Iowa,  290 ;  Peatman  v.  Centerville  etc. 
Power  Co.,  100  Iowa,  245.  If  this  were  an  action  to  recover  back 
the  premium  paid  or  for  benefits  received,  the  rule  just  quoted 
might  apply:  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Keokuk  etc.  Bridge  Co.^ 
131  U.  S.  371.  But  such  is  not  the  nature  of  the  proceeding. 
It  is  to  recover  upon  a  contract  of  indemnity  which  the  cor- 
poration had  no  power  to  make,  and  which  is  prohibited  by 
statute.  The  case  does  not  differ  in  principle  from  Lucas  v. 
White  Line  Transfer  Co.,  70  Iowa,  541,  59  Am.  Rep.  449,  which 
was  an  action  upon  a  contract  of  suretyship.  ^^^  We  there  held 
that  the  corporation  was  not  liable  and  that  the  officers  of  thtt 
corporation  could  not  ratify  such  a  contract.  In  the  Beach- 
Wakefield  case  we  held  that  the  corporation  was  bound  to  ac- 
count for  the  money  it  had  received  on  the  theory  of  an  equitable- 
estoppel,  or  that  he  who  has  accepted  the  benefits  of  a  transac- 
tion must  accept  its  burdens.  The  law  expressly  enjoined  the 
officers  of  the  insurance  company  from  receiving  premiums,  and 
it  prohibited  the  making  of  just  such  contracts  as  the  one  in 
suit.  Surely,  the  members  of  the  society  who  were  bound  to 
each  other  by  mutual  pledges  should  not  be  held  to  respond 
to  appellee  for  the  amount  of  his  loss.  The  order  disallowing 
appellant's  claim  was  clearly  right,  and  it  is  affirmed. 

INSTTRANCB  COMPANIES-MUTUAL  INSURANCE  COMPA- 
NIES differ  epspntlally  from  stock  Insurance  companies:  Baxter  v. 
Chelsea  Mut  etc.  Co..  1  Allen.  294,  79  Am.  Dec.  730. 

INST'RANCB  COMPANIES -MUTUAIv-MEMBERS  NOT  PART- 
NERS.—The  holder  of  a  policy  of  insurance  in  a  mutual  company  i» 


156  In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

in  uo  sense  a  partner  of  the  corporation;  bis  relation  with  the  com- 
pany is  one  of  contract,  measured  by  the  terms  of  the  policy:  Uhl- 
man  v.  New  York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  109  N.  Y.  421,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  482; 
see,  also,  Payne  v.  Snow,  12  Cush.  443,  59  Am.  Dec.  203. 

The  Doctrine  of  Ultra  Vires  in  Relation  to  the  Contracts  of  Private 

Corporations.* 

The  rapid  spread  of  the  corporation  idea  in  the  business  world, 
particularly  in  the  United  States,  during  the  last  half-century,  has 
necessitated  a  correspondingly  rapid  development  of  corporation 
law.  This  latter  development  has  been  to  a  large  degree  forced  and 
unnatural.  The  questions  arising  have  been  both  new  and  numer- 
ous, following  upon  each  other  in  a  rapid  complexity,  more  or  less 
■disconcerting  to  the  judicial  temperament,  accustomed  from  time 
immemorial  to  leisurely  and  dignified  mental  operations.  In  such 
a  state  of  affairs,  our  judicial  system  has  apparent  disadvantages. 
■Corporation  law  has  been  developed  by  our  numerous  state  and 
federal  courts  under  varying  conditions,  varying  statutes,  and  vary- 
ing constitutional  provisions,  and  it  is  to  be  expected  that  corpora- 
tion law,  as  a  separate  body  of  our  law,  should  present  the  aspect 
-of  an  unfinished  structure  being  hastened  to  completion  in  a  man- 
ner at  once  unsystematic  and  spasmodic.  Much  of  it  still  remains 
for  building,  and  much  that  has  been  placed  in  the  structure  will 
have  to  be  torn  away  before  a  logical  and  congruous  completion 
will  be  had. 

Involved  State  of  Our  Subject.— ThoBe  students  of  corporation  law 
"Who  have  considered  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  bear  unanimous  wit- 
ness that  the  subject  is  much  confused  and  unsettled.  Mr.  Brlce, 
having  prepared  his  work  on  Ultra  Vires,  speaks  of  the  doctrine  in 
his  preface  as  "a  guiding,  or  rather  misleading,  principle  in  the 
legal  system"  of  England,  and  says  that  "the  decisions  and  dicta 
upon  this  subject  are  very  conflicting,  and  some  absolutely  irrecon- 
cilable, while  the  principle  is  become,  if  not  an  excrescence  upon, 
at  least  a  very  aisturbing  element  in,  the  legal  system.'  Mr.  Brlce 
speaks  concerning  the  state  of  the  doctrine  in  Englacd.  That  the 
same  conditions  obtain  in  our  own  country  cannot  be  doubted  by 
one  who  has  attempted  to  collect  and  classify  the  American  cases. 
Perhaps  the  best  qualified  of  American  writers  to  speak  upon  this 
matter  is  Seymour  D.  Thompson,  who,  in  an  article  on  "The  Doc- 
trine of  Ultra  Vires  in  Relation  to  Private  Corporations,"  published 
in  the  American  Law  Review,  volume  28,  page  376.  says:  "After 
"having  given  a  long  and  attentive  study  to  the  subject,  the  writer 
afllrms  that  the  Anglo-American  law  with  reference  to  it  is  in  a 
state  of  hopeless  and  inextricable  confusion;  that  contradictory  de- 
cisions are  constantly  rendered  by  the  same  courts,  that  opposing 
principles,  tending  to  contrary  results,  jostle  and  crowd  each  other 
as  the  Ice  floes  jostle  and  crowd  each  other  going  southward  out  of 
Baffin's  bay  through  Davis  straits;  and  that  the  judge  seizes  upon 

♦reference  to  monographic  notes. 
Sale  by  corporation  of  Its  assets:  99  Am.  Dec.  833-3:^8. 

Power  of  corporation  to  purchase  its  own  capital  stock:  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  83»-847. 
Right  of  one  corportUlon  to  acquire  stock  In  another:  86  Am.  St.  Rep.  184-142. 
Eight  to  transfer  public  franchl^es:  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  89(M07. 


Jan.  1899.]    In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         157 

one  of  these  principles  to-day  and  to-morrow  upon  another,  and  en- 
larges It  or  applies  it  according  to  the  seeming  exigencies  of  justice 
in  the  particular  case." 

Misuse  of  Terms.— Although  partly  traceable  to  other  causes,  this 
confusion  is  due  In  a  great  measure  to  the  carelessness  with  which 
courts  hav#  used  the  term  "ultra  vires."  "There  is  nothing  of  mys- 
tery or  of  sanctity  In  the  use  of  the  words  of  a  dead  language— 'ul- 
tra vires,' "  said  the  court  in  National  Bank  v.  Porter,  125  Mass. 
333,  28  Am.  Rep.  235.  The  term.  If  It  have  any  proper  place  In  the 
vocabulary  of  the  law,  must  have  a  definite  and  ascertainable  mean- 
ing. Whether  with  strict  propriety  or  not,  the  term, "ultra  vlres,"l» 
used  In  different  senses.  "An  act  is  said  to  be  ultra  vires  when  it 
is  not  within  the  scope  of  the  powers  of  the  coi-poratlon  to  perform 
it  under  any  circumstances,  or  for  any  purpose.  An  act  is  also, 
sometimes,  said  to  be  ultra  vires  with  reference  to  the  rights  of 
certain  parties  when  the  corporation  Is  not  authorized  to  perform 
it  without  their  consent;  or  with  reference  to  some  specific  purpose, 
when  it  is  not  authorized  to  perform  it  for  that  purpose,  although 
fully  within  the  general  powers  of  the  corporation,  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  parties  Interested,  or  for  some  other  purpose":  Miners' 
Ditch  Co.  V.  Zellerbach,  37  Cal.  543,  99  Am.  Dec.  300.  It  Is  a  rather 
common  error  to  confuse  the  terms  "illegality"  and  "ultra  vires," 
terms  which  represent  totally  different  and  distinct  ideas.  A  con- 
tract of  a  corporation  may  be  both  ultra  vires  and  illegal,  though 
!t  by  no  means  follows  that  because  such  a  contract  is  ultra  vires  it 
is  also  Illegal,  nor  Is  Illegality  a  necessary,  or  perhaps  even  a  usual, 
characteristic  of  ultra  vires  contracts.  Whether  a  contract  is  illegal 
or  not  is  determined  by  its  quality,  and  In  this  connection  It  matters 
little  whether  it  be  the  contract  of  a  corporation  or  of  an  Individ- 
ual; whether  It  be  ultra  vires  or  not  Is  determined  from  a  consid- 
eration of  the  powers  expressly  conferred  upon  the  corporation  by 
the  Instrument  of  its  creation,  together  with  those  other  powers 
implied  in  the  purposes  of  its  creation  and  In  the  powers  expressly 
granted:  BIssell  v.  Railroad  Cos.,  22  N.  Y.  258.  An  illegal  contract, 
the  same  being  Illegal  In  the  sense  of  malum  in  se  or  malum  pro- 
hibitum, is  ultra  vires  of  anyone  to  make,  corporation  or  private 
individual;  so  when  the  contract  in  question  is  of  a  corporation  it 
would  avoid  confusion  If  the  terms  "illegal"  and  "ultra  vires"  were 
divorced,  and  only  the  latter  used,  especially  where  the  question  Is 
not  of  its  legality  but  purely  whether  or  not  It  is  ultra  vires  of  the 
corporation  making  It:  Compare  People  v.  Chicago  Gas  Trust  Co., 
130  111.  2G8,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  319;  Franklin  Company  v.  Lewiston 
Inst,  for  Savings,  68  Me.  43,  28  Am.  Rep.  9.  To  say  that  a  con- 
tract is  ultra  vires  is  to  affirm  that  It  is  Illegal  in  the  sense  that 
It  is  beyond  the  powers  conferred  by  law  upon  the  corporation  mak- 
ing the  contract,  but  It  is  to  this  especial  sense  that  the  term  is 
properly  applicable.  Or,  we  may  say,  the  term  "Illegal"  is  generic 
while  that  of  ultra  vires  is  specific,  and  to  use  a  generic  term  where 
a  specific  term  only  Is  applicable  is  to  sacrifice  exactness  and  pro- 
duce confusion.  Of  what  value  are  refinements  in  legal  terms  and 
definitions  if  we  do  not  recognize  them? 


158  In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

Proper  Use  of  "Ultra  Vires"  and  the  Meaning  of  the  Term.— When  acts 
of  corporations  are  spoken  of  as  ultra  vires,  it  is  not  intended  that 
they  are  unlawful,  or  even  such  as  the  corporation  cannot  perform, 
but  merely  those  which  are  not  within  the  powers  conferred  upon 
the  corporation  by  the  act  of  its  creation,  and  are  In  violation  of  the 
trust  reposed  in  the  managing  Ixtard  by  the  shareholders,  that  the 
affairs  shall  be  managed  and  the  funds  applied  solely  for  carrying 
out  the  objects  for  which  the  corporation  was  created:  Whitney 
Arms  Co.  V.  Barlow,  63  N.  Y.  62,  20  Am.  Rep.  504;  Kadish  v.  Garden 
City  etc.  Assn.,  151  111.  531,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  256.  The  term  "ultra 
vires"  is  applicable  to  contracts  of  corporations  only  when  they  in- 
volve adventures  or  undertakings  outside  and  not  within  the  scope 
of  the  power  given  by  their  charters:  Leslie  v.  Lorillard,  110  N.  Y. 
519;  Jemison  v.  Citizens'  Sav.  Bank,  122  N.  Y.  135,  19  Am.  St.  Rep. 
482;  Monument  Nat.  Bank  v.  Globe  Works,  101  Mass.  57,  3  Am.  Rep. 
322;  Citizens'  State  Bank  v.  Hawkins,  71  Fed.  Rep.  369;  Matthews 
V.  Skinner,  62  Mo.  329,  21  Am.  Rep.  425.  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  In  Rail- 
way Cos.  V.  Keokuk  Bridge  Co.,  131  U.  S.  371,  thus  states  the  basis 
of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires:  "The  reasons  why  a  corporation  is 
not  liable  upon  a  contract  ultra  vires,  that  Is  to  say,  beyond  the 
powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the  legislature  and  varying  from  the 
objects  of  its  creation  as  declared  in  the  law  of  its  organization  are: 
1.  The  interest  of  the  public,  that  the  corporation  shall  not  transcend 
the  powers  granted;  2.  The  interest  of  the  stockholders,  that  capi- 
tal shall  not  be  subjected  to  the  risk  of  enterprises  not  contem- 
plated by  the  charter,  and  therefore  not  authorized  by  the  stock- 
holders In  subscribing  for  the  stock;  3.  The  obligation  of  everyone 
•entering  into  a  contract  with  a  coi-poration  to  take  notice  of  the 
'legal  limit  of  its  powers." 

As  we  shall  have  occasion  to  note  later,  courts  have  adopted  dif- 
ferent views  as  to  the  status  of  ultra  vires  contracts  and  the  en- 
forceable rights  which  may  arise  out  of  them.  The  doctrine  of  ul- 
tra vires  as  it  first  took  shape  was  quite  rigid.  It  proceeded  upon 
the  old  theory  as  to  the  character  of  corporations  which  were  re- 
garded as  purely  artificial  persons  having  absolutely  no  powers  be- 
yond those  given  under  a  strict  construction  of  their  charters.  Be- 
yond the  limits  of  these  powers  they  could  create  no  valid  obliga- 
tions. A  contract  beyond  these  powers  was  absolutely  null  and 
void:  Straus  v.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St.,  60.  A  corporation  had  no 
potential  existence  outside  the  scope  of  its  creation:  Davis  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  R.,  131  Mass.  258,  41  Am.  Rep.  221.  So,  where  a  corpora- 
tion attempted  to  make  a  contract  entirely  foreign  to  the  purpose 
and  objects  of  its  creation,  such  contract  was  void:  Rock  River 
Bank  v.  Sherwood,  10  Wis.  230.  78  Am.  Dec.  669.  "A  contract  of  a 
corporation  which  is  ultra  vires,  in  (he  proper  sense,  that  Is  to  say 
outside  the  object  of  Its  creation  as  defined  in  the  law  of  its  organ- 
ization, and  therefore  beyond  the  powers  conferred  upon  It  by  the 
legislature.  Is  not  voldahle  only,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Gray  in  Central 
Transp.  Co.  v.  rullmau's  Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24,  "but  wholly  void, 
and  of  no  legal  effect    The  objection  to  the  contract  is,  not  merely 


Jan.  1899.]    In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  159 

that  the  corporation  ought  not  to  have  made  It,  but  that  It  could  not 
make  It.  The  contract  cannot  be  ratified  by  either  party,  because 
It  could  not  have  been  authorized  by  either.  No  performance  on 
either  side  can  give  the  unlawful  contract  any  validity,  or  be  the 
foundation  of  any  right  of  action  upon  it":  Xhomas  v.  Railroad  Oo., 
101  U.  S.  71;  Elevator  Co.  v.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Tenn.  703, 
4  Am.  St.  Rep.  798.  A  corporation  having  taken  and  used  steam- 
boats purchased  under  an  ultra  vires  contract  was  held  to  have  in- 
curred no  liability  upon  notes  given  for  the  purchase  price:  Pearce 
v.  Madison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  How.  441.  These  matters  open  up  large 
questions  which  we  will  treat  later  herein.  Here  It  is  only  our  pur- 
pose to  give  an  outline  of  the  tlieories  out  of  which  the  doctrine  un- 
der consideration  grew.  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  purely 
private  corporation  Is  a  modern  creation.  Early  corporations  were 
mostly  created  for  public  purposes  and  invested  with  public  fran- 
chises. Therefore  the  interest  of  the  public  that  they  should  be  al- 
lowed no  other  powers  than  those  granted  them  was  more  than  Imag- 
inary. The  same  Is  to  be  said  of  quasi  public  corporations.  The 
purely  private  corporation,  however,  still  has  a  doubtful  status,  and 
it  Is  obvious  that  in  applying  to  It  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  new 
problems  have  been  encountered  which  have  rendered  such  appli- 
cation difficult.  In  many  ways  the  old  conception  of  a  corporation 
has  been  qualified,  as,  for  example,  in  holding  corporations  liable 
for  torts,  though  the  commission  of  torts  is  certainly  otftside  and 
beyond  the  pui-poses  and  objects  for  which  corporations  are  cre- 
ated. The  tendency  has  been,  and  Is,  to  treat  private  corporations 
as  private  Individuals,  a  tendency  which  cannot  be  too  highly  com- 
mended. It  Is  coming  to  be  sensibly  recognized  that  a  private  cor- 
poration Is  really  an  association  of  persons  and  that  no  judicial  dic- 
tum or  legislative  enactment  can  alter  this  fact:  Stockton  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  J.  Eq.,  52. 

Judicial  Prejudice  Against  Plea  of  Ultra  Firc».— The  modern  tend- 
ency is  to  relax  the  ancient  rigor  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  as 
applied  to  the  contracts  of  private  corporations.  The  doctrine  is 
held  to  have  no  application  in  favor  of  corporations  for  wrongs  com- 
mitted by  them:  National  Bank  v.  Graham,  100  U.  S.  699.  "The 
law,"  it  Is  said,  "never  sustains  the  defense  of  ultra  vires  out  of  re- 
gard for  the  corporation.  It  does  so  only  where  the  most  persuasive 
considerations  of  public  policy  are  involved":  Wright  v.  Hughes, 
119  Ind.  324,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  412.  A  liberal  application  of  the  doc- 
trine is  generally  approved,  and  It  Is  held  that  the  plea  of  ultra  vires 
should  not,  as  a  general  rule,  prevail,  whether  it  is  interposed  for  or 
against  a  corporation,  when  It  would  not  advance  justice,  but,  on 
the  contrary,  would  accomplish  a  legal  wrong:  Whitney  Arms  Co. 
V.  Barlow,  63  N.  Y.  62,  20  Am.  Rep.  504;  Wright  v.  Hughes,  119  Ind. 
324,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  412;  Third  Avenue  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dimock.  24 
N.  J.  Eq.,  26;  Holmes  etc.  Co.  v.  Holmes  etc.  Metal  Co.,  127  N.  Y. 
252,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  448;  Linkauf  v.  Lombard,  137  N.  Y.  417,  33  Am. 
St.  Rep.  743;  Carson  City  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Elevator  C5o.,  90  Mich.  550, 
30  Am.  St  Rep.  454;  Bear  River  Valley  etc.  Co.  v.  Hanley,  15  Utah. 


100  In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

506;  Lewis  v.  American  Sav.  etc.  Co.,  98  Wis.  203;  Railway  Co.  y. 
McCarthy,  96  U.  S.  258.  The  defense  of  ultra  vires  is  looked  upon 
by  the  courts  with  disfavor  whenever  it  is  presented  for  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  an  obligation  which  the  corporation  has  assumed 
merely  in  excess  of  powers  conferred  upon  it  and  not  in  violation 
of  some  express  provision  of  the  statute:  Kennedy  v.  California 
Sav.  Bank,  101  Cal.  495,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  69.  "The  safety  of  men 
In  their  daily  contracts  requires  that  this  doctrine  of  ultra  vire» 
should  be  confined  within  narrow  bounds,"  said  Lord  St.  Leonards 
In  Eastern  Counties  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hawkes,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  331.  A  court 
will  be  very  slow  to  set  aside  a  contract  as  ultra  vires  because  not 
beneficial  to  the  corporation,  where  the  general  power  to  make  it  is 
conceded,  and  when  the  stockholders,  at  the  time  it  was  made,  with 
the  lights  they  then  had,  considered  it  to  be  beneficial:  Marbury  v. 
Kentucky  Union  Land  Co.,  62  Fed.  Rep.  335.  The  old  doctrine  of 
ultra  vires,  resting  in  the  close  interest  that  the  public  has  in  re- 
straining corporations  from  contracting  beyond  their  powers,  is  left 
far  behind  in  the  holding  that  a  corporation,  to  make  the  defense  of 
ultra  vires  availabe  in  an  action  on  contract,  must  plead  it  and 
make  manifest  the  defect  in  power  relied  upon:  Charleston  etc. 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Willey,  16  Ind.  34.  It'  is  presumed  that  a  contract 
.made  by  a  corporation  is  ultra  vires  and  one  assumes  the  burden  of 
proof  who  sets  up  that  it  is  ultra  vires:  Downing  v.  Mount  Wash- 
ington Rbad  Co.,  40  N.  H.  230;  Rider  Life  Raft  Co.  v.  Roach,  97  N. 
Y.  378. 

Whut  Contracts  are  Ultra  Fires.— It  Is  to  be  deplored  that  the  term 
"ultra  vires"  has  been  applied  in  various  senses  to  the  contracts  of 
private  corporations.  The  proper  sense,  and  the  one  to  which  we 
shall  try  to  adhere  herein,  is  found  in  its  application  to  contracts 
which  are  outside  the  objects  for  which  the  corporation  was  cre- 
ated, and  in  excess  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  it  by  the  legislature 
In  the  instrument  of  its  creation.  As  we  have  said  already,  the  term 
Is  improperly  applied  to  contracts  which  are  forbidden  by  pubic 
policy,  or  by  positive  law,  such  contracts  being  illegal.  Again,  It 
Is  applied  to  contracts  which  are  defective,  not  In  the  fact  that 
their  execution  is  outside  the  purjjose  and  power  of  the  corporation, 
but  in  the  fact  that  they  ai"e  executed  in  an  unauthorized  manner; 
and,  again,  to  contracts  the  defect  In  which  Is  that  they  were  en- 
tered into  by  officers  of  the  corporation  in  excess  of  the  scope  of 
their  authority,  although  the  power  of  the  corporation  to  properly 
enter  Into  such  contracts  is  undoubted.  The  latter  class  of  cases 
pertain  to  agency  and  none  of  the  applications  made  of  the  term, 
ultra  vires,  is  strictly  correct  except  that  one  first  mentioned  and 
approved  herein.  An  Indefinite  amount  of  space  might  be  taken  up 
Id  calling  attention  to  the  infinite  variety  of  contracts  made  by 
private  corporations  and  construed  by  courts  to  be  or  not  to  be  ul- 
tra vires.  The  businesses  for  the  transaction  of  which  corporations 
are  formed  and  chartered  are  as  various  as  those  engaged  In  by 
private  Individuals,  and  these  corporations  transact  their  businesses 
along  much  the  same  Hues  as  do  individuals.    There  is  a  continued   ; 


J:;n.  1899.]     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  161 

stress  toward  tbe  allowance  to  corporations  of  the  same  right  to 
contract  that  Is  allowed  individuals,  but  the  special  difference  be- 
tween the  two  is  a  restraining  factor.  A  corporation's  powers  are 
limited  by  the  charter  of  its  creation,  an  impediment  with  which 
iudividuais  are  not  burdened,  and  in  any  case  involving  the  ultra 
vires  quality  of  a  corporation's  contract,  the  contract  and  the 
charter  in  question  are  the  important  matters.  However,  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  classification  is  possible  and  may  serve  to  illustrate 
the  reason  of  the  doctrine,  as  well  as  the  unreason  with  which  It 
is  sometimes  interpreted  and  applied. 

The  statement  of  the  sense  in  which  we  shall  use  the  term  "ultra 
vires"  is  the  groundworlj  of  any  attempt  to  answer  the  querj', 
What  contracts  of  private  corporations  are  ultra  vires?  A  detailed 
notice  of  the  cases  will  simply  elaborate  this  statement.  It  may  be 
regarded  as  well  settled  that  where  general  authority  is  given  a 
corporation  to  engage  in  business,  and  there  are  no  special  restraints 
in  its  charter,  it  takes  power  as  a  natural  person  enjoys  it,  with 
all  its  incidents  and  accessories;  it  may  borrow  money  to  attain 
its  legitimate  objects  precisely  as  an  individual,  and  bind  itself 
by  any  form  of  obligation  not  forbidden:  Wright  v.  Hughes,  119  Ind. 
324;  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  412;  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dow,  19  Fed. 
Rep.  388;  New  England  Fire  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  25  Ind.  53G; 
Reichwald  v.  Commercial  Hotel  Co.,  106  111.  430;  Hays  v.  Gallon 
Gas  Light  etc.  Co.,  29  Ohio  St.,  330;  Booth  v.  Robinson,  55  Md.  419. 
It  is  a  question  of  what  is  directly  or  impliedly  inhibited  by  the  char- 
ter of  a  corporation.  Unless  such  an  inhibition  exists,  a  corporation 
may  loan  its  undivided  profits:  Dock  v.  Schlichter  Jute  Cordage 
Co.,  107  Pa.  St.  370.  A  statute  providing  that,  "No  corporation 
shall  engage  in  mercantile  or  agricultural  business,  nor  in  commis- 
sion, brokerage,  stock-jobbing,  exchange,  or  banking  business  of 
any  kind,"  refers  only  to  the  buying  and  selling  of  merchandise  as 
an  employment,  implies  oi)erations  conducted  with  a  view  of  realiz- 
ing the  profits  wlijch  come  from  skillful  purchase,  barter,  specu- 
lation, and  sale,  and  does  not  render  ultra  vires  a  single  purchase 
of  cotton  by  a  railroad  corporation  incorporated  thereunder:  Gra- 
ham V.  Hendricks,  22  La.  Ann.  52.3.  Whether  an  act  of  a  corpo- 
ration comes  within  the  powers  granted  by  its  charter  must  be  de- 
termined in  each  case  from  all  its  facts  and  circumstances.  Acts 
wliich,  if  standing  alone,  or  when  engaged  in  as  a  business,  would 
be  beyond  the  powers  of  the  corporation,  are  not  necessarily  ultra 
vires  when  they  are  merely  incidental  to,  or  form  part  of,  an  en- 
tire transaction,  that,  in  its  general  scope,  is  within  the  corporate 
purpose:  Central  Ohio  Nat.  Gas  etc.  Co.  v.  Capital  City  Dairy  Co., 
60  Ohio  St.  90. 

If  a  contract  Is  Intended  to  further  the  Interests  and  objects  of  a 
corporation,  courts  are  loth  to  declare  it  ultra  vires;  and  it  is  ob- 
vious that  such  a  criterion  allows  courts  a  very  liberal  latitude. 
A  contract  by  a  railroad  corporation  employing  a  surgeon  to  at- 
tend injured  employes  is  not  ultra  vires:  Bedford  Belt  Ry.  Co.  v. 
McDonald,  17  Ind.  App.  492;  fiO  Am.  St.  Rep.  172.  Two  railroad 
companies  may  enter  into  a  contract  to  advance  one  another's  io- 
AM.  ST.  Kkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— 11 


162  In  ee  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

terests  In  all  lawful  manners:  Tonawanda  R.  R.  Co.  v.  New  York 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Hun,  496.  It  is  said  in  Jaclisonville  etc.  Ry.  etc.  Co. 
V.  Hooper,  160  U.  S.  514:  "Courts  may  be  permitted,  where  there 
Is  no  legislative  prohibition  shown,  to  put  a  favorable  construc- 
tion upon  such  exercise  of  power  by  a  railroad  company  as  is  suita- 
ble to  promote  the  success  of  the  company  within  its  chartered 
powers,  and  to  contribute  to  the  comfort  of  those  who  travel 
thereon.  To  lease  and  maintain  a  summer  hotel  at  the  seaside  ter- 
minus of  a  railroad  might  obviously  increase  the  business  of  the 
company  and  the  comfort  of  its  passengers,  and  be  within  the  pror 
visions  of  the  statute  of  Florida  above  cited,  whereby  a  railroad 
company  is  authorized  'to  sell,  lease,  or  buy  any  land  or  real  es- 
tate not  necessary  for  its  use,'  and  to  'erect  and  maintain  all  con- 
venient buildings  ....  for  the  accommodation  and  use  of  their  pas- 
sengers.' "A  contract  entered  into  by  a  railroad  corporation  before, 
for  the  transportation  of  freight  after,  the  completion  of  its  line,  is 
not  ultra  vires:  Louisville  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Flanagan,  113  Ind.  488;  3 
Am.  St.  Rep.  674.  But  a  corporation  chartered  to  carry  on  the  busi- 
ness of  a  common  carrier  is  not  authorized  to  contract  for  the  pur- 
chase and  sale  of  grain:  Northwestern  Union  Pacliet  Co.  v.  Shaw, 
37  Wis.  655,  19  Am.  Rep.  781;  though  in  that  case  it  was  doubted 
but  that  such  corporation  might  lawfully  purchase  grain  and  other 
produce  for  storage  and  shipment,  for  the  purpose  of  lieeping  its 
warehouses  and  boats  employed. 

Where  a  corporation  was  chartered  "to  buy,  own,  and  sell  real 
and  personal  property  and  to  improve  the  same,"  it  was  held  not 
ultra  vires  for  it  to  contract  for  the  erection  of  a  building  on  its 
lands  and  to  turn  the  same  over  to  a  college  corporation  to  be  or- 
ganized. This  upon  the  ground  that  the  corporation  had  power  to 
build  the  college,  or  do.  anything  else,  the  direct  or  proximate  ten- 
dency of  which  would  be  to  improve  the  property  of  the  corpora- 
tion by  enhancing  its  value,  or  to  render  it  more  desirable  and 
salable:  Fulton  v.  Sterling  Land  etc.  Co.,  47  Kan.  621.  Compare 
Kentucliy  Lumber  Co.  v.  Green,  87  Ky.  257.  Similarly,  a  corpora- 
tion created  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  in  lands,  and  to  which  the 
powers  to  purchase,  to  subdivide  and  to  sell,  and  to  make  any  con- 
tract essential  to  the  transaction  of  Its  business,  are  expressly 
granted,  possesses,  as  fairly  Incidental,  the  power  to  incur  liability 
In  respect  of  securing  better  facilities  for  transit  to  and  from  the 
lots  of  land,  as  by  building  a  bridge:  Fort  Worth  City  Co.  v.  Smith 
Bridge  Co.,  151  U.  S.  294.  A  contract  by  a  mining  corporation  to 
advance  a  sum  of  money  for  the  construction  of  a  tunnel  to  be  used 
In  conducting  its  business  is  not  ultra  vires:  Sutro  Tunnel  Co.  v. 
Segregated  Belcher  Min.  Co.,  19  Nev.  121.  It  is  not  ultra  vires  for 
a  corporation  organized  for  the  manufacture  of  certain  articles  to 
assume  to  fill  a  contract  made  with  another  for  furnishing  such 
articles:  Louis  Cook  Mfg.  Co,  v.  Randall,  62  Iowa,  244.  But  a  sav- 
ings bank  empowered  by  its  charter  to  "borrow  money,  buy  and 
Bell  exchange,  bullion,  bank  notes,  government  stocks,  and  other 
securities,  has  not  the  power  to  enter  into  speculative  contracts 
for  the  sale  or  purchase  of  stocks  at  the  stock  board  or  elsewhere 


Jan.  1899.]    In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  163 

•ubject  to  the  hazard  and  contingency  of  gain  or  loss.  Such  con- 
tracts are  ultra  vires:  Jemlson  v.  Citizens'  Sav,  Bank,  122  N.  Y. 
135,  19  Am.  St.  ,Rep.  482.  The  character  of  the  transactions  in  such 
a,  case  Is  all-important.  Thus,  the  fact  that  a  cotton-mill  corpo- 
ration purchases  cotton  for  future  delivery,  through  a  broker,  and 
puts  up  margins  necessary  to  carry  It,  does  not  render  the  pur- 
■chases  ultra  vires,  if  they  were  not  in  fact  speculations  on  the  rise 
And  fall  of  cotton,  but  vrere  made  in  the  ordinary  and  legitimate 
business  of  the  mill  for  Its  own  use:  Sampson  v.  Camperdown  Cot- 
ton Mills,  82  Fed.  Rep.  833.  Contracts  in  furtherance  of  the  busi- 
ness of  a  corporation  are  not  ultra  vires  because  made  in  antici- 
pation of  legislation  that  will  authorize  the  completion  of  the  con- 
tract: New  Haven  etc.  Co.  v.  Hayden,  107  Mass.  525;  Supervisors 
v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  121  Mass.  4G0.  But  a  corporation 
<loes  not  possess  the  power  to  acquire  by  assignment  claims  of 
■others  for  damages  growing  out  of  an  alleged  conspiracy  to  de- 
fraud, but  in  no  way  connected  with  its  affairs,  and  not  necessary 
to  preserve  its  property  or  protect  its  interests:  Farwell  Co.  v. 
Wolf,  96  Wis.  10;  65  Am.  St  Rep.  22.  See  as  illustrative  cases:  Sim- 
mons V.  Troy  Ii'on  Works,  92  Ala.  427;  Richelieu  Hotel  Co.  v.  Mili- 
tary etc.  Co.,  140  111.  248;  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  234. 

Contracts  Transferring  or  Leasing  Corporate  Property.— In  an  earlier 
note  In  this  series  we  discussed  the  right  of  corporations  to  transfer 
public  franchises,  and  stated  that  the  cases  are  virtually  in  unison 
as  to  the  doctrine  that  a  transfer  of  franchises  cannot  be  effected 
without  the  authority  of  the  sovereign  grantor,  and  that  the  rule 
is  the  same  whether  the  transfer  Is  attempted  to  be  made  by  a  vol- 
tintary  act,  such  as  conveyance,  mortgage,  lease,  consolidation,  or 
by  a  forced  sale  at  the  Instance  of  the  creditors  of  the  holder  of 
the  franchises:  See  monographic  note  to  Brunswick  Gas  Light  Co.  v. 
United  Gas  etc.  Co.,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  390;  Central  Transp.  Co.  v. 
Pullman's  Car  Co..  139  U.  S.  24;  Smith  v.  Cornelius,  41  W.  Va.  60; 
Stockton  V.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  J.  Eq.  52.  This  rule,  which  la 
•with  good  reason  applied  to  public  and  quasi  public  corporations, 
loses  Its  reason  when  attempted  to  be  applied  to  strictly  private 
■corporations  in  regard  to  their  corporate  assets.  No  reason  is  ap- 
parent why  such  a  corporation  may  not  in  good  faith  and  while 
solvent  dispose  of  its  assets  in  whole  or  In  part:  See  monographic 
note  to  Miner's  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbach,  99  Am.  Dec.  333.  Such 
■corporations,  like  a  partnership  or  Indivdual,  may  either  sell  or 
lease  their  property:  Holmes  etc.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Holmes  etc.  Metal 
CJo.,  127  N.  Y.  252,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  448;  Central  Transp.  Co.  v.  Pull- 
man's Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24;  Treadwell  v.  Salisbury  Mfg.  Co..  7 
<Jray,  393,  66  Am.  Dec.  490;  Evan  v.  Boston  Heating  Co.,  157  Mass. 
37;  Lauman  v.  I^banon  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  42,  72  Am.  Dec 
«85;  Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  North  American  Oil  etc.  Co.,  66  Pa.  St.  375; 
State  V.  Western  Irrigating  Canal  Co.,  40  Kan.  96,  10  Am.  St  Rep. 
166;  Bartholomew  v.  Derby  Rubber  Co.,  69  Conn.  521,  61  Am.  St. 
Rep.  57.  Compare  Byrne  v.  Schuyler  Electric  Mfg.  Co.,  65  Conn. 
S36;  McCutoheon  v.  Merz  Capsule  Co.,  71  Fed.  Rep.  787. 

Negotiable  Paper— Contracts  of  Guaranty  and  Suretyship.— It  seems 


164  In  bb  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

that  It  Is  not  ultra  vires  for  a  corporation  to  enter  Into  contract* 
of  guaranty  and  suretyship  when  it  does  so  in  the  legitmate  fur- 
therance of  its  purposes  and  business.     Thus,  a  lumber  company^ 
where  it  is  essential  to  the  successful  prosecution  of  its  business 
that  a  short  line  of  railway  penetrating  its  timber  lands  should 
be  constructed  and  operated,  may  guarantee  the  bonds  of  a  railroad 
company  taking  such  matter  in  hand:  Mercantile  Trust  Co.  v.  Kiser, 
91  Ga.  636;  Tod  v.  Kentucky  Union  Land  Co.,  57  Fed.  Rep.  47;  Mar- 
bury  V.  Kentucky  Union  Land  Co.,  62  Fed.  Rep.  335.    So  a  lumber 
company  may  become  surety  upon  the  bond  of  a  contractor  to  whouv 
it  furnishes  building  material,  such  being  the  custom  of  manufac- 
turers of  lumber  in  the  same  locality:  Wheeler  v.  Everett  Land  Co.» 
14  Wash.  630.     And  it  was  held  not  to  be  ultra  vires  for  a  brew- 
ing corporation  to  guarantee  the  rent  of  a  hotel,  the  bar  fixtures 
and  furniture  of  which  it  owned  and  in  which  its  beer  was  to  be 
sold:  Winterfield  v.  Cream  City  Brewing  Co.,  96  Wis.  239;  though 
the  contrary  has  also  been  held:  Filon  v.  Miller  Brewing  Co.,  60 
Hun,  582.     However,  If  two  business  corporations  have  different 
charter  purposes,  and  have,  therefore,  no  lawful  right  to  aid  or  as- 
sist each  other  in  business,  one  cannot,  in  the  absence  of  statutory 
authority,  become  surety  for  the  other:  Northside  Ry.  Co.  v.  Worth- 
Ington,  88  Tex.  562,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  778.    See,  also,  Lucas  v.  White 
Line  Transfer  Co.,  70  Iowa,  541,  59  Am.  Rep.  449.     The  power  of 
corporations  to  enter  into  contracts  of  guaranty  and  suretyship  Is. 
closely  related  to  their  power  to  execute  negotiable  and  accommo- 
dation paper.    A  corporation    with   i)ower    to    execute    negotiable 
paper  may  bind  Itself  as  indorser  or  guarantor  of  bonds  received 
by  it  in  due  course  of  business,  for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the 
value  of  such  bonds:  Tod  v.  Kentucky  Land  Co.,  57  Fed,  Rep.  47. 
The  proposition  Is  well  supported  by  authority  that  it  is  ultra  virea 
of  a  corporation  to  execute  accommodation  paper  or  to  enter  into 
contracts  of  guaranty  or  suretyship  not  in  furtherance  of  Its  busi- 
ness, unless  given  express  authority    to    do  so:  Tod  v.  Kentucky 
Union  Land  Co.,  57  Fed.  Rep.  47;  Lyon  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  85  Fed. 
Rep.  120;  Park  Hotel  Co.  v.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank,  86  Fed.  Rep.  742; 
Hall  V.  Auburn  Turnpike  Co.,  27  Cal.  255,  87  Am.  Dec.  75;  National 
Park  Bank  v.  German-American  etc.  Warehousing  etc.  Co.,  116  N. 
Y.  281;  Bridgeport  City  Bank  v.  Empire  Stone  etc.  Co.,  30  Barb. 
421;  Madison  etc.  Road  Co.  v.  Watertown  etc.  Road  Co.,  7  Wis.  59. 
But  It  has  been  held  that  the  stockholders  may  ratify  and  validate 
accommodation  paper  executed  without  authority  by  the  oflJcers  of 
a  corporation,  no  other  rights  Intervening:  Martin  v.  Niagara  Falls 
Paper  etc.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  165. 

On  the  Purchase  by  a  Corporation  of  Its  Own  or  Stock  of  Another  Cor- 
poration.—In  America,  the  great  wefght  of  authority  sustains  a  doc- 
trine directly  opposed  to  that  announced  by  the  English  courts,, 
and  In  this  country  It  Is  very  generally  maintained  that,  In  the  ab- 
sence of  statutory  prohibition,  a  solvent  corporation  or  Its  oflJcers 
may  Invest  Its  funds  in  the  purchase  of  Its  own  stock;  or  may  take 
such  stock  In  payment  of  debts  due  It  from  a  stockholder;  or  may 
take  It  lu  exchange  for  other  property  owned  by  the  corporation:  See 


Jan.  1899. J     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         165 

monographic  note  to  Commercial  Nat.  Bank  v.  Burch,  33  Am.  St. 
Rc'p.  339,  thoroughly  discussing  this  subject.  Compare  Adams  & 
Westlake  Co.  v.  Deyette,  5  S.  D.  418,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  887,  and 
Dock  V.  Schlichter  Jute  Cordage  Co.,  167  Pa".  St.  370.  As  to  the 
purchase  by  one  corporation  of  stock  in  another  a  contrary  rule 
obtains.  Such  transactions  are  viewed  by  the  courts  with  particu- 
lar disfavor  because  of  their  tendency  to  create  and  encourage 
monopolies.  In  this  matter  we  are  confronted  with  great  difficul- 
ties, because  the  acquisition  of  the  stock  may  be  so  connected  with 
the  business  of  the  corporation  that  much  doubt  may  reasonably 
€xlst  as  to  whether  or  not  the  transaction  is  defensible,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  incidental  to  the  exercise  of  some  power  clearly 
possessed  by  the  corporation.  It  is  well  settled,  however,  that  the 
power  of  one  corporation  to  purchase  the  stock  of  another  corpo- 
ration must  be  authorized  by  Its  charter  or  by  general  law,  and  that 
while  this  power  may  sometimes  be  incidental  to  some  undisputed 
authority,  its  exercise  when  the  object  is  to  obtain  the  control  and 
management  of  another  corporation  Is  distinctly  ultra  vires:  Sefr 
monographic  note  to  Denny  Hotel  Co.  v.  Schram,  36  Am.  St.  Rep. 
134;  Commercial  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Board  of  Revenue,  99  Ala.  1,  42 
Am.  St.  Rep.  17;  Railway  Co.  v.  Iron  Co.,  46  Ohio  St.  44;  Marble 
Co.  V.  Harvey,  92  Tenn.  115,  36  Am.  St  Rep.  71;  Knowles  v.  Sand- 
ercock,  107  Cal.  629;  Marbury  y.  Kentucky  Union  Land  Co.,  62  Fed. 
Rep.  335. 

Executory  Contracts  under  the  Doctrine  of  Ultra  Tires.— We  have, 
perhaps,  taken  up  too  much  space  In  discussing  what  contracts  of 
private  corporations  are  ultra  vires.  Any  treatment  of  that  ques- 
tion within  the  limits  of  a  note  of  this  kind  must  be  quite  inade- 
quate, but  a  rapid  resumi  such  as  we  have  attempted  seemed  nec- 
essary as  a  preparation  to  taking  up  the  phase  of  the  subject  upon 
which  we  now  enter.  In  discussing  the  application  of  the  doctrine 
of  ultra  vires  to  the  contracts  of  private  corporations,  we  find  that 
such  contracts  fall  Into  two  classes— executory  and  executed;  and 
that  executed  contracts  are  divided  Into  those  wholly  executed,  and 
those  partially  executed.  The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  may  be  said 
to  be  only  applicable,  in  its  fullest  force,  to  executory  contracts: 
Thompson  v.  Lambert,  44  Iowa,  239.  When  a  contract  has  been 
executed  wholly  or  in  part  either  by  the  corporation  or  the  other 
party,  other  elements  enter,  as  we  shall  see,  equities  arise  which 
demand  recognition,  and  the  application  of  the  doctrine  is  qualified. 
An  ultra  vires  contract  which  is  purely  executory  cannot  be  en- 
forced by  either  party,  and  in  a  suit  thereon  the  plea  of  ultra  ylrea 
is  a  good  defense  either  for  the  corporation  or  against  It:  Sherwood 
V.  Alvis,  83  Ala.  115,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  605;  Long  v.  Georgia  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.,  91  Ala,  519,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  931;  McNulta  v.  Corn  Belt  Bank, 
164  111.  427.  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  203;  Pennsylvania  etc.  Navigation  Co. 
V.  Dandridge,  8  Gill.  &  J.  248,  29  Am.  Dec.  543;  Garrett  v.  Kansas 
City  Coal  Min.  Co.,  113  Mo.  3.30,  35  Am.  St  Rep.  713;  Greenville 
Compress  etc.  Co.  v.  Planters'  Compress  etc.  Co.,  70  Miss.  669,  35 
Am.  St  Rep.  681;  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  9  Cal. 
453;  Nassau  Bank  v.  Jones.  95  N.  Y.  115,  47  Am.  Rep.  14;  Jemisoa 


166  In  re  Assignment  Mutu4l  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [lowa^ 

V.  Citizens'  Sav.  Bank,  122  N.  Y.  135,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  482;  Shermaa 
Center  Town  Co.  v.  Morris,  43  Kan.  282,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  134;  State- 
Board  V.  Citizens'  Street  Ry.  Co.,  47  Ind.  407,  17  Am.  Rep.  702; 
Bradley  v.  Ballard,  55  III.  413,  8  Am.  Rep.  656;  Day  v.  Spiral  Springs 
Buggy  Co.,  57  Mich.  146,  58  Am.  Rep.  352;  Wright  v.  Hughes,  119^ 
Ind.  324,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  412;  Simpson  v.  Building  etc.  Assn.,  38- 
Ohio  St.  349;  Easun  v.  Buckeye  Brewing  Co.,  51  Fed.  Rep.  156.  By 
the  same  cases  it  is  affirmed  that  an  ultra  vires  contract  which  i» 
executory  cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  a  recovery  of  damages.  It 
is  a  reasonable  rule  that  one  whose  condition  has  not  been  changed 
or  prejudiced  by  an  ultra  vires  contract  cannot  compel  its  enforce- 
ment: Twiss  V.  Guaranty  Life  Assn.,  87  Iowa,  733,  43  Am.  St.  Rep. 
418.  Courts  will  not  decree  a  conveyance  to  a  corporation  under 
an  ultra  vires  contract,  and  will  hesitate  to  set  aside  such  convey- 
ance when  already  completed:  Case  v.  Kelly,  133  U.  S.  21.  While  a 
contract  ultra  vires  remains  executory  courts  interfere  to  prevent 
its  enforcement,  or,  on  the  application  of  a  shareholder  or  other  au- 
thorized person,  the  court  prevents  its  execution:  Kadish  v.  Gar- 
den City  etc.  Assn.,  151  111.  531,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  256;  Bradley  v. 
Ballard,  55  111.  413,  8  Am.  Rep.  656;  Board  of  Commrs.  v.  Lafayette 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Ind.  85;  Small  v.  Minneapolis  Electro-Matrix  Co., 
45  Minn.  264;  Stewart  v.  Erie  etc.  Trans.  Co.,  17  Minn.  372;  Gifford 
V.  New  Jersey  R.  R.  etc.  Co.,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  174;  Elkins  v.  Camden 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  5;  Dodge  v.  Woolsey,  18  How.  331.  The 
right  of  a  stockholder  to  such  relief  does  not  depend  in  any  respect 
upon  the  profitableness  or  unprofitableness  of  the  contract  in  ques- 
tion: Byrne  v.  Schuyler  Electric  Mfg.  Co.,  65  Conn.  336.  Though 
he  may  be  precluded  from  obtaining  relief  by  his  laches  in  seek- 
ing it:  Boyce  v.  Montauk  Gas  Coal  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  73;  Boston  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  13  R.  L  260;  or  by  his  ac- 
quiescence in  the  contract:  Alexander  v.  Searcy,  81  Ga.  536,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  337;  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Grayson,  88  Ala.  572,  16 
Am.  St.  Rep.  69. 

Executed  Ultra  Vires  Contracts.— Where  an  ultra  vires  contract  has 
been  fully  performed  by  both  parties,  it  is  Justly  held  that  It  is  na 
longer  assailable  by  either  party:  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Keen,  64  Fed.  Rep.  36;  Thomas  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101  U.  S.  71;  Par- 
ish v.  Wheeler,  22  N.  Y.  494;  Long  v.  Georgia  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  91  Ala. 
519,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  931;  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  May's  Land- 
ing etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  530;  Taylor  v.  South  &  North  Ala» 
R.  R.  Co.,  4  Woods,  575;  Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Illinois  Midland  Ry. 
Co..  117  U.  S.  434;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  118  U.  S.  290.  It  Is  only  when  we  come  to  consider  ultra  vires 
contracts  which  have  been  fully  performed  on  one  side  that  we 
find  the  cases  Inextricably  confused.  There  are  sound  and  appar- 
rent  considerations  .which  give  to  such  contracts  a  standing  different 
from  that  cither  of  wholly  executory  or  wholly  executed  contracts. 
They  pre.««cnt  the  spectacle  of  benefits  received  and  enjoyed  by  one 
party,  and  outlays  by  the  other  party,  with  no  consideration  hav- 
ing passed  between  them.  A  right  Is  presented  for  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  foundation  maxim  of  equity,  there  must  be  a  correspond- 


Jan.  1899.J     In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         167 

Ing  remedy.  Few  courts,  If  any  at  all,  attempt  to  deny  this,  but 
in  their  search  for  thQ  desired  remedy  they  have  taken  dlflferent 
paths,  some  of  which  have  led  far  away  from  the  object  sought 
to  be  attained.  Pei-haps,  as  we  have  already  suggested,  a  great 
deal  of  the.  present  confusion  in  this  branch  of  the  law  would  have 
been  avoided  had  courts  agreed,  at  the  beginning,  upon  a  definition 
of  the  term  "ultra  vires"  as  applied  to  the  contracts  of  private  cor- 
porations. The  attempt  of  some  courts  to  recognize  no  distinction 
between  an  ultra  vires  contract  and  one  that  Is  Illegal  because  in 
violation  of  the  letter  of  the  law,  or  because  contrary  to  public 
policy,  was  most  unfortunate.  Beginning  with  the  proposition  that 
an  ultra  vires  contract  Is  unlawful  and  void,  courts  naturally  held 
that  such  a  contract  could  not  be  the  foundation  of  any  rights.  No 
performance  or  ratification,  no  application  of  the  rules  of  estoppel, 
could  give  to  such  a  contract  any  semblance  of  validity.  From 
another  point  of  approach  courts  were  confronted  by  the  rule  of 
law  that  persons  dealing  with  a  corijoratlon  must  take  notice  of  Its 
powers,  and,  therefore,  a  person  having  entered  into  a  contract 
with  a  corporation  which  was  ultra  vires  of  the  corporation,  did  so 
with  notice  of  such  fact,  and  was  guilty  of  a  species  of  contributory 
negligence  which  disabled  him  to  acquire  any  rights  under  such 
contract  But  the  injustice  of  such  a  rule  became  manifest  soon 
enough,  and  exceptions  became  numerous.  Approaching  from  still 
another  direction,  the  problem  presented  itself  In  this  wise:  Limi- 
tations upon  the  powers  of  corporations  are  made  for  the  benefit 
of  the  public.  Ultra  vires  contracts  violate  the  obligations  of  cor- 
porations to  the  sovereign  which  delegates  them  their  powers. 
Hence,  grew  the  doctrine  that  the  question  as  to  whether  an  act 
or  contract  of  a  corporation  Is  ultra  vires  can  only  be  raised  by, 
or  at  the  instance  of,  the  state.  These  matters,  coupled  with  a 
mistaken  idea  of  the  character  of  private  corporations,  and  of  the 
real  nature  of  an  ultra  vires  contract,  served  to  bring  about  the  con- 
fusion to  which  we  have  adverted. 

Estoppel  Arising  from  Receipt  of  Benefits.— We  have  already  said 
that  the  plea  of  ultra  vires,  either  when  made  for  or  against  a 
corporation,  will  not  be  sustained  when  it  will  not  advance  jus- 
tice, but  on  the  contrary,  will  promote -injustice.  When  the  plea 
of  ultra  vires  is  excluded,  it  Is  generally  upon  the  ground  of  es- 
toppel, It  being  well  settled  that  neither  party  to  an  ultra  vires 
contract  will  be  allowed  to  plead  ultra  vires  while  at  the  same  time 
retaining  benefits  received  thereunder:  "Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dow,  19  Fed.  Rep.  388;  American  Nat.  Bank  v.  National  Wall  Paper 
Co.,  77  Fed.  Rep.  85;  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  9 
Cal.  453;  Kennedy  v.  California  Sav.  Bank,  101  Cal.  495,  40  Am.  St. 
Rep.  09;  Macon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Ga.  103; 
People's  Gas  Light  etc.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Gas  Light  etc.  Co.,  20  111. 
App.  473;  Bradley  v.  Ballard,  55  111.  413,  8  Am.  Rep.  656;  Heims 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Flannery,  1.37  111.  309;  Kadlsh  v.  Garden  City  etc. 
Assn..  151  111.  531,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  256;  People  v.  Suburban  R.  R. 
Co..  178  111.  594;  State  Board  v.  Citizens'  Street  Ry.  Co.,  47  Ind. 
407,  17  Am.  Rep.  702;  Wright  v.  Hughes,  U9  Ind.  324,  12  Am.  St 


168  In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

Rep.  412;  White  v.  Marquardt,  105  Iowa,  145;  Sherman  Center 
Town  Co.  V.  Fletcher,  43  Kan.  282,  19  Am.  St.  Kep.  134;  Canal  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  St.  Charles  Street  R.  R,  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  1069;  Nims 
V.  Mt.  Hermon  Boys'  School,  160  Mass.  177,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  467; 
Dewey  v,  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Mich.  351;  Grohmaun  v.  Brown, 
68  Mo.  App.  630;  Williams  v.  Bank  of  Commerce,  71  Miss.  858,  42 
Am.  St.  Rep.  503;  Linkauf  v.  Lombard,  137  N.  Y.  417,  33  Am.  St. 
Rep.  743;  Seymour  v.  Spring  Forest  Cemetery  Assn.,  144  N.  Y.  333; 
Whitney  Arms  Co.  v.  Barlow,  63  N.  Y.  62,  20  Am.  Rep.  504;  Man- 
chester etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Concord  R.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  100,  49  Am. 
St.  Rep.  582;  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co  v.  Mays'  Landing  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
48  N.  J.  L.  530;  Oil  Creek  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Transpor- 
tation Co.,  83  Pa.  St  160;  Williamson  v.  Eastern  etc.  Assn.,  54 
S.  O.  582;  Horton  v.  Long,  2  Wash.  435,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  867; 
Tootle  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  6  Wash.  181;  McElroy  v.  Minnesota  etc. 
Horse  Co.,  96  Wis.  317.  Contra,  Chambers  v.  Falkner,  65  Ala.  448; 
Long  V.  Georgia  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  91  Ala.  519,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  931; 
Miller  v.  Insurance  Co.,  92  Tenn.  167;  Day  v.  Spiral  Springs  Buggy 
Co.,  57  Mich.  146,  58  Am.  Rep.  352. 

The  courts  which  deny  that  such  an  estoppel  arises  under  the 
circumstances  mentioned,  base  their  holdings  upon  various  grounds. 
In  City  Council  v.  Montgomeiy  etc.  Plank  Road  Co.,  31  Ala.  76, 
the  court  adverted  to  the  proposition  just  stated  and  said:  "If  this 
doctrine  be  established,  these  corporations,  no  matter  how  limited 
their  powers,  may  make  themselves  omnipotent.  They  have  only 
to  induce  persons  to  contract  with  them  beyond  the  scope  of  their 
powers,  and  their  very  usurpations  have  the  effect  of  conferring 
powers  on  them  which  the  legislature  have  witheld.  A  proposi- 
tion so  erroneous  can  scarcely  need  argument  to  overturn  it."  See, 
also,  Marion  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dunkin,  54  Ala.  471.  Thus,  in  Miller  v. 
Insurance  Co.,  92  Tenn.  167,  the  court  having  fairly  stated  the 
grounds  upon  which  this  application  of  the  law  of  estoppel  rests, 
sums  up  its  own  views  in  these  sentences:  "It  seems  to  us  that 
the  true  foundation  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  lies  in  the  propo- 
sition that  every  act  of  a  corporation  in  excess  of  its  power  is  an 
act  in  contravention  of  public  policy,  and,  for  that  reason,  to  be 
held  null  and  void.  The  ground  upon  which  corporate  privileges 
are  conferred  is,  that  the  public  interests  may  be  thereby  subsi^rved. 
If  this  be  not  so,  then  all  such  concessions  are  mere  acts  of  legis- 
lative favoritism,  and  contravene  the  foundation  upon  which  free 
government  Is  supposed  to  rest— that  all  are  to  be  protected  in  the 
enjoyment  of  equal  rights  and  privileges It  must  be,  there- 
fore, that  any  act  In  excess  of  these  granted  powers  is  an  act  con- 
trary to  public  policy,  and,  upon  tliat  ground,  Illegal  and  void."  The 
court  approves  the  English  rule  that,  as  to  such  contracts,  there 
can  be  no  ratification  or  estoppel. 

But  the  reasoning  of  these  cases  Is  not  convincing.  The  Inter- 
est which  the  public,  or  the  state,  has  In  the  business  transactions 
of  private  corporations  Is  greatly  exaggerated.  Such  exaggeration 
Is  traceable  to  the  earlier  times  when  corporations  were  mostly 
public  or  quasi  public,  iu  which  the  public  had  more  than  an  imagi- 


Jan.  1899.]     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  169 

nary  Interest.  When  It  Is  shown  that  a  corporation  of  the  present 
day  Is  abusing  Its  corporate  privileges,  'effectual  means  of  conserv- 
ing the  public  Interest  are  found  in  proceedings  brought  by  the 
state  to  forfeit  the  charter  of  the  offending  corporation.  In  the 
meantime,  the  Interest  of  private  individuals  who  have  dealing* 
with  corporations  is  important,  and  it  seems  to  us  that  since  there 
is  an  adequate  and  proper  remedy  available  to  the  state  to  confine 
corporate  transactions  within  proper  limits,  the  law  should  also 
protect  private  parties  from  the  "aggressions"  of  corporations.  The 
legal  evolution  of  private  corporations  has  brought  them  close  to 
the  status  of  private  individuals,  or  associations  of  individuals,  and 
in  their  private  dealings  they  should  be  subject  to  the  same  rules 
of  law  which  prohibit  fraud  and  unfair  dealing  between  man  and 
man.  Otherwise  their  charters,  granted  by  the  state  in  the  fur- 
therance of  the  public  interest,  become  mere  special  dispensations 
authorizing  an  infinite  variety  of  wrong  and  oppression.  The  proper 
rule  is,  that  when  a  transaction  Is  complete,  and  the  party  seeking 
relief  has  performed  on  his  part,  the  plea  of  ultra  vires  Is  inad- 
missable  in  an  action  brought  against  the  corporation  for  not  per- 
forming Its  side  of  the  contract,  in  all  those  instances  where  the 
party  who  has  performed  cannot,  upon  rescission,  be  restored  to 
his  former  status:  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mays  Landing  etc.  Co., 
48  N.  J.  L.  530.  The  same  rule  should  protect  a  corporation  which 
on  its  side  has  in  good  faith  performed  an  ultra  vires  .contract. 
The  doctrine  of  estoppel,  however,  has  no  application  in  favor  of 
one  furnishing  goods  to  a  third  person  on  the  ultra  vires  order  of  a 
corporation.  This  was  held  upon  the  ground  that  there  had  been 
no  receipt  of  benefits  by  the  corporation:  Famous  Shoe  etc.  Co. 
V.  Eagle  Iron  Works,  51  Mo.  App.  66.  Nor  does  estoppel  by  receipt 
of  benefits  apply  to  a  covenant  to  pay  advance  rent  for  future  oc- 
cupation under  an  ultra  vires  lease,  because  the  consideration  for 
the  promise  is  not  the  past  but  the  future  use  of  the  property:  Ore- 
gonian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  23  Fed.  Rep.  232. 

Of  the  Remedy  where  an  Ultra  Vires  Contract  has  been  Partly  Per' 
formed.— Where  an  ultra  vires  contract  of  a  corporation  has  been 
performed,  either  partially  or  entirely,  by  one  of  the  parties  to  it,  it 
is  unanimously  conceded  that  the  party  who  has  so  performed  has 
enforceable  rights.  How  are  his  rights  to  be  enforced?  Do  they 
arise  out  of  the  contract,  or  outside  of  it;  To  these  questions  our 
courts  give  an  Inharmonious  response.  If  all  of  the  courts  recog- 
nized a  distinction  between  a  contract  that  is  illegal  and  one  that 
is  simply  ultra  vires,  their  disagreement  might  be  avoided.  An  il- 
legal contract  cannot  be  sued  upon  nor  enforced,  so  If  It  be  con- 
ceded that  the  distinction  mentioned  does  not  exist,  it  follows  of 
necessity  that  no  performance  or  ratification  of  an  ultra  vires  con- 
tract will  enable  suit  to  be  brought  upon  it.  We  have  already  ex- 
pressed our  opinion  that  the  distinction  does  exist,  and  we  think 
it  supported  both  by  reason  and  authority.  The  term  "ultra  vires" 
does  not  apply  to  illegal  or  immoral  contracts  in  the  proper  sense, 
and  actions  upon  ultra  vires  contracts  which  are  also  Illegal  or  Im- 
moral cannot  be  allowed.    Such  contracts  constitute  a  separate 


170  In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  [Iowa, 

class,  actions  upon  which  are  denied  by  the  rule  of  law  which  de- 
nies a  right  of  action  upon  illegal  and  immoral  contracts  generally. 
And  we  thinli  it  an  eminently  just  and  sensible  rule,  which,  when 
an  ultra  vires  contract,  not  void  because  illegal,  immoral,  or  con- 
trary to  public  policy,  has  been  wholly  or  partially  performed  on 
one  side,  and  the  benefits  of  such  performance  have  been  enjoyedi 
on  the  other  side,  permits  an  action  for  relief  to  be  brought  directly 
oii  the  contract.  This  rule  is  well  supported  by  authority:  Ore- 
gonian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  23  Fed.  Rep.  232;  Gas- 
quet  V.  Crescent  City  Brewing  Co.,  49  Fed.  Rep.  49C;  Campbell  v. 
Argenta  Gold  etc.  Mln.  Co.,  51  Fed.  Rep.  1;  Southern  Life  Ins. 
etc.  Co.  V.  Lanier,  5  Fla.  110,  58  Am.  Dec.  448;  Bank  of  the  State 
V.  Hammond,  1  Rich.  281;  Grand  Gulf  Bank  v.  Archer,  8  Smedes  & 
M.  151;  Madison  Avenue  Baptist  Church  v.  Baptist  Church,  73  N.  Y. 
82;  Bradley  v.  Ballard,  55  111.  413,  8  Am.  Rep.  656;  Peatman  v.  Light 
etc.  Co.,  100  Iowa,  245;  State  Board  v.  Citizens'  Street  Ry.  Co.,  47 
Ind.  407,  17  Am.  Rep.  702;  Wright  v.  Hughes,  119  Ind.  324,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  412;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Derkcs,  103  Ind.  520;  Whitney 
Arms  Co.  v.  Barlow,  63  N.  Y.  62,  20  Am.  Rep.  504;  Kadish  v.  Gar- 
den City  etc.  Assn.,  151  III.  531,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  256;  Bloomingtoa 
Mut.  Ben.  Assn.  v.  Blue,  120  111.  128,  60  Am.  Rep.  558;  People  v. 
Suburban  R,  R.  Co.,  178  111.  594;  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mays 
Landing  etc.  R.  R,  Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  530;  Arkansas  Valley  Town  etc. 
Co.  V.  Lincoln,  56  Kan.  145;  Sherman  Center  Town  Co.  v.  Fletcher, 
46  Kan.  524;  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco.  16  Cal.  255;  Union  Water 
Co.  V.  Murphy's  Flat  etc.  Co.,  22  Cal.  621;  Main  v.  Casserly,  67  Cal. 
127;  North  Hudson  Mut.  etc.  Assn.  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  79  Wis.  31; 
McElroy  v.  Minnesota  Percheron  Horse  Co.,  96  Wis.  317;  Dewey  v. 
Toledo  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  91  Mich.  351;  Chapman  v.  Ironclad  Rheostat 
Co.,  N.  J.,  Nov.  1898;  Holmes  etc.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Holmes  etc.  Metal 
Co.,  127  N.  Y.  252,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  448;  Hamilton  etc.  Hydraulic 
Co.  V.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  29  Ohio  St.  341;  Rutland  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Proctor,  29  Vt.  93;  Johnson  v.  Mason  Lodge  No.  33,  Ky.  Ct. 
of  Appeals,  June,  1899. 

Where  an  ultra  vires  contract  is  also  void  because  illegal,  Immoral, 
or  contrary  to  public  policy,  it  cannot,  though  executed  by  one 
party,  be  enforced  by  him:  McNulta  v.  Corn  Belt  Bank,  164  111.  427, 
56  Am.  St.  Rep.  203.  Performance  by  either  party  does  not  estop 
the  other  to  plead  the  invalidity  of  the  contract  as  a  defense  to  an 
action  thereon:  Visalia  Gas  etc.  Co.  v.  Sims,  104  Cal.  326,  43  Am. 
St.  Rep.  105.  A  contract  that  is  unlawful  as  being  against  the  ex- 
press provisions  or  general  policy  of  any  particular  statute  is  void 
and  will  not  be  enforced  by  the  courts:  Cincinnati  Mut.  Health 
Assur.  Co.  v.  Rosenthal,  55  111.  85,  8  Am,  Rep.  626.  See,  also,  Win- 
scott  V.  Guarantee  Inv.  Co.,  03  Mo.  App.  367;  Grohmann  v.  Brown, 
OS  Mo.  App.  630;  Littlowort  v.  Davis,  50  Miss.  403;  Denver  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  V.  McClellan,  9  Colo.  11,  59  Am.  Rep.  134.  In  the  last  case, 
a  Are  Insurance  company  had,  ultra  vires.  Insured  against  ha:l.  Th© 
Insured  having  performed  his  part  of  the  contract,  and  the  com- 
pany having  received  the  benefit  of  such  performance,  the  latter 
■ought  to  escape  liability  under  the  policy  on  the  ground  that  it  was 


Jan.  1899.]     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  171 

ultra  vires.  In  denying  the  company's  right  to  set  up  such  defense 
the  court  said:  "It  is  argued  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that  the 
courts  ought,  In  all  such  cases,  to  sustain  the  defense  of  ultra  vires, 
here  interposed,  on  the  ground  of  public  policy;  that  the  public 
which  confers  the  corporate  powers  upon  such  companies  has  an 
Interest  in  the  protection  of  innocent  stockholders  and  creditors  of 
such  companies  by  confining  the  exercise  of  corporate  powers  strictly 
within  their  authorized  limits,  and  this  is  given  in  the  books  as  the 
chief  reason  for  the  rule  of  decision  in  the  cases  which  sustain  the> 
defense  of  ultra  vires.  That  the  public  has  such  an  interest  is- 
quite  true,  but  whether  to  afCord  such  protection  the  defense  of  ultra 
vires  is  always  necessary  in  such  cases  is  another  thing.  Stock- 
holders are  but  one  portion  of  the  public;  another  portion,  with  equal 
rlglits  of  protection,  is  that  with  whom  these  multiform  corporations^ 
deal,  in  the  daily  exercise  of  their  assumed  powers.  And  it  seema 
illogical  to  assume  that  the  interests  of  the  public  would  be  best 
subserved  by  a  public  policy  which  will  allow  a  corporation,  any 
more  tlian  an  individual,  to  violate  the  principles  of  common  honesty 
and  claim  exemption  from  the  obligations  of  its  contracts  by  plead- 
ing its  own  wrongdoing.  Such  policy  would  rather  seem  to  offer  a 
premium  for  dishonest  dealing."  A  particular  examination  of  the 
many  cases  cited  above  to  the  proposition  that  an  action  may  be 
brought  directly  upon  an  ultra  vires  contract,  where  it  has  been 
executed  on  one  side,  and  is  not  void  from  illegality,  immorality, 
or  because  in  violation  of  public  policy,  will  Indicate  the  habitual 
assurance  with  which  corporations  and  private  parties  attempt  to 
use  the  plea  of  ultra  vires  to  further  injustice. 

That  no  Action  can  he  Based  upon  an  Ultra  Tires  Contract— Decision* 
of  United  States  Supreme  Cour#.— Opposed  to  the  cases  which,  under 
the  circumstances  above  recited,  allow  an  action  to  be  brought  upon 
an  ultra  vires  contract,  there  is  a  respectable  array  of  authoritiea 
which  deny  that  such  a  contract  may  be  made  the  basis  of  an  action 
under  any  circumstances.  Chief  among  these  latter  are  the  decis- 
ions of  the  United  States  supreme  court,  which  august  tribunal  has 
shown  a  distinct  disinclination  to  fall  In  with  the  modern  tendency 
toward  liberaLzing  the  ancient  doctrine  of  ultra  vires.  According  to 
the  decisions  of  that  court,  a  contract  made  by  a  corporation  ultra 
vires  is  unlawful  and  void,  and  does  not,  by  being  carried  into  exe- 
cution, become  lawful  and  valid  so  that  It  may  be  sued  upon:  Rail- 
way Cos.  V.  Keokuk  Bridge  Co.,  131  U.  S.  371.  The  views  of  the 
supreme  court  are  thus  expressed  by  Mr.  Justice  Gray  In  Central 
Trans.  Co.  v.  Pullman's  Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24:  "A  contract  of  a  cor- 
poration which  Is  ultra  vires  in  the  proper  sense,  that  is  to  say, 
outside  the  object  of  its  creation  as  defined  by  the  law  of  its  organ- 
Ization,  and  therefore  beyond  the  powers  conferred  upon  It  by  the 
legislature,  is  not  voidable  only,  but  wholly  void,  and  of  no  legal 
effect.  The  objection  to  the  contract  is,  not  merely  that  the  cor- 
poration ought  not  to  have  made  It,  but  that  It  could  not  make  It. 
The  contract  cannot  be  ratified  by  either  party,  because  it  could  not 
have    been  authorized    by  either.    No  performance  on  either  Bld» 


172  In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  [Iowa, 

•can  give  the  unlawful  contract  any  validity,  or  be  the  foundation 
of  any  right  of  action  upon  it."  The  doctrine  so  generally  main- 
tained that  an  estoppel  to  set  up  the  defense  of  ultra  vires  arises 
from  the  receipt  of  benefits  under  an  ultra  vires  contract  is  repudi^ 
a  ted  by  the  United  States  supreme  court.  The  decisions  supporting 
the  foregoing  are:  Pearce  v.  Madison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  How.  441; 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290; 
Railway  Cos.  v.  Keokulj  Bridge  Co.,  131  U.  S.  371;  Central  Transp. 
•Co.  V,  Pullman's  Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24;  .Tacksonville  etc.  Ry.  v. 
Hooper,  160  U  S.  514;  California  Bank  v.  Kennedy,  167  U.  S.  362. 
According  to  these  decisions,  a  suit  to  enforce  rights  growing  out  of 
dealings  under  an  ultra  vires  contract  must  be  brought,  not  upon 
the  contract,  but  in  disaffirmance  of  it. 

In  Railway  Co.  v.  McCarthy,  96  U.  S.  258,  Mr.  Justice  Swayne, 
-speaking  for  the  court,  said:  "The  doctrine  of  ultra  vires,  when  in- 
voked for  or  against  a  corporation,  should  not  be  allowed  to  prevail 
■where  it  would  defeat  the  ends  of  justice  or  work  a  legal  wrong." 
This  was  a  direct  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  arising  from 
a  receipt  of  benefits,  and  was  a  step  in  the  right  direction,  but  In 
view  of  the  established  doctrines  of  the  court  for  which  the  learned 
justice  spoke,  it  becomes  meaningless  except  as  Indicating  a  re- 
bellion against  the  rigor  of  those  doctrines.  In  Thomas  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  101  U.  S.  71,  which  was  a  suit  to  enforce  the  unexecuted 
portion  of  an  ultra  vires  lease,  the  court  expressly  approved  the 
rule  that  the  executed  dealings  of  corporations,  though  invalid  for 
Avant  of  corporate  power,  shall  remain  as  the  foundation  of  rights 
acquired  by  the  transaction,  but  held  that  such  rule  did  not  apply 
to  the  case  in  hand.  So  in  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.  341, 
Which,  however,  was  an  action  against  a  municipal  corxwratlon, 
the  court  recognized  the  distinction,  which  we  have  already  urged, 
between  a  case  where  there  is  a  defect  in  the  power  of  a  corporation 
to  make  a  contract  and  one  where  the  contract  is  directly  violative 
of  its  charter  or  statute.  In  the  former  case,  the  contract  Is  said 
to  be,  "at  farthest,  only  ultra  vires;  and  in  such  a  case,  though  spe- 
cific performance  of  an  engagement  to  do  a  thing  transgresslve  of 
Its  corporate  power  may  not  be  enforced,  the  corporation  can  be  held 
liable  on  its  contract.  Having  received  benefits  at  the  expense  of 
the  other  contracting  party.  It  cannot  object  that  It  was  not  empow- 
•ered  to  perform  what  It  promised  In  return,  in  the  mode  in  which 
It  promised  to  perform."  Cited  and  approved  in  Fort  Worth  City 
€o.  V.  Smith  Bridge  Co.,  151  U.  S.  294.  So,  In  Jacksonville  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hooper,  160  U.  S.  514,  the  court  expressly  reaffirms  Its  adher- 
ence to  the  doctrines  established  by  Its  previous  decisions,  but  sa5^ 
that  in  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  "the  court  must 
be  Influenced  somewhat  by  the  special  circumstances  of  the  case," 
and,  In  effect,  should  not  hold  a  contract  of  a  corporation  ultra 
vires  to  the  prejudice  of  innocent  parties,  unless  there  Is  nothing 
■upon  which  to  base  a  contrary  conclusion.  The  outworking  of  such 
a  doctrine  must,  it  seems  to  us,  tend  to  defeat  the  very  end  of  the 
doctrine  of  ultra  vires  as  adhered  to  by  the  court,  for  It  will  result 


Jan.  1899.]    In  bb  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  173 

In  allowing  corporations  to  add  to  their  corporate  powers  by  simply 
exceeding  them  and  drawing  In  Intervening  equities  to  help  them 
out.  In  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S. 
290,  Mr.  Justice  Bradley,  with  whom  Mr.  Justice  Harlan  concurred, 
dissented  from  the  prevailing  opinion  of  the  court,  saying  In  part: 
"The  contract  has  been  performed  on  the  part  of  the  lessor  com- 
pany, and  the  lessee  and  Its  guarantors  have  enjoyed  the  benefit 
of  it.  With  what  face  can  they  now  refuse  to  pay  what  they  have 
agreed  to  pay?  With  what  face  can  they  plead  Incapacity  to  con- 
tract? This  Is  not  a  suit  to  compel  the  specific  performance  of 
the  contract  In  future;  but  to  compel  the  payment  of  money  earned 
by  past  performance  of  the  contract.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  com- 
panies concerned  are  estopped  to  deny  their  liability  to  malse  this 
payment." 

That  no  Action  may  be  Brought  upon  an  Ultra  Vires  Contract— De- 
cisions of  State  Courts.— The  doctrines  of  the  United  States  supreme 
court  as  we  have  stated  them  have  been  adhered  to  in  somo  of  the 
states,  where  it  Is  held  that  a  contract  made  by  a  corporation  which 
Is  unlawful  and  void  because  ultra  vires  does  not,  by  being  carried 
into  execution,  become  lawful  and  valid,  and  that  the  proper  remedy 
of  an  aggrieved  party  is  to  sue,  not  upon  the  contract,  but  in  dis- 
affirmance of  It:  Brunswick  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  United  Gas  etc.  Co., 
85  Me.  532,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  385.  No  performance  on  either  side, 
it  is  maintained,  can  give  validity  to  such  a  contract  or  enable  suit 
to  be  brought  upon  It:  Marble  Co.  v.  Harvey,  92  Tenn.  115,  36  Am. 
St.  Rep.  71.  No  action  lies  upon  the  Invalid  contract;  no  decree 
can  be  made  by  a  court  of  equity  for  its  specific  enforcement,  nor 
a  recovery  had  at  law  for  its  breach:  Greenville  Compress  etc,  Co.  v. 
Planters'  Compress  etc.  Co.,  70  Miss.  6G9,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  681.  The 
Btate  court  decisions  upholding  these  propositions,  in  addition  to 
those  already  cited,  are:  National  Trust  Co.  v.  Miller,  33  N.  J.  Eq. 
155;  Miller  v.  Insurance  Co.,  92  Tenn.  107;  Chambers  v.  Falkner,  65 
Ala.  448;  Marion  Sav.  Bank  v.  Dunkin,  54  Ala.  471;  Sherwood  v. 
Alvis,  83  Ala.  115,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  695;  Davis  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R., 
131  Mass.  258,  41  Am.  Rep.  221;  Northwestern  Union  Packet  Go.  v. 
Shaw,  37  Wis.  655,  19  Am.  Rep.  781. 

Recovery  tor  Benefits  Received.— A  comparison  of  the  opposing  prop- 
ositions to  which  we  have  cited  authorities  reveals  the  fact  that 
the  point  of  disagreement  is  not  vital,  but  rather  technical  In  Its 
nature.  As  we  have  already  stated,  all  the  cases  agree  that  where 
one  in  reliance  upon  an  ultra  vires  contract  entered  into  by  him 
In  good  faith,  makes  expenditures  or  Incurs  prejudice,  the  mere  fact 
that  the  contract  is  ultra  vires  does  not  deprive  him  of  the  right 
to  recover.  The  question  upon  which  the  cases  disagree  is  as  to  the 
manner  In  which  he  may  enforce  such  right.  Those  courts  which 
deny  his  right  to  sue  upon  the  contract,  without  exception  admit 
that  he  may  recover  by  a  suit  In  disaffirmance  of  the  contract. 
In  this  connection  It  is  said  In  Central  Transp.  Co.  v.  Pullman's 
Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24:  "A  contract  ultra  vires  being  unlawful  and 
void,  not  because  it  is  In  Itself  Immoral,  but  because  the  corpora- 
tion, by  the  law  of  its  creation,  is  incapable  of  making  it.  the  courts. 


174  In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

while  refusing  to  maintain  any  action  upon  tlie  unlawful  contract, 
have  always  striven  to  do  justice  between  the  parties,  so  far  as 
could  be  done  consistently  with  adherence  to  law,  by  permitting 
property  or  money  parted  with  on  the  faith  of  the  unlawful  con- 
tract to  be  recovered  back,  or  compensation  to  be  made  for  it. 
In  such  case,  however,  the  action  is  not  maintained  upon  the  unlaw- 
ful contract  nor  according  to  its  terms;  but  on  an  implied  contract 
of  the  defendant  to  return,  or,  failing  to  do  that,  to  make  compen- 
sation for  property  or  money  which  it  has  no  right  to  retain.  To 
maiutain  such  an  action  is  not  to  affirm,  but  to  disaffirm,  the  unlaw- 
ful contract."  To  this  statement  might  be  cited  all  of  the  cases 
just  cited  to  the  proposition  that  under  no  circumstances  may  an 
action  be  maintained  upon  an  ultra  vires  contract. 

The  action  brought  may  be  for  money  had  and  received:  North- 
western Union  Packet  Oo.  v.  Shaw,  37  Wis.  G5«5,  19  Am.  Bep.  781; 
iVIorvilie  v.  American  Tract  Soc,  123  Mass.  129,  25  Am.  Rep.  40. 
Assumpsit  for  work  and  labor  on  account  of  engi-aving  bank  bills 
will  lie  against  a  corporation,  although  such  corporation  is  prohib- 
ited by  law  from  engaging  in  the  business  of  banking:  Underwood 
V.  Newport  Lyceum,  5  B.  Mon.  129,  41  Am.  Dec.  260.  Where  a 
corporation  has  enjoyed  the  benefit  of  the  consideration  for  an  ultra 
vires  contract,  an  implied  assumpsit  rises  against  it:  San  Fran- 
cisco Gas  Co.  V.  San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453.  A  common  remedy  is 
by  suit  for  an  accounting.  If  a  corporation  has  received  the  ben- 
<>fit  of  performance  by  the  other  party  to  an  ultra  vires  contract,  it 
will  be  required  in  equity  to  account  to  such  other  party  for  what 
is  due  him  under  the  contract:  Boyd  v.  American  Carbon  Black  Co., 
182  Pa.  St.  206;  Pauly  v.  Pauly.  107  Cal.  8,  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  98. 
Where  a  corporation  has  received  a  large  consideration  for  a  con- 
tract ultra  vires  for  the  sale  of  a  telegraph  franchise,  it  will  be 
restrained  from  resuming  possession  of  said  franchise  and  the  prop- 
erty connected  therewith,  until  an  accounting  and  settlement  can 
be  had  between  the  parties:  American  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Union  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.,  1  McCrary,  188.  And  a  court  of  equity.  In  setting  aside 
an  ultra  vires  construction  contract  at  the  instance  of  railroad  com- 
pany, may  compel  the  company  to  account  to  the  other  party  for 
benefits  received  from  a  partial  performance:  New  Castle  Northern 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  23  Fed.  Rep.  214.  If  one  railroad  company 
has  used  the  road,  rolling  stock,  and  equipments  of  another  under  a 
contract,  it  Is  estopped  to  set  up  that  such  contract  is  ultra  vires 
when  sued  for  an  accounting  and  return  of  the  property:  Manchester 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Concord  R.  R.,  66  N.  H.  100,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  582. 
See,  also,  Manville  v.  Belden  Min.  Co.,  17  Fed.  Rep.  425;  Miller  v. 
Insumnce  Co.,  02  Tenn.  1G7.  And,  generally,  an  action  in  the  nature 
of  quantum  meruit  Is  an  effective  remedy,  where  one  has  expenrled 
labor  or  parted  with  property  In  bona  fide  reliance  upon  an  ultra 
vires  contract  of  a  corporation:  Greenville  Compress  etc.  Co.  v. 
Planters'  Compress  etc.  Co.,  70  Miss.  609.  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  681;  Day 
V.  Spiral  Springs  Buggy  Co..  57  Mich.  146,  58  Am.  Rep.  352;  Davis 
V.  Old  Colony  R.  R.,  131  Mass.  25S.  41  Am.  Rop.  221;  Farmers^ 
Loan  etc.  Co.  v.  St.  Joseph  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  McCrary,  247;  Roberts  v. 


Jan.  1899.]     In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  175 

Demlng  Woodworking  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  432;  Brunswick  Gas  Light  Co. 
V.  United  Gas  etc.  Co.,  85  Me.  532,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  385;  RaUway 
Cos.  V.  Keokuk  Bridge  Co.,  131  U.  S.  371;  Central  Transp.  Co.  v.  Pull- 
man's Car  Co.,  139  U.  S.  24.  Compare  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  y. 
St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290, 

Before  a  corporation  will  be  allowed  to  repudiate  its  ultra  vires 
contract  It  will  be  compelled  to  restore  and  repay  the  consideration 
received:  Williams  v.  Bank  of  Commerce,  71  Miss.  858,  42  Am.  St. 
Rep.  503.  Equity  will  not,  at  the  Instance  of  a  corporation,  rescind 
an  agreement  as  ultra  vires  after  the  parties  have  acquiesced  there- 
in for  more  than  fifteen  years,  and  large  expenditures  have  beea 
incurred  and  improvements  made  upon  the  faith  thereof,  and  the 
corporation  has  received  commensurate  benefits  and  been  relieved 
of  burdensome  obligations:  Odd  Fellows'  Assn.  v.  Hegele,  24  Or.  IG. 
And,  in  general,  equity  will  Insist  upon  a  return  of  the  consideration 
received  under  an  ultra  vires  contract  before  decreeing  the  rescis- 
sion thereof:  American  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.,  1  McCrary, 
188;  Madison  Avenue  Baptist  Church  v.  Oliver  Street  Baptist 
Church,  73  N.  Y.  82;  Brown  v.  Atchison,  39  Kan.  37,  7  Am.  St.  Rep. 
515;  Memphis  etc.  K  R.  Co.  v.  Dow,  19  Fed.  Rep.  389.  Though 
money  is  loaned  under  an  ultra  vires  contract,  the  ultra  vires  char- 
acter of  the  contract  will  not  defeat  a  recovery  of  the  money  so 
loaned:  Gold  Mln.  Co.  v.  National  Bank,  96  U.  S.  640;  West  v.  Mad- 
ison County  etc.  Board,  82  111.  205;  Kadish  v.  Garden  City  etc.  Assn., 
151  111.  531,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  250;  Germantown  Farmers'  etc.  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Dhein.  43  Wis.  420,  28  Am.  Rep.  549;  Pratt  v.  Short,  79  N.  Y. 
437,  35  Am.  Rep.  531;  Bowditch  v.  New  England  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co., 
141  Mass.  292,  55  Am.  Rep.  474;  Poock  v.  Lafayette  Building  Assn., 
71  Ind.  357;  Pancoast  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  79  Ind.  172;  Steam  Nav. 
Co.  V.  Weed,  17  Barb.  379.  Contra,  Grand  Lodge  v.  Waddill,  38 
Ala.  313.  Whether  or  not  securities  given  for  money  loaned  ultra 
vires  are  valid  and  enforceable  is  a  doubtful  question:  North  River 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Lawrence,  3  Wend.  482;  Germantown  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Dhein,  43  Wis.  420,  28  Am.  Rep.  549;  Matthews  v.  Sklnker,  62  Mo. 
329,  21  Am.  Rep.  425;  Macon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.. 
€3  Ga.  103;  Life  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mechanic  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  7  Wend. 
31;  Pratt  v.  Short,  79  N.  Y.  437,  35  Am.  Rep.  531.  Where  a  cor- 
poration is  expressly  forbidden  by  its  charter  to  loan  money  upon 
other  than  specified  securities.  It  cannot  recover  upon  securities  of 
another  character,  but  where  no  such  prohibition  exists,  and  a  cor- 
poration is  not  expressly  forbidden  by  its  charter  to  loan  money,  no 
reason  is  apparent  that  it  should  not  be  allowed  to  enforce  securities 
given  for  the  loan.  Where  a  corporation  gives  In  security  for  a  loan 
its  bonds  Issued  In  violation  of  law,  neither  the  corporation  nor  a 
stockholder  thereof,  who  as  president  participated  in  the  unlawful 
issue  of  the  bonds,  can  maintain  a  suit  In  equity  for  a  surrender 
or  cancellation  of  the  bonds.  The  doctrine  of  in  pari  delicto  apj)lies: 
Hinckley  v.  Pflster,  83  Wis.- 64.  Canal  boats  bought  by  a  railroad 
ultra  vires  become  its  property:  Parish  v.  Wheeler,  22  N.  Y.  494; 
and    machinery  acquired  by  a  corporation  ultra  vires  cannot    ba 


176  In  ee  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

seized  by  creditors  of  the  vendor  to  pay  his  debts:  Edwards  v.  Fair- 
banks, 27  La.  Ann.  449. 

A  lease  by  one  railroad  corporation  to  another  of  its  property 
and  franchises  for  a  long  period  of  years,  which  is  ultra  vires  of  one 
or  both  corporations,  will  not  be  set  aside  in  equity  at  the  suit  of  the 
lessor,  when  the  lessee  has  been  in  possession,  paying  the  stipulated 
rent,  for  seventeen  years,  and  has  taken  no  steps  to  repudiate  or  re- 
scind the  contract:  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Terre  Haute  etc.  B.  R. 
Co.,  145  U.  S.  393.  Though  a  lessee  may  throw  up  an  unexpired 
ultra  vires  lease  and  refuse  to  pay  rent  for  the  remainder  of  the 
term,  and  under  ultra  vires  contracts  generally  one  may  refuse  to 
complete  his  performance  begun  upon:  Malloa-y  v.  Hanaur  Oil 
Works.  86  Tenn.  598;  Bowman  Dairy  Co.  v.  Mooney,  41  Mo.  App. 
665;  Oregonian  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.,  23  Fed.  Rep.  232; 
McNulta  V.  Corn  Belt  Bank,  164  111.  427,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  203;  Penn- 
eylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  290.  Compare 
Heims  Brewing  Co.  v.  Flannery,  137  111.  309.  Where  one  has 
furnished  and  received  payment  for  part  of  the  goods  agreed  to  be 
furnished  under  an  ultra  vires  contract  with  a  corporation,  he  may 
refuse  to  furnish  any  more  thereunder:  Day  v.  Spiral  Springs  Buggy 
Co.,  57  Mich.  146,  58  Am.  Rep.  352. 

Duty  of  Persons  Dealing  tcith  Corporations  to  Know  the  Scope  of 
Their  Powers.— It  is  a  much  reiterated  rule  in  the  law  of  private 
corporations  that  persons  dealing  with  them  are  deemed  to  have 
notice  of  the  scope  of  their  powers  as  conferred  in  the  instruments 
of  their  creation  and  as  had  under  the  law  generally.  The  rapid 
development  of  the  coiT>oration  idea,  the  multiplicatioai  In  myriad 
form  and  variety  of  corporations,  and  the  extreme  complexity  of  the 
laws  governing  them,  must  make  apparent  to  the  most  superficial 
student  that  a  strict  adherence  to  this  rule  of  the  law  of  notice 
must  entail  endless  Injustice,  not  to  say,  involve  Infinite  absurdity. 
This  rule  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires  as  it 
was  originally  conceived.  It  is  maintained  by  many  cases  that  one 
who  has  Incurred  expenses  or  parted  with  property  under  an  ultra 
Viires  contract  made  by  him  with  a  corporation,  has  no  claim  to 
enforce  it  because  he  Is  held  to  have  had  constructive  notice  of 
the  capacity  of  the  corporation,  so  that  he  parted  with  his  property 
with  knowledge  that  the  contract  was  Illegal  and  void:  Chambers 
V.  Falkner,  65  Ala.  448;  Sherwood  v.  Alvis,  83  Ala.  115,  3  Am.  St. 
Rep.  695;  Hood  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R,  Co.,  22  Conn.  1.  He  cannot 
plead  Ignorance  In  avoidance  of  the  defense  of  ultra  vires:  Franklin 
Co.  V.  Lewiston  lust.,  68  Me.  43,  28  Am.  Rep.  9;  Franco-Texan  Land 
Co.  V.  McCormick,  85  Tex.  416,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  815;  Durkee  v. 
People,  155  III.  354,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  340;  Jemlson  v.  Citizens'  Sav. 
Bank,  122  N.  Y.  135.  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  482;  Elevator  Co.  v.  Memphis 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  85  Tenn.  703,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  798,  See,  also.  Railway 
Cob.  v.  Keokuk  Bridge  Co.,  131  U.  S.  371;  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Terre  Haute  R.  R.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  393.  These  rigid  rules  must, 
however,  be  qualified,  and  the  proper  qualification  is  suggested  la 
Blssell  v  Railroad  Cos.,  22  N.  Y.  258,  by  Seldon,  J.,  thus:  "Where 
the  want  of  power  Is  apparent  upon  comparing  the  act  done  with 


Jan.  1899.]     In  be  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         177 

the  terms  of  the  charter,  the  party  dealing  with  the  cofporation  is 
presumed  to  have  knowledge  of  the  defect,  and  the  defense  of  ultra 
vires  is  available  against  him.  But  such  a  defense  would  not  be 
permitted  to  prevail  against  a  party  who  cannot  be  presumed  to  have 
had  any  linowledge  of  the  want  of  authority  to  make  the  contract. 
Hence,  if  the  question  of  power  depends  not  merely  upon  the  law 
under  which  the  corporation  acts,  but  upon  the  existence  of  certain 
extrinsic  facts,  resting  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of  the  cor- 
porate officers,  then  the  corporation  would,  I  apprehend,  be  es- 
topped to  deny  that  which,  by  assuming  to  make  the  contract,  it 
bad  virtually  affirmed."  Quoted  and  approved  in  Monument  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Globe  Works,  101  Mass.  57,  3  Am.  Rep.  322.  See,  to  same 
effect.  Miller  v.  Insurance  Co.,  92  Tenn.  1G7;  Ossipee  Hosiery  etc. 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  Canney,  54  N.  H.  295.  Although  it  would  be  ultra  vires 
of  a  corporation  to  build  and  operate  a  railroad,  it  may  neverthe- 
less be  liable  for  "railroad  supplies"  purchased  and  used  by  it 
where  the  goods  purchased  were  not  of  such  character  as  to  charge 
the  seller  with  notice  that  the  corporation  could  not  use  them  in  its 
legitimate  business,  and  where  the  seller  had  no  notice  that  the 
goods  were  not  to  be  used  In  such  business:  Luttrell  v.  Martin,  112 
N.  C.  593. 

It  Is  held,  too,  that  one  who  sells  stock  to  a  corporation,  although 
he  knows  that  the  corporation  is  purchasing  to  sell  again  as  a  specu- 
lation, contrary  to  a  penal  provision  In  the  charter,  may  nevertheless 
recover,  on  an  implied  assumpsit,  the  value  of  the  stocks;  otherwise 
when  the  contract  provides  for  the  Illegal  use  of  the  thing  sold  or 
when  the  seller  does  any  act  to  promote  it.  Tracy  v.  Talmage,  14 
N.  Y.  162,  67  Am.  Dec.  132.  Nor  can  a  corporation  avoid  the  payment 
of  borrowed  money  on  the  ground  that,  although  It  had  power  to 
borrow  money,  it  expended  the  money  borrowed  in  prosecuting  a 
business  which  it  was  not  authorized  to  prosecute,  even  though  the 
lender  of  the  money  knew  that  the  corporation  was  transacting  a 
business  beyond  its  chartered  powers,  and  that  his  money  was  to  be 
used  in  such  business,  provided  the  business  itself  was  free  from 
any  intrinsic  immorality  or  Illegality:  Bradley  v.  Ballard,  55  111.  413, 
8  Am.  Rep.  656.  See  Parish  v.  Wheeler,  22  N.  Y.  494;  Wright  v. 
Hughes.  119  Ind.  324,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  412;  Thompson  v.  Lambert,  44 
Iowa,  239.  But  the  same  cases  affirm  that  the  rule  Is  otherwise 
where  the  contract  provides  for  the  illegal  use  of  the  money  or  the 
lender  does  anything  to  promote  such  use.  The  doctrine  of  ultra 
vires  will  not  enable  a  corporation  to  resist  the  payment  of  a  debt 
because  io  excess  of  its  statutory  limit,  where  the  creditor  had 
no  notice  of  such  fact:  Ossipee  Hosiery  etc.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Canney.  54 
N.  H.  295;  Connecticut  River  Sav.  Bank  v.  Fiske,  60  N.  H.  363; 
Humphrey  v.  Patrons'  Mercantile  Assn.,  50  Iowa,  607;  Auerbach 
V.  La  Sueur  Mill  Co.,  28  Minn.  291.  41  Am.  Rep.  285.  'The  rule  re- 
quiring persons  dealing  with  corporations  to  take  notice,  at  their 
peril,  of  the  scope  of  the  corporate  powers,  yields  to  the  general 
rule  protecting  bona  fide  holders  of  negotiable  paper  when  the 
transaction  In  question  Involves  the  rights  of  such  holders  without 
AM.  ST.  RiP.,  \ou  LXX.—U 


178  In  re  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [Iowa, 

notice  of  corporate  negotiable  paper  Issued  ultra  vires:  Lehigh  Val- 
ley Coal  Co.  V.  West  Depere  Agricultural  Works,  63  Wis.  45;  To  J 
V.  Kentucky  Union  Land  Co.,  57  Fed.  Rep.  47;  Auerbach  v.  La 
Sueur  MiU  Co.,  28  Minn.  291,  41  Am.  Rep.  285;  Bailey  v.  Methodist 
etc.  Church,  71  Me.  472;  National  Bank  v.  Young,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  531; 
Mechanics'  Bkg.  Assn.  v.  Saugerties  White  Lead  Co.,  35  N.  Y. 
504;  Credit  Co.  v.  Howe  Machine  Co.,  54  Conn.  357,  1  Am.  St.  Rep. 
123;  Monument  Nat.  Bank  v.  Globe  Works,  101  Mass.  57,  3  Am. 
Rep.  322.  Though  the  rule  applies  here  as  elsewhere  that  where  a 
corporation  is  not  authorized  to  give  its  notes  for  any  purpose  per- 
sons taking  such  notes  are  deemed  to  have  notice  of  the  defect  of 
power  and  cannot  recover  thereon:  Bailey  v.  Methodist  etc.  Church, 
71  Me.  472. 

Of  the  Doctrine  that  only  the  State  may  Raise  the  Question  of  Ul- 
tra Tires.— In  the  meantime,  the  disintegration  of  the  ancient  doc- 
trine of  ultra  vires  has  proceeded  from  another  direction.  The 
most  Important  of  the  propositions  upon  which  the  doctrine  is  based 
is  that  the  public  which  confers  corporate  powers  has  the  right  to 
insist  that  these  powers  be  not  exceeded.  In  case  of  usui-pation 
or  abuse  of  its  powers  by  a  corporation,  this  public  right  is  efifect- 
Ively  enforceable  by  proceedings  to  forfeit  the  charter  or  franchise 
of  the  corporation.  It  Is  not  ordinarily  proper  to  raise  questions 
of  public  right  In  private  actions;  In  other  words,  where  there  is 
a  transgression  of  a  public  right,  the  initiation  of  proceedings  to 
punish  such  transgression  is  ordinarily  made  by  the  state.  So  there 
has  been  growing  up  a  doctrine,  as  yet  In  a  rather  nebulous  state, 
and  the  outcome  of  which  cannot  be  clearly  seen,  that  the  ques- 
tion of  ultra  vires,  as  applied  to  the  transactions  of  corporations, 
can  only  be  raised  by,  or  at  the  instance  of,  the  state:  Barrow  v. 
Nashville  etc.  Turnpike  Co.,  9  Hump.  304;  Helskell  v.  Chickasaw 
Lodge,  87  Tenn.  668;  Union  Water  Co.  v.  Murphy's  Flat  Fluming 
Co.,  22  Cal.  621;  Grand  Gulf  Bank  v.  Archer,  8  Smedes.  &  M.  151; 
Oil  Creek  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pennsylvania  Transp.  Co.,  83  Pa.  St.  160; 
National  Bank  v.  Matthews,  98  U.  S.  621;  Jones  v.  Guaranty  etc. 
Co.,  101  U.  S.  622;  Southern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Orton,  6  Saw.  157; 
State  V.  Minnesota  Thresher  etc.  Co.,  40  Minn.  213;  St.  Louis  Drug 
Co.  V.  Robinson,  81  Mo.  19;  Prescott  Nat.  Bank  v.  Butler,  157  Mass. 
548;  Grant  v.  Henry  Clay  Coal  Co.,  80  Pa.  St.  208;  Southern  Life 
Ins.  etc.  Co.  v.  Lanier,  5  Fla.  110,  58  Am.  Dec.  448;  Hovelman  v. 
Kansas  City  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Mo.  632.  The  rule,  however,  can- 
not be  stated  as  broadly  as  this.  It  is  simply  a  step  beyond  the 
well-settcd  rule  that  the  legal  existence  of  a  de  facto  corporation 
cannot  be  questioned  in  a  collateral  proceeding:  Bushnell  v.  Con- 
solidated Ice  Co.,  138  111.  67;  Johnson  v.  Mason  Lodge  No.  33,  Ky.  Ct. 
of  Appeal,  Jan.  1899.  And  exceptions  to  It  are  recognized,  as  where 
the  charter  of  the  corporation  in  question  specifies  and  limits  the 
business  In  which  It  may  engage,  and  expressly,  or  by  fair  implica- 
tion. Invalidates  transactions  outside  of  its  legitimate  corporate  busi- 
ness: St.  Louis  Drug  Co.  v.  Robinson,  81  Mo.  19.  It  is  also  limited  In 
State  v.  Minnesota  Thresher  etc.  Co.,  40  Minn.  213,  thus:  "But  in  case 
of  excess  of  powers,  it  is  only  where  some  public  mischief  is  done 


Jan.  1899.]    In  rb  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         179 

■or  threatened  that  the  state,  by  the  attorney-general,  should  Inter- 
fere. If,  as  between  the  company  and  its  stockholders,  there  Is  a 
wrongful  application  of  the  capital,  or  an  illegal  incurring  of  lia- 
bilities, it  is  for  the  stockholders  to  complain.  If  the  corporation 
Is  entering  into  contracts  ultra  vires,  to  the  prejudice  of  persons 
•outside  the  corporation,  such  as  creditors,  it  is  for  such  persons  to 
take  steps  to  protect  their  interests." 

That  the  question  of  ultra  vires  may  be  raised  otherwise  than  by 
the  state  cannot  be  doubted,  under  the  law  as  it  now  stands.  It 
is  said:  "The  objection  may  come  from  the  state,  from  a  dissent- 
ing stockholder,  or  from  the  party  with  whom  the  contract  is  made. 
And  the  courts  often  give  a  different  meaning  to  the  term  accord- 
ing to  the  source  whence  the  objection  comes.  An  act  or  a  con- 
tract may  be  ultra  vires  if  the  state  objects  when  it  would  not  be 
80  held  if  the  objection  came  from  a  stockholder  or  from  a  con- 
tracting party:  Byrne  v.  Schuyler  Electric  Mfg.  Co.,  65  Conn.  336. 
When  the  action  of  a  corporation  is  challenged  by  the  sovereign 
which  gave  it  existence,  or  by  whose  favor  it  is  permitted  to  pur- 
sue its  business.  It  may  be  required  to  show  a  clear  warrant  for 
the  acts  called  in  question;  while  in  suits  between  Individuals  or 
corporations,  or  between  corporate  bodies  where  private  rights  only 
are  involved,  the  rule  Is  not  Inflexible,  and  yields  to  considera- 
tions of  right  and  justice:  Central  Ohio  Nat.  Gas.  etc.  Co.  v.  Capi- 
tal City  Dairy  Co.,  60  Ohio  St.  96;  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  47  Fed.  Rep.  15;  Tod  v.  Kentucky  Union  Land  Co., 
57  Fed.  Rep.  47.  When  tffe  state  challenges  the  legality  of  the 
transaction,  the  paramount  and  only  question  is,  whether  it  has  be- 
stowed upon  the  company  the  requisite  authority  to  engage  in  it. 
When  the  question  arises  between  the  company  and  the  other  party 
to  the  contract  other  legal  principles  apply  in  determining  whether 
the  contract  shall  be  observed:  Camden  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  May's 
Landing  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  48  N.  J.  L.  530.  See  Lucas  v.  White  Lino 
Transfer  Co.,  70  Iowa,  541,  59  Am.  Rep.  449;  Llttlewort  v.  Davis,  50 
Miss.  403.  One  whose  rights  are  not  Invaded  cannot  complain  that 
a  corporation  is  acting  ultra  vires.  In  such  case  only  the  state  or 
stockholders  can  complain:  Belcher  Sugar  Refining  Co.  v.  St.  Louis 
■Grain  Elevator  Co.,  101  Mo.  192;  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ellerman,  105  U.  S.  166;  Jersey  City  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Consumers' 
Cas.  Co.,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  427;  Rafferty  v.  Central  Traction  Co.,  147  Pa. 
St.  579,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  763;  Smith  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  45  Neb.  444; 
Erhman  v.  Union  Cent.  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  35  Ohio  St.  324.  The  right 
of  one  or  more  stockholders  in  a  corporation  to  maintain  a  suit  to 
restrain  the  corporation  from  entering  Into  or  performing  ultra 
vires  contracts.  Is  recognized  In  many  other  decisions:  Davis  v.  Old 
Colony  R.  R.,  131  Mass.  258,  41  Am.  Rep.  221;  Bliss  v.  Anderson, 
31  Ala.  612,  70  Am.  Dec.  511;  Pratt  v.  Pratt,  33  Conn.  446;  Board 
of  Commrs.  v.  Lafayette  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  Ind.  85;  Smith  v.  Bangs, 
15  111.  400;  Teachout  v.  Des  Moines  etc.  St.  Ry.  Co.,  75  Iowa,  722; 
Lauman  v.  Lebanon  Valley  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  42,  72  Am.  Dec. 
€85.     These  cases  pertain  more  closely  to  the  law  of  agency,  for 


180  In  ee  Assignment  Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.         [lowa^ 

they  are  usually  Instituted  to  restrain  the  officers  of  a  corporation 
from  acting  or  contracting  beyond  the  scope  of  their  agency.  S(x 
stockholders  cannot  complain  where  they  all  consent  to  the  con- 
struction and  maintenance  of  a  new  enterprise  authorized  by  & 
supplemental  charter,  but  not  within  the  grant  of  the  original  char- 
ter: Zabriskie  v.  Hackensack  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  178,  90 
Am.  Dec.  617.  A  stockholder  cannot  question  the  vires  of  a  con- 
tract made  by  a  corporation  while  the  corporation  retains  the  bene- 
fits of  the  contract:  Buford  v.  Keokuk  etc.  Packet  Co.,  69  Mo.  611. 
See  Alexander  v.  Searcy,  81  Ga,  536,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  337.  When  & 
corporation  enters  into  a  contract  which  under  no  circumstances 
It  has  power  to  make,  the  contract  is  held  to  be  void  as  to  creditors, 
although  assented  to  by  all  of  its  stockholders:  Washington  Mill 
Co.  V.  Sprague  Lumber  Co.,  19  Wash.  165.  But  where  the  indebt- 
edness that  a  corporation  is  authorized  by  its  charter  to  contract 
is  limited,  the  objection  that  a  mortgage  for  a  sum  in  excess  of  this 
amount  is  ultra  vires  cannot  be  successfully  urged  by  an  unse- 
cured creditor,  who  became  such  after  the  mortgage  was  executed, 
and  whose  claim  is  open  to  the  same  objection:  Allis  v.  Jones,  45 
Fed.  Rep.  149. 

Conclusion.— Kttev  a  study  of  the  cases  upon  the  subject  of  this 
note,  the  impression  is  forced  upon  us  that  the  doctrine  of  ultra 
vires,  as  applied  to  the  contracts  of  private  corporations,  has  al- 
most lost  its  meaning.  The  undermining  of  the  foundation  upoD 
which  it  has  rested  from  its  inception  has  proceeded  simultaneously 
from  different  directions  until  the  doctrine  itself  seems  almost  ready 
to  fall  of  its  own  weight.  The  original  rule,  that  an  ultra  vires 
contract  was  illegal  and  void,  could  give  rise  to  no  rights,  nor  be 
validated  by  any  performance  or  application  of  the  law  of  estop- 
pel, has  practically  been  erased  from  the  law,  for  those  courts 
which  do  not  contradict  it  directly  do  so  indirectly  by  their  man- 
ner of  applying  it.  An  appeal  to  the  public  interest  that  pri- 
vate corporations  should  be  restricted  in  the  making  of  contracts 
to  the  scope  of  their  granted  powers  is  growing  more  and  more 
Ineffectual  where  the  rights  of  persons  innocently  entering  into  ul- 
tra vires  contracts  with  such  corporations  intervene.  Mr.  Seymour 
D.  Thompson  says:  "My  own  view  is,  that  the  doctrine  of  ultra 
vires  has  no  proper  place  In  the  law  of  private  corporatilons  ex- 
cept in  respect  of  contracts  which  are  bad  in  themselves,  th& 
making  of  which  Is  prohibited  by  considerations  of  public  mor- 
ality, of  justice,  or  of  a  sound  public  policy,  and  which,  there- 
fore, stand  upon  such  a  footing  that  neither  party  can  be  re- 
garded as  Innocent  or  blameless  In  entering  into  them":  Am.  IjAW 
Rev.  28,  397,  398.  That  the  trend  of  the  cases  Is  toward  the  adop- 
tion of  this  advanced  view  admits  of  little  doubt,  and  It  may  be 
suggested  that  contracts  of  corporations  "which  are  bad  In  them- 
selves" are  generally  sufficiently  provided  for  In  our  law  without 
any  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  ultra  vires. 


Jan.  1899.]     Hasbrouck  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  181 


Hasbrouok  V.  Westeen  Union  Telegraph  Co. 

[107  Iowa,  160.] 

AGENCY  —  AUTHORITY  OP  AGENT  —  ERRONEOUSLY 
TRANSMITTED  TELEGRAM.— Where  an  agent,  sent  by  a  bank- 
ing firm  to  settle  and  adjust  a  claim  against  a  third  person,  tele- 
graphs  his  principal:  "Has  stock  twelve  hundred  dollars.  Mort- 
gage on  for  fifteen  hundred  dollars.  Am  offered  note,  with  Hark- 
uess  as  surety,  for  tweniy-five  hundred  dollars,  due  in  eighteen 
mouths,  in  full  settlement,"  and  the  telegram  is  erroneously  trans- 
mitted to  read  thus:  "Have  secured  twelve  hundred  dollars  mort- 
gage on  fifteen  hundred  dollars  and  offered  note,  with  Harkness  as 
surety,  for  twenty-four  hundred  dollars,"  et  cetera,  to  which  the 
principal  answers:  "If  twelve  hundred  mortgage  is  on  fifteen  hun- 
dred dollars  property,  accept,"  the  agent  is  justified  in  understand- 
ing that  he  is  to  accept  the  offer  of  settlement  under  the  facts  as 
he  had  stated  them,  unless  the  conditions  are  more  favorable  to 
plaintiff  than  they  would  be  with  a  twelve  hundred  mortgage  on 
a  fifteen  hundred  dollar  stock,  and  a  settlement  based  upon  and 
within  such  an  understanding  is  binding  upon  the  principal. 

AGENCY— NEGLIGENCE  OP  rillNCIPAL-ERRONEOUS 
TELEGRAM.— Where  a  principal,  being  in  doubt  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  a  telegram  from  his  agent  relating  to  the  matter  of  the  lat- 
ter's  agency,  requires  the  telegraph  agent  to  have  the  message  re- 
peated and  the  latter  reports  that  the  message  as  received  is  cor- 
rect, the  principal  is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law,  in  acting  upon  the  message  as  he  understands  it. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— DAMAGES  FOR  ERRONE- 
OUSLY TRANS]\riTTED  MESSAGE— DUTY  OF  PLAINTIFF  TO 
RESCIND  CONTRACT  ENTERED  INTO  IN  RELIANCE  UPON.— 
Where  a  principal  has  been  influenced  through  the  erroneous 
transmission  of  a  telegram  from  his  agent  to  authorize  the  latter 
to  enter  into  a  contract  of  settlement  with  the  former's  creditor 
which  he  would  not  have  authorized  except  for  such  erroneous 
transmission,  he  is  not  bound  to  take  steps  to  rescind  the  contract 
before  bringing  suit  against  the  telegraph  company  for  damages 
suffered. 

INSTRUCTIONS— ERRONEOUS  SUBMISSION  TO  JURY 
OF  MATTER  OF  LAW.— It  is  harmless  error  for  the  court  to  sub- 
mit to  the  jury  the  question  of  interpretation  of  a  telegram  con- 
ferring certain  authority  upon  an  agent,  when,  from  the  verdict 
rendered,  it  is  apparent  that  the  interpretation  adopted  by  the  jury 
gave  to  the  telegram  the  meaning  which,  as  a  matter  of  law,  was 
proper. 

INSTRUCTIONS  -  IMMATERIAL  ERROR.— Erroneous  in- 
structions as  to  the  interpretation  to  be  given  a  doubtful  telegram, 
when  without  prejudice,  are  not  ground  for  reversal. 

TELE(;RAPH  COMPANIES— ACTION  FOR  ERRONEOUS 
TRANSMISSION  OF.  MESSAGE  — EVIDENCE.  —  In  an  action 
against  a  telegraph  company  for  damages  resulting  from  a  con- 
tract entered  into  in  reliance  upon  an  erroneously  transmitted  mes- 
sage, the  plaintiff  is  properly  allowed  to  testify  that  the  contract 
in  question  would  not  have  been  entered  into  except  for  such  error 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant. 

APPEAIv— ERROR  FIRST  OB.TECTED  TO  ON  APPEAL.— 
It  cannot  be  first  objected  to  on  appeal  that  evidence,  properly 
admissible  for  a  certain  purpose,  was  admitted  without  instruc- 


182  Hasbrouck  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.         [Iowa, 

tions  limiting   its  application  to   such   purpose,   where  no   request 
was  made  for  such  instructions. 

Action  for  damages  resulting  to  plaintiff  from  a  contract  en- 
tered into  in  reliance  upon  an  erroneously  transmitted  telegram 
sent  from  plaintiff's  agent  to  him.  The  agent  was  sent  by  th& 
plaintiff,  a  banking  firm,  to  adjust  and  settle  a  claim  held  by 
the  plaintiff  against  one  Henderson  upon  a  note  for  three  thou- 
sand six  hundred  dollars.  Having  looked  into  the  matter  th& 
agent  telegraphed  his  principal:  "Has  stock  twelve  hundred  dol- 
lars. Mortgage  on  for  fifteen  hundred  dollars.  Am  offered  note^ 
with  Harkness  as  surety,  for  twenty-fire  hundred  dollars,  due 
in  eighteen  months,  in  full  settlement.  Shall  I  accept?  An- 
swer quick,  care  Leggett  House.  E.  C.  Poston."  The  messag'e 
as  delivered  to  plaintiff  was  as  follows:  "Have  secured  twehe 
hundred  dollar  mortgage  on  fifteen  hundred  dollars  and  offered 
note,  with  Harkness  as  surety,  for  twenty-four  hundred  dollars," 
et  cetera.  To  the  message  received  the  plaintiff  telegraphed  in 
reply :  "If  twelve  hundred  dollar  mortgagre  is  on  fifteen  hundred 
dollar  property,  accept."  On  receipt  of  this  telegram  Poston,  the 
agent,  settled  with  Henderson,  taking  his  note  for  twenty-five 
hundred  dollars,  secured  as  promised.  The  loss  complained  of 
was  of  eleven  hundred  dollars,  representing  the  twelve  hundred 
dollar  mortgage  expected  by  the  plaintiff,  less  the  one  hundred 
dollars  by  which  the  note  secured  exceeded  that  promised.  Ap- 
peal from  verdict  and  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff. 

McNett  &  Tisdale  and  George  H.  Fearons,  for  appellant. 

Miles  &  Steele,  for  the  respondent. 

*«2  GRANGER,  J.  1.  It  is  contended  that,  independent  of  the 
telegraphic  correspondence,  Poston  had  authority  to  make  the 
settlement;  and  the  first  proposition  argued  is  this:  "Did  the 
dispatch  written  at  Fairfield,  taken  in  connection  with  the  reply 
which  Po.ston  received  thereto,  constitute  apparent  authority 
on  his  part  to  effect  the  settlement  which  he  did,  or  was  he  justi- 
fied in  drawing  that  conclusion  ?"  It  seems  to  us  that  the  propo- 
sition is  very  fairly  stated  to  test  the  legal  question  involved. 
It  probably  will  not  be  disputed  ^^^  that  there  must  have  been 
a  binding  settlement  with  Henderson,  before  damages  legally 
accrued  to  plaintiff;  and  a  binding  settlement,  as  to  plaintiff, 
could  only  arise  from  such  a  delegation  of  authority  as  that,  in 
the  exercis'e  of  it,  he  would  be  bound.  Appellant  argues  the 
question  on  the  theory  that  Poston  had  the  right  to  consider 


Jan.  1899.]    Hasbrouck  v.  Westebn  Union  Tel.  Co.  183 

the  answer  to  his  dispatch  on  the  assumption  that  his  dispatch 
to  plaintiff  was  correctly  transmitted,  and  we  think  the  method 
of  reasoning  correct.    Appellant  then  takes  this  position:  The 
Poston  dispatch  notified  plaintiff  that  there  was  a  stock  worth 
twelve  hundred  dollars,  on  which  there  was  a  fifteen  hundred 
dollar  mortgage,  and  a  secured  note  for  two  thousand  five  hun- 
dred-dollars was  offered  in  settlement.     The  answer  was:  "If 
twelve  hundred  dollar  mortgage  is  on  fifteen  hundred  dollar 
property,  accept."    'Now,  leaving  out  of  mind  the  erroneous  dis- 
patch, we  may  see  the  exact  conditions  under  which  Poston 
acted  and  determine  the  question  of  his  authority.    It  is  said  the 
authority  to  accept  was  conditional  on  there  being  a  twelve  hun- 
dred dollar  mortgage  on  a  fifteen  hundred  dollar  §tock,and  not  on 
there  being  a  fifteen  hundred  dollar  mortgage  on  a  twelve  hun- 
dred dollar  stock,  and  that  plaintiff  had  a  right  to  impose  an  arbi- 
trary condition.  AVithout  doubt,  it  had  that  right ;  and  the  query 
comes,  Did  it  impose  such  a  condition?    That  is,  was  Poston 
justified  in  construing  the  dispatch  as  authorizing  the  settle- 
ment only  upon  a  literal  construction  of  the  dispatch,  or  was 
he  to  treat  the  words  imposing  the  condition  as  meaning  that 
there  must  not  be  a  settlement  less  favorable  to  plaintiff?    The 
situation  and  understanding  of  the  parties  have  much  to  do  with 
this  construction,  and   the   case   is   presented  on  that  theory. 
From  Poston's  dispatch,  as  written  by  him,  plaintiff  would  have 
known  that  the  mortgage  on  Henderson's  stock  exceeded  its 
value  by  three  hundred  dollars.    It  would  be  known  to  be  an 
estimate.    When  the  answer  came,  Poston  would  read  it  as  if 
plaintiff  knew  what  he  (Poston)  had  said.  ^^^  and  he  must  hare 
understood  that  he  was  to  accept  the  offer  of  settlement  under 
the  facts  as  he  had  stated  them,  and  also  that  he  was  to  accept, 
unless  the  conditions  were  more  favorable  to  plaintiff  than  they 
would  be  with  a  twelve  hundred  dollar  mortgage  on  a  fifteen 
hundred  dollar  stock.    We  hazard  little  in  saying  that  had  Pos- 
ton's dispatch  been  correctly  transmitted,  and  had  the  same  an- 
swer been  returned,  both  plaintiff  and  Poston  would  have  so 
understood  the  matter,  and  that  it  would  be  the  natural  and 
reasonable  conclusion  from  the  premises.    The  case,  from  a  legal 
point  of  view,  differs  little,  if  any,  from  facts  like  these:  A  is  the 
agent  for  B  for  the  purchase  of  horses.    A  writes  to  B  and  says: 
"I  can  buy  horses  of  a  certain  class  for  one  hundred  dollars  per 
head.     Shall  I  purchase?'*    B  answers,  **If  you  can  get  them 
for  ninety-five  dollars  per  head,  buy  them."    A  buys  them  for 


184  Hasbrouck  v.  Western  Ukion  Tel.  Co.        [Iowa, 

ninety  dollars  per  head.  No  one  would  doutt  his  authority. 
Why?  Because  it  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  authority 
granted.  The  situation  justifies  a  conclusion  that  the  limitation 
arising  from  the  conditional  words  is  only  against  going  further 
in  one  direction;  that  is,  paying  more.  So  in  the  case  at  bar. 
The  conditional  words  imposed  a  limitation  as  to  settlement  only 
in  case  the  stock,  in  value,  exceeded  the  mortgage  by  more  than 
three  hundred  dollars. 

Appellant  invokes  some  rules  under  the  law  of  contracts,  and 
cites  numerous  authorities,  and  among  them  Mecliem  on  Agency, 
sections  294,  297,  303.  We  do  not  discover  a  word  in  these  sec- 
tions against  our  theory  of  this  question.  Appellant  omits  sec- 
tion 298,  which  we  think  quite  significant,  and  we  quote  it,  with 
the  one  proceding  it:  "Sec.  297.  In  this  case,  as  in  the  other 
cases,  the  intention  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument, 
whether  it  be  made  of  one  piece  of  paper  or  of  many."  "Sec. 
298.  And  so,  in  doubtful  cases,  resort  must  be  had  to  the  situa- 
tion, surroundings,  and  relation  of  parties;  for  though  the  writ- 
ing cannot,  in  general,  be  contradicted  by  oral  evidence,  *^' 
yet  the  circumstances  may  properly  be  used  as  aids,  and,  by  put- 
ting the  court  more  or  less  fully  into  the  exact  situation  of  the 
parties,  to  enable  it  to  see  the  subject  matter  as  they  saw  it." 
Such  is  the  method  of  inquiry  we  pursue  in  this  case.  The  rule 
that,  in  the  making  of  contracts  by  correspondence,  the  accept- 
ance must  be  unconditional,  is  strongly  urged  as  applicable  in 
this  case.  With  our  view  of  the  case,  the  acceptance  was  un- 
conditional. That  rule  has  application  as  between  Henderson 
and  plaintiff.  AVhen  the  answer  came  to  Poston,  it  fixed  his 
authority;  and  the  acceptance  followed  that,  and  was  uncondi- 
tional. The  only  condition  imposed  was  upon  Poston,  which, 
as  we  hold,  was  observed,  so  that  his  authority  was  complete. 
It  is  probably  true  that  with  our  construction  of  the  terms  of 
the  telegram,  appellant  would  not  urge  the  authorities  cited  as 
applicable. 

2,  Contributory  negligence  is  pleaded,  and  urged  against 
plaintiff.  The  claim  is  based  first  on  the  negligence  of  Poston, 
in  that  when  he  received  the  reply  to  his  dispatch,  it  should 
have  put  him  on  inquiry,  because  of  the  language  as  to  a  twelve 
hundred  dollar  mortgage  on  a  fifteen  hundred  dollar  stock,  in- 
stead of  as  it  was  expressed  in  the  dispatch  as  written  by  Pos- 
ton, and  as  to  plaintiff,  it  is  thought  there  was  negligence  be- 
cause of  the  doubt  and  uncertainty  arising  from  the  dispatch  aa 


Jan.  1899.]     Hasbrouck  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  185 

delivered  by  the  defendant.  It  does  appear  from  the  record 
that,  when  plaintiff  received  the  telegram  from  Poston,  its  mean- 
ing was  thought  to  be  doubtful;  and  the  agent  at  Humeston  was 
asked  if  it  was  correct,  and  he  said  he  would  have  it  repeated, 
which  he  said  he  did,  and  that  it  was  correct.  The  court  sub- 
mitted the  question  to  the  jury,  and  said  in  its  instructions: 
"As  to  whether  the  plaintiff,  under  the  circumstances  shown, 
did  all  that  reasonable,  prudent  men  would  do  under  like  circum- 
stances, and  exercised  reasonable  care  under  the  facts  shown, 
will  be  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine  from  the  evidence. 
If  they  did,  they  are  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in 
that  regard.  If  they  *^°  did  not,  they  are  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory negligence,  and  cannot  recover  beyond  the  amount  paid  for 
the  telegram,  with  interest."  And  to  the  negligence  of  Poston, 
the  court  said:  "It  is  also  alleged  that  plaintiffs  were  guilty  of 
contributory  negligence,  for  the  reason  that  the  plaintiffs'  reply 
message  to  their  agent,  Poston,  was  of  such  a  nature  as  to  put 
him  on  his  guard  that  they  had  not  truly  interpreted  the  mes- 
sage sent  by  him  to  them.  The  plaintiffs  in  the  case  at  bar  are 
responsible  for  the  acts  of  their  agent,  Poston,  and  any  negli- 
gence on  his  part  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  would  be  im- 
puted to  plaintiffs.  If  the  jury  find  that,  under  the  circum- 
stances shown,  the  said  Poston  did  not  use  reasonable  care,  the 
plaintiffs  would  be  held  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  and 
could  not  recover."  We  do  not  think  the  defendant  has  any 
ground  for  complaint  on  this  branch  of  the  case.  As  to  the 
claim  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  plaintiff,  it  could  not  be 
said  to  be  negligence,  as  a  matter  of  law,  after  the  pains  taken 
to  know  if  the  dispatch  as  received  was  correct;  and,  as  to  the 
negligence  of  Poston,  the  only  doubtful  question  is  if  it  does 
not  affirmatively  appear  that  he  was  not  negligent.  In  this 
particular  we  may  refer  to  our  discussion  in  the  first  division 
of  the  opinion. 

3.  It  is  claimed  that,  after  plaintiff  knew  of  the  mistake,  it 
should  have  taken  steps  to  rescind  the  contract  of  settlement; 
and  reliance  is  placed  on  the  familiar  rule  in  Greenleaf  on  Evi- 
dence, section  261,  and  stated  in  Beymer  v.  McBride,  37  Iowa, 
114,  that:  "It  is  a  general  principle  of  law,  in  case  of  a  breach 
of  a  specific  contract,  that  if  the  injured  party  can  protect  him- 
self from  damage,  he  is  bound  to  do  so,  if  practicable,  at  a  mod- 
erate expense,  or  by  ordinary  efforts,  and  he  can  charge  the  de- 
linquent party  for  such  expense  and  efforts  and  for  such  damages 


186  Hasbkouck  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.         [Iowa, 

only  as  could  not  be  prevented  by  the  exercise  of  such  diligence." 
"We  have  found  no  case  like  this  where  such  a  rule  has  been  ap- 
plied. Appellant's  claim  in  this  respect  is  that:  "As  the  extent 
and  scope  of  Poston's. authority  to  settle  or  compromise  ^^"^  was 
measured  and  defined  by  the  two  telegrams,  and  Henderson 
knew  of  the  contents  of  the  one  sent,  and  either  knew  or  had 
opportunity  of  knowing  the  one  received,  he  was  bound  by  the 
extent  of  the  authority  which  Poston  in  fact  had,  and  was 
charged  with  notice  of  its  limitations.  Hence  he  was  in  no 
position  to  legally  resist  a  rescission  or  repudiation  of  the  set- 
tlement." In  view  of  what  we  have  already  said,  there  is  a  very 
conclusive  answer  to  the  claim.  The  claim  is  that  Henderson 
was  bound  by  the  extent  of  the  authority,  on  the  theory  of  the 
first  dispatch  being  correctly  transmitted;  and,  conceding  Hen- 
derson's knowledge  to  have  been  the  same  as  that  of  Poston, 
the  same  inferences  as  to  authority  would  be  justified.  If  the 
situation  would  justify  Poston  in  accepting  the  settlement  of- 
fered, it  would  justify  Henderson  in  completing  the  transac- 
tion. We  are  not  to  be  understood  as  determining  this  question 
on  any  other  theory  or  claim  than  the  one  presented.  The  case 
of  Reed  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  135  Mo.  661,  58  Am.  St. 
Pep.  609,  is,  in  several  particulars,  like  the  one  at  bar.  The 
facts  in  that  case  are  substantially  these:  One  Hedges,  residing 
at  Cedar  Rapids,  Iowa,  was  the  agent  for  Reed,  the  plaintiff, 
residing  at  Kansas  City,  Missouri.  Hedges  filed  with  the  com- 
pany a  dispatch  to  Reed  as  follows  (omitting  date,  et  cetera): 
"Offered  thirteen  hundred  dollars  cash,  lot  two,  houses  near 
planing  mill.  Must  hear  immediately.  Can't  get  more."  In 
transmission  the  word  "thirteen"  was  changed  to  "nineteen," 
80  that  the  offer  to  her  was  nineteen  hundred  dollars.  She  an- 
swered: "Sell  property  for  amount  offered.  Will  send  deed  Mon- 
day, 27."  Hedges  completed  the  agreement  for  the  sale,  and 
accepted  part  payment.  When  the  deed  came,  it  expressed  a 
consideration  of  ninceteen  hundred  dollars,  and  Hedges,  think- 
ing there  might  be  a  mistake,  suggested  waiting  until  he  could 
write;  but  the  purchaser  refused  and  threatened  suit,  and  the 
transaction  was  completed  by  accepting  thirteen  hundred  dol- 
lars. The  action  was  to  recover  the  deficiency,  to  make  up  the 
amount  of  nineteen  hundred  dollars.  The  court  permitted  a 
**^  recovery,  and  on  the  question  of  authority,  which  we  have 
before  considered,  it  said:  "The  defendant  was  fully  advised 
of  its  importance  on  the  face  of  the  message;  and,  after  being 


Jan.  1899.]    Hasbrouck  ».  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  187 

60  advised,  its  agent  assured  plaintiff  that  it  had  been  repeated^ 
and  she  could  rely  upon  its  correctness.  In  this  way  plaintiff 
was  led  to  believe  she  w^as  offered  nineteen  hundred  dollars  for 
her  property.  Being  willing  to  part  with  it  for  that  sum,  she 
wired  acceptance  of  the  proposition  made.  The  proposal  was 
only  thirteen  hundred  dollars,  but  in  this  way  she  was  made  to- 
accept  that  proposal.  Her  agent  was  clothed,  not  only  with  ap- 
parent, but  actual,  authority  to  sell  for  thirteen  hundred  dollars 
so  far  as  he  was  advised.  Being  thus  empowered  to  sell,  he  made 
a  binding  contract,  and  accepted  a  part  of  the  purchase  money. 
The  deed  was  forwarded,  and  he  delivered  it.  All  this  was  done 
upon  reliance  in  the  correctness  of  defendant's  actions.  Could 
a  more  natural  consequence  erer  follow  a  transaction  than  this^ 
loss  did  upon  the  mistake  of  defendant  ?"  In  the  same  connec- 
tion the  court  said  upon  the  question  of  plaintiff's  obligation, 
to  rescind:  "Does  it  lie  in  defendant's  mouth  to  speculate  how 
plaintiff  or  her  agent,  by  the  exercise  of  care,  which  it  failed  to 
exercise,  might  have  avoided  her  contract  with  the  purchaser  ? 
lias  the  defendant  the  right  to  require  plaintiff  to  enter  upon. 
a  long  and  doubtful  litigation  to  rescind  the  contract,  which 
was  fully  executed  by  delivery  of  her  deed,  and  the  receipt  of 
the  purchase  money?  "We  most  clearly  think  not.  The  cases- 
cited  by  learned  counsel  do  not  meet  this  case.  Here  the  dam- 
ages are  the  direct  result  of  defendant's  negligence.  Moreover^ 
they  had  fully  accrued  when  plaintiff  discovered  the  mistake. 
There  were  no  means  of  avoiding  them,  except  to  sue  the  blame- 
less purchaser  or  the  negligent  company.  She  chose  the  latter 
course,  and  we  think  properly."  In  this  case  the  note  against 
Henderson  for  three  thousand  six  hundred  dollars  had  been  sur- 
rendered, if  not  other  securities,  and  the  transaction  was  com- 
plete, so  far  as  to  make  it  binding  between  the  parties. 

i«o  4  rpj^g  court,  by  its  fifteenth  instruction,  left  it  to  the-, 
jury  to  determine  whether  the  telegram  authorized  Boston  to- 
make  the  settlement.  This  is  said  to  be  error,  and  that  it  wa» 
the  duty  of  the  court  to  construe  the  telegrams.  Appellant** 
claim  is  made  specific  that  Boston's  authority  must  be  deter- 
mined by  the  two  telegrams,  omitting  the  erroneous  one,  and 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  court  to  tell  the  jury  what  the  twa 
telegrams  meant.  We  determine  the  question  on  that  theory, 
and  such  is  the  rule  we  have  so  far  observed.  Under  such  a 
rule  we  need  not  determine  the  correctness  of  the  instruction; 
for  we  had  held  that,  as  a  matter  of  law,  the  telegrams  gave 


188  Hasbrouck:  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.        [Iowa, 

authority,  and  the  jury  must  have  so  found,  in  order  to  return 
A  verdict  for  plaintiff.  Hence,  no  prejudice  resulted  from  giving 
the  instruction.  In  view  of  another  objection  to  the  same  in- 
struction, we  set  out  the  important  part  of  it,  as  follows:  "In 
regard  to  such  defense,  the  jury  are  instructed  that,  in  de- 
termining the  true  purport  and  meaning  of  the  telegrams  sent, 
the  words  used  are  to  be  taken  in  their  usual  and  ordinary 
significance  and  meaning,  and  are  to  be  interpreted  in  the  light 
■of  the  facts  as  they  were  known  to  the  parties  at  the  time.  If 
the  said  Poston  did  not  exercise  reasonable  oare  in  interpreting 
and  acting  on  the  message  received  in  view  of  the  facts  as  he 
inew  them,  the  plaintiffs  cannot  recover.  [The  mere  fact,  how- 
ever, that  said  Poston  did  not  follow  the  strict  letter  of  his  au- 
thority in  the  message  sent  him,  as  to  whether  the  niortgage 
jeferred  to  was  a  twelve  hundred  dollar  mortgage  on  a  fifteen 
hundred  dollar  stock  or  a  fifteen  hundred  dollar  mortgage  on  a 
twelve  hundred  dollar  stock,  would  not,  alone,  prevent  a  re- 
>covery,  unless  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  such  de- 
parture occasioned,  in  whole  or  in  part,  the  loss  complained  of.]" 
The  part  now  complained  of  we  have  included  in  brackets.  Tho 
•complaint  is,  that  it  permits  a  departure  from  the  strict  letter 
of  the  authority  granted,  which  is  said  to  violate  the  rule.  We 
read  the  instruction  to  mean,  in  the  particular  suggested,  that, 
if  there  was  otherwise  a  right  of  recovery,  a  departure  from  the 
strict  letter  not  affecting  ^''^  such  right  would  not  defeat  a  re- 
•covery.  It  is  saying,  in  effect,  that  an  immaterial  departure 
would  be  without  prejudice.  Surely  such  an  instruction  does 
not  violate  the  law.  A  further  complaint  is  made  of  the  same 
instruction  in  the  use  of  the  words:  "If  said  Poston  did  not 
•exercise  reasonable  care  in  interpreting  and  acting  on  the  mes- 
sage received,  in  view  of  the  facts  as  he  knew  them,  the  plain- 
.  tiffs  cannot  recover."  The  complaint  is,  that  "although  the  jury 
should  find  that  the  interpretation  put  upon  the  message  by 
Poston  was  not  the  true  one,  and  they  should  find  that  Poston 
•used  reasonable  care  in  his  effort  to  interpret,  but  made  a  mis- 
take, they  would  still  find  for  the  plaintiff."  Appellant's  con- 
'Clusion  is  not  warranted.  But,  aside  from  this,  in  view  of  the 
legal  construction  to  be  put  on  the  telegrams,  and  that  must 
have  been  put  upon  them  in  reaching  the  verdict,  no  prejudice 
could  result.  We  think,  as  does  appellant,  that  it  was  a  ques- 
tion of  correct  interpretation,  and  we  think  it  affirmatively  ap- 
pears that  the  verdict  is  in  accord  with  such  an  interpretation. 


Jan.  1899.]     Hasbrouck  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.         18& 

because  of  which  language  complained  of,  even  if  erroneous^ 
would  be  without  prejudicee. 

5.  Mr.  Hasbrouck,  a  member  of  the  plaintiff  firm,  was  per- 
mitted to  testify,  as  was  also  the  other  member,  that  if  the 
telegram  as  filed  by  Poston  for  transmission  had  been  received, 
they  would  not  have  sent  the  message  they  did  send.  Ther& 
was  no  error  in  permitting  the  answers.  It  was  a  necessary  fact 
to  be  shown  under  the  issues,  and  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  any 
other  method  of  proving  it.  They  were  the  only  ones  who  knew 
the  fact,  and  they  did  know.  A  state  of  facts  so  similar  as  to 
make  the  holding  clear  authority  on  this  question  is  in  State 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Jamison,  79  Iowa,  245.  We  need  add  nothing  to 
what  we  have  said  in  that  case.  The  rule  has  support  in  cases 
therein  cited,  and  in  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  91 
Tex.  454,  66  Am.  St.  Eep.  906. 

6.  Dr.  McCuUoch,  one  of  the  plaintiff  firm,  in  connection  with 
his  testimony  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  telegram  ^"^^  received 
from  Poston  was  permitted  to  state  that  he  then  knew,  or  had 
an  idea  in  regard  to,  the  value  of  the  stock  of  goods,  and  to 
state  that,  according  to  his  idea,  the  value  was  about  fifteen 
hundred  dollars.  It  seems  to  be  conceded  in  argument  that,  had 
had  the  court  limited  the  application  of  the  evidence  as  to  what 
was  in  the  witness'  mind  in  interpreting  the  dispatch  from  Pos- 
ton, it  might  have  been  proper.  There  is  scarcly  room  to  doubt 
that  the  jury  so  understood  it,  from  the  connection  in  which 
it  was  given.  We  have  no  doubt  that  it  was  proper  for  that 
purpose,  and,  if  proper,  the  error  was  not  in  admitting  it;  but 
in  a  failure  to  limit  its  application.  The  court  was  not  asked 
60  to  do,  nor  error  assigned  upon  such  a  refusal  or  neglect. 

The  instructions  given  are  without  prejudicial  error,  and  they 
80  fairly  submit  the  case  that  there  was  no  error  in  the  refusal  of 
those  asked.  The  evidence  clearly  sustains  the  verdict.  The 
judgment  is  affirmed. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— CONTRIBUTARY  NEGLIGENCE 
OP  PARTY  RECEIVING  TELEGRAM.— Where  the  recipient  of  a 
telegraphic  message  sent  from  Staten  Island,  but  appearing  to  have 
bren  sent  from  South  Carolina,  after  going  to  the  telegraph  office 
to  make  Inqu'lry  and  finding  It  closed,  has  been  misled  into  taking 
a  fruitless  trip  to  South  Carolina,  it  cannot  be  said  as  matter  of 
law  that  he  is  chargeable  with  contributory  negligence:  Tobin  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  375,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  802. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES  —  LIABILITY  FOR  ERRONEl- 
OUS^LY  TRANSMITTED  MESSAGE.— Proof  that  a  telegraphic 
message  was  not  transmitted  as  it  was  delivered  to  the  comxMiny, 
and  that  it  was  acted  u];>on  as  received  by  the  sendee,  establishes  a 


190  Casey  v.  Casey.  [Towa, 

prima  facie  case  of  negligence  against  tlie  company:  Eeed  v.  Westv 
«rn  Union  Tel.  Co.,  135  Mo.  661,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  609,  and  note.  See 
Rittenliouse  v.  Independent  Line  etc.,  44  N.  Y.  263,  4  Am.  Rep.  673. 
INSTRUCTIONS— NONPREJUDICIAL  ERROR— FAILURE  TO 
REQUEST  INSTRUCTIONS.— Error  cannot  be  based  upon  the  fail- 
ure of  the  trial  court  to  give  instructions  when  no  request  was 
jnsjde:  Wragge  v.  South  Carolina  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  47  S.  C.  105,  58 
Am.  St.  Rep.  870,  and  note;  State  v.  Harrison,  66  Vt.  523,  44  Am. 
St.  Rep.  864.  See  monographic  note  to  Strohn  v.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R. 
€o.,  99  Am.  Dec.  118;  Macfarland  v.  Heim,  127  Mo.  327,  48  Am.  St. 
Rep.  629.  If  the  result  reached  by  the  trial  is  correct,  errors  in 
giving  or  denying  declaration  of  law,  or  in  giving  or  denying  in- 
structions, must  be  treated  as  harmless  on  appeal:  Fox  v.  Windes, 
127  Mo.  502,  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  648. 


Casey  v.  Casey. 

[107  Iowa,  192.] 

COTENANCY— ADVERSE  POSSESSION— EVIDENCE.— To 
prove  adverse  possession  by  one  cotenant  of  the  land  of  the  co- 
tenancy, his  declarations  claiming  sole  ownership  are  admissible 
in  evidence  though  not  made  in  the  presence  of  his  cotenant. 

COTENANCY  — ADVERSE  POSSESSION  BETWEEN  CO- 
TENANTS.— Exclusive  occupancy  by  one  tenant  in  common,  ac- 
companied by  acts  and  declarations  of  sole  ownership,  if  known 
To  his  cotenant,  will  amount  to  ouster  so  that  his  possession  may 
ripen  into  title. 

COTENANCY  — ADVERSE  POSSESSION  BETWEEN  CO- 
TENANTS— NOTICE.— In  order  that  exclusive  possession  of  the 
land  of  the  cotenancy  by  one  cotenant,  accompanied  by  hostile  acts 
and  claims  of  ownership,  may  amount  to  an  ouster  of  his  cotenant, 
such  acts  and  declarations  must  be  Ivnown  to  the  latter.  Actual  no- 
tice, must  be  shown,  but  it  may  be  by  circumstantial  evidence. 

Willett  &  Willett,  for  the  appellants. 

L.  BuUis,  for  the  appellee. 

103  WATERMAN,  J.  Plaintiff  is  the  widow  of  one  Timothy 
Casey,  who  died  in  the  year  1894.  Her  claim  to  the  real  estate 
in  question  is  founded  upon  the  will  of  her  husband,  in  which 
it  was  devised  to  her.  Timothy  Casey  and  his  brother,  the  de- 
fendant William  Casey,  obtained  title  to  this  land  jointly,  a  part 
in  the  year  1858  and  a  part  in  1860.  In  the  deeds  they  were 
both  named  as  grantees.  Both  went  into  possession,  and  they 
continued  in  the  joint  occupation  of  the  premises  until  the  year 
1865,  when  William  purchased  another  farm  some  three  miles 
distant,  and  moved  thereon.  Timothy  remained  in  sole  posses- 
sion of  the  premises  in  dispute  from  that  time  until  his  death. 


Jan.  1899.]  Casey  v.  Casey.  191 

and  since  his  death  such  possession  has  been  held  by  his  widow. 
Plaintiff  claims  title  by  adverse  possession,  and  also  asserts  that 
a  deed  was  made  therefor  by  William  to  Timothy,  which  has 
been  lost.  Both  *®^  of  these  claims  are  denied,  and  defendant 
William  Casey  seeks  to  have  title  to  the  undivided  one-half 
quieted  in  him.  In  the  year  1867,  Timothy  and  William  Casey, 
with  their  wives,  joined  in  making  a  mortgage  on  the  land,  and 
there  is  evidence  from  two  sons  of  William  Casey  that  Timothy 
admitted  that  William  owned  an  interest  therein.  These  decla- 
rations, it  is  said,  were  made  in  1892  and  later.  There  seems 
to  have  been  nothing  in  the  conversation,  as  it  appears  in  the 
record,  to  have  called  them  out.  The  facts  just  stated,  together 
with  the  fact  that  the  last  deed  in  the  chain  of  title,  stands  in 
the  name  of  the  two  brothers  as  grantees,  makes  the  case  for 
defendants.  On  the  other  hand,  the  undisputed  testimony  shows 
that  Timothy  Casey  held  exclusive  possession  from  the  time  his 
brother  moved,  in  18G5.  During  that  time  he  paid  the  taxes, 
received  the  rents  and  profits,  and  made  various  improvements 
upon  the  land.  Among  other  of  such  improvements  he  built 
a  dwelling-house.  At  different  times  he  claimed  sole  owner- 
ship. Evidence  of  this  fact  was  objected  to,  because  the  decla- 
rations were  not  shown  to  have  been  made  in  the  presence  of 
William  Casey.  But  we  think  such  evidence  was  admissible  to 
prove,  not  the  title,  but  the  intent  of  the  party  in  possession: 
Youngs  V.  Cunningham,  57  Mich.  153;  Lamoreaux  v.  Huntley, 
€8  Wis.  24.  Furthermore,  to  sustain  plaintiff's  claim  it  is  shown 
without  dispute  that  during  all  the  years  of  Timothy  Casey's 
occupancy  of  the  land  the  defendant  William  lived  only  three 
miles  distant,  and  that  he  was  aware  of  many,  if  not  all,  of 
the  improvements  made  upon  the  premises.  There  is  no  pre- 
tense of  his  ever  exercising  any  act  of  ownership  after  1865, 
other  than  his  joining  in  the  mortgage  mentioned.  On  the  con- 
trary, we  find  that  in  the  year  1893  a  son  of  William,  with  the 
latter's  knowledge  and  assent,  leased  a  part  of  the  land  from 
Timothy  and  farmed  it  that  year.  These  are  the  facts.  Ap- 
plying to  them  well-recognized  principles  of  law,  and  we  find 
that  Timothy  and  his  brother,  the  defendant,  *"^  were  tenants 
in  common.  Exclusive  occupancy  by  one  tenant  in  common, 
accompanied  by  acts  or  declarationes  of  sole  ownership,  if  known 
to  his  cotenant,  will  amount  to  an  ouster:  Flock  v.  Wyatt,  49 
Iowa,  466;  Warfield  v.  Lindell,  38  Mo.  561;  90  Am.  Dec.  443; 
Campau  v.  Dubois,  39  Mich.  274;  Cummings  v.  Wyman,  10  Mass. 


192  Casey  v.  Casey.  [Iowa, 

4.64;  Hubbard  v.  Wood,  1  Sneed,  279.  And  where  there  is  an 
ouster,  the  possession  of  the  occupying  tenant  may  ripen  into  a 
title.  Actual  notice  of  the  hostile  acts  and  claim  must  be  shown, 
bui  this  may  be  done  by  circumstancial  evidence,  as  in  this 
case.  In  Lara  way  v.  Larue,  63  Iowa,  408,  the  defendant  was 
one  of  several  tenants  in  common.  He  set  up  title  by  adverse 
possession  founded  upon  facts  quite  similar  to  the  facts  in  this 
case  relied  upon  by  plaintiff.  This  court  held  the  possession 
to  be  adverse,  and  the  title  based  thereon  to  be  valid,  and  said 
upon  the  issue:  "The  deed  to  defendant  was  made  in  March, 
1854,  more  than  twenty  years  prior  to  the  commencement  of  this 
action.  The  land  was  wild  prairie.  The  defendant  took  posses- 
sion at  once,  paid  the  back  taxes,  broke  and  fenced  the  land, 
and  built  a  good  common  farmhouse,  sixteen  by  twenty-four, 
and  also  barns,  stables  and  cribs.  He  rented  it  for  six  years, 
and  collected  the  rents.  Afterward  he  moved  upon  it,  and  oc- 
cupied it  continuously  as  a  homestead,  and  kept  the  taxes  paid. 
....  No  one  of  the  heirs  claimed  an  interest  in  the  land  during 
this  twenty  years,  nor  claimed  any  rents  or  profits,  though  two 
of  them  lived  near  the  land We  cannot  think  for  a  mo- 
ment that  the  defendant  supposed  he  was  a  mere  tenant  in  com- 
mon, and  held  with  half  a  dozen  others,  as  the  plaintiff  con- 
tends that  he  did."  So,  in  the  case  at  bar,  while  the  death  of 
Timothy  Casej'  renders  it  impossible  to  show  what  understand- 
ing or  agreement  he  had  with  his  brother  when  the  latter  re- 
moved from  the  land  in  1865,  yet  we  cannot  think,  in  view 
of  what  subsequently  transpired,  that  he  supposed  he  was  only 
a  tenant  in  common  with  William.  Knowles  v.  Brown,  69  Iowa, 
11,  is  a  case  similar  in  principle  to  the  one  we  have  cited.  A 
tenant  in  common  was  there  *®^  awarded  title,  based  upon  ad- 
verse possession,  against  his  cotenant.  While  we  are  unable,  un- 
der the  evidence,  to  reconcile  the  making  of  the  joint  mortgage 
by  the  two  brothers  after  William  had  removed  from  the  land 
with  the  claim  of  TimoLhy  to  sole  ownership  at  that  time,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  latter's  death  seals  the  lips  of  the 
only  witness  who  could  speak  in  plaintiff's  behalf  on  this  point. 
On  the  other  had,  it  is  impossible  to  make  the  conduct  of  these 
two  brothers  during  Timothy's  long  occupancy  accord  with  any 
other  theory  than  that  there  was  some  conveyance  or  contract 
by  which  Timothy  acquired  William's  interest  in  this  land.  To 
the  claimed  declarations  of  Timothy  to  the  sons  of  William  wo 
ere  not  inclined  to  allow  any  weight.    The  time  and  circum- 


Jan.  1899.]  Wyman  v.  Eatox.  193 

stances  when  they  are  said  to  have  been  made  give  an  air  of 
improbability  to  the  occurrence,  and  the  fact  said  to  have  been 
stated  is  contradicted  by  all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances 
in  evidence.  "We  see  no  reason  to  interfere  with  the  judgment 
of  the  district  court.  It  is  just,  and  has  support  in  the  evidence, 
and  is  therefore  affirmed. 


COTENANCY— ADVEKSE  POSSESSION  BETWEEN  COTEN- 
AN'i'S— NOTICE.— The  possession  of  oue  coteiiaut  is  prosuiued  to 
be  llie  possession  of  all,  and,  in  order  to  rebut  this  presumption 
and  make  the  possession  adverse,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  pos- 
session was  with  the  intent  to  hold  adversely,  and  such  intent  must 
be  indicated  by  acts  calculated  to  exclude  the  colenant:  Bader  v. 
Dyer,  lOG  Iowa,  715,  G8  Am.  St.  Rep.  332.  There  must  be  an  actual 
ouster:  Manstield  v.  McGinncss,  8G  Me.  118,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  532. 
Exclusive  possession  by  a  tenant  in  common  who  has  taken  a  con- 
veyance purporting  to  convey  the  property  in  severalty,  does  not 
constitute  an  ouster  of  his  cotenants,  and  therefore  cannot  bar  their 
right  to  partition,  although  he  claims  to  own  the  whole  of  the 
tr:ict.  unless  knowledge  of  such  claim  is  brought  home  to  them: 
lliirnite  v.  Hignite.  05  Miss.  447,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  073;  Boyd  v.  Boyd, 
170  111.  40,  08  Am.  St.  109. 

COTENANCY  —  ADVERSE  POSSESSION  —  EVIDENCE.  —  The 
evidence  necessary  to  prove  ouster  by  one  cotenant  against  an- 
other is  much  greater  than  in  cases  in  which  such  relation  does 
not  exist  between  the  parties:  Wheeler  v.  Taylor.  32  Or.  421;  07 
Am.  St.  Rep.  540,  and  note.  As  to  the  burden  of  proof  In  such 
cases,  see  Stewart  v.  Stewart,  83  Wis.  3^4,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  67,  and 
cote. 


Wyman  v.  Eaton. 

[107  IOWA,  214  ] 

RECEIVERS-FOREIUN-SUITS— BY.— The  right  Of  a  re- 
ceiver to  bring  suits  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction  to  enforce  a  liabil- 
ity arising  under  the  law.  of  the  state  of  his  appointment  canuot 
be  conferred  upon  him  absolutely  by  his  order  of  appointment,  but 
can  arise  only  through  an  exercise  of  comity  between  states,  and 
such  exercise  will  be  denied  where  it  would  be  in  contravention  of 
the  rights  of  citizens  and  opposed  to  equity. 

The  defendants  in  this  action  were  original  subscribers  for 
stock  in  the  Iowa  and  Nebraska  State  Insurance  Company. 
They  paid  fifty  per  cent  of  their  several  subscriptions,  as  re- 
quired by  the  Nebraska  statute  under  which  the  company  was 
incorporated.  They  later  surrendered  their  certificates,  and  new- 
stock  was  issued  to  the  parties  purchasing  from  them.  Accom- 
panying these  transfers  of  stock  were  substitutes  for  the  prom- 
issory notes  given  by  the  defendants  to  secure  the  unpaid  half 
of  their  subscriptions,  of  other  notes  given  for  the  same  purpose 

AM.  ST.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.-13 


194  Wyman  v.  Eaton.  [Iowa, 

by  thoS'e  persons  to  whom  the  defendants  transferred  their 
stock.  These  substitutions  and  transfers  were  made  in  good 
faith  by  all  parties,  and  recorded  in  the  books  of  the  company 
while  the  latter  was  solvent.  From  the  date  of  these  transac- 
tions, which  were  completed  prior  to  1887,  these  defendants 
ceased  to  have  any  connection  with  or  control  over  the  corpo- 
ration. The  remaining  facts  appear  from  the  opinion.  Appeal 
from  judgment  in  favor  of  the  defendants. 

E.  &  A.  C.  Wakley  and  Flickinger  Brothers,  for  the  appellant. 

Harl  &  McCabe,  Finley,  Burke,  Wright  &  Baldwin,  Sanders  & 
Stewart,  John  Y.  Stone  and  C.  R.  Marks,  for  the  appellees. 

^i''  GEANGEE,  J.  It  will  be  well  to  repeat  that  this  action 
is  by  a  receiver  appointed  to  wind  up  the  affairs  of  the  Nebraska 
Fire  Insurance  Company,  on  the  application  of  one  of  its  stock- 
holders, to  recover  from  the  defendants  on  their  subscriptions 
to  the  original  enterprise,  wherein  was  contemplated  the  organi- 
zation of  two  companies — one  in  Nebraska,  to  be  known  as  the 
Nebraska  &  Iowa  Insurance  Company,  and  one  in  Iowa,  to  be 
known  as  the  Iowa  &  Nebraska  Insurance  Company,  the  two 
companies  to  be  thereafter  consolidated.  The  first-named  com- 
pany was  organized  under  the  laws  of  Nebraska  and  located  at 
the  city  of  Omaha,  in  that  state,  and  the  latter  under  the  laws 
of  Iowa,  and  located  at  the  city  of  Council  Bluffs,  in  Iowa.  The 
consolidation  was  never  made  and  the  latter  company  was 
changed  to  that  of  the  Western  Home  of  Sioux  City,  and  its 
place  of  business  changed  to  Sioux  City,  Iowa,  about  May,  1885. 
The  Nebraska  &  Iowa  Company  was  changed  to  the  Nebraska 
Fire  Insurance  Company,  and  continued  to  operate  until  1891, 
when  the  insurance  department  of  Nebraska  withdrew  its  cer- 
tificates authorizing  the  company  to  do  business,  and,  on  the 
application  of  one  of  its  stockholders,  its  insolvency  was  decreed ; 
and  the  plaintiff  is  now  engaged  in  winding  up  its  affairs,  and 
this  action  is  in  aid  of  that  purpose. 

The  action  has  for  a  legal  basis  a  provision  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nebraska,  as  follows  (Neb.  Const.,  art.  11,  sec.  4) :  "Lia- 
bilities of  Subscribers  to  Stock. — In  all  cases  of  claims  against 
corporations  and  joint  stock  associations,  the  exact  amount  due 
shall  be  first  ascertained,  and  after  the  corporate  property  shall 
have  been  exhausted,  the  original  subscribers  thereof  shall  be 
individually  *^®  liable  to  the  extent  of  their  unpaid  subscrip- 


Jan.  1899.]  Wyman  t;.  Eaton.  195 

tions,  and  the  liability  for  unpaid  subscriptions  shall  follow  the 
stock."  Dismissing  for  the  moment  the  effect  of  an  arbitrary 
legal  liability,  which  must  be  respected  and  enforced  when 
known,  there  is  not,  in  view  of  the  entire  record  in  this  case, 
-an  equitable  consideration  favorable  to  a  recovery  against  these 
■defendants.  The  present  liabilities  of  the  Nebraska  corporation 
cannot  truthfully  be  said  to  have  accrued  in  consequence  of,  or 
with  reliance  upon,  the  former  connection  of  these  defendants 
with  the  enterprise  from  which  sprang  the  present  company. 
These  facts  are  important  as  aiding  in  the  solution  of  a  legal 
proposition  urged  by  appellees,  to  the  effect  that  this  action  can- 
not be  maintained  in  Iowa  because  it  is  brought  by  a  receiver 
of  a  Nebraska  corporation  to  enforce  a  provision  of  the  law  of 
that  state;  the  claim  being  that  such  a  proceeding  can  only 
be  had  as  a  result  of  comity  between  the  states,  and  that  the 
basis  of  such  an  exercise  is  that  the  citizens  of  the  state  granting 
it  shall  not  be  thereby  prejudiced  or  injured.  Admitting,  for  the 
«ake  of  argument,  the  rule  that  comity  controls  as  to  the  au- 
thority of  plaintiff  to  sue  in  this  state,  and,  as  we  have  in  effect 
said,  the  record  leaves  us  without  doubt  that  its  exercis'e  should 
be  denied,  because  it  would  be  in  contravention  of  the  rights  of 
our  citizens,  and  operate  to  their  injury. 

Upon  the  question  of  the  absolute  right  of  plaintiff  to  sue  in 
this  state,  we  are  not  without  precedent  in  our  own  decisions; 
and  while,  in  announcing  a  rule,  we  have  recognized  the  fact 
of  a  conflict  of  authority,  we  are  not  persuaded  by  the  argu- 
ment in  this  case  that  a  change  should  be  made,  or  the  rule 
modified.  Stress  is  given  in  argument  to  the  fact  that  the  order 
of  appointment  in  Nebraska  gives  to  the  receiver  authority  to 
bring  suits  in  other  states.  That  authority  is  valuable  as  an 
aid  to  secure  the  right  to  do  so  in  the  state  where  the  privilege 
is  sought,  and  is  judiciously  granted;  but  it  is  without  efficiency 
to  create  such  a  right  independent  of  sanction  ***  within  the 
state.  The  case  of  Booth  v.  Clark,  17  How.  322,  contains  a 
somewhat  exhaustive  consideration  of  the  question  of  the  right 
of  a  receiver  appointed  in  one  state  to  bring  a  suit  for  the  pos- 
session of  property  in  another  state,  and  it  is  there  said:  "He 
has  no  extraterritorial  power  of  official  action;  none  which  the 
court  appointing  him  can  confer,  with  authority  to  enable  him 
to  go  into  a  foreign  jurisdiction  to  take  possession  of  the  debtor*s 
property;  none  which  can  give,  upon  the  principle  of  comity,  a 
privilege  to  sue  in  a  foreign  court  or  another  jurisdiction,  as  the 


196  Wyman  v.  Eaton.  [lowa^ 

judgment  creditor  himself  might  have  done,  where  his  debtor 
may  be  amenable  to  the  tribunal  which  the  creditor  may  seek.'* 
An  underlying  thought  of  the  rule  seems  to  be  that,  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  one's  appointment  as  receiver,  he  is  amenable  in 
his  official  capacity  to  the  courts,  and  he  may  exercise  his  au- 
thority under  the  law  of  the  jurisdiction;  while,  in  a  foreign 
jurisdiction,  the  law  d-oes  no  more  than  to  make  the  person 
entering  it  amenable  to  its  laws,  and  in  no  way  recognizes  th& 
official  capacity.     As  a  citizen  in  a  jurisdiction  foreign  to  his 
residence,  he  has  a  legal  status,  and  is  amenable  to,  and  may 
invoke  the  protection  of,  the  law.    As  an  officer  of  a  court  from 
a  foreign  jurisdiction,  he  has,  and  is  entitled  to,  no  legal  recog- 
nition, except  as  the  courts  may,  in  their  discretion,  grant  it, 
because  he  is  without  the  official  obligation  that  he  assumed  in 
his  own  jurisdiction,  and  which  is  essential  to  a  proper  and  safe 
exercise  of  such  power.    In  Ayres  v    Siebel,  82  Iowa,  347,  we 
denied  the  right  of  a  trustee,  appointed  by  the  court  in  Indiana, 
to  sue  and  recover  on  a  contract  in  this  state;  and  in  Parker 
V.  Lamb,  99  Iowa,  265,  we  denied  such  a  right  to  receiver,  and 
cited  the  Ayres-Siebel  case.    In  Parker  v.  Lamb,  99  Iowa,  265,^ 
we  quoted  approvingly  from  High  on  Eeceivers,  section  289^ 
as  follows:  "Upon  the  question  of  the  territorial  extent  of  a 
receiver's  jurisdiction  and  power  for  the  purpose  of  instituting 
actions  connected  with  his  receivership,  the  prevailing  doctrine 
established  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  and  sus- 
tained by  the  weight  of  authority  in  various  ^^^  states,  is  that 
the  receiver  has  no  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  or  power  of  of- 
ficial action,  and  cannot  go  into  a  foreign  state  or  jurisdiction, 
and  there  institute  a  suit  for  the  recovery  of  demands  due  the 
person  or  estate  subject  to  his  receivership.    His  functions  and 
powers,  for  the  purpose  of  litigation,  are  held  to  be  limited  to- 
the  courts  of  the  state  in  which  he  was  appointed ;  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  comity  between  states  and  nations  which  recognize  the 
judicial  decisions  of  one  tribunal  as  conclusive  on  another  do  not 
apply  to  such  a  case,  and  will  not  warrant  a  receiver  in  bringing 
an  action  in  a  foreign  court  or  jurisdiction."    These  authorities 
are  broad  and  conclusive,  and,  unless  we  are  to  set  them  aside,, 
are  conclusive  of  this  case.    Counsel  have  shown  great  zeal  and 
tact  in  presenting  authorities  more  or  less  in  point,  and  we  ac- 
knowledge somewhat  of  a  conflict,  as  we  have  done  in  other 
cases ;  but  the  weight  of  authority  we  regard  as  in  line  with  our 
holdings,  and  we  are  not  disposed  to  disturb  them.    Beach  on 


Jan.  1899.]     Iowa  Savings  &  Loan  Assn.  v,  Heidt.  197 

Eecedvers,  section  680,  states  the  same  rule,  and  cites  Booth  v. 
€lark,  17  How.  332,  from  which  we  have  quoted,  and  then  says: 
''The  rule  thus  laid  down  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States  has  been  followed  by  other  courts  with  essential  una- 
nimity, and  can  hardly  be  said  to  be  seriously  questioned."  In 
Fitzgerald  v.  Fitzgerald  etc.  Construction  Co.,  41  Neb.  374,  these 
authorities  are  approvingly  cited  and  applied.  It  remains  for 
us  to  state  as  a  conclusion  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to 
recover  in  the  courts  of  Iowa,  and  the  judgment  of  the  district" 
court  will  be  affirmed. 


RECEIVERS— FOREIGN— SUITS  BY.— A  receiver  appointed  in 
anotlier  state  for  an  insolvent  corporation  may,  in  this  state,  main- 
tain an  action  in  its  name  upon  a  liability  due  it.  Through  comity 
between  states  a  representative  of  a  court  of  one  state  will  be  per- 
mitted to  sue  in  the  courts  of  the  other  when  the  suit  does  not  in- 
juriously aCfect  tlie  interests  of  the  citizens  of  the  latter  nor  violate 
its  policy  or  laws:  Castleman  v.  Templeman,  87  Md.  546,  67  Am. 
St.  Rep.  363,  and  note.  See  the  extended  note  to  Straughan  v.  Hall- 
wood,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  49;  also  the  note  to  Alley  v.  Caspari,  6  Am. 
St.  Rep.  185. 


lowA  Savings  &  Loan   Association  v,  Heidt. 

[107  lOWA,  297.] 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS  —  LOANS  TO 
ME>[RERS— PROPER  DEDUCTIONS.— A  building  and  loan  asso- 
ciation may  retain  from  loans  made  to  members  a  sum  sufficient 
to  rover  the  cost  of  examining  abstract,  appraiser's  fee,  recording 
mortgage,  and  expenses  of  management. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USUBY—EXAO- 
TION  OF  PREMIUMS.— A  building  and  loan  association  author- 
ized by  statute  to  receive  "premiums  bid  by  members  for  the  right 
of  precedence  in  taking  loans,"  has  no  authority  to  exact  from  the 
borrower,  where  there  is  no  competition,  an  arbitrary  sum  in  ad- 
dition to  the  interest  on  his  loan,  where  the  whole  amounts  to  more 
than  legal  interest. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-USURY— INTER- 
EST UPON  FAQE.  RATHER  THAN  AMOUNT,  OF  LOAN.— A 
building  and  loan  association,  having  deducted  from  a  loan  to  a 
member  a  sum  sufficient  to  pay  expenses  incidental  to  malting  the 
loan,  which  are  properly  charged  to  the  borrower,  may  compute 
legal  interest  upon  the  face  of  the  loan  instead  of  the  amount  ao^ 
tually  received  by  the  borrower  without  making  the  transactioa 
usurious. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-EXORBITANT 
FINES.— One  who  purchases  stock  In  a  building  and  loan  associa- 
tion is  held  to  a  knowledge  of  the  terms  of  his  membership,  and 
will  not  be  heard  later  to  complain  of  the  Imposition  of  reasonable 
fines  for  defaults  in  payments,  which  fines  are  authorized  by  stat* 
ote. 


398  Iowa  Saving  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.         [Iowa, 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-TJSURY— CON- 
STITUTIONAL LAW— The  legislature  may  exempt  transaction* 
between  building  and  loan  associations  and  their  members  from  the 
operation  of  the  law  against  usury. 

USURY  —  STATUTORY  CHANGES  —  RETROACTIVE  EF- 
FECT.—The  privilege  of  pleading  usury  pertains  only  to  the  rem- 
edy and  may  be  taken  away  by  statute  as  to  contracts  entered 
into  before  the  enactment  of  the  statute,  nor  does  such  a  statute' 
impair  vested  rights  when  enacted  pending  an  appeal  from  a  de- 
cree in  favor  of  a  member  of  a  building  and  loan  association  on  a 
plea  of  usury,  made  to  avoid  the  enforcement  of  a  contract  betweert 
liimself  and  the  association. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— AMOUNT  RE- 
COVERABLE FROM  MEMBERS— STATUTORY  CONSTRUC- 
TION.—A  statute  fixing  the  amounts  that  may  be  included  in  the 
recovery  by  a  building  and  loan  association  from  a  borrower  should 
be  construed  as  fixing  the  maximum  amount  of  recovery,  and  not 
as  preventing  the  association  from  contracting  to  receive  a  less 
amount. 

Action  in  equity  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on  real  estate  and  to 
cancel  certain  shares  of  stock  held  hy  the  defendant  in  plaintiff 
association.  The  defense  of  usury  was  sustained  by  the  trial 
court.  An  accounting  was  had.  A  judgment  of  forfeiture 
was  given  in  favor  of  the  school  fund.  The  appeal  is  from  a 
decree  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  for  seventy-two  dollars  and  eighty 
cents  without  either  interest  or  costs. 

Bailey  &  Ballreich,  for  the  appellant. 

Dudley,  Coffin  &  Byers,  for  the  appellee. 

298  WATERMAN",  J.  Plaintiff  is  a  building  and  loan  as- 
sociation, having  incorporated  as  such  originally  in  1889.  On 
July  2,  1896,  its  articles  were  amended  to  comply  with  the  re- 
quirements of  chapter  85  of  the  acts  of  the  twenty-sixth  general 
assembly.  Defendant  was  the  owner  of  ten  shares  of  stock  in 
Baid  association,  and  on  February  15,  1891,  he  borrowed  from 
it  the  sum  of  one  thousand  dollars,  giving  as  security  his  sharesi 
of  sto<!k  in  pledge  and  the  mortgage  in  suit.  At  the  time  of 
^^^  making  the  loan,  plaintiff  deducted  from  the  amount  of  the 
loan  the  following  sums:  Attorney's  fee  for  examining  abstract, 
two  dollars  and  fifty  cents;  appraiser's  fee,  two  dollars;  record- 
ing mortgage,  one  dollar;  abstractor's  fee,  nine  dollars.  The 
remainder,  nine  hundred  and  eighty-five  dollars  and  fifty  cents, 
was  paid  to  defendant.  Defendant  was  to  pay,  according  to  the 
contract  contained  in  his  note  and  mortgage,  the  sum  of  seven- 
teen dollars  per  month  until  the  maturity  of  hia  stock.    Thi» 


Jan.  1899.]     Iowa  Savings  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.  199 

amount  was  made  up  as  follows:  sixty  cents  per  share,  install- 
ments on  his  stock,  six  dollars;  sixty  cents  per  share,  premium 
for  the  loan,  six  dollars;  and  fifty  cents  per  share  as  interest  on 
the  money  received,  five  dollars.  Out  of  the  dues  on  stock,  the 
association  deducted  seven  cents  from  each  sixty  cents  paid  for 
expenses  of  management,  but  only  so  much  of  this  was  used  or 
kept  as  was  necessary  for  actual  expenses.  From  time  to  time 
the  surplus  of  the  expense  fund  was  carried  to  the  credit  of  the 
stockholders. 

1.  It  is  claimed  that  defendant  did  not  receive  the  full 
amount  of  his  loan,  and  this  is  correct.  But  the  amounts  de- 
ducted were  necessary  expenses  in  perfecting  the  loan.  These 
sums  were  not  retained  by  the  association,  but  were  paid  to 
others,  and  were  proper  charges  against  defendant:  Hawkeye 
State  etc.  Assn.  v.  Johnston,  106  Iowa,  218. 

Some  complaint  is  also  made  because  of  the  deduction  by  the 
association  of  seven  cents  out  of  each  sixty  cents  of  dues,  for 
expense  of  management.  We  see  no  ground  for  a  member's 
objection  to  this  method.  It  is  not  claimed  that  more  was  used 
for  expens'es  than  was  actually  necessary.  Now,  it  is  apparent 
that  these  expenses  had  to  be  paid  by  the  members.  If  a  fund 
was  not  raised  in  this  way,  the  amount  would  have  to  be  taken 
from  the  earnings.  In  any  event  the  burden  would  fall  on  the 
stockholders. 

2.  With  these  minor  matters  out  of  the  way,  we  take  up  the 
next  question  in  the  case,  which  is  the  claim  of  usury.  It  k 
said:  1.  That  the  contract  is  usurious,  because  the  premium  ex- 
acted was  not  bid  for  the  right  of  precedence  in  ^^®  taking  the 
loan;  2.  Because  interest  was  charged  upon  the  face  of  the  loan; 
and  3.  Because  the  fines  and  fees  were  exorbitant.  It  is  true 
that  the  premium  was  a  fixed  sum,  established  by  the  by-laws 
of  the  association,  and  chapter  6,  title  9,  of  the  Code  of  1873, 
was  in  force  when  this  loan  was  made.  In  that  chapter  such 
associations  are  given  the  right  to  receive  "premiums  bid  by 
members  for  the  right  of  precedence  in  taking  loans,"  and  then 
it  is  said  the  taking  of  such  premiums  shall  not  be  held  to  be 
usury.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that,  under  the  statute,  it  was 
not  lawful  for  the  association  to  exact  from  a  borrower,  where 
there  was  no  competition,  an  arbitrary  sum  in  addition  to  the  in- 
terest on  his  loan,  where  the  whole  amounted  to  more  than  legal 
interest;  and  we  may  say,  without  setting  out  the  computation, 
that  we  think  it  did  in  this  case.     In  Burlington  etc.  Assn.  v. 


200  Iowa  Savings  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.  [Iowa, 

Heider,  55  Iowa,  424,  and  Hawkeye  etc.  Assn.  v.  Blackburn,  48 
Iowa,  385,  each  of  which  involved  a  construction  of  the  statute 
we  are  now  considering,  while  usury  was  pleaded,  the  question 
presented  now  was  not  raised.  Except  in  name,  the  premium 
here  does  not  differ  in  any  way  from  interest.  It  is  paid  for  the 
use  of  money,  and  not  for  the  privilege  of  getting  the  loan. 
As  it  is  claimed  that  the  acts  of  plaintiff  in  exacting  from  de- 
fendant the  various  sums  it  did  as  consideration  for  the  loan 
were  validated  by  subsequent  legislation,  it  may  be  well  for  us 
to  determine  to  just  what  extent  curative  acts  were  needed. 
AVe  take  up,  therefore,  defendant's  further  claims  of  usury. 

3.  It  is  said  that  the  loan  was  usurious,  because  interest  was 
charged  on  the  face  of  the  note,  and  not  on  the  amount  ac- 
tually paid  to  defendant.  The  two  cases  last  cited  are  thought 
by  counsel  for  appellee  to  support  this  claim.  In  those  cases 
the  premium  charged  for  the  loan  was  deducted  at  the  time 
the  loan  was  made,  and  was  retained  by  the  association  for  its 
benefit,  and  interest  was  collected  upon  the  whole  sum,  includ- 
ing the  amount  of  the  premium;  and  this  interest  exceeded  the 
rate  fixed  by  law.  The  items  which  defendant  claims  should 
not  have  been  included  in  the  principal  in  the  ^^^  case  at  bar, 
and  upon  which  interest  was  computed,  are  the  two  dollars  and 
fifty  cents  for  examining  abstract  and  two  dollars  appraisement 
fee.  Both  of  these  were  legitimate  matters  of  expense,  as  we 
have  already  said.  As  we  understand  the  record,  while  the  two 
dollars  fee  was  paid  into  the  expense  fund,  it  was  the  exact 
amount  that  was  paid  by  the  association  out  of  that  fund  for 
the  appraisement  in  the  making  of  this  loan;  and  the  other  fee 
was  paid  to  an  attorney  for  services  actually  rendered.  The 
payment  by  the  borrower  of  the  necessary  expenses  of  the 
lender,  incurred  in  making  the  loan,  in  addition  to  the  legal 
interest,  will  not  constitute  usury:  Smith  v.  Wolf,  55  Iowa, 
555.  These  amounts  were  not  exacted  as  a  bonus  by  the  asso- 
ciation, and  it  got  no  benefit  whatever  from  their  payment. 
This  case  is  materially  different  from  those  upon  which  de- 
fendant relies. 

4.  Next,  it  is  said  that  the  fines  charged  were  exorbitant. 
Doubtless,  a  fine  may  be  so  unreasonable  and  excessive  as  to  be 
void.  But  these  do  not  appear  to  be  that  of  character.  Im- 
positions proportionately  as  heavy  have  been  approved  in  simi- 
lar cases:  See  4  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  1042,  note  4.  The 
statute  authorized  these  penalties,  and  it  fixed  no  limit  to  the 


Jan.  1899.]     Iowa  Savings  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.  201 

amount  that  might  be  imposed.  The  amount  fixed  by  the  by- 
laws of  the  association  was  five  cents  for  the  first  default  on 
each  share,  and  ten  cents  for  each  subsequent  default.  This 
amount  was  not  exceeded  in  defendant's  case.  He  knew,  or 
should  have  known,  the  terms  of  his  membership  when  he  pur- 
chased stock  in  the  association,  and  we  do  not  think  he  can  be 
heard  now  to  complain  of  an  obligation  which  he  voluntarily 
assumed. 

5.  As  we  have  found  that  the  contract  was  tainted  with  usury 
because  of  the  exaction  of  the  level  or  arbitrary  premium,  it 
now  becomes  necessary  to  determine  whether  it  had  been  purged 
of  this  illegality  by  subsequent  legislation.  This  loan  was 
made  in  1891.  In  1896  the  twenty-sixth  general  assembly 
passed  an  act  (chapter  85)  providing  for  the  government,  man- 
agement, and  operation  of  associations  of  ^***  this  character. 
Section  9  of  that  act,  so  far  as  material,  is  as  follows:  "All 
building  and  loan  and  savings  and  loan  associations  upon  re- 
ceiving the  certificate  of  the  auditor  shall  have  power  .... 
to  assess  and  collect  from  members  such  dues,  membership  fees, 
fines,  premiums  and  interest  on  loans  as  may  in  the  articles  of  in- 
corporation and  by-laws  have  been  provided,  and  the  same  shall 
not  be  held  to  be  usurious  ....  to  make  loans  to  members  on 
feiich  terms  and  conditions  as  the  articles  of  incorporation  and 

by-laws   provide In  case    of   foreclosure,  the   borrower 

shall  be  charged  with  the  full  amount  of  the  loan  made  to  him, 
together  with  dues,  interest,  premium,  and  fines  for  which  he 
is  delinquent,  and  he  shall  be  credited  with  the  same  value  of 
his  pledged  shares  as  if  he  had  voluntarily  withdrawn  the  same." 
It  is  claimed  by  plaintiff  that  this  section  applied  to  contracts 
made  prior  to  its  passage,  and  validated  acts  already  done. 
This  law  is  not  expressly  made  retroactive,  and  we  should  hesi- 
tate before  giving  it  that  effect,  especially  to  the  extent  claimed 
by  plaintiff.  But  in  view  of  our  holding  upon  another  statute, 
which  is  set  up,  and  which  we  shall  next  consider,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  we  decide  this  question. 

6.  Section  9,  which  we  have  set  out,  with  some  changes  not 
material  to  be  noticed  here,  went  into  the  present  Code  as  sec- 
tion 1898.  The  twenty-seventh  general  assembly,  by  chapter 
48,  amended  this  section,  as  follows:  "The  provisions  of  said 
section  shall  apply  to  and  govern  all  contracts  between  build- 
ing and  loan  and  savings  and  loan  associations  and  their  mem- 
bers, made  and  entered  into  prior  to  the  taking  effect  of  the 


202  Iowa  Savings  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.  [Iowa, 

code^  and  every  such  contract  shall  in  all  actions  and  proceed- 
ings be  construed  and  enforced  as  in  said  section  provided,  and 
with  the  same  force  and  effect,  as  if  made  and  entered  into  after 
the  code  took  effect,  anything  in  the  statutes  in  force  when  such 
contracts  were  made  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding."  We 
think  this  act  was  intended  to  make  valid  and  enforceable  all 
previous  contracts  for  loans,  which  were  within  the  terms  of 
section  1898,  as  the  contract  in  suit  clearly  was. 

303  ipj^g  jjg^^  question  is  as  to  the  legislative  power  to  do  this. 
As  a  general  rule,  it  may  be  said  the  legislature  can  validate  any 
act  which  it  might  originally  have  authorized.  "Windsor  v. 
Des  Moines,  101  Iowa,  343;  Clinton  v.  Walliker,  98  Iowa,  655. 
A  number  of  objections  are  made  to  the  application  of  this  rule 
to  the  case  at  bar.  First,  it  is  said 'that  the  building  and  loan 
law  of  the  state  is  unconstitutional,  because  it  is  class  legisla- 
tion. Some  of  the  arguments  advanced  in  support  of  this  claim 
assail  rather  the  policy  of  such  statutes  than  the  power  to  enact, 
them.  In  theor}^,  these  institutions  are  profit-sharing.  The 
amounts  directly  paid  for  the  use  of  money  go  indirectly  to  the 
benefit  of  the  stockholders,  through  the  increase  in  the  value  of 
their  shares.  Where  the  loans  are  confined  to  shareholders,  we 
can  see  good  reason  for  exempting  such  associations  from  the 
operation  of  the  usury  law.  That  the  constitutional  power  ex- 
ists to  make  this  exemption,  we  think,  is  without  serious  doubt: 
People's  Bldg.  etc.  Assn.  v.  Billing,  104  Mich.  186;  Vermont 
etc.  Trust  Co.  v.  Whithed,  2  N.  Dak.  82;  Archer  v.  Baltimore 
etc.  Assn.  (W.  Va.  April,  1898),  30  S.  E.  Rep.  241.  See  also, 
on  the  general  character  of  these  institutions,  and  the  reasons 
for  special  legislation  in  their  favor,  Hawkins  v.  American  etc. 
Assn.,  96  Ga.  206;  Granite  State  etc.  Assn.  v.  Monk  (N.  J.  Ch. 
Jan.  3,  1895),  30  Atl.  Eep.  872;  Natchez  etc.  Assn.  v.  Shields, 
71  Miss.  630.  Next,  it  is  said  the  curative  act  is  invalid,  so  far 
as  this  case  is  concerned,  for  to  give  it  effect  as  against  de- 
fendant would  impair  vested  rights.  The  act  in  question  was 
passed  after  the  decree  was  rendered  by  the  trial  court  in  this 
case;  and  for  this  reason  it  is  thought  that  defendant's  rights 
had  so  accrued  and  vested  as  that  they  could  not  be  disturbed 
or  altered  such  legislation.  In  Clinton  v.  Walliker,  98  Iowa, 
655,  the  curative  act  was  given  application  to  a  contract  in- 
volved in  a  suit  which  was  pending  when  the  act  was  passed. 
The  same  holding  was  made  in  Tuttle  v.  Polk,  84  Iowa,  12. 
Richman  v.  Supervisors,  77  Iowa,  513,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  308, 


Jan.  1899.]    Iowa  Savings  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.  205 

^***  was  a  certiorari  proceeding  to  test  the  validity  of  an  assess- 
ment and  levy  of  a  tax  for  building  a  levee.  In  a  former  pro- 
ceeding, the  action  of  the  board  of  supervisors  had  been  set 
aside,  and  the  assessment  declared  void,  by  the  circuit  court, 
and  this  holding  was  affirmed  by  this  court.  After  this  final 
judgment,  the  general  assembly  passed  an  act  authorizing  a  new 
assessment.  This  was  had,  and  proceedings  were  again  insti- 
tuted to  test  the  validity  of  the  tax  levied  under  the  curativo 
act.  This  last  is  the  case  we  have  cited.  It  was  urged  by  tho 
petitioners  that  they  had  vested  rights  under  the  first  decision, 
but  the  claim  was  denied  by  this  court.  In  Huff  v.  Cook,  44 
Iowa,  639,  defendant,  a  woman,  claimed  to  have  been  elected 
to  the  office  of  county  superintendent.  In  a  proceeding  to  test 
her  right  to  the  office,  the  trial  court  held  that  she  was  ineli- 
gible because  of  her  sex.  She  appealed.  After  the  judgment 
below,  an  act  was  passed  by  the  general  assembly,  which  in  effect 
declared  that  no  person  previously  elected  to  such  office  should 
be  disqualified  from  holding  the  same  because  of  her  sex.  It 
was  held  by  this  court  that  the  bringing  of  an  action  vests  no 
right  to  a  particular  decision,  and  that  defendant  being  eligible 
when  final  judgment  was  pronounced  it  should  go  in  her  favor. 
See,  also,  Iowa  etc.  Land  Co.  v.  Soper,  39  Iowa,  112,  124.  It 
is  difficult  to  perceive  what  right  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  case  at 
bar  was  disturbed  by  the  curative  act  other  than  a  mere  privi- 
lege of  pleading  usury;  and  this  pertains  only  to  the  remedy, 
which,  it  is  uniformly  held,  may  be  altered  at  the  legislative 
will:  Kossuth  County  v.  Wallace,  60  Iowa,  508;  State  v. 
Squires,  26  Iowa,  340.  So  far  as  the  payments  made  and  fines 
imposed  are  concerned,  they  were  in  accord  with  the  terms  of 
defendant's  contract.  The  effect  of  the  subsequent  legislation 
was  not  to  change  the  agreement,  but  only  to  remove  a  bar  to 
its  enforcement.  The  cause  being  triable  de  novo  in  this  courts 
there  seems  no  legal  objection  to  the  entering  of  a  decree  in  con- 
formity with  the  law  as  it  now  exists. 

*^  7.  It  is  further  urged  against  the  validity  of  the  subse- 
quent legislation  that  it  allows  a  recovery  which  may  be  greater 
than  the  amount  fixed  by  the  contract  in  some  cases;  and  it  i» 
said  that,  in  the  case  at  bar,  plaintiff  could  recover  more  under 
the  law  than  it  could  lawfully  claim  on  its  contract.  But,  so 
far  as  plaintiff  is  concerned,  it  is  seeking  nothing  more  than  it» 
contract  calls  for.  Furthermore,  we  do  not  think  the  measure 
of  recovery  specified  in  the  law  is  meant  to  be  mandatory,  in  the 


201  Iowa  Savikgs  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt.  [Iowa, 

cense  that  the  parties  may  not  make  a  contract  more  favorable 
to  the  debtor  by  which  they  will  be  bound.  The  law  fixes  the 
maximum  of  recovery  against  a  debtor,  and  we  can  see  no  rea- 
feon  why,  within  the  limit  specified,  an  agreement  for  a  differ- 
ent settlement  may  not  be  made. 

8.  Plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  for  the  sum  of  five 
hundred  and  seventy-one  dollars  and  eighty  cents,  with  interest 
^t  eight  per  cent  from  November  1,  1895,  the  date  of  defend- 
ant's default.  We  find  this  amount  by  adding  the  dividends 
to  the  dues  and  premiums  paid,  which  makes  a  total  of  four 
hundred  and  twenty-eight  dollars  and  twenty  cents,  and  de- 
ducting this  from  the  face  value  of  the  note.  We  have  made 
no  deduction  from  defendant's  credits  for  expenses,  because  we 
are  unable  to  determine  what  the  actual  expenses  were.  The 
amount  plaintiff  withheld  from  premiums  for  this  purpose  is 
^iven;  but  it  appears  that  this  was  often  too  liberal  an  allow- 
ance, and  left  a  balance  to  be  carried  to  the  loan  fund.  Plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  charge  defendant  only  for  his  share  of  the  ac- 
tual and  necessary  expense  of  management,  and,  as  is  said,  we 
-cannot  determine  what  this  would  be.  It  is  manifest  from  what 
has  been  said  that  the  judgment  in  favor  of  the  school  fund  is 
■erroneous.  Under  the  circumstances,  we  think  an  apportion- 
ment of  the  cosits  should  be  made.  Following  the  rule  applied 
in  Iowa  etc.  Land  Co.  v.  Soper,  39  Iowa,  112,  the  copts  both  of 
the  court  below  and  of  this  court  will  be  equally  divided  be- 
tween the  parties.  Modified  as  we  have  suggested,  the  decree 
against  defendant  will  be  affirmed. 


BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USURY.-In  some 
parts  of  the  United  States  are  statiites  authorizing  the  formation 
of  such  associations  and  the  loaning  of  their  moneys  upon  pre- 
miums paid  by  their  members,  and  wher'e  such  Is  the  case  the  cor- 
porate mode  of  doing  business  Is  necessarily  legalized  and  ex- 
•empted  from  the  penalties  of  usury.  Partly  from  the  Influence 
of  special  statutes  and  partly  because  the  courts  have  not  regarded 
transactions  of  tliis  class  as  mere  loans  of  money,  but  as  being 
part  of  a  general  business  scheme  In  which  the  borrower  partiei- 
patps  in  the  profits  and  obtains  advantages  In  addition  to  the  mere 
loan  of  money  to  hlra,  the  majority  of  the  decisions  in  this  coun- 
try sustain  the  transactions  in  question,  and  declare  that  they  do 
not  offend  against  the  statutes  upon  the  subject  of  usury:  See  the 
extended  note  to  Bank  of  Newport  v.  Cook,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  200; 
Pollock  V.  Carolina  etc.  Assn.,  51  S.  C.  420,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  683. 
■Contra,  see  Meroney  v,  Atlantic  etc.  Assn.,  116  N.  C.  882,  47  Am. 
€t.  Rep.  841,  and  note.  See  the  monographic  note  to  Robertson 
▼.  Homestead  Assn..  60  Am.  Dec.  150-166. 


Jan.  1899.]    McPeek  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  205 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-USURT-EXACTION 
OF  PREMIUMS.— A  premium,  to  be  legal,  must  be  one  that  Is  bid 
for  a  right  of  precedence  in  taking  a  loan  at  a  competitive  sale, 
and,  when  there  is  no  such  sale  and  no  bid,  there  can  be  no  legal 
premium:  McCauley  v.  Building  etc.  Assn.,  07  Tenn.  421,  56  Am. 
St.  Rep.  813. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— FINES.— Fines  for 
nonpayment  of  dues  are  essential  to  the  exercise  of  the  express 
powere  conferred  upon  building  and  loan  associations  in  their  Inr 
corporation,  and  they  have  a  right  to  impose  them  whether  any 
express  warrant  is  found  for  it  in  the  statute  of  incorporation  or 
not.  They  have  such  power  by  Implication,  but  when  not  fixed  by 
statute,  such  fines  must  be  prescribed  by  the  charter  or  by-laws  of 
the  association  in  precise  and  unequivocal  terms,  so  as  to  be  readily 
understood  by  members,  and  they  must  be  reasonable,  or  they  can- 
not be  enforced:  Roberts  v.  American  etc.  Assn.,  62  Ark.  572,  54  Am. 
St.  Rep.  309,  and  note. 


MoPeet^  V,  Western  Union  Telegraph  Co. 

[107  Iowa,  356.] 

REWARDS -EVIDENCE  TO  PROVE  OFFER— COPY  OP 
GOVERNOR'S  PROCLAMATION.— To  prove  the  offer  of  a  reward 
for  the  arrest  of  a  person,  a  copy  of  the  governor's  proclamation, 
duly  certified  by  the  secretary  of  state,  with  whom  the  original  is 
deposited.  Is  admissible  in  evidence. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— NOTICE  OF  IMPORTANCE 
OP  MESSAGE.— In  an  action  for  damages  occasioned  by  the  delay 
of  a  telegraph  company  in  delivering  a  message,  extrinsic  evidence 
is  admissible  to  show  that  the  company  had  notice  of  the  import- 
ance of  the  messatre. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES- LIABILITY  FOR  NONDE- 
LIVERY OF  MESSAGE.— The  liability  of  a  telegraph  company  \o 
the  sendee  of  a  message  for  damages  resulting  from  a  delay  In 
delivery  is  not  one  arising  from  contract,  but  is  based  uixtn  its 
negligence  In  the  performance  of  a  duty  In  its  public  capacity  as  a 
common  carrier  of  messages. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— DELAY  IN  DELIVERING 
MESSAGE— MEASURE  OP  DAMAGES.— A  person  injured  by  the 
delay  of  a  telegraph  company  in  delivering  a  message  to  him  is 
not  limited  in  his  recovery  to  such  damages  as  might  reasonably 
have  been  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties,  but  recovery 
may  be  had  for  all  the  injurious  results  which  flow  therefrom,  by 
ordinary  natural  sequence,  without  the  Interposition  of  any  other 
negligent  act  or  overpowering  force. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— DAMAGES  FOR  DELAY  IN 
DELIVERY  OF  MESSAGE— LOSS  OP  REWARD.— Where  a  per- 
son has  laid  a  plan  for  the  capture  of  a  fugitive  from  justice  with  a 
view  to  obtaining  the  reward  offered  therefor,  and  has  notified  a 
telegraph  agent  tbat  he  Is  expecting  a  telegram  of  great  Importance 
to  the  success  of  his  plan,  and  the  agent  knows  that  prompt  de- 
livery of  such  message  will  be  necessary,  the  telegraph  company 
will  be  liable  in  damages  to  the  amount  of  such  reward  If  the  agont'8 


206  McPeek  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  [Iowa, 

delay  in  delivery  of  the  message  frustrates  the  sendee's  plan.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  agent  have  actual  notice  of  the  offer  of  the 
reward,  he  being  charged  vrith  knowledge  that  such  offer  might  be 
made. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE  IN  DELIV- 
ERY OF  MESSAGE— BURDEN  OF  PROOF.— In  an  action  aga  nst 
a  telegraph  company  for  the  loss  of  a  reward  offered  for  the  capture 
of  a  fugitive  from  justice,  which  loss  is  alleged  to  have  resulted 
from  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  in  delivering  a  certain  tele- 
gram, the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  the  question 
whether  or  not  such  loss  resulted  from  the  negligence  alleged  Is  for 
the  jury. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  NONDE- 
LIVERY OF  MESSAGE— OFFICE  HOURS.— An  agent  of  a  tele- 
graph company  undertaking  to  deliver  a  message  outside  of  office 
hours  is  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  agency,  and  the  company 
is  liable  for  his  failure  to  exercise  reasonable  diligence.  Whether 
or  not  such  diligence  was  exercised  is  a  question  for  the  Jury. 

Blake  &  Blake,  for  the  appellant. 

John  D.  Dill  and  W.  I.  Babb,  for  the  appellee. 

3s»  LADD,  J.  September  20,  1896,  after  mortally  wound- 
ing John  Finley,  the  marshal  of  Morning  Sun,  Orman  McPher- 
son  fled.  A  few  days  after  the  plaintiff  saw  McPherson's  wife, 
who  promised  to  assist  him  in  procuring  the  arrest  of  her  hus- 
band. McPeek  obtained  McPherson's  pension  papers  from 
Keithsburg,  Illinois,  for  her  and  she  advised  him  (being  in 
secret  correspondence  under  an  assumed  name)  of  having  these, 
and  he  came  to  her  room  at  the  hotel  at  Morning  Sun,  where 
she  was  employed  as  cook,  October  23,  1896,  at  about  10  o'clock 
P.  M.  (having  so  arranged  earlier  in  the  evening),  and  there  re- 
mained until  between  3  and  4  o'clock  the  following  morning. 
Before  coming  in,  he  gave  up  his  revolvers,  and  she  placed  them 
in  a  bureau  where  they  remained  during  his  stay.  She  had 
agreed  to  write  to  McPeek  when  she  expected  her  husband,  but, 
if  he  came  unexpectedly,  then  to  telegraph  him.  At  about 
7  o'clock  P.  M.  of  the  twenty-second,  she  delivered  to  the  de- 
fendant's agent  at  Morning  Sun  this  telegram:  "E.  E.  McPeek, 
Winfield.  Come  on  first  train.  Answer.  M.  E.  M." — telling 
him  she  wanted  it  "sent  right  away  and  delivered,  and  wanted 
an  answer."  Ridgway,  the  agent  at  Winfield,  usually  closed  his 
office  at  6  o'clock,  but  was  ordinarily  at  the  station  at  about  9 
o'clock.  He  received  the  message  at  9:15  o'clock  P.  M.,  and 
carried  it  to  the  plaintiff's  house,  reaching  there  at  about  9:30. 
After  repeatedly  rapping  at  the  door,  and  being  unable  to  arouse 


Jan.  1899.]     McPeek  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  207 

anyone,  as  he  says,  he  placed  the  message  over  the  door  knob, 
with  the  end  of  the  envelope  between  the  door  and  the  jamb, 
where  it  was  found  the  next  day  at  between  9  and  10  o'clock 
A.  M.  It  seems  the  agent  supposed  the  family  was  away  from 
home,  and  would  find  it  upon  their  return.  They  had  in  fact  i 
retired,  and  all  testify  that  they  did  not  hear  the  rapping  of 
Eidgeway,  or  any  noise  at  the  door,  and  that  they  would  have 
heard  it  had  there  been  any.  The  only  train  carrying  passen- 
gers leaving  Winfield  for  Morning  Sun,  a  distance  of  about 
twelve  miles,  left  the  former  place  ^*®  at  6  o'clock  A.  M.  LIc- 
Peek  had  told  liidgeway  he  was  making  an  effort  to  capture 
McPherson,  and  might  get  a  telegram  from  Morning  Sun  con- 
cerning the  matter,  and  that  if  a  message  came,  and  he  was  un- 
able to  find  him,  to  deliver  it  to  Siberts,  a  constable.  Both  had 
repeatedly  called  at  the  office  for  such  a  telegram.  It  also  ap- 
pears that  Siberts,  by  direction  of  McPeek,  had  arranged  for  a 
team  at  the  livery  stable  and  a  driver  to  be  ready  for  him  at  any 
time,  and  that  Siberts  was  to  go  with  McPeek  in  case  McPher- 
son should  come  to  Morning  Sun.  The  constable  at  the  latter 
place,  and  another,  had  agreed  to  assist  him,  though  not  ad- 
vised as  to  the  nature  of  the  business  except  that  it  was  to  make 
an  arrest.  The  evidence  was  such  that  the  jury  was  warranted 
in  finding  the  facts  as  stated,  though  it  must  be  added  that 
Eidgeway  denies  having  previously  talked  with  either  the  plain- 
tiff or  Siberts;  and  McPherson,  who  was  afterward  arrested, 
declared  he  was  not  at  Morning  Sun  as  testified  by  his  wife, 
and  did  not  correspond  with  her.  On  the  twenty-first  day  of 
October,  1896,  the  governor  of  Iowa,  by  proclamation,  offered 
a  reward  of  three  hundred  dollars  for  the  arrest  of  McPherson, 
and  his  delivery  to  the  proper  authorities.  The  plaintiff's  ac- 
tion is  ba^ed  on  the  allegation  that  he  lost  this  reward  through 
the  negligence  of  the  defendant  in  not  delivering  the  message 
on  the  evening  of  October  22d.  "With  these  preliminary  state- 
ments we  shall  be  able  to  consider  the  different  questions  pre- 
sented by  the  record. 

1.  A  copy  of  the  governor's  proclamation,  duly  certified  by 
the  secretary  of  state,  was  received  in  evidence  ove/  the  objec- 
tion of  defendant.  That  such  a  reward  was  authorized  by  sec- 
tion 58  of  the  code  of  1873  is  not  questioned.  The  method  of 
making  the  offer  is  not  pointed  out,  but  it  is  to  be  paid  upon  the 
certificate  of  the  governor.  Usage  has  approved  offering  such 
rewards  by  way  of  proclamations,  and  this  fully  complies  with 


203  McPfiKK  V.  Western  Union  Tel,  Co.  [Iowa, 

the  statute.  That  the  original  proclamations  made  by  the 
executire  of  a  state  should  be  preserved  admits  of  no  doubt. 
The  statute  makes  no  express  provision  ^^^  for  such  pres- 
ervation, but  by  section  66  the  secretary  of  state  "shall  have 
charge  of  and  keep  ....  papers  which  are  now  or  may  be 
hereafter  deposited  to  be  kept  in  his  office."  The  secretary 
certified  that  he  was  the  custodian  of  the  record  of  the  official 
acts  of  the  executive  department,  and  that  the  proclamation 
was  a  part  of  the  files  of  his  office.  "We  take  it,  then,  that  this 
was  deposited,  to  be  kept  by  the  secretary  of  state.  Section 
4649  provides,  in  substance,  that  acts  of  the  executive  of  this 
state  are  proved  by  the  records  of  the  state  department.  The 
very  evident  purpose  is  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  calling  the  gov- 
ernor before  a  co-ordinate  branch  of  government  to  give  evi- 
dence or  answer  for  any  of  his  acts.  While  the  statute  does 
not  in  express  terms  make  such  papers  a  part  of  the  files  to  be 
kept  and  preserved  by  the  secretary  of  state,  we  are  of  opinion 
that  section  66  is  broad  enough  to  include  them,  that  by  fair 
implication  section  4649  authorizes  them  to  be  so  kept,  and 
that,  under  sections  4649  and  4635  of  the  code,  a  certified  copy 
thereof  is  admissible  in  evidence  in  lieu  of  the  originals. 

3.  The  defendant  also  interposed  objections  to  the  testimony 
of  the  plaintiff,  Siberts,  and  Mrs.  McPherson  to  the  arrange- 
ment made  between  them  with  reference  to  the  capture  of  Mc- 
Pherson. This' was  original,  and  not  hearsay,  evidence.  It  re- 
lated to  circumstances  and  facts  essential  to  be  proven  as  lead- 
ing up  to  the  sending  of  the  telegram  and  had  a  direct  bearing 
upon  the  probability  of  the  plaintiff  effecting  the  arrest  of  Mc- 
Pherson, had  the  telegram  been  properly  delivered.  It  was 
necessary  to  show  the  exact  situation,  and  all  that  had  been  done 
to  accomplish  that  purpose.  The  appellant  is  impressed  by  the 
danger  of  fraud  in  this  class  of  evidence.  It  is  suggested  that, 
if  there  be  possibility  of  fraud,  it  may  readily  be  obviated  by  the 
exercise  of  diligence. 

3.  It  is  insisted  that  the  damages  were  remote,  and  not  such 
as  either  party  might  have  contemplated  from  the  ""^  wording 
of  the  message.  But  extrinsic  evidence  was  admissible  to  show 
that  defendant  had  notice  of  the  importance  of  the  message: 
Postal  Tel.  Cable  Co.  v.  Lathrop,  131  111.  575,  19  Am.  St.  Eep. 
55;  Western  Union  Tel.*  Co.  v.  Edsall,  74  Tex.  329,  15  Am.  St. 
Rep.  835.  The  appellant  argues  the  case  on  the  theory  that  the 
action  of  plaintiff  is  for  the  breach  of  contract.     He  made  no 


Jan.  1899.]     McPeek  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  209 

contract  with  the  defendant.  This  is  conceded  by  appellant  in. 
its  opening  argument,  and  denied  in  its  reply.  The  first  im- 
pression was  undoubtedly  the  correct  one.  The  contract  was 
with  the  sender  of  the  message,  and  whether  recovery  might  be 
had  for  breach  thereof,  because  made  for  plaintiff's  benefit,  we 
need  not  determine.  This  action  is  based  on  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant  in  the  performance  of  a  duty  in  its  public  ca- 
pacity as  a  common  carrier  of  messages.  In  all  such  actions, 
sounding  in  tort,  the  injured  party  is  not  limited  to  damages 
which  might  reasonably  have  been  within  the  contemplation  of 
the  parties,  but  recovery  may  be  had  "for  all  the  injurious  re- 
sults which  flow  therefrom,  by  ordinary,  natural  sequence, 
without  the  interposition  of  any  other  negligent  act  or  over- 
powering force":  Mentzer  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  93  Iowa, 
757,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  294;  Code,  sec.  2163;  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Du  Bois,  128  111.  248,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  109;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Allen,  66  Miss.  549;  Ellis  v.  American 
Tel.  Co.,  13  Allen,  226;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Fenton,  52 
Ind.  1;  Smith  v.  AVestern  Union  Tel.  Co.,  83  Ky.  104,  4  Am. 
St.  Rep.  126;  Milliken  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  110  N.  Y. 
403;  Young  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  107  N.  C.  370,  22  Am. 
St.  Rep.  883;  AVestern  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Adams,  75  Tex.  531, 
16  Am.  St.  Rep.  920.  There  was  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
immediate  delivery  was  requested,  and  that  the  agent  at  Win- 
field  knew  that  McPeek  was  expecting  a  message,  that  it  would 
relate  to  the  capture  of  McPherson,  and  that  prompt  delivery 
was  required.  If  so,  while  he  may  not  have  known  of  the  re- 
ward being  offered  he  may  well  be  credited  with  understanding 
that  McPeek  was  putting  forth  his  efforts  to  accomplish  a  ^**** 
purpose  from  which  he  anticipated  some  benefit  to  accrue  to 
himself.  The  law  authorizes  the  offering  of  such  rewards,  and  it 
is  not  too  strict  a  rule  to  hold  the  defendant  responsible  for  such 
losses  as  may  reasonably  be  anticipated  to  follow  its  negligence, 
whether  informed  definitely  what  these  may  be  or  not.  It  was 
charged  with  knowledge  that  such  a  reward  might  be  made,  and 
it  might  reasonably  reckon  on  such  a  contingency,  in  omitting 
its  duty  with  reference  to  such  a  message.  Nor  was  the  plaintiff 
advised  that  the  reward  had  actually  been  offered  on  October 
22d,  though  he  understood  it  would  be,  and  was  acting  to  se- 
cure this  and  others  proposed  by  local  officers.  That  the  omis- 
sion of  the  defendant  caused  greater  loss  than  he  then  supposed 
does  not  affect  its  liability,  or  his  right  of  recovery.     Certainly, 

Am.  St.  Rbp..  Vou  LXX.— 14 


iilO  McPeek  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  [Iowa, 

the  loss  of  the  reward  was  the  direct  result  of  the  failure  to  ar- 
rest and  deliver  McPherson  to  the  proper  authorities,  for  this 
was  the  very  condition  of  its  payment. 

4.  The  burden  was  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  that  in  all  rea- 
sonable probability  the  loss  resulted  from  the  negligence  of  the 
defendant:  Hendershott  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  106  Iowa, 
529,  68  Am.  St.  Eep.  313.  Had  the  plaintiff  proceeded  by  team 
to  Morning  Sun,  with  the  assistance  of  the  two  constables  and 
another,  there  §eems  no  good  reason  to  doubt  that  he  would 
have  arrested  McPherson,  who  had  been  disarmed  by  his  wife. 
This  is  not  absolutely  certain,  for  many  contingencies  may  be 
supposed  which  could  have  intervened.  While  these  might  well 
be  considered,  they  do  not  warrant  us  in  saying  that  these  men 
would  not  have  accomplished  that  which  has  often  been  done 
before,  and  which  is  ordinarily  done  by  officers  in  like  situation. 
Whether  they  would  in  all  probability  have  succeeded  was  for 
the  jury  to  determine. 

5.  It  is  suggested  that,  as  the  train  did  not  go  until  6:06  in 
the  morning,  even  if  the  message  had  been  delivered  the  plain- 
tiff could  not  have  reached  Morning  Sun  in  time  to  make  the 
arrest.  But  the  plaintiff  had  made  every  arrangement  to  go  by 
team.  This  message  was  understood  '^^^  by  the  plaintiff  to 
require  immediate  attention  owing  to  his  agreement  with  Mrs. 
McPherson. 

6.  It  may  be  that  the  defendant  can  fix  office  hours  which 
are  reasonable,  and  that  those  from  8  A.  M.  to  6  o'clock  P.  M. 
are  not  unreasonable.  This  we  do  not  decide.  But  see  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Harding,  103  Ind.  505;  Given  v.  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.,  24  Fed.  Eep.  119.  The  company  received  thisi 
message,  if  Mrs.  McPherson  is  to  be  believed,  with  the  under- 
standing that  it  was  to  be  delivered  at  about  9  o'clock.  The 
agent  at  Winfield  received  it,  and  the  company,  having  under- 
taken to  deliver  it,  was  bound  to  do  so  with  reasonable  dili- 
gence: Thompson  on  Electricity,  sec.  300.  He  was  acting  with- 
in the  scope  of  his  agency,  although  not  within  the  hours  fixed 
for  the  active  discharge  of  his  duties.  This  could  not  relieve 
the  company  from  discharging  the  obligation  incurred  by  fe- 
ceiving  the  message  to  be  delivered  out  of  office  hours. 

7.  The  defendant  asserts  that  no  negligence  in  failiT><T  to  de- 
liver the  message  has  been  shown.  If  the  testimony  of  llidgeway 
be  accepted  as  true,  it  might  be  that,  in  loudly  rapping  on  the 
door  repeatedly,  and  receiving  no  response,  he  exercised  reasona- 


Jan.  1899.]     McPeek  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  211 

ble  diligence.  Tliis  is  in  dispute.  The  daughter  of  the  plaintiff 
testified  that  she  was  at  his  home  from  9  o'clock  P.M.,  and  did  not 
retire  until  a  half-hour  later,  and  that  she  heard  no  noise  at  the 
door.  Mr.  and  Mrs.  McPeek  also  testified  that  they  heard  no 
€uch  noise,  and  that  they  would  have  been  likely  to  have  heard 
it,  had  there  been  any.  Whether  Kidgeway  made  any  effort  to 
arouse  the  family  is  put  in  question  by  this  evidence.  If  he  was 
■advised  of  the  importance  of  the  message,  as  claimed  by  the 
plaintiff,  he  was  bound  to  exercise  diligence  accordingly,  and 
whether  he  so  did  was  for  the  determination  of  the  jury. 

Some  other  matters  are  discussed,  but  they  are  not  of  suri- 
cient  importance  to  call  for  special  attention.  We  discover  nc 
€rror  in  the  record,  and  the  judgment  must  be  affirmed. 


TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES-DELAY  IN  DELIVERY  OP  MES- 
SAGE—LIABILITY TO  SENDEE.— No  relation  of  contract  exists 
between  the  receiver  of  a  dispatch  and  the  telegraph  company,  and 
the  proper  remedy  of  the  former  for  damages  is  an  action  in  tort: 
Webhe  v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  169  111.  610.  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  '207; 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dubois,  128  III.  248,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  109. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— DELAY  IN  DELIVERY— DAM- 
AGES.—It  is  as  much  the  duty  of  a  telegraph  company  to  use  dili- 
gence in  delivering  messages  without  unreasonable  delay  as  in 
transmitting  them,  and  it  is  generally  liable  in  special  damages  for 
such  delay  or  for  the  nondelivery  of  a  message:  Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.  V.  Moore,  12  Ind.  App.  136,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  515,  and  note.  A 
telegraph  company  is  liable  for  such  damage  as  is  the  direct  and 
natural  result  of  Its  ^allure  to  deliver  a  message:  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  V,  Broesche,  72  Tex.  654,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  843.  The  general 
rule  is,  that  the  damages  must  be  such  as  may  fairly  be  supi)osed 
to  have  entered  into  the  contemplation  of  the  parties  when  they 
made  the  contract;  that  Is,  must  be  such  as  might  naturally  be  ex- 
pected to  follow  its  violation:  See  the  extended  note  to  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  778.  The  loss  of  a  mere 
opportunity  or  possibility  to  make  some  money  does  not  render  a 
telegraph  company  liable  in  damages  for  the  nondelivery  of  a  tile- 
gram:  Clay  V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  81  Ga.  285,  12  Am,  St.  Rep. 
316. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— NOTICE  OF  IMPORTANCE  OF 
MESSAGE.— To  authorize  a  recovery  of  special  damages  for  delay 
in  the  delivery  of  a  message,  the  telegraph  company  must  have 
had  notice,  either  from  the  face  of  the  message  or  otherwise,  at  the 
time  of  receiving  it,  of  the  circumstances  out  of  which  special  dam- 
ages might  arise:  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Loonio.  82  Tex.  323,  27  Am. 
St.  Rep.  891,  and  note.  Contra,  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hyer, 
22  Fla.  037,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  222,  and  note. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES  —  DELIVERY  OF  MESSAGE— 
BURDEN  OF  PROOF.— A  prima  facie  case  is  made  out  asainst  a 
telegraph  company  when  it  is  shown  that  the  message  which  the 
company  undertook  to  send  was  not  delivered,  and  that  damage 
has  resulted,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  then  thrown  upon  the 
company  to  show  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  and  that  its  fnllure 
to  transmit  and  deliver  the  message  was  not  caused  by  Its  fault 
or  nesligpnoe,  or  that  of  its  tMuplov/^s:  Fowler  v.  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.,  80  Me.  381,  6  Am.  St  Rep.  211. 


212  Feder  v.  Iowa  State  etc.  Assn.  [Iowa, 


Fbder  V.  Iowa  State  Traveling  Men's  Association. 

[107  Iowa,  538.] 

INSURANCE  -  ACCIDENT  -  WHAT  IS.-While  it  may  be 
true  that  an  accident  Is  an  event  which  takes  place  without  one'a 
foresight  or  expectation,  and  Is  undesigned,  It  is  not  true  that  every 
unforeseen,  undesigned,  and  unexpected  event  is  an  accident  A 
result  which,  though  not  designed,  foreseen,  or  expected,  is  yet  the 
natural  and  direct  effect  of  acts  voluntarily  done,  or  of  conditlona 
voluntarily  assumed,  cannot  be  said  to  be  accidental. 

INSURANCE  —  ACCIDENT  —  DEATH  BY— RUPTURE  OF 
ARTERY.— Where  the  death  of  an  insured  was  due  to  the  rupture 
of  an  artery  it  will  not  be  considered  as  the  result  of  accident  where, 
in  the  circumstances  attending  the  rupture,  there  is  no  evidence 
that  anything  was  done  or  occurred  which  the  insured  had  not  fore- 
seen or  planned,  except  the  rupture  and  Its  consequences. 

Berry  hill  &  Henry  and  George  E.  Hubbell,  for  the  appel- 
lants. 

Cumm'ins,  Hewitt  &  Wright,  for  the  appellee. 

«538  EOBINSON,  C.  J.  The  certificate  in  suit  was  issued  to 
one  Louis  L.  Feder,  and  entitled  him  to  all  the  benefits  accru- 
ing from  membership  in  the  defendant  by  virtue  of  its  consti- 
tution and  by-laws.  "When  the  certificate  was  issued,  an  article- 
of  the  constitution  of  the  defendant  provided  that  "whenever 
the  death  of  a  member  of  this  association  in  good  standing 
shall  occur  from  any  accidental  cause  (except  while  such  mem- 
ber shall  be  under  the  influence  of  intoxicating  liquors  or  nar- 
cotics)," and  proofs  thereof  should  be  made,  the  ^'^^  proceeds 
of  an  assessment  of  two  dollars  on  each  member  of  the  associa- 
tion, not  exceeding  the  sum  of  five  thousand  dollars,  should  be- 
paid  to  the  beneficiary  named  in  the  certificate,  or  to  hia  heirs 
or  legal  representatives,  provided,  however,  that  if,  at  the  time 
of  such  death,  the  amount  of  money  in  the  treasury  of  the  asso- 
ciation not  otherwise  appropriated  should  exceed  the  sum  of  five 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  payment  of  five  thousand  dol- 
lars was  to  be  made  from  the  money  in  the  treasury.  On  the 
eighteenth  day  of  April,  1894,  Feder  died.  At  that  time  he- 
was  a  member  of  the  association  in  good  standing,  and  this  ac- 
tion is  brought  on  the  certificate,  to  recover  the  sum  of  five- 
thousand  dollars.  The  validity  of  the  certificate  is  admitted,  the 
death  of  Feder  is  not  disputed,  and  notice  and  proofs  of  his 
death  are  shown.  We  are  required  to  determine  whether  there 
was  sufficient  evidence  tending  to  show  that  Feder's  death  re- 


Feb.  1899.]       Feder  v.  Iowa  State  etc.  Assn.  213 

suited  "from  an  accidental  cause"  to  require  the  submission  of 
the  case  to  the  jury. 

The  evidence  tended  to  establish  the  following:  The  dece- 
dent, at  the  time  of  his  death,  was  about  twenty-six  years  of 
age,  and  had  been  in  Denver,  where  his  death  occurred,  about 
nine  months.  He  was  suffering  from  consumption,  and  wet  t 
to  Denver  and  resided  there,  on  account  of  his  health.  He  was 
benefited  by  the  change  of  climate  and  medical  treatment  he 
received,  and  his  health  had  been  considerably  improved,  and 
was  constantly  improving,  at  the  time  of  his  death.  During 
the  day  of  his  death  he  had  been  as  well  as  usual,  and  in  the 
evening  was  with  two  of  his  brothers  in  their  office.  Prepara- 
tory to  leaving  it,  the  decedent  went  to  a  window  to  close  the 
shutters.  A  chair  stood  in  front  of  the  window,  and  he  stood 
on  his  toes,  and  reached  over  the  chair  toward  the  shutters,  and, 
as  he  did  so,  blood  began  to  flow  from  his  mouth.  He  was 
placed  on  a  lounge,  and  died  within  a  few  minutes.  The  cause 
of  his  death  was  hemorrhage  from  a  ruptured  artery,  and  the 
evidence  would  have  authorized  the  conclusion  that  the  rup- 
ture *****  of  the  artery  was  not  due  to  the  disease  from  which 
he  was  suffering.  There  is  no  evidence  that  he  fell,  slipped, 
lost  his  balance,  failed  to  catch  the  shutter  when  he  reached  for 
it,  or  that  it  moved  at  his  touch  more  or  less  readily  than  he 
had  expected  it  would  move;  in  other  words,  there  is  no  evi- 
dence whatever  that  anything  was  done  or  occurred  which  he 
had  not  foreseen  and  planned,  excepting  the  rupture  of  the  ar- 
tery, and  the  consequences  which  resulted  from  it. 

Did  his  death  result  "from  an  accidental  cause"  ?  Various  . 
definitions  of  the  word  "accident"  are  quoted  by  the  appellants, 
and  among  them  are  the  following:  It  is  an  "unexpected  event, 
which  happens  as  by  chance,  or  which  does  not  take  place  ac- 
cording to  the  usual  course  of  things":  North  American  etc.  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Burroughs,  69  Pa.  St.  43,  8  Am.  Rep.  212.  "The  equita- 
ble definition  of  the  term  'accident'  includes,  not  only  inevitable 
casualties,  and  such  as  are  caused  by  the  act  of  God,  but  also 
those  which  arise  from  unforeseen  occurrences,  misfortunes, 
losses,  and  acts  or  omissions  of  other  persons,  without  fault,  neg- 
ligence, or  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the  person  injured" :  Bost- 
wick  V.  Stiles,  35  Conn.  198.  "An  event  which  takes  place 
without  one's  foresight  or  expectation";  and  it  may  include  an 
injury  received  in  a  common-law  affray,  without  the  fault  of 
the  person  injured:  Supreme  Council  etc.  v.  Garrigus,  104  Ind« 


214  Fedeb  v.  Iowa  State  etc.  Assn.  [Iowa> 

133,  54  Am.  Eep.  298.  ''An  event  that  takes  place  without 
one's  foresight  or  expectation;  an  event  which  proceeds  from 
an  unknown  cause,  or  is  an  unusual  effect  of  a  known  cause,  and,, 
therefore,  not  expected";  Schneider  v.  Provident  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  24 
Wis.  30,  1  Am.  Eep.  157.  "An  accident  is  the  happening  of 
an  event  without  the  aid  and  the  design  of  the  person,  and 
which  is  unforeseen":  Paul  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  112  N.  Y. 
472,  8  Am.  St.  Eep.  758.  "An  event  thai  takes  place  without 
one's  foresight  or  expectation;  an  undesigned,  sudden,  and  un- 
expected event" :  Webster's  International  Dictionary.  See,  also,. 
Fidelity  etc.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  72  Miss.  333;  Games  v.  Iowa  etc> 
Ass.,  106  Iowa,  281,  68  Am.  St.  Eep.  306.  The  ordinary  ^^^ 
and  popular  meaning  of  the  word  "accidental"  is  said  to  be 
"happening  by  chance;  unexpectedly  taking  place;  not  accord- 
ing to  the  usual  course  of  things;  or  not  as  expected":  United 
States  etc.  Assn.  v.  Barry,  131  U.  S.  100. 

It  is  argued  that  the  rupture  of  a  blood  vessel  is  not  the 
usual  result  of  an  effort  to  close  shutters;  therefore,  when  it 
occurs,  it  is  unusual,  unexpected,  and  an  accident.  While  it 
may  be  true  that  an  accident  is  an  event  which  takes  place 
without  one's  foresight  or  expectation,  and  is  undesigned,  it 
is  not  true  that  every  unforeseen,  undesigned,  and  unexpected 
event  is  an  "accident,"  within  the  ordinary  and  popular  mean- 
ing of  that  term.  Thus,  a  person  might  voluntarily  and  know- 
ingly expose  himself  to  a  contagious  disease,  or  to  excessive 
heat  or  cold,  or  to  sudden  changes  of  temperature,  or  might 
adopt  a  strange  diet  or  mode  of  living;  but,  if  death  resulted,  it 
.would  not  be  due  to  an  accidental  cause,  although  wholly  un- 
designed, unforeseen,  and  unexpected.  So,  if  a  person  suffer- 
ing from  some  weakness  or  disease,  should  subject  himself  to 
conditions  which  would  not  injuriously  affect  persons  in  ordi- 
nary health,  but  would  be  dangerous  to  him,  and  injury  result^ 
it  would  not  be  due  to  an  accidental  cause.  For  example,  if  a 
person  having  a  diseased  heart  should  take  violent  exercise  vol- 
untarily, and  death  should  result,  the  cause  would  not  be  acci- 
dental: Southard  v.  Eailway  etc.  Assur.  Co.,  34  Conn.  574.  See,, 
also.  Bacon  v.  United  States  etc.  Assn.,  123  K  Y.  304,  20  Am. 
St.  Eep.  748;  Sinclair  v.  Assurance  Co.,  3  El.  &  E.  478.  Al- 
though a  result  may  not  be  designed,  foreseen,  or  expected,  yet^ 
if  it  be  the  natural  and  direct  effect  of  acts  voluntarily  done,  or 
of  conditions  voluntarily  assumed,  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  ac- 
cidental. 


Feb.  1899.]       Fedeb  v.  Iowa  State  etc.  Assn.  215 

"We  do  not  think  the  cases  relied  upon  by  the  appellant  hold 
a  contrary  rule.  In  Hamlyn  v.  Insurance  Co.,  1  Q.  B.  Div.  750, 
it  appeal's  that  a  person  sustained  an  injury  to  his  knee  in  at- 
tempting to  catch  a  rolling  marble;  but  it  was  found  that  the 
injury  resulted  from  an  unnatural  position  or  movement  of 
the  leg,  which  was  not  intended  by  the  person  ***  injured. 
The  injury  considered  in  North  American  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bur- 
roughs, 69  Pa.  St.  43,  8  Am.  Rep.  212,  was  caused  by  the  unin- 
tended slipping  of  a  pitchfork  in  the  hands  of  the  person  in- 
jured in  such  a  manner  that  it  struck  him  in  the  bowels,  and 
caused  the  injury.  The  case  of  Burkhard  v.  Travellers'  Ins.  Co., 
102  Pa.  St.  262,  48  Am.  Rep.  205,  involved  the  act  of  a  person 
injured  in  stepping  into  a  hole  in  a  bridge,  of  which  he  had  no 
knowledge.  And  in  the  case  of  Schneider  v.  Provident  etc.  Ins. 
Co.,  24  Wis.  28,  1  Am.  Rep.  157,  it  appears  that  the  person  in- 
sured, in  attempting  to  get  upon  a  moving  train,  fell  under 
the  cars  and  was  killed ;  but  it  was  not  claimed  that  his  fall  was 
the  result  of  his  doing  what  he  intended  to  do. 

The  certificate  in  suit  made  the  defendant  liable  if  the  death 
of  Feder  resulted  from  an  accidental  cause.  The  evidence 
shows  that  the  cause  was  the  ruptured  artery;  but  that  was  not 
accidental,  if  it  was  the  natural  result  of  an  act  voluntarily 
done  by  Feder.  That  he  did  an3rthing  but  what  he  intended  to 
do,  in  attempting  to  close  the  shutters,  is  not  shown  nor  claimed. 
It  is  not  even  shown  that  he  made  any  unusual  exertion  in  what 
he  did.  Had  the  artery  been  ruptured  while  the  decedent  was 
sitting  quietly  in  his  chair,  or  while  walking  at  a  moderate 
pace,  there  would  be  no  ground  for  claiming  that  the  rupture 
was  accidental;  and  we  do  not  think  that,  because  the  act  of 
closing  the  shutters  may  have  required  a  little  more  exertion 
than  would  have  been  required  to  remain  seated  or  to  walk  lei- 
surely, the  rupture  was  accidental.  So  far  as  is  shown,  it  may 
have  been,  and  probably  was,  due  to  a  weakened  or  diseased 
condition  of  the  artery.  But,  however  that  was,  we  are  satis- 
fied that  there  was  no  evidence  which  would  have  authorized 
the  jury  to  find  that  the  rupture  was  accidental,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  certificate.  "We  conclude  that  the  district  court 
was  right  in  directing  a  verdict  for  the  defendant,  and  the  judg- 
ment rendered  is  therefore  affirmed. 


INSURANCE-ACCIDENT— WHAT  IS.— An  acclrlent,  within  the 
meaning  of  insurance  against  doath  from  an  accidental  cause,  is 
an  event  happening  without  any  human  agency,  or,  If  happening 


216  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Bank.  [Iowa, 

through  human  agency,  an  event  which,  under  the  circumstances, 
is  unusual,  and  not  expected,  to  the  person  to  whom  it  happens: 
Carnes  v.  Iowa  etc.  Assn.,  106  Iowa,  281,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  306;  Meyer 
V.  Fidelity  etc.  Co.,  96  Iowa,  378,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  374.  Death  by 
"accident"  means  death  from  any  unexpected  event  which  proceeds 
from  an  unlinown  and  unforeseen  cause,  happening  without  the 
design  of  the  person  acted  upon:  Lovelace  v.  Travelers'  Protective 
Assn.,  126  Mo.  104,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  638.  See  the  extended  note  to 
Paul  V.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  8  Am.  St  Rep.  763,  on  what  is  death 
by  accidental  means. 


First  National  Bank  v.  German  Bank. 

[107  IOWA,  643.] 

BANKS  AND  BANKING-SELECTION  OF  NOTARY— LIA- 
BILITY FOR  HIS  NEGLIGENCE.— A  bank  to  which  a  draft  is 
sent  by  another  bank  for  collection  is  not  liable  to  the  latter  for  the 
negligence  of  a  notary  public  prudently  selected  by  the  former  to 
protest  the  draft  for  nonpayment,  which  negligence  consisted  iu 
the  failure  of  the  notary  to  ascertain  the  residence  of  the  person 
who  indorsed  the  draft  to  the  sendor  bank,  or  to  notify  him  of  the 
dishonor  of  the  draft.  This  rule  is  not  changed  by  the  fact  that 
the  notary  was  also  assistant  cashier  of  the  collecting  bank. 

BANKS  AND  BANKING— COLLECTIONS— NEGLIGENCE 
OF  NOTARY.— Where  one  bank  makes  another  bank  its  agent  for 
the  collection  of  a  draft,  it  impliedly  authorizes  it  to  employ  a 
notary,  if  necessary,  to  protest  the  draft,  and  if,  through  the  not- 
ary's negligence,  collection  of  the  draft  is  prevented,  in  the  absence 
of  reasonable  prudence  on  the  part  of  the  collecting  bank  In  the 
selection  of  a  notary,  such  collecting  bank  is  not  liable  for  the 
notary's  negligence,  but  the  sendor  bank  must  seek  its  remedy 
against  the  notary. 

BANKS  AND  BANKING  —  SELECTION  OF  NOTARY- 
POWERS  OF  NOTARIES.— In  Iowa,  giving  notice  to  indorsers  of  a 
protested  instrument  is  made  a  part  of  the  official  duty  of  the  notary 
making  the  protest,  and  a  collecting  bank  acts  prudently  in  intrust- 
ing to  a  notary  the  giving  of  such  notice. 

The  plaintiff  purchased  of  Fameraan  a  draft,  which,  comini^ 
into  defendant's  hands  for  collection,  was  properly  presented 
for  payment,  which  was  refused.  The  draft  was  at  once  placed 
in  the  hands  of  a  notary  for  protest,  and  through  his  failure  to 
properly  notify  Farneman,  the  plaintiff  was  denied  a  recovery 
against  Farneman  on  the  draft:  See  Bank  v.  Farneman,  93 
Iowa,  1G3.  This  action  is  for  the  amount  of  the  draft  and  the 
expenses  and  costs  of  that  ease.  Appeal  from  judgment  for  de- 
fendant. 

F.  M.  Powers,  for  the  appellant. 

M.  W.  Beach,  for  the  appellee. 


Feb.  1899.]     First  Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Bank.  217 

'^'^  LADD,  J.  That  ihe  draft  was  sent  to  the  defendant 
bank  for  collection,  and  was  presented  to  the  drawee  for  pay- 
ment in  apt  time  admits  of  no  doubt:  Hamlin  v.  Simpson,  105 
Iowa,  125.  The  exercise  of  prudence  in  the  selection  of  a  no- 
tary public  is  not  questioned.  The  very  gist  of  the  action  is 
that  the  defendant  is  chargeable  with  the  negligence  of  that 
officer  in  failing  to  learn  of  Fameman's  residence,  and  notifying 
him  of  the  dishonor  of  the  draft.  But  a  notary  is  a  public  offi- 
cer, appointed  by  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  state,  is  under 
bond  for  the  faithful  performance  of  his  duties  as  such,  and 
keeps  a  public  record  of  his  acts,  certified  copies  of  which  may 
be  received  in  evidence:  Code,  sec.  373  et  seq.  He  is  not  a  mere 
agent  of  the  bank,  but  a  public  officer  sworn  to  properly  dis- 
charge his  duties  to  the  public.  As  such  officer,  the  bank  may 
not  control  his  acts,  nor  dictate  in  what  manner  he  shall  per- 
form his  duties.  If  guilty  of  malfeasance  in  the  performance 
of  an  official  act,  he,  and  not  the  bank,  is  responsible.  That 
this  notary  was  also  an  employe  of  the  bank  can  make  no  dif- 
ference. When  acting  as  such  officer,  he  was  not  discharging 
his  duties  as  servant.  The  positions  were  distinct,  and  his  acts 
in  the  capacity  of  an  officer  of  the  state  had  no  connection  with 
the  services  he  owed  the  bank.  Again,  the  defendant  was  a 
mere  agent  for  the  collection  of  the  draft,  and,  owing  to  its  dis- 
honor, deposited  it  with  a  notary  for  protest.  "A  subagent  is 
accountable,  ordinarily,  only  to  his  superior  agent,  when  em- 
ployed without  the  assent  or  direction  of  the  principal.  ^'*^ 
But,  if  he  be  employed  with  the  express  or  implied  assent  of  the 
principal,  the  superior  agent  will  not  be  responsible  for  his  acts. 
There  is,  in  such  a  case,  a  privity  between  the  subagent  and  the 
principal,  who  must,  therefore,  seek  a  remedy  directly  against 
the  subagent  for  his  negligence  or  misconduct" :  Guelich  v.  Na- 
tional St.  Bank,  56  Iowa,  435,  41  Am.  Rep.  110.  In  making 
such  collections  it  is  usual  to  employ  a  notary,  and,  in  forward- 
ing the  draft,  there  was  an  implied  direction  to  do  so,  if  neces- 
sary: See  Mount  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  37  Iowa,  457.  If  the 
defendant  exercised  prudence  in  making  the  selection,  its  re- 
sponsibility ended.  This  is  all  it  could  have  done  had  the 
draft  been  its  own,  and  surely  it  will  not  be  held  to  a  higher 
degree  of  care  when  acting  for  others:  Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  La., 
1  I>a.  Ann.  13,  45  Am.  Dec.  72;  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Howell,  8  Md. 
530,  63  Am.  Dec.  714;  Hyde  v.  Planters'  Bank,  17  La.  560, 
36  Am.  Dec.  621;  Tiernan  v.  Commercial  Bank,  7  How.  (Miss.) 


218  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Bank.  [Iowa, 

648,  40  Am.  Dec.  83;  Bellemire  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  4  Whart.  105, 
33  Am.  Dec.  46;  Britton  v.  Niccolls,  104  U.  S.  '766;  Warren 
Bank  v.  Suffolk  Bank,  10  Cush.  582;  Stacy  v.  Dane  County 
Bank,  12  Wis.  629;  May  v.  Jones,  88  Ga.  308,  30  Am.  St.  Eep. 
154;  Agricultural  Bank  v.  Commercial  Bank,  7  Smedes  &  M. 
592;  Bank  v.  Butler,  41  Ohio  St.  519,  52  Am.  Eep.  94;  Mechem 
on  Agency,  sec.  514.  While  there  is  a  conflict  in  opinion,  the 
rule  announced  is  sustained  by  the  weight  of  authority  and  the 
better  reason:  See  collection  of  cases  in  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency. 
of  Law,  2d  ed.,  808,  and  note  to  Isham  v.  Post,  141  N.  Y.  100, 
38  Am.  St.  Ptep.  775;  also  Allen  v.  Merchants'  Bank,  22  Wend. 
215,  34  Am.  Dec.  289. 

The  distinction  between  a  foreign  and  an  inland  bill  of  ex- 
change should  not  be  overlooked.  To  charge  the  makers  and 
indorsers,  the  former  must  be  protested.  Not  so  with  the  latter. 
All  that  is  required  is  a  demand,  and,  on  refusal  to  pay,  notice 
of  dishonor  in  order  to  fix  liability  of  the  indorsers  of  an  in- 
land bill;  and  these  may  be  made  and  given  by  the  holder,  or 
anyone  acting  in  his  behalf.  By  the  law  merchant,  giving 
notice  of  dishonor  is  no  part  of  a  notary's  official  duty,  and 
when  he  does  so  he  is  merely  acting  as  agent  of  the  holder: 
Swayze  v.  Britton,  17  Kan.  625;  ^*^  Allen  v.  Merchants'  Bank, 
22  Wend.  215,  34  Am.  Dec.  289;  Daniels  on  Negotiable  Instru- 
ment, sec.  960.  But  it  is  customary  for  him,  in  protesting  a 
bill,  to  give  the  proper  notice  of  dishonor:  Proffatt  on  Notice, 
sees.  142,  143.  And  in  many  of  the  s'tates  the  law  merchant  is 
60  modified  that  he  is  required  to  give  notice.  Formerly  his 
certificate  might  not  be  received  as  proof  of  the  protest  of  an 
inland  bill:  Case  v.  Heffner,  10  Ohio,  180.  By  section  378  of 
the  code,  "every  notary  public  is  required  to  keep  a  true  record 
of  all  notices  given  or  sent  by  him,  with  the  time  and  manner 
in  which  the  same  were  given  or  sent  and  the  names  of  all  the 
parties  to  whom  the  same  were  given  or  sent,  v*-ith  a  copy  of 
the  instrument  in  relation  to  which  the  notice  is  served  and  of 
the  notice  itself."  Section  379  requires  his  record  and  official 
papers  to  be  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  court  upon  his  death, 
resignation,  or  removal,  and  provides  for  certified  copies.  Very 
evidently  this  is  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  proof  of  the 
notice  as  well  as  of  the  demand  and  protest.  Section  3054 
permits  a  notary  "to  inform  the  indorser  or  any  party  to  be 
charged,  if  in  the  ?ame  town  or  township,  by  notice  deposited  in 
the  nearest  postoffice  to  the  parties  to  be  charged,  on  the  day 


Feb.  1899.]     First  Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Bank.  219 

of  the  demand,  and  no  other  notice  shall  be  necessary  to  charge 
such  party."  The  advantage  in  having  an  inland  bill  pro- 
tested by  a  notary,  and  notice  given  by  him,  is  that  the  evi- 
dence is  thus  perpetuated;  and  notice  to  indor^ers  living  in  the 
&ame  town  or  township  may  be  given  by  mail,  instead  of  per- 
sonally. These  statutes  clearly  recognize  giving  notice  as  a  part 
of  the  notary's  official  duty.  Indeed,  the  term  "protest"  is- 
ordinarily  used  as  including  the  entire  proceeding  necessary  to- 
charge  indorsers.  Notaries  are  -nearly  always  resorted  to  for 
this  work,  and  the  owner  of  the  draft  may  be  assumed  to  have- 
intended  this  course  to  be  pursued.  As  said  in  Tiernan  v.  Com- 
mercial Bank,  7  How.  (Miss.)  648,  40  Am.  Dec.  83:  "No  agent 
could  have  been  selected  with  more  propriety  for  the  perform- 
ance of  this  duty  than  one  whose  profession  and  office  were- 
calculated  to  fit  him  peculiarly  for  the  discharge.  They  are  al- 
most universally  resorted  to  for  the  '^'^  purpose.  We  cannot 
perceive,  therefore,  that  the  bank  was  wanting  either  in  the 
degree  of  skill  or  diligence  which  is  required  under  such  cir- 
cumstances to  exempt  an  agent  from  liability":  Baldwin  v. 
Bank  of  La.,  1  La.  Ann.  13,  45  Am.  Dec.  72;  Hyde  v.  Planters*^ 
Bank,  17  La.  560,  36  Am.  Dec.  621;  Smedes  v.  Utica  Bank^ 
20  Johns.  384;  Bellemire  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  4  Whart.  105,  1 
Miles,  173,  33  Am.  Dec.  46;  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Howell,  8  Md. 
530,  63  Am.  Dec.  714;  Fisher  v.  State  Bank,  7  Blackf.  610; 
Turner  v.  Rogers,  8  Ind.  139.  Bank  of  Lindsborg  v.  Ober,  31 
Kan.  599,  is  based  on  the  finding  that  the  statutes  of  Kansas  do- 
not  authorize  the  notary  to  give  notice.  Our  conclusion  rests 
on  statutes  allowing  a  notary  as  such  to  perform  this  duty. 
Surely,  the  bank  acted  prudently  in  intrustin*  to  a  public  offi- 
cer the  doing  of  that  which  was  incumbent  on  him  as  an.  officer 
of  the  law  to  do. 
Affirmed. 


BANKS  AND  BANKING-SELECTION  OF  NOTARY— LIA« 
BILITY  FOR  HIS  NEGLIGENCE.— The  authorities  are  divided 
upon  the  question  whether  a  bank  is  lial)le  for  the  negligence  of  & 
notary  which  it  selects  to  protest  a  draft  or  note  for  nonpayment. 
The  weight  of  authority  seems  to  be  with  the  principal  case  In 
holding  that  the  bank  is  not  liable  if  it  has  used  reasonable  prudence 
In  the  selection  of  the  notary:  See  the  extended  note  to  Allen  v. 
Merchants'  Bank.  34  Am.  Dec.  313,  314,  where  the  cases  on  both 
sides  of  the  question  are  collected.  As  holding  that  the  bank  is  not 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  the  notary,  see  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Howell^ 
8  Md.  fim.  ♦«  Am.  Dec.  714;  Bellemire  v.  Bank  of  U.  S..  4  Whart. 
lOri,  33  Ara.  Dec.  40.  and  note:  Hyde  v.  Planters'  Bank,  17  La.  nOO. 
36  Am.  Dec.  621;  Tiernaa  v.  Commercial  Bank,  7  How.  (Miss.)  648^ 


220  WiLcoxEN  V.  Smith.  [Iowa, 

40  Am.  Dec.  83;  Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  La,,  1  La.  Ann.  13,  45  Am. 
Dec.  72;  Bank  v.  Butler,  41  Ohio  St.  519,  52  Am.  Rep.  94.  Contra, 
see  Allen  v.  Merchants'  Bank,  22  Wend.  215,  34  Am.  Dec.  289; 
Miranda  v.  City  Bank,  6  La.  740,  26  Am.  Dec.  493;  Gerhardt  v. 
Boatman's  Sav,  Inst.,  38  Mo.  60,  90  Am.  Dec.  407;  Ayrault  v.  l»aciflc 
Bank,  47  N.  Y.  570,  7  Am.  Rep.  489.  See,  also,  the  note  to  German 
Is'at  Bank  y.  Burns,  13  Am.  St  Rep.  253. 


WiLCoxEN  V.  Smith. 

[107  Iowa,  555.] 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USURY— PREMI- 
UMS.—A  statute  authorizing  building  and  loan  associations  to  col- 
lect premiums  from  borrowing  members  for  the  right  of  precedence 
In  taking  loans,  and  that  these  premiums  so  paid,  taken  with  the 
legal  rate  of  interest,  shall  not  be  construed  as  making  the  loans 
usurious,  contemplates  good-faith  bidding  of  premiums  for  the  right 
of  precedence.  Where  the  monthly  payments  of  premiums  and  in- 
terest together  exceed  the  legal  rate  of  interest,  and  payments  made 
by  a  member  are  designated  as  premiums  merely  as  a  device  to 
evade  the  law  against  usury  instead  of  being  paid  in  good  faith 
to  secure  a  loan,  the  loan  is  usurious. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USURIOUS  IN- 
TEREST AND  PREMIUMS— APPLICATION  TO  MEMBER'S 
OREDIT.— Usurious  interest  and  premiums  paid  to  a  building  and 
loan  association  by  a  borrowing  member  should  be  applied  to  the 
credit  of  such  member  as  deductions  from  the  amount  of  his  loan. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— INSOLVENCY- 
RIGHTS  OF  BORROWING  AND  NONBORROWING  MEMBERS. 
In  case  of  the  insolvency  of  a  building  and  loan  association,  and  a 
liquidation  of  Its  affairs,  there  should  be  an  equitable  distribution  of 
its  assets  less  its  liabilities.  Borrowing  members  are  only  entitled 
to  be  credited  with  the  actual  value  of  their  shares,  although  by  the 
by-laws  of  the  association  and  under  the  terms  of  their  loans  they 
are  entitled  to  the  book,  or  withdrawal,  value  of  such  shares.  Such 
provisions  in  the  by-laws  and  terms  of  the  loans  contemplate  a  going 
•concern,  and  do  not  apply  when  the  association  has  become  insol- 
vent and  Is  In  the  process  of  final  liquidation. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— RIGHTS  OF 
MEMBERS— PLEDGING  STOCK  AS  SECURITY  FOR  LOAN. 
Where  the  articles  of  Incorporation  and  by-laws  of  a  building  and 
loan  association  provide  for  loans  to  shareholders  on  the  security 
■of  their  shares  of  stock,  shareholders  do  not  cease  to  be  members 
of  the  association  by  pledging  their  shares  for  loans. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-INSOLVENCY— 
RIGHTS  OP  BORROWING  MEMBERS— CREDIT  FOR  VALUE 
OF  SHARES.— Where  a  building  and  loan  association  is  Insolvent, 
and  Its  afTalrs  are  In  process  of  liquidation,  it  will  be  presumed  in 
the  absence  of  proof,  that  borrowing  members  are  entitled  to  have 
<;redited  upon  their  debts  to  the  association  the  book  value  of  their 
shares.  The  burden  of  proof  Is  upon  one  who  would  rebut  this  pro- 
•umptlon  to  show  the  actual  value  of  such*  shares. 

William  M.  Wilcoxen,  for  the  appellant. 


Feb.  1899.]  Wilcoxen  v.  Smith.  221 

S.  B.  Snyder,  for  the  appellee. 

•"^  EOBINSON",  C.  J.  The^e  cases  are  submitted  together, 
for  the  reason  that  controlling  questions  are  common  to  all  of 
them.  The  case  of  Wilcoxen,  receiver,  against  Smith  involves 
the  following  facts:  The  Union  Building  &  Saving  Association 
was  organized  to  transact  business  as  a  mutual  building  asso- 
ciation, under  and  by  virtue  of  sections  1184  to  1187,  inclusive; 
of  the  code  of  1873.  On  the  twenty-eighth  day  of  December, 
1894,  it  was  insolvent  to  the  extent  that  it  was  unable  to  pay 
to  the  shareholders  the  full  amounts  paid  by  them  to  the  loan 
fund  of  the  association,  and  William  M.  ^^"^  Wilcoxen  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  district  court  of  Polk  county  receiver  of  the 
association,  and  he  duly  qualified  and  is  acting  as  receiver. 
About  the  1st  of  January,  1893,  the  defendant  T.  L.  Smith 
subscribed  for  ten  shares  of  Class  A  stock  of  the  association, 
and  thereby  became  a  member  thereof  and  shareholder.  A  few 
days  later  he  and  his  wife  and  codefendant  applied  to  the  asso- 
ciation for  a  loan  of  one  thousand  dollars,  and  signed  a  written 
obligation,  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy : 

"January  2,  1893. 

"As  the  holder  of  ten  shares  of  stock  in  the  Union  Building 
and  Saving  Association  of  Des  Moines,  Iowa,  and  in  considera- 
tion of  the  sum  of  one  thousand  dollars  advanced  to  T.  L.  Smith 
and  wife,  Elizabeth  R.  Smith,  by  said  association,  the  receipt 
whereof  is  hereby  acknowledged,  we  promise,  contract,  and 
agree  to  pay  to  said  association,  its  successors  oi  assigns,  as  fol- 
lows, to  wit:  The  sum  of  eighteen  and  80-100  dollars  on  the 
first  day  of  February,  1893,  and  a  like  sura  of  eighteen  and 
80-100  dollars  on  the  first  day  of  each  and  every  month  there- 
after— the  same  being  the  sum  of  five  and  80-100  dollars  as 
monthly  installments;  the  sum  of  five  dollars  for  one  month's 
interest  at  six  per  cent  per  annum,  on  said  loan;  the  sum  of 
eight  dollars  monthly  as  and  for  premiums  bid  for  said  loan. 
Also  all  fines  and  penalties  which  we  may  incur  as  the  holder  of 
said  ten  shares  of  stock.  In  accordance  with  the  by-laws  of 
srid  association,  all  said  payments  are  to  be  made  on  the  first 
day  of  each  and  every  month,  and  shall  continue  to  be  made 
until  such  time  as  the  monthly  installments  paid  in  on  said 
ten  shares  of  stock,  together  with  the  profits  thereon,  shall 
equal  their  aggregate  par  value  of  one  thousand  dollars.  We 
further  agree  that  if  default  shall  be  made  in  the  payment  of 
said  sums  of  money,  or  any  of  them,  for  the   period  of    three 


222  WiLcoxEN  V.  Smith.  [Iowa, 

months,  after  the  same  are  due  and  payable,  the  whole  of  said 
principal  sum,  advanced  as  above,  shall  at  once  become  due, 
and,  if  suit  be  commenced  to  enforce  the  collection  of  the 
amount  due  on  this  contract,  a  reasonable  sum  shall  be  allowed 
as  plaintiff's  attorney  fee  and  taxed  with  the  costs  in  the  case. 
"'(Signed)     T.  L.  SMITH. 

"ELIZABETH  E.  SMITH." 
To  secure  the  payment  ^^^  of  the  loan.  Smith  and  his  wife 
executed  to  the  association  a  mortgage  on  certain  lots  in  an 
addition  to  the  city  of  Council  Bluffs,  and  Smith  assigned  to 
the  association  his  certificate  for  ten  shares  of  stock,  to  be  held 
as  further  security  for  the  loan.  The  plaintiff  claims  that  the 
defendants  are  more  than  three  months  in  arrears  in  the  pay- 
ment of  dues,  interest,  and  premiums,  and  that,  by  the  terms 
of  the  loan,  the  entire  amount  thereof  is  due.  The  Smiths  al- 
lege that  they  are  entitled  to  credit  as  follows:  One  hundred 
and  eighty-four  dollars  for  premiums  paid  at  the  rate  of  eight 
dollars  per  month,  ten  dollars  paid  as  certificate  fees,  one  hun- 
dred and  fifteen  dollars  paid  as  interest,  and  two  hundred  and 
two  dollars  and  thirty  cents  paid  as  dues  on  stock,  and  to. 
earnings.  They  further  allege  that  the  loan  was  usurious,  and 
that  the  premiums  paid  were  not  in  fact  fixed  on  competitive 
bids  by  the  members  of  the  association,  but  were  fixed  by  it  for 
the  use  of  the  money  loaned.  It  is  admitted  that  Smith  had 
made  all  payments  due  from  him  prior  to  the  appointment  of 
the  receiver,  and  that  he  has  not  paid  anything  since  that  time. 
He  paid  as  premiums  one  hundred  and  eighty-four  dollars,  and 
as  interest,  at  the  rate  of  six  per  cent  per  annum,  one  hundred 
and  thirty-eight  dollars.  It  is  also  admitted  that  the  associa- 
tion is  insolvent,  and  that  when  the  receiver  was  appointed  the 
book  value  of  the  shares  of  stock  held  by  the  association  was 
two  hundred  and  fourteen  dollars  and  ninety-one  cents,  includ- 
ing profits  to  the  amount  of  thirty-five  dollars  and  seven  cents, 
which  had  been  apportioned  to  the  stock.  The  district  court 
found  that  the  loan  was  usurious  and  illegal;  that  the  defend- 
ants were  entitled  to  credits  thereon  for  the  interest  and  pre- 
miums paid  and  the  book  value  of  the  stock  to  the  aggregate 
amount  of  five  hundred  and  thirty-six  dollars  and  ninety-one 
cents;  and  rendered  a  decree  against  Smith  for  the  balance  of 
four  hundred  and  sixty-throe  dollars  and  nine  cents  and  for 
one  hundred  and  seventy-six  dollars  and  forty-eight  cents  for 
the  use  of  the  school  fund,  and  also  decreed  the  foreclosure  of 
the  mortgage.    The  other  cases  involve  similar  facts. 


Feb.  1899.]  Wilcoxen  v.  Smith.  223 

^^  1.  We  first  inquire  whether  the  loans  were  usurious. 
The  by-laws  of  the  association  provided  that  its  funds  should 
be  loaned  on  real  estate  security,  only  to  its  members,  "upon 
such  conditions  as  the  board  of  directors  may  dictate";  that 
the  rate  of  interest  should  be  six  per  cent  per  annum  on  the  *- 
money  actually  loaned;  that  all  interest  and  premiums  should 
be  paid  monthly;  and  that  all  applications  for  loans  would  ''he 
granted  according  to  the  priority  of  the  application,"  in  case 
the  security  should  be  approved  by  the  board  of  directors  or 
executive  committee.  Although  the  by-laws  contemplated  the 
payment  of  premiums,  they  did  not,  in  terms,  require  premiums, 
nor  prescribe  any  rule  for  ascertaining  what  premiums  should 
be  paid.  The  evidence  does  not  show  that  the  board  of  direc- 
tors ever  adopted  any  formal  rule  in  regard  to  them.  But  it 
appears  that  the  amount  of  premium  specified  in  the  applica- 
tions of  the  borrowers  as  that  which  they  offered  to  pay  for  the 
desired  loan  was  uniformly  eighty  cents  for  each  one  hundred 
dollars  of  the  loan.  There  was  no  formal  bidding  for  the 
loans.  When  a  borrower  asked  for  the  terms  on  which  he 
could  procure  a  loan,  he  was  informed,  in  effect,  that  a  premium 
of  eighty  cents  on  each  one  hundred  dollars  of  the  loan  would 
be  required  each  month.  That  amount  was  as  definitely  fixed 
and  as  regularly  exacted  as  was  the  payment  of  interest,  and 
both  premium  and  interest  were  placed  in  the  loan  fund  of 
the  association.  Section  1185  of  the  code  of  1873,  which 
applies  to  the  transactions  in  question,  provides  that  a  mutual 
building  association  "shall  be  authorized  and  empowered  to 
levy,  assess,  and  collect  from  its  members  such  sums  of  money, 
by  rates  of  stated  dues,  fines,  interest  on  loans  advanced,  and 
premiums  bid  by  members  for  the  right  of  precedence  in 
taking  loans,  as  the  corporation  by  its  by-laws  shall  adopt," 
and  that  "the  dues,  fines,  and  premiums  so  paid  by  members, 
in  addition  to  the  legal  rate  of  interest  on  loans  taken  by  them, 
shall  not  be  construed  to  make  the  loans  so  taken  usurious." 
That  section  contemplated  good-faith  bidding  of  ^^^  premiums 
to  obtain  the  right  of  precedence.  The  statute  does  not  re- 
quire the  payment  of  the  premium  in  advance,  and  the  fact  that 
it  is  to  be  paid  monthly,  until  the  maturity  of  the  loan,  would 
not  necessarily  impress  it  with  the  character  of  interest  paid. 
Whether  an  association  can  fix,  in  advance  of  application,  the 
premium  which  shall  be  paid,  we  do  not  determine,  although 
«ome  authorities  seem  to  hold  that  the  power  to  do  so  exists. 


224     ,  WiLcoxEN  V.  Smith.  [Iowa, 

But  it  is  clear  that  the  premiums  must  he  fixed  and  paid  in  good 
faith,  to  secure  the  loan,  and  not  as  a  mere  device  to  evade 
the  law  against  usury:  4  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  2d  ed., 
1071.  The  premiums  paid  in  these  cases  differ  from  the  in- 
terest only  in  name  and  amount.  The  mortgages  were  given 
to  secure  the  payments  of  the  premiums  as  well  as  other  sums, 
and  provided  that,  in  the  event  of  foreclosure,  the  amount  due 
should  include  all  monthly  installments,  interest,  premiums, 
fines,  and  penalties  due  at  the  date  of  the  decree  of  foreclosure, 
less  the  withdrawal  value  of  the  shares  of  stock  held  as  collateral 
security.  It  thus  appears  that  the  premium  was  not  a  fixed 
sum,  to  be  paid  in  any  event,  but  that  only  so  much  of  it  was 
to  be  paid  as  should  have  accrued  at  the  time  of  foreclosure. 
We  are  satisfied  that  the  sums  nominally  paid  as  premiums 
were  for  the  use  of  the  money  loaned,  and  as  truly  interest  as 
were  the  payments  made  as  interest,  and  that  the  designation 
of  some  of  the  payments  as  premiums  was  a  mere  device  to 
evade  the  law  against  usury.  As  the  monthly  payments  of 
premiums  and  interest  together  exceeded  the  highest  rate  of 
interest  allowed  by  law,  the  loan  was  usurious.  The  cases  of 
Ilawkeye  etc.  Assn.  v.  Blackburn,  48  Iowa,  385,  and  Burlington 
etc.  Asso.  V.  Heider,  55  Iowa,  424,  are  not  precisely  in  point, 
but  may  be  read  with  profit. 

2.  The  district  court  rightly  refused  to  allow  the  plaintiff 
anything  for  the  interest  and  premiums  paid,  and  deducted 
their  aggregate  amounts  from  the  sums  loaned  as  credits  in 
favor  of  the  defendants.  The  district  court  also  allowed  as  a 
•credit  in  each  case  the  book  value  of  the  stock  pledged  as 
collateral  security,  and  of  that  the  appellant  also  complains. 
As  already  mentioned,  the  ^^^  mortgage  provided  that  the  with- 
drawal value  of  that  stock  should,  in  the  event  of  foreclosure, 
be  credited  on  the  amount  due  on  the  loan.  The  by-laws  of  the 
association  provide  that  any  shareholder  in  good  standing,  who 
has  paid  three  months'  dues,  may,  after  due  notice,  and  upon 
the  surrender  of  his  certificate,  withdraw  the  full  amount  of 
his  payments  to  the  loan  fund,  together  with  the  earnings  up 
to  the  last  dividend  period.  We  understand  that  the  book 
value  of  the  certificates  of  stock  allowed  by  the  district  court 
in  each  case  was  the  amount  of  installments  paid  on  the  stock 
and  the  earnings  thereof  to  the  last  dividend  period  preceding  _ 
the  appointment  of  a  receiver.  But  the  book  value  was  not  the 
actual  value,  for  the  reason  that  the  association  was  insolvent 


Feb.  1899.]  Wilcoxen  v.  Smith.  225 

wid  unable  to  pay  to  cacb  shareholder  the  book  value  of  his 
shares.  We  are  therefore  required  to  determine  whether  the 
stipulation  in  the  mortgage  to  which  we  have  referred  controls. 
If  it  does,  then  it  is  manifest  that  the  shareholders  who  are 
borrowers,  and  whose  mortgages  are  foreclosed,  will  receive  more 
for  their  stock  than  will  the  shareholders  who  are  not  borrowers. 
But  the  association  is  composed  of  members  whose  rights  are 
mutual,  and  among  whom  there  should  be  equality,  based  upon 
their  payments  to  the  capital  stock  of  the  association;  there- 
fore, if  the  borrowing  member  is  allowed  for  all  the  payments 
he  has  made  and  the  earnings  thereof,  the  losses  of  the  associa- 
tion will  fall  upon  the  members  who  have  not  borrowed,  there 
will  not  be  an  equality  between  the  two  classes  of  members, 
and  great  injustice  will  be  done.  A  court  of  equity  should 
seek  to  avoid  that  result.  It  was  said  in  Eabbitt  v.  Wilcoxen, 
103  Iowa,  35,  64  Am,  St.  Rep.  162,  a  case  which  involved  an 
interpretation  of  by-laws  of  the  association  now  imder  con- 
sideration, that  it  was  quite  evident  that  the  by-laws  "were 
adopted  with  reference  to  doing  business,  rather  than  with 
reference  to  closing  up"  the  affairs  of  the  association,  and  that 
the  provision  for  paying  back  contributions  to  the  loan  fund 
contemplated  monthly  receipts  for  the  fund,  and  that  there 
was  nothing  to  show  a  purpose  to  make  such  payments  after 
*^**^  the  receipts  had  ceased,  and  the  only  business  of  the  cor- 
poration is  a  final  settlement  and  an  equitable  division  of  the 
assets.  What  was  thus  said  is  applicable  in  this  case.  The 
withdrawal  value  of  the  shares  of  stock,  as  fixed  by  the  by-laws 
while  the  association  was  a  going  concern,  was  the  full  amount 
of  the  shareholder's  payments  to  the  loan  fund,  together  with 
the  earnings;  but  the  by-laws  did  not  require  the  payment  of 
that  amount  when  the  association  had  become  insolvent,  had 
ceased  to  do  business,  and  when  its  affairs  were  in  the  process 
of  final  liquidation.  In  such  a  case,  an  equitable  distribution 
of  the  assets,  if  any,  in  excess  of  the  liabilities,  should  be 
affected ;  and  that  requires  that  the  fair  value  of  the  shares  be 
ascertained,  and  that  the  value  thus  ascertained,  of  the  shares 
of  the  borrowing  members,  be  deducted  from  the  loan  to  him 
for  which  a  foreclosure  is  sought.  It  is  proper  to  observe,  in 
this  connection,  that  the  articles  of  incorporation  and  by-laws 
of  the  association  provide  for  loans  to  shareholders  upon  the 
g^ecurity  of  their  shares  of  stock,  and  that  by  pledging  their 
shares  for  loans  the  shareholders  did  not  cease  to  be  members 

Am.  St.  Rkp.,  VoU  LXX.— 15 


226  WiLcoxEN  V.  Smith.  [Iowa, 

of  the  association :  See  Endlich  on  Building  Associations,  2d  ed., 
sees.  121-123,  475,  514;  Thompson  on  Building  Associations, 
see.  15,  p.  129. 

Our  conclusion  that  the  appellees  are  only  entitled  to  credits 
for  the  actual  value  of  their  shares  of  stock  has  support  in  the 
authorities:  See  Knutson  v.  N'orthwes4;em  etc.  Assn.,  67  Minn. 
201,  64  Am.  St.  Eep.  410;  Eversmann  v.  Schmitt,  53  Ohio, 
174,  53  Am.  St.  Eep.  632;  Price  v.  Kendall,  14  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
26;  Strohen  v.  Franklin  etc.  Assn.,  115  Pa.  St.  273;  Christian's 
Appeal,  102  Pa.  St.  184;  People  v.  Lowe,  117  N.  Y.  175; 
Eogers  v.  Hargo,  92  Tenn.  35;  Eogers  v.  Eaines,  100  Ky.  295; 
Thompson  on  Building  Associations,  sec.  2,  p.  60;  Thompson 
on  Building  Associations,  sees.  11,  12,  15,  pp.  127,  129;  Endlich 
on  Building  Associations,  2d  ed.,  sees.  45,  77,  514,  531. 

^^^  It  follows  from  what  we  have  said  that  the  district  court 
erred  in  crediting  the  defendants  with  the  book  value  of  their 
shares.  The  appellant  contends  that  no  credit  for  the  shares 
should  be  allowed  in  these  actions,  because  the  affairs  of  the 
association  are  not  yet  settled,  and,  until  that  is  done,  the 
credits  to  be  allowed  for  the  shares  cannot  be  ascertained.  It 
is  true  that  no  credit  for  the  shares  should  be  allowed  until 
their  -value  is  ascertained,  and  it  appears  that  when  these  ac- 
tions were  heard  in  the  district  court  the  settlement  of  the 
affairs  of  the  .association  had  not  progressed  so  far  that  the 
value  of  the  shares  could  have  been  known.  If  such  value  can 
be  determined  in  these  actions,  we  know  of  no  objection  to  the 
allowance  of  proper  credits  therefor;  but  in  view  of  the  con- 
ditions under  which  this  case  is  submitted,  and  the  conclusion 
reached,  we  do  not  determine  whether  there  can  be  a  recovery 
of  the  amount  of  the  loans  and  a  foreclosure  of  the  mortgages 
before  the  credits  which  should  be  allowed  for  the  stock  can  be 
ascertained.  In  the  absence  of  proof,  it  would  be  presumed 
that  the  credits  should  be  the  book  values  of  the  shares,  and 
the  burden  would  be  upon  the  plaintiff  to  rebut  the  presump- 
tion   and  show  the  actual  value  of  the  shares. 

3.  In  the  case  against  C.  B.  Howard,  his  codefendant, 
^fargaret  Howard,  claimed  a  credit  on  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action  for  the  value  of  twelve  shares  of  stock  of  the  association 
which  she  held.  The  appellant  insists  that  she  was  not  en- 
titled to  the  allowance  claimed.  Since  no  allowance  was  made 
for  the  credit  claimed,  and  the  appellees  do  not  appeal,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  consider  the  matter  further. 


Feb.  1899.]  Wilcoxen  v.  Smith.  227 

4.  It  is  claimed  in  the  case  against  the  congregation  that  the 
proof  fails  to  show  that  its  trustees  had  authority  to  subscribe  for 
fitock  and  enter  into  the  contract  and  mortgage  in  suit.  The 
■evidence  on  their  part  is  not  wholly  satisfactory,  but  is  sufficient 
to  sustain  the  action  of  the  trustees.  In  reaching  the  con- 
■clusion  expressed,  we  have  not  treated  chapter  48  of  the  acts 
of  the  twenty-seventh  general  assembly  '***  nor  section  1898 
of  the  code  as  applicable  to  these  cases,  and  are  not  to  be  under- 
stood as  determining  whether  they  do  or  do  not  so  apply. 
Nothing  is  claimed  for  them,  and,  in  determining  the  questions 
presented  to  us,  we  have  assumed,  without  deciding,  that  sec- 
tion 1185  of  the  code  of  1873  is  applicable. 

The  views  we  have  expressed  dispose  of  all  questions  involved 
in  the  several  cases  presented  in  argument.  For  the  reasons 
shown,  the  decree  in  each  case  reversed;  and,  since  proof  of  the 
ectual  value  of  the  shares  when  the  receiver  was  appointed  was 
not  and  could  not  have  been  made  at  the  time  of  the  hearing, 
equitable  considerations  demand  that  the  causes  be  remanded 
to  the  district  court  for  further  proceedings  in  harmony  with 
this  opinion,  to  ascertain  and  make  due  nllowance  for  the 
credits,  if  any,  for  shares  of  stock  to  which  the  appellees  are 
€ntitled,  or,  if  that  cannot  be  done  in  these  actions,  to  protect 
the  right  of  the  appellees  to  recover  such  credits  by  appropriate 
proceedings. 

Reversed. 


BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS  —  USURY  PREMI- 
UMS.—A  building  and  loan  association  authorized  by  statute  to  re- 
•ceive  "premiums  bid  by  members  for  the  right  of  precedence  la 
taking  loans,"  has  no  authority  to  exact  from  the  borrower,  where 
there  is  no  competition,  an  arbitrary  sum  in  addition  to  the  interest 
on  his  loan,  where  the  whole  amounts  to  more  than  legal  Interest: 
Iowa  etc.  Assn  v.  Heidt,  107  Iowa,  297,  ante,  p.  197,  and  note. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USURIOUS  INTER- 
EST—APPLICATION TO  MEMBER'S  CREDIT.— Where  a  member 
of  a  building  and  loan  association  contracts  to  pay  usurious  in- 
terest and  premiums,  the  court  will  merely  require  him  to  do  equity 
by  repaying  the  money  borrowed  with  legal  interest,  after  being 
first  credited  with  such  payments  as  he  has  made,  with  legal  iuter- 
■est:  McCauley  v.  Building  etc.  Assn.,  07  Tenn.  421,  56  Am.  St. 
Rep.  813. 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS- INSOLVENCY - 
RIGHTS  OF  BORROWING  AND  NONBORROWING  MEMBERS. 
For  the  effect  of  insolvency  of  a  building  and  loan  association  on 
the  rights  and  liabilities  of  its  members,  see  the  monographic  note  to 
Curtis  v.  Granite  State  Provident  Assn.,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  24-30.  See. 
also,  the  note  to  Robertson  v.  Homestead  Assn.,  69  Am.  Dec.  165. 


228  Scott  v.  Hawk,  [Iowa, 


Scott  v.  Hawk. 

[107  IOWA,  723.] 

WILLS-SIGNATUKE-TESTATOR'S  MARK.— Where  a  tes- 
tator, being  unable  to  write  his  signature  to  his  will,  makes  his 
marlc  Instead,  the  will  so  executed  Is  "signed"  within  the  meaning 
of  the  law. 

WILLS-EXECUTION— PUBLICATION.— In  the  executioa 
of  a  will,  nothing  more  than  compliance  with  the  statute  Is  neces- 
sary, and  publication  is  not  necessary  unless  made  so  by  statute. 

WILLS— EXECUTION— PROOF  OF— ATTESTING  WIT- 
NESSES.—Where  a  will  Is  signed  by  the  testator's  making  his  mark, 
and  the  subscribing  witnesses  are  dead  or  beyond  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court,  proof  of  their  handwriting  is  a  compliance  with  the 
law  as  to  due  execution;  and  it  need  not  be  proved  that  the  testator 
had  the  will  read  over  to  him,  or  was  informed  of  its  contents,  before 
he  signed  it. 

WILLS— SIGNING  WITH  MARK.— Where  a  testator  signed 
his  wiU  by  making  his  mark,  it  Is  not  essential  to  the  valid  execu- 
tion of  the  will  that  his  name  be  written  by  one  of  the  attesting 
Witnesses. 

C.  M.  Brown  and  D.  D.  Hill,  for  the  appellants. 

Hamilton  &  Donohue,  Woodin  &  Son,  and  C.  H.  Mackey,  for 

the  appellees. 

''**  LADD,  J.    The  closing  part  of  the  paper  purporting  to 
be  the  will  of  John  Scott,  deceased,  is  as  follows: 

"Witness  my  hand  this  15th  day  of  June,  1886. 

his 
"JOHN  X  SCOTT." 
mark. 

On  the  same  paper,  below  the  signature,  is  this  attestation : 
"The  foregoing  instrument  was  at  the  date  thereof  subscribed 
by  John  Scott,  in  our  presence,  and  in  the  presence  of  each 
other,  and  he  at  the  same  time  declared  the  same  to  be  his  last 
will  and  testament,  and  by  his  request  we  sign  our  names  thereto 
as  witnesses  thereof,  both  in  his  presence  and  in  the  presence 
of  each  other. 

'T).  L.  FIDLER. 
"S.  HARND.*' 
The  subscribing  witnesses  died  before  the  trial,  but  the  genu- 
ineness of  their  signntures  and  the  testamentary  capacity  of  the 
decedent  were  establislied  beyond  controversy.  As  the  testator 
was  unable  to  write,  he  made  his  mark — the  cross.  Is  a  will 
thus  executed  "signed,"  within  the  meaning  of  the  law? 


Dec.  1898.]  Scott  v.  Hawk.  229 

In  Schouler  on  Wills,  section  303-306,  it  is  said:  'To  write 
out  one's  own  name  in  full  is  doubtless  the  safest  course,  as  well 
as  the  most  natural;  for  such  compliance  best  indicates  '^*'  a 
rational  mind,  a  free  will  and  physical  power  at  the  date  of 
execution.  But,  undoubtedly,  the  making  of  his  mark  by  the 
testator  will  satisfy  the  statute;  and  that,  too,  as  various  cases 

rule,  notwithstanding  he  was  able  to  write  at  the  time 

If  an  illiterate  but  intelligent  testator  makes  cross-strokes  with 
his  pen  upon  the  paper,  the  act  of  signature  is  his  own;  and  so, 
too,  where  the  hand  of  the  testator,  who  is  physically  unable 
to  subscribe  without  assistance,  is  guided  by  another.  Wher- 
ever, in  truth,  the  act  is  the  testator's  own  act,  animo  testandi, 
though  with  the  assistance  of  another,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
prove  any  express  request  for  assistance  on  his  part."  This,  we 
think,  a  correct  statement  of  the  law,  and  fully  sustained  by 
the  authorities:  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  49  Neb.  157;  Higgins 
V.  Carlton,  28  Md.  115,  92  Am.  Dec.  666;  Guthrie  v.  Price,  23 
Ark.  396;  Flannery's  Will,  24  Pa.  St.  502;  In  re  Guilfoyle,  96 
Cal.  598;  Pool  v.  Buffum,  3  Or.  438;  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  39 
N.  Y.  159;  In  re  Jenkin's  Will,  43  Wis.  610;  Rook  v.  Wilson, 
142  Ind.  24,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  163;  Bevelot  v.  Lestrade,  153  111. 
625;  Stephens  v.  Stephens,  129  Mo.  422,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  454; 
2  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  7th  ed.,  674;  29  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of 
Law,  168. 

2.  If  the  statute  is  complied  with,  nothing  more  in  the  exe- 
cution of  the  will  is  necessary.  Thus,  publication,  as  such,  is 
not  required  in  this  state:  In  re  Hulse's  Will,  52  Iowa,  662;  In 
re  Convey's  Will,  52  Iowa,  199;  nor  is  it  generally,  except  when 
made  so  by  the  statute.  As  far  back  as  Bondv.Seawell,3  Burrows, 
1775,  Lord  Mansfield  remarked:  "It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
testator  should  declare  the  instrument  he  executed  to  be  his 
last  will":  Osbom  v.  Cook,  11  Cush.  532,  59  Am.  Dec.  155.  In- 
deed, it  is  not  essential  that  the  witnesses  know  the  character 
of  the  instrument  the  signature  to  which  they  attest:  Allen  v. 
■Griffin,  69  Wis.  529;  Remsen  v.  Brinckerhoff,  26  Wend.  325,  37 
Am.  Dec.  251;  Dean  v.  Dean,  27  Vt.  746;  Linton's  Appeal,  104 
Pa.  St.  228;  Dickie  v.  Carter,  42  111.  376;  Leverett  v.  ^^  Car- 
lisle, 19  Ala.  80;  Brown  v.  McAlister,  34  Ind.  375;  Flood  y. 
Pragoff,  79  Ky.  607. 

3.  In  Allison  v.  Allison,  104  Iowa,  130,  we  held  that,  "where 
subscribing  witnesses  are  dead  or  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,  proof  of  their  handwriting  is  a  compliance  with  the  la\r 


230  Scott  v.  Hawk.  [lowa^ 

as  to  due  execution."  In  that  case  the  signature  was  writtei* 
by  another  for  the  decedent.  We  discover  no  reason  for  a  dif- 
ferent rule  when  the  will  is  signed  by  a  mark.  Such  a  distinc- 
tion has  not  been  made  by  the  authorities,  and  certainly  the 
recitals  of  the  attestation  should  be  given  quite  as  much  weight 
when  the  will  is  signed  by  a  mark  as  when  this  is  done  by  writing 
the  name  or  having  some  one  else  do  so:  See  Jackson  v.  Van 
Dusen,  5  Johns.  144,  4  Am.  Dec.  330;  Nickerson  v.  Buck,  12^ 
Cush,  342.  The  point  is  made  that  proponents  did  not  prove 
the  will  to  have  been  read  over  to  the  deceased  before  he  signed 
it,  or  that  he  was  informed  of  its  contents.  "Whether  the  burden 
was  upon  the  proponents  to  affirmatively  show  this,  we  need  not 
now  determine.  But  see  notes  in  29  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law, 
244.  In  any  event  it  was  included  in  the  execution  of  the  will. 
As  said  in  Kirk  v.  Carr,  54  Pa.  St.  285:  "The  law  allows  the 
attesting  signature  to  speak  when  the  tongue  is  silent;  and  it 
attests  that  everything  was  rightly  done,  unless  the  act  attested 
be  impeached,  not  negatively  merely,  but  positively** :  Carpenter 
V.  Denoon,  29  Ohio  St.  379, 

It  is  suggested  that  John  Scott's  name  was  not  written  by 
one  of  the  attesting  witnesses.  In  some  states  this  is  required 
by  statute:  St.  Louis  Hospital  Assn.  v.  Williams,  19  Mo.  609; 
Greenough  v.  Greenough,  11  Pa.  St.  489,  51  Am.  Dec.  567;  but 
such  is  not  the  law  of  Iowa.  Indeed,  the  writing  of  his  name 
was  not  essential  to  the  signing  of  the  will,  his  mark  alone  being 
sufficient  for  that  purpose:  Jackson  v.  Jackson,  39  N.  Y.  159; 
In  re  Savory,  15  Jur.  1042;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  49  Reb. 
157;  In  re  Bryce,  2  Curt.  Ecc.  325;  Everhart  v.  Everhart,  34 
Fed.  Eep.  85;  29  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  168.  As  the  evi- 
dence referred  to  alone  established  the  execution  of  the  will, 
we  need  not  '^^'^  consider  the  alleged  errors  in  admitting  other 
evidence  for  the  same  purpose. 

Affirmed. 


WILLS— SIGNATURE— TESTATOR'S  MARK.— The  mark  of  a 
testator  to  his  will  Is  just  as  effective  as  when  he  signs  his  name: 
Robinson  v.  Brewster,  140  III.  649,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  265,  and  note; 
riat«.''8  Estate,  148  Pa.  St.  55,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  805;  Ray  v.  Hill,  3 
Strob.  207,  49  Am.  Dec.  647;  Chaffee  v.  Baptist  etc.  CJonventlcm,  10 
Pajge,  85,  40  Am.  Dec.  225. 

WILLS-PUBLICATION.— If  the  due  subscribing  ana  attesting 
of  a  win  be  proved,  It  need  not  be  shown  that  the  testator  made  the 
usual  declarations  that  it  was  his  last  will  and  testament:  Small 
V.  Small,  4  Greenl,  220,  16  Am.  Dec.  253. 

WILLS— EXECUTION— PROOF  OF.— If  the  witnesses  to  a  will 


Dec.  1898.]  "Scott  v.  Hawk.  231 

cannot  be  found,  or,  though  found,  deny  their  signatures,  clrcum- 
Btantlal  evidence  may  supply  the  deficiency.  The  handwriting  of 
the  witnesses  may  be  proved,  and  the  jury  left  to  determine  from 
all  the  circumstances  whether  the  will  was  published  with  the 
requisite  formalities:  Pearson  v.  Wlghtman,  1  Mill,  336,  12  Am.  Dec. 
636,  and  note;  Tynan  v.  Paschal,  27  Tex.  286,  84  Am.  Dec.  619; 
Jackson  v.  Van  Dusen,  5  Johns.  144,  4  Am.  Dec.  830. 


CASES 

m  THB 

SUPEEME   COURT 

or 

MASSACHUSETTS. 


Hancock  National  Bank  v.  Ellis. 

[172  MASSACmJSKTTB,  39.] 

ACTIONS  AGAINST  STOCKHOLDERS— WHEN  TRANSI- 
TORY.—An  action  against  a  stockholder  of  a  corporation  organized 
tinder  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Kansas,  to  compel  the  payment  of  a 
debt  against  the  corporation,  is  transitory. 

CORPORATIONS  -  STOCKHOLDERS  —  LIABILITY  TO 
CREDITORS- TRANSITORY  ACTION.— The  liability  of  a  stock- 
holder in  a  corporation  organized  under  the  laws  of  the  state  of 
Kansas  for  the  debts  of  the  corporation  is  several,  and  may  be  en- 
forced ty  an  action  against  him  in  any  court  of  general  jurisdiction 
In  the  state  where  personal  service  of  process  can  be  made  upon  the 
stockholder. 

EVIDENCE.— THE  LAWS  OF  ANOTHER  STATE  are  facts 
to  be  proved. 

EVIDENCE— FOREIGN  LAW -QUESTION  OF  LAW.-lf 
the  evidence  of  foreign  law  consists  entirely  of  statutes  or  reports 
of  Judicial  decisions,  the  construction  and  effect  of  the  statutes 
and  decisions  are  usually  for  the  court  alone. 

EVIDENCE— FOREIGN  LAW— QUESTION  OF  FACT.— If 
the  evidence  of  foreign  law  consists  of  reports  of  Judicial  decisions, 
the  question  of  what  the  law  is  becomes  one  of  fact,  where  the 
decisions  are  conflicting,  or  where  Inferences  of  fact  must  be  drawn. 

W.  R.  Bigelow  and  H.  J.  Jaquith,  for  the  plainitiff. 

A.  Hemenway  and  E.  B.  Adams,  for  the  defendant. 

*•  FIELD,  C.  J.  This  case  was  once  before  considered  by 
ns  on  demurrer  to  the  declaration :  Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis, 
166  Mass.  414.  The  demurrer  having  been  overruled,  the  de- 
fendant answered,  and  the  cause  was  heard  by  a  justice  of  the 
superior  court,  without  a  jury. 

(232) 


Sept.  1898.]       Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  233 

At  the  close  of  the  evidence,  both  the  plaintiff  and  the  de- 
fendant made  numerous  requests  for  rulings.  The  presiding 
justice  gave  the  third,  fourth,  fifth,  sixth,  and  eighth  of  the 
rulings  requested  by  the  plaintiff,  and  all  of  the  rulings  re- 
quested by  the  defendant,  and  made  the  folio-wing  special  find- 
ings: "1.  I  find  that  the  Commonwealth  Loan  and  Trust  Com- 
pany ceased  to  do  business  on  February  21,  1891;  2.  I  find  from 
the  evidence  that  such  corporation  did  not  resume  business 
thereafter,  and  that  by  virtue  of  the  statutory  law  of  Kansas 
there  was  a  dissolution  of  the  corporation  previous  to  the  date 
of  this  writ;  3.  There  was  no  legal  or  competent  evidence  given 
at  the  trial  which  enabled  nae  to  find  what  were  the  assets  or 
the  liabilities  of  this  corporation  at  the  date  of  the  original  judg- 
ment against  the  corporation,  or  at  the  date  of  the  issue  of  exe- 
cution against  it,  or  at  the  date  of  the  writ  in  this  action." 

The  firjst  four  rulings  requested  by  the  plaintiff  which  the 
court  gave  were  as  follows: 

"3.  Upon  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  as  matter  of  law,  the 
court  is  bound  to  find  that,  imder  the  law  of  Kansas,  stock- 
holders in  corporations  organized  under  the  laws  of  Kansas  are 
liable  severally,  and  not  jointly,  to  the  judgment  creditors  of 
the  corporation,^®  who  pursue  the  remedy  provided  byparagraph 
1192  of  the  General  Statutes  of  Kansas  of  1889. 

"4.  Upon  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  as  matter  of  law,  the 
court  is  bound  to  find  that,  under  the  laws  of  Kansas,  stock- 
holders in  Kansas  corporations  who  appear  as  stockholders  upon 
the  books  of  the  corporation  are  conclusively  presumed  to  be 
stockholders  of  the  corporation  within  the  meaning  and  liability 
of  said  paragraph  1192,  already  referred  to. 

"5.  Upon  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  as  matter  of  law,  the 
court  is  bound  to  find  that,  under  the  laws  of  Kansas,  the  stock- 
holder's liability  under  said  paragraph  1192,  already  referred  to, 
is  a  contractual  liability,  and  arises  upon  the  contract. of  sub- 
scription to  the  capital  stock  made  by  the  defendant  in  becom- 
ing a  stockholder;  and  that  in  subscribing  to  said  stock  and 
becoming  a  stockholder  he  thereby  guaranteed  payment  to  the 
creditors  of  the  corporation  of  an  amount  equal  to  the  par  value 
of  the  stock  held  and  owned  by  him, 

"6.  Upon  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  as  matter  of  law,  the 
court  is  bound  to  find  that,  under  the  laws  of  Kansas,  the  stock- 
holder who  is  liable  under  said  paragraph  1192  is  liable  to  the 
judgment  creditor  of  the  corporation  who  first  pursues  his  rem- 


234  Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  [Mass. 

edy  under  the  statutes,  and  is  discharged  from  all  further  lia- 
bility by  once  paying  the  full  amount  thereof  to  such  creditor." 
Among  the  rulings  requested  by  the  plaintiff  which  the  court 
declined  to  give  is  the  seventh,  which  is  as  follows: 

"7.  Upon  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  as  matter  of  law,  the 
court  is  bound  to  find  that,  under  the  laws  of  Kansas,  an  action 
to  enforce  the  stockholder's  liability  under  said  paragraph  1193, 
already  referred  to,  is  transitory,  and  may  be  brought  in  any 
court  of  general  jurisdiction  in  the  state  where  personal  service 
can  be  made  upon  the  stockholder." 

The  rulings  requested  by  the  defendant  which  the  court  gave 
are  to  the  effect  that  the  obligations  imposed  by  the  statutes 
of  Kansas  will  be  enforced  in  Massachusetts  only  as  a  matter 
of  comity;  that  the  courts  of  Massachusetts  will  nat  enforce 
them  against  a  resident  citizen  of  Massachusetts  unless  it  ap- 
pears that  no  injustice  will  be  done;  that  these  courts  are  unable 
to  do  justice  to  stockholders  resident  in  Massachusetts  who  have 
paid  the  debts  of  the  corporation  and  are  entitled  to  sue'  other  ** 
stockholders  to  enforce  contribution,  especially  if  the  corpora- 
tion has  been  dissolved  or  has  suspended  business;  that  the  stat- 
utes of  Kansas  which  provide  for  contribution  are  a  part  of  a 
scheme  for  ultimately  compelling  stockholders  ratably  to  pay  the 
debts  of  the  corporation,  and  that,  concerning  as  they  do  the 
relations  between  the  corporation  and  its  stockholders,  they  can 
be  effectually  and  completely  enforced  only  by  the  courts  of  Kan- 
sas; and  the  enforcement  of  them  should  be  left  to  those  courts. 
The  Commonwealth  Loan  and  Trust  Company  is  a  private 
corporation,  established  under  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Kansas 
on  February  2,  1887,  for  the  purpose  of  transacting  the  business 
of  a  loan  and  trust  compan}'',  and  having  places  of  business  at 
Kansas  City  in  Kansas  and  in  Missouri,  and  in  the  city  of  Bos- 
ton in  Massachusetts.  The  plaintiff,  the  Hancock  National 
Bank  of  Boston,  is  the  same  corporation  as  the  Traders'  Na- 
tional Bank  of  Boston.  On  September  1,  1891,  the  Traders* 
National  Bank  of  Boston,  having  previously  lent  the  Loan  and 
Trust  Company  twenty-five  thousand  dollars,  received  its  prom- 
issory note  therefor  signed  by  the  loan  and  trust  company,  in- 
dorsed on  which  appear  payments  of  interest  and  certain  sums 
of  money  on  account  of  the  principal.  On  September  9,  1893, 
the  bank  commenced  suit  against  the  loan  and  trust  company  on 
this  note  in  the  circuit  court  of  the  United  States  for  the  dis- 
trict of  Kansas,  and  on  December  8,  1893,  recovered  judgment 


Sept.  1898.]       Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  235 

therein  against  the  loan  and  trust  company  in  the  sum  of  six- 
teen thousand,  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  dollars  and  seventy- 
six  cents  damages,  and  twenty-eight  dollars  and  forty-five  cent* 
costs  of  suit;  and  on  April  27,  1894,  execution  issued  therefor, 
which  was  returned  on  May  29,  1894,  by  the  marshal  of  th& 
United  States  for  said  district  wholly  unsatisfied,  after  he  had 
made  diligent  search  for  any  property  of  the  defendant  on  which 
to  levy  the  execution  and  had  found  none.  The  present  suit 
was  brought  in  the  superior  court  for  the  county  of  Suffolk  in, 
this  commonwealth  on  May  25, 1895.  The  defendant  is  a  resident 
of  the  commonwealth.  On  April  27,  1894,  the  defendant  owned 
one  certificate  of  five  shares  of  stock  of  the  loan  and  trust  com- 
pany, and  had  in  his  possession  as  collateral  security  for  the- 
payment  of  a  debt  due  to  him  another  certificate  of  five  shares,, 
both  of  which  he  continued  to  hold  down  to  the  time  of  the  trial 
here,  and  the  certificates  *^  were  produced  at  the  trial.  Th& 
certificates  are  each  dated  February  7,  1887,  and  they  certify 
that  the  defendant  is  the  owner  of  five  shares  in  the  capital  stock 
of  the  loan  and  trust  company,  "transferable  only  on  the  books- 
of  the  said  company  on  the  surrender  of  this  certificate,  properly 
endorsed.'*  They  differ  only  in  this,  that  one  certificate  de- 
scribes the  defendant  as  "owner  of,  as  collateral  security,  five 
shares,"  et  cetera,  while  the  other  omits  the  words  "as  collateral 
security."  A  record  of  these  certificates  appears  in  the  transfer- 
book  and  in  the  stock  ledger  of  the  corporation.  On  July  16,^ 
1894,  by  a  decree  entered  in  a  suit  in  the  circuit  court  of  the 
United  States  for  the  district  of  Kansas,  William  S.  Hinman  of 
Boston,  Massachusetts,  and  Waldo  H.  Howard  of  Kansas  City, 
Kansas,  were  appointed  receivers  of  the  loan  and  trust  company, 
for  the  purpose  of  winding  up  the  affairs  of  the  corporation. 
The  order  appointing  the  receivers  did  not  purport  to  dissolve- 
the  corporation.  The  corporation  had  been  established  to  exist 
for  fifty  years  from  February  2,  1887,  and  had  a  capital  stock  of 
one  hundred  thousand  dollars,  divided  into  one  thousand  shares^ 
of  one  hundred  dollars  each.  There  was  evidence  that  a  great 
many  of  the  stockholders  reside  outside  of  the  state  of  Kansas. 
The  plaintiff  in  the  present  suit  put  in  evidence  the  General 
Statutes  of  Kansas  of  1889,  paragraphs  1192,  1193,  1199,  1205, 
1206,  4080,  4081,  4083,  4084,  4085,  4087,  4167,  4168,  4169, 
4170.  Paragraphs  1192,  1205,  and  1206  are  printed  in  the  mar- 
gin. '*^  These  statutes,  so  far  as  material,  were  in  existence  for 
some  time  before  the  defendant  became  the  owner  of  the  cer* 


236^  Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  [Mass. 

tificates  of  stock,  and  before  the  organization  of  the  loan  and 
trust  company.  The  plaintiff  also  put  in  evidence  the  official 
reports  of  the  following  decisions  of  the  courts  of  Kansas: 
Howell  V.  Manglesdorf,  33  Kan.  194;  Wells  v.  Robb,  43  Kan. 
201;  Abbey  v.  Grimes  Dry  Goods  Co.,  44  Kan.  415;  Abbey  v. 
Long,  44  Kan.  688;  Plumb  v.  Bank  of  Enterprise,  48  Kan.  484; 
Hoyt  V.  Bunker,  50  Kan.  574;  Howell  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  52 
Kan.  133;  Van  Demark  v.  Barons,  52  Kan.  775";  Achenbach  v. 
Pomeroy  Coal  Co.,  2  Kan.  App.  357;  United  States  Wind  En- 
gine etc.  Co.  V.  Davies,  2  Kan,  App.  611;  Buist  v.  Citizens'  Sav. 
Bank,  4  Kan.  Apg.  700.  The  defendant,  subject  to  the  excep- 
tion of  the  plaintiff,  put  in  evidence  the  General  Statutes  of  the 
state  of  Kansas  of  1889,  article  12  of  the  constitution,  para- 
graph 211,  and  paragraphs  1200  and  1204  of  the  statutes  which 
are  printed  in  the  margin,  and  also  the  official  report  of  the  de- 
-cision  of  the  supreme  court  of  Kansas  in  Hentig  v.  James,  23 
Kan.  326. 

"**  The  courts  of  Kansas,  from  the  nature  of  the  question, 
•can  never  directly  decide  that  the  liability  of  a  stockholder,  un- 
der paragraph  1192  of  the  Genral  Statutes  of  Kansas,  is  one  that 
may  be  enforced  in  any  court  of  general  jurisdiction  in  any  other 
state  or  country  where  due  service  of  process  can  be  made  upon 
the  stockholder.  Only  courts  of  other  jurisdictions  can  decide 
that  question.  The  courts  of  Kansas  can  only  express  an  opin- 
ion to  that  effect,  if  they  entertain  it  in  cases  before  them,  as 
one  of  the  reasons  for  the  judgment  they  render  in  those  cases. 
That  opinion  the  supreme  court  of  Kansas  has  expressed  in 
Howell  V.  Manglesdorf,  33  Kan.  194,  195.  The  other  decisions 
cited  of  the  courts  of  last  resort  in  Kansas  tend  to  confirm  that 
opinion.  None  is  inconsistent  with  it.  The  courts  of  the  United 
States  inferior  to  the  supreme  court  have  uniformly  held  that 
the  liability  under  the  statutes  of  Kansas  which  we  are  con- 
sidering can  be  enforced  against  a  stockholder  in  any  s'tate  or 
district  where  he  can  properly  be  served  with  process:  Whitman 
V.  National  Bank  of  Oxford,  51  U.  S.  App.  536,  affirming  on 
error  tihe  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  in  National  Bank  of 
Oxford  V.  Whitman,  76  Fed.  Rep.  697;  Brown  v.  Trail,  89  Fed. 
Rep.  641;  American  Freehold  Land  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Wood- 
worth,  79  Fed.  Rep.  951 ,  82  Fed.  Rep.  269;  McVickar  v.  Jones, 
70  Fed.  Rep.  754;  Rhodes  v.  United  States  Nat.  Bank,  66  Fed. 
Rep.  512;  Bank  of  North  America  v.  Rindge,  57  Fed.  Rep.  279. 
See  Auer  v.  liOmbard,  72  Fed.  Rep.  209;  Mechanics'  Sav.  Bank 


Sept.  1S98.]       Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  237 

V.  Fidelity  Ins.  etc.  Co.,  87  Fed.  Rep.  113.  These  decisions  are 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the  decisions  of  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  with  reference  to  statutes  of  other 
states  somewhat  similar  to  those  of  Kansas:  Flash  v.  Conn,  109 
TJ.  S.  371;  Huntington  v.  Attrill,  146  U.  S.  657. 

The  decisions  of  state  courts  other  than  those  of  Kansas  are 
not  unifonn  upon  the  question  whether  the  statutory  liability 
of  '*°  a  stockholder  to  creditors  of  the  corporation  under  these 
statutes  of  Kansas  can  be  enforced  by  a  suit  against  the  stock- 
holder in  any  stai,e  where  he  resides,  and  can  be  served  with 
process.  In  favor  of  such  a  doctrine  are  Guemey  v.  Moore,  131 
Mo.  650,  Bagley  v.  Tyler,  43  Mo.  App.  195,  and  Ferguson  v. 
Sherman,  116  Cal.  169.  See  Gushing  v.  Perot,  175  Pa.  St.  G6, 
52  Am.  St.  Rep.  835.  Contra  are  Fowler  v.  Lamson,  146  111. 
472,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  163;  Tuttle  v.  National  Bank  of  the  Re- 
public, 161  111.  497,  and  Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Farnum,  20  R.  I. 
000.  Marshall  v.  Sherman,  148  N.  Y.  9,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  654,  is  a 
case  which  arose  upon  demurrer,  and  somewhat  resembles  Bank 
of  North  America  v.  Rindge,  154  Mass.  203,  26  Am.  St.  Rep. 
240,  and  the  decision  in  both  depended  upon  the  averments  of 
the  declaration. 

This  court  has  many  times  decided  that  the  statutes  of  other 
states,  creating  the  liability  of  stockholders  to  creditors  of  a  cor- 
poration, which  provide  for  a  suit  of  a  special  kind  to  which  the 
corporation  and  all  the  stockholders  are  to  be  made  parties,  will 
not  in  general  be  enforced  by  the  courts  of  this  state.  It  often 
happens  that  the  courts  of  this  state  could  acquire  no  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  corporation  which  is  a  necessary  party,  or  over 
many  of  the  stockholders,  and  the  suit  itself  is  sometimes  of  a 
kind  unknown  to  our  laws.  The  proper  courts  of  the  state  un- 
der whose  laws  the  corporation  is  established  have  full  jurisdic- 
tion over  the  corporation.  "Whether  in  such  a  suit  such  courts 
can  acquire  jurisdiction  over  all  the  stockholders,  wherever  they 
reside,  in  order  to  determine  their  liability  under  the  statutes 
to  which  they  may  be  held  to  have  assented  in  becoming  stock- 
holders, it  is  unnecessary  now  to  consider.  The  proceedings  are 
somewhat  analogous  to  the  laying  of  assessments  ratably  upon 
all  stockolders  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  debts  of  the  cor- 
poration in  the  manner  and  to  the  extent  prescribed  by  the  stat- 
utes. The  special  remedy  provided  by  the  statutes  must  be  pur- 
sued, and,  as  the  statutes  of  a  state  have  no  force  ex  proprio 
vigore  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  state,  the  remedy 


233  Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  [Mass. 

usually  must  be  pursued  in  the  state  where  the  corporation  has 
been  established  and  the  statutes  passed:  Erickson  v.  Nesmith, 
15  Gray,  221;  4  Allen,  233;  New  Haven  Horse  Nail  Co.  v.  Lin- 
den Spring  Co.,  142  Mass.  349;  Post  v.  Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
144  Mass.  341,  59  Am.  Eep.  86;  Bank  of  North  America  v. 
Eindge,  154  Mass.  203,  26  Am.  St.  Eep.  240;  Coffing  v.  Dodge, 
-*«  167  Mass.  231.  See  Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Francklyn,  120 
U.  S.  747;  Lowry  v.  Inman,  46  N.  Y.  119;  May  v.  Black,  77 
Wis.  101,  107;  Rice  v,  Merrimack  Hosiery  Co.,  56  N.  H.  114; 
Nimick  v.  Mingo  Iron  Works,  25  W.  Va.  184. 

In  Higgins  v.  Central  New  England  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  155  Mass. 
176,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  544,  the  grounds  on  which  the  courts  of 
this  state  entertain  an  action  at  law  founded  on  the  statutes  of 
another  state  are  stated  to  be  as  follows:  "Assuming  that  the 
cause  of  action  is  one  not  existing  at  the  common  law,  but  cre- 
ated by  the  statute  of  another  state,  we  have  seen  that  it  is  tran- 
sitory, and  that  it  survives  and  passes  from  the  deceased  to  his 
administrator.  When  an  action  is  brought  upon  it  here,  the 
plaintiff  is  not  met  by  any  difficulty  upon  these  points.  Whether 
our  courts  will  entertain  it  depends  upon  the  general  principles 
which  are  to  be  applied  in  determining  the  question  whether 
actions  founded  upon  the  laws  of  other  states  shall  be  heard 
here.  These  principles  require  that,  in  cases  of  other  than  penal 
actions,  the  foreign  law,  if  not  contrary  to  our  public  policy,  or 
to  abstract  justice  or  pure  morals,  or  calculated  to  injure  the 
fftate  or  its  citizens,  shall  be  recognized  and  enforced  here,  if  we 
have  jurisdiction  of  all  necessary  parties,  and  if  we  can  see  that, 
consistently  with  our  own  forms  of  procedure  and  law  of  trials, 
we  can  do  substantial  justice  between  the  parties.  If  the  foreign 
law  is  a  penal  statute,  or  if  it  offends  our  own  policy,  or  is  re- 
pugnant to  justice  or  to  good  morals,  or  is  calculated  to  injure 
this  state  or  its  citizens,  or  if  we  have  not  jurisdiction  of  parties 
who  must  be  brought  in  to  enable  us  to  give  a  satisfactory  rem- 
edy, or  if  under  our  forms  of  procedure  an  action  here  cannot 
give  a  substantial  remedy,  we  are  at  liberty  to  decline  jurisdic- 
tion: Blanchard  v.  Russell,  13  Mass.  1,  6,  7  Am.  Dec.  106;  Pren- 
tis  V.  Savage,  13  Mass.  20,  24;  Ingraham  v.  Geyer,  13  Mass.  146, 
7  Am.  Dec.  132;  Tappan  v.  Poor,  15  Mass.  419;  Zipcey  v. 
Thompson,  1  Gray,  243,  245;  Erickson  v.  Nesmith,  15  Gray, 
221,  4  Allen,  233,  236;  ITalsey  v.  McLean,  12  Allen,  439,  443,  90 
Am.  Dec.  157;  New  Haven  Horse  Nail  Co.  v.  Linden  Spring 


Sept.  1898.]       Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis.  239 

Co.,  142  Mass.  349,  353;  Bank  of  North  America  t.  Eindge,  154 
Mass.  203,  26  Am.  St.  Eep.  240." 

In  Post  V.  Toledo  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  144  Mass.  341,  59  Am.  Rep. 
86,  this  court  say;  "The  obligation  imposed  by  the  statutes  of 
Ohio  upon  the  stockholders  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  *'" 
payment  of  the  debts  of  the  corporation  is  quasi  ex  contractu. 
It  must  be  taken  that  all  persons  who  become  stockholders  in  an 
Ohio  corporation  know  the  law  under  which  the  corporation  is 
organized,  and  assent  to  the  liability  which  that  law  imposes 
upon  stockholders,  and  that  all  persons  who  deal  with  the  cor- 
poration rely  upon  the  liability  of  the  stockholders  as  security 
for  the  payment  of  whatever  debts  may  be  due  them  from  the 
corporation.  It  is  for  the  people  or  the  legislature  of  each  state 
to  determine  to  what  extent,  if  at  all,  the  stockholders  of  cor- 
porations created  by  the  laws  of  that  state  shall  be  liable  for  the 
debts  of  such  corporations.  It  was  early  the  policy  of  Massa- 
chusetts to  make  every  stockholder  liable  to  have  his  property 
taken  to  satisfy  a  judgment  against  a  Massachusetts  corporation 
of  which  he  was  a  member:  See  Child  v.  Boston  etc.  Iron  Works, 
137  Mass.  516,  50  Am.  Rep.  328;  and  although  this  policy  has 
now  been  chang'ed,  and  the  liability  restricted  to  specific  cases, 
and  to  corporations  of  a  particular  character,  yet  there  is  noth- 
ing in  the  laws  of  Ohio,  as  stated  in  the  bill,  that  is  so  opposed 
to  the  general  policy  of  our  laws  that  even  citizens  of  Massa- 
chusetts, who  voluntarily  have  become  stockholders  in  Ohio  cor- 
porations, should  not  be  held  to  perform  the  obligations  im- 
posed by  those  laws." 

When  the  liability  is  distinctly  imposed  by  statute  upon  the 
stockholders  severally,  it  would  be  unfortunate  if  it  could  not  be 
enforced  against  stoclcholders  not  resident  within  the  state  un- 
der whose  laws  the  corporation  has  been  established,  on  the 
ground  that  due  process  could  not  be  served  on  them  within  that 
state,  and  the  courts  of  the  state  where  they  reside  would  not 
take  jurisdiction  of  suits  to  enforce  the  liability. 

It  certainly  concerns  the  due  administration  of  justice  that  all 
stockholders,  wherever  they  reside,  should  be  compelled  by  pro- 
ceedings somewhere  to  perform  the  statutory  obligations  toward 
creditors  of  the  corporation  which  they  have  assumed  by  becom- 
ing stockholders. 

The  remedy  provided  by  paragraphs  1200  and  1204  of  the 
General  Statutes  of  Kansas,  even  if  applicable  to  the  present 
case,  wa«  not  intended  to  be  exclusive  when  a  judgment  has 


210  Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v,  Ellis.  [Mast. 

been  obtained  against  the  corporation.  The  present  plaintiff  haa 
pursued  exactly  the  remedy  provided  by  paragraph  1192  of  those 
^*  statutes.  That  paragraph  permits  the  plaintiff  to  proceed  by 
action  to  charge  the  stockholders  with  the  amount  of  the  judg- 
ment. The  courts  of  Kansas  hold  that  the  action  must  be 
against  the  stockholders  severally,  and  not  jointly.  The  stock- 
holder who  pays  more  than  his  proportion  of  any  debt  of  the 
corporation  may  compel  contribution  from  the  other  stockholders 
by  action.  The  creditor  of  the  corporation  can  by  action  col- 
lect the  amount  of  his  judgment  remaining  unpaid  of  any  stock- 
holder, "to  any  extent  equal  to  the  amount  of  stock  by  him  or 
her  owned,  together  with  any  amount  unpaid  thereon."  The 
stockholder  is  discharged  as  against  all  creditors  of  the  corpora- 
tion when  he  has  paid  the  debts  of  the  corporation  to  this  ex- 
tent. "We  are  unable  to  see  in  what  manner  the  enforcement 
of  these  statutes  by  the  courts  of  Massachusetts  against  stock- 
holders resident  here,  at  the  instance  of  a  creditor  of  the  corpora- 
tion, does  any  injustice  to  the  citizens  of  Massachusetts.  If  they 
pay  what  they  are  required  to  pay,  they  have  the  same  remedy 
for  contribution  which  any  other  stockholders  have.  This  rem- 
edy may  be  difficult  to  enforce,  because  the  stockholders  may 
reside  in  many  different  states  or  countries;  but  the  same  rem- 
edy for  contribution  is  given  to  all  stockholders  wherever  they 
reside.  The  legislature  of  Kansas  has  chosen  to  give  to  the  cred- 
itors of  certain  of  its  corporations  the  security  which  the  indi- 
vidual liability  of  each  stockholder  affords,  to  the  extent  pre- 
scribed by  its  statutes,  leaving  the  burden  of  enforcing  contribu- 
tion from  other  stockholders  on  any  stockholder  who  has  been 
compelled  to  pay  anything  in  discharge  of  the  debts  of  the  cor- 
poration. This  somewhat  resembles  the  law  of  Massachusetts 
whereby  judgment  creditors  of  cities  and  towns  can  levy  exe- 
cution on  the  property  of  any  inhabitant,  and  such  inhabitant 
is  left  to  enforce  contribution  from  the  other  inhabitants.  Per- 
sons becoming  stockholders  In  foreign  corporations  can  ascertain 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  li^ibility  of  the  stockholders  in  such 
corporations  according  to  the  laws  of  the  state  or  country  under 
which  the  corporations  are  organized,  and  they  cannot  complain 
if  this  liability  is  enforced  against  them. 

"We  are  unable  to  assent  to  the  decision  of  the  supreme  court 
of  Pennsylvania  in  Gushing  v.  Perot,  175  Pa.  St.  G6,  52  Am. 
St.  Rep.  835,  that  the  liability  of  the  defendant  passed  to  the 
receivers  of  the  corporation  ^^  as  an  asset  of  the  corporation. 


i 


Sept  1898.]      Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellb.  241 

because  we  think  that  the  liability  as  created  by  the  statutes 
of  Kansas  is  directly  to  the  creditors,  and  cannot  be  enforced 
by  receivers  in  their  own  names  or  in  the  name  of  the  corpora- 
tion: Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis,  166  Mass.  414,  419,  55  Am. 
St.  Eep.  414;  National  Bank  v.  Hingham  Mfg.  Co.,  127  Mass. 
563,  667;  Chamberlin  v.  Huguenot  Mfg.  Co.,  118  Mass.  532. 

The  law  of  Kansas  was  a  fact  to  be  proved  in  the  present 
suit.  Where  the  evidence  of  foreign  law  consists  entirely  of 
statutes  or  reports  of  judicial  decisions,  the  constructions  and 
effects  of  the  statutes  and  decisions  are  usually  for  the  court 
alone:  Bride  v.  Clark,  161  Mass.  130;  Eeyer  v.  Odd  Fellows' 
etc.  Assn.,  157  Mass.  367,  34  Am.  St.  Eep.  288;  Gibson  v.  Manu- 
facturers' Ins.  Co.,  144  Mass.  81.  Where  the  decisions  are  con- 
flicting, or  where  inferences  of  fact  must  be  drawn,  the  question 
of  what  the  law  is  becomes  one  of  fact:  Wylie  v.  Cotter,  170 
Mass.  356,  64  Am.  St.  Eep.  305. 

Upon  the  evidence  introduced  at  the  trial,  a  majority  of  the 
court  think  that  the  reasonable  inference  is  that  the  action  given 
to  enforce  the  liability  of  stockholders  under  paragraph  1192  of 
the  General  Statutes  of  Kansas  of  1889  was  intended  to  be  a 
transitory  action  of  such  a  nature  that  it  might  be  brought  in 
any  court  of  general  jurisdiction  over  similar  actions  in  any 
state  or  country  where  service  according  to  the  laws  of  that  state 
or  country  could  be  made  upon  a  stockholder. 

They  are  of  opinion  that  the  superior  court  should  have  found 
in  accordance  with  the  seventh  request  of  the  plaintiff.  This  al- 
most necessarily  follows  in  the  view  they  have  taken  of  the  stat- 
utes of  Kansas,  from  the  four  rulings  requested  by  the  plaintiff 
which  the  court  gave,  whether  they  be  regarded  as  rulings  of 
law  or  findings  of  fact.  It  is  unnecessary  now  to  consider  the 
other  questions  which  have  been  argued,  or  which  appear  in  the 
bill  of  exceptions. 

The  entry  must  be  exceptions  sustained. 

CORPORATIONS-PERSON.Mi  LIABILITY  OP  STOCKHOLD- 
ERS—ENFORCEMENT OF.  IN  OTHER  STATES.— The  liability 
of  stockholders  of  corporations  to  creditors  is  several:  ColemsJi  v. 
Howe,  154  111.  458,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  133.  An  absolute  and  uncondi- 
tional individual  liability  imposed  upon  a  stoclvholder  Is  person.il, 
and  enforceable  everywhere,  in  the  same  way  that  other  personal 
obligations  are  enforced,  and,  according  to  the  course  of  proceduro, 
in  the  place  where  the  individual  sought  to  be  charged  is  found: 
See  monographic  note  to  Fowler  v.  Lanisou,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  169.  on 
the  enforcement,  in  other  states,  of  the  personal  liability  of  stoclc- 
holders;  but,  when  a  special  remedy  Is  given  to  the  creditors  of  a 
corporation  against  Its  stockholders,  the  liabilitj  of  the  latter  can- 

Am.  ST.  £XF.,  Vol.  LXX.— is 


242  Commonwealth  v.  Hubley.  [Mass^ 

not  be  enforced  In  any  state  except  that  In  which  the  corporation 
•was  organized:  Note  to  Mandel  v.  Swan  etc.  Cattle  Co.,  45  Am,  St. 
Rep.  132.  Compare  Marshall  v.  Sherman,  148  N.  Y.  9,  51  Am.  St. 
Rep.  654. 

EVIDENCE.— FOREIGN  LAWS,  INCLUDING  THOSE  OF  SIS- 
TER STATES,  must  be  pleaded  and  proved  as  other  facts:  Robert- 
eon  V.  Staed,  135  Mo.  135,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  569;  Summer  v.  MltchelU 
29  Fla.  179,  80  Am.  St  Rep.  106. 


Commonwealth  v.  Hublet. 

[172  MASSACHrSKTTS,  58.] 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— ORDINANCES— DEALING 
IN  OLD  RAGS.— A  city  ordinance  which  forbids  the  business  of 
collecting,  storing,  and  dealing  in  old  rags,  old  papers,  or  other  such 
refuse  material,  within  the  thickly  settled  portions  of  the  city,  ex- 
cept when  conducted  by  licensed  persons,  is  reasonable  and  valid. 

POLICE  POWER— PROTECTION  OF  PUBLIC  HEALTH- 
DEALING  IN  OLD  RAGS.— As  the  business  of  collecting,  storing, 
and  dealing  in  old  rags,  old  papers,  and  lilje  material,  may  be  dan- 
gerous to  the  health  of  the  community,  it  is  proper  that  trust- 
worthy persons  only  should  be  permitted  to  carry  it  on.  When  th& 
Interests  of  individuals  conflict  with  the  rights  of  the  public,  the 
Individual  interest  must  yield  to  the  paramount  right. 

H.  Parker,  district  attorney,  and  G.  S.  Taft,  assistant  district 
attorney,  for  the  commonwealth. 

W.  J.  Taft,  for  the  defendant. 

»8  KNOWLTON,  J.  The  defendant  was  convicted  of  a  vio- 
lation of  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Worcester,  which  is  as  fol- 
lows: "An  ordinance  to  regulate  the  collecting  and  storage  of 
old  rags,  old  papers,  or  other  refuse  material.  Section  1.  No 
person  shall  carry  on  the  business  of  collecting,  storing,  and  deal- 
ing in  old  rags,  old  papers,  or  other  such  refuse  material,  in  any 
building  •**  within  a  circle  the  radius  of  which  is  two  miles 
from  the  intersection  of  the  south  line  of  Front  street  and  the 
east  line  of  Main  street,  unless  he  is  duly  licensed  therefor  by 
the  board  of  aldermen,  for  which  license,  if  granted,  no  fee 
shall  be  charged."  The  only  question  in  the  case  is  whether 
the  ordinance  is  valid.  By  its  charter  the  city  of  Worcester  has 
all  the  rights  to  pass  ordinances  that  are  given  to  cities  and 
towns  by  general  laws:  Stats.  1893,  c,  444,  sec.  19.  Under  the 
Public  Statutes,  chapter  27,  section  15,  towns  may  make  "such 
necessary  orders  and  by-laws,  not  repugnant  to  law,  as  they  may 


Oct.  1898.]  Commonwealth  v.  Hubley.  243 

judge  most  conducive  to  their  welfare,"  for  tlie  following  pur- 
poses among  others,  namely,  "for  directing  and  managing  the 
prudential  affairs,  preserving  the  peace  and  good  order,  and 
maintaining  the  internal  police  thereof."  By-laws  and  ordi- 
nances looking  to  the  preservation  of  the  public  health  are 
plainly  within  the  authority  conferred  by  this  section:  See 
Commonwealth  v.  Parks,  155  Mass.  531.  The  authority  given 
by  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  80,  sections  18,  84,  to  boards 
of  health  of  to\^Tis  to  make  regulations  and  pass  orders  in  refer- 
ence to  certain  mttters  affecting  the  health  of  the  community, 
cannot  properly  be  construed  to  prevent  the  passage  of  reason- 
able by-laws  by  towns,  under  the  authority  of  the  Public  Stat- 
utes, chapter  27,  section  15:  Commonwealth  v.  Parks,  155 
Mass.  531,  533.  Special  authority  is  given  by  the  Public  Stat- 
utes, chapter  80,  section  18,  to  a  board  of  health  "respecting 
articles  which  are  capable  of  containing  or  conveying  infection 
or  contagion,  or  of  creating  sickness  brought  into  or  conveyed 
from  its  town."  It  is  manifest  that  old  rags  may  be  very  dan- 
gerous in  this  respect.  The  case  of  Train  v.  Boston  Disinfecting 
Co.,  144  Mass.  523,  59  Am.  Eep.  113,  fully  recognizes  the  rea- 
sonableness of  provisions  regulating  the  business  of  dealing  in 
rags. 

Besides  the  authority  found  in  the  statute  already  quoted,  we 
have  in  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  102,  section  28,  a  provi- 
eion  for  licensing  "dealers  in  and  keepers  of  shops  for  the  pur- 
chase, sale,  or  barter  of  junk,  old  metals,  or  second  hand  arti- 
cles." There  is  certainly  strong  ground  for  the  argument  of 
the  district  attorney  thai  dealing  in  rags  is  within  the  express 
language  of  this  statute. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  it  was  not  unreasonable  for  the  city  of 
Worcester  to  forbid  the  business  of  collecting,  storing,  and  deal- 
ing in  rags  within  the  thickly  settled  portions  of  the  city  except 
when  conducted  by  licensed  persons.  The  safety  of  the  com- 
munity ^  might  be  found  to  require  that  only  persons  who 
could  be  trusted  to  observe  proper  precautions  should  be  per- 
mitted to  carry  on  this  business.  When  the  interests  of  individ- 
uals conflict  with  the  rights  of  the  public,  the  individual  inter- 
est must  yield  to  the  paramount  right :  Watertown  v.  Mayo,  109 
Mass.  315,  12  Am.  Rep.  694;  Train  v.  Boston  Disinfecting  Co., 
144  Mass.  523,  59  Am.  Rep.  113;  Newton  v.  Joyce,  166  Mass. 
83,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  385. 

Exceptions  overruled. 


244  McIsAAc  V.  Northampton  etc.  Co.  [Mass. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— POLICE  POWER— SANITARY 
REGULATIONS.— A  city  has  incidental  power  of  enacting  sanitary 
regulations:  Note  to  State  v,  Payssan.  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  393.  It  is 
within  the  general  power  of  the  state  to  preserve  and  promote  the 
public  welfare  and  health,  even  at  the  expense  of  private  rights, 
and  this  power  may  be  delegated  to  municipal  corporations: 
Walker  v.  Jameson,  140  Ind.  591,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  222. 


MoIsAAo  V,  Northampton  Electric  Lighting  Co. 

[172  Massachusetts,  89.] 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPA- 
NIES—DUTY TO  LINEMEN.— An  electric  light  company  does  not 
owe  to  a  lineman,  whose  business  it  is  to  work  upon  poles  on  which 
the  company's  wires  are  suspended,  the  duty  to  inspect  its  poles 
below  the  surface  of  the  ground  to  ascertain  whether  they  are  de- 
cayed, and  to  inform  him  of  that  fact  if  such  is  found  to  be  the 
case. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT-ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPA- 
NIES AND  LINEMEN— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISKS— POLES.— 
When  a  lineman  enters  the  service  of  an  electric  light  company  for 
the  purpose  of  working  upon  poles  on  which  the  company's  wires 
are  suspended,  he  assumes  the  risk  that  a  pole  of  uncertain  age 
may  break  and  fall  when  a  lineman  is  working  upon  it,  if  he  does 
not  take  measures  to  ascertain  its  condition  before  going  upon  it. 

ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPANIES— INJURY  TO  LINEMAN 
—ACTION— IMMATERIAL  EVIDENCE.— A  lineman  who  was  in- 
jured while  in  the  employ  of  an  electric  lighting  company  by  a  de- 
cayed pole  breaking  below  the  surface  of  the  ground,  and  falling 
upon  him  while  he  was  at  work  upon  it,  cannot  maintain  an  action 
against  the  company  for  the  injury  without  showing  that  the  com- 
pany was  negligent;  and  this  is  not  done  by  proof  that  the  company 
faihd  to  inspect  the  pole  before  the  accidtut.  Such  evidence  is  Im- 
material, for  the  company  owed  him  no  duty  to  inspect  It.  On  the 
contrary,  in  any  case  where  the  apparent  ago  of  the  pole  was  such 
as  to  make  it  probable  that  it  was  not  strong  enough  to  sustain  a 
man  working  upon  it,  due  care  on  the  part  of  the  lineman  would  re- 
quire him  to  examine  it  Just  below  the  surface  of  the  ground  before 
risking  himself  upon  it. 

WITNESSES-EXAMINATION  OF— STRIKING  OUT  AN- 
SWER.— A  witness'  answer  which  is  not  responsive  to  the  question 
may  righily  b'  stricken  out. 

WITNESSES— RULING  OUT  QUESTIONS  CALLING  FOR 
AN  OPINION.— A  question  which  calls  for  an  opinion  of  the  wit- 
ness In  regard  to  the  legal  effect  of  a  contract  is  properly  ruled  out. 

WITNESSES.— IMMATERIAL  QUESTIONS  asked  of  a  wit- 
ness are  properly  ruled  out. 

Tort,  for  personal  injuries  sustained  by  the  plaintiff  while  in 
the  defendant's  employ  as  a  lineman.  At  the  defendant's  re- 
quest, the  court  ruled  that  the  action  could  not  be  maintained, 
and  directed  the  jury  to  return  a  verdict  for  the  defendant. 
The  plaintiff  excepted. 


Oct.  1898.]      McIsAAc  V.  Northampton  etc.  Co.  245 

J.  B.  Carroll  and  W.  H.  McClintock,  for  the  plaintiff. 
W.  G.  Bassett,  for  the  defendant. 

8»  KNOWLTON,  J.  The  plaintiff  was  employed  by  the  de- 
fendant as  a  lineman,  and  was  injured  by  the  breaking  and  fall- 
ing of  a  pole  on  which  the  defendant's  wires  were  suspended. 
The  pole  was  about  forty  feet  in  length,  was  set  in  the  ground 
about  five  ***  feet,  and  was  about  thirty-five  feet  high.  The 
undisputed  evidence  tended  to  show  that  it  was  badly  decayed 
a  few  inches  below  the  surface  of  the  ground,  so  that  it  broke 
off  square  with  the  strain  upon  it  resulting  from  the  plaintiff's 
weight  and  the  force  from  wires  drawing  upon  it  after  other 
wires  had  been  removed,  which  probably  had  previously  tended 
to  counteract  the  strain  from  those  that  remained.  The  plain- 
tiff contends  that  the  defendant  was  guilty  of  negligence  in  fail- 
ing to  ascertain  whether  the  pole  was  sound  and  strong,  or  to 
take  other  precautions  for  his  safety. 

The  plaintiff  was  directed  to  go  and  take  down  from  the  pole 
the  two  wires  upon  it  which  belonged  to  the  defendant,  and  to 
put  them  on  a  new  pole  near  by,  which  had  been  erected  on  ac- 
count of  a  change  of  grade  in  a  railroad  at  a  crossing.  He  went 
alone  to  do  the  work,  using  a  horse  and  wagon  belonging  to  the 
defendant  to  carry  such  tools  and  materials  as  he  thought  he 
needed.  He  was  a  man  of  experience  in  this  kind  of  business, 
and  the  method  of  doing  the  work  he  seems  to  have  determined 
for  himself.  The  pole  was  of  chestnut  wood,  about  eight  inches 
in  diameter  at  the  top,  and  about  fourteen  inches  at  the  surface 
of  the  ground.  It  had  been  set  between  eight  and  nine  years, 
and  the  evidence  tended  to  prove  that  it  showed  no  weakness  or 
sign  of  decay  above  the  ground. 

A  fundamental  question  is  whether  the  defendant  owed  to  a 
lineman,  whose  business  it  was  to  work  upon  poles  all  along  the 
line  as  occasion  might  require,  the  duty  to  inspect  its  poles  be- 
low the  ground,  and  inform  the  linemen  whenever  any  of  them 
were  so  decayed  as  to  be  unsafe  to  work  upon. 

The  plaintiff  admitted  in  his  testimony  that  he  knew  that  the 
life  of  a  pole  was  limited,  and  that  any  pole  after  a  time  would 
become  unsafe.  He  had  worked  upon  poles  in  the  construction 
and  repair  of  electric  lines  many  years.  When  he  engaged  to 
work  for  the  defendant  he  knew  it  would  be  his  duty  to  go  upon 
poles  that  had  been  set  in  the  ground  an  uncertain  length  of 
time.     He  must  have  known  that  the  work  of  climbing  poles 


246  McIsAAc  V.  Northampton  etc.  Co.  [Mass. 

and  taking  down  and  putting  up  wires  would  often  put  a  strain 
upon  a  pole  much  greater  that  it  would  be  exposed  to  in  sus- 
taining wires  when  they  were  all  in  their  proper  positions.  He 
must  have  known  that  it  would  be  inexpedient  and  impracticable 
to  have  a  man  or  company  of  men  to  go  and  examine  each  pole 
upon  which  ®^  a  lineman  was  about  to  work,  to  see  whether  it 
would  sustain  the  strain  which  the  work  would  put  upon  it. 
The  evidence  was  undisputed  that  it  was  easy  to  determine  very 
quickly  whether  a  pole  was  badly  decayed  a  little  below  the  sur- 
face of  the  ground,  and  that  no  skill  or  experience  was  required 
to  do  it  beyond  that  which  was  possessed  by  ordinary  linemen. 
The  plaintiff  testified  that  there  were  risks  about  the  business 
with  which  he  was  familiar  as  a  lineman.  "We  think  that  one 
of  the  most  common  and  obvious  of  these,  in  reference  to  which 
both  he  and  his  employer  must  have  been  presumed  to  have  con- 
tracted when  he  entered  the  defendant's  service,  was  the  risk 
that  some  pole  of  uncertain  age  might  break  and  fall  when  a 
lineman  was  working  upon  it,  if  he  did  not  take  measures  to 
ascertain  its  condition  before  going  upon  it.  All  the  evidence 
tends  to  show  that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  the  business,  the 
linemen,  who  are  often  expected  to  work  alone  without  super- 
vision, as  the  plaintiff  was  working  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
would  examine  the  poles  for  themselves  so  far  as  they  consid- 
ered it  necessary  to  do  so  for  their  safety.  They  easily  could 
make  any  necessary  tests  to  ascertain  the  condition  of  the  poles 
as  to  soundness  without  the  aid  of  special  inspectors,  and  from 
their  knowledge  of  common  affairs  could  judge  whether  the  pole 
was  safe  to  go  upon.  The  plaintiff  testified  that  there  were 
pike  poles  belonging  to  the  defendant  at  the  shed  from  which 
he  started  with  the  horse  and  wagon,  and  that  he  was  familiar 
with  the  use  of  pike  poles  in  setting  new  poles  and  bracing  up 
old  ones,  and  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he  might  not  have 
taken  some  of  them  to  use  in  the  work  if  he  had  chosen  to. 

The  burden  was  upon  him  to  show  that  the  defendant's  ne- 
glect of  some  duty  caused  the  accident.  We  are  of  opinion  that 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  risk  of  falling  on  account  of  the 
weakness  of  old  poles  was  not  a  risk  of  the  business  which  the 
plaintiff  assumed  by  his  contract  to  work  upon  such  poles.  As 
between  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  the  defendant  was 
under  no  obligation  to  inspect  the  poles  to  see  whether  they 
were  decayed,  and  there  was,  therefore,  no  evidence  of  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  defendant. 


Oct.  1898.]      McIsAAc  V.  Northampton  etc.  Co.  247 

There  was  no  error  in  the  rulings  in  regard  to  the  admission 
of  testimony.  Evidence  that  the  defendant  had  made  no  in- 
spection ®*  of  its  pole  prior  to  the  accident  was  immaterial,  in- 
asmuch as  the  defendant  owed  the  plaintiff  no  duty  to  inspect 
it. 

The  words,  '*It  is  not  the  lineman's  business  to  do  it,"  in 
Dorsey's  answer,  were  rightly  stricken  out.  To  say  nothing  of 
other  objections,  they  were  not  responsive  to  the  question. 
The  question  whether  it  was  a  "part  of  the  work  of  a  lineman  to 
make  that  inspection"  was  properly  ruled  out.  It  called  for 
an  opinion  of  the  witness  in  regard  to  the  legal  effect  of  a  con- 
tract. The  question  whether  linemen  "customarily  perform 
that  work  of  inspection"  was  also  immaterial.  So  far  as  ap- 
peared it  was  not  the  custom  of  anybody  to  make  such  an  in- 
spection; but  in  any  case  where  the  apparent  age  of  the  pole 
was  such  as  to  make  it  probable  that  it  was  not  strong  enough 
to  sustain  a  man  working  upon  it,  due  care  on  the  part  of  the 
lineman  would  require  him  to  examine  it  just  below  the  surface 
of  the  ground  before  risking  himself  upon  it. 

Our  review  of  the  main  question  makes  it  unnecessary  to  con- 
sider whether  the  general  duty  of  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff 
in  regard  to  the  strength  of  the  poles  on  which  he  was  working 
is  affected  by  the  fact  that  it  was  not  the  owner  of  the  pole  that 
broke,  but  was  merely  using  it  in  its  business  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  owner. 

Exceptions  overruled. 


MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPANIES- 
ASSUMPTION  OF  RISKS— POLES.— The  linemen  of  telephone 
and  telegraph  companies  have  no  right  to  rely  upon  the  soundness 
and  safety  of  poles  upon  which  they  are  to  work.  This  is  especially 
true  where  it  is  a  custom  for  linemen  to  look  out  for  their  own 
safety  and  to  Inspect  and  test  poles  for  themselves,  and  to  judge  of 
their  safety,  suitable  appliances  being  at  hand  for  such  testing. 
An  experienced  lineman  must  be  presumed  to  have  known  of  this 
custom,  and,  if  he  climbs  a  pole,  when  ordered,  without  such  test, 
and  Is  injured  through  its  rotten  condition,  the  accident  must  be 
regarded  as  due  to  his  own  fault  or  negligence:  McGorty  v.  South- 
ern etc.  Telephone  Co.,  69  Conn.  635,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  62. 

WITNESSES— IMMATERIALITY.— A  question  asked  of  a  wit- 
ness Is  properly  excluded,  when  the  answer  to  it  could  not  have  been 
ma  ei-lal:  Eastman  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Oo.,  44  N.  H.  143,  82  Am.  Dec 
201. 


248  Ellsbury  v.  New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.  [Mass^ 


Ellsbuey  V.  New  York,  New  Haven  &  Hartfori> 
Railroad  Company. 

[172  Massachusetts,  130.] 

KAILROADS— COUPLING  OF  CARS— ASSUMPTION  OP 
RISKS— LIABILITY  FOR  INJURY —If  one  railroad  receives  a  car 
from  another  railroad,  with  a  drawbar  different  in  make  and 
height  from  that  which  it  uses  itself,  and  an  experienced  man  Is 
ordered  to  couple  the  cars  together  by  a  linli  and  pin,  but  he  is 
crushed  between  the  sills  of  the  cars  while  attempting  to  make  th& 
connection,  because  one  drawbar  slides  over  the  other,  the  railroad 
company  is  not  answerable  for  the  injury,  because  the  difference 
In  height  was  an  obvious  risk  assumed  by  the  plaintiff. 

Tort  for  personal  injuries  received  by  the  plaintiff  while  irt 
the  defendant's  employ.  The  court  directed  a  verdict  for  the 
defendant. 

J.  E.  McConnell,  for  the  plaintiff. 

F.  P.  Goulding  and  W.  C.  Mellish,  for  the  defendant. 

*^®  HOLMES,  J.  This  is  an  action  of  tort  for  injuries  re- 
ceived while  attempting  to  couple  two  cars  tog'ether  in  obedi- 
ence to  orders.  The  two  cars  had  different  kinds  of  drawbars 
— one,  belonging  to  the  defendant,  a  Miller,  the  other  belonging 
to  the  Pennsylvania  Eailroad,  a  Jenny,  They  could  be  coupled 
only  by  the  use  of  a  link  and  pin.  A  fellow-servant  of  the  plain- 
tiff put  a  link  into  the  Pennsylvania  car,  but,  according  to  the 
plaintiff's  story,  the  drawbar  of  that  car  was  too  high  to  allow 
the  connection,  and,  when  the  cars  came  together,  it  slid  over 
the  other  one,  and  the  plaintiff,  who  held  the  link,  was  crushed 
between  the  sills  of  the  cars.  The  plaintiff  was  an  experienced 
man  but  testified  that  he  could  not  have  told  the  difference  in 
height,  or,  it  would  seem,  the  alleged  impossibility  of  the  con- 
nection, *^^  until  the  drawbars  were  close  to  each  other.  At 
the  trial  the  judge  directed  a  verdict  for  the  defendant. 

We  are  unable  to  see  any  ground  on  which  the  plaintiff  could 
be  allowed  to  recover.  In  Lawless  v.  Connecticut  River  E.  R. 
Co.,  136  Mass.  1,  the  defendant  furnished  a  locomotive  to  be 
used  as  a  switcher.  The  drawbar  was  too  low  for  the  cars  with 
which  it  was  expected  to  be  used;  the  plaintiff  did  not  know  it,, 
and  was  not  called  on  to  look  out  for  it.  In  Bowers  v.  Connecti- 
cut River  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  312,  there  was  some  slight  evi- 
dence that  the  drawbar  was  defective  in  having  too  much  lateral 
play,  and  that  the  accident  was  due  to  that  defect.    In  Groodrich 


Oct.  1898.]     Ellsbuby  v.  New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.  24^ 

V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y.  398,  15  Am.  St. 
Rep.  410,  there  was  no  question  that  the  injury  was  caused  by  a 
defect  in  the  bumper.  But  such  cases  do  not  dispose  of  the 
present.  It  was  lawful  for  the  defendant  to  receive  a  car  from 
another  railroad,  with  a  drawbar  different  in  make  and  height 
from  that  which  it  used  its'elf.  It  was  lawful  for  it  to  couple 
such  a  car  with  its  own.  So  far  as  appears,  both  cars  were  in 
proper  condition.  The  difference  in  height  was  not  a  defect 
for  which  the  defendant  was  answerable,  either  at  common  law 
or  by  Statute :  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Ebaugh,  144  Ind.  687.  The 
defendant  was  not  called  on  to  make  preliminary  measurements, 
and  to  warn  the  plaintiff  of  the  possible  difference  before  set- 
ting him  to  work.  The  possibility  was  obvious  in  a  car  coming 
from  a  different  road:  Michigan  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smithson, 
45  Mich.  212,  220.  So  far  as  appears,  the  cars  might  have  been 
coupled  successfully,  if  not  with  a  straight  link,  then  with  a 
crooked  one.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  defendant  failed  to 
furnish  whatever  appliances  were  necessary  to  do  the  work.  It 
was  not  the  defendant's  duty  to  see  that  the  plaintiff  or  his 
fellow-servants  picked  out  suitable  ones,  if  it  furnished  them. 
All  that  we  can  say  is,  that  an  experienced  man  was  s"et  to  do 
a  dangerous  thing  and  met  the  consequences  of  failure.  We 
cannot  see  evidence  that  the  failure  was  due  to  the  defendant's 
fault:  See  Michigan  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Smithson,  45  Mich.  212; 
Fort  Wayne  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Gildersleeve,  33  Mich.  133;  Penn- 
sylvania Co.  V.  Ebaugh,  144  Ind.  687;  Toledo  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Black,  88  111.  112;  Baldwin  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  50  Iowa, 
680;  Hulett  v.  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  67  Mo.  239;  St.  Louis 
^32  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Higgins,  44  Ark.  293;  McDonald  v.  Norfolk 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Va.  98;  Norfolk  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  91 
Va.  668,  672;  Kohn  v.  McNulta,  147  U.  S.  238. 
Judgment  on  the  verdict. 


RAirROADS-COUPLING  OP  CARS— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISK. 
A.  brakeman  on  a  railroad  train  takes  upon  himself  the  manifest 
ri.sk  of  coupling  cars  with  double  deadwoods,  and  of  coupling  the 
car  of  another  road  to  a  caboose,  where  there  is  an  apparent  dlffer- 
enre  In  the  hnlght  of  the  couplings:  Note  to  Chicago  etc.  B.  B.  Oo. 
V.  Curtis.  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  472. 


250  Avery  v.  Monroe.  [Mass. 


Avert  v,  Monroe. 

[172  Massachusetts,  132,J 

ATTACHMENT— TRUSTEE  PROCESS— PROPERTY  IN 
HANDS  OF  ASSIGNEE  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  CREDITORS.— If  a 
debtor  conveys  machinery,  supplies,  and  stoclt  on  hand  In  a  shoe 
factory,  and  laook  accounts,  to  an  assignee  in  trust  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors,  and  creditors  do  not  become  parties  to  the  deed,  the 
property,  in  the  hands  of  the  assignee,  is  subject  to  trustee  process, 
though  nothing  has  been  done  about  talcing  possession  of  it,  for  the 
title  has  passed,  as  between  the  parties  to  the  deed,  and  the  as- 
signee or  trustee  has  the  Immediate  right  of  possession. 

Trustee  process.  Avery  and  another  were  the  plaintiffs  and 
Monroe  and  others,  including  the  trustee,  were  defendants. 
The  writ'  was  dated  March  27,  1896,  and  was  served  on  the 
trustee  on  March  28,  1896.  The  assignment  was  executed  on 
March  25,  1896.  The  trustee  was  charged  on  his  answers  to 
the  plaintiff's  interrogatories,  and  he  alleged  exceptions. 

A.  A.  "Wyman,  for  the  plaintiffs. 

F.  W.  Blackmer  and  E.  H.  Vaughan,  for  the  trustee. 

*^  HOLMES,  J.  At  the  time  of  the  s'ervice  of  the  writ  in 
this  action  the  person  sought  to  be  charged  as  trustee  had  ac- 
cepted from  the  principal  defendants  a  conveyance  of  all  their 
property  not  exempt  from  attachment,  consisting  mainly  of  ma- 
chinery, supplies,  and  stock  on  hand  in  a  shoe  factory,  and  book 
accounts,  in  trust  for  the  defendant's  creditors,  but  had  done 
nothing  about  **^  taking  possession  of  the  property.  No 
creditors  appear  to  have  become  parties  to  the  deed.  The  ques- 
tion before  us  is  whether  these  facts  warranted  the  superior 
court  in  charging  the  trustee. 

The  title  had  passed  as  between  the  parties  to  the  deed.  The 
trustee  had  the  right  to  the  immediate  possession.  We  do  not 
see  why  he  was  not  as  well  "able  to  turn  it  out,  to  be  disposed 
of  on  execution"  (Andrews  v.  Ludlow,  5  Pick.  28,  31)  as  if 
he  had  taken  possession  by  a  formal  act.  The  case  of  Viall  v. 
Bliss,  9  Pick,  13,  seems  probably  to  have  been  similar  to  this, 
and  in  Maine  it  seems  settled  that  in  cases  like  the  present  the 
trustee  is  to  be  charged:  Lane  v.  Nowell,  15  Mc.  86;  Arnold  v. 
Elwell,  13  Me,  261;  Peabody  v,  Maguire,  79  Me,  572,  584; 
Glenn  v.  Boston  etc.  Glass  Co,,  7  Md,  287.  See,  also.  Mechan- 
ics' Sav.  Bank  v,  Waite,  150  Mass,  234,  235;  Gushing  on  Trustee 
Process,  sees.  63-55;  Drake  on  Attachment,  7th  ed.,  sec.  482; 


Oct.  1898.]     Berqner  &  Enqel  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus.    251 

Freeman  on  Executions,  2d  ed.,  sec.  160.  Section  26  of  the  Pub- 
lic Statutes,  chapter  183,  is  not  intended  to  limit  the  liability  of 
trustees  under  deeds  like  this' to  cases  where  they  have  taken 
possession,  but  simply  to  declare  the  existing  law  that  they  may 
be  charged  by  trustee  process  under  section  21.  Rev.  Stats., 
c.  109,  sec.  35,  Commissioners'  note.  We  are  of  opinion  that 
the  property  was  "intrusted  in  the  hands"  of  the  trustee  within 
the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  183,  section  21. 

It  is  suggested  that  it  does  not  appear  from  the  trustee's  an- 
swers to  interrogatories  that  all  the  defendants  had  executed  the 
deed  before  service  of  the  writ.  It  does  not  appear  that  they 
had  not.  The  deed  was  executed,  and,  if  it  be  material,  may  be 
presumed  to  have  been  executed  by  all  three  of  the  defendants 
on  the  day  of  its  date,  as  it  cerfainly  was  by  two  of  them. 

Exceptions  overruled. 

GARNISHMENT— ASSIGNEE  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  CREDIT- 
ORS.—Property  held  by  an  assignee  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  la 
not  subject  to  garnishment  by  a  creditor:  Calumet  Paper  Co.  v. 
Haskell  Printing  Co.,  144  Mo.  331.  66  Am.  St  Rep.  425,  and  note. 


Bergner  &  Engel  Brewing  Company  v.  Dreyfus. 

[172  MASBACirnsETTS,  154.] 

A  CORPORATION  HAS  ITS  DOMICILE  In  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  state  which  created  It,  and,  as  a  consequence,  has  no  domi- 
cile anywhere  else. 

CORPORATIONS— ACTION  BY  A  FOREIGN  CORPORA- 
TION— DISCHARGE  OF  INSOLVENT  AS  A  BAR.— A  discharge 
under  the  insolvency  laws  of  Massachusetts  does  not  discharge  a 
debt  due  from  the  Massachusetts  debtor  to  a  corporation  of  an- 
other state,  having  Its  principal  place  of  business  In  the  latter  state, 
although  it  has  a  place  of  business  In  Massachusetts,  and  a  license 
under  the  laws  of  that  state,  and  has  complied  with  Its  laws  regu- 
lating foreign  corporations  doing  business  there,  respecting  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  person  upon  whom  process  may  be  served. 

Contract  for  beer  and  ale  sold  and  delivered  to  the  defendant. 
The  writ  was  dated  September  30,  1896.  The  plaintiff  was  a 
corporation  organized  under  the  laws  of  Pennsylvania.  Its 
principal  oflRces,  where  its  meetings  were  held  and  its  books  kept, 
were  in  Philadelphia,^  where  it  manufactured  and  sold  malt 
liquors.  It  had  no  brewery,  and  manufactured  nothing,  in 
Massachusetts.  It  had  an  office  and  a  storeroom,  however,  in 
Boston,  which  it  hired  in  its  own  name,  and  where  it  sold  its 


252         Bekqner  &  Engel  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus.     [Mass. 

products  at  wholesale.  It  hired  an  agent,  styled  a  manager,  a 
bookkeeper,  and  delivery  men  iov  the  conduct  of  its  business 
in  Boston,  and  it  owned  there  a  complete  set  of  office  furniture 
and  horses  and  wagons  sufficient  for  the  delivery  of  the  goods 
which  it  sold  in  Boston.  All  of  these  employes  resided  in 
Massachusetts.  The  plaintiff  had  complied  with  the  statutes 
of  Massachusets  regulating  foreign  corporations  having  a  usual 
place  of  business  in  that  commonwealth  and  had  received  from 
the  board  of  police  of  the  city  of  Boston  a  license,  in  its  name, 
of  the  fourth  class,  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  in  that  city  sa 
a  wholesale  dealer.  The  defendant,  a  citizen  of  Massachusetts, 
ordered  of  the  plaintiff,  at  its  office  in  Boston,  beer  and  ale, 
which  were  delivered  to  him  in  Boston  from  the  plaintiff's 
Btoreroom  there  and  some  time  after  this  purchase  was  made, 
and  the  goods  delivered,  the  defendant  filed  his  petition  in  in- 
fiolvency.  He  received  his  discharge  before  this  action  was 
brought.  The  plaintiff  did  not  prove  its  claim  in  those  pro- 
ceedings, and  never  received  payment  of  any  part  thereof.  The 
plaintiff  contended,  in  this  action,  that  the  discharge  was  not  a 
bar,  because  it  was  a  citizen  of  Pennsylvania.  There  was  a 
judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  and  the  defendant  appealed. 

H.  H.  Baker,  for  the  plaintiff. 

B.  S.  Ladd  and  T.  F.  Strange,  for  the  defendant. 

*'*'*  HOLMES,  J.  This  is  a  suit  by  a  Pennsylvania  corpora- 
tion to  recover  a  debt  for  goods  sold  and  delivered  here.  The 
only  defense  is  a  discharge  in  insolvency  under  our  statutes, 
which,  of  course,  commonly  is  no  defense  at  all.  This  was  re- 
affirmed unanimously  in  1890,  after  full .  consideration  of  the 
objections  now  urged,  and  it  was  decided,  also,  not  for  the  first 
time,  that  the  general  language  of  the  insolvent  law  was  not  in- 
tended to  affect  access  to  Massachus'etts  courts  by  a  local  rule  of 
procedure  unless  the  substantive  right  was  barred  by  the  dis- 
charge: Phoenix  Nat.  Bank  v.  Batcheller,  151  Mass.  589.  The 
grounds  urged  for  an  exception  in  the  present  case  are  that  the 
*'**  plaintiff,  although  its  brewery  and  main  offices  are  in  Penn^ 
Bylvania,  has  an  office  in  Boston  and  maintains  here  a  complete 
outfit  for  the  distribution  of  its  products,  that  it  has  a  license  of 
the  fourth  class  under  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  100,  section 
10,  and  that  it  has  complied  with  the  laws  regulating  foreign 
corporations   doing  business   here,  including,  we   assume,  that 


Oct.  1898.]     Bergner  &  Engel  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus.     253 

which  requires  the  appointment  of  the  commissioner  of  corpo- 
rations its  "attorney  upon  whom  all  lawful  processes  in  any  ac- 
tion or  proceeding  against  it  may  be  served":  Stats.  1884,  c. 
S30,  sec.  1;  see  Stats.  1895,  c.  157. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  these  facts  are  not  enough  to  bring 
the  plaintiff  under  the  operation- of  the  state  insolvent  law.  It 
is  settkd  that  doing  business  here  does  not  have  that  effect  upon 
a  citizen  or  corporation  of  another  state:  Guernsey  v.  Wood, 
130  Mass.  503;  Eegina  Flour  Mill  Co.  v.  Holmes,  156  Mass  11. 
It  is  not  pointed  out  what  the  license,  whether  valid  or  void, 
has  to  do  with  the  matter,  and  we  do  not  perceive  that  complying 
with  the  laws  concerning  foreign  corporations  ought  to  have  any 
greater  effect.  We  think  it  plain  that  the  words  just  quoted  from 
the  Statutes  of  1884,  chapter  330,  section  1,  do  not  mean  that, 
by  appointing  the  commissioner  of  corporations  their  attorney, 
foreign  corporations  agree  not  only  that  publication  of  notice  in 
insolvency  proceedings  shall  have  the  effect  of  personal  service 
upon  them  in  an  action,  but  also  that,  as  a  result,  they  shall  be 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state  insolvency  proceedings 
so  as  to  be  bound  by  a  discharge. 

The  most  that  could  be  deduced  from  the  appointment  would 
be  that,  if  on  other  grounds  a  foreign  corporation  were  subject 
to  the  operation  of  the  insolvent  law,  publication  of  notice 
should  have  the  same  effect  upon  it  as  upon  other  creditors 
in  making  it  a  party  to  the  proceedings.  But  we  do  not  sup- 
pose that  it  would  be  suggested  that  a  natural  person,  a  creditor 
who  was  a  citizen  of  another  state,  lost  his  immunity  and  be- 
came a  party  to  the  proceedings  merely  by  his  accidental  pres- 
ence in  the  commonwealth  at  the  moment  when  the  notice  ap- 
peared: Olivieri  v.  Atkinson,  168  Mass.  28.  No  greater  direct 
effect  than  the  actual  presence  of  a  natural  person  can  be  at- 
tributed to  the  presence  of  an  attorney  authorized  to  receive 
service  of  process.  Furthermore,  we  doubt  whether  the  ^**^ 
act  of  1884  purports  to  give  the  appointment  even  so  much 
effect  as  that.  The  language  discloses  no  thought  about  insol- 
vent proceedings,  and  when,  at  a  later  date;  it  was  decided  to 
make  foreign  corporations  subject  to  be  put  into  insolvency 
here,  it  was  thought  proper  to  provide  expressly  that  service 
upon  the  commissioner  of  corporations  should  be  a  sufficient 
notice  to  the  corporation  of  the  presentment  of  the  petition  by 
creditors  against  it.  Stats.  1890,  c.  321,  sec.  1.  If  the  act  of 
1884  attempted  to  do  more  than  we  have  construed  it  to  at- 


254         Berqner  &  Engel  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus.     [Mass. 

I 

tempt,  its  validity  might  be  drawn  in  doubt  as  requiring  the 
corporation  to  surrender  a  privilege  secured  to  it  by  the  con- 
stitution and  laws  of  the  United  States:  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v. 
Denton,  146  U.  S.  202,  207. 

The  independent  ground  on  which  it  is  urged  that  the  plain- 
tiff is  subject  to  the  insolvent  law  in  the  present  case  is  that 
the  plaintiff  is  domesticated  in  this  state,  as  shown  by  the  facts 
above  recited,  of  which  the  appointment  of  an  attorney  is  only 
one.  The  word  "domesticated,"  which  was  used  in  the  argu- 
ment for  the  defendant,  presents  no  definite  legal  conception 
which  has  any  bearing  upon  the  case.  We  presume  that  it  was 
intended  to  convey  in  a  conciliatory  form  the  notion  that  the 
plaintiff  was  domiciled  here — "resident,"  in  the  language  of  Pub- 
lic Statutes,  chapter  157,  section  81 — and  therefore  barred  by 
the  language  and  legal  operation  of  the  act.  It  could  not  be 
contended  that  the  corporation  was  a  citizen  of  Massachusetts. 
In  such  sense  as  it  is  a  citizen  of  any  state,  it  is  a  citizen  of  the 
state  which  creates  it  and  of  no  other.  But  there  are  even 
greater  objections  to  a  double  domicile  than  there  are  to  double 
citizenship.  Under  the  law  as  it  has  been,  a  man  might  find 
himself  owning  a  double  allegiance  without  any  choice  of  his 
own.  But  domicile,  at  least  for  any  given  purpose,  is  single  by 
its  essence:  Dicey  on  Conflict  of  Laws,  95.  A  corporation  does 
not  differ  from  a  natural  person  in  this  respect.  If  any  person, 
natural  or  artificial,  as  a  result  of  choice  or  on  technical  grounds 
of  birth  or  creation,  has  a  do^micile  in  one  place,  it  cannot  have 
one  elsewhere,  because  what  the  law  means  by  domicile  is  the 
one  technically  pre-eminent  headquarters  which,  as  a  result 
either  of  fact  or  of  fiction,  every  person  is  compelled  to  have  in 
order  that  by  aid  of  it  certain  rights  and  duties  which  have  been 
attached  to  it  by  the  law  may  be  determined.  It  is  ^^**  settled 
that  a  corporation  has  its  domicile  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state 
which  created  it,  and  as  a  consequence  that  it  has  not  a  domicle 
anywhere  else:  Boston  Investment  Co.  v.  Boston,  158  Mass. 
461,  462,  463;  Shaw  v.  Quincy  Min.  Co.,  145  U.  S.  444,  450; 
Martine  v.  International  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  53  K  Y.  339,  346,  13  Am. 
Rep.  529.  The  so-called  modifications  of  this  rule  by  statutes 
like  the  act  of  1884  do  not  modify  it  because  jurisdiction  of  the 
ordinary  personal  actions  does  not  depend  upon  domicile,  but 
only  upon  such  presence  within  the  jurisdiction  as  to  make  ser- 
vice possible:  See  In  re  Hohorst,  150  U.  S.  653.  But  the  opera- 
tion of  our  insolvent  law  by  its  very  terms  may,  and  in  this 


Oct.  1898.]     BERGNER&  Eng EL  Brewing  Co.  V.Dreyfus.     255 

case  does,  depend  upon  the  domicile  of  the  creditor,  and  aa  there 
can  be  no  doubt  either  in  fact  or  in  law  that  the  plaintiff  was 
domiciled  in  Pennsylvania  in  such  a  sense  that  a  statute  lika 
the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  157,  section  81,  would  hit  it  there, 
it  cannot  have  been  domiciled  here  for  the  same  purpose  at  the 
same  time. 

Judgment  for  the  plaintiff  affirmed. 

FIELD,  C.  J.,  DISSENTED.  He  took  the  ground  that  the  dis- 
charge should  be  upheld  as  valid  until  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  has  decided  to  the  contrary.  "There  is  no  doubt,"^ 
he  said,  "that  the  words  of  the  statutes  relating  to  discharges  in  in- 
solvency, as  well  as  the  words  of  the  discharge  itself,  purport  to 
make  the  discharge  pleaded  in  the  present  action  a  bar  to  the  action. 
Section  81  of  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  157,  provides  that  the 
debtor,  upon  obtaining  his  discharge,  shall  be  absolutely  dis- 
charged from  all  provable  debts  founded  'on  any  contract  made  by 
him  subsequently  to  the  last  day  of  July,  1838,  and  while  an  in- 
habitant of  this  state,  if  made  within  this  state,  to  be  performed 
within  the  same,  or  due  to  any  person  resident  therein  at  the  time 
of  the  first  publication  of  the  notice  of  the  Issuing  of  the  warrant.' 
The  contract  sued  on  was  made  while  the  defendant  was  axi  in- 
hal)itant  of  this  state,  and  was  made  within  the  state,  to  be  per- 
formed within  the  state,  and,  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  was  per- 
formed within  the  state;  and  therefore  it  is  exactly  within  the  terms 
of  the  statutes.  Whether  or  not  the  debt  is  due  to  a  person  resi- 
dent within  this  state  at  the  time  of  the  first  publication  of  the 
notice  m.'iy  depend  upon  the  question  whether  the  plaintiff  corpora- 
tion had  a  domicile  within  the  state." 

"There  is  no  contention,"  he  said,  "that  our  statutes  relating  to 
Insolvency  are  In  violation  of  the  consitltution  of  Massachusetts. 
The  contention  is,  that  in  their  application  to  creditors  who  are  citi- 
zens of  other  states  than  Massachusetts  they  are  in  violation  of  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States."  He  admitted  that  the  decisions 
of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  upon  the  meaning  of  the 
federal  constitution  are  conclusive;  but  the  real  difficulty,  he  said, 
is  in  determining  the  principle  on  which  that  court  has  decided 
that  a  dlschaige,  granted  under  a  state  inaolveucy  law  enacted  be- 
fore the  contract  sued  on  was  entered  into,  will  not  discharge  a 
debt  due  under  the  contract,  if  due  to  a  citizen  of  another  state 
than  that  In  whit  h  the  law  was  passed. 

"This  difficulty,"  he  said,  "has  often  been  noticed";  and  to  illus- 
trate It,  he  quoted  from  Marsh  v.  Putnam,  S  Gray,  551,  In  which 
Mr.  Justice  Thomas,  speaking  for  the  court,  In  carefully  reviewing 
the  decisions  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  up  to  the 
time  of  that  decision,  said:  "In  this  state  of  the  opinions  of  that 
tribunal  to  which,  on  these  subjects,  we  look  for  guidance,  we 
know  of  no  safe  rule  but  stare  decisis,  and  yet  n»t  go  beyond  the 
precise  limits  of  the  decisions."     "The  principal  decisions  of  the  so- 


256         Bergneb  &  Enqel  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus.     [Mass. 

preme  court  of  the  United  States  on  this  subject,"  said  Field,  C.  J., 
"since  those  considered  in  Marsh  v.  Putnam,  3  Gray,  551,  are  Bald- 
win V.  Hale,  1  Wall.  223;  Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  Newbury,  1  Wall. 
234;  Gilman  v.  Lockwood,  4  Wall.  409;  and  Denny  v.  Bennett,  12S 
U.  S.  489."  His  honor  then  discussed  and  quoted  from  these  cases, 
as  well  as  from  Stoddard  v.  Harrington,  100  Mass.  87,  97  Am.  Dec. 
80,  1  Am.  Eep.  92,  to  show  that  he  was  unable  to  see  any  conflict 
between  the  insolvent  laws  of  Massachusetts  and  the  federal  con- 
stitution. He  also  cited  Phoenix  Nat.  Bank  v.  Batcheller,  151  Mass. 
589;  Kelley  v.  Drury,  9  Allen,  27;  Ogden  v.  Saunders,  12  Wheat.  213, 
358,  and  PuUen  v.  Hillman,  84  Me.  129,  30  Am.  St.  Eep.  340,  in  sup- 
port of  his  views.  In  Stoddard  v.  Harrington,  100  Mass.  87,  97  Am. 
Dec.  80,  1  Am.  Rep.  92,  the  court  said:  "The  suggestion  that  the 
power  of  a  state  over  the  contracts  of  its  citizens  is  limited  by  the 
power  to  make  them  parties  to  the  proceedings  in  insolvency  does 
not  seem  to  us  well  founded,  because  we  think  that  the  effect  of  the 
insolvent  law  qualifies  the  contract  from  its  inception;  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  sufficiency  of  the  notice  to  creditors  to  make  them  so  far 
parties  as  to  be  bound  by  these  proceedings  does  not  seem  to  be  one 
over  which  the  courts  of  the  United  States  have  any  peculiar  juris- 
diction." "This  decision,"  said  the  dissenting  justice,  "wherein  it  was 
held  that  if  a  contract  is  made  between  two  citizens  of  Massachu- 
setts within  the  state,  and  one  of  them  afterward  removes  there- 
from and  becomes  a  citizen  of  another  state,  and  the  other  then 
obtains  in  Massachusettts,  where  he  continues  to  reside,  a  discharge 
under  the  insolvent  laws,  which  were  in  force  when  the  contract 
was  made,  the  discharge  is  a  bar  to  an  action  against  him  on  the 
contract,  has  not  been  overruled  by  this  court,  and  the  precise 
■case  does  not  seem  to  have  come  before  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States." 

He  said  that  the  doctrine  that  the  statutes  of  a  state,  ex  proprio 
vigore,  have  no  extraterritorial  force  is  a  doctrine  of  the  common 
law,  and  not  a  provision  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States;  and 
claimed  that  a  discharge  under  the  bankruptcy  laws  of  England  is 
held,  in  the  courts  of  England,  to  be  a  discharge  of  debts  due  to 
citizens  or  subjects  of  other  countries,  without  any  regard  to  the 
■question  whether  the  courts  of  England  have  any  jurisdiction  over 
the  foreign  creditors  whereby  they  could  render  personal  judgments 
against  them:  Citlug  Dicey  on  (Conflict  of  Laws,  448  et  seq.;  Ellis 
V.  McHenry,  L.  R.  0  Com.  P.  228.  He  also  considered  the  better 
opinion  to  be  that  a  corporation  can  have  a  domicile  other  than 
that  in  the  state  under  whose  laws  It  was  incorporated:  Citing 
Attorney  General  v.  Bay  State  Min.  Co.,  90  Mass.  148,  153,  9G  Am. 
Dec.  717;  Ricker  v.  American  Loan  etc.  Co.,  140  Mass.  346,  350;  Gar- 
ham  V.  Mutual  Aid  Soc,  101  Mass.  357,  3G6;  and  said  that:  "If  the 
•operation  of  the  insolvent  laws  of  Massachusetts  upon  contracts 
made  here  between  persons  domiciled  here  can  be  avoided  upon  the 
ground  that  they  were  made  In  behalf  of  corporations  organized 
under  the  laws  of  other  states,  although  having  usual  places  of  busl- 
tiess  here,  and  subject  to  be  sued  here,  then  It  will  be  possible  for 


Oct.  1898.]  Bebgner  &  Engel  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus  257 

foreign  corporations  to  obtain  substantially  all  the  business  advan- 
tages in  Massacliusetts  conferred  by  our  laws  without  subjecting 
themselves  to  the  liability  of  having  debts  due  to  them,  and  con- 
tracted within  the  commonwealth,  discharged  by  proceedings  in  in- 
solvency on  the  part  of  inhabitants  of  the  commonwealth  with 
whom  the  contracts  were  made. 

"I  know  of  no  decision  in  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States 
upon  exactly  the  state  of  facts  appearing  in  the  present  case,  and, 
on  principle,  I  do  not  see  why  the  contract  made  and  performed 
here  by  the  parties  in  this  case  is  not  subject  to  be  discharged  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  Massachusetts  in  force  when  the  con- 
tract was  made.  The  contract  undoubtedly  Is  to  be  governed  gen- 
erally by  the  laws  of  Massachusetts,  and  the  plaintiff  has  elected 
to  bring  its  suit  in  a  Massachusetts  court,  and  the  plaintiff  is  not 
only  subject  to  be  sued  in  Massachusetts,  but  may  be  made  an  In- 
solvent debtor  under  the  insolvency  statutes  of  Massachusetts: 
Stats.  1890,  c.  321.  To  enforce  our  insolvency  statutes  in  the  case 
of  such  a  contract  entered  into  here  between  such  parties,  after 
the  Insolvency  statutes  were  passed,  does  not  seem  to  me  to  give 
the  statutes  any  extraterritorial  force,  and  the  plaintiff  corporation 
seems  to  me,  in  reference  to  contracts  made  here  with  citizens  or 
inhabitants  of  Massachusetts,  to  be  subject  to  our  laws. 

"I  am  not  aware  that  anyone  has  pointed  out  the  particular  pro- 
visions of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  which  our  insolv- 
ency statutes  would  violate  if  it  were  held  by  the  courts  of  Massa- 
chusetts that  the  discharge  pleaded  In  the  present  action  was  a  bar 
to  the  action.  The  early  decisions  of  the  supreme  court  of  thr 
United  States  were  only  to  the  effect  that  contracts  entered  into  be- 
fore the  passage  of  the  insolvency  statutes  of  a  state,  or  entered 
into  in  another  state  than  that  in  which  such  statutes  had  been 
passed,  but  to  which  the  contracts  were  not  subject,  could  not  be 
discharged  under  the  statutes,  because,  under  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States,  no  state  could  pass  a  'law  impairing  the  obliga- 
tion of  contracts.'  But  this  seems  inapplicable  to  contracts  entered 
into  within  a  state,  subject  to  the  laws  thereof,  when  insolvency 
statutes  are  In  existence  within  the  state;  and  are  a  part  of  the 
laws  to  which  the  contracts  are  subject. 

•'It  is  evident  that,  in  recent  years,  this  court,  in  its  anxiety  to  do 
nothing  which  might  seem  to  be  in  violation  of  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States  according  to  the  later  decisions  of  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States,  has  rendered  decisions  which  go  far  in 
the  direction  of  the  decision  of  the  court  in  the  present  case:  Guern- 
sey V.  Wood,  130  Mass.  503;  Phoenix  Nat.  Bank  v.  Batcheller,  151 
Mass.  589;  Regina  Flour  Mill  Co.  v.  Holmes,  156  Mass.  11.  In 
Guernsey  v.  Wood,  130  Mass.  503,  the  plaintiff  was  not  a  corpora- 
tion, but  a  citizen  of  Pennsylvania,  never  resident  In  Massachu- 
setts. In  Phoenix  Nat.  Bank  v.  Batcheller,  151  Mass.  589,  it  does 
not  appear  that  the  plaintiff  corporation  had  any  usual  place  of 
business  in  Massachusetts,  or  had  complied  with  our  statutes  regu- 
lating foreign  corporations  doing  business  here,  or  was  subject  to 

AM.  St.  Rep.,  Vou  LXX.— 17 


258  Parmenter  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hamilton.  [MaBB. 

legal  process  here.  The  same  is  true  of  Kegina  Flour  Mill  Co.  v. 
Holmes,  156  Mass.  11.  In  none  of  these  cases  was  there  any- 
thing in  the  nature  of  the  license  shown  in  the  present  case.  These 
distinctions  seem  to  me  important.  Certainly  it  is  going  beyond 
the  'precise  limits'  of  the  decisions  of  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  if  it  is  held  that  the  discharge  pleaded  in  the  present 
suit  is  invalid. 

"I  thinli  that  this  court  ought  to  uphold  the  validity  of  the  dis- 
charge, In  the  present  case,  until  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States  has  decided  to  the  contrary.  The  question,  of  course,  be- 
comes of  little  importance  when  there  are  banliruptcy  laws  of  the 
United  States  in  force;  but  such  laws  have  been  in  force  only  for 
short  periods  of  time,  and  the  insolvency  laws  of  Massachusetts 
are  not  repealed,  but  only  suspended,  by  the  banlsruptcy  laws  of  the 
United  States." 


CORPORATIONS— DOMICILE  OF.— A  corporation  can  have  but 
one  legal  residence,  and  that  must  be  within  the  state  or  sover- 
eignty creating  it,  although  by  comity  it  may  be  allowed  to  do  busi- 
ness, through  its  officers  and  agents,  in  other  jurisdictions:  Ireland 
V.  Globe  etc.  Reduction  Co.,  19  R.  I.  180,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  756;  Bay 
State  Iron  Co.  v.  Goodall,  39  N.  H.  223,  75  Am.  Dec.  219;  Asplnwall 
V.  Ohio  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Ind.  492,  83  Am.  Dec.  329. 

INSOLVENCY— EFFECT  OF  DISCHARGE  AS  AGAINST  NON- 
RESIDENT.—A  discharge  under  the  insolvent  laws  pf  one  stale 
does  not  affect  a  nonresident,  unless  he  voluntarily  appears  in  the 
insolvency  proceedings,  and  becomes  a  party  thereto.  A  banlcruptcy 
or  insolvency  statute  can  have  no  extraterritorial  operation,  and  a 
citizen  of  one  state  cannot  be  required  to  appear  in  the  courts  of  an- 
other, and  submit  to  their  exercise  of  jurisdiction  over  him,  or  tO' 
their  discharge  of  an  obligation  due  him,  though  it  was  created,  or 
Is  to  be  performed,  in  the  state  where  such  courts  have  jurisdiction. 
As  the  Insolvency  court  does  not  have  jurisdiction  of  him,  in  such 
a  case,  it  cannot  discharge  his  right  to  recover  his  debt:  Scammart 
V.  Bonslett,  118  Cal.  293,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  226,  and  note;  Pullen  v. 
Hillman,  84  Me.  129,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  340.  See,  also,  note  to  Mor- 
rill V.  MorrUl,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  113,  and  Chase  v.  Henry,  166  Mass* 
677,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  423. 


Parmentee    Manufacturing   Co.  v,  Hamilton. 

[172  Massachusetts,  178.] 

BANKRUPTCY— EFFECT  OF  FEDERAL  STATUTE  UPON 
STATE  INSOLVENCY  PROCEEDINGS.— The  United  Sa  e» 
banlsruptcy  law  of  July  1,  1898,  supersedes  all  state  laws  In  regard 
to  insolvency  from  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  statute.  Hence 
Insolvency  proceedings  commenced  in  the  state  courts  after  the  pas- 
sage of  that  law  are  unauthorized. 

Bill  in  equity,  praying  that  a  decree  of  the  judg-e  of  insolvency 
of  September  6,  1898,  on  a  petition  of  the  defendants  that  a 


Kov.  1898.]    Pabmenter  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hamilton.  259 

warrant  issue  to  a  messenger  to  take  possession  of  the  plaintiff's 
estate,  be  reversed;  that  the  warrant  be  recalled  and  the  petition 
dismissed;  and  that  the  messenger  be  enjoined  from  Interfering 
with  the  property  of  the  plaintiff.  The  plaintiff  contended  that 
the  state  insolvent  law  had  been  suspended  by  the  act  of  Con- 
gress of  July  1,  1898.  The  defendants,  Hamilton  and  others, 
demurred  for  want  of  equity,  and  the  question  of  law  was  re- 
served by  the  justice  who  heard  the  bill  for  the  opinion  of  the 
full  court. 

E.  I.  Morgan  and  R.  A.  Stewart,  for  the  plaintiff. 

C.  M.  Eice,  for  the  defendants. 

1^8  KNOWLTON,  J.  The  United  States  bankruptcy  law 
passed  on  July  1,  1898,  ends  with  the  following  provision:  "This 
act  shall  go  into  full  force  and  effect  upon  its  passage ;  provided, 
howerer,  that  no  petition  for  voluntary  bankruptcy  shall  be  filed 
within  one  month  of  the  passage  thereof,  and  no  petition  for  in- 
voluntary bankruptcy  shall  be  filed  within  four  months  of  the 
passage  thereof.  Proceedings  commenced  under  st»te  insolvency 
laws  before  the  passage  of  this  act  shall  not  be  affected  by  it." 

The  question  In  this  case  is,  whether  this  act  so  far  superseded 
the  insolvency  laws  of  this  commonwealth  from  the  time  of  its 
^''^  passage  as  to  deprive  our  courts  of  jurisdiction  to  entertain 
petitions  for  the  commencement  of  insolvency  proceedings  filed 
after  July  1,  1898.  This  depends  upon  the  intention  of  Con- 
gress, as  manifested  by  the  language  above  quoted.  Of  the  power 
of  Congress  to  pafis  an  act  having  this  effect,  there  is  no  doubt: 
U.  S.  Const.,  art.  1,  sec.  8,  cl.  4;  Griswold  v.  Pratt,  9  Met. 
16;  In  re  Klein,  1  How.  277,  280,  281;  Sturges  v.  Crowninshield, 
4  Wheat.  122,  192;  Ogden  v.  Saunders,  12  Wheat.  213,  369. 
The  language  is  materially  different  from  that  of  the  bankruptcy 
act  of  1867,  and  from  that  of  the  earlier  bankruptcy  law  of  1841: 
See  U.  S.  Stats.,  March  2,  1867;  Day  v.  Bardwell,  97  Mass.  246; 
Judd  V.  Ives,  4  Met.  401;  Swan  v.  Littlefield,  4  Cush.  574.  The 
argument  that  the  change  in  question  was  intentional  is  almost 
irresistible.  The  act  is  to  "go  into  full  force  and  effect  upon 
its  passage."  That  is  to  say,  the  rights  of  all  persons,  in  the 
particulars  to  which  the  act  refers,  are  to  be  determined  by  the 
act  from  the  time  of  its  passage.  Among  these  rights  is  the  right 
to  have  insolvent  estates  settled  in  bankruptcy  under  the  provi- 
sions of  the  act,  including  the  rights  to  have  acts  of  bankruptcy 


Pabmenter  Mfq.  Co.  v.  Hamilton.  [Mass. 

affecting  the  settlement  of  estates  determined  by  it  (section  3),  to 
have  the  rights  of  debtors  to  file  voluntary  petitions,  and  of 
creditors  to  file  involuntary  petitions  determined  by  it  (section 
4),  and  to  have  preferences  and  liens  governed  by  the  provisions 
of  it  (sections  60  and  67).  These  various  provisions  affecting  the 
rights  and  conduct  of  debtors  and  creditors  are  different  from 
those  previously  existing  in  most  of  the  states,  and  perhaps  dif- 
ferent from  those  found  in  the  laws  of  any  state,  and  they  super- 
fi'ede  all  conflicting  provisions.  The  only  limitation  upon  the 
full  and  complete  operation  of  the  act  upon  its  passage  is  that 
■the  right  to  begin  proceedings  is  postponed  one  month  in  the 
case  of  voluntary  petitions  and  four  months  in  the  case  of  in- 
voluntary petitions.  Wlienever  the  proceedings  are  commenced, 
the  conduct  of  the  parties  after  the  passage  of  the  act  is  to  be 
tested  by  its  requirements.  The  only  saving  clause  aft'ecting  the 
jurisdiction  of  state  courts  provides  for  cases  commenced  in 
those  courts  before  the  passage  of  the  act.  The  plain  implica- 
tion is,  that  proceedings  commenced  in  the  state  courts  after  the 
passage  of  the  act  are  unauthorized.  This  is  in  accordance  with 
the  earlier  language  giving  the  statute  full  force  and  effect  *®* 
from  the  time  of  its  passage,  except  that  the  filing  of  petitions 
is  to  be  postponed  for  a  short  time. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  the  language  was  chosen  to  make  clear 
the  purpose  of  Congress  that  the  new  system  of  bankruptcy 
should  supersede  all  state  laws  in  regard  to  insolvency  from  the 
date  of  the  passage  of  the  statute. 

Demurrer  overruled. 


BANKRUPTCY— EFFECT  OF  FEDERAL  STATUTE  ON 
STATE  INSOLVENCY  LAWS.— The  passage  of  a  bankrupt  act  by 
Congress  renders  It  supreme;  the  state  laws  must  yield  to  it,  and 
can  no  longer  operate  upon  persons  or  cases  within  the  purview  of 
such  act.  It  suspends  the  state  laws  on  the  same  subject,  but  does 
not  affect  pending  proceedings:  See  monographic  note  to  Norton  v. 
Coolt,  23  Am.  Dec.  353,  354,  on  what  demands  may  be  discharged 
under  state  insolvent  laws;  Mlnot  v.  Thacher,  7  Met.  348,  41  Am. 
Dec.  444;  note  to  Sanford  t.  Sauford,  17  Am.  Bep.  207. 


Nov.  1898.]  Shane  v.  Lyons.  261 


Shane  v.  Lyons. 

[172  Massachusetts,  199.] 
HUSBAND  AND  WIFE>-ASSAULT  IN  WIFE'S  ABSENCE, 
BY  HUSBAND,  WHO  IS  HER  AGENT— WIFE'S  LIABILITY.— 
A  married  woman  is  civilly  answerable  for  personal  injuries  in- 
flicted, not  in  her  presence,  upon  a  third  person,  by  her  husband, 
while  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  authority  as  her  agent. 

Tort,  for  an  assault  and  battery  committed  by  the  husband 
of  the  defendant.  It  appeared  on  the  trial  that  he  was  her 
authorized  agent  for  the  care  of  her  real  estate;  that  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  assault  upon  the  plaintiff,  Mamie  Shane, 
by  the  husband,  and  in  the  commission  thereof,  he  was  acting 
within  the  scope  of  his  authority  as  such  agent;  and  that  his 
wife  was  not  then  present.  The  court  was  requested  by  the  de- 
fendant to  rule  as  follows:  "The  defendant  in  this  case,  being 
the  wife  of  the  person  committing  the  alleged  assault,  cannot 
be  held  responsible  therefor,  because  of  the  fact  that  she  is  his 
wife;  that  is  to  say,  a  wife  cannot  he  held  legally  responsible 
for  an  assault  committed  by  her  husband,  whether  her  husband 
was  at  the  time  her  lawful  agent  for  certain  purposes,  such  as 
the  care  of  her  real  estate,  or  not."  This  ruling  was  refused, 
and  the  jury  returned  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  exceptions  being 
alleged  by  the  defendant. 

D.  B.  Kelly  and  J.  F.  Batchelder,  for  the  plaintiff. 

C.  H.  Poor  and  E.  B.  Fuller,  for  the  defendant. 

^^^  HAMMOND,  J.  The  only  question  is  whether  a  married 
woman  can  be  civilly  responsible  for  personal  injuries  inflicted 
not  in  her  presence  upon  a  third  person  by  her  husband  whilo 
acting  within  the  scope  of  his  authority  as  her  agent. 

The  act  of  the  agent  is  the  act  of  the  principal,  and  she  must 
be  held  unless  there  is  something  in  the  relation  of  husband 
and  wife  which  takes  the  case  out  of  the  general  rule. 

It  is  contended  by  the  defendant  that,  while  the  wife  is  liable 
for  assaults  and  other  torts  committed  by  her  when  not  acting 
under  the  coercion  of  her  husband,  she  is  not  so  liable  when 
acting  under  such  coercion,  and  that,  as  the  husband  was 
present  at  the  time  of  this  assault,  she  herself,  if  she  had  been 
personally  present  and  had  actually  joined  in  the  assault,  would 
have  been  presumed  to  have  acted  under  coercion,  and  so  would 


262  Whiting  v.  Pbice.  [Mass. 

not  have  been  liable,  and  tbat  a  fortiori  she  ought  not  to  be  held 
liable  when  absent. 

But  this  presumption  of  coercion  is  simply  a  presumption 
■which  may  be  rebutted  by  evidence,  and  a  wife  may  be  held  re- 
sponsible, either  criminally  or  civilly,  for  assaults  committed  of 
her  own  free  will  and  while  actually  under  no  coercion  from  her 
husband,  even  although  he  be  present  and  join  therein:  Com- 
monwealth V.  Eagan,  103  Mass.  71;  Handy  v.  Foley,  121  Mass. 
259,  23  Am.  Eep.  270,  and  cases  cited;  Ferguson  v.  Brooks,  67 
Me.  251. 

Our  statutes  have  given  to  a  married  woman  the  right  to  hold, 
manage,  and  dispose  of  her  property  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
she  were  sole,  and  a  necessary  consequence  of  this  enlargement 
of  her  power  is  a  corresponding  increase  of  her  responsibility  for 
all  acts  relating  thereto  and  growing  out  of  her  management  and 
control.  If  she  appoints  her  husband  as  her  agent  in  such  a 
matter,  and  in  making  such  appointment  acts  of  her  own  free 
will  and  without  coercion  from  him,  we  see  no  reason  for  regard- 
ing her  as  incapable  of  authorizing  any  act  to  be  done  by  him 
in  her  name,  and  on  her  behalf,  or  for  shielding  her  from 
responsibility. 

It  must  be  held  that  whatever  is  done  within  the  scope  of  tho 
agency  is  done  by  her  authority 

Exceptions  overruled. 


AGENCY— LIABILITY  OP  PRINCIPAL  FOR  TORTS  OP 
AGENT.— A  principal  is  liable  to  third  persons,  in  a  civil  suit,  for 
the  torts  of  his  agent,  committed  in  the  course  of  his  employment, 
although  the  principal  did  not  authorize,  Justify,  or  participate  in, 
or  know  of,  such  misconduct:  Note  to  Jarvis  v.  Manhattan  Beach 
Co.,  51  Am.  St.  Bep.  733. 


Whitinq  v.  Priob, 

[172  Massachusetts,  240.] 

FRAUD— .\CTION  FOR  FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  IN 
SALE  OF  BOND— WHAT  WILL  SUPPORT.— Although  a  certain 
bond  of  an  electric  light  company  states  that  payment  thereof  Is 
"secured  by  a  first  mortgage  on  all  the  property,  rights,  and  fran- 
chises of  said  company  (present  and  future  acquired),"  a  representa- 
tion made,  in  selling  the  bond,  that  it  was  secured  by  a  mortgage 
of  real  estate  of  the  value  of  half  a  million  dollars,  will  support  an 
action  for  false  representations,  where  it  appears  that  the  company 
owied  no  real  estate  and  that  the  bond  was  not  secured  by  a  mort- 
gage of  real  estate. 


Nov.  1898.  J  Whiting  t>.  Price.  263 

FRAUD -FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  IN  SALE  OP 
BOND— RELYING  ON  REPRESENTATIONS— QUESTION  FOR 
JURY.— In  an  action  for  false  representations  in  the  sale  of  a  bond, 
where  it  appears  that  the  defendant  referred  the  plaintiff  to  the 
sources  of  his  information,  and  advised  the  plaintiff  to  consult  the 
persons  named,  the  question  as  to  whether  he  ought  to  have  done 
so  may  depend  on  circumstances,  and  It  is  not  Improper  to  leave  tt 
to  the  Jury. 

DAMAGES— MEASURE  OF,  FOR  FALSE  REPRESENTA- 
TIONS IN  SALE  OP  BOND.— The  measure  of  damages,  in  an  ac- 
tion for  false  representations  in  the  sale  of  a  bond,  is  the  difference 
between  the  actual  value  of  the  bond,  at  the  time  of  purchase,  and 
Its  value  if  it  had  been  what  it  was  represented  to  be,  secured  as 
represented.  Subsequent  events  may  be  considered  in  arriving  at 
the  two  values,  at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  though  they  show  the 
market  value  of  the  bond  to  have  been  worthless. 

FRAUD  — FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  IN  SALE  OP 
BOND— RETURN  OF  BOND.— In  an  action  for  false  representa- 
tions in  the  sale  of  a  bond,  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  return 
the  bond  to  the  defendant. 

Tort  against  Price  and  Parker  for  false  representations  in  the 
sale  of  a  bond  of  the  Jacksonville  Electric  Light  Company. 
There  was  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  and  the  defendants  al- 
leged exceptions. 

G.  A.  Perkins,  for  the  plaintiff. 

H.  J.  Fuller  and  W.  H.  Pond,  for  the  defendants. 

*'*^  HOLMES,  J.  This  is  an  action  for  false  representations, 
which  has  been  before  the  court  already  upon  a  demurrer  to  the 
declaration:  Whiting  v.  Price,  169  Mass.  576,  61  Am.  St.  Eep. 
307.    It  now  comes  up  upon  exceptions  taken  at  the  trial. 

The  bond  respecting  which  the  representations  were  made 
stated  that  payment  was  "secured  by  a  first  mortgage  on  all 
the  property,  rights,  and  franchises  of  said  company  (present 
and  future  acquired)."  The  representation  proved  was  that 
the  *^  bond  was  secured  by  a  mortgage  of  real  estate  of  the 
value  of  half  a  million  dollars.  In  fact,  the  company  owned  no 
real  estate,  and  the  bond  was  not  secured  by  a  mortgage  of  real 
estate.  An  exception  was  taken  to  a  ruling  allowing  the  plain- 
tiff, even  if  he  had  read  the  bond,  to  recover  for  this  further 
staitement  about  the  security.  We  see  no  reason  for  the  excep- 
tion, and  none  is  offered  for  it.  The  alleged  representations  did 
not  contradict  the  bond;  they  made  specific  and  definite  what 
the  bond  left  vague. 

The  defendant  Parker  stated  to  the  plaintiff  at  North  Attle- 
borough  what  he  alleged  he  had  been  told  by  several  persons, 
named,  living  in  the  town  and  known  to  the  plaintiff.    The  de- 


264  Whiting  v.  Price.  [Mas», 

fendant  advised  the  plaintiff  to  see  and  consult  with  them.  Tha 
defendant  asked  a  ruling  to  the  effect  that  the  plaintiff  could 
not  recover  for  such  statements  when  he  was  referred  to  the 
sources  of  the  defendant's  alleged  information.  This  was  ref  ased, 
the  judge  intimating  that  it  depended  on  the  circumstances,  and 
seemingly  leaving  it  to  the  jury  whether  the  plaintiff  ought  to 
have  inquired  of  the  persons  named.  So  far  as  appears,  this  was 
the  proper  course.  It  is  true  that  in  cases  of  representations  as  to 
quality,  correspondence  to  sample,  et  cetera,  of  goods  exhibited 
in  the  buyer's  presence,  the  court  has  ruled  that  if  the  buyer 
had  full  means  of  ascertaining  the  truth  for  himself,  he  could 
not  set  up  that  he  was  imposed  upon  by  fraud:  Salem  India 
Eubber  Co.  v.  Adams,  23  Pick.  256,  265;  Slaughter  v.  Gerson, 
13  Wall.  379;  Long  v.  Warren,  68  N.  Y.  426;  and  that  a  verdict 
has  been  directed  partly  on  that  ground:  Poland  v.  Brownell, 
131  Mass.  138,  41  Am.  Eep.  215.  See  Bayly  v.  Merrel,  Cro. 
Jac,  386.  But  the  requirement  as  it  has  been  worked  out  doe» 
not  call  for  more  than  reasonable  diligence:  Hoist  v.  Stewart^ 
161  Mass.  516,  522,  42  Am.  St.  Eep.  442;  Brown  v.  Leach,  107 
Mass.  364,  368;  Nowlan  v.  Cain,  3  Allen,  261,  264;  and  distance 
or  other  slight  circumstances  have  been  held  sufficient  to  war- 
rant leaving  the  question  to  the  jury:  Hoist  v.  Stewart,  161  Mass. 
516,  522,  523,  42  Am.  St.  Eep.  442.  See  Burns  v.  Lane,  13S 
Mass.  350,  355,  356;  Whiteside  v.  Brawley,  152  Mass.  133.  The 
matter  may  have  been  confused  a  little  by  not  distinguishing 
between  seller's  talk  as  to  value  and  the  like,  where  the  rule  ia 
absolute  in  ordinary  cases  that  the  buyer  must  look  out  for  him- 
eelf,  and  representation  of  facts  concerning  ^^^  which  even  sell- 
lers  may  be  held  liable  for  fraud,  and  as  to  which  the  buyer  may 
be  warranted  in  relying  wholly  on  the  seller's  word.  The  no- 
tion that  the  buyer  must  look  out  for  himself  sometimes  has 
been  pressed  a  little  too  strongly  into  the  latter  class  of  cases. 

The  judge,  at  the  defendant's  request.  Instructed  the  jury 
that  the  measure  of  damages  was  the  difference  between  the  ac- 
tual value  of  the  bond  at  the  time  of  the  purchase  and  its  value 
if  it  had  been  what  it  was  represented  to  be,  s:ecured  as  repre- 
sented: Morse  v.  Hutchins,  102  Mass.  439,  440;  Nash  v.  Minne- 
sota Title  Ins.  etc.  Co.,  163  Mass.  574,  587,  47  Am.  St.  Eep. 
489.  He  then  instructed  them  further  that  they  "would  in- 
quire what  the  value  of  the  bond  was  at  that  time  in  view  of 
the  circumstances  which  have  transpired,"  and  what  it  would 
have  been  if  it  had  been  secured  as  according  to  the  plaintiff'* 


Nov.  1898.]  Whiting  ».  Price.  265 

evidence  the  defendant  said  it  was,  adding,  'TTou  will  take  into 
account  what  has  happened  since  in  order  to  determine  what  the 
value  of  the  bond  was  and  what  it  is  now."  The  defendants 
excepted  to  the  further  instruction.  With  some  hesitation,  we 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  this  exception  should  be  over- 
ruled with  the  rest.  The  reference  to  the  present  value  of  the 
bond,  in  the  last  words  quoted,  cannot  be  taken  to  have  over- 
ruled the  express  direction  as  to  how  the  damages  were  to  be 
measured.  We  think  that  what  was  added  to  that  express  direc- 
tion merely  amounted  to  allowing  the  jury  to  take  subsequent 
events  into  account  in  arriving  at  the  two  values  at  the  time  c-f 
the  purchase,  which  the  jury  were  directed  to  compare.  We 
cannot  say  that  this  was  wrong.  The  market  value  of  the  bond 
at  the  time  of  the  sale  may  have  been  illusory,  because  the  pub- 
lic also  may  have  been  deceived.  The  statement  which  we 
have  quoted,  appearing  in  the  bond  of  an  electric  light  company, 
certainly  conveys  the  impression  that  it  has  a  plant  and  prop- 
erty which  naturally  would  include  land-.  Or  if  it  be  answered 
that  the  public,  which  makes  market  prices  generally,  looks  a 
little  further  than  such  vague  words,  the  question  remains. 
What  would  have  been  the  value  of  a  bond  adequately  secured, 
when  the  public  were  willing  to  pay  par  for  one  depending  so 
far  upon  speculation  for  its  value  that  subsequent  events  have 
shown  it  to  be  worthless?  The  subsequent  events  may  be 
likened  to  the  coming  out  of  a  ^*^  latent  disease  existing  in  a 
horse  at  the  time  of  a  fraudulent  sale,  to  take  an  example  put  by 
Cockburn,  C.  J.,  in  Twycross  v.  Grant,  2  C.  P.  Div.  469,  544.  It 
was  intimated  that  subsequent  events  might  be  considered  in 
CofBng  V.  Dodge,  167  Mass.  231,  241,  and  it  was  decided  that 
they  might  be,  in  order  to  determine  the  worth  of  stock,  in 
Peek  V.  Derry,  L.  R.  37  Ch.  Div.  541,  591,  et  seq.,  a  decision 
not  affected  by  the  subsequent  reversal  by  the  house  of  lords, 
on  the  ground  that  fraud  was  not  made  out:  Derry  v.  Peek, 
L.  R.  14  App.  Cas.  337.  See,  also,  Hubbell  v.  Meigs,  50  N.  Y. 
480,  492;  SedgM'ick  on  Damages,  8th  ed.,  sec.  257.  We  may- 
follow  these  cases  without  regard  to  the  possible  conflict  between 
the  measure  of  damages  in  this  state,  and  that  adopted  else- 
where. It  would  seem  probable  that  in  the  present  case  the 
jury  found  the  bond  to  have  been  worthless,  and  gave  the  plain- 
tiff no  more  than  he  paid,  but  with  that  we  have  nothing  to  do. 
The  plaintiff  did  not  offer  to  return  the  bond  to  the  defend- 
ants.   He  was  not  bound  to  do  so.     The  action  is  for  false  rep- 


266  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass, 

resentations  and  proceeds  upon  an  affirmation  of  the  purchase : 
Whiteside  v.  Brawley,  152  Mass.  133,  134.  The  dictum  in  the 
case  of  Hedden  v.  Griffin,  136  Mass.  229,  49  Am.  Eep.  25,  cited 
for  the  defendant,  has  no  hearing.  There  the  plaintiff  was  in- 
duced by  the  defendant's  false  representations  to  take  a  con- 
tract of  insurance  from  a  third  person.  The  insurance  com- 
pany was  solvent,  and  the  policy  was  a  good  policy.  The  repre- 
sentations went  to  collateral  matters.  The  plaintiff  had  a  right 
to  rescind,  however,  which  he  exercised.  It  was  intimated  in 
the  course  of  the  decision  that,  if  he  had  chosen  to  keep  the 
contract,  his  damages  would  have  been  only  nominal,  which 
very  likely  was  true,  as  the  plaintiff  got  what  he  expected. 
Here  the  ground  of  complaint  is  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  get 
what  he  expected. 
Exceptions  overruled. 


FRAUD  —  FRAUDULENT  REPRESENTATIONS  —  DILIGENT 
INQUIRY  AS  TO  FALSITY  IS  NOT  ESSENTIAL  TO  ACTION.— A 
representation,  if  a  falsehood,  and  acted  upon  by  one  deceived  there- 
by, is  always  fraudulent:  Note  to  Hecht  v.  Metzler,  60  Am.  St.  Rep. 
■914.  Diligent  inquii'y  to  discover  whether  representations  are  falsy 
is  not  essential  to  recovery  in  an  action  for  false  representations: 
Cottrill  V.  Krum,  100  Mo.  397,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  549. 

DAMAGES  — MEASURE  OF,  FOR  FALSE  REPRESENTA- 
TIONS.—In  an  action  for  false  representations  in  the  sale  of  prop- 
erty, real  or  personal,  the  measure  of  damages  is  the  difference  be- 
tween the  value  tliereof  as  sold  and  what  its  value  would  have  been 
if  it  had  been  as  represented:  See  monographic  note  to  Cottrill  v. 
Krum,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  562,  on  action  to  recover  for  false  represen- 
tations: Gustafson  v.  Rustemeyer,  70  Conn.  125,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  92; 
note  to  Hecht  v.  Metzler,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  914. 


Murphy  v.  Commonwealth. 

[172  MA8SACHU8KTT8,  264.J 

STATUTES.— THE  TERM  "EX  POST  FACTO"  applies  only 
to  penal  or  criminal  matters. 

STATUTES.— A  PENAL  STATUTE  IS  EX  POST  FACTO 
where  It,  In  relation  to  the  offense  or  its  consequences,  alters  the 
situation  of  the  party  accused  of  the  crime  to  his  disadvantage;  as, 
where  the  penalty  is  increased,  or  the  accused  is  deprived  of  sub- 
stantial rights  or  privileges  to  which  he  was  entitled  as  the  law 
stood  when  the  offense  was  committed. 

STATUTES  — EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS  —  PROCEDURE- 
PRISON  DISCIPLINE.— Statutes  which  relate  to  procedure  or  penal 
administration  or  prison  discipline  are  not,  as  a  general  rule,  ob- 
jectloual)le  as  being  ex  post  facto,  though  passed  after  the  offense, 
even  where  the  effect  may  bo.  in  the  last  two  instances,  to  enhance 
the  severity  of  the  confinement. 


Jau.  1899.]        MufiPUY  v.  Commonwealth.  267 

STATUTES— EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS.— THE  LEGISLA- 
TURE cannot,  under  the  guise  of  laws  relating  to  procedure  or 
prison  discipline  or  penal  administration,  take  away  or  interfere 
with  any  substantial  right  or  privilege  which  was  secured  to  a  party 
by  the  law  as  it  was  when  the  offense  was  committed. 

STATUTES— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— A  law  cannot  be  con- 
stitutional In  some  cases  and  unconstitutional  in  others  involving 
like  circumstances  and  conditions.  If  it  is  unconstitutional  as  to 
any  it  is  unconstitutional  as  to  all. 

STATUTES  — EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS  —  INTERFERING 
.WITH  CREDITS  FOR  GOOD  BEHAVIOR.— If  the  affect  of  good 
conduct,  on  the  part  of  a  prisoner,  under  existing  laws,  is  to  shorten 
his  term  of  imprisonment,  and  to  give  him  a  right  to  his  discharge 
at  the  expiration  of  the  shortened  term,  a  subsequent  statute  which 
bas  the  effect  of  taking  away  the  right  of  deduction  for  good  beha- 
vior, or  which  Interferes  with  it  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  convict. 
Is  clearly  ex  post  facto,  because  it  practically  lengthens  the  sentence 
which  was  provided  by  law  for  the  offense  at  the  time  when  it  was 
committed. 

STATUTES-EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS^CREDITS  FOR 
GOOD  BEHAVIOR.— A  statute  which  gives  a  convict  a  right  to  de- 
ductions for  good  behavior,  thus  practically  shortening  his  term  of 
Imprisonment,  cannot  be  construed  merely  as  a  measure  of  prison 
discipline  or  regulation,  and  therefore  liable  to  change  from  time  to 
time,  as  the  legislature  may  see  fit,  without  interfering  with  any 
rights  on  the  part  of  the  convict. 

STATUTES.— A  CRIMINAL  STATUTE  IS  TO  BE  CON- 
STRUED PROSPECTIVELY,  to  apply  to  sentences  for  offenses 
committed  after  it  took  effect. 

Indictment  for  embezzlement.  The  sentence  attacked  was 
pronounced  on  May  28,  1896. 

E.  F.  McClennen,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

J.  M.  Hallowell,  assistant  attorney  general,  for  the  common- 
wealth. 

2<»  MORTON,  J.  This  is  a  petition  for  a  writ  of  error  to 
reverse  a  sentence  of  the  superior  court  for  the  county  of  Essex 
by  which  the  petitioner  is  confined  in  the  state  prison.  The 
plea  is  in  nullo  est  erratum,  and  therefore  admits  the  facts  well 
assigned  in  the  petition:  Bodurtha  v.  Goodrich,  3  Gray,  508, 
612;  Conto  v.  Silvia,  170  Mass.  152.  From  those  and  from  the 
record  of  the  superior  court,  it  appears  that  the  offenses  of 
which  the  petitioner  was  convicted  were  committed  between 
July  19,  1892,  and  November  17,  1893,  but  that  he  was  sen- 
tenced under  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  50-i,  entitled  "An  act 
relative  to  sentences  to  the  state  prison,**  which  took  effect  on 
the  first  day  of  January,  1896,  and  which  provides,  in  section  1, 
that  "when  a  convict  is  sentenced  to  the  state  prison,  otherwise 
than  for  life,  or  as  an  habitual  criminal,  the  court  imposing  the 


268  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass, 

BenteDoe  shall  not  fix  the  term  of  imprisonment,  hut  shall  es- 
tahlish  a  maximum  and  minimum  term  for. which  said  convict 
shall  he  held  in  said  prison.  The  maximum  term  shall  not  he 
longer  than  the  longest  term  fixed  hy  law  for  the  punishment 
of  the  offense  of  which  he  is  convicted,  and  the  minimum  term 
shall  not  he  less  than  two  and  one-half  years." 

The  petitioner  was  indicted  under  the  Public  Statutes,  chap- 
ter 203,  section  40,  and  was  found  guilty  of  sixty-three  counts, 
each  of  which,  except  in  a  few  instances,  alleged  the  value  of  the 
property  stolen  to  he  more  than  one  hundred  dollars.  The 
penalty  is  prescribed  in  section  20  of  the  same  chapter,  and  is 
imprisonment  in  the  state  prison  not  exceeding  five  years>  or 
fine  not  exceeding  six  hundred  dollars  and  imprisonment  in  the 
jail  not  exceeding  two  years,  if  the  value  of  the  property  stolen 
exceeds  one  hundred  dollars.  The  maximum  sentence  imposed 
in  the  present  case  was  not  more  than  fifteen  years  and  thii 
minimum  not  less  than  ten.  The  maximum  term  was,  there- 
fore, only  a  small  fraction  of  ^^^  that  authorized  by  law,  and 
it  is  agreed  that  it  probably  does  not  exceed  the  sentence  which 
would  have  been  imposed  before  the  passage  of  the  Statutes  of 
1895,  chapter  504. 

The  error  assigned  is,  that  the  sentence  and  the  commitment 
pursuant  to  it  were  wholly  unauthorized  and  void,  because  the 
statute  under  which  the  sentence  was  imposed  was  ex  post  facto, 
and  contrary  to  section  10,  article  1,  of  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  article  24  of  the  declaration  of  rights  of 
the  constitution  of  Massachusetts. 

The  statute  was  considered  by  this  court  in  Commonwealth  v. 
Brown,  167  Mass.  144,  146,  and  again  in  Oliver  v.  Oliver,  169 
Mass.  592.  It  was  also  before  the  court  in  Commonwealth  v. 
Crowley,  168  Mass.  121.  In  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  167 
Mass.  144,  the  court  says  that  it  sees  no  reason  why  the  statute 
should  not  be  construed  to  apply  to  all  sentences  in  the  cases 
referred  to  in  it  passed  after  it  went  into  effect.  But  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  attention  of  the  court  was  directed  more  to  the 
effect  of  the  feature  of  indeterminate  sentences  upon  the  con- 
stitutionality of  the  statute  than  to  other  matters.  The  fact 
that  the  statute  might  interfere  with  his  rights  or  privileges 
in  regard  to  a  permit  to  be  at  liberty,  and  was,  therefore,  ob- 
jectionable as  ex  post  facto,  was  not  suggested  in  the  defend- 
ant's brief.  In  Oliver  v.  Oliver,  169  Mass.  592,  the  point  de- 
cided was  that  a  sentence  imposed  under  the  statute  in  ques- 


Jan.  1899.]  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  269 

tion  must  be  regarded  as  a  sentence  for  the  maximum  term, 
and  not  for  the  minimum  or  any  intermediate  term.  The 
point  now  raised  was  not  involved  nor  considered  in  that  case. 
Commonwealth  v.  Crowley,  168  Mass.  121,  followed  Common- 
wealth V.  Brown,  167  Mass.  144.  There  was  in  the  opinion  no 
discussion  of  the  statute,  and  the  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment 
did  not  aver  that  the  statute  was  unconstitutional  because  of  its 
interference  with  the  defendant's  rights  to  a  permit  to  be  at 
liberty  for  good  conduct  under  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222, 
section  20,  or  otherwise.  An  examination  of  the  defendant's 
brief  shows  that  the  ground  on  which  it  was  contended  that  the 
statute  was  unconstitutional  was  the  indeterminate  feature  of 
the  sentences.  This  had  been  fully  considered  and  dispos'ed  of 
in  Commonwealth  y.  Brown,  167  Mass.  144,  and  hence  a  refer- 
ence to  that  case  was  all  that  was  necessary.  We  discover 
nothing  in  either  of  these  cases  which  precludes  us  from  examin- 
ing the  question  now  presented.  The  statute  was  also  consid- 
ered by  the  United  States  ^^"^  circuit  court  for  the  jBrst  circuit 
when  this  plaintiff  was  before  it  recently  on  a  petition  for  a  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,  which  it  was  led  to  deny,  and  to  leave  the 
petitioner  to  his  writ  of  error,  largely,  as  we  infer,  on  account 
of  the  views  concerning  the  statute  which  this  court  was  sup- 
posed to  have  expressed  in  the  two  cases  of  Commonwealth  v. 
Brown,  167  Mass.  144,  and  Oliver  v.  Oliver,  169  Mass.  692,  re- 
ferred to  above:  In  re  Murphy,  87  Fed.  Eep.  549. 

"We  have  already  quoted  section  1  of  the  act.  By  section  2 
it  is  provided  that  at  any  time  after  the  expiration  of  the  mini- 
mum term  the  commissioners  of  prisons  may  issue  a  permit  to 
the  convict  to  be  at  liberty  on  such  terms  and  conditions  as  they 
may  deem  best,  and  may  revoke  the  permit  at  any  time  previous 
to  the  expiration  of  the  maximum  term.  The  permit  shall  not 
be  issued  without  the  approval  of  the  governor  and  council  or 
unless  the  commissioners  shall  be  of  the  opinion  that  the  con- 
vict will  lead  an  orderly  life  if  set  at  liberty.  Other  provisions 
contained  in  the  act  were  taken  from  the  Statutes  of  1884,  chap- 
ter 152,  sections  1  and  2,  which  will  be  referred  to  later. 

The  statutes  applying  to  the  petitioner's  case  which  were  in 
force  when  he  committed  the  offenses  of  which  he  was  con- 
victed are  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  sections  20-22,  and 
the  Statutes  of  1884,  chapter  152.  There  were  and  are  stat- 
utes relating  to  the  issue  of  permits  to  persons  confined  for 
drunkenness  in  jails,  houses  of  correction,  or  other  places  under 


270  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass. 

the  Jurisdiction  of  the  county  commibsioners,  or  in  the  county 
of  Suffolk  under  that  of  the  board  of  directors  of  public  in- 
stitutions and  who  have  reformed,  and  also  to  persons  im- 
prisoned in  the  reformatory  prison  for  women  who  have  re^ 
formed.     But  those  are  not  applicable  to  this  case. 

The  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  provide  that 
every  officer  in  charge  of  a  prison  or  other  place  of  confinement 
shall  keep  a  record  of  each  person  whose  term  is  not  less  than 
four  months  and  "everj'  such  prisoner  whose  record  of  conduct 
shows  that  he  has  faithfully  observed  all  the  rules  and  has  not 
been  subjected  to  punishment  shall  be  entitled  to  a  deduction 
from  the  terra  of  his  imprisonment  to  be  estimated  as  follows" 
— stating  it.  Later  in  the  section,  it  is  provided:  "Each  pris- 
oner who  is  entitled  to  a  deduction  ....  shall  receive  a  writ- 
ten permit  to  be  at  liberty  during  the  time  thus  deducted  upon 
Buch  terms  as  the  board  granting  the  same  shall  fix."  The 
permits  are  to  be  issued  to  ^^^  prisoners  in  the  state  prison  by 
the  commissioners  of  prisons,  and  they  "may  at  any  time  revoke 
the  same,  and  shall  revoke  it  when  it  comes  to  their  knowledg'e 
that  the  person  to  whom  it  was  granted  has  been  convicted  of 
any  offense  punishable  by  imprisonment. 

The  Statutes  of  1884,  chapter  152,  section  1,  provides  that  if 
the  holder  of  a  permit  shall  violate  any  of  its  terms  or  condi- 
tions, or  any  law  of  this  commonwealth,  "such  violation  shall 
of  itself  make  void  said  permit."  Section  2  provides  that, 
when  any  permit  has  been  revoked  or  has  become  void,  the 
board  granting  it  may  cause  the  holder  of  it  to  be  arrested  and 
returned  to  the  place  in  which  he  was  confined,  and,  when  so 
returned,  he  "shall  be  detained  therein  according  to  the  terms 
of  his  original  sentence,"  and  "the  time  between  his  release  upon 
said  permit  and  his  return  to  said  place  of  confinement  shall  not 
be  taken  to  be  any  part  of  the  term  of  the  sentence."  These 
provisions  are  embodied  in  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504, 
and  are  the  ones  previously  referred  to.  The  other  provisions 
of  the  statutes  of  1884,  chapter  152,  are  not  now  material. 

From  this  examination  it  appears  that  the  Statutes  of  1895, 
chapter  504,  differs  from  the  statutes  which  were  in  force  at  the 
time  when  the  offenses  were  committed,  and  that  the  differences 
consist:  1.  In  the  matter  of  indeterminate  sentences;  2.  In 
Providing  that  the  permit  shall  not  be  issued  till  after  the  ex 
piration  of  the  minimum  sentence,  and  in  omitting  any  provi- 
sion for  deductions  for  good  behavior;  and  3.  In  leaving  the  is- 


Jan.  1899.]  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  271 

sue  of  the  permit  to  the  discretion  of  the  commissioners,  and 
in  providing  that  it  shall  receive  the  approval  of  the  governor 
and  council.  The  petitioner  contends  that  the  effect  of  these 
differences  may  be  to  make  the  term  of  imprisonment  longer 
than  it  would  have  been  under  the  laws  in  force  at  the  time  the 
offenses  were  committed,  and  to  change  his  position  in  other 
respects  to  his  disadvantage,  and  that  therefore  the  statute  ia 
unconstitutional  and  void.  The  commonwealth  contends  that 
the  provisions  are  in  the  nature  of  prison  discipline,  or  of  penal 
administration  or  criminal  procedure,  and  are  not,  therefore, 
open  to  the  objection  of  being  ex  post  facto. 

As  the  term  "ex  post  facto"  has  been  construed,  it  applies  only 
to  penal  or  criminal  matters.  The  objection  to  ex  post  facto 
legislation  consists  in  the  uncertainty  which  would  be  intro- 
duced *^®  thereby  into  legislation  of  a  penal  or  criminal  char- 
acter, and  the  injustice  of  punishing  an  act  which  was  not  pun- 
ishable when  done,  or  of  punishing  it  in  a  different  manner  from 
that  in  which  it  was  punishable  when  done.  But  not  all  re- 
trospective legislation  is  unconstitutional  as  being  ex  post  facto. 
The  question  in  each  case  is,  whether  it  will  increase  the  pen- 
alty, or  operate  to  deprive  a  party  of  substantial  rights  or  privi- 
leges to  which  he  was  entitled  as  the  law  stood  when  the  offensa 
was  committed,  or  "in  short,  which,  in  relation  to  the  offensfr 
or  its  consequences,  alters  the  situation  of  a  party  to  his  dis- 
advantage": Kring  v.  Missouri,  107  U.  S.  221,  228;  Calder  v. 
Bull,  3  Dall.  386;  Gumming  v.  State,  4  Wall.  277;  Ex  parte 
Garland,  4  Wall.  333;  Medley,  petitioner,  134  U.  S.  160;  Dun- 
can V.  Missouri,  152  U.  S.  377;  Thompson  v.  Utah,  170  U.  S. 
343;  Hartung  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  95;  Shepherd  v.  People,  25- 
N.  Y.  406;  Eatzky  v.  People,  29  N.  Y.  124.  A  statute  which 
mitigates  the  penalty  is  not  objectionable,  though  passed  after 
the  offense:  Commonwealth  v.  Wyman,  12  Gush.  237;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Gardner,  11  Gray,  438;  Dolan  v.  Thomas,  12- 
Allen,  421,  424;  nor,  speaking  generally,  are  statutes  which  re- 
late to  procedure  or  penal  administration  or  prison  discipline, 
even  though  the  effect  may  be  in  the  last  two  instances  to  en- 
hance the  severity  of  the  confinement:  Duncan  v.  Missouri,  152' 
TJ.  S.  377;  Cook  v.  United  States,  138  U.  S.  157;  Hopt  v. 
People,  110  U.  S.  574;  Gut  v.  State,  9  Wall.  35;  Common- 
wealth V.  Hall,  97  Mass.  570;  Garter  v.  Burt,  12  Allen,  424; 
Hartung  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  95;  Marion  v.  State,  20  Neb.  233,. 
57  Am.  Rep.  825;  Ex  parte  Bethurum,  66  Mo.  545;  People  n 


272  Murphy  v.  Commokwealth.  [Mass, 

Mortimer,  46  Cal.  114;  Cooky's  Constitutional  Limitations, 
Sd  ed.,  272;  Black's  Constitutional  Law,  sec.  184.  No  one  has 
a  right  to  insist  that  particular  remedies  shall  remain  un- 
changed, or  that  courts  and  their  jurisdiction  and  the  proceed- 
ings in  them  shall  continue  unaltered,  or  that  there  shall  bo 
no  departure  from  established  methods  in  prison  discipline  or 
penal  administration.  But  the  legislature,  under  the  guise  of 
laws  relating  to  procedure  or  prison  discipline  or  penal  admin- 
istration, cannot  take  away  or  interfere  with  any  substantial 
right  or  privilege  which  was  secured  to  a  party  by  the  law  as 
it  was  when  the  offense  was  committed:  Kring  v.  Missouri,  107 
IT.  S.  221,  232;  Thompson  v.  Utah,  170  U.  S.  343;  Medley, 
Petitioner,  134  U.  S,  160.  To  ^''^  deprive  him  in  any  manner 
of  such  right  or  privilege  would  be  to  increase  the  penalty.  In 
-determining  in  any  case  whether  this  is  or  is  not  the  effect  of 
^  statute,  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  constitutional  pro- 
vision was  intended  as  a  security  to  life  and  liberty,  and  as  a 
safeguard  against  the  infliction  of  any  punishment  except  such 
tis  was  duly  authorised  by  law,  and  it  is  to  be  construed  so  as  to 
promote  these  ends. 

As  the  law  formerly  stood  in  this  state,  the  effect  of  good 
conduct  on  the  part  of  the  prisoner  was  to  shorten  his  term  of 
imprisonment,  and  to  give  him  a  right  to  his  discharge  at  the 
expiration  of  the  shortened  term:  Stats.  1857,  c.  284;  Stats. 
1858,  c.  77;  Stats.  1859,  c.  108;  Gen.  Stats,  c.  178,  sec.  47. 
This  was  no  said  in  the  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  13  Gray,  618. 
And  although  the  Statutes  of  1857,  chapter  284,  was  entitled, 
^'An  act  concerning  the  discipline  of  the  state  prison,"  and  the 
acts  of  1858  and  1859  were  respectively  entitled,  ''An  act  con- 
cerning the  discipline  of  jails  and  houses  of  correction,"  and 
"An  act  to  amend  an  act  concerning  the  discipline  of  jails  and 
houses  of  correction,"  it  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  the 
justices  that  the  right  of  the  convict  was  affected  thereby. 
They  declared,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  act  of  1857,  upon  the 
construction  of  which  the  answer  to  the  question  proposed 
mainly  depended,  gave  the  convict  a  right  to  have  his  term  re- 
•dueed  and  shortened  by  tjie  scale  provided  in  it  for  good  be- 
havior, and  bore  upon  the  sentence  and  shortened  the  term  of 
imprisonment,  and  afforded  "an  assurance  of  the  highest  char- 
acter that,  upon  the  condition  of  good  behavior,  the  convict 
ehall  have  the  promised  benefit  of  an  earlier  release."  And 
again   they   said   that  "the  benefit   promised,  in  consideration 


Jan.  1899.]  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  273 

of  good  behavior,  was  intended  to  be  an  actual  reduction  of  sen- 
tence as  a  right,  and  not  as  a  favor,"  and  "therefore  operated 
upon  the  sentence  itself."  It  would  seem  plain,  therefore, 
that  a  subsequent  statute  which  interfered  to  his  disadvantage 
with  the  right  of  deduction  for  good  behavior  to  which  a  con- 
vict was  entitled  at  the  time  the  commission  of  the  offense 
under  the  acts  of  1857,  1858,  and  1859,  would  have  been  uncon- 
stitutional and  void,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  those  acts 
related,  according  to  their  titles,  to  the  discipline  of  the  state 
prison,  and  to  that  of  jails  and  houses  of  correction,  and  there- 
fore appeared  to  pertain  to  prison  regulation.  To  have  taken 
^"^^  away  the  right  of  deduction  for  good  behavior,  or  to  have 
interfered  with  it  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  convict,  would 
have  been  in  effect  to  lengthen  the  sentence  which  was  pro- 
vided by  law  for  the  offense  at  the  ti?ae  when  it  was  committed; 
and  a  statute  which  did  that  clearly  would  have  been  ex  post 
facto:  See  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  13  Gray,  618;  Kring  v. 
Missouri,  107  U.  S.  221;  Medley,  Petitioner,  134  U.  S.  160; 
Thompson  v.  Utah,  170  IT.  S.  343;  Commonwealth  v.  Mc- 
Donough,  13  Allen,  581;  In  re  Canfield,  98  Mich.  644;  Ex 
parte  Hunt,  28  Tex.  App.  361. 

The  question  then  is,  whether  the  changes  made  in  regard 
to  deductions  for  good  behavior  by  the  Statutes  of  1880,  chap- 
ter 218,  which  were  subsequently  incorporated  into  and  are  no^ 
found  in  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  have  so 
modified  the  rights  which  convicts  had,  under  statutes  pre- 
viously in  force,  that  those  committing  offenses  after  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Statutes  of  1880,  chapter  218,  cannot  be  said  to  have 
anything  in  the  nature  of  a  right  to  deductions  for  good  con- 
■duct,  and  to  a  'permit  to  be  at  liberty  which  could  not  be  in- 
terfered with  to  their  disadvantage  by  subsequent  legislation — ■ 
in  other  words,  whether  the  effect  of  the  Statutes  of  1880, 
chapter  218,  and  of  the  Public  Statutes,  has  been  and  is  to  make 
deductions  for  good  behavior  and  the  issuing  of  a  permit  a  mat- 
ter of  favor,  and  not  in  any  sense  a  matter  of  right. 

It  should  be  noted  in  passing,  that  the  words  "with  the  con- 
sent of  the  governor  and  council,"  were  inserted  in  the  General 
Statutes,  chapter  179,  section  51,  which,  with  one  other  amend- 
ment that  is  not  now  material,  is  a  re-enactment  of  the  Statutes 
of  1857,  chapter  284,  section  1.  These  words  were  not  in  the 
commissioners'  report  (c.  180,  sec.  50),  and  it  does  not  appear 
how  they  came  to  be  inserted.     They  were  not  in  the  General 

Am.  St.  Rkp.,  Vou  LXX.— 18 


274  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass, 

Statutes,  chapter  178,  section  47,  and  were  omitted  from  the 
Statutes  of  1880,  chapter  218,  and  are  not  found  in  any  subse- 
quent statute. 

It  seems  to  us  that,  under  the  Statutes  of  1880,  chapter  218,^ 
and  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  the  convict 
was  and  is  entitled  to  deductions  for  good  conduct,  and  to  a 
permit  to  be  at  liberty  for  the  time  thus  deducted,  as  a  matter 
of  right  rather  than  of  favor.  The  object  was  to  furnish  an 
incentive  to  good  conduct  while  the  convict  was  in  confinement, 
by  offering  him  a  reward  therefor.  Applying  the  language  of 
the  Opinion  of  the  Justices,  13  Gray,  618,  the  provisions  of  the- 
Statutes  of  1880,  chapter  218,  and  of  the  Public  Statutes, 
*'afford  an  assurance  of  the  highest  character  that,  upon  condi- 
tion of  good  ^"^^  behavior,  the  convict  shall  have  the  promised 
benefit'^  of  certain  deductions,  and  a  permit  to  be  at  liberty 
for  the  time  thus  deducted  from  the  term  of  his  sentence. 
Though  the  provisions  of  the  Statutes  of  1880  and  of  the  Publia 
Statutes  may  not  bear  as  directly  upon  the  sentence  as  those 
of  the  Statutes  of  1857  did,  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  purpose 
was  to  secure  to  the  convict  a  substantial  advantage  as  a  reward 
for  his  good  conduct,  which  practically  would  have  the  effect^ 
of  shortening  his  sentence.  It  is  true  that  the  prison  com- 
missioners could  revoke  the  permit  without  cause  shown,  or 
for  a  violation  of  its  terms,  and  that  they  are  bound  to  revoke  it 
when  they  have  knowledge  that  the  convict  has  been  convicted 
of  an  offense  punishable  by  imprisonment.  But  this  does  not 
affect  the  right  of  the  convict  to  deductions,  and  to  a  permit  in 
the  first  instance.  Besides,  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  the  power 
of  revocation  will  not  be  exercised  capriciously.  Unless  the 
provisions  of  the  statute  were  intended  to  secure  a  substantial 
advantage  to  the  convict  as  a  reward  for  his  good  conduct,  to 
the  enjoyment  of  which  he  could  look  forward  with  reasonable 
certainty,  if  he  did  not  violate  the  terms  of  the  permit,  nor  com- 
mit an  offense  punishable  by  imprisonment,  it  is  difficult  to 
Bee  what  object  the  legislature  had  in  view. 

Conlon's  case,  148  Mass.  168,  is  relied  on  as  tending  to  show 
that  the  convict  had  no  right  to  a  permit.  One  of  the  conten- 
tions of  the  petitioner  in  that  case  was  that  his  confinement  in 
the  reformatory  was  unlawful,  because  his  removal  to  it  from 
the  state  prison  to  which  he  had  been  sentenced  interfered  with 
or  took  away  his  right  to  deductions  for  good  conduct,  under 
the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20.     But  neither  that 


Jan.  1899.]  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  275 

statute  nor  the  Statutes  of  1880,  chapter  218,  of  which  it  was 
a  re-enactment,  was  in  force  at  the  time  when  the  petitioner 
committed  the  offense  of  which  he  was  convicted,  and  no  -ques- 
tion under  either  was  properly  before  the  court.  Further,  de- 
ductions for  good  conduct  under  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter 
222,  section  20,  are  not  limited  to  persons  confined  in  the  state 
prison,  but  extend  to  those  confined  in  "a  prison  or  other  place 
of  confinement,"  and  the  legislature  had  the  right  to  change 
the  place  of  confinement  of  any  prisoner  so  long  as  the  penalty 
was  not  thereby  aggravated:  Carter  v.  Burt,  12  Allen,  424. 
Lastly,  the  permit  in  that  case  was  issued  under  the  Statutes  of 
1884,  chapter  152,  and  was  revoked  by  the  commissioners  for  a 
violation  of  its  conditions,  *''*  as  they  had  the  right  to  do. 
The  decision  would  have  been  the  same  if  the  permit  had  is- 
sued under  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  and 
had  been  revoked  for  a  like  cause.  The  nature  of  the  right  to  a 
permit  under  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  was 
therefore  not  material  to  the  decision. 

For  these  reasons  the  case,  though  rightly  decided,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  authoritative  on  the  question  now  before  us.  And 
we  think,  as  has  been  already  observed,  that  the  Statutes  of 
1S80,  chapter  218,  and  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section 
20,  secured  to  prisoners  who  were  convicted  of  offenses  com- 
mitted when  they  were  in  force,  and  who  came  within  their 
scope,  deductions  for  good  conduct  and  permits  to  be  at  liberty 
as  something  to  which  they  were  entitled  as  of  right  rather  than 
by  favor,  for  faithful  observance  of  the  rules,  and  fomot  having 
been  subjected  to  punishment,  and  that  their  rights  in  these 
respects  could  not  be  taken  away  or  interfered  with  to  their 
disadvantage  by  subsequent  legislation. 

The  next  question  is,  whether  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter 
604,  alters  or  may  alter  to  their  disadvantage  in  a  substantial 
manner  the  position  of  those  committing  offenses  prior  to  its  pas- 
sage and  while  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  was 
in  force.  We  think  that  it  is  clear  that  such  might  be  its  effect. 
In  case  the  maximum  sentence  was  for  fifteen  years,  the  convict 
would  be  entitled  for  good  conduct  to  deductions  under  the  Pub- 
lic Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20,  which  would  shorten  the 
term  to  twelve.  Under  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504,  how- 
ever, he  could  be  sentenced  for  a  maximum  term  of  fifteen  years 
and  a  minimum  of  thirteen,  or  of  any  number  less  than  fifteen 
and  more  than  twelve.  In  the  present  case,  the  minimum  was 
ten,  and  it  is  possible  that  the  statute  might  operate  more  bene- 


276  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass. 

ficially  in  the  case  of  the  petitioner  than  the  Public  Statutes, 
chapter  222,  section  20,  and  the  Statutes  of  1884,  chapter  153, 
woud  have  operated.  But  that  cannot  avail.  A  law  cannot  be 
constitutional  in  some  cases  and  unconstitutional  in  others  in- 
volving like  circumstances  and  conditions.  If  it  is  unconslitu- 
tional  as  to  any,  it  is  unconstitutional  as  to  all. 

It  is  suggested  in  In  re  Murphy,  87  Fed. Rep.  549,  that  the  sup- 
posed leniency  of  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504,  might  have 
led  the  court  to  make  the  maximum  sentence  longer  than  it 
otherwise  would,  and  the  implication  is,  that  this  also  would 
render  the  statute  objectionable  as  to  past  offenses.  But  it  is 
obvious  that  this  argument  might  prevent  the  application  of 
any  mitigative  statute  ^''■*  to  past  offenses,  and  we  should  hesi- 
tate to  pronounce  the  act  unconstitutional  on  that  ground. 

It  is  also  said  in  In  re  Murphy,  87  Fed.  Eep.  549,  that  under 
the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504,  "important  conditions  were 
added  which  would  permit  the  recall  of  a  permit,  and  still 
others  which  would  revoke  it  absolutely.  The  most  serious  new 
provision  is,  that  the  act  of  1895  directs  that,  if  a  permit  is 
revoked,  no  portion  of  the  time  the  prisoner  may  have  been 
at  liberty  under  it  shall  be  taken  to  be  any  part  of  the  term  of 
his  sentence."  But  this  last  provision,  which  is  called  "the 
moat  serious  new  provision"  of  the  Statutes  of  1895,  is  found  in 
the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  21,  and  in  the  Statutes 
of  1884,  chapter  152,  section  2,  and  was  not  therefore  new,  and 
was  in  force  when  the  offenses  were  committed  of  which  the 
petitioner  was  convicted,  and  applied  to  persons  confined  in  the 
state  prison.  So  far  as  the  revocation  of  permits  is  concerned, 
it  is  doubtful  if  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504,  adds  anything 
new.  Under  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  section  20^  the 
commissioners  have  power,  as  already  observed,  to  revoke  permits 
without  cause  shown.  They  have  the  same  power  under  the 
Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504.  Under  the  Statutes  of  1884,  chap- 
ter 152,  a  violation  by  the  holder  of  a  permit  of  any  of  its  terms 
or  conditions,  or  of  any  law  of  this  commonwealth,  rendered  the 
permit  void.  The  same  is  true  under  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chap- 
ter 504.  And  the  provisions  as  to  the  return  of  the  holder  of  a 
permit  which  has  been  revoked  or  has  become  void  are  the  same 
in  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504,  as  in  the  Statutes  of  1884, 
chapter  152,  except  that  the  latter  contains  a  provision  that  the 
order  for  the  arrest  and  return  of  the  convict  may  be  served  by 
any  officer  authorized  to  serve  civil  or  criminal  process  in  any 
county  in  the  commonwealth  which  is  omitted  from  the  Statutes 


Jan.  1899.]  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  277 

of  1895,  chapter  504.  So  far,  therefore,  as  revocation  and  the 
results  which  follow  it,  and  violation  of  the  terms  and  condi- 
tions of  the  permit,  or  of  any  law  of  the  commonwealth,  and  the 
results  which  follow  that  are  concerned,  there  would  seem  to  be 
nothing  in  the  statute  of  1895  which  as  compared  with  the  laws 
in  force  when  the  offense  was  committed  changes  the  situation 
of  the  petitioner  for  the  worse. 

The  petitioner  further  contends  that,  independently  of  the 
effect  of  the  statute  upon  his  right  to  deductions  for  good  be- 
havior and  to  a  permit  to  be  at  liberty,  the  statute  is  inoperative 
as  an  ex  post  facto  act  because  it  renders  the  duration  of  his 
^''^  sentence  uncertain,  and  gives  tq  the  prison  commissioners 
the  power  to  fix  the  term  of  his  imprisonment.  But  there  is 
no  uncertainty  in  the  sentence  itself.  That,  it  has  been  held,  is 
in  effect  for  the  maximum  term:  Oliver  v.  Oliver,  169  Mass. 
592,  and  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  167  Mass.  144;  People  v. 
Illinois  State  Keformatory,  148  111.  413;  State  v.  Peters,  43  Ohio 
St.  629.  The  convict  may  be  released  before  its  expiration, 
either  by  an  absolute  or  conditional  pardon  from  the  governor 
(Public  Statutes,  c.  218,  sees.  12  et  seq.),  or  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  minimum  term  by  a  permit  from  the  commis- 
sioners approved  by  the  governor  and  council.  In  the  latter 
case,  he  is  under  sentence  till  the  expiration  of  the  maximum 
term:  Oliver  v.  Oliver,  169  Mass.  592.  It  is  as  correct,  it  seems 
to  us,  to  say  that  the  duration  of  his  sentence  is  uncertain  be- 
cause the  governor  may  pardon  him  absolutely  or  conditionally 
at  any  time,  as  it  is  to  say  that  it  is  uncertain  because  after  tho 
expiration  of  the  minimum  term  the  commissioners  may  release 
him  before  the  expiration  of  the  maximum  term  on  a  permit 
approved  by  the  governor  and  council,  and  as  correct  to  say  that 
in  case  of  a  pardon  the  governor  fixes  the  term  of  imprisonment, 
as  to  say  that  in  case  of  release  upon  a  permit  the  commissioners 
fix  it.  Moreover,  "the  form  of  sentence,"  as  was  said  in  Com- 
monwealth V.  Brown,  167  Mass.  144,  "  is  made  to  recognize  and 
carry  out  a  policy  familiar  to  our  legislation  and  acted  on  here- 
tofore without  question."  In  no  just  sense  can  it  be  said,  we 
think,  that  the  duration  of  his  sentence  is  uncertain,  or  that  the 
determination  of  the  term  of  the  imprisonment  is  taken  from 
the  courts  where  it  belongs,  and  left  to  the  prison  commission- 
ers: See  People  v,  Illinois  State  Eeformatory,  148  111.  413; 
George  v.  People,  167  111.  447;  State  v.  Peters,  43  Ohio  St.  629; 
^Miller  v.  State,  149  Ind.  607;  contra,  People  v.  Cummings,  88 
Mich.  249. 


278  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass. 

The  petitioner  also  insists  that  requiring  the  approval  of  the 
governor  and  council  to  a  permit  is  a  serious  interference  with 
his  rights,  and  without  anything  more  would  render  the  statute 
void  as  an  ex  post  facto  law.  But  we  think  that  the  provision 
does  not  afTect  any  substantial  right  to  which  the  petitioner  was 
entitled  when  the  offenses  were  committed,  but  relates  rather  to 
a  matter  of  procedure. 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  we  think,  that  in  the  matter  of  per- 
mits, -'*  the  legislature  could  have  substituted  some  other 
tribunal  for  the  prison  commissioners,  or  could  have  added  to 
the  number  of  the  commissioners  on  the  same  principle  that  it 
could  have  abolished  the  court  which  existed  when  the  offenses 
were  committed,  and  have  created  another  court  for  the  trial  of 
such  offenses,  or  have  added  to  the  number  of  the  Judges  of  the 
existing  court.  If  this  had  been  the  only  change,  the  effect  of  it 
would  have  been  merely  to  require  that  so  many  more  persona 
chould  act  in  regard  to  the  matter  of  permits.  The  petitioner 
would  have  still  been  entitled  to  deductions  for  good  behavior, 
and  to  a' permit  to  be  at  liberty  during  the  time  of  such  deduc- 
tions, and  there  would  have  been  no  increase  in  the  penalty  for 
the  offense  or  other  change  to  his  disadvantage.  It  is  not  con- 
tended that  the  terms  and  conditions  of  permits  issued  when 
the  offense  was  committed,  or  the  rules  of  government  of  the 
prison  then  in  force,  must  remain  the  same. 

By  the  Statutes  of  1898,  chapter  371,  which  is  in  amendment 
of  and  in  substitution  for  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504,  and 
which  went  into  effect  since  the  indictment  was  found  in  this 
ease,  it  is  now  provided  that  a  convict  who  has  faithfully  ob- 
served all  the  rules,  and  has  not  been  subjected  to  punishment, 
shall  be  entitled  to  release  at  the  expiration  of  the  minimum 
term,  and  shall  be  given  a  permit  to  be  at  liberty  during  the  un- 
expired portion  of  the  maximum  term,  which  permit  shall  be 
issued  by  the  commissioners  of  prisons.  The  approval  of  the 
governor  and  council  is  no  longer  required,  and  the  permit  is  no 
longer  to  be  issued  at  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the  commissioners. 

We  think,  therefore,  that  the  statute  of  1895  could  not  be 
declared  unconstitutional  as  an  ex  post  facto  act  because  it  re- 
quires the  approval  of  the  governor  and  council  to  permits  to 
be  at  liberty,  or  because  it  renders  the  duration  of  the  sentence 
uncertain,  or  gives  the  prison  commissioners  power  to  fix  the 
term  of  imprisonment;  but  we  think  that,  as  the  law  stood 
when  the  offense  was  committed,  the  petitioner  was  entitled  to 


Jan.  1899.]  Murphy  v.  Commonwealth.  279 

a  deduction  for  good  behavior,  and  to  a  permit  to  be  at  liberty 
for  the  time  thus  deducted,  on  such  terms  as  the  prison  commis- 
sioners should  fix,  and  subject  to  revocation  by  them,  and  if  sen- 
tenced under  the  statute  of  1895,  this  right  might  be  interfered 
with  to  his  disadvantage,  and  that  the  S'tatute  is  therefore  inop- 
erative ^'^'^  and  void  as  an  ex  post  facto  law.  We  do  not  see 
how  the  statute  can  be  construed  as  merely  a  measure  of  prison 
discipline  or  regulation,  and  therefore  liable  to  change  from 
time  to  time  as  the  legislature  may  see  fit  without  interfering 
with  any  rights  on  the  part  of  the  convict. 

"We  have  assumed  thus  far  that  the  act  of  1895  applied  to  all 
oases  of  convicts  sentenced  to  the  state  prison  after  it  took 
effect,  except  such  as  are  sentenced  for  life  or  as  habitual  crimi- 
nals. But  we  think  that  it  is  doubtful,  notwithstanding  the 
generality  of  the  language,  whether  it  should  be  so  construed. 
It  is  manifest  that  convicts  sentenced  under  the  statutes  of  1895 
are  not  entitled  to  the  benefits  of  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter 
228,  section  20.  The  sentence  is  intended  to  be  different  in 
character  from  that  referred  to  in  section  20,  and  the  provisions 
of  that  section  in  regard  to  deduction  for  good  behavior  could 
not  be  applied  to  a  sentence  under  the  statute  of  1895.  Section 
20  of  the  Public  Statutes,  chapter  222,  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
convicts  sentenced  to  the  state  prison,  is  not  repealed  in  terms 
by  that  statute.  To  hold  that  that  statute  operates  by  necessary 
implication  as  a  repeal  of  it  to  that  extent,  as  it  would  seem  that 
we  should  be  obliged  to  do  if  the  statute  of  1895  is  construed  to 
apply  to  all  sentences  to  state  prison  after  it  took  effect,  whether- 
the  offenses  occurred  before  or  after  it  went  into  operation 
(Flaherty  v,  Thomas,  12  Allen,  428;  Commonwealth  v.  McDon- 
ough,  13  Allen,  581),  would  result  in  the  discharge  of  all  persona 
who  might  have  been  sentenced  under  it  to  the  state  prison  for 
offenses  committed  before  it  took  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
constniing  it,  as  we  think  properly  may  be  done  pursuant  to  the 
general  rule  that  statutes  are  to  be  construed  prospectively,  to 
apply  to  sentences  for  offenses  committed  after  it  took  effect, 
this  difficulty  will  be  avoided :  See  Pub.  Stats.,  c.  3,  sec.  3,  els. 
1,  2;  Commonwealth  v.  Sullivan,  150  Mass.  315;  Commonwealth 
V.  Desmond,  123  Mass.  407;  King  v.  Tirrell,  2  Gray,  331;  North 
Bridgewater  Bank  v.  Copeland,  7  Allen,  139;  Gardner  v.  Lucas, 
L.  R.  3  App.  Cas.  528,  590 ;  Lambard,  Appellant,  88  Me.  587. 

The  result  is,  that  the  only  error  being  an  error  in  the  sen- 
tence, and  the  superior  court  having  jurisdiction  to  impose  such 


280  Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass. 

sentence  as  should  be  imposed,  the  sentence  in  question,  in  the- 
opinion  of  a  majority  of  the  court,  must  be  reversed,  and  th& 
case  ^'^^  remanded  to  that  court  for  sentence  according  to  the- 
law  as  it  was  at  the  time  when  the  offenses  were  committed  be- 
fore the  passage  of  the  Statutes  of  1895,  chapter  504:  Jacquins 
V.  Commonwealth,  9  Cush.  279;  Pub.  Stats.,  c.  187,  sec.  13. 
So  ordered. 


STATUTES— EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS— APPLICATION  OF— 
PROCEDURE.— An  ex  post  facto  law  is  one  enacted  after  the  of- 
fense has  been  committed,  and  which,  in  relation  to  it  or  its  conse- 
quences, alters  the  situation  of  the  accused  to  his  disadvantage. 
The  term  relates  to  criminal  and  not  to  civil  proceedings:  State  v. 
Caldwell,  50  La.  Ann.  6G6,  69  Am.  St.  Rep.  465,  and  note,  showing 
that  a  law  changing  a  remedy  is  not  ex  post  facto.  No  statute 
which  modifies  the  rigor  of  the  criminal  law  is  regarded  as  an  ex- 
post  facto  law:  People  v.  Hayes,  140  N.  Y.  4&4,  37  Am.  St.  Rep. 
572.  It  has  been  held  that  a  statute,  providing  that  a  convict  whO' 
shall  be  serving  a  second  term  in  prison  shall  be  entitled  to  a  less 
favorable  credit  for  good  behavior  than  first  termers,  is  not  ex  post 
facto  legislation:  In  re  Miller,  110  Mich.  676,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  376. 

STATUTES.— THE  UNCONSTITUTIONALITY  OP  ONE  POR- 
TION of  a  statute  cannot  defeat  other  portions  unless  the  nature  of 
the  unconstitutional  provision  is  such  as  to  render  it  of  vital  impor- 
tance to  the  whole  statute:  Note  to  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones» 
41  Am.  St.  Rep.  303. 


Telegram  Newspaper  Company  v.  Commonwealth 

[172  MASa\CHUSKTTS    294.] 

CONTEMPT  —  CORPORATION  —  LIABILITY.  —  An  intent 
may  be  Imputed  to  a  corporation  in  criminal  proceedings,  and  it 
may,  therefore,  be  held  answerable  for  a  criminal  contempt  of  court. 

CONTEMPT— CORPORATION— NEWSPAPER  PUBLICA- 
TION.—The  publication  of  an  article  in  a  newspaper,  printed  by  a 
corporation  and  circulated  in  the  place  where  a  trial  is  had,  pending 
the  trial,  which  concerns  the  cause  on  trial  and  which  is  calculated 
to  prejudice  the  jury  in  the  cause  a:nd  prevent  a  fair  trial,  is  a 
criminal  contempt  of  the  court  trying  the  cause,  for  which  the  cor- 
poration may  be  held  answerable. 

CONTEMPT— INSTITUTION  OF  PROCEEDINGS  FOR  BY 
COURT-NEWSPAPER  PUBLICATIONS.— When  it  comes,  in  any 
manner,  to  the  knowledge  of  the  presiding  justice  of  a  court  that 
articles  are  published  in  a  newspaper  circulated  In  a  place  where 
the  court  is  held,  which  are  calculated  to  prevent  a  fair  trial  of  a 
cause  then  on  trial  before  the  court,  the  court,  of  Its  own  motion^ 
can  institute  proceedings  for  contempt 

CONTEMPT— CORPORATION— NEWSPAPER  PUBLICA- 
TION OF  FACTS.— It  is  a  contempt  of  court  for  a  newspaper^ 
printed  by  a  corporation  and  circulated  in  the  place  where  a  trial  is 


Jan.  1899.]      Telegram  etc.  Co.  Commonwealth.  281 

had,  pending  the  trial,  to  publish  statements  of  facts,  evidence  of 
which  is  not  competent  at  the  trial,  and  which  is  not  introducer^ 
thereon,  if  they  are  so  made  that  it  is  liiiely  that  the  presiding  Jus- 
tice and  the  jurors  will  read  them  during  the  trial,  and  their  natural 
and  probable  effect  will  be  to  improperly  influence  the  justice  and 
the  jury  in  the  determination  of  the  cause. 

CONTEMPT— CORPORATION  —  FINE— EXECUTION.— The 
proper  method  of  collecting  a  fine  imposed  upon  a  corporation  for  a 
contempt  of  court  is  by  a  levy  of  an  execution  issued  by  the  court. 

P.  P.  Goulding  and  W.  C.  Mellish,  for  the  plaintiffs  in  error, 

H.  Parker,  district  attorney,  and  G.  S.  Taft,  assistant  district 
attorney,  for  the  commonwealth. 

206  FIELD,  C.  J.  These  are  two  writs  of  error,  and,  al- 
though the  pleadings  may  possibly,  raise  issues  of  fact  as  well  as 
issues  of  law,  the  cases  were  entered  without  objection  on*the. 
part  of  any  of  the  parties  upon  the  docket  of  the  full  court,  and 
each  case  was  heard  upon  the  plea  in  nullo  est  erratum.  Tho 
Telegram  Newspaper  Company  is  a  Massachusetts  corporation,, 
having  its  usual  place  of  business  in  Worcester  and  publishing 
there  a  daily  newspaper.  The  Gazette  Company  is  a  corpora- 
tion established  under  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Maine,  having  its- 
usual  place  of  business  in  Worcester,  and  publishing  there  a 
daily  newspaper.  It  is  understood  that  it  had  complied  with 
the  Statutes  of  1884,  chapter  330,  and  had  made  the  commis- 
sioner of  corporations  its  attorney,  upon  whom  legal  process^ 
might  be  served.  The  record  in  the  cases  recites  that  the  corpo- 
rations respectively  appeared  in  the  superior  court,  with  counsel,^ 
in  obedience  to  the  summons  of  that  court  to  show  cause  why 
they  should  not  be  adjudged  in  contempt  for  publishing  cer- 
tain articles  in  their  newspapers  of  the  dates  of  January  13  and 
14  respectively  of  the  year  1898,  which  articles  dealt  with  and 
discussed  the  matter  of  the  trial  before  said  court  of  the  action 
or  petition  of  Silas  H.  Loring  against  the  town  of  Holden,  and 
that  the  corporations  appearea  and  were  heard,  so  that  any 
question  of  due  service  of  the  summons  upon  the  foreign  corpo- 
ration has  become  immaterial. 

At  the  time  of  the  publication  of  the  articles  in  the  news- 
papers, the  petition  of  Silas  H.  Loring  against  the  town  of 
Holden  was  on  trial  before  the  superior  court  sitting  at  Worces- 
ter, and  it  was  for  the  assessment  of  damages  suffered  by  the  tak- 
ing of  land  of  the  petitioner  for  the  abolition  of  a  grade  crossing 
of  the  Fitchburg  Eailroad  Company.  The  portion  of  the  articles 
***  published  which  the  court  found  was  calculated  to  obstruct 


282  Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  [Mass. 

the  course  of  justice  in  said  court  and  prevent  a  fair  trial  of  said 
petition  was,  after  describing  the  petition  of  Loring  against  the 
town  of  Holden,  the  following:  "The  town  offered  Loring 
•eighty  dollars  at  the  time  of  the  taking,  but  he  demanded  two 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  and,  not  getting  it,  went  to  law,'* 
which  appeared  in  the  "Worcester  Daily  Telegram";  and  "The 
town  .offered  the  plaintiff  eighty  dollars,  but  he  wanted  two 
hundred  and  fifty  dollars,"  which  appeared  in  the  "Worcester 
Evening  Gazette."  Whether  there  is  any  truth  in  these  state- 
ments does  not  appear.  The  facts  stated,  even  if  they  were 
true,  were  not  admissible  in  evidence  at  the  trial  of  the  petition 
before  the  superior  court,  and,  so  far  as  appearb',  they  were  no 
part  of  the  proceedings  at  the  trial,  and,  if  they  were  brought  to 
the*knowledge  of  the  jurors  'before  they  rendered  their  verdict, 
were  calculated  to  influence  them  upon  the  amount  of  the 
damages  to  be  given  by  their  verdict.  The  newspapers  were 
published  and  circulated  in  Worcester,  and  it  was  not  improba- 
ble at  the  time  of  publication  that  the  articles  would  be  read 
by  some  of  the  jurors  before  the  trial  of  the  petition  was  fin- 
ished. 

The  record  before  us,  in  each  case,  after  setting  out  the 
whole  of  the  articles  published,  and  the  summons,  service,  and 
appearance  of  the  corporation  and  the  hearing,  concludes  as  fol- 
lows: "When,  after  hearing  all  matters  and  things  concerning 
said  publication  by  said  respondents,  it  appearing  to  said  court 
that  said  article  was  calculated  to  obstruct  the  course  of  justice 
in  said  court  and  prevent  a  fair  trial  of  said  case,  and  that  it  was 
a  contempt  of  said  court  for  said  corporation  to  publish  the  said 
article  during  the  said  trial,  it  was  therefore  ordered  by  said 
court  that  said  respondent  corporation  be  adjudged  guilty  of 
contempt  of  said  court  for  said  publication  of  said  article,  and 
it  was  thereupon  ordered  by  said  court  that  said  respondent 
corporation  pay  a  fine  of  one  hundred  dollars,  and  it  was  further 
■ordered  that,  if  said  fine  be  not  paid,  within  twenty-four  hours, 
an  execution  be  issued  against  said  respondent  corporation  for 
the  collection  of  said  fine  by  a  levy  on  its  property." 

It  is  contended  that  a  corporation  cannot  be  guilty  of  a  crimi- 
nal contempt  of  court,  although  it  may  be  fined  for  what  is 
called  a  civil  contempt.  It  is  said  that  an  intent  cannot  be  im- 
puted to  a  corporation  in  criminal  proceedings.  It  has  been 
decided  in  **''  this  commonwealth  that  a  corporation  may  be 
liable  civilly  for  a  libel   or  a  malicious  prosecution:  Fogg  v. 


Jan.  1899.]     Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwe  vlth.  283 

Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  148  Mass.  513>  12  Am.  St.  Eep.  583; 
Reed  v.  Home  Sav.  Bank,  130  Mass.  443,  39  Am.  Rep.  468,  We 
think  that  a  corporation  may  be  liable  criminally  for  certain 
offens'es  of  which  a  specific  intent  may  be  a  necessary  element. 
There  is  no  more  difficulty  in  imputing  to  a  corporation  a  specific 
intent  in  criminal  proceedings  than  in  civil.  A  corporation 
cannot  be  arrested  and  imprisoned  in  eitlaer  civil  or  criminal 
proceedings,  but  its  property  may  be  taken  either  as  compensa- 
tion for  a  private  wrong  or  as  punishment  for  a  public  wrong. 
In  most  of  the  states  of  this  country  corporations  may  be  formed 
under  general  laws  for  the  purpose  of  doing  almost  any  kind  of 
business  as  easily  as  partnerships,  and  many  of  the  newspapers 
are  published  By  corporations.  Although  natural  persons  who 
publish  or  assist  in  publishing  a  libel  in  a  newspaper  owned  by 
a  corporation  may  be  punished  criminally  by  fine  or  imprison- 
ment, or  both,  yet,  if  the  corporation  cannot  be  punished  by  a 
fine,  it  will  escape  all  criminal  liability.  The  authors  of  libel's 
are  often  irresponsible  persons,  and  the  remedy  by  private  action 
against  corporations  for  the  publishing  of  libelous  statements  is 
often  inadequate.  That  a  corporation  may  be  indicted  for  a 
misfeasance  as  well  as  for  a  nonfeasance  has  been  decided  in  this 
commonwealth:  Commonwealth  v.  New  Bedford  Bridge,  2 
Gray,  339;  see  The  Queen  v.  Great  North  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  9  Q.  B. 
315,  326.  A  corporation  may  be  indicted  for  a  libel:  State  v. 
Atchison,  3  Lea,  729,  31  Am.  Rep.  663,  and  note;  Brennan  v. 
Tracy,  2  Mo.  App.  540;  Pharmaceutical  Soc.  v.  London  etc. 
Supply  Assn.,  5  App.  Cas.  857,  869,  870;  2  Bishop's  New  Crimi- 
nal Law,  sec.  935;  Newell  on  Slander  and  Libel,  2d  ed.,  362, 
363;  Odgers  on  Libel  and  Slander,  3d  ed.,  436;  Thompson  on 
Corporations,  sees,  6418  et  seq. 

The  publication  of  an  article  in  a  newspaper  which  is  printed 
and  circulated  in  the  place  where  a  trial  is  had  pending  the 
trial,  and  which  concerns  the  cause  on  trial  and  is  calculated  to 
prejudice  the  jury  in  the  cause  and  prevent  a  fair  trial,  often  has 
been  held  to  be  a  criminal  contempt  of  the  court  trying  the 
cause:  O'Shea  v.  O'Shea,  L,  R.  15  P,  D.  59;  Ex  parte  Green,  7 
Times  L,  R,  411;  Daw  v,  Eley,  L,  R,  7  Eq,  49,  55;  Ramsbotham 
2»8  V,  Senior,  L,  R.  8  Eq.  575;  People  v.  Wilson,  64  111.  195,  16 
Am.  Rep.  528;  In  re  Sturoc,  48  N.  H.  428,  97  Am.  Dec.  626; 
In  re  Cheeseman,  49  N.  J.  L.  115,  137,  60  Am.  Rep.  596;  State 
V.  Frew,  24  W.  Va.  416,  49  Am.  Rep.  257:  Oswald  on  Contempt 
of  Court,  2d  ed.,  58  et  seq.;  7  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  2d  ed., 
59.    If  a  corporation  publishes  the  article,  we  see  no  reason  why 


234  Telegram  etc.  Co.  d.  Commonwealth.         [Mass. 

it  should  not  he  held  liable  for  a  criminal  contempt:  Thompson 
on  Corporations,  sees.  6448  et  seq. ;  7  Am.  &  Eng,  Ency .  of  Law, 
2d  ed.,  847,  and  cases  cited. 

There  are  no  statutes  in  this  commonwealth  regulating  the 
proceedings  in  the  trial  and  punishment  of  contempt  of  court. 
"The  summary  power  to  commit  and  punish  for  contempts 
tending  to  obstruct  or  degrade  the  administration  of  justice  is 
inherent  in  courts  of  chancery  and  other  superior  courts,  as 
essential  to  the  execution  of  their  powers  and  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  their  authority,  and  is  part  of  the  law  of  the  land,  within 
the  meaning  of  Magna  Charta  and  of  the  twelfth  article  of  our 
declaration  of  rights":  Cartwright's  case,  114  Mass.  230,  238. 
See  Tinsley  v.  Anderson,  171  U.  S.  101. 

In  the  present  cases,  it  was  not  necessary  that  a  formal  com» 
plaint  should  first  have  been  made  to  the  court.  The  contempt, 
if  there  was  one,  was  not,  strictly  speaking,  committed  in  the 
presence  of  the  court,  but  it  related  to  a  trial  tiaen  proceeding 
before  the  court.  In  each  case  a  summons  to  the  plaintiffs  in 
error  was  issued  by  the  court,  of  its  own  motion  and  without 
complaint  made,  to  show  cause  why  the  corporations  should  not 
be  adjudged  in  contempt  for  publishing  an  article  dealing  with  a 
matter  on  trial  before  the  court.  When  it  come  in  any  manner 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  presidi;ig  justice  of  a  court  that  articles 
are  published  in  a  newspaper  circulated  in  the  place  where  the 
court  is  held  which  are  calculated  to  prevent  a  fair  trial  of  a 
cause  then  on  trial  before  the  court,  the  court,  of  its  own  motion, 
can  institute  proceedings  for  contempt.  Such  a  power  in  the 
court  is  necessary  for  its  own  protection  against  an  improper 
interference  with  the  due  administration  of  justice,  and  it  is  not 
dependent  upon  the  complaint  of  any  of  the  parties  litigant.  If 
the  publication  amounts  to  a  contempt  of  court,  because  it  in- 
terferes with  the  due  administration  of  justice  in  a  cause  before 
the  court,  the  contempt  is  analogous  to  a  contempt  committed 
in  the  presence  of  the  court.  The  proceedings  in  the  present 
^^^  cases  after  the  service  of  process  show  that  the  plaintiffs  in 
error  were  specifically  informed  of  the  nature  of  the  charge 
against  them,  and  were  given  a  full  opportunity  to  be  heard 
with  the  aid  of  counsel. 

The  most  important  question  is,  whether  the  publication  of 
these  articles,  under  the  circumstances  stated,  could  be  adjudged 
a  contempt.  The  articles  published  were  not  defamatory,  either 
as  regards  the  presiding  justice  of  the  court  or  the  jurors  before 
whom  the  cause  referred  to  was  being  tried,  or  the  parties  to 


Jan.  1899.]     Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.  235 

the  cause.  In  one  case  the  court  discharged  the  treasurer  and 
manager  of  the  new&paper,  and  in  the  other  the  editor  and  the 
publisher,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  not  shown  to  be  directly 
responsible  for  the  publications.  It  is  probable,  although 
this  does  not  expressly  appear  in  the  papers  before  us,  that  the 
person  or  persons  employed  to  report  for  each  newspaper  the 
proceedings  of  the  court  wrote  the  articles  and  caused  them  to 
be  published.  The  superior  court  "has  not  found  that  there  was 
an  intent  to  influence  the  trial  of  the  cause  referred  to  on  the 
part  of  anybody.  The  articles  are  objectionable  only  because 
they  purport  to  state  the  amount  of  money  which  the  town 
offered  to  pay  the  plaintiff,  and  the  amount  the  plaintiff  de- 
manded before  the  petition  was  brought.  The  law  encourages 
attempts  to  settle  or  compromise  disputes  without  subjecting 
the  parties  to  any  liability,  if  the  attempts  fail,  of  having  any 
concessions  therein  made  to  avoid  litigation  put  in  evidence 
against  them  in  the  subsequent  litigation:  Upton  v.  South 
Eeading  Branch  E.  R.  Co.,  8  Gush,  600;  Harrington  v.  Lincoln, 
4  Gray,  563,  64  Am.  Dec.  95;  Gay  v.  Bates,  99  Mass.  263; 
Draper  v.  Hatfield,  124  Mass.  53.  We  are  content  to  assume 
that  the  person  or  persons  who  wrote  and  caused  the  articles  to 
be  published  did  not  know  this  rule  of  law,  and  acted  without 
any  intent  to  pervert  the  course  of  justice.  As  the  only  intent 
which  can  be  imputed  to  the  corporations  is  the  intent  of  its 
officers  or  agents,  the  question  is,  whether  the  publication  of 
these  articles  without  any  intent  to  pervert  the  course  of  justice 
can  be  adjudged  a  contempt.  In  Metropolitan  Music  Hall  Co. 
V.  Lake,  58  L.  J.  Ch.,  N".  S.,  513,  it  is  said  that  it  must  be  shown 
that  the  articles  were  published  with  knowledge  of  the  pending 
cause,  and  that  appears  in  the  present  cases. 

*^  In  Cartwright's  case,  114  Mass.  230,  it  is  said  by  the 
court:  "But  the  jurisdiction  and  power  of  the  court  do  not  de- 
pend upon  the  question  whether  the  offense  might  or  might  not 

be  punished   by  indictment 'As  regards   the   question 

whether  a  contempt  has  or  has  not  been  committed,  it  does  not 
depend  upon  the  intention  of  the  party,  but  upon  the  act  he  has 
done.'  By  Taney,  C.  J.,  in  Wartman  v.  Wartman,  Taney,  3G<}, 
370."  If  a  person  talk  with  or  send  a  statement  to  a  juror 
about  a  cause,  during  the  trial  of  it,  in  such  a  manner  that  it 
may  cause  prejudice  or  bias  in  the  cause,  although  the  intent 
with  which  the  person  acted  may  affect  the  amount  of  his  pun- 
ishment, he  cannot  justify  his  conduct  by  showing  that  he  had 
no  evil  intent,  and  knew  no  better. 


286  Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth.         [Mass* 

It  was  not  necessary  that  the  auperior  court  should  find  that 
the  articles  published  actually  had  been  read  by  some  of  th© 
jurors  while  trying  the  cause  to  which  the  articles  referred. 
They  plainly  had  been  read  by  the  presiding  justice  during  the 
trial,  and  it  was  likely  that  they  had  been  read  by  some  of  the 
jurors.  The  intention  of  the  publisher  of  a  newspaper  is  that  it 
should  be  bought  and  read  by  persons  within  the  place  wher& 
it  circulates.  Cases  before  a  court  should  be  determined  on 
evidence  presented  in  court.  It  is  an  inevitable  perversion  of 
the  proper  administration  of  justice  to  attempt  to  influence  the 
judge  or  jury  in  the  determination  of  a  cause  pending  before 
them  by  statements  outside  of  the  courtroom,  and  not  in  the 
presence  of  the  parties,  which  may  be  false,  and  even  if  they  are 
true  are  in  law  not  admissible  as  evidence. 

We  cannot  say  that  it  appears  that  the  superior  court  erred 
in  adjudging  that  the  publication  of  these  articles,  under  the 
circumstances  stated,  was  a  contempt  of  that  court,  and  it  was 
for  that  court  to  determine  whether  it  was  necessary  to  institute 
proceedings  for  contempt  in  order  to  vindicate  its  authority  to 
secure  the  due  administration  of  justice  in  a  cause  pending 
before  it.  The  publications  contain  statements  of  facts,  evi- 
dence of  which  was  not  competent  at  the  trial  and  was  not 
introduced  at  the  trial,  and  they  were  so  made  that  it  was  likely 
that  the  presiding  justice  and  the  jurors  would  read  them  dur- 
ing the  trial,  and  the  natural  and  probable  effect  of  them  would 
be  improperly  to  influence  the  justice  and  the  jury  in  the  deter- 
mination of  the  cause. 

*®i  The  proper  method  of  collecting  a  fine  imposed  upon  a 
corporation  is  by  a  levy  of  an  execution  issued  by  the  court: 
The  King  v.  Woolf,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  609;  1  Chitty,  583;  Huddle- 
eon  V.  Ruffin,  6  Ohio  St.  604;  1  Chitty  on  Criminal  Law,  2d  ed,, 
811;  1  Bishop's  ^ew  Criminal  Procedure,  sees.  1303  et  seq. 

Judgments  affirmed. 

CONTEMPT— NEWSPAPER  PUBLICATIONS.— A  criminal  con- 
tempt Is  any  act  done  to  obstruct  the  course  of  justice  or  to  preju- 
dice the  trial  of  any  action  or  proceeding  then  pending  in  court: 
State  V.  Circuit  Court,  97  Wis.  1,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  90.  Any  publica- 
tion relating  to  a  cause  pending  in  court,  tending  to  prejudice  the 
public  as  to  Its  merits,  and  to  corrupt  or  embarrass  the  aii ministra- 
tion of  justice,  or  reflecting  on  the  tribunal  or  its  proceedings,  or  on 
the  parties,  jurorB,  witnesses,  or  counsel,  may  be  punished  as  a  con- 
tempt: Peraival  v.  State,  46  Neb.  741,  50  Am.  St.  Rep,  568,  and 
monographic  note  thereto  on  contempts  of  court  by  libelous  news- 
paper publicatlonsi. 


Jan.  1899.]     Pain  v.  Societb  St.  Jean  Baptiste.  287 

CONTEMPT.— COURTS  HAVE  INHERENT  POWER  to  protect 
themselves  and  the  administration  of  justice  by  the  punishment  of 
those  who  commit  a  contempt:  Note  to  Peiclval  v.  State,  50  Am. 
St.  Rep.  573. 

CONTEMPT.— CORPORATIONS  can  only  be  punished  for  con- 
tempt through  their  officers  or  those  acting  in  aid  of  such  corpora- 
tions: Sercomb  v.  Catlin,  128  111.  556,  15  Am.  St  Rep.  147. 


Pain  v.  Societe  St.  Jean  Baptists. 

[172  MASSACBrSETTS,  319.] 

ASSOCIATIONS  —  BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  —  POWER  TO 
AMEND  BY-LAWS.— An  incorporated  beneficiary  association  has 
power  to  so  amend  its  by-laws  as  to  deprive  a  member  of  his  right 
to  future  benefits,  under  a  disability  existing  at  the  time  of  tho 
amendment,  where  it  has,  without  limitation  or  restriction,  reserved 
the  power  to  amend  its  by-laws. 

ASSOCIATIONS  —  BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  —AMENDMENT 
OF  BY-LAWS  APPLIES  TO  WHAT  MEMBERS.— If  a  by-law  of 
an  incorporated  beneficiary  association,  which  allows  every  member 
a  right  to  five  dollars  a  week  if  he  becomes  disabled  during  ii 
period  of  not  exceeding  thirteen  weeks  in  each  year,  is  amended 
so  as  to  limit  his  benefits  to  one  dollar  per  week,  for  thirteen  weeks 
of  each  year,  during  a  period  of  five  years,  after  he  has  received 
thirty-nine  weeks  of  sick  benefits,  such  amendment  applies  to  Ji 
member  who,  at  the  time  of  its  adoption,  was  under  a  disability, 
and  had  been  paid  benefits  for  thirty-nine  weeks. 

Contract,  to  recover  the  amount  of  benefits  alleged  to  he  due 
to  the  plaintiff  as  a  member  of  the  defendant  society.  There 
was  a  judgment  for  the  defendant,  and  the  plaintiff  appealed. 

L.  E.  Wood  and  A.  G.  Weeks,  for  the  plaintiff. 

H.  A.  Dubuque,  for  the  defendant. 

"*"  HAMMOND,  J.  The  defendant  society  is  a  beneficiary 
organization,  chartered  in  1884,  under  the  Public  Statutes, 
chapter  115,  and  ever  since  its  incorporation  the  plaintiff  has 
been  a  member  in  good  standing.  In  June,  1890,  the  plaintiff, 
by  reason  of  sickness,  became  unable  to  work,  and  has  so  con- 
tinued to  the  present  time,  and  ^^^  during  that  time  he  has  re- 
ceived benefits  at  the  rate  of  five  dollars  per  week  for  thirteen 
weeks  of  each  year  down  to  July  7,  1896;  and  since  the  latter 
date  he  has  received  benefits  at  the  rate  of  only  one  dollar  per 
week  for  thirteen  weeks  of  each  year.  This  suit  is  brought  to 
recover  the  additional  four  dollars  per  week  for  a  period  of  nine 
weeks. 


288  Pain  v.  Societe  St.  Jean  Baptiste.  [Mass. 

Whether  the  plaintiff  can  recover  depends  upon  the  construc- 
tion and  effect  of  the  amendment  of  the  hy-laws  which  was 
passed  on  July  7,  1896.  If  it  is  applicable  to  him,  he  cannot 
recover,  if  not,  he  can. 

The  by-law  of  1893,  which,  so  far  as  the  plaintiff  is  concerned, 
was  not  materially  different  from  that  of  1889,  under  which  the 
plaintiff  was  receiving  aid  at  the  time  of  the  amendment  in 
question,  was  as  follows:  ''Every  member  who  shall  belong  to 
the  society  for  twelve  consecutive  months,  who  has  paid  his  dues, 
contributions,  fines,  or  other  sums  assessed  by  vote  or  by-law  of 
the  society,  shall  have  a  right  to  five  dollars  per  week  if  he  be- 
comes unable  to  work,  in  consequence  of  sickness  or  accident, 
during  a  period  not  exceeding  thirteen  weeks  in  each  year,  be- 
ginning from  the  date  of  the  first  application  for  benefits."  And 
the  amendment  of  July  7,  1896,  was  as  follows:  "Provided  that 
when  a  member  has  received  thirty-nine  weeks  of  sick  benefits, 
or  one  hundred  ninety-five  dollars,  for  the  same  or  a  different 
period  of  disability,  then  he  shall  not  hereafter  receive  more 
than  one  dollar  per  week,  instead  of  five  dollars, .  for  thirteen 
weeks  of  each  year,  if  his  sickness  shall  so  long  continue,  and 
that  during  a  period  of  five  years,  aggregating  sixty-five  dollars 
of  benefits.  Each  year  reckons  from  the  date  of  the  first  ap- 
plication for  benefits.  If  after  that  period  of  five  years  he  is  still 
unable  to  work,  he  is  then  entitled  to  five  dollars  a  week  for 
thirteen  weeks  of  eacb  year  for  three  years,  as  at  first.  This 
partial  suspension  of  benefits  is  established  so  as  to  allow  as 
much  as  possible  all  the  members  to  share  more  equitably  in  the 
disability  funds." 

The  plaintiff  concedes  that  the  amendment  was  duly  passed, 
but  in  his  brief  contends,  in  the  first  place,  that  "the  defendant 
society  cannot,  by  such  an  amendment,  under  the  circumstances 
of  this  case,  so  change  its  obligation  to  the  plaintiff,"  because 
his  "originally  contingent  right  to  receive  benefits  as  stated  be- 
came vested  upon  the  happening  of  the  contingency,  1.  e.,  his 
disability  ^^^  to  work,  June  7,  1890,  and  from  that  time  no  act 
of  the  society,  by  amendment  to  its  by-laws,  could  divest  him 
of  that  right";  and  in  the  second  place,  that  even  if  his  rights 
"were  not  vested  and  could  be  taken  away  by  amendment  of 
the  by-laws,  such  amendment  could  have  no  retroactive  force," 
and  that  "to  hold  that  payments  of  benefits  made  before  the 
adoption  of  the  amendment  can  be  applied  to  benefits  accruing 
under  the  amendment  will  make  such  amendment  retroactive 
in  force,  and  will  place  the  plaintiff  in  a  worse  position  than 


Jan.  1899.]     Pain  v.  Societe  St.  Jean  Baptiste.  289 

the  other  members  of  the  society  at  the  time  of  the  adoption 
of  the  amendment." 

The  plaintiffs  contention,  more  briefly  expressed,  is  that  the 
defendant  had  no  power  to  amend  its  by-laws  so  as  to  affect  hia 
rights  to  future  benefits  under  a  disability  then  existing,  and, 
€ven  if  it  has  such  power,  this  amendment,  fairly  construed,  does 
not  affect  such  rights.  The  rights  of  the  plaintiff  are  deter- 
mined by  the  nature  of  the  contract  between  him  and  the  soci- 
ety, as  interpreted  by  the  by-laws  under  which  it  was  made  and 
in  the  light  of  the  surrounding  circumstances.  The  general 
purpose  of  the  society  was  to  give  pecuniary  aid  to  its  sick  or 
disabled,  and,  in  case  of  the  death  of  a  member,  to  provide  for  the 
relief  of  his  family.  The  fund  for  this  purpose  was  to  be  raised 
by  monthly  dues,  and,  in  case  of  death,  by  an  assessment  upon 
the  survivors.  Of  course,  the  amount  of  benefits  which  the  so- 
ciety, with  due  regard  to  the  interest  of  the  sick  as  well  as  that 
of  the  other  members,  could  properly  pay  depended  upon  many 
circumstances,  such  as  the  number  of  its  members,  the  actual 
or  relative  number  of  the  sick,  the  promptness  with  which  dues 
were  paid,  and  others  of  similar  nature;  and,  as  these  various 
circumstances  might  and  probably  would  change  from  time  to 
time,  it  might  be  regarded  not  only  as  prudent,  but  as  neces- 
sary, for  the  successful  management  of  the  society,  that  there 
should  exist  the  power  to  make  such  corersponding  changes  in 
the  by-laws  as  the  circumstances  for  the  time  being  might  seem 
to  require. 

The  power  to  amend  the  by-laws  was  reserved,  and  there  ia 
no  limit  to  the  reservation.  After  certain  preliminary  proceed- 
ings, its  by-laws  could  be  amended  at  any  time  and  in  any  rea- 
sonable way.  All  this  the  plaintiff  well  knew  from  the  first, 
and  he  was  present  at  the  meeting  of  July  7,  1896,  and  spoke 
against  the  adoption  of  the  amendment. 

322  There  being  a  power  of  amendment  reserved,  the  contract 
between  the  plaintiff  and  the  society  was  liable  to  changes  with 
regard  to  future  benefits  to  which  a  disabled  member  might  be 
entitled,  as  well  as  in  other  matters,  and  the  plaintiff  had  agreed 
that  these  changes,  duly  made  in  compliance  with  the  rules  of 
the  society,  should  be  binding  upon  him,  not  as  a  new  contract, 
but  as  a  part  of  the  old  contract  and  under  its  provisions. 

But  the  plaintiff  contends  that  there  is  an  implied  limitation 
to  this  power  of  amendment,  that  it  cannot  be  made  so  as  to 
deprive  him  of  a  vested  right,  and  that  his  right  to  the  benefit 

AM.  Br.  BXP..  You  LXX.— 19 


Pain  v,  Societe  St.  Jean  Baptiste.  [Mass* 

became  fixed  by  his  disability,  and  can  never  be  changed  during 
that  disability.  But  how  does  the  right  become  fixed?  There 
is  no  such  restriction  contained  in  the  words  expressing  the 
power  of  amendment.  To  thus  restrict  the  power  would  be  to- 
divide  the  society  into  two  classes,  one  comprising  those  like  the- 
plaintiff,  who  could  not  be  affected  by  any  reduction  of  future 
benefits,  and  the  second  comprising  the  well  members,  who- 
would  be  affected  by  such  reduction.  And  no  matter  how  many 
of  these  preferred  pensioners  there  might  be,  this  society,  whose 
right  to  graduate  payment  according  to  varying  circumstances- 
has  been  reserved  so  carefully,  and  in  language  so  general  and 
comprehensive,  and  which  is  so  plainly  necessary  to  the  pur- 
poses for  which  it  was  incorporated,  is  powerless  to  do  what 
might  be  necessary  even  to  its  own  existence.  There  can  be  no 
•  right  to  future  benefits  vested  in  one  member  more  than  in  an- 
other. The  right  of  a  sick  member  to  future  benefits  which  be- 
comes vested  in  the  plaintiff  at  the  time  of  the  disability  is  not 
a  right  to  receive,  so  long  as  such  disability  continues,  the  future 
benefits  provided  by  the  by-law  existing  at  the  time  the  disabil- 
ity begins,  but  simply  a  right  to  receive  them  subject  to  such 
changes  as  may  be  made  by  the  society,  and  it  is  no  violation  of 
such  a  vested  right  to  make  the  changes  at  any  time.  Such  a 
change  is  not  a  repudiation  of  the  terms  of  the  contract,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  is  in  accordance  with  them. 

As  was  said  in  Smith  v.  Galloway  (1898),  1  Q.  B.  71,  77: 
"Where  ....  the  original  contract  ....  provides  for  altera- 
tion of  the  rules,  he  is  bound  by  any  subsequent  alteration  that 
may  be  made  within  the  power  of  alteration,  whatever  the  ex- 
tent of  that  alteration  may  be."  Such  an  interpretation  of  the 
contract  ^^^  seems  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  for 
amendments,  and  to  be  the  only  one  reasonably  calculated  to 
subserve  the  interests  of  all,  and  to  enable  the  society  to  accom- 
plish the  objects  for  which  it  was  incorporated. 

We  are  aware  that  the  doctrine  herein  enunciated  is  incon- 
fcistent  with  some  decisions  in  other  states,  but  we  are  satisfied 
that  it  is  sustained  by  the  better  reasoning  and  the  weight  of 
authority:  Smith  v.  Galloway  (1898),  1  Q.  B.  71;  Stohr  v.  San 
Francisco  Musical  Fund  Soc.,  82  Cal.  557;  Poultney  v.  Baoh- 
man,  31  Hun,  49;  Bowie  v.  Grand  Lodge,  99  Cal.  398;  Fugure 
y.  Mutual  Soc.  of  St.  Joseph,  46  Vt.  363;  Supreme  Lodge  K. 
of  P.  V.  Knight,  117  Ind.  489;  3  L.  R.  A.  409,  and  note.  Su- 
preme Commandery  v.  Ainsworth,  71  Ala.  436,  449,  46  Am. 
Eep.  332;  Loeffler  t.  Modem  Woodmen  of  America,  100  Wis, 


Jan.  1899.]    Pain  v.  Societe  St.  Jean  Baptiste.  291 

79;  Borgards  v.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.,  79  Jlich.  440;  Moore  v.  Union 
Fraternal  Ace.  Assn.,  103  Iowa,  424;  Carpenter  v.  Knapp,  101 
Iowa,  712;  Hughes  v.  Wisconsin  Odd  Fellows'  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  98 
Wis.  292;  Catholic  Knights  of  America  v.  Morrison,  16  R.  I. 
468. 

Of  course,  no  amendment  could  change  the  amount  of  any 
benefit  which  under  any  by-law  has  passed  from  a  possible  to 
WaX  of  a  future  benefit  and  has  become  a  debt.  The  right  be- 
comes vested  absolutely  as  the  time  expires  for  which  the  benefit 
is  granted. 

As  to  the  second  contention  of  the  plaintiff,  it  is  sufficient  to 
say  that  we  think  the  by-law  applies  to  the  case  of  the  plaintiff. 
The  language  is  broad  enough  to  cover  his  case.  The  plaintiff 
had  received  more  than  "thirty-nine  weeks  of  sick  benefits,"  and 
it  was  provided  that  such  a  person  shall  "not  hereafter  receive 
more  than  one  dollar  per  week."  We  have  no  doubt  the  con- 
struction put  upon  the  amendment  by  the  officers  of  the  society 
was  the  one  intended  and  justified  by  the  language. 

Judgment  affirmed. 


MUTUAL  BENEFIT  ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS— RErSERVED 
POWER  TO  AMEND.— If  a  mutual  benefit  association  expressly  re- 
serves the  right  to  amend  its  by-laws,  and  the  member  makes  him- 
self subject  to  whatever  change  the  association  may  make  in  the 
contract,  he  Is  bound  by  the  rules  "now  in  force  or  which  may  here- 
after be  enacted,"  and  must  take  notice  of  the  existence  and  efifect 
of  such  reserved  power:  See  monographic  note  to  Lake  v.  Minne- 
sota etc.  Assn.,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  557.  on  features  of  the  law  specially 
applicable  to  mutual  or  membership  life  or  accident  insurance.  But 
while  a  mutual  benefit  society  has  the  power  to  make,  alter,  abro- 
gate, or  amend  its  by-laws,  it  cannot  so  exercise  this  right  that  it 
will  operate  as  a  repudiation  of  its  obligations,  or  to  work  a  for- 
feiture of  rights  previously  vested  in  its  members:  See  notes  to  Rox- 
bury  Lodge  v.  Hocking.  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  600;  Starling  v.  Supreme 
Council,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  712. 


292  Haediman  t;.  Whollky.  [Mass. 


Hardiman  v.  W'hollet. 

[172  Massachusetts,  41L] 

ANIMALS— KICK  FROM  A  HORSE  UPON  THE  SIDE- 
WALK—OWNER'S LIABILITY.— A  person  who  has  heen  kicked 
and  Injured  by  a  horse  temporarily  standing  upon  a  sidewalk,  where 
It  ought  not  to  be,  is  entitled  to  recover  therefor  without  proof 
that  the  animal  was  vicious,  and  that  the  owner  know  it,  particu- 
larly where  the  horse  was  In  an  exceptionally  nervous  condition  in 
consequence  of  the  driver's  treatment.  In  such  a  case,  it  is,  there- 
fore, correct  to  refuse  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  defendant. 

Tort  for  personal  injuries  occasioned  to  the  plaintiff  by  the 
kick  of  a  horse.  There  was  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
defendant  alleged  exceptions. 

H.  S.  Stearns,  for  the  plaintiff. 

F.  J.  Keleher,  for  the  defendant. 

■***  HOLMES,  J.  This  is  an  action  to  recover  for  personal 
injuries  caused  by  the  kick  of  a  horse.  The  wagon  to  which 
the  horse  was  attached  had  stuck  in  the  mud  half  an  hour  be- 
fore the  accident,  and  this  hors^e  and  another  had  been  unhitched 
and  were  feeding  out  of  feed-bags  attached  to  their  heads.  There 
was  evidence  that  this  horse  had  been  made  nervous  by  the  ef- 
fort to  pull  the  wagon  out,  and  by  being  brutally  beaten,  and 
that  he  was  standing  partially  on  the  sidewalk.  He  was  stand- 
ing at  right  angles  to  it,  and,  as  the  plaintiff  approached,  sud- 
denly whirled  round  and  kicked  him.  The  case  is  here  upon  an 
exception  to  the  refusal  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  defendant. 
The  refusal  was  right.  It  used  to  be  said  in  England,  under 
the  rule  requiring  notice  of  the  habits  of  an  animal,  that  every 
dog  was  entitled  to  one  worry,  but  it  is  noi  universally  true 
that  every  horse  id  entitled  to  one  kick.  In  England,  if  the 
horse  is  a  trespasser  and  kicks  another,  the  kick  will  enhance 
the  damages  without  proof  that  the  animal  was  vicious  and  that 
the  owner  knew  it:  Lee  v.  ^*2  j^^ey,  18  Com.  B.,  N.  S.,  722. 
See  Lyons  v.  Merrick,  105  Mass.  71,  76.  So,  in  this  common- 
wealth, going  further,  it  would  seem,  than  the  English  law,  a 
kick  by  a  horse  wrongfully  at  large  upon  the  highway  can  be 
recovered  for  without  proof  that  it  was  vicious:  Barnes  v. 
Chapin,  4  Allen,  444,  81  Am.  Dec.  710;  Marsland  v.  Murray, 
148  Mass.  91,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  520;  Dickson  v.  McCoy,  39  N.  Y. 
400,  401.  See  Cox  v.  Burbidge,  13  Com.  B.,  N.  S.,  430.  The 
same  law  naturally  would  be  applied  to  a  horse  upon  a  sidewalk 
where  it  ought  not  to  be  (see  Mercer  v.  Corbin,  117  Ind.  450, 


Jan.  1899.]  Coupe  v.  Platt.  293 

454,  10  Am.  St.  Eep.  76),  and  in  this  case  there  was  evidence 
of  the  further  fact  that  the  horse  was  in  an  exceptionally  ner- 
vous condition  in  consequence  of  the  driver's  treatment. 
Exceptions  overruled. 


ANIMALS— INJURIES  BY— LIABILITY  OF  OWNER— The 
owner  of  au  animal,  not  naturally  vicious,  is  not  answerable  for  an 
injury  done  by  it  in  the  place  whore  it  belongs,  unless  it  was  In  fact 
vicious,  and  the  owner  knew  it:  Clowdis  v.  Fresno  etc.  Irr.  Co.,  118 
Cal.  315,  62  Am.  St.  Hep.  238;  but  if  the  animal  Is  wrongfully  In 
the  place  where  It  does  the  mischief,  the  owner  is  liable,  though 
he  had  no  notice  that  It  was  accustomed  to  do  so  before:  Reed  v. 
Southern  E,xp.  Co.,  95  Ga.  108,  51  Am.  St  Rep.  62.  A  party  In- 
jured by  a  vicious  horse  may  recover  damages  of  the  owner;  Note 
to  Fake  v.  Addlcks.  22  Am.  St  Rep.  719. 


Coupe  v,  Platt. 

[172  Massachusetts,  458.] 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT-DEFECTIVE  PREMISES- 
LANDLORD'S  LIABILITY  TO  TENANT'S  GUESTS.— If  a  land- 
lord  maintains  outside  steps  and  a  platform  for  the  use  in  common 
of  tenants  of  different  parts  of  the  building,  and  a  visitor  to  one 
of  the  tenants,  expressly  Invited  by  the  tenant  to  come  on  a  par- 
ticular day  for  a  particular  purpose,  is  injured  by  a  defect  In  the 
platform  while  passing  over  it,  the  landlord  is  answerable,  for  the 
visitor  was  using  the  platform  In  the  tenant's  right 

Tort  for  personal  injuries.  There  was  a  verdict  for  the  plain- 
tiff, and  the  defendant  alleged  exceptions. 

M.  R.  Hitch,  for  the  plain-tiff. 

R.  F.  Raymond,  for  the  defendant. 

*»»  KNOWLTON,  J.  The  question  how  far  a  host  is  liable 
to  his  guest  for  the  unsafe  condition  of  his  premises,  when  he 
is  visited  upon  an  invitation,  express  or  implied,  merely  in  a 
social  way,  from  considerations  of  friendship  or  for  pleasure,  is 
not  raised  by  this  bill  of  exceptions.  The  judge  assumed  in 
favor  of  the  defendant  that  the  law  of  this  commonwealth  is 
like  that  of  England,  where  it  is  held  that,  in  the  absence  of 
traps,  neither  the  poor  nor  the  rich  are  bound  to  change  the  con- 
ditions in  which  they  are  accustomed  to  live  in  order  to  furnish 
for  their  friends  or  guests,  recipients  of  their  gratuitous  hospi- 
tality, safer  or  more  comfortable  surroundings  than  they  have 
for  themselves  and  their  families.  The  English  law  on  this  sub- 
ject was  somewhat  considered  in  Hart  v.  Cole,  156  Mass.  475, 


294  Coupe  v.  Platt.  [Mass. 

478,  and  in  Plummer  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  426,  32  Am.  St.  Eep. 
463,  but  whether  it  is  to  be  followed  in  this  commonwealth 
has  never  been  decided. 

The  question  in  -this  case  is  different.  The  defendant  was  a 
landlord  who  maintained  outside  steps  and  a  platform  for  the 
use  in  common  of  tenants  of  different  parts  of  her  building. 
The  plaintiff  was  injured  by  a  defect  in  the  platform  wliile 
passing  over  it  on  a  visit  to  one  of  the  tenants,  made  on  his 
express  invitation  to  come  on  a  particular  day  for  a  particular 
purpose.  The  duty  of  the  defendant  to  keep  the  platform  safe 
for  the  tenant,  and  for  those  claiming  under  him,  grew  out  of 
the  contract  of  hiring.  It  was  a  part  of  the  contract  that  the 
platform  should  be  kept  reasonably  safe  for  the  tenant  for  use  in 
connection  with  his  tenement.  The  contract  impliedly  in- 
cluded, not  only  the  tenant  himself,  but  the  m^embers  of  his 
family,  and  his  servants  and  agents  who  might  rightfully  occupy 
and  use  the  tenement  with  him.  It  included  boarders  and 
lodgers,  if,  in  a  proper  use  of  the  tenement,  such  persons  might 
be  received  there  by  the  tenant.  It  included  all  persons  who,  in 
connection  with  the  use  of  the  tenement  by  the  tenant,  might 
properly  pass  over  the  platform  under  the  express  authority  of 
the  tenant,  and  in  his  right.  To  all  such  persons,  by  virtue  of  her 
contract  with  the  tenant,  the  landlord  owed  the  same  duty  that 
she  owed  to  the  tenant  personally,  to  keep  the  platform  reason- 
ably safe.  Whether  the  tenant  would  or  would  not  have  been  liable 
to  the  plaintiff  for  an  injury  received  from  an  unsafe  condition 
of  the  tenement  which  he  occupied,  he  expressly  authorized  the 
plaintiff  "****  to  pass  over  the  platform  in  the  exercise  of  his 
rights  under  the  contract  with  the  defendant,  and  the  defendant 
owed  the  plaintiff  the  duty  which  arose  from  the  contract  in  fa- 
vor of  those  who  were  acting  by  express  authority  of  the  tenant 
in  the  tenant's  right:  Wilcox  v.  Zane,  167  Mass.  302. 

Exceptions  overruled. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT— COMMON  STAIRWAY-LAND- 
LORD'S DUTY  AND  LIABILITY— TENANTS  GUESTS.— If  rooms 
or  portions  of  the  same  building  are  let  to  different  tenants,  the 
bnlhllng  having  a  common  stairway  for  the  use  of  all,  the  landlord 
Is  bound  to  keep  It  in  reasonable  repair,  and  is  liable  for  a  failure 
to  do  so,  where  the  tenant's  guests,  or  strangers  rightfully  on  the 
premises,  are  Injured  In  consequence  of  the  defective  condition  of 
the  stairway:  Sawyer  v.  McGilllcuddy,  81  Me.  318,  10  Am.  St.  Rep. 
2(50,  and  note;  note  to  Llndsey  v.  Leighton,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  201, 
notes  to  Poor  v.  Sears,  2(5  Am.  St  Rep.  278;  Nalley  v.  Hartford  Car- 
pet Co.,  50  Am.  Rep.  53. 


Jan.  1899.]  Hayd£n  v.  Babreit.  295 


Hayden  v.  Barrett. 

[172  Massachusetts,  472.] 

DESCENT— ILLEGITIMATE  CHILD  AS  AN  HEIR.— Under 
the  statutory  law  of  Massachusetts,  an  illegitimate  child  is  the  heir 
of  his  mother;  but  at  common  law  he  could  not  be  an  heir,  even  of 
his  mother. 

WILLS— ILLEGITIMATE  CHILD  AS  AN  "HEIR  BY 
BLOOD."— An  illegitimate  child  Is  the  "heir  by  blood"  of  his  mother 
within  the  meaning  of  a  will  wherein  the  term  "heirs  by  blood"  is 
used,  where  it  plainly  appears  that  the  testator  intended  by  the  use 
■of  that  term  to  indicate  those  persons  whose  relationship  was  by 
some  tie  of  consanguinity;  and  to  exclude  all  others,  such  as  hus- 
band, wife,  or  adopted  children. 

Bill  in  equity,  brought  by  trustees,  Hayden  and  another, 
against  Barrett  and  others,  for  instructions  as  to  the  construc- 
tion of  the  following  portion  of  the  will  of  Sidney  B.  Morse: 
"I  give,  devise,  and  bequeath  all  the  rest,  residue,  and  remainder 
of  my  property  and  estate,  real,  personal,  and  mixed  ....  to 
....  trustees  ....  to  pay  the  net  income,  rents,  and  profits 
thereof  to  my  beloved  wife,  Mary  Ann  Morse,  during  her  life, 
....  and  upon  her  decease  to  continue  to  hold  ....  the 
€ame  during  the  term  of  ten  years  from  said  time ;  ....  5.  To 
pay  three-tenths  of  the  income  thereof  to  the  children  of  my 
brother,  George  H.  Morse,  viz.,  Mary  Ann  Morse,  Fannie  E. 
Barrett,  wife  of  Frank  S.  Barrett,  and  Roswell  M.  Morse,  to  be 
equally  divided  among  them,  the  portion  payable  to  females  to 
be  so  paid  upon  their  sole  receipt  and  free  from  the  control 
or  interference  of  any  husbands  they  may  have,  or,  in  case  one 
or  more  of  them  decease  prior  to  the  expiration  of  said  ten 
years,  to  pay  the  income  due  to  such  one  or  more  to  his  or  her 
or  their  respective  heirs  by  blood,  and,  at  the  expiration  of  said 
ten  years,  to  transfer,  pay  over,  and  convey  one  of  said  ten  parts 
80  divided  as  hereinbefore  provided  to  the  said  Mary  Ann  Morse, 
one  of  said  ten  parts  to  the  said  Fannie  E.  Barrett,  and  one  of 
said  ten  parts  to  the  said  Eoswell  M.  Morse;  or,  in  case  one 
or  more  of  them  are  not  then  living,  to  transfer,  pay  over,  and  • 
convey  such  part  or  portion  to  his  or  her  or  their  respective 
heirs  by  blood."  Mary  Ann  Morse,  the  widow  of  the  testator, 
died  on  or  about  July  11,  1895,  and  his  niece,  Mary  Ann  Morse, 
died  on  or  about  November  25,  1895.  The  respondent,  Fannie 
E.  Barrett,  was  the  sister,  and  the  respondent,  Horace  E.  Morse, 
was  the  son,  of  a  pre-deceased  brother  of  the  niece,  Mary  Ann 
Morse.  This  niece  was  never  married,  and  the  respondent, 
Ernest  L.  Morse,  was  her  illegitimate  child.    She  left  no  father 


296  Hayden  v.  Barrett.  [Mass. 

or  mother,  and  no  issue,  brother  or  sister,  or  descendant  of  any 
deceased  brother  or  sister,  other  than  the  respondents.  It  wa& 
alleged  in  the  bill  that  a  certain  portion  of  the  income  in  the 
hands  of  the  trustees  was  payable  by  the  terms  of  the  fifth  clause 
above-mentioned,  and  that  a  like  portion  of  the  income  to  accrue- 
during  the  period  of  ten  years  from  the  death  of  the  testator'a 
widow,  and  also  of  the  principal  of  the  trust  fund  at  the  expi- 
ration of  the  ten  years  would  be  payable  to  the  "heirs  by  blood" 
of  the  niece,  Mary  Ann  Morse,  deceased.  The  justice  who  heard 
the  bill  was  of  the  opinion  that  Ernest  L.  Morse  was  entitled 
to  the  portion  of  the  fund  in  controversy,  but,  at  the  request 
of  the  other  respondents,  reported  the  case  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  full  court. 

C.  P.  Lincoln,  for  the  petitioners. 

W.  Sullivan,  for  the  respondent,  Ernest  L.  Morse. 

E.  G.  Mclnnes  and  C.  A.  Whittemore,  for  the  other  re- 
Bpondenta. 

'*'''*  HAMMOND,  J.  The  single  question  is,  whether  under 
the  fifth  clause  of  the  tenth  item  of  this  will  the  illegitimate 
eon  of  Mary  Ann  Morse  takes  as  her  "heir  by  blood." 

By  the  common  law  of  England  and  of  this  commonwealth  a 
bastard  in  all  matters  relating  to  the  inheritance  of  property  wa* 
nobody's  child,  and  as  to  such  matters  his  existence  was  there- 
fore  ignored:  Cooley  v.  Dewey,  4  Pick.  93,  16  Am.  Dec.  326;  2 
Dane's  Abridgment,  622,  and  cases  therein  cited;  Pratt  v.  At- 
wood,  108  Mass.  40. 

And  accordingly  it  is  also  well  settled  that,  in  the  absence  of 
any  language  clearly  expressing  the  contrary,  all  general  words 
in  the  statutes  of  distribution,  such  as  "child,"  "children,"  "next 
of  kin,"  and  similar  words  descriptive  of  classes  who  are  to  in- 
herit, do  not  include  illegitimate  children:  Kent  v.  Barker,  2 
Gray,  535,  and  cases  therein  cited.  And  so  of  similar  expres- 
Bions  in  a  Massachusetts  will:  Kent  v.  Barker,  2  Gray,  535; 
Adams  v.  Adams,  154  Mass.  290;  Haraden  v.  Larrabee,  113  Mass. 
430. 

If,  therefore,  the  rights  of  the'illegitimate  son  of  Mary  Ann 
Morse  depended  upon  the  common  law,  the  decision  must  be 
against  him.  But  for  two  generations  and  more  it  has  been  the 
statute  law  of  this  commonwealth  that  an  illegitimate  child 
shall  be  the  heir  of  his  mother,  and  the  tendency  of  legislation 


Jan.  1899. J  Hayden  v.  Barrett.  297 

as  shown  by  an  amendment  to  the  statute  seems  to  be  growing 
in  the  direction  of  change  in  the  common  law  in  this  respect 
more  favorable  to  him.  By  our  statute^  Ernest  L.  Morse  was 
the  heir  of  his  mother,  and  of  any  maternal  ancestor,  and,  if 
the  mother  died  intestate,  he,  being  the  only  child,  was  her  sole 
heir  as  to  all  her  property:  See  Pub.  Statutes,  c.  125,  sec.  3. 

By  the  will  the  property  at  her  death  goes  to  the  "heirs  by 
blood."  The  illegitimate  son,  it  is  true,  does  not  take  it  by  de- 
scent from  his  mother,  but,  if  at  all,  as  the  person  designated  by 
the  will. 

^''*^  In  Larery  v.  Egan,  143  Mass.  389,  392,  where  real  estate 
had  been  devised  to  a  person  for  life,  with  contingent  remainder 
to  her  heirs,  it  was  decided  that  the  husband  of  the  life  tenant 
took  as  her  heir  under  the  Statutes  of  1880,  chapter  211,  section 
1,  which  provides  that  in  certain  cases  a  husband  shall  take  in 
fee  the  real  estate  of  his  deceased  wife  to  an  amount  not  ex- 
ceeding five  thousand  dollars  in  value.  In  giving  the  opinion 
Mr.  Justice  Field  says:  "Although  in  the  case  at  bar  the  heirs 
of  ...  .  [the  life  tenant]  do  not  take  from  her  by  inheritance, 
but  take  as  persons  designated  by  the  will,  yet  we  know  of  no 
way  of  determining  the  persons  intended  by  the  will,  except 
by  ascertaining  the  persons  who  by  law  would  have  inherited 
the  estate  from  her  if  she  had  died  seised  of  it  and  intestate.*' 

Applying  that  principle  to  this  case,  we  have  no  doubt  that, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  will  as  interpreted  in  the  light  of  the 
statute,  the  illegitimate  child  was  the  heir  of  his  mother,  and 
it  only  remains  to  be  considered  whether  he  was  her  heir  **by 
blood"  within  the  meaning  of  the  will. 

The  expression  'Tieirs  by  blood"  occurs  several  times  in  the 
will.  In  the  first  clause  of  this  tenth  item  the  trustees  are  di- 
rected to  pay  certain  income  "to  my  niece  Helen  E.  Howland, 
daughter  of  my  said  sister  Caroline  Ware  Morris,  upon  her  sole 
receipt  and  free  from  the  control  or  interference  of  any  hus- 
band she  may  have,  and  in  case  of  her  death  prior  to  the  ex- 
piration of  said  ten  years  to  pay  said  balance,  if  any,  to  her  heirs 
by  blood."  And  the  second  clause  of  said  item  is  as  follows:  "To 
pay  one-tenth  of  the  income  thereof  to  my  niece  Caroline  E. 
Button  upon  her  sole  receipt,  free  from  the  control  or  inter- 
ference of  any  husband  she  may  have,  and,  in  case  of  her  death 
prior  to  the  expiration  of  said  ten  years,  then  to  pay  the  said 
income  to  her  heirs  by  blood,  and  at  the  expiration  of  said  ten 
years  to  transfer,  pay  over,  and  convey  one  of  said  ten  parts 


HQS  Spade  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  [Mass. 

80  divided  as  hereinbefore  provided  to  tlie  said  Caroline  E.  But- 
ton, or,  in  case  she  is  not  then  living,  to  her  heirs  by  blood." 

And  the  same  language  is  used  with  reference  to  the  legacies 
to  the  other  nieces  and  to  his  nephew,  in  the  same  iteai  of  the 
will.  All  the  way  through  this  item  the  testator  was  bearing 
constantly  in  mind  the  husbands  of  these  various  nieces,  and  he 
desired  that  there  should  be  no  control  or  interference  on  the 
'*''^  part  of  any  such  husband  during  the  life  of  the  niece,  and 
then  in  the  same  general  line  of  thought  uses  language  which 
finally  excludes  the  husband  from  having  any  share  in  the  prop- 
erty after  the  decease  of  the  niece. 

It  is  plain,  we  think,  that  the  testator  intended  by  the  use  of 
the  term  **heirs  by  blood"  to  indicate  those  persons  whose  re- 
lationship was  by  some  tie  of  consanguinity,  and  to  exclude  all 
others,  such  as  husband,  wife,  or  adopted  children.  He  in- 
tended to  keep  the  property  in  the  family  and  within  the  tie  of 
consanguinity,  but  otherwise  was  content  that  the  law  should 
determine  who  should  be  the  heir  to  any  niece. 

Within  the  meaning  of  the  will,  Ernest  L.  Morse  was  the  "heir 
by  blood"  of  his  mother. 

Decree  accordingly. 


ILLEGITIMATE  CHILD  AS  AN  HEIII.-A  bastard  could  not  In- 
herit even  from  Its  mother  by  the  common  law,  but  this  rule  has 
been  changed  by  statute  in  some  of  the  states:  McDonald  v.  Pitts- 
burg etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144  Ind.  459,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  185,  and  note.  See, 
also,  the  monographic  note  to  Simmons  v.  Bull.  50  Am.  Dec.  263,  on 
the  policy  of  the  ancient  common  law  toward  bastards,  and  rights 
of,  generally. 


Spade  v.  Lynn  and  Boston  Railroad  Company. 

[172  Massachtjsbtts,  ■188.] 

RAILROADS-STREET-CARS— RISK  ASSUMED  BY  PAS- 
SENGER-EXPELLING DRUNKEN  MAN.— A  passsenger  upon  a 
street-oar  assumes  the  risls,  when  he  talcea  passage,  of  the  conse- 
qucnr-es  of  a  lawful  and  reasonable  act  of  the  conductor  in  expelling 
a  drunken  man  from  the  car. 

RAILROADS  —  STREET-CARS  —UNAVOIDABLE  ACCI- 
DENT TO  PASSENGER  IN  EJECTING  DRUNKEN  MAN- 
RIGHT  OF  ACn'ION.— If  due  care  is  used  in  expelling  a  drunken 
man  from  a  street-car,  an  unavoidable  battery  committed  on  a  pas- 
senger's person,  during  the  process,  by  the  conductor's  jostlinc:  an- 
other drunken  man,  who  falls  upon  the  passenger,  seems  not  to  be 
actionable. 

R.AILROADS— STREET-CARS— DAMAGES  FOR  FRI^'HT 
CAUSED  BY  EJECTING    DRUNKEN  PASSENGER.— If  the  con- 


Jan.  1899.]     Spade  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  299 

ductor  of  a  street-car.  In  ejecting  a  drunken  man  therefrom,  Jostles 
against  another  drunken  man,  who  falls  upon  a  lady  passenger, 
and  the  injury  from  the  fall  is  slight,  though  she  suffers  physical 
Injury  from  fright  caused  by  the  fall  and  the  rest  of  the  occurrences, 
she  can  recover.  If  at  all,  only  for  the  fright  caused  by  the  Inad- 
vertent battery,  and  not  for  that  attributable  to  the  general  disturb- 
ance. 

RAILROADS— STREET-GARS— OBLIGATION  TO  NERV- 
OUS PASSENGERS.— The  obligation  of  a  street  railway  company 
toward  a  passenger  cannot  be  increased  simply  by  his  notifying  the 
conductor  that  he  has  unstable  nerves. 

ASSAULT— BATTERY  UPON  PERSON  OF  UNSTABLE 
NERVES— DAMAGES.— If  a  street-car  conductor  commits  an  un- 
justifiable battery  upon  the  person  of  a  lady  passenger,  who  has 
unstable  nerves,  the  company  must  answer  for  the  actual  conse- 
quences of  the  wrong  to  her  as  she  Is,  and  the  damages  cannot  be 
cut  down  by  showing  that  the  efCect  would  have  been  less  upon  a 
normal  person. 

Tort,  for  personal  injuries  sustained  by  the  plaintiff,  while  a 
passenger  on  the  defendant's  car,  through  the  company's  alleged 
negligence.  There  was  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff,  and  the  de- 
fendant alleged  exceptions. 

S.  L.  Whipple  and  W.  R.  Sears,  for  the  plaintiflC 

C.  K.  Cobb,  for  the  defendant. 

*®®  HOLMES,  J.  This  is  an  action  for  personal  injuries 
which  already  has  been  before  the  court:  Spade  v.  Lynn  etc. 
E.  R.  Co.,  168  Mass.  285,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  393.  At  the  second 
trial  the  evidence  was  that  the  defendant's  conductor  in  remov- 
ing a  drunken  man  from  a  car  jostled  another  drunken  man 
who  was  standing  in  front  of  the  plaintiff,  and  threw  him  upon 
her.  The  fall  upon  her  seems  to  have  been  a  trifling  matter, 
taken  by  itself,  but  the  fright  caused  by  that  and  the  rest  of 
the  occurrences  in  the  car  resulted  in  physical  injury.  The  case 
comes  up  again  upon  exceptions. 

The  judge  was  asked  to  direct  a  verdicf  for  the  defendant. 
We  find  some  difficulty  in  seeing  upon  what  ground  the  jury 
were  warranted  in  finding  for  the  plaintiff.  So  far  as  appears, 
the  conductor  was  acting  rightly  in  putting  the  drunken  man 
"***  off  the  car.  As  against  the  plaintiff,  he  was  doing  one  of  the 
things  which  she  had  to  contemplate  as  liable  to  happen  when 
she  got  into  the  car.  We  all  know  that,  if  people  are  standing 
in  the  passageway  of  a  street-car,  you  cannot  remove  a  man 
forcibly  through  the  passageway  without  more  or  less  contact. 
If  the  fall  upon  the  plaintiff  was  the  necessary  consequence  of 
a  lawful  and  reasonable  act,  then  it  was  one  of  the  risks  which 
ehe  assumed  when  she  took  her  passage. 


800  Spade  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  [Maes". 

It  is  a  question  which  deserves  more  discussion  than  it  haa 
received,  whether  a  man  is  answerable  for  an  injury  inflicted 
upon  an  innocent  stranger  knowingly,  or  with  sufficient  notico 
of  the  danger,  if  the  injury  is  an  unavoidable  incident  of  lawful 
self  protection.  It  might  be  said,  and  it  has  been  held,  when  it 
is  a  question  of  paying  damages,  that  a  man  cannot  shift  his 
misfortunes  to  his  neighbor's  shoulders:  Gilbert  v.  Stone, 
Aleyn,  35,  Style,  72;  Scott  v.  Shepard,  2  W.  Black,  892,  896; 
Cooley  on  Torts,  115;  see  McLeod  v.  Jones,  1(75  Mass.  403,  405, 
7  Am.  Eep.  539;  Miller  v.  Horton,  152  Mass.  540,  547,  23  Am. 
St.  Eep.  850;  Pierce  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  153  Mass.  87,  90; 
Whalley  v.  Lancashire  etc.  Ey.,  13  Q.  B.  Div.  131.  And  com^ 
pare  the  rule  as  to  duress  in  contracts  and  conveyances:  Fair- 
banks v.  Snow,  145  Mass.  153,  155,  1  Am.  St.  Eep.  44(j.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  contrary  has  been  intimated  in  a  case  of 
shooting  in  self-defense,  the  injury  to  the  third  person  being 
treated  on  the  footing  of  accident:  Morris  v.  Piatt,  32  Conn. 
75,  84.  See  Bacon's  Maxims,  Eeg.  V.  &  VI.;  Addison  on 
Torts,  6th  ed.,  380,  383.  And  the  right  to  pull  down  a  house 
when  the  destruction  is  necessary  to  stop  a  fire,  as  it  usually  is 
stated,  looks  the  same  way:  See  Taylor  v.  Plymouth,  8  Met. 
462,  465;  American  Print  Works  v.  Lawrence,  23  K  J.  L.  590, 
613,  57  Am.  Dee.  420.  The  alleged  immunity  for  the  necessary 
destruction  of  a  building  suggests  that  perhaps  the  question 
cannot  be  answered  in  general  terms,  and  that  one  possible  dis- 
tinction may  be  found  where  the  parties  have  a  common  inter- 
est, even  though  the  act  done  in  furtherance  of  it  may  cause 
more  harm  than  good  to  the  plaintiff.  Perhaps  it  would  be  un- 
safe to  find  any  countenance  to  such  a  distinction  in  decisions 
as  to  the  rights  of  landowners  or  officials  in  diking  against 
water  when  it  appears  as  a  common  enemy :  The  King  v.  Sewer 
Commrs.,  8  Barn.  &  C.  355;  Nield  v.  London  etc.  ^'^»  Ey., 
L.  R.  10  Ex.  4.  Compare  Whalley  v.  Lancashire  etc.  Ey.,  13 
Q.  B.  Div.  131.  But  when  we  go  a  step  further,  and  take  a  case 
like  the  present,  where  all  parties  concerned  are  in  a  conveyance, 
and  to  maintain  order  and  keep  the  car  clear  of  obnoxious  per- 
sons is  the  defendant's  right,  and  its  duty  to  the  plaintiff  and 
the  other  passengers,  no  passenger  can  complain  of  any  conse- 
quence which  the  performance  of  that  duty  necessarily  entails. 
We  assume,  for  present  purposes,  that  carriers  of  passengers 
owe  the  same  degree  of  care  in  respect  of  such  matters  as  they 
owe  in  respect  of  the  construction  and  management  of  their 
vehicles;  but  if  that  care  is  shown,  probably  the  injury  must  be 


Jan.  1899.]     Spadb  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  301 

regarded  as  an  inevitable  accident.  As  to  whether  there  was 
any  negligence  in  the  manner  of  expelling  the  drunken  man,  or 
otherwise,  we  will  go  no  further  than  to  say  that  it  has  not  been 
pointed  out  to  us.  We  need  not  decide  the  question,  as  there 
must  be  a  new  trial  for  another  reason. 

A  ruling  was  asked  to  the  effect  that  the  plaintiff  could  re- 
cover only  for  the  pain  and  fright  caused  by  the  contact  with 
her  person  and  not  for  such  mental  disturbance  and  injury  as 
were  caused  by  other  acts  of  the  conductor  and  the  general  dis- 
turbance in  the  cap.  This  was  refused,  and  the  jury  were  in- 
structed that,  if  there  was  a  physical  injury  and  accompanied 
by  it  there  was  fright  which  operated  to  her  injury  in  body  or 
mind,  she  could  recover  for  the  damage  caused  by  the  fright, 
and  the  jury  were  told  that  they  might  take  all  that  happened 
as  one  whole.  The  effect  of  the  refusal  and  the  instructions  ap- 
pears to  us  to  have  been  that,  when  once  a  battery  of  the  plain- 
tiff was  proved,  the  defendant  became  or  might  be  found  liable 
for  all  the  consequences  of  the  disturbance  in  the  car  and  of  the 
plaintiff's  fright,  however  caused.  We  do  not  so  understand 
the  law.  By  something  of  an  anomaly,  consequences  of  the  de- 
fendant's conduct  which  would  not  of  themselves  constitute  a 
cause  of  action  may  at  times  enhance  the  damages,  if  the  con- 
duet  has  some  other  consequence  for  which  an  action  lies. 
But  this  further  liability  is  not  for  all  consequences  of  the  de- 
fendant's conduct,  but  for  consequences  of  the  defendant's 
wrong  to  the  plaintiff.  The  wrong  to  the  plaintiff,  if  any,  be- 
gan with  the  battery,  and  it  is  for  the  consequences  of  the  bat- 
tery only  '*®*  that  the  defendant  is  liable,  not  for  all  the  con- 
sequences of  the  drunken  man's  presence  in  the  car  or  of  the 
defendant's  attempt  to  remove  him.  We  are  perfectly  aware  of 
the  difficulty  of  discriminating.  But  it  seems  quite  possible  in 
this  case  that  the  plaintiff's  trouble  was  due  in  substance  to  the 
disturbance  as  a  whole,  although  it  may  be  that  the  jury  would 
be  warranted  in  finding  that  the  impact  upon  her  person  gave 
the  detonating  spark  without  which  she  would  not  have  col- 
lapsed. It  is  unnecessary  to  express  an  opinion  whether  the 
evidence  in  this  case  warranted  the  latter  feeling. 

We  may  add  a  word  with  reference  to  a  suggestion  made  on 
behalf  of  the  plaintiff,  and  having  some  bearing  u|>on  the  eighth 
instruction  asked  and  the  instructions  given.  It  is  argued  that, 
because  the  conductor  had  known  the  plaintiff  for  several  years, 
the  defendant's  obligations  to  her  were  increased,  if  the  jury 
believed  that  she  was  a  particularly  sensitive  person  and  that 


302  Spade  v.  Lynn  &  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  [Mass. 

the  conductor  must  have  known  it.  "We  regard  such  an  argu- 
ment even  to  the  jury  as  wholly  inadmissible.  Ordinary  street- 
cars must  be  run  with  reference  to  ordinary  susceptibilities,  and 
the  liability  oJ  their  proprietors  cannot  be  increased  simply  by 
a  passenger's  notifying  the  conductor  that  ho  has  unstable 
nerves.  In  this  case  it  will  be  left  to  the  jury  to  say  whether 
there  was  anything  that  called  for  special  attention  to  the  plain- 
tiff beyond  what  was  due  to  other  women.  Nothing  is  pointed 
out  to  us  as  a  basis  for  such  increased  obligation  except  the  con- 
ductor's acquaintance  with  the  plaintiff,  and  that  laid  no 
foundation  for  it.  We  should  add,  however,  to  avoid  being 
misunderstood  and  with  reference  to  the  plaintiff's  tenth  re- 
quest, that  if  the  defendant's  servant  did  commit  an  unjusti- 
fiable battery  on  the  plaintiff's  person,  the  defendant  must  an- 
swer for  the  actual  consequences  of  that  wrong  to  her  as  she 
was,  and  cannot  cut  down  her  damages  by  showing  that  the 
effect  would  have  been  less  upon  a  normal  person:  Braithwaite 
V.  Hall,  168  Mass.  38,  40.  The  measure  of  the  defendant's 
duty  in  determining  whether  a  wrong  has  been  committed  is 
one  thing,  the  measure  of  liability  when  a  wrong  has  been  com- 
mitted is  another. 
Exceptions  sustained. 

RAILROADS— EXPULSION  FROM  STREET-CARS-LIABII^ 
ITY  FOR  NEGLIGENT  EXECUTION  OF  LAWFUL  ACT.— An 
obnoxious  passenger  may  be  lawfully  expelled  from  a  street-car: 
Vinton  V.  Middlesex  R.  R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  304,  87  Am.  Dec.  714;  Le- 
mont  V.  Washington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Mackey,  180,  47  Am.  Rep.  238; 
but  a  railroad  company  is  answerable  where  its  employ^  performs 
an  act  incident  to  his  employment  so  unslcillfuUy,  negligently,  reck- 
lessly, or  wantonly,  as  to  injure  persons  who  are  without  fault: 
Toledo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon,  47  111.  298,  95  Am.  Dec.  489. 

DAMAGES  FOR  FRIGHT  OCCASIONED  BY  NEGLIGENCE. 
In  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  an  injury  sustained  through 
the  negligence  of  another,  there  can  be  no  recovery  for  a  bodily 
Injury  caused  by  mere  fright:  Spade  v.  Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  KiS 
Mass.  285,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  393.  If  there  is  no  immediate  personal 
injury  to  a  plaintiff  from  tlie  negligence  of  another,  she  cannot 
recover  for  injury  occasioned  by  her  fright  arising  from  the  negli- 
gent act,  though  in  consequence'  of  the  fright  she  became  uncon- 
scious, and  had  a  miscarriage:  Mitchell  v.  Rochester  Ry.  Co.,  151 
N.  Y.  107,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  GOt.  On  the  other  hand,  that  railroad 
companies  are  answerable  in  damages  for  mental  suffering  or  pliys- 
Ical  injury  arising  from  fright  caused  by  their  negligence,  see  Mack 
V.  South  Bound  R.  R.  Co.,  52  S.  C.  323,  08  Am.  St.  Rep.  913. 

ASSAULT  AND  BATTERY-UNINTENTIONAL  IN.IURY  TO 
THIRD  PERSON.— An  Intention  to  do  harm  is  of  the  essence  of 
assault,  hence  a  defendant  is  not  answerable  for  an  accidental  casu- 
alty, but,  if  he  Intends  to  harm  a  person  by  his  act,  and  uninten- 
tionally injures  a  third  person,  he  is  liable  for  an  assault  and  bat- 
tery: Peterson  v.  UaCfner,  59  Ind.  130,  20  Am.  Rep.  81,  and  note. 


Feb.  1899.]     Grafton  National  Bank  v.  Wing.  303 

Gbapton  National  Bank  v.  "Wing.     Geafton 
Savings  Bank  v.  Wing. 

[172  MA88ACHUSETTS,  513.] 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— WHAT  WORDS  DO  NOT 
BIND  ONE  AS  AN  INDORSER.— The  words,  "Estate  of  Jona.  D. 
Wheeler,  Henry  P.  Wing,  Executor,"  indorsed  on  a  promissory  note^ 
mean  "Estate  of  Wheeler  by  Wing,"  and  do  not  bind  Wing  by  con- 
tract. Wing's  estate  is  not,  therefore,  liable  upon  such  an  indorse^ 
ment 

Contract  upon  promissory  notes  made  by  the  Wheeler  Cotton, 
Mills.  Henry  F.  Wing,  the  defendant's  intestate,  was  the  treas- 
urer of  the  Wheeler  Cotton  Mills,  and  also  executor  of  Jonathan 
1).  Wheeler's  will.  The  plaintiff  in  each  case  had  received  a 
part  payment  under  a  compromise  agreement  with  the  Wheeler 
Cotton  lilills,  and  the  plaintiffs  sought  to  hold  Henry  F.  Wing's 
estate  on  the  ground  that  he  was  personally  liable.  The  notes 
were  again  given  in  renewal  of  former  notes,  similarly  indorsed, 
and  which  had  been  originally  indorsed  by  Jonathan  D. 
Wheeler,  in  his  lifetime.  The  defendant,  Oliver  M.  Wing,  re- 
quested the  judge  to  rule  that  the  actions  could  not  be  main- 
tained, but  he  refused  to  do  so  and  found  for  the  plaintiff  ia 
each  case.    The  defendant  alleged  exceptions. 

F.  P.  Goulding  and  W.  C.  Mellish,  for  the  plaintiffs. 

J.  B.  Scott  and  T.  H.  Gage,  Jr.,  for  the  defendant. 

^^^  HOLMES,  J.  These  are  two  actions  of  contract  against 
the  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Henry  F.  Wing,  seeking  to 
hold  him  upon  two  indorsements  made  by  Henry  F.  Wing  a» 
executor  of  the  will  of  Jonathan  D.  Wheeler.  The  indorse- 
ments were  in  the  following  form:  "Estate  of  Jona.  D.  Wheeler,. 
Henry  F.  Wing,  Executor." 

A  majority  of  the  court  are  of  opinion  that  these  words  mean 
'^Estate  of  Wheeler  by  Wing,"  and  therefore  that  at  least  they 
failed  to  bind  Wing  by  contract.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  law 
does  not  know  the  estate  of  a  dead  man  as  a  contractor,  and 
that,  unless  the  fact  that  these  indorsements  were  the  renewal 
of  indorsements  by  Wheeler  in  his  lifetime  makes  a  difference^ 
they  did  not  bind  the  estate.  But  that  merely  shows  that  the 
indorsements  were  made  by  Wing  under  a  mistake  of  law,  as  the 
testimony  also  proves  to  have  been  a  fact.     But  the  presence  of 


S04  Van  Norman  v.  Gordon.  [Mass. 

Wing's  name  upon  the  paper  and  his  failure  to  bind  his  sup- 
posed principal  are  not  enough  to  make  the  contract  his  own: 
Jefts  V.  York,  4  Cush.  371,  50  Am.  Dec.  791;  10  Gush.  392, 
395,  396;  Abbey  v.  Chase,  6  Cush.  54,  56,  57;  Taylor  v.  Shel- 
•ton,  30  Conn.  122.  If  a  man  does  not  purport  to  be  a  party 
to  negotiable  paper,  he  is  not  a  party  to  it :  See,  further,  1  Daniel 
on  Negotiable  Instruments,  4th  ed.,  sees.  30G-308;  Bartlett  v. 
Tucker,  104  Mass.  336,  6  Am.  Eep.  240.  It  is  true  that  it  is 
suggested  by  Mr.  Daniel  that  in  such  cases  an  ambiguous  ex- 
pression may  be  interpreted  to  bind  the  agent,  but  neither  that 
suggestion  nor  a  presumption  that  the  agent  knew  the  law  can 
pervert  words  from  their  meaning  if  the  meaning  is  plain.  The 
so-called  presumption  is  a  requirement,  not  a  presumption  of 
fact,  and  has  no  bearing  or  weight  upon  the  construction  of 
instruments. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  the  court  should  have  ruled  that  the 
defendant  was  not  liable. 

Exceptions  sustained. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS.— INDORSING  AS  AGENT  Is 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  that  the  indorser  will  not  be  personally 
liable:  Mott  v.  Hicks,  1  Cow.  513.  13  Am.  Dec.  550. 


Van  Norman  v.  Gordon. 

[172  Massachusetts,  576.] 

JUDGMENT,  THOUGH  CONFESSED  UNDER  WARRANT 
OF  ATTORNEY,  IS  ENTITLED  TO  "FAITH  AND  CREDIT"  IN 
ANOTHER  STATE.— A  judgment  of  a  court  of  one  state  Is  entitled 
to  full  faith  and  credit  In  other  states  where  the  court  which  ren- 
dered It  had  jurisdiction  to  render  such  a  judgment.  If  it  had, 
then  the  fact  that  It  is  a  juQgment  by  confession,  under  a  warrant 
■of  attorney,  Is  Immaterial.  Such  judgments,  when  rendered  by 
courts  having  jurisdiction  of  the  cause  and  the  parties,  have  all  the 
qualities,  Incidents,  and  attributes  of  other  judgments. 

COURTS -TRESUMPTION  AS  TO  JURISDICTION.-A 
county  court,  with  a  clerk  and  seal,  is  a  court  of  record.  Hence,  If 
it  enters  a  Judgment  upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 
ment, upon  which  an  action  is  brought  in  another  state,  such  court 
■will  there  be  presumed  to  have  been  a  court  of  general  Jurisdiction. 

JUDGMENT  OF  SISTER  STATE— ACTION  UrON— PRE- 
•SUMPTIONS.— In  an  action  upon  a  judgment  of  a  sister  state,  en- 
tered upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  the  pre- 
sumption is,  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  enter  It,  and  that  the 
proceedings  were  regular  and  according  to  the  laws  of  that  state. 

JUDGMENT  CONFESSED  UNDER  WARRANT  OF  AT- 
TORNEY-ILLUSTRATION—"FAITH    AND     CREDIT"    IN    AN- 


May,  1899.]  Van  Nobman  v.  Gordon.  806 

OTHER  STATE.— If  a  person  signs  a  promissory  note,  executing, 
at  the  same  time,  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  Judgment,  and  a 
judgment  of  a  court  of  record  in  an  action  upon  the  note  Is  entered, 
under  such  warrant  by  the  confession  of  an  attorney  of  such  court, 
who  was  requested  to  appear  by  the  attorney  named  In  the  war- 
rant, such  Judgment  Is  entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit  in  another 
st;ite,  if  an  action  Is  brought  upon  It,  though  such  appearance  In  the 
former  state  was  really  in  the  plaintiflf's  Interest,  where  there  is  no 
charge  of  fraud,  no  appearance  of  Irregularity,  and  what  was  done 
in  confessing  judgment  came  within  the  terms  of  the  warrant  of  at- 
torney. 

Contract  upon  a  judgment  rendered  by  a  county  court  of  the 
state  of  Wisconsin.  The  action  was  brought  by  the  plaintiff. 
Van  Norman,  against  the  defendant,  Gordon.  The  plaintiff 
had  recovered  a  judgment  against  the  defendant,  in  Wisconsin, 
upon  a  promissory  note.  At  the  time  that  the  defendant  made 
the  note,  he  executed  a  warrant  of  attorney  in  which  he  ap- 
pointed E.  H.  Bottum,  "or  any  attorney  of  any  court  of  record,'* 
his  attorney  to  waive  service  of  process  and  confess  judgment 
in  favor  of  Van  Norman  upon  the  note.  Annexed  to  the 
declaration  in  this  case  was  a  copy  of  the  record  of  the  court  in 
which  the  judgment  was  entered, which  set  out  the  "complaint," 
reciting  the  making  and  delivery  of  the  note,  and  demanding 
judgment  for  the  amount  due,  by  "Winkler,  Flanders,  Smith, 
Bottum,  and  Vilas,  plaintiff's  attorneys."  The  answer  showed 
that  Ogden  &  Hunter,  defendant's  attorneys,  appeared,  waived 
service,  and  confessed  judgment  for  the  defendant.  An  execu- 
tion was  returned  unsatisfied,  and  the  papers  were  authenticated 
by  the  clerk  of  the  court,  with  the  seal  affixed.  In  Massachu- 
setts, the  superior  court  rendered  a  judgment  for  the  defend- 
ant, and,  on  appeal,  it  was  agreed  that  the  defendant  signed 
the  note,  on  which  suit  was  brought,  in  Wisconsin;  that  he 
also  signed  the  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  on 
which  judgment  was  confessed,  in  Wisconsin;  that  at  the  time 
he  signed  the  note  and  warrant  of  attorney,  he  was  in  and  was 
a  resident  of  that  state;  that  no  personal  service  was  made  on 
the  defendant  in  the  Wisconsin  suit;  that  the  defendant  never 
authorized  Ogden  and  Hunter  to  appear  or  act  for  him  in  the 
suit  except  as  they  may  have  been  authorized  so  to  do  by  the 
warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment;  that  the  judgment 
was  entered  as  set  forth  in  the  declaration  and  the  record  there- 
to annexed,  and  had  never  been  vacated  or  satisfied  in  any  part; 
and  that  the  said  Ogden  and  Hunter  were  attorneys  of  a  court 
of  record. 

AM.  ST.  Rbp..  You  LXX.-aO 


806  Van  Norman  v.  Gordon.  [Ma8». 

C.  H.  Sprague,  for  the  plaintiff. 
G.  B.  Upham,  for  the  defendant. 

«78  MORTON,  J.  The  question  is,  whether  the  judgment 
which  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  enforce  is  entitled  to  full  faith  and 
credit.  The  answer  depends  on  whether  the  court  which  ren- 
dered it  had  jurisdiction  to  render  such  a  judgment:  Board  of 
Puhlic  Works  v.  Columbia  College,  17  Wall.  521.  If  it  had, 
then  the  fact  that  it  is  a  judgment  by  confession  under  a  war- 
rant of  attorney  is  immaterial.  Such  judgments,  when  ren- 
dered by  courts  having  jurisdiction  of  the  cause  and  the  parties^ 
have  all  the  qualities,  incidents,  and  attributes  of  other  judg- 
ments: Teel  V.  Yost,  128  N.  Y.  387;  see  Henry  v.  Estes,  127 
Mass.  474. 

It  does  not  appear  from  the  facts  that  are  agreed  whether  the 
laws  of  Wisconsin  in  force  at  the  time  authorized  the  entry  of 
'^''*  judgments  pursuant  to  powers  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 
ment, or  if  so,  under  what  circumstances,  or  whether  the  court 
which  rendered  the  judgment  was  a  court  of  record  or  of  general 
jurisdiction,  or,  if  that  is  material,  whether  the  defendant  was  a 
resident  of  Wisconsin  when  the  judgment  was  rendered  and  the 
proceedings  were  instituted.  No  objection  has  been  made,  how- 
ever, in  respect  to  these -matters,  and  the  copy  of  the  record^ 
which  has  been  submitted  to  us,  shows  that  the  court  was  a 
county  court,  with  a  clerk  and  seal,  and  was  therefore  a  court 
of  record,  and  may  be  presumed  to  have  been  a  court  of  general 
jurisdiction:  Knapp  v.  Abell,  10  Allen,  485,  489;  Pringle  v» 
Woolworth,  90  N.  Y.  502. 

And  in  view  of  the  further  considerations  that  every  pre- 
sumption is  to  be  made  in  favor  of  the  regularity  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, that  it  is  not  now  contended  that  the  court  had  not  jur- 
isdiction to  enter  judgment  pursuant  to  a  warrant  of  attorney 
to  confess  judgment,  and  that  such  proceedings  are  well  known 
at  common  law  and  in  many  states,  we  think  that  it  may  also  be 
presumed  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  enter  judgment 
upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  and  that  the 
proceedings  were  regular,  and  according  to  the  laws  of  Wiscon- 
sin: McMahon  v.  Eagle  Life  Assn.,  169  Mass.  539,  61  Am.  St. 
Rep.  306,  and  cases  cited;  Wright  v.  Andrews,  130  Mass.  149; 
Stockwell  V.  McCracken,  109  Mass.  84;  Bissell  v.  Wheelock,  11 
Gush.  277;  Galpin  v.  Page,  18  Wall.  350. 

The   attorneys  who   appeared  and  acted  for  the   defendant 


May,  1899.]  Van  Norman  v.  Gordon.  307 

never  were  authorized  to  appear  for  him  and  confess  judgment, 
except  as  they  were  authorized  to  do  so  by  the  warrant  of  at- 
torney. It  is  agreed  that  they  were  attorneys  of  a  court  of 
record — in  Wisconsin,  we  assume.  We  assume  also  that  they 
were  requested  to  appear  by  the  attorney  named  in  the  warrant, 
or  his  firm,  and  that  their  appearance  was  really  in  the  plain- 
tiff's  interest.  That  naturally  would  be  so,  and  must  have  been 
expected  when  the  power  of  attorney  was  given.  There  is  no 
charge  of  fraud,  or  that  judgment  was  entered  for  more  than 
was  due,  or  before  the  note  was  due,  which  would  have  been 
contrary  to  the  power  of  attorney.  The  record  shows  that 
judgment  was  not  entered  till  seventeen  or  eighteen  months 
after  the  note  was  due.  The  note  and  warrant  of  attorney  were 
****^  both  signed  in  Wisconsin,  where  the  defendant,  and,  as  we 
infer,  the  plaintiff  resided  at  the  time,  and  the  note  was  payable 
in  Wisconsin,  where  the  plaintiff  has  his  place  of  business,  if 
not  his  home. 

What  waa  done  in  confessing  judgment  came  within  the  terms 
of  the  warrant  of  attorney.  Unless,  therefore,  the  warrant  of 
attorney  purported  to  give  an  authority  which  it  did  not,  or 
was  for  some  reason  invalid,  we  see  no  ground  on  which  the 
judgment  can  be  called  in  question.  Assuming  that  we  could 
refuse  full  faith  to  the  judgment  if  we  thought  that  there  was 
an  error  of  law  in  it  (see  contra,  Laing  v.  Eigney,  160  U.  S.  531, 
Carpenter  v.  Strange,  141  U.  S.  87,  and  Eichards  v.  Barlow,  140 
Mass.  218),  we  find  nothing  which  would  justify  such  a  conclu- 
sion. The  warrant  well  might  be  held  valid  in  Wisconsin, 
though  adjudged  invalid  in  another  state.  According  to  Mr. 
Dicey  and  Mr.  Freeman,  however,  a  warrant  of  attorney  may  be 
60  drawn  as  to  authorize  a  confession  of  judgment  in  a  foreign 
state:  Dicey  on  Conflict  of  Laws,  377;  Freeman  on  Judgments, 
sec,  545. 

Lord  Blackburn  went  so  far  in  one  case  as  to  suggest  that: 
**If  at  the  time  when  the  obligation  was  contracted  the  defend- 
ants were  within  the  foreign  country,  but  left  it  before  the  suit 
was  instituted,  we  should  be  inclined  to  think  the  laws  of  that 
country  bound  them":  Schibsby  v.  Westenholz,  L.  E.  6  Q.  B, 
155,  161,  He  was  overruled,  however,  in  Sirdar  Gurdyal  Singh 
V.  Eajah  of  Faridkote  (1894),  App.  Cas.  670,  685,  686, 

In  Eichards  v.  Barlow,  140*Mas8.  218,  no  objection  seems  to 
have  been  taken  because  the  warrant  authorized  an  appearance 
'Tdv  any  attorney  of  any  court  of  record";  See,  also,  First.  'N'at. 
Bank  v.  Garland,  109  Mich.  615,  63  Am,  St.  Rep.  597;  Teel  v. 


308  Van  Norman  v.  Gordon.  [Mass. 

Yost,  128  N.  Y.  387.  And  in  Pirie  v.  Stem,  97  Wis.  150,  65 
Am.  St.  Eep.  103,  it  was  held  that  a  power  authorizing  a  con- 
fession of  judgment  "in  any  court  of  record"  could  be  executed 
in  any  state  in  the  Union,  disapproving,  as  does  also  the  court 
in  Michigan  in  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Garland,  109  Mich.  515,  63 
Am.  St.  Rep.  597,  the  cases  in  Ohio  and  Tennessee  on  which 
the  defendant  relies.  In  Blanck  v.  Medley,  63  111.  App.  211, 
it  was  held  that  a  warrant  of  attorney  authorizing  "any  attorney 
of  any  court  of  record"  to  confess  judgment  could  be  executed 
by  an  attorney  in  partnership  with  the  attorney  who  signed 
the  declaration  for  the  holder  of  the  note:  See,  also,  Mikeska 
V.  Blum,  63  Tex.  4-4. 

681  -^g  think,  therefore,  that  the  judgment  must  be  regarded 
as  rendered  by  consent  of  the  defendant,  that  it  was  such  a 
judgment  as  the  court  which  rendered  it  had  jurisdiction  to 
render,  and  that  it  is  entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit. 

Judgment  for  the  plaintiff. 

JUDGMENT  BY  CONFESSION— WARRANT  OF  ATTORNEY- 
"FAITH  AND  CREDIT."— A  judgment  on  a  promissory  note,  en- 
tered in  one  state  by  confession  under  a  warrant  of  attorney,  is 
valid  in  a  sister  state:  Kitchen  v.  Belief ontaine  Nat.  Bank,  53  Kan. 
242,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  282;  note  to  Pirie  v.  Stern,  65  Am.  St.  Rep. 
106.  Under  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  judgment 
of  a  sister  state  must  be  accorded  in  this  state  the  same  "faith  and 
credit"  which  it  has  in  the  state  where  it  was  rendered:  Crumlish 
V.  Central  Imp.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  390,  4o  Am.  St.  Rep.  872.  That  there 
may  be  a  confession  of  judgment  in  one  state  upon  a  power  of  at- 
torney executed  in  another,  see  Pirie  v.  Stern,  97  Wis.  150,  65  Am. 
St.  Rep.  103. 

JUDGMENTS  OF  SISTER  STATES— PRESUMPTION  OF  JUR- 
ISDICTION.—In  the  absence  of  contradictory  evidence  there  is  a 
legal  presumption  in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  of  record 
of  another  state  which  has  assumed  jurisdiction  over  the  subject 
matter  in  controversy  between  parties  residing  there:  Note  to  Kelley 
V.  Kelley,  42  Am.  St  Rep.  398. 


CASES 

IN  THB 


SUPREME  COURT 

.MINNESOTA. 


Dorr  v.  Life  Insurance  Clearing  Company. 

[71  Minnesota,  38.] 

CORPORATIONS— STATUTORY  LIEN  ON  STOCK.— When, 
by  general  law,  a  lien  Is  given  to  a  corporation  upon  the  stocli  of 
a  stockholder  in  the  corporation  for  his  indebtedness  to  It,  that 
lien  is  valid  and  enforceable  against  all  the  world,  unless  it  has 
been  waived,  surrendered,  or  lost  in  some  sufficient  manner. 

CORPORATIONS— ASSIGNMENT  OF  STOCK— EFFECT 
ON  LIEN  OF  THE  CORPORATION.— An  assignment  or  sale  of  cor- 
poration stock,  to  a  person  ignorant  of  a  statutory  lien  thereon  held 
by  the  corporation,  will  not  discharge  the  lien. 

CORPORATIONS— NOTICE— KNOWLEDGE  OF  PRESI- 
DENT.—A  corporation  cannot  be  charged  with  the  knowledge  of 
its  president,  when  such  knowledge  was  obtained  before  he  be- 
came president,  or  when  he  is  acting  In  his  own  interest  and  behalf. 

William  G.  White,  for  the  appellant. 

Munn  &  Thygeson,  for  the  respondent, 

^  COLLINS,  J.  This  was  an  action  to  establish  a  lien 
claimed  by  plaintiff  upon  twenty-nine  shares  of  defendant's 
capital  stock,  the  certificates  therefor  having  been  executed, 
issued,  and  delivered  to  one  Eussell  R.  Dorr  as  an  original 
subscriber  for  stock  shares  in  defendant  corporation.  It  was 
plaintiff's  claim  that  Dorr  had  pledged  these  stock  shares  to  her 
to  secure  an  indebtedness  for  money  borrowed  with  which  to 
pay  for  them  when  issued.  The  defendant  corporation  as- 
serted a  lien  upon  the  shares,  alleged  to  be  superior  and  para- 
mount, for  and  on  account  of  an  indebtedness  due  to  it  from 
Dorr  arising  out  of  his  failure  to  pay  for  his  stock  shares.  The 
cause  was  tried  below  with  that  of  St.  Paul  Nat.  Bank  v.  Life 

(809) 


310  DoRE  V.  Life  Ins.  Cleartno  Co.  [Minn. 

Ins.  etc.  Co.,  71  Minn.  123,  in  which  the  same  kind  of  relief 
was  demanded,  and  is  closely  connected  with  it,  althoupjh  the 
facts  here  are  much  less  complicated. 

From  the  findings  it  appears  that,  prior  to  the  incorporation 
of  defendant.  Dorr  borrowed  three  thousand  dollars  of  plaintiff 
for  the  purpose  of  paying  for  stock  shares  then  subscribed  for, 
agreeing  to  secure  the  loan  by  pledging  the  shares  so  paid  for 
as  collateral  security.  After  the  incorporation  he  made  an 
arrangement  with  the  defendant  by  which  it  agreed  to  accept 
his  notes,  secured  by  real  estate  mortgages,  in  part  or  in  full 
payment  for  these  and  other  stock  shares,  but,  to  evade  the 
statutory  regulation  requiring  payment  in  cash,  defendant,  by 
its  board  of  directors,  voted  a  nominal  loan  to  Dorr  for  the 
amount  of  his  notes.  This  part  of  the  transaction  was  in  form, 
but  not  in  fact,  a  loan  to  Dorr.  Defendant  then  accepted  the 
notes  and  mortgages  and  issued  and  delivered  to  Dorr  the  certif- 
icates, three  in  number,  representing  the  twenty-nine  shares 
of  stock,  and  he,  in  accordance  with  his  agreement  with  plain- 
tiff, assigned  and  delivered  the  same  to  her  as  collateral  security. 

Until  shortly  prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  action,  de- 
fendant corporation  had  no  notice  or  knowledge  of  this  trans- 
action between  plaintiff  and  Dorr,  Later,  under  some  arrange- 
ment for  reducing  defendant's  capital  stock,  Dorr  returned  these 
tliree  certificates  for  surrender  and  cancellation.  In  lieu  there- 
of another  ■***  certificate  for  a  less  number  of  shares  was  exe- 
cuted by  defendant  to  Dorr,  and  issued  and  delivered  to  one 
William  E.  Dorr,  acting  as  agent  for  plaintiff  and  Eussell  E. 
Dorr.  This  certificate  was  accepted  in  lieu  of  the  others.  At 
the  time  of  this  transaction  defendant  had  no  notice  or  know- 
ledge of  plaintiff's  interest  in  these  stock  shares,  or  that  the 
same  had  been  assigned  to  her,  or  that  Wiliam  E.  Dorr  was  act- 
ing as  her  agent  in  the  matter.  Dorr  defaulted  in  the  pay- 
ment of  his  notes  secured  by  the  mortgages,  and  this  action  was 
the  immediate  result  of  defendant's  attempt  to  foreclose  its 
alleged  lien  by  a  sale  of  the  stock  shares  at  public  auction. 

Four  points  are  made  in  the  brief  of  counsel  for  plaintiff 
(appellant):  1.  That  the  stock  in  question  was  "full  paid,"  what- 
ever that  may  mean;  2.  That  as  between  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant the  latter  had  allowed  the  former  to  believe  that  the  stock 
shares  were  fully  paid  for,  and  is  now  estopped  from  asserting 
a  claim  that  they  were  not;  3.  That,  if  defendant  ever  had  any 
lien  upon  these  stock  shares,  it  has  been  waived  as  to  plaintiff; 


Jan.  1898.]       Dobb  v.  Life  Ins.  Clearing  Co.  311 

and  4.  That  as  Dorr,  who  became  president  of  defendant  cor- 
poration at  its  organization,  had  knowledge  of  the  entire  affair 
with  plaintiff,  his  knowledge  must  be  imputed  to  defendant, 
and  the  findings  in  respect  to  its  want  of  notice  or  knowledge 
until  just  prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  action  were  there- 
fore unsupported  by  the  evidence. 

We  need  not  take  up  these  points  in  detail.  The  General 
Statutes  of  1894,  section  2799,  provides  that  the  stock  of  a  cor- 
poration of  this  character  shall  be  transferable  only  on  the  books 
of  the  corporation  in  such  form  as  the  directors  prescribe,  and 
that  the  "corporation  shall  at  all  times  have  a  lien  upon  the 
stock  or  property  of  its  members  invested  therein,  for  all  the 
debts  due  from  them  to  such  corporation,  which  may  be  en- 
forced" by  sale. 

There  was  no  controversy  over  the  fact  that  Dorr  had  not 
paid  his  notes,  and,  with  this  admitted,  it  is  obvious  that  he 
was  indebted  to  the  defendant,  for  which  indebtedness  it  had 
the  right  to  enforce  the  statutory  lien.  The  statute  is  notice 
to  everyone  of  the  right  of  a  corporation  to  a  superior  and 
paramount  lien  on  stock  shares  for  the  indebtedness  of  a.  stock- 
holder. Its  operation  ^*  is  very  comprehensive.  The  assignee 
or  pledgee  of  the  stock  takes  it  subject  to  the  statutory  right 
of  the  corporation.  He  cannot  acquire  any  greater  rights  than 
had  the  stockholder  himself. 

When,  by  general  law,  a  lien  is  given  to  a  corporation  upon 
the  stock  of  a  stockholder  in  the  corporation  for  his  indebtedness 
to  it,  that  lien  is  valid  and  enforceable  against  all  the  world, 
unless  it  has  been  waived,  surrendered,  or  lost  in  some  sufficient 
manner.  An  assignment  or  sale  of  the  stock  to  a  person  ig- 
norant of  the  lien  will  not  discharge  it.  The  authorities  seem 
to  be  uniform  upon  this  subject:  Cook  on  Stock  and  Stock- 
holders, sec.  532;  23  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  695,  and  cases 
cited  in  notes.  See,  also  Schmidt  v.  Hennepin  etc.  Co.,  35 
Minn.  511. 

There  was  no  waiver,  or  surrender,  or  loss  of  this  lien  shown 
in  this  case.  The  findings  as  to  defendant's  want  or  lack  of 
notice  or  knowledge  of  the  transaction  between  plaintiff  and 
Dorr  were  fully  sustained  by  the  evidence,  and,  with  these 
findings  unassailable,  there  is  nothing  left  of  the  contention 
of  counsel  as  to  the  remaining  points. 

Even  if  it  should  be  held  that  notice  or  knowledge  of  the 
transaction  between  Dorr  and  plaintiff,  whereby  he  secured  the 


312  Merrill  v.  Security  Trust  Co.  [Minn. 

loan  upon  a  promise  to  pledge  the  stock  shares  subscribed  as 
collateral,  could  be  material  or  effectual  as  to  defendant  cor- 
poration, there  are  two  good  reasons  why  such  notice  or  know- 
ledge cannot  be  imputed  to  it:  1.  When  the  loan  was  made  and 
the  money  obtained.  Dorr  was  not  its  president,  for  it  had  not 
then  been  organized;  2.  Had  he  been  president  at  the  time,  he 
was  acting  in  his  own  interest  and  behalf.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  defendant  corporation  could  not  be  charged 
with  the  knowledg'e  of  its  presiding  officer:  Bang  v,  Brett,  62" 
Minn,  4. 

Order  aflSrmed. 


CORPORATIONS  —  LIEN  ON  STOCK  —  ASSIGNMENT  Ta 
THIRD  PARTY.— If  a  lien  on  stock  is  given  by  statute  for  indebt- 
edness to  ttie  corporation,  owing  by  a  stocliliolder,  a  transfer  of  the 
stock;  to  a  person  ignorant  of  the  lien  does  not  discharge  it,  nor 
authorize  the  purchaser  to  demand  and  receive  a  transfer  of  it  so 
discharged:  See  monographic  note  to  Victor  G.  Bloede  Co.  v. 
Bloede,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  394.  A  lien  merely  created  by  a  by-law  is 
void  as  against  an  innocent  holder  for  value:  Bank  of  Atchison 
County  V.  Durfee,  118  Mo.  431,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  396. 

CORPORATIONS— NOTICE  TO  PRESIDENT.— Notice  to  the 
president  of  a  corporation  is  not  notice  to  the  corporation,  where 
the  president  is  acting  in  his  own  interests  and  against  those  of 
the  corporation:  Seaverns  v.  Presbyterian  Hospital,  173  111.  414,  &i 
Am.  St.  Rep.  125,  and  note;  Franklin  Min.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  22  Colo. 
129,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  118,  and  note.  See  Bank  v.  Sneed,  07  Tenn^ 
120,  56  Am.  St  Bep.  788. 


Merrill  ?;.  Security  Trust  Company. 

[71  Minnesota,  6].] 

DOWER— ASSIGNMENT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  CREDITORS. 
Where  a  married  man  executes,  under  the  insolvent  law,  an  as- 
signment of  all  his  nonexempt  property  for  the  benefit  of  credit- 
ors (his  wife  not  joining),  the  assignee's  title  to  the  real  estate 
assigned  Is  not  subject  to  the  wife's  inchoate  right. 

DOWER,  STATUTORY— WHEN  SUBJECT  TO  PAYMENT 
OF  HUSBAND'S  DEBTS.— In  Minnesota,  the  widow's  statutory 
one-third  In  the  real  estate  of  her  husband  is  "subject.  In  Its  just 
proportion  with  the  other  real  estate,  to  the  payment  of  such  debts 
of  the  deceased  as  are  not  paid  from  the  personal  estate." 

Edmund  S.  Durment,  for  the  appellant. 

M.  L.  Countryman,  for  the  respondent. 

«»  MITCHELL,  J.     In  1893  D.  D.  Merrill  (a  married  man),, 
being  insolvent,  executed  to  the  defendant  pursuant  to  the  in-^ 


Jan.  1898.]       Merrill  v.  Security  Trust  Co.  815 

solvent  law  of  1881  (Gen.  Stats.  1894,  sees.  4240-4252)  an  as- 
signment of  all  his  nonexempt  property  for  the  benefit  of  his 
creditors.  Included  in  the  assigned  property  was  a  large  amount 
of  real  estate,  which  the  defendant  still  holds  for  the  purpose* 
of  the  trust.  Mrs.  Merrill  did  not  join  with  her  husband  in  the 
execution  of  the  assignment.  Merrill  died  in  1896,  and  the 
plaintiff,  his  widow,  brings  this  action  against  the  defendant 
for  a  partition  of  the  real  estate,  claiming  that,  under  the 
statute,  she  is  now  the  absolute  owner  of  one  undivided  third 
of  it,  free  from  the  payment  of  any  part  of  the  debts  of  her 
deceased  husband.  Aside  from  certain  question  of  practice, 
not  necessary  to  be  considered,  the  only  question  presented  by 
this  appeal  is  whether  this  claim  on  part  of  the  widow  is  correct. 

Owing  to  their  early  professional  education,  lawyers  may  be 
liable  to  enter  upon  the  consideration  of  this  question  with 
certain  preconceived  impressions,  derived  from  the  doctrines 
relating  to  common-law  dower  (which  was  not  subject  to  the 
payment  of  the  husband's  debts),  and  to  fail  to  give  due  weight 
to  the  fact  that  with  us  the  widow's  statutory  one-third  in  the 
real  estate  of  her  husband  is  "subject,  in  its  just  proportion  with 
the  other  real  estate,  to  the  payment  of  such  debts  of  the  de- 
ceased as  are  not  paid  from  the  personal  estate." 

Some  things  which  this  court  has  said,  if  not  decided,  will 
show  that  our  minds  have  not  always  been  entirely  free  from 
these  preconceived  impressions.  In  view  of  the  plain  provi- 
sions of  the  statute  **  there  can  be  no  question  that,  when 
the  husband's  estate  is  administered  in  the  probate  court,  the 
widow's  third  in  his  real  estate  is  subject  to  the  payment  of 
its  just  proportion  of  his  debts.  Sales  of  real  estate  by  the 
personal  representative  for  the  payment  of  debts  are  not  sub- 
ject to  the  widovsr*  right,  but  convey  a  complete  title.  All  that 
the  widow  gets  in  such  a  case  is  a  third  of  the  real  estate  which 
is  left  after  the  debts  are  paid. 

Every  reason  for  this  applies  with  equal  or  greater  force 
where  the  husband's  entire  nonexempt  estate  is  administered 
by  the  district  court  in  bankruptcy.  In  the  latter  case,  al- 
though not  physically  dead,  he  is  financially  so.  If,  after  his 
discharge,  he  acquires  property,  it  is  by  virtue  of  what  may  be 
termed  a  "new  financial  birth,"  as  of  the  date  of  his  discharge. 
In  bankruptcy,  as  in  probate,  his  entire  nonexempt  estate  is 
in  court  for  purposes  of  administration  and  distribution;  and 
in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other  all  his  creditors  are  or  may 
become  parties  to  the  proceedings.     The  insolvent  law  contains 


314  Meerill  v.  Security  Trust  Co.  [Minn. 

no  provision  that  the  assignment  by  the  husband  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  the  wife's  inchoate  right  in  his  real  estate;  and,  in  our 
opinion,  the  provisions  of  statute  requiring  the  wife's  assent  in 
writing  to  conveyances  by  the  husband,  in  order  to  bar  her 
inchoate  interest  in  the  property  conveyed,  have  no  application 
to  a  general  assignment  under  the  insolvency  law  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors.  It  would  result  in  an  anomalous  state  of  things 
if  the  wife  is  held  to  have  greater  rights  when  her  husband's 
€sta)te  is  administered  in  bankruptcy  than  when  it  is  adminis- 
tered in  probate. 

Take  the  present  case  for  example.  If  plaintiff's  contention  is 
correct,  she  is  entitled  to  an  absolute  one-third  of  her  husband's 
estate,  regardless  of  the  amount  of  his  debts;  and  yet,  if  he  had 
happened  to  die  without  making  this  assignment,  and  the.  estate 
had  been  administered  by  the  probate  court,  she  would,  in  all 
probability,  hare  been  entitled  to  nothing  except  the  homestead, 
if  there  was  one.  Any  such  rule  would  be  attended  with  grave 
practical  evils,  and  would  tend  to  defeat  to  a  great  extent  the 
purposes  of  the  insolvency  law.  It  is  a  well  known  fact  that 
property  sold  subject  to  the  wife's  inchoate  interest  will  not 
usually  bring  anything  like  its  full  value.  The  result  would 
be  that  the  land  would  be  disposed  ^^  of  without  either  debtor 
or  creditors  getting  the  benefit  of  its  full  value,  and  that,  too, 
without  the  wife  deriving  anything  but  a  very  remtdte  and 
contingent  advantage  from  the  sacrifice  of  the  property. 

"We  are  referred  to  Dayton  v.  Corser,  51  Minn.  406,  as  being 
in  conflict  with  these  views.  In  that  case  we  held  that  the 
sale  of  the  land  of  one  spouse,  on  execution  founded  upon  a 
judgment  against  the  owner,  did  not  divest  the  inchoate  interest 
of  the  other  spouse.  "Whatever  might  be  said  of  the  decision 
if  the  question  was  res  Integra,  we  are  not  disposed  to  overrule 
or  modify  it.  But  that  case  and  the  present  one  are  not  at  all 
analogous.  In  the  case  of  sale  on  execution,  the  estate  of  the 
debtor  is  not  in  court  for  administration.  No  property  is  af- 
fected except  the  particular  tract  or  tracts  sold.  Neither  are 
his  creditors  'n  court  or  parties  to  the  proceeding.  There  is  no 
way  of  determining  who  his  creditors  are,  or  how  much  his  debts 
amount  to.  Hence  there  is  no  way  by  which  it  can  be  deter- 
mined what  would  be  the  just  proportion  of  his  debts  to  which 
the  wife's  inchoate  interest  in  the  particular  tract  should  be 
subjected. 

Goodwin  v.  Kumm,  43  "Minn.  403,  is  also  relied  on  by  plain- 
tiff's counsel.     That  case  was  rightly  decided  on  the  ground 


Jan.  1898.]  Wolfobd  v.  Cook.  815 

that  the  husband  oanno-t,  hy  his  convenants  of  title  against  the 
inchoate  interest  of  his  wife  in  the  deed  of  conveyance,  create 
by  their  breach  a  debt  which  will  indirectly  hare  the  effect  of 
devesting  the  wife's  inchoate  interest  in  the  property  conveyed. 
If  the  opinion  had  put  the  decision  of  the  case  on  that  ground 
alone,  it  would  have  been  entirely  sound;  but  it  proceeded  obiter 
to  announce  certain  other  propositions,  some  of  which  are  prob- 
ably incorrect. 

The  order  overruling  the  demurrer  is  reversed. 


DOWER-NOT  LIABLE  FOR  HUSBAND'S  DEBTS  AT  COM- 
MON LAW— STATUTORY  CHANGES.— A  sale  made  by  an  admin- 
trator  under  an  order  of  court  of  his  Intestate's  lands  to  pay  or- 
dinary unsecured  debts  proved  against  his  estate  does  not  bar  tho 
widow  of  the  Intestate  from  dower:  Motley  v.  Motley,  53  Neb.  375, 
€8  Am.  St.  Rep.  G08.  Dower,  provided  by  law  in  behalf  of  the 
widow,  Is  paramount  to  all  conveyances,  contracts,  encumbrances, 
debts,  or  liabiltles  of  the  husband  executed  or  incurred  by  him  dur- 
ing coverture:  Higginbotham  v.  Cornwell,  8  Gratt.  83,  56  Am.  Dec. 
130;  Combs  v.  Young,  4  Terg.  218,  26  Am.  Dec.  225.  In  some  states 
the  common-law  rule  has  been  changed.  For  example.  In  North 
Carolina,  the  sale  of  land  under  execution  divests  the  defendant's 
estate,  and  bars  the  dower  of  his  wife,  though  the  deed  be  not  exe- 
cuted until  after  the  assignment  of  the  dower:  Den  v.  Frew,  3  Dev. 
8,  22  Am.  Dec.  708,  and  note  thereto. 


WoLFOED  V.  Cook, 

171  Minnesota,  77.  ] 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS.— PART  PAYMENT  OF  A 
DEBT,  In  order  to  take  a  case  out  of  the  statute,  must  be  made 
voluntarily  by  the  debtor  sought  to  be  charged  with  the  effect  of  it, 
or  by  some  one  authorized  by  hira  to  make  a  new  promise  on  his 
behalf. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS-PART  PAYMENT— CREDI- 
TOR AS  AGENT  OF  DEBTOR.— A  creditor  cannot  be  made  the 
agent  of  the  debtor  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  an  act  done  by  him 
operate  as  a  new  promise  to  himself. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT-PRO- 
CEEDS OF  COLLATERAL  SECURITIES.— Whore  collateral  secu- 
rity has  been  given  by  a  debtor  to  his  creditor,  under  an  agreement 
that,  if  necessary,  the  creditor  sliould  sell  the  collateral  and  apiJy 
the  proceeds  on  liis  debt,  the  subsequent  sale  of  such  collateral  ar.d 
the  application  of  the  proceeds  on  the  debt,  to  which  the  debtor 
made  no  objection,  will  not  operate  as  a  part  payment  at  the  date 
of  the  receipt  of  such  proceeds,  so  as  to  interrupt  the  operation  of 
the  statute  of  litnitatlons. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT— GIVING 
ADDITIONAL  SECURITY.— If  a  debtor,  in  the  absence  of  any 
circumstiinccs  tending  to  rebut  the  inference  of  an  implied  prom- 
ise to  pay  the  whole  debt,  gives  new  and  additional  security  fop 


316  WoLFORD  V.  Cook.  [Minn. 

tlie  payment  of  the  debt,  the  proceeds  of  which  when  collected  ta 
be  applied  on  the  debt,  it  will  operate  as  a  part  payment  suflacient 
to  take  it  out  of  the  statute. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS-PART  PAYMENT-PAY- 
MENT IN  GOODS.— It  is  not  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  inter- 
nipting  the  statute,  that  the  part  payment  should  be  in  actual 
money.    A  payment  in  goods  may  be  sufficient  for  that  purpose. 

Armstrong  Taylor,  for  the  appellants. 

Jacob  H.  Cook  and  Welch,  Hayne  &  Hubachek.  for  the  res- 
pondent. 

'■**  MITCHELL,  J.  This  action  was  brought  in  February, 
1897,  by  the  legatees  under  the  will  of  Peter  Wolford,  deceased, 
to  recover  a  balance  claimed  to  be  due  on  a  promissory  note 
dated  March  9,  1889,  and  payable  seven  months  after  date.  It 
is  conceded  that  the  note  was  ban-ed  by  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions, unless  the  running  of  the  statute  had  been  interrupted 
by  partial  payments.  The  plaintiffs  rely  upon  two  alleged  pay- 
ments as  having  that  effect.     These  we  will  consider  separately. 

1.  Contemporaneously  with  the  execution  of  the  note  in  suit, 
and  as  part  of  the  same  transaction,  the  defendant  assigned  to 
Peter  Wolford  and  the  plaintiffs,  as  collateral  security,  certain 
notes  and  mortgages  against  third  parties  under  an  agreement 
that,  if  Wolford  or  the  plaintiffs  had  to  foreclose  the  mortgages, 
they  should  bid  in  the  mortgaged  premises  for  the  full  amounts 
due  thereon,  and,  if  no  redemption  was  made  from  the  sales 
within  the  year,  they  should  then  credit  defendant  on  his  note 
with  the  amounts  for  which  the  property  was  sold.  These 
collateral  mortgages  were  foreclosed,  and  the  premises  bid  in 
by  Wolford  and  the  plaintiffs  on  February  17,  1890,  and  one 
year  thereafter  Wolford  applied  the  amount  on  defendant's  note, 
and  subsequently  sent  him  a  statement  showing  that  credit  and 
the  balance  due  on  the  note,  to  which  the  defendant  never  made 
any  objection. 

The  principle  upon  which  part  payment  of  a  debt  will  take 
a  case  out  of  the  statute  is  that  such  payment  amounts  to  an 
acknowledgment  of  the  existence  of  the  debt,  from  which  the 
law  implies  a  new  promise  to  pay  the  balance.  To  have  that 
effect,  the  payment  must  be  voluntarily  made  by  the  debtor  in 
person  who  is  sought  to  be  charged  with  the  effect  of  it,  or  by 
6ome  one  authoriz^ed  by  him  to  make  a  new  promise  on  his  be- 
half. It  has  been  held,  or  at  least  intimated,  in  some  cases,  that 
a  sale  of  collaterals  made  within  a  reasonable  time  after  they 


Jan.  1898.]  WoLFORD  v.  Cook.  317 

are  deposited  with  the  creditor,  and  the  applioation  of  the  pro- 
ceeds on  the  debt,  will  operate  as  a  part  payment  at  the  date 
of  the  receipt  of  such  proceeds,  so  as  to  interrupt  '"*  the  opera- 
tion of  the  statute.  This  doctrine  rests  upon  the  mistaken 
idea  that  the  creditor  is  thereby  made  the  agent  of  the  debtor 
for  the  collection  or  sale  of  the  collaterals,  ignoring  the  fact 
that  the  creditor  cannot  be  made  the  agent  of  the  debtor  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  make  an  act  done  by  him  operate  as  a  new 
promise  to  himself,  without  which  element  a  payment  can  never 
operate  to  remove  the  bar  of  the  statute:  Wood  on  Limitation 
of  Actions,  sec.  101. 

Wolford's  right  to  receive  the  proceeds  of  the  collateral  mort- 
gages, and  apply  them  in  part  payment  of  defendant's  note, 
was  acquired  under  and  by  virtue  of  the  contract  made  at  the 
time  the  collaterals  were  transferred  to  him.  His  subsequent 
exercise  of  that  right  was  not  a  voluntary  payment  made  by  the 
defendant  from  which  a  promise  to  pay  the  residue  can  be  in- 
ferred. The  defendant  had  done  nothing  since  he  transferred 
the  collaterals  to  Wolford  in  March,  1889.  The  fact  that  he 
made  no  objection  when  informed  by  Wolford  that  he  had  ap- 
plied the  proceeds  of  these  collaterals  on  his  note  could  not  take 
the  case  out  of  the  statute.  He  had  no  reason  to  object,  and, 
if  he  had  done  so,  it  would  have  been  futile.  Wolford  had  mere- 
ly exercised  a  contract  right  which  he  acquired  in  1889.  De- 
fendant's passive  acquiescence  in  the  exercise  of  that  right  con- 
stituted neither  a  voluntary  payment  as  of  that  date,  nor  a  new 
promise  in  writing  to  pay  the  balance  of  the  debt:  Harper  v. 
Fairley,  53  K  Y.  442;  Smith  v.  Ryan,  66  N.  Y.  352,  23  Am. 
Rep.  60;  Brown  v.  Latham,  58  N.  H.  30,  42  Am.  Rep.  568. 

Some  of  the  cases  may  be  misleading,  for  the  reason  that  they 
seem  to  lay  some  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  debtor  never  knew 
of,  and  consequently  never  assented  to,  the  application  by  the 
creditor  of  the  proceeds  of  the  collaterals.  If  the  debtor  had 
any  option  in  the  matter,  or  any  power  to  object  effectively  to 
the  application,  there  would  be  some  force  in  the  suggestion 
that  his  assent  to  it  amounted  to  a  voluntary  payment  by  him 
as  of  that  date.  But  this  cannot  be  so  where  the  creditor  is 
merely  exercising  an  absolute  legal  right  under  the  original 
contract. 

2.  At  the  time  the  note  in  suit  was  executed,  and  as  part  of 
the  same  transaction,  the  defendant,  as  additional  collateral  se- 
curity for  its  payment,  procured   to   be   conveyed  certain  im- 


318  WoLFORD  V.  Cook.  [Minn. 

proved  real  estate  to  Peter  Wolford.  While  this  conveyance  was 
in  form  an  ®^  absolute  deed,  it  is  conceded  that  it  was  in  fact 
merely  a  mortgage,  and  created  between  the  parties  the  relation 
of  mortgagor  and  mortgagee.  The  defendant  remained  in  pos- 
eession  of  the  property,  and  in  the  receipt  of  the  rents,  until 
in  1893,  when  the  plaintiffs  claimed  and  took  possession,  col- 
lected the  rents,  and  applied  them  upon  the  note  in  suit. 

The  evidence  bearing  on  this  branch  of  the  case  is  very  indefi- 
nite and  unsatisfactory,  and  very  little  attention  is  paid  to  it 
in  the  briefs  of  counsel.  There  is  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
"Wolford  and  the  plaintiffs  claimed  the  right  to  collect  the  rents 
and  apply  the  proceeds  on  the  note  by  virtue  of  some  agreement 
between  them  and  the  defendant,  made  contemporaneously  with 
the  execution  of  the  mortgage.  If  so,  the  agreement  was  not 
enforceable:  Cullen  v.  Minnesota  Loan  etc.  Co.,  60  Minn.  6. 
But  there  is  also  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  defendant 
voluntarily  let  the  plaintiffs  into  possession  for  the  purpose  of 
collecting  the  rents  and  applying  them  on  the  note,  thus  placing 
them  in  the  position  of  mortgagee  in  possession.  This  would 
amount  to  the  giving  of  new  and  additional  security  for  the 
payment  of  the  debt.  It  is  not  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
terrupting the  statute,  that  the  part  payment  should  be  in  actual 
money.  A  payment  in  goods  may  be  sufficient  for  tHat  purpose. 
So,  the  indorsement  and  delivery  by  the  debtor  of  the  note  of 
a  third  party  as  collateral  security  for  his  indebtedness  to  an- 
other, the  proceeds  when  collected  to  be  applied  on  the  debt, 
may  operate  as  a  payment  sufficient  to  take  it  out  of  the  statute: 
Wood  on  Limitation  of  Actions,  sec.  112. 

Hence,  if  the  defendant  voluntarily  and  in  the  absence  of  any 
circumstances  tending  to  rebut  the  inference  of  an  implied 
promise  to  pay  the  whole  debt,  turned  over  the  rents  and  profits 
of  the  mortgaged  premises  to  Wolford  and  the  plaintiffs,  to  be 
by  them  applied,  when  collected,  on  the  note  in  suit,  this  would, 
in  law,  amount  to  such  a  part  payment  as  would  interrupt  the 
statute.  As  alreadly  suggested,  circumstances  might  rebut  the 
inference  of  any  implied  promise  to  pay  the  balance  of  the  debt, 
as,  for  example,  if  the  defendant  was  merely  submitting  to  the 
exercise  by  Wolford  and  the  plaintiffs  of  an  enforceable  legal 
right  acquired  under  a  prior  contract,  or  if  Wolford  and  the 
plaintiffs  were  asserting  and  ®*  claiming  such  a  right,  and  the 
defendant  yielded  to  the  claim  honestly  believing  that  they  had 
Buch  a  right,  to  which  he  was  legally  compelled  to  submit.    The 


Jan.  1898.]  MoFFETT  v.  Parker.  319 

evidence  on  this  branch  of  the  case  should  have  been  submitted 
to  the  jury  under  proper  instructions.    On  the  first  branch  of 
the  case  there  was  nothing  to  submit  to  them. 
Order  reversed. 


LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— WHAT  CONSTITUTES  PART 
PAYMENT.— Part  payment,  iu  ordor  to  arrest  the  ruuuing  of  tlie 
statute  of  limitations,  is  a  voluntary  payment,  made  by  the  debtor 
himself,  or  by  some  one  authorized  by  him  to  make  the  payment: 
Moffitt  V.  Carr,  48  Neb.  403,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  GOG. ' 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT— ASSIGNEE. 
AS  AGENT.— The  payment  of  a  dividend  by  the  assignee  of  an  in- 
solvent debtor  will  not  tal<e  the  debt  out  of  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions as  against  the  debtor:  Whitney  v.  Chambers,  17  Neb.  90,  52 
Am.  Rep.  398,  and  monographic  note  thereto. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT— GIVING  AD- 
DITIONAL SECURITY— PROCEEDS  OF  COLLATERAL  SECU- 
RITY.—The  delivery  of  the  promissory  note  to  a  third  person  i» 
sufficient  to  suspend  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  limitations  from 
the  date  of  delivery,  but  not  from  the  date  of  actual  payment  of 
the  note:  Smith  v.  Ryan,  G6  N.  Y.  352,  23  Am.  Rep.  60.  Where  the 
maker  of  a  note  has  placed  personal  property  In  the  hands  of  the 
payee  as  collateral  security,  the  payee's  application  thereof,  with- 
out notice  to  the  debtor  and  his  assent,  will  not  constitute  a  pay- 
ment warranting  the  inference  of  a  new  promise:  Brown  v,  Latham» 
58  N.  H.  30,  42  Am.  Rep.  568. 


MoFFETT  V.  Parker. 

[71  Minnesota,  139.] 

MORTGAGES -RIGHTS  OF  ASSIGNEE  -  EQUITIES  OP 
THIRD  PARTIES.— A  mortgage  has  none  of  the  privileges  of  ne- 
gotiable paper,  but  is  a  mere  chose  in  action.  Hence,  au  assignee 
thereof  takes  it  subject  to  any  defense  that  exists  between  the  origi- 
nal parties,  unless  they  are  equitably  estopped  by  their  acts,  or 
otherwise,  from  asserting  it  as  against  the  assignee;  but  the  as- 
signee does  not  take  it  subject  to  any  equities  of  thii-d  parties  of 
which  he  has  no  notice. 

MORTGAGES  — DEFENSE  AGAINST  MORTGAGEE.- A 
mortgagor  in  a  real  estate  mortgage,  given  without  consideration 
to  defraud  creditors,  may  enjoin  its  foreclosure  by  the  mortgagee. 

MORTGAGE  GIVEN  WITHOUT  CONSIDERATION  TO  DE- 
FRAUD CREDITORS— RIGHTS  OF  ASSIGNEE.— Where  a  moit- 
gage  Is  given  without  consideration,  to  defraud  creditors,  ihe 
dishonest  mortgagor  is  equitably  estopped  from  claiming  that  there 
was  no  consideration  for  the  mortgage,  as  against  a  purchaser  la 
good  faith,  for  value,  and  without  notice. 

ESTOPPEIi.— Where  one,  by  his  willful  or  fraudulent  con- 
duct, causes  another  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  certain  facts» 
who  is  thereby  Induced  to  act  on  the  belief,  and  does  so  In  good 
faith,  and  parts  with  his  money  in  reliance  Tuereon,  the  former 
U  estopped  from  denying  the  existence  of  such  facts. 


320  MoFFETT  V.  Parker.  [Minn. 

James  I.  Best  and  Eugene  N".  Best,  far  the  appellants. 
Albert  G.  Broker,  for  the  respondents. 

140  START  C.  J.  Action  by  plaintiffs,  as  judgment  cred- 
itors of  the  defendants  Samson  and  Hannah  R.  Parker,  to  have 
canceled  the  mortgages  hereinafter  referred  to,  with  the  records 
thereof,  given  by  them  upon  the  premises  described  in  the  com- 
plaint. Judgment  (from  which  the  plaintiffs  appealed)  was  ren- 
dered in  their  favor,  for  the  relief  prayed,  upon  condition  that 
they  first  pay  to  the  defendant  Broker,  as  trustee  of  the  Mer- 
chants' National  Bank  of  Wadena,  $3,500  and  interest. 

The  facts  as  found  by  the  trial  court  are:  On  July  8,  1896, 
the  plaintiffs,  upon  an  indebtedness  which  accrued  December  15, 
1893,  ^*^  recovered  and  docketed  a  judgment  against  the 
Parkers,  each  of  whom  is  insolvent,  for  $1,239.11,  upon  which 
an  execution  has  been  returned  wholly  unsatisfied.  On  Decem- 
ber 27,  1895,  James  J.  Lee  held  a  mortgage  on  the  premises, 
"which  was  duly  recorded,  for  $800,  made  by  the  Parkers  to 
him,  which  they  then  paid;  but,  for  the  purpose  of  continuing 
the  mortgage  on  the  premises  with  the  intent  of  hindering  and 
<lelaying  the  plaintiffs  in  the  collection  of  their  demand,  they 
caused  the  mortgage  to  be  assigned  by  Lee  to  their  son,  Warren 
E.  Parker,  and  the  assignment  was  recorded  January  2,  1896. 
On  February  26,  1896,  the  Parkers  also  gave  to  Warren  E. 
Parker  a  mortgage  on  the  premises  for  $4,000,  and  on  the  same 
day  they  caused  it  to  be  duly  recorded.  This  mortgage  was  exe- 
cuted without  any  adequate  consideration,  to  secure  a  pretended 
indebtedness  of  $4,000,  and  with  intent  on  the  part  of  the  mort- 
gagors and  the  mortgagee  to  defraud  creditors,  and  particularly 
the  plaintiffs,  by  creating  an  apparent  lien  on  the  premises. 

Before  the  plaintiffs  recovered  their  judgment,  and  on  May 
22,  1896,  Warren  E.  Parker  borrowed  $3,500  from  the  Mer- 
chants' National  Bank  of  Wadena,  and,  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
curing and  securing  such  loan,  duly  assigned  the  two  mortgages 
to  the  defendant  Broker,  to  be  held  in  trust  for  the  bank,  as 
security  for  the  money  eo  borrowed.  This  assignment  was  duly 
recorded  May  29,  1896.  Neither  Broker  nor  the  bank  then  had 
■any  knowledge  or  notice  of  the  frauds  in  connection  with  the 
mortgages,  or  either  of  them,  but  they  took  such  assignment 
and  received  the  mortgages  as  such  collateral  security  in  good 
faith  and  without  notice. 

1.  The  correctness  of  the  findings  of  fact  is  not  challenged. 


9 
Jan.  1898.]  Moffett  v.  Parkeb.  321 

except  in  two  particulars.  It  is  claimed :  1.  That  the  trial  court 
erred  in  not  finding  that  the  $4,000  mortgage  was  given  without 
any  consideration.  The  finding  is,  that  it  was  given  without 
any  adequate  consideration,  which  is,  we  assume  for  the  purposes 
of  this  appeal,  the  equivalent  of  a  finding  that  the  mortgage  was 
made  without  any  consideration ;  and  2.  That  the  finding  to  the 
effect  Broker,  as  the  trustee  of  the  bank,  was  in  fact  a  purchaser 
of  the  mortgages  in  good  faith  for  value,  without  notice,  is  not 
supported  by  the  evidence.  The  burden  of  establishing  the  fact 
was  upon  Broker  and  the  bank.  The  point  is  made  that  tho 
evidence  *'*^  received  in  support  of  the  finding  was  not  admis- 
sible under  the  pleadings.  No  such  objection  was  made  at  tho 
trial,  but  simply  the  objection  that  the  evidence  was  immaterial, 
which  was  insufficient  to  call  the  court's  attention  to  the  plead- 
ings. Besides,  the  record  shows  no  exception  to  the  ruling  of 
the  court.  We  have  considered  the  evidence,  and  hold  it  suffi- 
cient to  support  the  finding  in  question. 

2.  The  remaining  assignments  of  error  are  to  the  effect  that 
the  trial  court  erred  in  its  conclusion  of  law  that  Broker,  for  the 
bank,  was  entitled  to  a  lien  on  the  premises  by  virtue  of  the 
assignment  of  the  mortgages  to  him,  to  the  extent  of  $3,500  and 
interest,  which  was  superior  to  th$  lien  of  the  plaintiffs'  judg- 
ment; or,  in  other  words,  that  the  judgment,  in  so  far  as  it  re- 
quires the  payment  by  the  plaintiffs  to  the  bank  of  the  amount 
of  its  loan,  as  a  condition  of  having  the  mortgages  canceled  as 
to  it,  is  not  supported  by  the  facts  found. 

The  real  question  is,  then,  whether  the  bank  is  equitably  en- 
titled to  hold  as  against  the  plaintiffs  the  $4,000  mortgage  to  se- 
cure its  loan  of  $3,500.  If  it  is,  then  it  is  wholly  immaterial 
whether  it  is  entitled  so  to  hold  the  $800  mortgage;  for,  if  it 
be  conceded  that  it  is  not,  still  the  fact  remains  that  the  $4,000 
mortgage  exceeds  the  bank's  claim,  and  the  cancellation  of  the 
$800  mortgage  would  not  affect  its  lien  for  the  full  amount  of 
its  claim,  or  subordinate  its  lien  to  that  of  the  plaintiffs'  judg- 
ment. It  would  seem,  however,  that  the  $800  mortgage,  having 
been  assigned  and  delivered  to  Warren  E.  Parker  at  the  request 
of  the  mortgagors,  for  the  purpose  of  continuing  it  as  a  mort- 
gage on  the  premises  to  defraud  creditors,  should  be  treated 
as  a  mortgage  made  to  him  without  consideration,  to  defraud 
creditors.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  conclusion  we  have  reached 
renders  it  unnecessary  to  refer  further  to  the  $800  mortgage. 

It  is  the  settled  law  of  this  state  that  a  mortgage  has  none 

AM.  81.  REP.. Vol.  LXX.— 21 


322  MoFFETT  V.  Parker.  [Mini>. 

of  tlie  privileges  of  negotiable  paper,  but  is  a  mere  chose  in 
action;  hence  an  assignee  thereof  takes  it  subject  to  any  defens'e 
that  exists  between  the  original  parties,  unless  they  are  equitably 
estopped  by  their  acts,  or  otherwise,  from  asserting  it  as  against 
the  assignee.  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  preposition  that 
the  plaintiffs  ^^^  have  any  equity  superior  to  the  bank  to  have 
the  mortgage  canceled,  for  it  is  equally  well  settled,  at  least  in 
this  state,  that  the  assignee  of  a  mere  chose  in  action  or  of  past 
due  negotiable  paper,  takes  it  subject  to  the  equities  of  the  orig- 
inal parties  thereto,  but  not  as  to  any  equities  of  third  parties 
of  which  he  has  no  notice:  Newton  v.  Newton,  46  Minn.  33; 
Plymouth  Cordage  Co.  v.  Seymour,  G7  Minn.  311. 

Now,  the  plaintiffs  had  the  equitable  right  to  subject  the 
premises  in  question  to  the  payment  of  their  claim  against  the 
mortgagors,  and  to  have  the  mortgage  canceled  as  against  the 
mortgagee.  But  this  was  an  equity  external  to  the  mortgage. 
They  were  not  parties  to  it,  and  the  bank  parted  with  its  money 
in  reliance  upon  the  mortgage  and  the  assignment  thereof  in 
good  faith,  without  any  notice  of  the  equity  of  the  plaintiffs. 
Therefore  the  equity  of  the  former  as  between  it  and  the  plain- 
tiffs is  the  superior.  But  the  plaintiffs'  equity  against  the  mort- 
gagors and  mortgagee  is  clear,  and  if  the  bank  cannot  retain 
and  enforce  the  $4,000  mortgage,  to  the  extent  of  the  loan 
against  the  mortgagors,  the  plaintiffs  are  also  entitled  to  have 
the  mortgage  canceled  as  to  the  bank  as  well,  for,  if  the  bank 
has  no  equity  as  against  the  mortgagors  which  it  can  enforce,, 
then  the  cancellation  of  the  mortgage  cannot  injure  it. 

This  brings  us  to  the  pivotal  question  in  this  case:  Has  the 
bank  the  equitable  right  to  enforce  this  mortgage  to  the  extent 
of  its  loan  against  the  mortgagors.  It  must  be  conceded  that,  if 
the  mortgagee  had  attempted  to  enforce  this  mortgage,  the 
mortgagors  could  defeat  his  action  by  showing  want  of  consid- 
eration, although  the  mortgage  was  executed  for  the  purpose  of 
defrauding  their  creditors.  It  was  held  in  Bickford  v.  Johnson, 
36  Minn.  123,  that  a  mortgagee  in  a  chattel  mortgage  given 
without  consideration,  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  the  cred- 
itors of  the  mortgagor,  could  not  enforce  his  mortgage.  The 
case  of  Stevens  v.  McMillin,  37  Minn.  509,  seems  to  introduce 
a  discordant  note,  and  to  hold  to  the  contrary;  but  the  matter 
was  fully  and  finally  considered  in  Devlin  v.  Quigg,  44  Minn. 
634,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  592,  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  a 
mortgagor  in  a  real  estate  mortgage  given  without  consideration, 
to  defraud  creditors,  might  ***  enjoin  its  foreclosure  by  the  mort- 


Jan.  1898.]  Moffett  v.  Parker.  323 

gagee.  In  so  deciding  the  court  did  not  disregard  the  rule  tliat 
courts  will  not  exert  their  powers  to  extricate  parties  from  the 
consequences  of  their  dishonesty.  On  the  contrary,  the  decision 
rests  upon  the  principle  that  parties  to  a  contract  will  not  be 
permitted  to  show  its  dishonest  character  as  between  themselves. 
Neither  will  be  allowed  to  prove  his  own  turpitude  for  the  pur- 
pose of  cheating  the  other.  So  when  the  mortgagor,  in  an  action 
by  the  mortgagee  to  foreclose  the  mortgage,  establishes  the  fact 
that  there  was  no  consideration  for  the  mortgage,  the  mortgagee 
cannot  be  permitted  to  rebut  this  defense  by  showing  that  the 
mortgage  was  made  and  received  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding 
creditors. 

The  reasons  why  a  fraudulent  mortgagee  may  not  enforce  a 
mortgage  given  without  consideration  to  defraud  creditors  do 
not  apply  to  a  bona  fide  assignee  without  notice,  who  has  parted 
with  his  money  for  the  mortgage.  It  will  not  do  to  group  the 
general  rules  we  have  referred  to  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  and 
reason  thus:  The  assignee  of  a  mortgage  takes  it  subject  to  any 
defense  existing  between  the  original  parties.  The  mortgagor 
who  gives  a  mortgage  without  consideration,  to  defraud  his  cred- 
itors, may  plead  and  prove,  as  against  the  mortgagee,  the  want 
of  consideration  as  a  defense.  Therefore  the  assignee  (the  bank 
in  this  case)  cannot  enforce  this  mortgage  against  the  mort- 
gagors for  any  amount. 

The  defect  in  this  logic  is,  that  it  is  not  always  true  that  the 
assignee  of  a  mortgage  takes  it  subject  to  defenses  between  the 
original  parties.  The  conduct  and  acts  of  a  mortgagor  may  be 
such  as  equitably  to  estop  him  from  asserting  a  defense  against 
the  assignee  which  would  be  open  to  him  as  against  the 
mortgagee.  Where  one,  by  hiy  willful  or  fraudulent  conduct, 
causes  another  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  certain  facts, 
who  is  thereby  induced  to  act  .on  the  belief,  and  does  so  in  good 
faith,  and  parts  with  his  money  in  reliance  thereon,  the  former 
is  estopped  from  denying  the  existence  of  such  facts:  Tousley 
V.  Board  of  Education,  39  Minn.  419. 

Now,  in  this  case,  if  the  bank  brings  an  action  against  the 
mortgagors  to  enforce  this  mortgage,  if  they  answer  that  the 
mortgage  was  given  without  consideration,  the  bank  will  not 
be  in  the  position  ***  of  the  fraudulent  mortgagee,  who  would 
not  be  permitted  to  show  the  real  transaction,  because  it  would 
be  alleging  and  proving  his  own  turpitude,  but  the  bank  may, 
in  rebuttal,  allege  and  prove  the  facts  as  to  the  making  of  the 
mortgage  and  its  purchase  of  it,  as  found  by  the  trial  court. 


324  MoFFETT  V.  Parker.  [Minn. 

The  whole  dishonest  transaction  may  be  given  in  evidence. 
Such  facts  show,  upon  the  plainest  principles  of  morals  and 
equity — they  are  identical — that  the  mortgagors  are  equitably 
estopped  from  claiming,  as  against  the  bank,  that  there  was  no 
consideration  for  the  mortgage  given  to  defraud  their  creditors. 
We  are  not  dealing  with  a  case  where  the  maker  of  a  note 
or  mortgage  has,  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  been  induced  to 
give  it  without  any  consideration.  In  such  a  case,  he  is  not 
estopped,  by  a  recital  under  his  hand  and  seal,  that  the  instru- 
ment was  given  for  a  valuable  consideration,  to  show  that  such 
was  not  the  fact.  But  we  are  dealing  with  a  case  where  the 
mortgagors,  for  the  dishonest  purpose  of  defrauding  their  cred- 
itors, willfully  and  fraudulently  represented,  under  their  hands 
and  seals,  that  they  owed  the  mortgagee  $4,000,  and  that  they 
gave  him  a  lien  on  their  real  estate  to  secure  its  payment.  And, 
further,  for  the  purpose  of  making  it  appear  to  the  world  that 
such  indebtedness  and  lien  in  fact  did  exist,  they,  as  the  trial 
court  found,  themselves  caused  this  representation  to  be  spread 
upon  the  public  records,  there  to  remain  a  continuing  declara- 
tion that  it  was  an  honest  mortgage.  They  also  delivered  this 
solemn  and  formal  representation  to  the  mortgagee,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  furthering  their  design  of  defrauding  their  creditors. 
For  this  dishonest  purpose  they  put  it  in  his  power  to  cheat 
honest  men.  The  bank,  in  reliance  upon  these  representations, 
the  mortgage  and  its  record,  in  good  faith  and  without  notice 
parted  with  $3,500. 

Shall  the  honest  assignee  of  this  mortgage  or  the  dishonest 
mortgagors  suffer  this  loss?  Our  answer  is,  the  mortgagors.  Tt 
would  be  a  reproach  to  the  administration  of  justice  to  hold 
otherwise.  They  are  estopped  as  against  the  assignee  from  as- 
serting the  defense  that  the  mortgage  was  executed  without  con- 
sideration, in  order  to  defraud  their  creditors.  In  so  holding,, 
we  do  not  *^^  impinge  upon  the  rule  that  a  mortgage  is  a  non- 
negotiable  chose  in  action. 

So  far  as  we  are  advised,  there  are  but  few  adjudged  cases  upon 
this  question.  We  have  not  been  referred  to  any  opposed  to  the 
conclusion  reached.  The  case  of  Bloomer  v.  Henderson,  8  Mich. 
395,  77  Am.  Dec.  453,  was  one  where  an  action  was  brought 
against  the  mortgagor,  mortgagee,  and  assignee  to  set  aside  a  real 
estate  mortgage,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  given  to  defraud  the 
plaintiff,  and  without  consideration.  It  did  not  appear  that  there 
was  any  negotiable  note  connected  with  the  mortgage,  and  it 
was  treated  as  a  chose  in  action,  and  held  that  the  assignee  took 


Jan.  1898.]  Moffett  v.  Parker.  826 

the  mortgage  subject  to  all  equities  existing  between  the  mort- 
gagor and  the  mortgagee,  but  not  as  to  any  equities  of  the  plain- 
tiff; and,  further,  that  the  mortgagor  could  not  set  up,  as  against 
the  assignee  in  good' faith,  that  the  mortgage  was  given  to  de- 
fraud creditors,  and  without  consideration,  Christiancy,  J., 
speaking  for  the  court,  said,  at  page  404:  "He  [the  mortgagor], 
at  least,  cannot  be  heard  to  complain  if  an  assignee  has  chosen 
to  act  upon  the  presumption  that  it  was  executed  for  an  honest 
purpose,  and  by  an  honest  man.  To  hold  otherwise  would  be  to 
encourage  fraud,  rather  than  to  suppress  it." 

The  case  cited  is  not  directly  in  point,  as  it  was  also  disposed 
of  upon  the  further  ground  that  it  was  intended  by  the  mort- 
gagor that  the  mortgagee  should  sell  the  mortgage.  See,  also, 
the  case  of  Sleeper  v.  Chapman,  121  Mass.  404,  wherein  it  was 
held  that  the  assignee,  without  notice,  of  a  mortgage  given  in 
fraud  of  creditors,  acquires  a  good  title  against  the  creditors  of 
the  mortgagor.  The  bank,  having  the  equitable  right  to  enforce 
the  mortgage  against  the  mortgagors  to  the  extent  of  its  lo^n, 
and  its  equity  being  superior  to  that  of  the  plaintiffs  to  have 
it  set  aside,  it  follows  that  the  judgment  must  be  affirmed. 

So  ordered. 


MORTGAGES  — RIGHTS  OF  ASSIGNEE —  EQUITIES  OF 
THIRD  PARTIES  AGAINST  ASSIGNOR.— The  general  rule,  as 
stated  broadly,  is  that  the  assignee  of  a  mortgage  takes  it  subject 
to  all  equities  in  favor  of  the  mortgngor  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
assignment:  Horstman  v.  Gerlver,  49  Pa.  St.  282,  88  Am.  Dec.  501. 
But  this  general  rule  is  subject  to  the  exception  noted  in  the  prin- 
cipal case,  that  the  mortgagor  may  be  estopped  from  setting  up 
any  equities  that  may  exist  in  his  favor:  Wilson  v.  Ott,  173  Pa. 
St.  253,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  767.  But  an  assignee.  Without  notice,  does 
not  talve  the  mortgage  subject  to  any  equity  of  a  third  person 
against  the  assignor:  Mott  v.  Clarlj,  9  Pa.  St.  309,  49  Am.  Dee.  5GG; 
James  v.  Morey,  2  Cow.  246,  14  Am.  Dec.  475.  And  where  the  mort- 
gage is  accompanied  by  a  negotiable  note,  which  is  assigned  be- 
fore maturity  and  for  a  valuable  consideration,  the  assignee  talies 
the  securities  free  of  any  equities  existing  between  the  original  pT- 
ties  of  which  he  had  no  notice:  Williams  v.  Keyes,  90  Mich.  290, 
30  Am.  St  Rep.  438;  Webb  v.  Hoselton,  4  Neb.  308,  19  Am.  Rep.  038. 
But  see  the  note  to  James  v.  Morey,  14  Am.  Dec.  514. 

ESTOPPEL.— For  the  requisite  to  constitute  an  estoppel,  see 
Blodgett  v.  Perry,  97  Mo.  263.  10  Am.  St  Rep.  307;  Sweeney  v. 
Pratt.  70  Conn.  274,  66  Am.  St  Rep.  101. 


326  ScANLAN  V.  Grimmeb.  [Minn. 


SoANLAN  V.  Grimmer. 

[71  Minnesota,  351.] 

NAMES,  CONTRACT  UNDER  ASSUMED— IDENTITY.— A 
person,  not  engaged  In  a  fraudulent  or  criminal  purpose,  may  enter 
into  a  contract  under  any  name  he  may  choose  to  assume.  All  that 
the  law  looks  to  is  the  identity  of  the  individual,  and  when  that 
is  established  the  act  will  be  binding  upon  him  and  upon  others. 

NAMES,  CONTRACT  UNDER  ASSUMED-KNOWLEDGE 
OP  OTHER  PARTI.— A  contract  entered  into  under  an  assumed 
name  is  binding,  even  though  the  other  parties  thereto  were  in- 
duced to  believe  that  the  assumed  name  was  the  person's  real  name, 
and  though  such  parties  were  opposed  to  entering  into  a  transac- 
tion with  the  person  himself. 

MORTGAGES--USURY— GRANTEE  ASSUMING  MORT- 
GAGE—ESTOPPEL.— A  vendee  who  accepts  a  conveyance  of  laud 
subject  to  a  mortgage  thereon,  and  containing  a  covenant  whereby 
such  vendee  assumes  and  agrees  to  pay  said  mortgage,  is  estopped 
from  asserting  that  the  obligation  secured  thereby  is  usurious. 

S.  L.  Pierce,  for  the  appellant. 
J.  A.  Sawyer,  for  the  respondent. 

*^'*  COLLINS,  J.  Action  to  determine  adverse  claims  to 
real  property,  the  actual  purpose  being  to  set  aside  and  cancjel 
a  mortgage  thereon  of  date  January  12,  1894,  purporting  to 
have  been  executed  and  delivered  to  one  John  B.  Alexander,  as 
mortgagee,  to  have  been  assigned  to  one  Maggie  A.  Henningsen 
by  Sylvester  Davis,  as  attorney  in  fact  ^^^  for  said  Alexander, 
and  subsequently  assigned  by  Henningsen  to  defendant  Grim- 
mer, who  alone  answered  in  the  action. 

The  primary  and  principal  question  in  the  case  grows  out  of 
the  fact  that  the  money  loaned  to  plaintiff's  husband,  Martin 
Scanlan,  who  then  owned  the  land,  belonged  to  Davis  himself, 
and  was  furnished  by  him  for  the  express  purpose  of  making 
the  loan,  under  an  agreement  entered  into  by  him  with  one  Glea- 
Bon,  who  was  found  by  the  court  to  have  been  his  agent  in  the 
matter,  that,  for  all  of  the  necessary  purposes  of  the  transaction, 
Davis  should  assume  the  name  of  John  B.  Alexander,  that  the 
moneyshould  be  loaned  to  Scanlan  as  belonging  to  a  man  bearing 
that  name,  that  the  note  should  be  made  so  payable,  and  that 
John  B.  Alexander  should  be  named  as  mortgagee  in  the  mort- 
gage. The  agreement  was  carried  out;  the  note  and  mortgage  were 
so  written;  Davis  delivered  the  amount  of  the  loan,  two  thou- 
sand dollars,  to  Gleason  in  Scanlan's  presence;  and  the  former 
paid  out  for  the  latter,  and  upon  his  authority,  in  liquidating 
existing  liens  on  the  land,  between  eighteen  hundred  dollars  and 


Jan.  1898.]  Scanlan  v.  Grimmeb.  327 

nineteen  hundred  dollars.  It  appears  that  Gleason  kept  the 
balance  of  the  money  for  himself.  The  note  and  mortgage  were 
delivered  to  Davis,  and  by  him  the  mortgage  was  put  upon 
record. 

Subsequently  Scanlan  and  his  wife  sold,  and  by  warranty  deed 
conveyed,  the  premises  to  a  son,  Joseph  Francis.  The  latter 
€Oon  afterward  sold,  and  by  warranty  deed  conveyed,  the  same  to 
another  8on,Patrick,  and  then  he  sold,and  by  warranty  deed  con- 
veyed, the  land  to  this  plaintiff.  Each  of  these  deeds  was  in 
the  usual  form,  but  to  the  covenant  against  encumbrances  in 
€ach  was  added  this  language:  "Except  a  mortgage  for  two  thou- 
sand dollars  to  John  B.  Alexander,  dated  January  12,  1894, 
which  mortgage  and  interest  the  party  of  the  s^econd  part  as- 
sumes and  agrees  to  pay." 

In  October,  1894,  Davis,  pretending  to  act  by  virtue  of  a 
power  of  attorney  and  as  the  constituent  of  John  B.  Alexander, 
in  writing  assigned  the  note  and  mortgage  to  Mrs.  Henningsen. 
The  fact  was  that  Davis'  son  signed  the  name  of  John  B.  Alex- 
ander to  the  writing,  purporting  to  be  the  power,  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  his  father  and  Gleason;  the  latter,  as  a  notary  public, 
pretending  to  take  and  certifying  ^^**  to  Alexander's  acknowl- 
edgment thereof.  Of  this  Mrs.  Henningsen  was  ignorant.  She 
was  a  bona  fide  purchaser,  and  paid  to  Davis  two  thousand  dol- 
lars in  cash  for  the  note  and  mortgage.  She  then  sold,  and  in 
writing  assigned,  the  same,  with  a  covenant  as  to  the  amount 
clue  thereon,  to  the  defendant  Grimmer,  who  was  also  a  pur- 
chaser in  good  faith,  paying  two  thousand  dollars  in  cash.  Scan- 
lan paid  one  year's  interest  upon  the  note — to  whom  does  not 
appear. 

On  its  findings,  in  accordance  with  the  above  statement  of 
facts,  the  court  below  held,  as  conclusions  of  law,  that  the  note 
and  mortgage  were  usurious,  but  that  by  reason  of  the  assump- 
tion clauses  in  the  warranty  deeds,  whereby  title  to  the  premises 
was  rested  in  this  plaintiff,  the  defense  of  usury  was  waived, 
and  that  the  latter  was  estopped  from  interposing  such  defense. 
It  also  held  that  the  mortgage,  power  of  attorney,  and  assign- 
ments were  each  absolutely  null  and  void,  and  that  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  the  relief  demanded  in  her  complaint  as  against  de- 
fendant Grimmer. 

As  stated  at  the  outset,  the  main  question  here  is  the  one 
covered  by  the  conclusion  that  the  mortgage  was  and  is  void 
because  Davis,  for  the  purposes  of  the  transaction  and  for  some 
undisclosed  reason,  assumed  the  name  of  Alexander  as  mort- 


328  ScANLAN  V.  Grimmer.  [Mini*. 

gagee.  The  court  seems  to  have  been  of  the  opinion  that  be- 
cause the  mortgagors  were  misinformed  and  misled,  and  in- 
tended to  mortgage  their  land  to  Alexander,  and  not  to  Davis^ 
the  instrument  was  absolutely  void  for  want  of  necessary  parties, 
and  therefore  defendant  Grimmer,  an  innocent  purchaser,  who 
parted  with  his  money  in  good  faith,  is  to  be  deprived  of  his  se- 
curity, and  probably  made  to  lose  his  investment.  Any  rule  or 
doctrine  which  would  result  in  such  a  gross  injustice  would  have 
to  be  exceedingly  well  settled  before  we  could  indorse  and  adopt 
it. 

Fortunately, we  are  not  confronted  with  such  a  case.  The  court 
below  failed  to  apply  the  true  and  well-settled  rule  to  the  facts. 
It  overlooked  the  distinction  between  the  assumed  name  of  a 
person  actually  identified  and  a  wholly  fictitious  name  without 
an  identified  person  behind  it.  The  evidence,  as  well  as  the  find- 
ings of  fact,  conclusively  shows  that  Davis  assumed  the  name  of 
Alexander,  and  identified  him  as  the  real  mortgagee  under  the 
assumed  name.  In  assuming  this  name  in  a  business  transaction, 
Davis  was  ^""  not  engaged  in  a  fraudulent  or  criminal  purpose, 
and  he  could  bind  himself  as  well  as  other  persons  by  its  adop- 
tion and  use.  In  Wakefield  v.  Brown,  38  Minn.  361,  8  Am.  St. 
Rep.  671,  it  was  held  that,  although  a  grantor  of  land  executed 
a  conveyance  thereof  under  an  assumed  name,  such  conveyance 
would  be  effectual  to  convey  title  if  the  grantor  was  in  fact  the 
true  owner;  and  that  in  such  a  case  evidence  outside  the  in- 
strument could  be  introduced  to  identify  the  actual  grantor. 
While  not  so  stated,  it  is  obvious  that  this  conclusion  was 
founded  upon  the  established  rule  of  law  that  in  business  mat- 
ters a  contract  or  obligation  may  be  entered  into  by  a  person 
by  any  name  he  may  choose  to  assume.  All  that  the  law  looks 
to  is  the  identity  of  the  individual,  and,  when  that  is  ascer- 
tained and  clearly  established,  the  act  will  be  binding  upon  him 
and  upon  others:  Bell  v.  Sun  Printing  etc.  Co.,  10  Jones  &  S. 
567;  In  re  Snook,  2  Hilt,  566.  See,  also,  Toole  v.  Peterson,. 
31  N.  C.  180;  Thomas  v.  Wyatt,  31  Mo.  188,  77  Am.  Dec.  640. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  contention  of  counsel,  evidently  quite 
potent  with  the  court  below,  that  the  mortgagors  were  induced 
to  believe  that  they  were  dealing  with  a  person  named  Alexander 
and  that,  according  to  their  own  testimony,  they  were  opposed 
to  entering  into  such  a  transaction  with  Davis,  of  whom  they 
had  heard  "had  reports":  See  Fellowes  v.  Lord  Gwydyr,  1  Sim. 
C3,  1  Russ.  &  M.  83.  Their  contract  with  the  mortgagee  was 
with  him  and  his  assigns,  as  is  usual  in  such  transactions.  They 
expressly  authorized  an  assignment  of  this  instrument.    Had  the 


Jan.  1898.]  Scanlan  v.  Grimmer.  329 

mortgagee  actually  borne  the  name  of  Alexander,  he  could  have 
at  once  assigned  to  Davis  without  consulting  the  mortgagors. 
The  point  is  too  far-fetched  and  fanciful  to  be  of  value.  The 
trial  court  erred  when  finding  that  the  mortgage  lacked  a  mort- 
gagee, and  when  holding  it  to  be  void. 

There  was  no  error  in  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  court  that  • 
the  defense  of  usury  was  unavailing  to  plaintiff.  In  each  of  the 
deeds  whereby  title  to  the  mortgaged  property  was  transferred 
from  plaintiff's  husband  to  herself  was  the  assumption  clause 
heretofore  quoted.  The  land  was  conveyed  to  plaintiff,  as  it  had 
been  to  her  immediate  and  remote  grantors,  subject  to  the 
mortgage  for  two  thousand  dollars,  which  mortgage,  with  in- 
terest, she  as  grantee  assumed  and  agreed  ^^^  to  pay.  This  is 
a  covenant  on  which  an  action  is  ordinarily  maintainable  against 
a  vendee:  Follansbee  v.  Johnson,  28  Minn.  311. 

Of  course,  we  do  not  decide  that  the  defense  of  usury  could 
not  be  successfully  interposed  in  such  an  action,  for  the  ques- 
tion is  not  in  this  case.  A  vendee  who  accepts  a  conveyance 
of  land  subject  to  a  mortgage  thereon,  and  containing  a  cove- 
nant whereby  such  vendee  assumes  and  agrees  to  pay  said  mort- 
gage, is  estopped  from  asserting  that  the  obligation  secured 
thereby  is  usurious.  The  whole  title  of  such  vendee  rests  upon 
the  conveyance,  and  the  continued  existence  of  the  mortgage, 
aa  an  encumbrance,  forms  a  part  of  it.  The  conveyance  is  evi- 
dence of  title,  and  when  proven,  as  such  evidence,  the  existing 
mortgage  and  the  assumption  thereof  is  also  proven.  A  grantee 
cannot  be  permitted  to  claim  title  *T)oth  under  and  against  the 
same  deed;  to  insist  upon  its  efficacy  to  confer  a  benefit,  and 
repudiate  a  burden  with  which  it  has  qualified  it;  to  affirm  a 
part  and  reject  a  part."  The  proposition  above  laid  down  in 
respect  to  the  estoppel  is  more  than  supported  by  the  authori- 
ties: Calkins  v.  Copley,  29  Minn.  471;  Parkinson  v.  Sherman, 
74  K  Y.  88,  30  Am.  Rep.  268;  Pidgeon  v.  Trustees  of  Schools, 
44  111.  501;  Gibson  v.  Lyon,  115  U.  S.  439.  See,  also,  27  Am. 
&  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  953,  notes  1,  2. 

Judgment  reversed,  and  new  trial  ordered. 

NAMES-CONTRACTS  UNDER  ASSUMED.— Where  a  party 
adopts  a  name,  he  will  be  holden  by  contracts  executed  in  such 
name,  whether  the  name  so  assumed  be  an  artificial  one  or  the 
proper  name  of  a  living  person:  Pease  v.  Pease,  35  Conn.  131.  95 
Am.  Dec.  225.  If  the  true  owner  conveys  property  by  any  name, 
the  conveyance  as  between  the  grantor  and  grantee  will  transfer 
the  title:  Fallon  v.  Kehoe,  38  Cal.  44.  99  Am.  Dec.  347,  and  noto 
thereto.  A  chattel  mortgage  executed  by  a  party  under  a  floti  lous 
name  is  valid:  Alexander  v.  Graves,  25  Neb.  453,  13  Am.  St.  Rep. 
501. 


330  Cooper  v.  Hayward.  [Minn. 

MORTGAGES— USURY.— AN  ASSIGNEE  OF  THE  MORT- 
<5AGOR,  standing  In  legal  privity  witli  the  mortgagor,  may  avoid 
tlie  contract  for  an  excess  of  usury,  and  is  entitled  to  the  proper 
reduction  on  the  mortgage,  to  enable  him  to  perform  his  contract, 
and  by  payment  to  relieve  the  mortgaged  premises  from  the  en- 
cumbrance, in  favor  of  a  purchaser  from  the  mortgagor:  Banks  v. 
McClellan,  24  Md.  62,  87  Am.  Dec.  594. 


Cooper  v.  Hayward. 

[71  Minnesota,  374.] 

EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS— CONTRACTS- 
ACTION  ON  PROMISSORY  NOTE  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  AN- 
OTHER.— Where  a  promissory  note  is  taken  in  the  name  of  one 
party  for  the  benefit  of  another,  the  administrator  of  the  payee  may 
maintain  an  action  on  it. 

ESTATES  OF  DECEDENTS— ASSETS  DISPOSED  OF  BY 
SOLE  HEIR— RECOVERY  BY  ADMINISTRATOR.— Where,  be- 
fore an  administrator  is  appointed  of  an  estate,  agamst  which 
there  are  no  debts  proved  or  to  be  proved,  a  sole  heir  and  distri- 
butee makes  an  equitable  assignment  of  all  her  interest  and  the 
interest  of  the  estate  in  certain  personal  property,  such  assign- 
ment Is  binding  upon  an  administrator  subsequently  appointed  on 
the  petition  of  such  sole  heir  and  distributee,  and  he  cannot  re- 
cover the  property  disposed  of. 

RELEASE— IGNORANCE  OF  CLAIM.— A  party  cannot  re- 
lease a  claim  of  which  he  had  no  knowledge,  and  of  the  existence 
of  which  he  had  always  been  fraudulently  kept  in  ignorance. 

M.  D.  Taylor,  for  the  appellants. 

G.  W.  Stewart,  for  the  respondent. 

*''**  CANTY,  J.  This  is  the  second  appeal  in  this  action: 
See  Cooper  v.  Hayward,  67  Minn.  92.  After  the  decision  on 
the  former  appeal,  the  case  was  again  tried  in  the  court  helow, 
and,  at  the  close  of  the  trial,  the  judge  ordered  a  verdict  for 
plaintiff  for  the  amount  of  the  note  and  interest.  From  an 
order  denying  a  new  trial   defendant  appeals. 

It  appears  by  the  evidence  that  in  1887  defendant's  brother, 
"W.  H.  Ilayward,  and  his  father,  J.  E.  Hayward,  were  associated 
together  as  partners  in  the  lumber  business,  under  the  firm  name 
of  W.  H.  Hayward  &  Co. ;  that  the  brother  had  at  that  time  but 
little  property  of  his  own;  that  the  father  furnished  all  the  capi- 
tal for  the  business,  and  had  besides  a  considerable  amount  of 
individual  property;  and  that  the  brother  was  manager  of  both 
the  partnership  business  and  most  of  the  father's  individual 
business,  and  had  authority  to  draw  checks  on  the  partnership 


Jan.  ISiJS.J  Cooper  v.  Hayward.  331 

funds  in  the  bank,  and  also  to  draw  checks  in  his  father's  name 
on  the  individual  funds  of  the  latter  in  the  bank.  At  this  time 
defendant  was  financially  embarrassed,  and  was  about  to  lose 
some  of  his  property  on  chattel  mortgages. 

The  evidence  tends  to  prove  that  there  had  been  some  trouble 
between  him  and  his  father,  and  he  did  not  want  the  latter  to 
know  that  his  property  was  mortgaged.  So  he  applied  to  his 
mother  for  ^"^^  assistance,  and  she  requested  her  son,  W.  H. 
Hayward,  to  draw  checks  on  said  partnership  funds  in  payment 
of  defendant's  debts.  W.  H.  Hayward  at  first  refused  to  do  this, 
as  he  feared  the  father  would  discover  what  he  had  done.  There- 
upon she  told  him  that  she  would  be  responsible  for  it,  and 
would  stand  between  him  and  his  father,  if  the  latter  discovered 
it.  Then  W.  H.  Hayward  drew  the  checks  in  payment  of  de- 
fendant's debts,  either  wholly  on  the  partnership  funds,  or 
partly  on  those  funds  and  partly  on  the  individual  funds  of  the 
father,  and,  when  these  debts  were  thus  paid,  defendant  exe- 
cuted to  W.  H.  Hayward  the  note  in  suit  for  the  amount  of  the 
payments.  W,  H.  Hayward  died  in  1890,  and  the  father  in 
1895.  The  evidence  also  tends  to  prove  that  the  father,  dur- 
ing his  lifetime,  never  knew  or  discovered  that  any  of  his  funds, 
or  the  partnership  funds,  went  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  defend- 
ant, or  that  the  latter  had  executed  the  note  to  his  brother.  On 
these  facts,  it  was  held  on  the  former  appeal  that  there  was  a 
good  consideration  for  the  note. 

The  note  being  taken  in  the  name  of  W.  H.  Hayward,  he 
would,  under  section  5158  of  the  General  Statutes  of  1894,  have 
a  right  to  maintain  an  action  on  it,  even  though  he  had  no  bene- 
ficial interest  in  it  at  all.  Under  section  4297  of  the  General 
Statutes  of  1894,  a  trust  estate  does  not,  on  the  death  of  the 
trustee,  descend  to  his  heirs  or  pass  to  his  personal  representa- 
tives, as  it  did  at  common  law,  but  the  execution  of  the  trust 
vests  in  the  district  court,  and  it  appoints  a  new  trustee.  But 
we  cannot  hold  that  this  statute  applies  to  such  a  case  as  this, 
where  no  trust  appears  on  the  face  of  the  instrument,  and  it  is 
merely  a  case  of  a  promissory  note  being  taken  in  the  name  of 
one  party  for  the  benefit  of  another.  Then  the  administrator 
of  the  payee  of  the  note  can  maintain  the  action  wfether  the 
amount  recovered  will  be  held  for  the  estate  of  W.  H.  Hayward, 
or  the  estate  of  his  father,  or  partly  for  each  estate.  This  is 
what  was  held  on  the  former  appeal. 

But  some  additional  facts  have  since  come  into  the  case  which 
have  been  set  out  in  plaintiff's  supplemental  complaint.    It  is 


332  Cooper  v,  Hayward.  [Minn. 

alleged  in  this  complaint,  and  admitted  in  the  answer  to  it,  that 
the  widow  of  W.  H.  Hayward  is  his  sole  heir  and  distributee. 
It  is  alleged,  and  appears  by  the  evidence  given  on  the  last  trial, 
that  after  his  death,  and  before  an  administrator  of  his  estate 
was  appointed  *''''  she  and  the  father  entered  into  a  contract, 
by  the  terms  of  which,  for  a  certain  consideration,  she  assigned 
to  the  father,  and  released  to  him,  all  her  interest  in  the  part- 
nership property  and  assets,  and  the  father  released  her  and  the 
estate  of  W.  H.  Hayward  from  all  debts  due  from  the  latter  to 
the  father  or  to  the  partnership. 

After  the  father's  death  his  estate  was  administered  in  the 
probate  court,  and  on  March  1,  1897,  the  decree  of  distribution 
was  entered,  which,  after  assigning  specific  portions  of  the  es- 
tate to  different  heirs  and  distributees,  assigned  all  the  balance 
of  the  estate  of  four  certain  distributees.  On  May  3,  1897, 
these  four  distributees,  by  an  instrument  under  seal,  released 
and  discharged  defendant  from  all  claims  which  they  may  have 
had  on  account  of  this  note.  Plaintiff  admitted  on  the  trial 
that  there  were  no  debts  proved,  or  to  be  proved,  against  the  es- 
tate of  W.  H.  Hayward,  and,  as  his  widow  was  his  sole  heir  and 
distributee,  it  was  competent  for  her  to  make  an  equitable  as- 
signment of  all  her  interest  and  the  interest  of  his  estate  in  the 
property  and  assets  of  the  partnership,  and  the  assignment 
which  she  has  so  made  to  the  father  is  binding  on  the  plaintiff, 
the  administrator:  See  Vail  v.  Anderson,  61  Minn.  552;  1 
Woemer's  Am'erican  Law  of  Administration,  sec.  201 ;  2  Woer- 
ner's  American  Law  of  Administration,  sec.  566;  Foote  v. 
Foote,  61  Mich.  181.  In  the  case  of  Wiswell  v.  Wiswell,  35 
Minn.  371,  it  did  not  appear  that  the  widow  who  sold  the  horse 
was  the  sole  distributee,  and  that  there  were  no  debts  proved 
OT  to  be  proved  against  the  estate.  In  the  case  at  bar,  these 
things  appear  conclusively.  The  plaintiff  was  appointed  ad- 
ministrator on  the  petition  of  the  widow  herself,  more  than  five 
years  and  a  half  after  she  had  made  said  settlement  with  the 
father  as  surviving  partner.  Then,  if  the  beneficial  interest  in 
the  note  in  suit  was  in  the  father  or  in  the  partnership  firm  at 
the  time  of  the  death  of  W.  H.  Hayward,  such  interest  had 
passed  to  the  father  by  said  assignment  from  the  widow,  has 
been  assigned  to  said  four  distributees  by  said  residuary  clause 
in  said  decree  of  the  probate  court,  and  defendant  has  been  re- 
leased by  them  from  liability. 

Then,  since  the  former  appeal,  it  has  become  material  to  de- 
termine whether,  on  the  one  hand,  the  whole  beneficial  interest 


Jan.  1898.]  .    Cooper  v.  Ha\ward.  833 

in  this  ^"^^  note  was  in  W.  H.  Hayward  at  the  time  of  hia 
death,  or  whether,  on  the  other  hand,  such  interest  was  in  his 
father  or  in  the  partnership  firm.  The  evidence  tends  to  prove 
that  the  consideration  for  this  note  came  originally  out  of  the 
partnership  funds  or  the  individual  funds  of  the  father,  or 
partly  from  each.  W.  H.  Hayward  in  his  lifetime,  and  his  es- 
tate after  his  death,  were  liable  to  the  father  for  the  funds  so 
taken  without  the  father's  knowledge  or  consent;  and  it  can- 
not be  held  that  by  the  release  of  all  claims  against  the  son's 
estate,  made  by  the  father  in  his  contract  with  the  widow,  he 
released  a  claim  of  which  he  had  no  knowledge,  and  of  the  ex- 
istence of  which  he  had  always  been  fraudulently  kept  in  igno' 
ranee.  There  is  no  evidence  that  W.  H.  Hayward  accounted  to 
the  father  in  any  manner  for  the  funds  thus  drawn  out.  He 
might  have  accounted  to  the  father  for  them  as  being  funds 
drawn  out  for  his  ovra  use  and  benefit,  without  disclosing  to  the 
father  that  they  were  applied  to  the  payment  of  defendant's 
debts,  and,  if  he  did  so  account,  the  beneficial  interest  in  this 
note  would  thereby  have  become  vested  in  him.  The  partner- 
ship contract  provided  that  true  books  of  account  should  be 
kept,  and,  at  least  once  in  each  year,  there  should  be  an  account- 
ing, the  profits  and  losses  ascertained,  and  the  profits,  if  any, 
divided.  But  it  does  not  appear  that  any  such  books  were  ever 
kept  or  any  such  accounting  was  ever  had. 

We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  evidence  would  warrant  the 
jury  in  finding  that  the  funds  which  went  to  pay  defendant's 
debts  were  drawn  out  of  the  father's  funds,  or  out  of  the  funds 
of  the  partnership,  or  partly  out  of  each;  that  W.  H.  Hayward 
never  accounted  to  his  father  for  the  funds  thus  drawn  out,  but 
that  the  loss  of  the  same  remained  the  loss  of  the  father  or  of 
the  partnership,  or  partly  of  each,  until  after  the  death  of  W.  H. 
Hayward;  and  therefore  the  court  erred  in  ordering  a  verdict 
for  plaintiff. 

The  order  appealed  from  is  reversed,  and  a  new  trial  is 
granted. 

CONTRACTS  MADE  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PARTY- 
RIGHT  OF  ACTION.— If  a  promise  or  contract  has  been  made  be- 
tween two  parties  for  the  benefit  of  a  third,  an  action  will  lie 
thereon,  at  the  instance  and  in  the  name  of  the  party  to  be  bene- 
fited, although  the  promise  or  contract  was  made  without  his  knowl- 
edge, and  without  any  consideration  moving  from  him:  Brown  v. 
Markland.  16  Utah,  360.  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  629.  and  note. 

EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS— RIGHT  TO  SUE.— An 
executor  of  a  testator,  having  been  clothed  with  commission  of  the 
probate  court,  is  vested  with  the  title  to  all  the  movable  property 


334  Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fuisk-Tukneii  Co.     [Minn. 

and  riglits  of  action  which  the  deceased  possessed  at  the  instant  of 
his  death:  Peterson  v.  Cheniical  Bank.  32  N.  Y.  21,  SS  Am.  Dec. 
298.  But  see  Horsliius  v.  Williamson,  1  T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  145,  4  Am. 
Dec.  703,  where  it  was  held  that  where  a  bond  is  made  payable 
to  A,  as  the  executor  of  B,  and  A  dies,  the  right  to  sue  upon  the 
bond  was  in  the  representative  of  A,  and  not  B. 


Nicollet  National  Bank  v.  Feirk-Turner  Co. 

[71  Minnesota,  413.] 

CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A  corporation  possesses  only 
those  properties  which  the  charter  of  its  creation  confers  upon  it, 
either  expressly,  or  as  incidental  to  its  very  existence. 

CORPORATIONS  —  DEFINITIONS.  —"AN  INCIDENTAL 
POWER  is  one  that  is  directly  and  immediately  appropriate  to  the 
execution  of  the  specific  power  granted,  and  not  one  that  has  a 
slight  or  i-emote  relation  to  it." 

CORPORATIONS— CONSTRUCTION  OF  ARTICLES  OF  IN- 
CORPORATIONS—MANUFACTURING.— A  corporation,  whose  ar- 
ticles of  incorporation  state  that  "its  business  shall  be  the  manu- 
facturing of  clothing  of  every  description,  and  the  sale  of  clothing 
so  mannfactiu'ed,  and  the  transaction  of  all  other  business  neces- 
sary and  incidental  to  such  manvifacture  and  sale  of  clothing,"  is  a 
manufacturing  corporation  within  the  meaning  of  article  10,  section 
3,  of  the  Minnesota  constitution. 

CORPORATIONS,  MANUFACTURING  -WHEN  ARTICLES 
OP  INCORPORATION  DO  NOT  AUTHORIZE  THE  CONDUCT- 
ING OF  A  MERCANTILE  BUSINESS.— The  buying  and  selling  of 
ready-made  clothing  is  purely  a  mercantile  business,  and  is  un- 
authorized by  the  articles  of  Incorporation  of  a  manufacturing  cor- 
poration permitting  "the  transaction  of  all  other  business  necessary 
and  incidental  to  such  manufacture  and  sale  of  clothing." 

CORPORATIONS— POWERS— DIRTIES  OF  THIRD  PER- 
SONS.—Strangers  or  third  persons  are  presumed  to  know  the  law  of 
the  land,  and  are  bound,  when  dealing  with  corporations,  to  know 
the  powers  conferred  by  their  chai'ters. 

CORPORATIO:*S.  CHARACTER  OF  —  HOW  DETER- 
MINED.— At  least  in  the  absence  of  a  fraudulent  attempt  to  evade 
the  law,  the  articles  of  incorporation  are  themselves  the  sole  cri- 
terion to  ascertain  the  purpose  for  which  the  corporation  was 
formed. 

CORPORATIONS-BUSINESS  NOT  AUTHORIZED  BY  AR- 
TICLES OP  INCORPORATION— LIABILITY  OF  STOCKHOLD- 
ERS.—The  mere  fact  tliat  a  corporation  has  done  some  business 
outside  that  authorized  by  its  articles  does  not  render  the  stock- 
holders, as  such,  liable  for  Its  corporate  debts,  to  the  amount  of 
stock  owned  or  hold  by  them,  although  the  stockholders  would  be 
80  liable,  under  the  state  constitution,  if  such  business  had  Ijeen  au- 
thorized by  its  articles. 

A.  B.  Jackson,  for  the  appellant. 

Koon,  Whelan  &  Bennett,  Keith,  Evans,  Thompson  &  Fair- 
child,  Wilson  &  Van  Derlip,  C.  J.  Kockwood,  and  H.  M.  Farnam, 
for  the  respondenta. 


Feb.  1898.]     Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  t;.  Frisk-Turner  Co.      335 

*^^  BUCK,  J.  The  plaintiff  bank  recovered  a  judgment 
against  the  Frisk-Turner  Company  on  July  28,  1896,  for  the 
sum  of  fourteen  thousand  four  hundred  and  forty-three  dollars 
and  sixteen  cents,  on  which  an  execution  was  returned  unsatis- 
fied. On  July  24,  1896,  said  company  made  an  assignment, 
under  the  insolvency  laws  of  this  state,  to  Willard  T.  Atwater,. 
one  of  these  defendants-.  The  total  value  of  "^^^  the  assets, 
which  came  into  the  assignee's  possession  and  control  did  not 
exceed  three  thousand  dollars.  The  plaintiff  brought  this  ac- 
tion, by  supplemental  complaint,  to  enforce  the  individual  lia- 
bility of  the  shareholders  of  the  Frisk-Turner  Company.  The 
receiver  of  the  City  Bank  of  Minneapolis  filed  an  intervening^ 
complaint,  asking  permission  to  participate  in  the  sum  recov- 
ered on  a  claim  which  said  City  Bank  had  against  the  Frisk- 
Turner  Company. 

The  question  involved  in  this  issue  is,  whether  the  stock- 
holders of  the  Frisk-Turner  Company  are  liable  for  the  plain- 
tiff's debt  evidenced  by  the  judgment  so  rendered  against  it. 
The  company  was  organized  as  a  corporation  under  the  laws  of 
this  state,  and  the  material  article  of  the  corporation  is  article 
1,  which  reads  as  follows:  "The  name  of  the  corporation  shall 
be  Frisk-Turner  Company,  and  the  principal  place  of  transact- 
ing its  business  shall  be  at  Minneapolis,  in  the  state  of  Minne- 
sota, and  its  business  shall  be  the  manufacturing  of  clothing  of 
every  description,  and  the  sale  of  clothing  so  manufactured,  and 
the  transaction  of  all  other  business  necessary  and  incidental  to- 
£uch  manufacture  and  sale  of  clothing." 

The  corporation,  after  publishing  its  articles  and  completing- 
its  organization,  began  active  business  November  1, 1890.  In  ad- 
dition to  its  own  manufacture  of  men's  and  youth's  clothing,  and 
the  sale  thereof,  it,  as  part  of  its  business,  bought,  handled,  and 
sold  large  invoices  of  children's  manufactured  ready-made 
clothing.  These  ready-made  goods  were  purchased  and  handled 
by  defendant  in  the  ordinary  course  of  jobbing  business.  The 
ordinary  jobber's  profit  was  added  to  the  cost  price,  and  the 
goods  were  then  put  on  the  market  for  sale.  Defendant's  sales- 
men solicited  orders  for  them,  as  well  as  for  the  goods  manu- 
factured by  defendant,  and  sold  these  ready-made  goods  either 
independently  and  separate  from  the  goods  of  defeudant's  manu- 
facture, or  in  conjunction  with  the  latter,  as  customers  might 
desire.  They  were  not  bought  to  fill  orders  previously  received 
from  customers,  but  were  bought  and  sold,  for  profit,  inde- 
pendently of  the  goods  manufactured  by  defendant.    The  total 


336  Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Tubneb  Co.      [Minn. 

sales  made  by  defendant  company  while  engaged  in  business 
■aggregated  about  one  million  dollars.  The  sales  of  children's 
clothing  bought  by  *^''  defendant  ready-made  aggregated  from 
five  to  seven  per  cent  of  the  total  volume  of  sales,  or  from  fifty 
thousand  dollars  to  seventy  thousand  dollars. 

The  defendants  contend  that,  under  these  articles  of  incorpo^ 
ration,  they  are  authorized  to  manufacture  in  part,  and  buy  in 
p&rt  from  other  manufacturers,  and  to  sell  all  the  stock  so  ac- 
quired, as  ordinary  jobbers  or  wholesalers,  without  incurring  the 
shareholder's  liability  which  would  have  attached  if  they  had 
declared  these  double  purposes  plainly  in  their  articles.  On 
the  other  hand,  plaintiff  alleges  that  this  suit  is  brought  upon 
the  ground  that  the  corporation  was  in  fact  organized  for  mer- 
cantile as  well  as  manufacturing  purposes,  and  depends  wholly 
on  the  provisions  of  the  constitution,  and  that  any  competent 
evidence  to  show  that  the  defendant  company  was  not  organized 
exclusively  for  manufacturing  purposes,  so  as  to  come  within 
the  exception  to  that  provision,  was  admissible. 

The  constitution,  article  10,  section  3,  provides  that:  "Each 
fitockb older  in  any  corporation  (excepting  those  organized  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  on  any  kind  of  manufacturing  or  me- 
chanical business)  shall  be  liable  to  the  amount  of  stock  held 
or  owned  by  him.'* 

A  corporation,  being  the  mere  creature  of  the  law,  "possesses 
•only  those  properties  which  the  charter  of  its  creation  confers 
«pon  it,  either  expressly,  or  as  incidental  to  its  very  existence" : 
Marshall,  C.  J.,  in  Trustees  v.  Woodward,  4  Wheat.  518-636. 
The  articles  of  incorporation  in  question  do  not  authorize  the 
Frisk-Turner  Company  to  buy  and  sell  clothing  manufactured 
by  concei-ns  other  than  its'elf.  Such  business  would  be  a  purely 
^'mercantile  business,"  and  the  latter  words  and  "manufacturing 
or  mechanical  business"  are  not  interchangeable  terms.  Both 
kinds  of  business  might,  under  the  constitution  and  laws,  be  car- 
ried on  in  conjunction  by  one  corporation,  if  the  articles  so 
provided;  but  the  liabilities  of  the  stockholders  would  in  such 
case  be  different  from  those  of  a  corporation  organized  to  carry 
on  an  exclusively  manufacturing  or  mechanical  business,  under 
article  10,  section  3,  of  the  constitution. 

In  the  phrase,  "the  transaction  of  all  other  business  neces- 
sary and  incidental  to  such  manufacture  and  sale  of  clothing,'* 
•we  find  ****  no  warrant  for  such  corporation  including  in  its 
business  a  purely  mercantile  business,  such  as  buying  and  gelling 
ready-made  clothing. 


Feb.  1898.]     Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Tubnee  Co.     337 

"An  incidental  power  is  one  that  is  directly  and  immediately 
appropriate  to  the  execution  of  the  specific  power  granted,  and 
not  one  that  has  a  slight  or  remote  relation  to  it";  Hood  v. 
New  York,  23  Conn.  1,  16. 

The  exercise  of  a  power  which  might  be  beneficial  to  the  prin- 
cipal business  is  not  necessarily  incident  to  it.  It  might  be  the 
€xercise  of  a  power  inhibited  by  the  constitution,  or  one  not 
warranted  by  law,  while  the  principal  business  might  be  per- 
mitted by  both.  The  constitution  exempts  the  stockholders  in 
any  corporation  carrying  on  manufacturing  or  mechanical  busi- 
ness from  liability  to  the  amount  of  the  stock  held  or  owned 
by  him,  and  its  purpose  is  self-evident.  "That  purpose  was  to 
encourage  manufacturing  enterprises,  by  exempting  those  in- 
vesting their  capital  in  that  business  from  personal  liability**: 
State  V.  Minnesota  Thresher  Mfg.  Co.,  40  Minn.  213,  222. 

In  this  case  if  the  buying  and  selling  of  ready-made  cloth- 
ing by  virtue  of  its  articles  of  incorporation  is  authorized 
under  the  guise  of  being  incidental  to  the  manufacturing  and 
selling  of  its  own  manufactured  clothing,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
just  where  the  partition  line  may  be  found  between  the  prin- 
cipal business  and  that  which  is  incidental  to  it.  If  the  buy- 
ing and  selling  of  fifty  thousand  dollars  to  seventy  thousand 
dollars*  of  ready-made  clothing  in  a  business  of  one  million 
dollars  is  only  incidental,  who  shall  determine  whether  the  buy- 
ing and  selling  of  half  a  million  dollars'  worth,  more  or  less,  of 
ready-made  clothing  is  not  also  merely  incidental.  If  the  di- 
rectors, at  their  option  or  election,  can  thus  shift  the  amount 
and  dividing  line,  that  which  is  claimed  to  be  incidental  in  the 
articles  of  incorporation  will  become  the  principal,  and  the 
original  principal  business  merely  incidental. 

The  liability  of  stockholders  cannot  rest  upon  any  such  un- 
certain or  transitory  basis.  The  evidence  of  defendants  tend- 
ing to  show  that  the  buying  and  selling  of  children's  ready- 
made  clothing  by  the  corporation  was  necessary  to  the  success- 
ful manufacture  and  sale  of  its  own  clothing  cannot  change 
the  legal  effect  of  the  language  used  in  its  articles  of  incorpo- 
ration; and  the  result  of  such  business  **®  ending  in  insol- 
vency, does  not  carry  a  very  strong  conviction  that  even  the 
buying  and  selling  of  ready-made  clothing  was  a  necessary  in- 
cident to  the  successful  manufacture  of  its  own  clothing. 

The  sale  of  its  own  manufactured  goods  is  within  the  con- 
stitutional provision  conferring  the  power  to  carry  on  the  manu- 
facturing business,  because  such  business  would  become  futile 

AM.  ST.  Rkp.,  Vou  LXX.-22 


Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turner  Co.       [Minn» 

if  such  products  could  not  be  disposed  of  with  profit.  So,  also, 
buying  the  raw  material  for  the  purpose  of  manufacturing  it 
into  articles  of  commerce  and  selling  the  same  would  be  within 
the  power  conferred  by  the  constitutional  provision  in  question,, 
and  its  articles  of  incorporation.  It  would  enable  it  to  carry 
on  the  manufacturing  business  contemplated  by  the  very  lan- 
guage of  the  constitution  itself.  But,  as  the  buying  and  sell- 
ing of  ready-made  clothing  is  purely  a  mercantile  business,  it 
is  unauthorized  by  the  articles  of  incorporation. 

This  brings  us  to  the  question  whether  the  fact  that  the  cor- 
poration exceeded  its  powers  in  buying  and  selling  children'^ 
clothing  already  manufactured,  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
eeveral  of  the  incorporators,  with  knowledge  thereof  on  the  part 
of  all  the  directors  and  stockholders,  after  the  signing  of  the 
articles,  and  before  the  commencement  of  the  manufacturing- 
business,  purchased  several  hundred  dollars'  worth  of  manu- 
factured children's  clothing,  with  intent  to  sell  the  same,  and 
employed  salesmen  for  that  purpose,  rendered  the  individual 
stockholders  liable. 

While  the  evidence  vras  excluded  as  to  the  acts  of  said  in- 
corporators, we  assume  that  such  would  have  been  the  proven 
fact,  had  not  the  objection  to  its  admission  been  sustained. 
The  buying  and  selling  such  ready-made  clothing  by  the  cor- 
poration, to  the  amount  of  fifty  thousand  dollars  to  seventy 
thousand  dollars  was  admitted,  and  that  it  was  carried  on  for 
a  series  of  years,  necessarily  requiring  the  employment  of  clerks 
and  salesmen.  Hence,  we  feel  justified  in  assuming,  for  the 
purpose  of  this  decision,  that  the  facts  offered  to  be  proven 
were  true.  But  do  these  facts  alter  the  liability  of  the  stock- 
holders ? 

This  corporation  was  evidently  organized  under  the  Laws  of 
1873,  chapter  11,  and  subsequent  amendments,  being  the  same- 
as  incorporated  into  the  ■*^^  General  Statutes  of  1894,  section 
2805,  and  subsequent  sections  upon  the  same  subject.  Section 
2807  of  this  statute  provides  that:  "The  purpose  for  which 
every  such  corporation  shall  be  established  shall  be  distinctly 
and  definitely  specified  by  the  stockholders  in  their  articles  of 
association,  and  it  shall  not  be  lawful  for  said  corporation  to 
direct  its  operations  or  appropriate  its  funds  to  any  other  pur- 
pose." 

The  articles  in  question  were  duly  recorded  in  the  office  of 
the  register  of  deeds  of  Hennepin  county,  where  the  corporatioa 
was  located,  and  filed  and  recorded  in  the  office  of  the  secre- 
tary of  state,  and  published  in  a  public  newspaper,  as  required 


Feb.  1898.]     Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turnek  Co.    339 

by  law.  Strangers  or  third  persons  are  presumed  to  know  the 
law  of  the  land,  and  are  bound,  when  dealing  with  corporations, 
to  know  the  powers  conferred  by  their  charters:  Kraniger  v. 
People's  Building  Soc,  60  Minn.  94.  The  act  of  the  corpora- 
tion in  buying  and  selling  ready-made  clothing  was  not  only  a 
direct  violation  of  the  law  above  quoted,  but  a  violation  of  the 
articles  of  its  incorporation.  But  this  violation  was  well  known 
to  the  plaintiff,  from  actual  knowledge  received  as  to  what  the 
corporation  was  doing  and  intended  to  do,  as  well  as  from  its 
presumptive  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  the  articles  so  re- 
corded and  published,  and  the  law  above  quoted.  The  repre- 
sentation of  the  incorporators  was  not  made  upon  an  apparent 
authority  based  upon  private  papers,  to  which  strangers  had  no 
access,  but  that  they  were  buying  and  selling,  and  intended  to 
continue  to  buy  and  sell,  ready-made  clothing  in  violation  of 
law  and  their  articles  of  incorporation,  which  plaintiff,  knowing 
such  acts  to  be  unlawful,  had  no  right  to  rely  upon. 

What  the  result  would  be  if  it  appeared  that  the  whole 
scheme  ^as  a  fraudulent  contrivance  on  the  part  of  the  corpo- 
rators to  evade  their  constitutional  liability  we  need  not  con- 
sider. There  were  not  the  slightest  indicia  of  fraud  in  the 
whole  transaction.  It  was  not  alleged  or  proved,  and  was  speci- 
fically disclaimed  by  plaintiff's  counsel  on  the  argument  of  this 
case.  Nor  were  such  representations  the  acts  of  the  corpora- 
tion. The  charter  was  the  measure  of  its  power  as  to  all  parties 
dealing  with  it.  At  least,  in  the  absence  of  such  fraudulent 
attempt  to  evade  the  law,  the  articles  of  incorporation  are  them- 
selves the  sole  criterion  to  ascertain  the  purpose  '**^  for  which 
the  corporation  was  formed.  But  the  mere  fact  that,  as  in  this 
case,  it  had  done  some  business  outside  that  authorized  by  its 
articles,  does  not  render  the  stockholders,  as  such,  liable  for  its 
corporate  debts,  to  the  amount  of  stock  owned  or  held  by  them. 

There  are  no  authorities  in  this  court  to  the  contrary  of  the 
views  herein  expressed.  In  the  case  of  Hastings  Malting  Co.  v. 
Iron  Eange  Brewing  Co.,  65  Minn.  28,  it  was  held  that  the  gen- 
eral nature  of  the  business  of  the  corporation,  as  defined  by  its 
articles  of  incorporation,  was  the  manufacture  or  brewing  of 
lager  beer,  and  selling  and  disposing  of  the  same,  together  with 
such  other  business  as  might  be  incidental  thereto,  and  hence 
that  it  was  exclusively  a  manufacturing  corporation,  and  its 
stockholders  not  liable  for  the  corporate  debts,  beyond  the 
amount  due  on  their  stock  subscription.  The  liability  of  the 
corporation  for  dealing  in  business  outside  of  that  authorized 
by  its   articles  was  not  involved.    First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Winona 


340  NicoLLBT  Nat.  Bank  v.  Fbisk-Tubner  Co.      [Minn. 

Plow  Co.,  58  Minn.  167,  was  a  case  where  it  appeared  from  its 
articles  that  it  was  not  only  formed  for  the  manufacture  and 
eale  of  farm  implements,  hut  for  the  purchase  and  sale  of  others 
already  manufactured;  and  it  was  held  that  it  was  not  organized 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  an  exclusively  manufacturing 
business,  and  its  stockholders  were  held  liable  for  its  corporate 
debts  to  the  amount  of  their  stock.  Densmore  v.  Shepard,  46 
Minn.  54,  involved  the  construction  of  articles  which  provided 
that  the  general  nature  of  the  business  was  to  be  **the  manu- 
facturing and  sale  of  lime,  quarrying  stone  for  making  lime 
and  for  building  and  other  purposes,  digging  and  selling  sand, 
together  with  the  buying  and  selling  of  lime,  hair,  sand,  cement, 
end  like  articles,  and  other  building  materials,  and  the  doing  of 
all  things  necessary  to  carry  on  said  business";  and  it  was  held 
that  it  was  not  organized  exclusively  for  the  purpose  of  carry- 
ing on  a  manufacturing  business.  In  other  cases  where  the 
Bame  rule  was  applied,  the  articles  themselves  authorized  the 
carrying  on  or  doing  some  kind  of  independent  business  in  ad- 
dition to  that  of  manufacturing,  and  such  cases  have  no  con- 
trolling influence  on  the  question  here  involved.  The  power 
to  do  such  independent  business  was  there  given  by  the  articles, 
and,  in  going  beyond  the  manufacturing  business,  the  corpora- 
tion still  kept  '^^  within  the  limits  of  its  charter;  but  in  so 
doing  the  stockholders  became  liable,  not  because  they  had 
violated  the  law,  but  because  their  articles  authorized  the  cor- 
poration to  carry  on  a  business  other  than  that  of  manufactur- 
ing, though  in  strict  compliance  with  that  authorized  by  the 
articles  themselves.     The  distinction  is  obvious. 

What  other  remedies  creditors  may  have  against  those  in  the 
management  or  control  of  the  affairs  of  a  manufacturing  cor- 
poration, who  have  extended,  or  authorized  the  extension  of, 
its  business  beyond  what  was  authorized  by  its  articles,  is  a 
question  not  now  before  us. 

Order  affirmed. 


CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A  corporation  possesses  only  such 
powers  as  are  expressly  Riven  It  by  law,  and  such  Implied  powers 
as  are  necessary  to  enable  It  to  exercise  the  express  powers  thus 
plven:  Franklin  Nat.  Bank  v.  Whitehead.  149  Ind.  560.  O?  Am.  St. 
Rep.  302,  and  note;  Port  of  Mobile  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  84 
Ala.  115.  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  342. 

CORPORATIONS— AN  INCIDENTAL  POWER  Is  one  that  In  di- 
rectly and  Immediately  appropriate  to  the  execution  of  the  specific 
power  granted,  and  not  one  that  has  a  sli.srht  or  remote  relation  to 
It:  People  v.  Chicago  Gas  Trust  Co.,  130  111.  2GS,  17  Am.  St.  Rep. 
819. 


Feb.  1898.]      Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  341 

CORPORATIONS— POWERS-DUTIES  OF  THIRD  PERSONS.— 
lie  who  deals  with  a  corporation  Is  chargeable  with  notice  of  Ita 
powers  and  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  formed,  and,  when  deal- 
ing with  its  agents  or  officers,  is  bound  to  know  the  extent  of  their 
powers  and  authority:  Jemlson  v.  Citizens'  Sav.  Bank,  122  N.  Y.  135, 
19  Am.  St.  Rep.  482;  Durkee  v.  People  155  111.  354,  46  Am.  St  Rep. 
340;  Franklin  Nat.  Bank  v.  Whitehead,  149  Ind.  5G0,  63  Am.  St. 
Rep.  302;  Elevator  Co.  v.  Memphis  etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  85  Tenn.  703,  4 
Am.  St.  Rep.  798. 

CORPORATIONS— CHARACTER  OF.— The  character  of  a  cor- 
poration, whether  public  or  private,  depends  upon  the  purposes  for 
which  it  was  formed,  and  the  powers  conferred  upon  It,  and  not 
upon  the  character  of  its  stockholders:  Bardstown  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Metcalfe,  4  Met  (Ky.)  199,  81  Am.  Dec.  541. 


Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Railway  Company. 

(71  MINN80TA,  438.] 

STREET  RAILWAYS— EVIDENCE— GENERAL  INCOMPE- 
TENCY OF  MOTORMAN.— Evidence  of  the  general  incompetency 
of  a  motorman,  based  on  the  observations  of  witnesses  who  had 
seen  him  operate  his  car  on  prior  occasions,  is  inadmissible  to  es- 
tablish negligence  at  the  time  of  the  accident 

STREET  RAILWAYS— MASTER  AND  SERVANT— EVI- 
DENCE—RULES  OP  COMPANY.— The  private  rules  of  a  master 
regulating  the  conduct  of  his  servants  in  the  management  of  his 
own  business,  intended  only  for  the  guidance  of  his  servants,  al- 
though designed  for  the  protection  of  others,  are  not  admissible  in 
evidence  to  establish  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  master. 

NEGLIGENCE— STANDARD  OF  DUTY.— A  person  cannot 
by  the  adoption  of  private  rules,  fix  the  standard  of  his  -duty  to 
others. 

STREET  RAILWAYS— CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE- 
WANTON  CONDUCT  OF  MOTORMAN.— A  plaintiff  may  recover 
of  a  street  railway  company,  notwithstanding  that  he  might  have 
negligently  placed  himself  in  a  place  of  danger.  If  the  conduct  of 
the  motorman  In  running  him  down  was  wanton  and  willful,  or  if, 
after  discovering  the  plaintiff  In  a  place  of  danger  in  time  to  have 
prevented  the  injury  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  he  failed 
to  do  so. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE— POWER  OF  DEFEND- 
ANT TO  AVOID  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PLAINTIFF'S  NEGLI- 
GENCE.—The  doctrine  that  a  plaintiff  may  recover  if  the  defend- 
ant might,  by  the  exercise  of  care,  have  avoided  the  consequences 
of  the  plalntlCTs  negligence,  is  only  applicable  to  cases  In  which  the 
plaintiff's  negligence  preceded  that  of  the  defendant.  But  when 
the  negligence  of  the  two  persons  is  contemporaneous,  and  the  fault 
of  each  operates  directly  to  cause  the  injury,  neither  can  recover 
from  the  other. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE— WILLFUL  ACT  OF  DE- 
FENDANT.—Where  the  defendant's  acts  are  willful  and  inten- 
tional, the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff.  If  any,  is  no  longer  deemed 
In  law  a  proximate  cause  of  the  Injury. 

COMPARATIVE  NEGLIGENCE.— The  doctrine  of  compara- 
tive negligence  has  never  been  recognized  in  Minnesota. 


342        Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.      [Minn. 

PRESUMPTION  —  SUPPRESSION  OF  EVIDENCE.  —  The 
presumption  arising  from  the  spoliation  or  suppression  of  evidence 
that  it  would,  if  produced,  be  unfavorable  to  the  party  destroying 
or  suppressing  it,  is  not  limited  to  the  case  of  documentary  evi- 
dence in  the  exclusive  possession  and  control  of  the  party. 

WITNESS,  FAILURE  TO  CALL  —  PRESUMPTION  —  IN- 
STRUCTIONS.—The  omission  of  the  defendant  to  call  its  motorman 
as  a  witness,  though  available,  will  justify  the  court  in  instructing 
the  jury  that,  in  weighing  the  evidence  introduced,  they  are  at 
liberty  to  indulge  in  the  presumption  that  the  testimony  of  the 
motorman,  if  introduced,  would  not  have  been  favorable  to  the  de- 
fendant's cause. 

Munn  &  Thygeson,  for  the  appellant. 

Stevens,  O'Brien,  Cole  &  Albrecht,  for  the  respondent. 

'*43  MITCHELL,  J.  The  plaintiff,  a  stranger  to  and  not  an 
employe  of,  the  defendant,  recovered  a  verdict  for  personal  in- 
juries caused  by  the  alleged  negligence  of  defendant's  servants; 
and  from  an  order  denying  its  motion  for  Judgment,  notwith- 
standing the  verdict,  or  for  a  new  trial,  the  defendant  appealed. 

1.  The  first  three  assignments  of  error  challenge  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  evidence  to  justify  the  verdict,  for  the  reasons: 
1.  That  it  failed  to  establish  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant;  and  2.  That  it  conclusively  appeared  that  the  plain- 
tiff himself  was  guilty  of  contributory  negligence. 

The  accident  occurred  at  or  near  the  easterly  intersection  of 
Walnut  and  Seventh  streets,  in  the  city  of  St.  Paul.  These 
streets  intersect  each  other  at  right  angles,  the  course  of  Wal- 
nut sfreet  being  northerly  and  southerly,  and  that  of  Seventh 
street  easterly  and  westerly.  The  width  of  Seventh  street  from 
curb  to  curb  is  forty-six  feet.  Along  the  middle  of  this  street 
the  defendant  has  two  parallel  tracks,  the  northerly  track  being 
used  by  west-bound  and  the  southerly  by  east-bound  cars. 
These  tracks  are  four  and  three-quarters  feet  wide,  and  the 
space  between  them  is  a  little  less  than  four  feet — sufficient  to 
permit  cars  to  pass  each  other  in  safety. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  day  of  the  accident,  plaintiff  had 
traveled  southerly,  down  Walnut  street,  to  Seventh,  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  an  east-bound  car  going  down  town.  He  had 
reached  the  northeast  corner  of  Walnut  and  Seventh,  and  then 
started  to  cross  the  latter,  for  the  purpose  of  getting  on  the 
south  side  of  the  southerly  track  in  order  to  take  his  car.  His 
testimony  as  to  what  occurred  is  as  follows:  "Just  as  I  left  the 
sidewalk  to  cross  Seventh  street,  I  looked  up,  and  looked  both 
ways.  I  saw  a  car  approaching  from  the  east  over  a  block  away, 
and  I  also  looked  the  other  way  toward  the  west,  and  there  was 


Feb.  1898.]       Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  848 

a  car  coming  from  that  way  too;  and  I  walked  out  on  the  rails, 
and  my  intention  was,  as  I  walked  out  there,  to  ***  get  across 
the  rails,  before  the  east-bound  car  got  down  there  (the  car  I 
was  going  to  take).  As  I  walked  out  on  the  track,  that  east- 
bound  car  got  down  there,  and  I  couldn't  cross  it.  So  I  hesi- 
tated a  minute  as  the  car  got  down  by  me.  Then  I  started  to 
walk  around  the  tail  end.  Just  as  I  started  to  walk  around 
the  tail  end,  and  took  a  few  steps,  this  west-bound  car  came 
along,  and  struck  me,  and  knocked  me  down." 

Leaving  out  of  consideration  for  the  present  plaintiff's  state- 
ment as  to  the  distance  of  the  west-bound  car  when  he  looked 
eastward,  this  testimony  photographs  quite  correctly  the  gene- 
ral situation  and  manner  in  which  the  accident  occurred.  Evi- 
dently, the  plaintiff  estimated  that  he  had  time  to  cross  both 
tracks  before  either  car  would  reach  the  street  crossing,  but  he 
overestimated  the  length  of  time  it  would  take  the  east-bound 
car  to  arrive.  Hence,  whan  he  reached  the  space  between  the 
two  tracks,  he  found  the  east-bound  car  in  too  close  proximity 
to  enable  him  to  cross  in  front  of  it,  and  then  hurriedly  turned 
to  the  west  in  order  to  go  around  the  rear  end  of  it.  He  tes- 
tified that  when  he  looked  west,  as  he  started  to  cross  Seventh 
street,  the  east-bound  car  was  a  little  this  side  of  the  middle  of 
the  block  (that  is,  the  block  immediately  west  of  Walnut  street), 
and  was  coming  down  a  pretty  good  gait. 

The  testimony  of  other  witnesses  as  to  the  respective  dis- 
tances of  the  two  cars  when  plaintiff  started  to  cross  Seventh 
street  is  conflicting.  Plaintiff  testified  that  he  walked  across 
Seventh  street  at  an  ordinary  gait,  of  three  or  four  miles  an 
hour,  until  he  turned  to  the  west  to  pass  around  the  end  of  the 
€ast-bound  car,  when  he  increased  his  speed.  After  he  looked 
east,  as  he  stepped  from  the  curbstone  to  cross  Seventh  street, 
he  did  not  again  look  to  see  how  far  the  west-bound  car  was  from 
him.  Just  as  he  stepped  upon  the  northerly  track,  he  signaled 
the  east-bound  car  to  stop.  He  testified  that  he  heard  the  gong 
on  the  east-bound,  but  not  on  the  west-bound,  car.  The  other 
evidence  was  conflicting  as  to  whether  any  signal  was  given  on 
the  latter  of  its  approach  to  the  street  crossing. 

The  evidence  as  to  the  rate  of  speed  of  the  west-bound  car 
when  it  reached  the  Walnut  street  crossing,  and  passed  the 
other  car,  varied  from  seven  or  eight  miles  up  to  fifteen  or  twenty 
miles  an  hour.  Other  evidence  in  the  case  is,  perhaps,  con- 
clusive that  the  latter  is  an  overestimate;  but  the  jury  would 
have  been  amply  *^  justified  in  finding  that  it  was  consider- 
ably more  than  seven  or  eight  miles;  also,  that  its  previous  rate 


844        Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.     [Minn. 

of  speed  was  not  at  all  slackened  as  it  approached  tlie  street 
crossing.  Approaching  Walnut  street  from  the  east,  Seventh 
street  is  on  a  downgrade,  and  on  that  forenoon  the  rails  of  the 
track  were  somewhat  wet  and  slippery  from  recent  rain.  The 
motorman  on  the  west-bound  car  was  not  produced  as  a  wit- 
ness on  the  trial.  There  were  numerous  other  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances in  evidence  having  more  or  less  bearing  upon  th& 
questions  of  defendant's  negligence  and  of  plaintiff's  contribu- 
tory negligence,  but  what  has  been  stated  will  give  a  fairly  cor- 
rect and  complete  idea  of  the  general  drift  of  the  evidence. 

The  conjuncture  of  circumstances  was  such  as  to  require 
peculiar  caution  on  the  part  of  the  motorman  on  the  west- 
bound car.  He  was  approaching  the  crossing  of  two  much- 
traveled- streets  in  a  populous  part  of  the  city.  He  knew,  or 
ought  to  have  known,  that  he  was  about  to  pass  another  car, 
and  that,  too,  on  the  side  of  the  crossing  where  it  was  liable  to 
stop  to  let  off  or  take  an  passengers — a  place  of  peculiar  danger. 
The  jury  were  abundantly  justified  in  finding  that  he  was  guiltj 
of  negligence. 

The  question  of  plaintiff's  contributory  negligence  was,  under 
the  evidence,  also  a  question  for  the  jury.  A  court  would  not 
be  justified  in  holding,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  he  was  negligent. 
The  number  of  concurring  circumstances  that  bear  upon  that 
question  makes  the  case  peculiarly  one  for  a  jury. 

The  strongest  argument  that  can  be  advanced  against  th© 
plaintiff's  conduct  is  that  he  did  not  continue  to  watch  the  west- 
bound car  after  he  left  the  curb  to  cross  Seventh  streeit.  But 
it  must  be  remembered  that  the  distance  he  had  to  travel  waa 
very  short,  and  would  occupy  only  a  very  few  seconds.  He  would 
apparently  have  crossed  the  north  track  in  safety  but  for  the 
(to  him)  unanticipated  arrival  of  the  east-bound  car.  Doubt- 
less, his  attention  was  directed  to  that  car,  which  was  the  one 
he  desired  to  board;  but  the  situation  was  one  which  was  calcu- 
lated to  distract  his  thoughts  from  the  west-bound  oar.  He 
was  suddenly  confronted  with  an  unexpected  emergency,  with 
little  time  to  decide  on  his  course  of  action.  He  had  seen,  as 
the  jury  might  have  found,  the  west-bound  car  quite  a  distance 
away  when  he  started  to  cross  Seventh  street.  He  had  '*'*^  no- 
reason  to  anticipate  that  it  would  be  run  at  any  unlawful  or 
unusual  rate  of  speed.  On  the  contrary,  he  might  reasonably 
expect  that  it  would,  in  accordance  with  what  everyone  knows 
of  the  general  custom,  approach  with  caution  and  slackened 
speed  a  street  crossing,  where  another  car  going  in  the  opposite 
direction  was  about  to  stop  to  take  on  or  let  off  passengers.     Our 


Feb.  1898.]       Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  345 

conclusion  is,  that  the  evidence  justified  the  verdict;  but,  for 
errors  of  law  occurring  on  the  trial,  there  must  be  a  reversal. 

3.  Upon  the  trial,  the  court,  against  the  objection  of  defend- 
ant, admitted  evidence  of  the  general  incompetency  of  the 
motorman,  based  on  the  observations  of  witnesses  who  had  seen 
him  operate  his  car  on  prior  occasions.  We  think  this  was  error. 
The  defendant  is  liable,  if  at  all,  for  the  acts  of  its  servant 
upon  the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior.  If  the  motorman 
was  negligent  on  this  occasion,  the  defendant  is  liable,  no  matter 
how  competent  he  was  or  how  habitually  careful  he  had  been  on 
other  occasions.  On  the  othei  hand,  if  he  was  not  negligent 
on  this  occasion,  the  defendant  is  not  liable,  notwithstanding 
that  he  may  have  been  incompetent  or  habitually  careless  on 
former  occasions.  The  sole  issue,  aside  from  that  as  to  plain- 
tiff's contributory  negligence,  was  whether  or  not  the  motor- 
man  was  guilty  of  negligence  at  the  time  of  the  accident. 

When  the  act  or  omission  is  proved,  whether  it  be  actionable 
negligence  is  to  be  determined  by  the  character  of  the  act  or 
omission  itself,  and  not  by  the  character  of  prior  acts  of  the 
party  committing  it.  If  the  plaintiff  could  offer  testimony  as 
to  the  general  incompetency  or  as  to  prior  negligent  acts  or 
omissions  of  the  motorman,  then  with  equal  propriety  the  de- 
fendant, upon  the  issue  of  contributory  negligence,  might  offer 
evidence  of  plaintiff's  general  carelessness,  or  of  his  negligent 
acts  on  other  occasions.  Indeed,  we  do  not  see  why  plaintiff 
would  not,  upon  the  same  principle,  have  the  right  to  introduce 
evidence  that  he  himself  was  an  habitually  careful  and  cautious 
man.  As  the  liability  of  a  master  for  the  acts  of  his  servant 
rests  upon  the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior,  it  can  mate  no 
difference  as  to  the  admissibility  of  such  evidence  whether  the 
alleged  negligent  act  was  committed  by  the  servant  or  by  the 
master  in  person.  Hence,  if  the  offered  evidence  was  admissible 
'*^'"  in  tbis  case,  it  would  have  been  equally  competent  had  the 
defendant  been  a  natural  person,  and  operating  the  car  himself, 
to  prove  that  he  was  incompetent  to  perform  such  work,  or  had 
performed  it  negligently  on  former  occasions. 

There  are  some  cases  which  hold  that  where  the  person  in- 
jured was  killed,  and  there  were  no  eyewitnesses  of  the  occur- 
rence, the  general  character  of  the  deceased  as  a  careful  and 
prudent  man  may  be  shown,  for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  pre- 
sumption that  he  was  not  negligent  on  the  occasion  in  question. 
But  this  rule  is  based  upon  the  supposed  necessities  of  the  case, 
and  is  repudiated  by  very  eminent  authorities.  There  is  also 
a  line  of  authorities  which  holds  that,  where  the  issue  is  whether 


346  Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  [Minn. 

a  particular  act  or  a  particular  way  of  doing  it  is  or  is  not  negli- 
gent, evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  people  generally  under 
similar  circumstances  do  the  act,  or  do  it  in  the  same  way. 
This  is  upon  the  ground  that  what  men  generally  do  under  like 
circumstances  is  some  test  of  ordinary  care.  But  the^e  cases 
have  no  bearing  upon  the  question  now  under  consideration. 

Many  of  the  authorities  cited  by  plaintiff's  counsel  are  cases 
where  a  servant  brought  an  action  against  his  master  for  injuries 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant.  In  such  cases, 
the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  does  not  apply,  the  gist  of 
Action  being  the  negligence  of  the  master  in  employing  or  re- 
taining an  incompetent  servant.  A  moment's  reflection  will 
show  that  such  cases  are  not  at  all  in  point.  One  or  two  of  the 
€ases  cited  by  counsel  were  actions  against  the  vendor  for  breach 
of  warranty  as  to  the  efficiency  of  a  machine  in  certain  particu^ 
lars  going  to  its  general  mechanism,  and  where  it  was  held  that 
it  was  competent  to  show  that  other  machines  of  the  same  pat- 
tern, made  and  sold  by  the  same  vendor,  had  been  tried  and 
found  defective  in  the  same  particulars.  The  principle  upon 
which  these  cases  proceed  is  very  apparent,  and  is  the  same  upon 
which,  in  "fire  eases,"  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  competent  to 
show  that  the  locomotive  alleged  to  have  started  the  fire  in 
■question  started  other  fires  about  the  same  time. 

"We  have  examined  all  of  the  numerous  cases  cited  on  this 
■question,  and  find  that,  aside  from  obiter  remarks  in  one  or 
two  of  which  ^^^  the  question  was  not  involved  or  not  raised, 
only  the  following  at  all  tend  to  support  plaintiff's  contention, 
viz.:  Vicksburg  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Patton,  31  Miss.  156,  %&  Am. 
Dec.  552;  State  v.  Manchester,  52  N".  H.  528;  Craven  v.  Central 
Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Cal.  345;  State  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  58 
N.  H.  410.  But  a  careful  examination  of  these  cases  shows  that 
all  they  hold  (unless  it  is  the  first)  is  that  when  evidence  is  con- 
flicting as  to  whether  a  person,  in  conducting  his  business  or 
performing  his  services,  performed  a  particular  act,  or  performed 
it  in  a  particular  way,  it  is  competent  to  show  that  he  was  in 
the  habit  of  performing  the  act  or  performing  it  in  that  particu- 
lar way,  not  as  evidence  of  character  or  of  fitness  or  unfitness, 
but  simply  as  having  some  tendency  to  show  that  on  the  par- 
ticular occasion  in  question  he  probably  did  the  act,  or  did  it  in 
a  particular  way,  in  accordance  with  his  general  habit  or  cus- 
tom. 

Whether  this  rule  is  corr  et  or  incorrect,  it  falls  short  of  sus- 
taining tbe  contention  of  plaintiff's  conn<5el  in  the  present  case. 
The  evidence  introduced  was  not  directed  or  limited  to  showing 


Feb.  1898.]       Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  S47 

that  the  motorman  was  in  the  habit  of  doing  or  omitting  to  do 
some  particular  act  which  the  other  evidence  tended  to  prove 
that  he  did  or  omitted  to  do  on  the  occasion  in  question.  It 
was  to  the  effect  that  he  was  generally  incompetent,  as  shown 
in  a  variety  of  ways,  by  his  method  of  managing  his .  car  on 
former  occasions.  In  brief,  the  inference  sought  to  be  drawn 
is,  that  if  he  was  generally  incompetent,  it  was  more  probably 
that  he  operated  the  car  improperly  on  this  occasion.  Such  an 
inference  might  at  first  blush  seem  to  be  a  legitimate  one,  but 
it  is  too  remote  and  conjectural  to  be  permissible.  Any  such 
rule  of  evidence  would  drag  innumerable  collateral  issues  into 
the  trial  of  a  case;  for  evidence  of  general  incompetency  would 
necessarily  result  in  the  introduction  of  evidence  of  particular 
acts. 

3.  The  court  also  admitted  in  evidence,  over  defendant's  ob- 
jection, its  rules  intended  only  for  the  guidance  of  its  own  em- 
ployes in  the  operation  of  its  cars.  We  think  this  was  error. 
There  was  no  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  had  any  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  these  rules  or  of  any  custom,  based  upon  them, 
as  to  the  manner  of  operating  cars;  hence  his  conduct  could 
not  have  been  in  any  way  affected  or  influenced  by  them.  It 
is  not  claimed  that  these  ■***  rules  require  or  permit  anything 
that  is  inconsistent  with  reasonable  care.  The  theory  upon  which 
they  were  offered  was  that  they  tended  to  show  what  duty  the 
defendant  owed  to  the  public  in  the  operation  of  its  cars,  and 
hence  that  a  violation  of  any  of  them,  being  a  breach  of  such 
duty,  constituted  actionable  negligence,  or  at  least  was  evidence 
of  it. 

Private  rules  of  a  master  regulating  the  conduct  of  his  ser- 
vants in  the  management  of  his  own  business,  although  designed 
for  the  protection  of  others,  stand  on  an  entirely  different  foot- 
ing from  statutes  and  municipal  ordinances  designed  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  public.  The  latter,  as  far  as  they  go,  fix  the 
standard  of  duty  toward  those  whom  they  were  intended  to 
protect,  and  a  violation  of  them  is  negligence  in  law  or  per  se. 
But  a  person  cannot,  by  the  adoption  of  private  rules,  fix  the 
standard  of  his  duty  to  others.  That  is  fixed  by  law,  either  statu- 
tory or  common.  Such  rules  may  require  more,  or  they  may 
require  less,  than  the  law  requires;  and  whether  a  certain  course 
of  conduct  is  negligent,  or  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  must 
be  determined  by  the  standard  fixed  by  law,  without  regard  to 
any  private  rules  of  the  party. 

Under  some   circumstances,  such   rules  may  become  an  im- 


848  Fonda  v.  St.  Padl  City  Ry.  Co.  [Minn, 

portant  factor  in  the  application  of  legal  principles  to  the  con- 
duct of  a  person;  as,  for  example,  where  the  rule  was  known 
to  him,  and  he  governed,  or  had  a  right  to  govern,  his  conduct 
accordingly.  Such  was  the  case  of  Smithson  v.  Chicago  Great 
Western,  71  Minn.  216.  In  that  case  the  rule  was  known  to, 
and  obligatory  upon,  both  the  party  injured  and  the  party 
guilty  of  the  alleged  negligent  act.  Each  was  bound  to  know 
that  the  other  might  and  could  regulate  his  own  conduct  on  the 
assumption  that  he  would  obey  the  rule.  Some  of  the  cases  cited 
by  counsel  come  within  this  class,  and  hence  have  no  applica- 
tion here.  Others  were  cases  of  servants  against  their  masters, 
in  which  the  gist  of  the  action  was  the  failure  of  the  master 
to  perform  his  absolute  duty  to  his  servants  to  make  and  pro- 
mulgate rules  which,  if  observed,  would  give  reasonable  protec- 
tion to  his  employes.  These  cases  are  equally  inapplicable.  Some 
are  oases  of  municipal  ordinances,  which,  for  reasons  already 
given,  are  not  in  point. 

There  are  a  few  cases  which  support  plaintiff's  contention, 
but  in  ^^^  none  of  them  is  the  question  considered  or  discussed 
at  any  length,  and  in  some  of  them  no  reason  whatever  is  given 
for  the  decision.  The  only  reason  assigned  in  any  of  them  why 
such  evidence  is  admissible  is  that  it  is  in  the  nature  of  an 
admission  by  the  party  promulgating  the  rule  that  reasonable 
care  required  the  exercise  of  all  the  precautions  therein  pre- 
scribed: Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  74  Ga.  723;  Lake  Shore 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ward,  135  111.  511.  The  fallaciousness  and  un- 
fairness of  any  such  doctrine  ought  to  be  apparent  on  a  moment's 
reflection.  The  effect  of  it  is,  that  the  more  cautious  and  care- 
ful a  man  is  in  the  adoption  of  rules  in  the  management  of  his 
business  in  order  to  protect  others,  the  worse  he  is  off,  and  the 
higher  the  degree  of  care  he  is  bound  to  exercise.  A  person  may, 
out  of  abundant  caution,  adopt  rules  requiring  of  his  employes 
a  much  higher  degree  of  care  than  the  law  imposes.  This  is 
a  practice  that  ought  to  be  encouraged,  and  not  discouraged. 
But,  if  the  adoption  of  such  a  course  is  to  be  used  against  him 
as  an  admission,  he  would  naturally  find  it  to  his  interest  not 
to  adopt  any  rules  at  all. 

To  treat  the  adoption  of  such  rules  as  an  admission  against 
the  party  would  involve  the  same  principle  as  treating  repairs 
or  improvements  made  after  an  accident  as  an  admission  of  prior 
defects — a  doctrine  long  since  repudiated  by  this  court,  and  now 
repudiated  by  most  of  the  courts  of  the  country :  Morse  v.  Minne- 
apolis etc.  Ry.  Co.,  30  Minn.  465.  If  we  could  hold,  as  a  matter 
of  law,  that  these  rules  required  nothing  more  than  was  required 


Feb.  1898.]       Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  349 

in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  their  admission  would  be  error 
without  prejudice;  but  an  examination  of  them  satisfies  us  that 
we  cannot  so  hold. 

4.  The  court  instructed  the  jury,  in  substance,  that  the  plain- 
tiff might  recover,  notwithstanding  that  he  might  have  negli- 
gently placed  himself  in  a  place  of  danger,  if  they  found  that 
the  con-duct  of  the  motorman  in  running  him  down  was  wanton 
and  willful,  or  if,  after  discovering  the  plaintiff  in  a  place  of  dan- 
ger in  time  to  have  prevented  the  injury  by  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  care,  he  failed  to  do  so.  Counsel  do  not  dispute  the 
correctness  of  this  instruction  as  an  abstract  proposition  of  law, 
but  contend  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  justify  the  court  in 
submitting  any  such  ■****  question  to  the  jury.  In  this,  we  think, 
they  are  right.  The  jury  might  have  been  justified  in  finding 
that  the  motorman  was  grossly  negligent,  under  the  circum- 
stances, in  running  his  car  at  so  high  a  rate  of  speed,  and  also 
in  failing  to  keep  a  proper  lookout  to  discover  people  on  the 
track;  but  we  do  not  think  that  there  was  any  evidence  that 
would  have  justified  them  in  finding  that  he  wantonly  and  will- 
fully injured  the  plaintiff,  or  that  he  discovered  him  in  a  place 
of  danger  in  time  to  have  avoded  the  accident. 

Counsel  for  plaintiff  contend  that  it  was  not  necessary,  in  order 
to  make  the  instructions  applicable,  that  the  motorman  should 
have  actually  seen  the  plaintiff  in  a  place  of  danger  in  time  to 
have  avoided  the  injury;  that  it  waa  sufiicient  if,  in  the  exercise 
of  due  care,  he  ought  to  have  discovered  him.  Any  such  rule  in 
cases  of  concurrent  negligence  proximately  contributing  to  the 
injury  would  practically  do  away  with  the  doctrine  of  contribu- 
tory negligence  altogether. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  plaintiff  may  be  entitled  to  re- 
cover if  the  defendant  might,  by  the  exercise  of  care,  have 
avoided  the  consequences  of  the  plaintiff's  negligence.  But  this 
doctrine  is  only  applicable  to  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff's  negli- 
gence preceded  that  of  the  defendant.  But  when  the  negligence 
of  the  two  persons  is  contemporaneous,  and  the  fault  of  each 
operates  directly  to  cause  the  injury,  neither  can  recover  from 
the  other:  Bigelow  on  Torts,  311. 

The  true  question  in  all  eases  is  whether  there  was  negligence 
on  part  of  the  plaintiff  contributing  directly  as  a  proximate  cause 
to  the  injury.  If  there  was,  he  cannot  recover.  Where  the  de- 
fendant's acts  are  willful  and  intentional,  the  negligence  of  the 
plaintiff,  if  any,  is  no  longer  deemed  in  law  a  proximate  cause 
of  the  injury.  In  such  cases  the  willful  and  intentional  acts  of 
the  defendant  are  deemed  the  sole  proximate  cause,  and  the  neg- 


350  Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  [Minn. 

ligence  of  the  plaintiff  only  the  remote  cause,  or,  more  properly 
speaking,  the  mere  occasion,  of  the  injury.  The  same  is  true 
where,  after  discovery  of  plaintiff's  negligence  in  time  to  avoid 
injury  to  him,  the  defendant  neglects  to  exercise  due  care  to  do 
BO.  Some  confusion  of  ideas  has  arisen  from  the  fact  that  courts, 
especially  in  the  older  decisions,  have  frequently  used  the  word 
"gross'*  as  if  synonymous  with  "willful"  and  "wanton,"  thereby 
conveying  the  impression  that  ^''^  a  plaintiff  may  recover,  not- 
withstanding his  own  contributory  negligence,  provided  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  defendant  was  gross.  This  would  be  to  adopt 
the  doctrine  of  comparative  negligence,  which  has  never  been 
recognized  by  this  court. 

5.  The  defendant  did  not  call  its  motorman  as  a  witness,  al- 
though it  appeared  that  during  the  trial  he  was  seen  on  one  oc- 
casion in  conversation  with  its  counsel,  and  on  another  at  its 
car  barn  in  the  city  of  St.  Paul.  In  view  of  this  fact,  the  court 
instructed  the  jury  that:  1.  "If  either  party  to  this  action  has 
failed  to  adduce  evidence  within  its  control  which  is  reasonably 
calculated  to  throw  light  upon  the  conduct  and  responsibility  of 
either  party,  such  failure  may  be  considered  by  the  jury  as  tend- 
ing to  militate  against  the  contention  of  such  party  with  refer- 
ence to  the  issue  regarding  which  such  evidence  would  have  been 
pertinent." 

This  is  assigned  as  error.  The  presumption,  arising  from  the 
spoliation  or  suppression  of  evidence,  that  it  would,  if  produced, 
be  unfavorable  to  the  party  destroying  or  suppressing  it,  obtains 
with  most  force  to  the  case  of  documentary  evidence  in  the  ex- 
clusive possession  and  control  of  the  party.  But  the  presump' 
tion  is  not  necessarily  limited  to  such  cases.  It  is  true  that 
no  unfavorable  inference  arises  in  ordinary  cases  from  the  mere 
failure  to  call  as  a  witness  one  whom  the  other  party  had  the 
same  opportunity  of  calling  or  one  whose  testimony  would  be 
merely  cumulative.  There  is  also  great  danger  of  such  a  pre- 
sumption being  allowed  to  supersede  the  necessity  of  other  evi- 
dence, instead  of  being  used  merely  as  a  means  of  weighing 
the  effect  of  the  evidence  actually  produced  applicable  to  the 
subject  in  dispute.  But  here  the  motorman  was  presumably  the 
person,  of  all  others,  who  could  have  fully  and  accurately  in- 
formed the  jury  just  how  he  operated  the  car,  and  explained  what 
he  did  and  what  he  saw.  Instead  of  calling  him,  the  defendant 
contented  itself  with  calling  bystanders,  passengers,  and  oth- 
ers whose  knowledge  on  the  subject  in  dispute  was  pre- 
sumably much  less  full  and  accurate.  It  is  true,  the  plaintiff 
might  have  procured  his  attendance  by  subpoena,  and  thus  ob- 


Feb.  1898.]       Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  351 

tained  his  testimony;  but  he  was  not  bound  to  do  so.  This  would 
have  amounted  substantially  to  going  "into  the  enemy's  camp'* 
for  evidence,  and  ^^^  calling  the  very  man  charged  with  the  neg- 
ligence which  caused  the  injury. 

Under  the  circumstances,  we  think  the  omission  of  the  defend- 
ant to  call  him  as  a  witness  would  have  been  a  legitimate  subject 
of  comment  to  the  jury  by  plamtiff's  counsel,  and  that  tliera 
would  iiave  been  no  error  in  the  court's  instructing  the  jury  that,, 
in  weighing  the  evidence  introduced,  they  would  be  at  liberty 
to  indulge  in  the  presumption  that  the  testimony  of  the  motor- 
man,  if  introduced,  would  not  have  been  favorable  to  defend- 
ant's cause:  See  1  Jones  on  Evidence,  sec.  16  et  seq.,  and  cases 
cited. 

But,  for  the  errors  already  referred  to,  the  order  appealed  from 
must  be  reversed,  and  a  new  trial  granted. 

So  ordered. 


RAILROAD  COMPANIES— EVIDENCE— HABITS  OF  CON- 
DUCTOR.—Evidence  of  the  habits  and  competency  of  a  conductor 
In  the  employ  of  a  railroad  company  is  admissible:  Pennsylvania 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Books.  57  Pa.  St.  339,  98  Am.  Dec.  229.  But  see  Ga- 
hajran  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Allen,  187,  79  Am.  Dec.  724,  and 
note. 

RAIIiROAD  COMPANIES.— BREACH  OF  RULES  of  a  railroad 
company  by  its  employes  does  not  necessarily  raise  an  inference  of 
negligence:  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Spearen,  47  Pa.  St.  300,. 
86  Am.  Dec.  544. 

STREET  RAILWAYS  —  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE  — 
WILLFUL  CONDUCT  OF  EMPLOYE.— Although  a  person  with  a 
wagon  drives  incautiously  upon  a  street  railway  track  at  a  public 
crossing,  the  company  cannot  recklessly  run  him  down,  and  then 
shield  itself  from  liability  on  the  ground  that  such  person  was  negli- 
gent in  the  first  instance:  Hall  v.  Ogden  City  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  13  Utah, 
243.  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  72G. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES  — NEGLIGENCE  — WHERE  BOTH 
PARTIES  ARE  NEGLIGENT.— If  both  parties  are  negligent,  the 
true  rule  is,  that  the  party  who  last  has  a  clear  opportunity  to  avoid 
an  accident,  notwithstanding  the  negligence  of  his  opponent.  Is  con- 
sidered solely  responsible  for  it:  Thompson  v.  Salt  Lake  Rapid 
Transit  Co.,  16  Utah.  281,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  621;  Keefe  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  92  Iowa,  182,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  542. 

NEGLIGENCE— GOMPARATIVE.—The  doctrine  of  comparative 
negligence  has  never  been  recognized  in  Missouri:  Hurt  v.  St.  Louis 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  94  Mo.  255,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  374. 

WITNESSES— FAILURE  TO  CALL.— It  is  the  defendant's  duty. 
In  an  action  for  negligence,  to  call  and  examine  a  witness  whose 
fault  caused  the  injury,  and,  if  he  fails  to  do  so.  all  legal  presump- 
tions are  unfavorable  to  his  testimony:  Barnes  v.  Shreveport  City 
L  R.  Co..  47  La.  Ann.  1218,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  400. 


S52       Mebcantu-e  National  Bank  v.  Macfarlane.     [Minn, 


Meeoantilb  National  Bank  v.  Macfarlane. 

[71  Minnesota,  497.] 

INSOLVENCY— CREDITOR— COLLATERAL.  SECURITY.— 
The  rule  that  a  creditor  of  an  insolvent,  having  collateral  suffi- 
■cient  to  satisfy  a  part  only  of  his  debt,  is  entitled  to  prove  the 
whole  of  his  claim,  and  cannot  be  required  to  allow  credit  for  any 
•collections  made  after  the  date  of  the  insolvency,  does  not  apply 
where  the  Insolvent's  liability  is  that  of  indorser  upon  negotiable 
notes,  which  it  discounted  to  a  third  party,  his  liability  becoming 
fixed  subsequent  to  the  insolvency,  and  where  there  is  no  indebt- 
■edness  indeijendent  of  the  notes. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  RELATION  OF  IN- 
DORSER AND  HOLDER.— The  relation  of  an  indorser  and  a  holder 
of  negotiable  paper  is  analogous  to  that  of  a  principal  and  surety. 

INSOLVENCY  —  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  CLAIM 
OF  HOLDER  AGAINST  INSOLVENT  INDORSER.— Where  the 
holder  of  a  bill  or  note  applies  to  prove  his  debt  against  the  estate 
of  an  insolvent  surety,  any  sum  actually  received  in  payment  from 
another  party  to  the  obligation  must  be  deducted  from  the  amount 
to  be  proved.  The  sum  actually  remaining  unpaid  must  be  the  basis 
tipon  which  the  dividend  is  to  be  computed. 

INSOLVENCY— NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— RIGHTS 
OF  HOLDER  AGAINST  INSOLVENT  INDORSER.— The  holder  of 
■&  note  or  bill  indorsed  by  an  insolvent  need  not  enforce  its  col- 
lection, as  against  parties  primarily  liable,  before  he  can  make  a 
claim  upon  the  Insolvent  estate.  Nor  is  he  required  to  surrender 
up  the  obligation  as  a  condition  to  participating  in  dividends.  In 
the  absence  of  statute  he  may  proceed  against  the  Insolvent  estate, 
And  also  against  the  other  parties  to  the  obligation,  until  his  debt 
is  fully  collected. 

SUBROGATION— INSOLVENCY— RIGHT  OF  ACTION  OF 
RECEIVER.— The  receiver  of  an  insolvent  Indorser  has  a  right  of 
«,ction  against  the  original  obligors  upon  the  paper,  upon  the  pay- 
ment of  a  dividend  to  the  creditor  holder;  and  upon  full  payment, 
the  estate  of  the  insolvent  la  subrogated  to  all  of  the  creditors' 
rights  as  against  prior  parties. 

INSOLVENCY— ATTACHMENT— EFFECT  ON  RIGHTS  OF 
•CREDITOR.— A  proceeding  in  attachment,  unnecessary  to  protect 
the  creditor  as  to  money  of  an  Insolvent  debtor  In  the  creditor's 
liands,  will  not  affect  the  creditor's  right  to  prove  the  balance  of 
■his  claim,  and  to  share  In  the  distribution  of  the  Insolvent's  estate. 

William  C.  White,  for  the  plaintiff. 

Billson,  Congdon  &  Dickinson,  for  the  defendant. 

***  COLLINS,  J.  Macfarlane  became  the  duly  appointed 
and  legally  qualified  receiver  of  the  Security  Bank  of  Duluth, 
an  insolvent,  August  16,  1896,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Laws 
of  1895,  chapter  145.  On  that  day,  the  claimant,  a  banking  in- 
stitution in  New  York  City,  held  commercial  paper  and  notes 
previously  discounted  and  indorsed  by  the  insolvent,  and  not  yet 
due,  to  the  amount  of  $62,600.  The  insolvent  also  had  on  de- 
posit with  claimant,  in  New  York,  a  sum  exceeding  $19,000. 


Feb.  1898.]  Mercantile  National  Bank.t;.  Macpablank.  353 

Immediately  after  the  insolvency,  other  creditors  of  the  in- 
flolvent  instituted  proceedings,  and  attached  this  deposit;  where- 
upon the  claimant  commenced  action,  attached  the  money  on 
deposit  and  also  the  notes  before  referred  to,  which  it  had  already 
discounted.  Subsequently,  by  stipulation  and  an  order  of  the 
court,  the  receiver  and  claimant  bank  settled  up  and  caused  to 
be  released  these  attachments,  and  out  of  this  settlement  the 
bank  received  nearly  $13,000.  It  had  also  received,  on  account 
of  and  as  payments  upon  the  indorsed  paper,  after  the  receiver 
was  appointed,  and  prior  to  the  day  this  cause  was  submitted 
to  the  court  for  its  decision,  nearly  $18,000,  so  that  there  re- 
mained due  to  it,  upon  the  indorsement  on  the  day  last  men- 
tioned, July  13,  1897,  the  sum  of  $32,269.79. 

In  February,  1897,  the  bank  filed  its  claim  with  the  receiver, 
alleging  the  amount  due  and  unpaid  on  account  of  the  indorse- 
ments made  by  the  insolvent  to  be  $33,731.68,  besides  interest 
and  protest  fees.  On  this  claim  the  receiver  allowed  the  sum  of 
$27,756.60,  and  no  more.  The  claimant  then  appealed  to  the 
district  court,  alleging  in  its  complaint  that  the  actual  amount 
due  on  ^®®  its  claims  was  erroneously  and  incorrectly  stated  when 
presented  to  the  receiver,  and  that  it  should  have  been  $62,600, 
besides  certain  protest  fees.  A  trial  resulted  in  findings  of  fact 
to  the  effect,  in  addition  to  the  facts  above  stated,  that  the  bal- 
ance due  claimant  bank  on  account  of  the  indorsed  paper  on 
said  July  13,  1897,  amounted  to  $32,269.79;  that  the  bank  still 
retained  possession  of  all  of  said  indorsed  notes,  except  such 
thereof  as  had  been  fully  paid  by  the  makers;  and  that  it  as- 
sumed  to  hold  and  enforce  the  remainder  as  against  makers  and 
indorsers  prior  to  the  insolvent's  indorsement. 

The  court  found,  as  matters  of  law,  that  the  claimant  bank  was 
entitled  to  have  been  allowed,  as  a  claim  against  the  insolvent 
estate,  the  sum  last  mentioned,  subject,  however,  to  the  condi- 
tion that,  before  being  allowed  to  participate  in  any  dividend 
or  dividends  which  had  been  theretofore  or  should  be  thereafter 
declared,  the  claimant  should  be  required  to  account  to  the  re- 
ceiver for  all  moneys  paid  as  principal  upon  the  notes  held  by 
it  subsequent  to  the  date  last  mentioned,  the  amount  thereof 
to  be  deducted  from  the  sum  allowed  as  a  claim,  the  unpaid 
balance  to  be  the  sum  or  basis  upon  which  dividends  were  to 
be  computed  and  paid  to  said  claimant,  such  accounting  and 
deduction  to  be  made  as  often  as  any  dividend  is  declared  in 
which  the  claimant  seeks  to  participate,  and  that  claimant  be 
entitled  to  retain  and  collect  all  of  such  paper,  subject  to  its 

AM.  St.  Rkp.,  Vou  LXX.— 28 


854       Mercantile  National  Bank  v.  Macfarlanb.     [Minn* 

obligation  to  account  for  collections,  when  seeking  to  participate' 
in  dividends.  Judgment  was  entered  on  these  conclusions,  and 
cross  appeals  taken. 

On  claimant's  appeal  it  is  contended  that  the  trial  court  erred 
in  not  allowing  as  a  claim  against  the  estate,  and  as  a  basis  for 
the  computation  and  allowance  of  dividends,  the  full  sum  of 
the  obligation  as  it  originally  existed — $63,600 — and  also  erred 
when  holding  that  claimant  must  account  to  the  receiver  for 
any  and  all  payments  on  the  principal  sums  due,  made  subse- 
quent to  July  13,  1897,  the  unpaid  balance  to  be  the  sum  upon 
which  dividends  are  to  be  computed  and  paid,  in  case  claimant 
seeks  to  participate  in  dividends. 

On  the  receiver's  appeal  it  is  claimed  by  his  counsel  that  the 
court  was  in  error  when  it  determined  that  the  claimant  could 
retain  ^^^  all  of  the  note  remaining  unpaid  on  the  day  referred 
■to  and  enforce  collection  thereof  as  against  the  makers  and  prior 
indorsers,  subject  only  to  the  obligation  to  account  for  the  suma 
paid  thereon  prior  to  the  time  of  any  distribution  of  the  trust 
funds  by  the  receiver.  It  is  further  contended  that  the  claim 
should  have  been  wholly  rejected,  because  the  claimant  bank 
had  elected,  before  filing  the  same  with  the  receiver,  to  proceed 
by  attachment  in  the  state  of  New  York,  and  to  there  pursue 
to  a  successful  termination  a  remedy  directly  opposed  and  hos- 
tile to  the  law  here  being  enforced,  and  the  benefits  of  which 
the  claimant  now  invokes. 

In  Ueland  v.  Haugan,  70  Minn.  349,  we  held  that  the  pro- 
visions of  the  General  Statutes  of  1894,  chapter  76,  are  appli- 
cable where  receivers  have  been  appointed  for  insolvent  banking 
corporations,  in  accordance  with  the  Laws  ofrl895,  chapter  145,. 
section  20.  The  effect  of  that  decision,  in  addition  to  supple- 
menting the  provisions  of  chapter  145  by  those  of  the  older 
statute,  was  to  ingraft  upon  all  proceedings  thereunder  the  rules- 
of  practice  and  the  code  of  procedure  which  had  been  built  up 
by  the  courts  for  the  government  of  cases  arising  under  said 
chapter  76.  But  in  neither  of  these  statutes  is  there  any  rule 
prescribed  for  the  allowance  of  claims,  or  for  the  distribution 
of  the  trust  funds  among  creditors.  The  only  reference  made 
to  the  subject  is  the  very  general  provision  in  section  20  of 
the  1895  laws,  for  the  payment  of  debts,  "upon  the  order  of  the 
court."  That  the  mode  of  procedure  and  the  rule  of  distribu- 
tion must  be  certain  and  uniform  in  all  cases  is  self-evident. 

Counsel  for  the  receiver  argue  that  we  should  adopt  and  apply 
in  these  proceedings  the  statutory  requirements  affecting  cred- 


Feb.  1898.]  Mercantile  National  Bank  v.  Macparlane.  355 

itors  holding  securities,  found  in  the  insolvency  laws,  because 
the  same  express  the  general  and  settled  policy  of  the  state  in 
respect  to  the  subject  of  the  distribution  of  the  assets  of  an  in- 
solvent; and  they  also  argue  that  the  statutory  requirements  are 
nothing  more  than  the  equity  rule  applicable  in  the  absence  of 
statutory  regulations.  We  cannot  now  agree  with  counsel  on 
the  first  proposition;  that  is,  we  are  not  now  willing  to  admit 
that  any  of  the  various  provisions  of  the  insolvency  laws  can 
be  read  into  the  1895  law;  and  it  is  manifest  that  the  equity 
rule  which  they  insist  upon  has  no  application  to  the  facts  be- 
fore us,  as  will  be  shown  hereinafter. 

^^^  Counsel  for  the  creditor  contends  that  the  rule  which 
should  be  applied  in  cases  of  this  kind  is  that  which  prevails 
in  many  of  the  states,  to  the  effect  that  a  creditor,  having  col- 
lateral sufficient  to  satisfy  a  part  only  of  his  debt,  is  entitled 
to  prove  the  whole  of  his  claim  against  assets  in  the  hands  of  a 
receiver,  and  cannot  be  required  to  allow  credit  for  any  collec- 
tions or  payments  made  after  the  date  of  the  declared  insol- 
vency from  collateral  securities.  Money  received  on  the  collat- 
erals after  declared  insolvency  is  to  be  considered  as  still  held  as 
collateral  to  the  debt,  and  is  not  to  be  deemed  a  payment  thereon. 
Citing  Gluck  and  Becker  on  Receivers,  sec.  90;  Chemical  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Armstrong,  8  C.  C."  A.  155,  59  Fed.  Eep.  372,  and  other 
authorities. 

A  most  excellent  reason  for  declining  to  apply  this  rule,  even 
if  it  is  the  law  in  a  proper  case,  is  that  the  facts  here  do  not 
present  any  question  of  collateral  security  at  all.  The  liability 
of  the  insolvent  was  that  of  indorser  upon  a  number  of  negotiable 
promissory  notes,  which  it  discounted  to  a  third  party,  and  up  n 
which  its  liability  to  the  latter  became  fixed  and  certain  by  due 
protest  of  the  paper  as  it  matured,  subsequently  to  the  declared 
insolvency.  There  was  no  indebtedness  independent  of  the 
notes,  and  they  were  not  held  as  collateral.  The  relations  be- 
tween the  insolvent  indorser  and  the  claimant  indorsee  were  sim- 
ply analogous  to  those  of  a  principal  and  surety,  the  suretyship 
of  the  insolvent  arising  out  of  the  indorsement  of  the  notes; 
and  the  case  is  to  be  determined  with  reference  to  this  fact. 

The  settled  rule,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute,  is  that  where 
the  holder  of  a  note  or  bill  applies  to  prove  his  debt  against 
the  estate  of  an  insolvent  surety,  any  sum  actually  received  in 
payment  from  another  party  to  the  obligation  must  be  deducted 
from  the  amount  to  be  proved.  The  sum  actually  remaining  un- 
paid must  be  the  basis  upon  which  the  dividend  is  to  be  com- 


35G        Mercantile  National  Bank  v.  Macfarlane.     [Minn. 

puted:  In  re  Babcock,  3  Story,  393,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  696;  Sohier 
V.  Loring,  6  Cush,  537. 

It  is  evident  that  no  other  rule  oould  be  adopted  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  estate  of  an  insolvent  surety  without  wholly 
ignoring  his  rights  as  such  surety,  as  the  same  have  been  defi- 
nitely settled  by  the  courts.  Nor  is  there  any  rule  of  law  or 
equity  which  requires  that  the  holder  of  a  note  or  bill  indorsed 
by  an  insolvent  ®^^  must  enforce  its  collection,  as  against  parties 
primarily  liable,  before  he  can  make  a  claim  upon  the  insolvent 
estate.  Nor  is  he  required  to  surrender  up  the  obligation  as  a 
condition  to  participating  in  dividends.  In  the  absence  of  a  stat- 
ute, he  may  proceed  against  the  insolvent  estate,  and  also  against 
the  other  parties  to  the  obligation,  until  his  dabt  is  fully  col- 
lected: See  In  re  Babcock,  3  Story,  393.  Immediately  upon  the 
payment  of  a  dividend  to  the  creditor,  the  receiver  can  proceed 
against  the  original  obligors  upon  the  paper,  and  as  to  them  en- 
force collection  of  the  amount  paid;  and,  upon  full  payment  of 
the  obligation,  the  estate  is  subrogated  to  all  of  the  creditors* 
rights  as  against  prior  parties. 

From  the  principles  laid  down  in  reference  to  the  administra- 
tion of  the  estate  of  insolvent  sureties,  it  is  clear  that  the  conclu- 
sions of  law  of  the  court  below  were  correct,  and  that  the  order 
appealed  from  must  be  affirmed. 

A  few  words  in  reference  to  the  contention  of  counsel  for  the 
receiver  that  the  claim  against  the  estate  should  have  been  wholly 
rejected,  for  reasons  hereinbefore  stated:  When  the  debtor  was 
declared  insolvent,  the  creditor  had  in  its  possession,  on  what  is 
knolen  as  a  "general  deposit  account,"  a  large  sum  of  money.  The 
title  of  the  receiver  to  this  money,  by  virtue  of  his  appointment 
under  the  statute,  would  have  been  recognized  and  enforced  in 
the  state  of  New  York  if  no  injustice  to  the  citizens  of  that  state 
would  have  resulted,  and  if  the  rights  of  creditors  were  not  there- 
by prejudiced,  provided  such  title  was  not  in  conflict  with  the 
laws  or  public  policy  of  that  state.  Subject  to  these  conditions, 
the  receiver  could  have  appeared  in  the  courts  of  that  state,  and 
have  maintained  an  action  for  the  recovery  of  the  money:  In  re 
Waite,  99  N.  Y.  433.  The  same  rule  prevails  here:  Comstock 
V.  Frederickson,  51  Minn.  350. 

It  must  stand  admitted  that  the  creditor  had  the  legal  right 
to  proceed  by  attachment  as  against  the  deposit  account.  But 
should  we  hold  that,  by  availing  itself  of  this  legal  right,  the 
creditor  claimant  had  barred  itself  from  making  any  claim  in 
the  insolvency  proceeding  under  a  law  which  it  had  disregarded 


Feb.  1898.]  Mercantile  National  Bank  v.  Macpablanb,  357 

when  preventing,  by  reason  of  its  seizure  of  the  money,  an  equal 
distribution  of  the  assets  of  the  insolvent,  we  should  be  met  by 
the  fact  *^^^  that  no  attachment  proceedings  were  necessary  in 
order  to  protect  the  creditor  as  to  the  money  in  its  hands  when 
insolvency  was  declared.  It  had  the  right  to  retain  the  money 
on  general  deposit,  and  to  offset  as  against  the  same  the  amount 
due  from  the  depositor  debtor  on  account  of  the  indorsements. 
Had  it  done  this,  instead  of  unnecessarily  proceeding  by  attach- 
ment, its  right  thereafter,  and  as  to  the  balance  due  on  the  in* 
dorsed  obligations,  to  participate  in  dividends,  could  not  well  be 
doubted.  As  it  had  the  right  to  offset  its  notes  to  the  'extent 
of  the  deposit,  its  proceeding  by  attachment  cannot  be  said  to 
have  materially  affected  the  question  of  its  right  to  prove  the 
balance  of  its  claim,  and  to  share  in  the  distribution. 

From  the  statement  of  facts  it  appears  that,  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  insolvency  laws,  this  claim  was  origi- 
nally presented  and  passed  upon  by  the  receiver.  This  was  ir- 
regular. The  claim  should  have  been  exhibited  to  the  court  in 
accordance  with  the  chapter  76,  section  5911,  of  the  General 
Statutes  of  1894.  But  this  irregularity  is  of  no  consequence, 
and  can  have  no  bearing  upon  the  present  appeals. 

Judgment  affirmed. 

INSOLVENCY  —  SECURED  CREDITOR'S  ENTIRE  CLAIM 
PROVABLE.— A  creditor  whose  claim  is  secured  by  a  mortgage  may 
prove  the  entire  claim  against  the  estate  of  an  Insolvent  debtor,  and 
Is  entitled  to  a  dividend  ou.  the  face  of  such  claim,  without  regard  to 
tlie  value  of  the  mortgaged  property:  Kellogg  v.  Miller,  22  Or.  406, 
29  Am.  St  Rep.  618. 

INSOLVENCY— NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— CLAIM  OP 
HOLDER  AGAINST  INSOLVENT  INDORSER  AND  MAKER. 
Where  the  maker  and  the  indorser  of  a  promissory  note  made  as- 
signments for  the  benefit  of  their  creditors,  and  each  estate  paid 
a  dividend,  it  was  held  that  the  holder  of  the  note  was  entitled  to 
a  dividend  upon  the  whole  amount  of  the  note  from  each  estate: 
Miller's  Estate,  82  Ta.  St.  113,  22  Am.  Rep.  754. 

INSOLVENCY  —  ATTACHMENT  IN  ANOTHER  STATE.— A 
creditor  who  has  In  another  state  attached  a  debt  due  to  his  debtor 
does  not,  by  filing  in  this  state  a  claim  against  such  debtor  In  pro- 
ceedings In  insolvency,  waive  or  abandon  his  attachment  lien.  The 
amount  he  may  receive  under  and  by  virtue  of  such  lien  may  be  de- 
ducted from  tiie  amount  of  his  claim,  and  the  balance  Is  the  true 
amount  of  Indebtedness  upon  which  he  is  entitled  to  dividends  in 
this  state:  Neuf elder  v.  North  British  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Wasb.  393, 
45  Am.  St.  Rep.  793,  and  note. 


358  Jacobson  v,  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  [Minn. 

Jacobson  V,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Paoipio 
Eailroad  Company. 

[71  Minnesota,  619.] 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— JURISDICTION  OF  STATB 
and  FEDERAL  COURTS-CONNEOTING  RAILROADS.— Where 
the  putting  in  of  a  connecting  switch  at  the  intersection  of  two 
railroads  for  the  purpose  of  transferring  cars  from  one  road  to  the 
other,  is  of  some  benefit  both  to  interstate  and  state  traffic,  the 
state  and  the  federal  courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  the 
matter,  and,  in  disposing  of  the  case,  they  may  talce  into  considera- 
tion the  whole  necessity  resulting  from  the  whole  benefit  which  will 
accrue  to  all  classes  of  commerce. 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF— PRESUMPTION.— Where  a  railroad 
commission  has  taken  any  action  under  a  statute,  every  presump- 
tion is  in  favor  of  the  action,  and  the  burden  is  upon  the  party 
complaining  to  show  that  such  action  was  contrary  to  law. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE  POWER  OVER 
—REASONABLE  REGULATION.— The  property  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  dedicated  to  a  public  use,  and  the  legislature  has  the  power 
to  regulate  that  use  in  a  reasonable  manner,  unless  the  charter  of 
the  railroad  company  expressly  protects  it  from  such  regulation. 
The  compelling  of  intersecting  lines  to  put  in  a  connecting  switch 
is  a  reasonable  regulation, 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  INCIDENTAL  POWERS.— As 
Incidental  to  the  operation  of  its  road,  a  railroad  company  has  the 
power  to  interchange  cars  with  other  connecting  companies. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE  POWER  OVER. 
The  legislature  has  the  power  to  compel  a  common  carrier  to  do 
business  in  the  ordinary  and"  usual  way,  and  therefore  may  compel 
such  interchange  of  cars  as  incidental  to  the  business  for  which 
the  company  was  chartered. 

Albert  E.  Clarke  and  Wilbur  P.  Booth,  for  the  appellant. 

H.  W.  Childs  and  George  B.  Edgerton,  for  the  respondent. 

•^2«  CANTY,  J.  The  Willmar  &  Sioux  Falls  Railroad  extends 
from  Willmar,  in  this  state,  in  a  southwesterly  direction,  to  Sioux 
Fells,  in  South  Dakota,  and  is  crossed  nearly  at  right  angles  by 
the  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad,  near  Hanley  Falls, 
in  this  state.  The  former  railroad  is  a  part  of  the  Great  North- 
em  system  of  railroads,  and  the  latter  is  operated  in  connection 
with  the  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  Railway,  and  as  a  part  of  the 
same.  The  crossing  near  Hanley  Falls  is  a  grade  crossing,  and 
there  has  never  been  any  switch  connecting  the  two  railroads  at 
that  point. 

Chapter  10  of  the  Laws  of  1887,  as  amended  by  chapter  91 
of  the  Laws  of  1895,  provides: 

"Sec.  3.  (A)  That  all  common  carriers  subject  to  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act  shall  provide,  at  all  points  of  connection,  cross- 
ing, or  intersection  at  grade  where  it  is  practicable  and  neces- 


April,  1898.]    Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  359 

aary  for  the  interest  of  traffic,  ample  facilities  by  track  connec- 
tions for  transferring  any  cars  used  in  the  regular  business  of 
their  respective  lines  of  road  from  their  lines  or  tracks  to  those 
•of  any  other  common  carrier  whose  lines  or  track  may  connect 
■with,  cross,  or  intersect  their  own,  and  shall  provide  equal  and 
reasonable  facilities  for  the  interchange  of  cars  and  traffic  be- 
tween their  respective  lines,  and  for  the  receiving,  forwarding, 
And  delivering  of  passengers,  property,  and  cars  to  and  from  their 
several  lines  and  those  of  other  common  carriers  connecting 
therewith." 

The  act  further  provides  that,  on  the  application  of  any  per- 
€on  interested,  the  state  railroad  and  warehouse  commission  shall 
■order  connections  to  be  made  at  such  crossings,  and  this  is  con- 
ceded by  appellants.  The  commission  did  so  order  in  this  case 
after  notice,  and  a  hearing  had  in  the  manner  provided  by  the 
statute.  Both  railroad  companies  appealed  to  the  district  court 
from  the  order.  On  hearing  had  in  the  district  court,  the  order 
was  affirmed,  and  the  connection  ordered  to  be  made  by  a  curved 
switch,  seven  hundred  and  seventy-eight  and  six-tenths  feet  long, 
and  particularly  described,  just  as  the  commission  had  ordered. 
^^'^  From  the  judgment  of  the  district  court  entered  thereon, 
hoth  railroad  companies  appeal  to  this  court.  The  Wisconsin, 
Minnesota  &  Pacific  I^ilroad  Company  has  appeared  and  filed  a 
brief,  but  the  other  appellant  has  not  argued  the  case  or  filed  any 
brief. 

The  connecting  switch  will,  at  the  middle  of  the  same,  extend 
outside  of  the  right  of  way  of  each  and  either  railroad,  and  it  will 
be  necessary  to  condemn  at  that  place  a  narrow  strip  of  land,  a 
few  hundred  feet  long,  for  the  use  of  the  switch.  One  of  the 
lines  of  the  Great  Northern  system  extends  from  Duluth  south- 
west to  Willmar.  Another  extends  from  St.  Paul  and  Minneap- 
olis west  to  Willmar.  These  two  lines  pass  through  large  areas 
of  wood  land,  the  timber  on  which  is  available  for  fuel  and  fence 
posts.  Southwest  of  Willmar,  and  for  many  miles  in  all  direc- 
tions around  Hanley  Falls,  the  country  is  mostly  prairie.  Tim- 
ber is  scarce,  and  great  quantities  of  cordwood  and  fence  posts 
are  brought  down  on  the  Willmar  &  Sioux  Falls  Railroad  from 
said  timbered  regions  and  distributed  along  that  road.  Timber 
is  not  so  plentiful  along  the  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  system. 
For  that  reason  cordwood  and  fence  posts  are  much  dearer  at 
the  stations  on  the  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad,  east 
and  west  of  Hanley  Falls,  than  such  wood  is  at  that  station  and 
the  stations  north  and  south  of  it  on  the  Willmar  &  Sioux  Falls 


360  Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  [Minn, 

Railroad.  For  this  reason  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  people  in 
the  territory  tributary  to  the  "Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacifia 
Railroad,  but  not  tributary  to  Hanley  Falls,  that  this  connection 
fihould  be  made,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  have  cars  of  wood  trans- 
ferred at  that  point  from  the  Willmar  &  Sioux  Falls  Railroad  ta 
the  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad,  and  distributed  at 
the  stations  along  the  latter  road.  But  this  will  deprive  the 
Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad  Company  of  the  benefit 
of  a  much  longer  haul  on  dearer  wood.  The  loss  of  revenue 
which  will  result  to  it  by  reason  thereof  is  one  of  the  grounds 
of  its  complaint  here. 

A  large  number  of  cattle  are  raised  in  the  territory  tributary 
to  the  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad  west  of  Hanley 
Falls.  For  such  of  these  cattle  as  are  fat  enough  for  beef,  Min- 
neapolis and  St.  Paul  are  the  best  market,  but,  for  the  stockers 
and  feeders,  '^^^  Sioux  City  or  Omaha  is  the  best  market.  But 
there  is  no  way  of  reaching  Sioux  City  or  Omaha  with  cars  of 
stock  shipped  from  said  territory  over  said  last-named  road,  ex- 
cept by  running  the  cars  first  to  Hopkins,  within  eight  miles 
of  Minneapolis,  and  then  transferring  them  to  another  railroad 
with  which  the  Minneapolis  &  St.  Louis  Railway  Company  has 
traffic  arrangements,  and  running  the  cars  over  such  other  road 
to  Sioux  City  or  Omaha.  The  distance-  from  Hanley  Falls  to 
Sioux  City  by  this  route  is  three  hundred  and  eighty  miles,  while 
the  distance  from  Hanley  Falls  to  Sioux  City  over  the  Willmar 
&  Sioux  Falls  Railroad  is  but  one  hundred  and  eighty-one  miles. 
Making  the  connection  in  question  wll  deprive  the  Wisconsin, 
Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad  Company  of  the  benefit  of  such 
longer  haul  on  such  stockers  and  feeders,  and  the  loss  of  revenue 
which  will  result  to  it  by  reason  thereof  is  another  ground  of 
complaint. 

1.  Appellant  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  &  Pacific  Railroad  Com- 
pany contends  that,  as  the  shipping  of  stock  to  Sioux  City  and 
Omaha  is  interstate  commerce,  the  state  tribunals  have  no  juris- 
diction over  it,  and  must  not  take  into  consideration  the  question 
of  transferring  of  cars  of  such  stock  when  determining  the  neces- 
sity of  a  connection  at  this  crossing. 

Conceding,  without  deciding,  that  the  state  tribunals  would 
have  no  jurisdiction  to  require  the  making  of  this  connection  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  transferring  cars  engaged  solely  in  the  carry- 
ing of  interstate  commerce,  it  does  not  follow  that  these  tri- 
bunals may  not  take  into  consideration  the  benefit  to  such  com- 
merce also,  when  determining  the  necessity  of  this  connection.. 


Apiil,  1898.]    Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  361 

The  whole  traffic  to  be  benefited  by  the  making  of  the  connec- 
tion may  be  amply  sufficient  to  justify  requiring  the  same  to  be 
made;  yet  the  part  of  such  traffic  commencing  and  ending  in  the 
state  may  not  be  sufficient  when  taken  alone,  and  the  part  which 
consists  of  interstate  commerce  may  not  be  sufficient  when  taken 
alone.  If  appellant's  position  is  correct,  neither  the  state  tri- 
bunals nor  the  federal  tribunals  would  have  jurisdiction  in  such 
a  case.  Clearly,  such  is  not  the  law.  In  such  a  case,  jurisdic- 
tion is  concurrent.  If  thefe  is  some  necessity  resulting  from 
the  benefit  which  will  accrue  to  exclusively  state  commerce  by 
reason  of  the  putting  in  of  the  connection,  this  gives  the  state 
tribunals  jurisdiction:  Munn  v.  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113,  126;  *»=*» 
and,  in  disposing  of  the  case,  they  may  take  into  consideration 
the  whole  necessity  resulting  from  the  whole  benefit  which  will 
accrue  to  all  classes  of  commerce. 

But,  even  if  this  position  was  not  correct,  there  is,  in  our 
opinion,  ample  evidence  in  this  case  of  necessity  resulting  from 
the  benefit  which  will  accrue  to  exclusively  state  commerce,  when 
considered  alone,  to  justify  the  ordering  of  the  connection  in 
question. 

"We  will  go  further.  Under  the  statute,  every  presumption 
is  in  favor  of  the  action  of  the  commission,  and  the  burden  was 
upon  appellant  to  show  that  such  action  was  contrary  to  law: 
See  Steenerson  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  69  Minn.  353,  Ap- 
pellant has  totally  failed  to  maintain  that  burden.  No  evidence 
at  all  was  offered  by  appellant  in  the  district  court  as  to  the 
want  of  necessity  for  the  making  of  this  connection,  but  it  rested 
its  case  wholly  on  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  called  in  behalf 
of  the  petitioner.  That  evidence  was  not  in  appellant's  favor, 
and  certainly  did  not  show  conclusively  that  there  was  no  neces- 
sity for  this  crossing. 

2.  Appellant  further  contends  that  said  act  of  the  legislature 
is  unconstitutional  and  void,  and  the  judgment  entered  in  this 
case  is  erroneous,  because  they  contravene  numerous  provisions 
both  of  the  state  and  federal  constitutions.  Said  law  and  judg' 
ment  require  appellant  to  exercise  the  power  of  eminent  domain, 
construct  a  railroad  track,  operate  the  same,  and  exchange  busi- 
ness with  intersecting  roads;  and  it  is  con-tended  that  all  of  this 
is  outside  of  and  beyond  what  its  charter  requires,  and  that, 
therefore,  the  law  impairs  the  obligation  of  the  charter  contract 
between  appellant  and  the  state,  deprives  appellant  of  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  takes  its  private  property  without  just 
compensation,  deprives  it  of  the  right  to  contract  with  reference 
to  its  own  business,  et  cetera. 


362  Jacceson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  [Minn. 

All  of  these  constitutional  objections  may  be  considered  to- 
gether. These  two  railroads  are  public  highways,  and  all  of 
these  objections  amount  simply  to  this:  It  is  wholly  foreign  to 
the  purpose  of  two  public  highways  of  the  same  character  to  re- 
quire them  to  connect  where  they  cross  each  other,  so  that  pub- 
lic traffic  may  pass  from  the  one  to  the  other.  And,  where  a 
private  corporation  has  been  chartered  to  construct,  maintain, 
and  operate  such  public  highway,  with  the  right  to  charge  rea- 
sonable compensation  for  its  services  in  ^^**  so  doing,  it  is  a  vio- 
lation of  its  charter  to  compel  it  to  connect  its  highway  with 
another  intersecting  highway  of  the  same  character,  unless  the 
right  to  require  the  connection  is  expressly  reserved  in  the 
charter.     We  cannot  so  hold. 

If  appellant's  position  is  correct,  it  has  the  constitutional 
right  to  completely  isolate  its  railroad  at  any  time  by  cutting  it 
off  from  all  connection  with  other  railroads,  unless  the  right  to 
compel  connections  is  expressly  reserved  in  its  charter.  Its  road 
■commences  at  the  village  of  Morton,  in  this  state  (an  unim- 
portant station  at  the  terminus  of  a  branch  of  the  Minneapolis 
■&  St.  Louis  Railway),  and  extends  westerly  to  Watertown,  in 
South  Dakota;  so  that  it  may  at  any  time,  and  in  spite  of  all 
public  authority,  be  very  completely  isolated  and  cut  off  from 
all  large  commercial  centers,  if  appellant  sees  fit  so  to  cut  it  off. 
The  legislature  chartered  appellant  to  construct,  maintain,  and 
operate  a  public  highway,  not  a  cul  de  sac,  or  something  worse, 
which  has  no  connection  with  like  highways  either  at  its  ends 
or  sides.  A  railroad  is  an  improved  highway,  on  which  certain 
modem  appliances  are  used.  It  will  not,  as  a  general  rule,  serve 
fully  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  intended,  unless  the  connec- 
tions between  it  and  other  like  highways  which  cross  or  touch 
it  are  improved  in  like  manner,  and  the  same  modern  appliances 
-are  used  in  passing  from  one  road  to  the  other  over  those  con- 
nections. 

Again,  why  is  not  the  doctrine  advanced  by  appellant  a  two- 
€dged  sword?  If  the  legislature  cannot  compel  the  making  of 
such  connections,  because  there  is  nothing  in  the  charter  ex- 
pressly authorizing  or  requiring  the  making  of  them,  why  is  it 
not  ultra  vires  under  such  a  charter,  and  without  express  legis- 
lative authority,  to  make  such  connections  voluntarily?  But 
who  will  contend  that  a  railroad  company  may  not,  without  ex- 
press authority,  and  as  incidental  to  its  general  powers,  connect 
its  irncks  with  the  tracks  of  other  railroads  that  extend  to  its 
road  at  its  ends,  or  intersect  it  at  its  sides? 


April,  1898.]     Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  363 

Appellant's  property  is  dedicated  to  public  use,  "is  affected 
with  a  public  interest,"  and  the  legislature  certainly  has  the 
power  to  regulate  that  use  in  a  reasonable  manner,  unless  appel- 
lant's charter  expressly  protects  it  from  such  regulation:  See 
Munn  V.  Illinois,  94  *»3i  xj.  S.  113,  126;  State  v.  Wabash  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  83  Mo.  144;  Allnutt  v.  Inglis,  12  East,  527;  Lord  Hale's 
Treatise  "De  Jure  Maris,"  1  Harg.  Law  Tracts,  6. 

Appellant  was  chartered  to  serve  the  public,  within  the  scope 
of  its  charter  powers  and  franchises,  in  the  best  and  most  effi- 
cient manner  possible.  It  was  not,  as  it  seems  to  contend,  char- 
tered to  obstruct  public  traffic  or  serve  the  public  the  least  that 
self-interest  might  dictate.  Appellant  cannot  be  allowed  to 
obstruct  the  course  of  public  traffic  under  the  claim  that,  by 
putting  in  this  connection  and  letting  such  traffic  take  its  course, 
appellant  will  lose  a  large  amount  of  revenue  which  it  would 
otherwise  earn.  If,  by  reason  of  putting  in  the  connection,  its 
revenues  will  be  so  reduced  that  it  will  not,  on  its  whole  busi- 
ness, receive  a  reasonaole  compensation  for  its  services,  its 
remedy  is  by  a  readjustment  of  the  whole  or  such  part  of  its 
schedule  of  rates  and  fares  as,  under  the  circumstances,  ought 
to  be  readjusted  in  order  to  enable  it  to  earn  such  reasonable 
compensation. 

It  is  contended  that,  even  if  the  connections  were  made, 
neither  railway  company  could  be  compelled  to  deliver  its 
loaded  cars  to  the  other,  to  be  carried  with  their  contents  to 
their  destination  over  the  road  of  such  other;  that  to  compel 
appellant  to  deliver  up  its  cars  to  be  carried  away  from  the  line 
of  its  road  to  distant  points  would  be  in  violation  of  its  charter 
contract,  and  unconstitutional;  that  for  this  reason  it  is  useless 
to  compel  the  making  of  the  connection  in  question,  and  there- 
fore the  legislative  act  fails  of  its  purpose,  and  is  unconstitu- 
tional and  void. 

Such  interchange  of  cars  between  different  railroads  is  a  com- 
mon and  almost  universal  practice;  yet  there  are  few  railroad 
charters  which  expressly  authorize  this  practice.  It  would 
hardly  be  contended  that  such  an  act  of  interchange  is  ultra 
vires  on  the  part  of  a  railroad  company  whose  charter  is  silent 
as  to  such  authority.  As  incidental  to  the  operation  of  its  road, 
a  railroad  company  has  the  power  to  interchange  cars  with  other 
connecting  companies,  and  this  is  the  ordinary  and  usual  way 
of  going  business.  We  are  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  the  legis- 
lature has  the  power  to  compel  a  common  carrier  to  do  business 
in  the  ordinary  and  usual  way,  and  therefore  may  compel  such 


364  Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  [Minn, 

interchange  of  cars  as  incidental  to  the  ^^^  business  for  which 
the  company  was  chartered.  The  supreme  court  of  Io\^a  reached 
the  same  conclusion  in  Burlington  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Dey,  83  Iowa, 
312,  31  Am.  St.  Eep.  477.  See,  also,  Atchison  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v. 
Denver  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  110  U.  S.  667;  Peoria  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  Ry.  Co.,  109  111.  135,  50  Am.  Rep.  605;  Michigan  v. 
Smithson,  45  Mich.  212;  State  v.  Wabash  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  83  Mo. 
144. 

The  statute  provides :  "In  the  event  of  that  said  railway  com- 
panies fail  to  establish  through  joint  rates,  or  fail  to  establish 
and  charge  reasonable  rates  for  such  through  shipments,  .... 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  railroad  and  warehouse  commission 
of  this  state  ....  to  establish  reasonable  joint  rates  for  the 
shipment  of  freight  and  cars  over  any  two  or  more  connecting 
lines  of  railroad  in  this  state,  and  to  prescribe  the  reasonable 
rules  under  which  any  such  cars  so  transferred  shall  be  re- 
turned": Laws  1895,  c.  91,  sec.  3  (C). 

Appellant  suggests  that  cases  may  arise  where  it  would  be 
compelled  to  deliver  its  cars  to  another  carrier,  who  is  insolvent, 
or  where  the  couplings,  air-brakes,  or  other  appliances  of  the 
cars  of  one  of  the  carriers  will  not  match  with  those  of  the  other, 
aftd  where  it  would  be  unsafe  to  haul  such  other  cars.  It  is  only 
necessary  to  say  that  such  cases  can  be  disposed  of  when  they 
arise.  There  is  no  suggestion  that  this  is  any  such  case.  Ap- 
pellant seems  to  contend  that  this  statute  attempts  to  make  the 
two  or  more  railroad  companies  partners  for  the  purposes  of  such 
a  through  shipment;  that  it  attempts  to  compel  the  making  of 
a  joint  shipping  contract,  by  which  each  company  will  be  liable 
for  all  the  defaults  of  the  others  in  the  through  shipment;  and 
that,  therefore,  the  statute  is  unconstitutional  and  void.  The 
statute  merely  provides  that,  in  case  all  the  railroad  companies 
concerned  in  the  through  shipment  fail  to  fix  a  reasonable  total 
sum  for  the  total  haul,  the  commission  shall  do  so  for  them. 
There  is  nothing  in  this  which  requires  any  company  to  assume 
any  liability  beyond  its  own  line  for  the  acts  of  others  in  making 
the  haul. 

There  is  nothing  in  the  suggestion  that  the  two  appellants 
are  competing  roads,,  witliin  the  terms  of  subdivision  F  of  sec- 
tion 3  of  said  statute,  at  least  as  far  as  regards  the  traffic  for 
which  the  connection  in  question  is  required.  This  disposes  of 
the  case,  and  the  judgment  appealed  from  is  affirmed. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE  POWER  OVER.— 
The  franchises  of  a  railroad  corporation  are  granted  for  the  public 


April,  1898.]    Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  365 

^ood,  and  In  exercising  them  the  corporation  Is  largely  subject  to 
the  control  and  discretion  of  the  legislature.  The  legislature  may, 
by  statute,  require  a  railway  corporation  to  operate  a  public  ferry 
which  constitutes  part  of  its  line,  although  such  operation  has  be- 
come unprofitable:  Brownell  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R,  Co.,  164  Mass.  29. 
49  Am.  St.  Rep.  442.  The  legislature  may,  by  general  laws,  impose 
new  burdens  on  railroad  companies  In  addition  to  those  Imposed  by 
their  charters,  when  such  burdens  are  conducive  to  the  public  in- 
terests and  safety:  Nelson  v.  Vermont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  717,  62 
Am.  Dec.  614.  See,  also,  Burdick  t.  People,  149  111.  600,  41  Am.  St. 
Rep.  329. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE  POWER  OVER— IN- 
TERSTATE COMMERCE.— Where  a  state  statute  required  rail- 
loads  connecting  with  railroads  outside  the  state  to  transfer  freight 
and  passengers  at  a  point  within  the  state.  It  was  held  that  the 
statute  was  void  as  In  conflict  with  the  constitution  of  the  United 
State,  giving  to  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  among 
the  states:  Council  Bluffs  v.  Kansas  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  338, 
24  Am.  Rep.  773.  See  the  note  to  People  r.  Wemple.  27  Am.  St  Rep. 
667.  668. 


I 


'      CASES 

IN  THK 

SUPREME   COURT 

ov 

NEBRASKA. 


MuNRO  V.  Callahan. 

[55  Nebraska.  75.1 

JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY.— If  a  Judgment  Is 
based  upon  perjured  evidence  of  a  successful  party  given  at  the 
trial,  while  the  defeated  party  has  a  good  defense  which  he  was 
prevented  from  presenting  by  reason  of  such  perjury,  and  without 
being  guilty  of  negligence  has  exhausted  all  his  ordinary  legal 
remedies  for  vacating  such  judgment,  equity,  in  a  proper  proceed- 
ing, may  vacate  the  judgment  and  grant  the  defeated  party  a  new 
trial. 

JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY— FRAUD.— A  court  of 
equity  cannot  vacate  a  judgment  after  the  term  at  which  it  wa» 
rendered,  and  grant  the  defeated  party  a  new  trial  for  fraud  prac- 
ticed upon  him,  except  when  such  fraud  was  practiced  in  connec- 
tion with  the  trial. 

JUDGMENTS  — RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  —  PERJURY  —  MIS- 
TAKE.—A  court  of  equity  cannot  vacate  a  judgment  on  account  of 
any  innocent  mistalte  or  want  of  recollection  on  the  part  of  the 
successful  party  or  his  witnesses,  nor  even  on  account  of  the  per- 
jury of  other  witnesses  in  the  case. 

J.  F.  Cromelien  and  W.  F.  Gurley,  for  the  appellants. 
J.  H.  Van  Dusen  and  W.  S.  Summers,  for  the  appellee. 

^  RAGAIST,  C.  June  25,  1892,  on  the  complaint  of  Delia  A. 
Callahan,  George  F.  Munro  was  by  the  district  court  of  Douglas 
county  adjudged  to  be  the  father  of  the  former's  illegitimate 
child.  From  this  judgment  Munro  prosecuted  a  proceeding  in 
error  to  this  court,  which  affirmed  the  judgment  of  the  district 
court:  Munro  v.  Callahan,  41  Neb.  849.  Subsequently,  on  De- 
cember 6,  1894,  Munro  filed  a  petition  in  the  district  court  of 
Douglas  county  against  Callahan,  reciting  the  record  and  pro- 

(360) 


May,  1898.]  Munro  v.  Callahan,  367 

ceedings  of  the  former  suit,  and  alleging,  among  other  things, 
that  Callahan  had  procured  said  judgment  by  committing  will- 
ful and  corrupt  perjury  on  the  trial  of  that  case,  and  prayed  th& 
court  to  set  such  judgment  aside,  and  to  grant  him,  Munro,  a 
new  trial.  The  district  court,  on  hearing  the  action,  set  aside 
the  former  judgment  and  granted  Munro  a  new  trial,  from  which 
order  Callahan  has  appealed.  The  bill  of  exceptions  containing 
the  evidence  offered  on  the  trial  of  this  case  in  the  district  court 
has  been  quashed,  and  the  sole  question  for  our  determination 
is  whether  the  pleadings  in  this  case  will  support  the  decree- 
rendered  therein. 

'''■  1.  To  the  petition  filed  by  Munro  on  December  6,  1894, 
an  answer  was  filed  on  the  15th  of  said  month,  and  subsequently, 
on  the  17th,  an  amended  petition  was  filed.  The  record  does 
not  disclose  that  an  answer  was  filed  to  this  amended  petition, 
but  the  case  seems  to  have  been  tried  on  the  amended  petition. 
The  decree  recites  that  the  case  was  heard  upon  the  pleadings^ 
filed  by  the  parties  and  upon  the  evidence,  and  counsel  for  the 
appellant  have  addressed  their  arguments  to  the  sufficiency  of 
the  allegations  of  the  amended  petition.  We  shall,  therefore, 
only  inquire  whether  the  allegations  of  the  amended  petition  will 
support  the  decree  under  review.  This  amended  petition,  among 
other  things,  alleged:  "Plaintiff  further  charges  that  said  ver- 
dict so  rendered  in  said  action  was  obtained  on  the  false,  fraudu- 
lent, and  perjured  testimony  of  the  said  Delia  A.  Callahan;  that 
sai'd  Delia  A.  Callahan  on  the  said  trial  testified  that  the  bastard 
child,  of  which  she  charged  this  plaintiff  as  being  the  father, 
was  conceived  on  Easter  Sunday,  March  29,  1891,  between  the 
hours  of  2  and  5  o'clock  of  the  afternoon  of  said  day;  that  said 
testimony  was  false  and  fraudulent;  and  said  Delia  A.  Callahan, 
at  the  time  of  giving  the  same,  well  knew  it  so  to  be.  Plaintiff 
alleges  the  fact  to  be  that  on  the  said  Easter  Sunday  he  did  not 

see  the  said  Delia  A.  Callahan Plaintiff  fm-ther  charges- 

the  fact  to  be  that  while  he  well  knew  that  the  said  Delia  A. 
Callahan  had  testified  falsely  on  said  trial,  yet  he  did  not,  at  the 
time,know  where  he  could  obtain  the  testimony  to  show  that  th& 
said  Delia  A.  Callahan  had  sworn  falsely  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining an  unjust  verdict  against  him;  that  he  had  no  knowledge 
of  where  he  could  obtain  the  witnesses  who  knew  and  would 
testify  that  said  Delia  A.  Callahan  had  sworn  falsely  in  said  ac- 
tion at  law  until  long  after  the  time  had  expired  for  filing  a 
motion  for  a  new  trial  in  said  cause;  that  this  plaintiff  now  has 
«uch  testimony  and  will  produce  the  same  in  court."    Since  the 


368  MuNRO  V.  Callahan.  [Nebraska, 

bill  of  exceptions  has  been  quashed  the  judgment  is  to  be  consid- 
ered as  if  "^^  it  had  been  rendered  by  default,  or  on  the  dis- 
trict court's  overruling  a  demurrer  interposed  to  the  amended 
petition  by  Callahan.  In  addition  to  certain  special  findings 
the  tenth  finding  of  the  district  court  is  as  follows:  "The  court 
further  finds  that  the  general  equities  are  with  the  plaintiff." 
We  take  it  that  within  this  general  finding  are  included  findings 
that  Munro  had  a  prima  facie  defense  to  the  action  brought 
against  him  by  Callahan;  that  the  defeat  suffered  by  him  in  that 
-action  was  not  the  result  of  any  negligence  or  laches  on  his  part ; 
and  that  he  had  diligently  pursued  and  exhausted  all  ordinary 
legal  remedies  provided  by  statute  for  obtsdning  a  new  trial  of 
said  action  and  for  the  vacation  of  said  judgment.  "We  think 
the  petition  sufficient  to  support  these  findings,  as  it  s'ets  out,  in 
addition  to  what  we  have  quoted,  the  filing  by  Miss  Callahan  in 
the  district  court  of  the  complaint  against  Munro  charging  him 
with  being  the  father  of  her  illegitimate  child;  thai  he  pleaded 
not  guilty  of  such  charge;  was  tried  to  a  jury  and  found  guilty; 
his  filing  of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial;  the  overruling  of  such 
motion;  the  judgment  upon  the  verdict  of  the  jury;  the  error 
proceeding  to  this  court  and  the  affirmance  of  the  judgment  of 
the  district  court. 

2.  Assuming  that  the  general  finding  of  the  district  court 
includes  the  finding  that  the  judgment  obtained  by  Miss  Calla- 
han against  Munro  was  procured  by  her  willful  perjury,  is  the 
petition  in  that  respect  sufficient  to  support  the  finding  ?  Is  it 
^ood  against  a  demurrer?  When  the  nature  of  the  case  in 
which  that  judgment  is  rendered  is  considered,  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  the  only  issue  in  that  case  was  whether  Munro 
was  guilty  of  being  the  father  of  Callahan's  illegitimate  child, 
that  without  her  positive  and  unequivocal  testimony  that  he  was 
her  child's  father,  she  could  not  have  procured  the  judgment  she 
■did,  and  that  she,  and  she  alone,  could  positively  and  certainly 
know  who  was  the  father  of  her  child,  we  think  the  petition  suffi- 
cient. In  other  words,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  a  find- 
ing that  one  is  the  ''"  father  of  a  bastard  child  rests,  and  must 
rest,  where  the  issue  is  litigated,  upon  the  testimony  of  the 
mother;  and  if  this  testimony  is  false  and  perjured,  then  a  judg- 
ment based  on  such  a  finding  is  one  procured  by  fraud  practiced 
by  the  successful  party.  Section  602  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Pro- 
cedure provides  that  a  district  court  shall  have  power  to  vacate 
a  judgment  rendered  by  it,  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  ren- 
dered, for  fraud  practiced  by  the   successful  party  in  obtaining 


May,  1898.]  Munro  v.  Callahan.  869 

the  judgment.  Certainly,  the  obtaining  of  a  judgment  by  will- 
ful and  corrupt  perjury  is  obtaining  it  by  fraud  within  the 
meaning  of  this  section  of  the  code.  But  this  statute  is  merely 
a  legislative  adoption  of  the  doctrine  of  the  equity  courts  in 
force  when  it  was  enacted.  Long  before  this  code  was  enacted 
the  setting  aside  of  a  judgment  procured  by  the  fraud  of  the 
successful  party  and  the  granting  the  defeated  party  a  new 
trial  were  jurisdictions  possessed  and  enforced  by  the  courts  of 
equity  when  it  appeared  that  the  defeated  party  had  a  valid  de- 
fense which  he  had  been  prevented  by  the  fraud  of  the  success- 
ful party  from  making  out,  and  where  he  had  been  guilty  of  no 
negligence  or  laches  and  had  exhausted  all  his  ordinary  legal 
remedies  for  obtaining  a  vacation  of  such  judgment:  3  Pome- 
ro/s  Equity  Jurisprudence,  2d  ed.,  sec.  1364;  2  Freeman  on 
Judgments,  4th  ed.,  sec.  489.  Whether,  then,  this  action  is 
based  on  section  602  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  or  whether 
it  be  regarded  as  an  independent  suit  in  equity,  the  jurisdiction 
and  authority  of  the  district  court  to  grant  Munro  a  new  trial 
of  the  law  action  are  undoubted. 

The  cases  are  not  numerous  in  which  a  judgment  has  been 
vacated  and  the  defeated  party  granted  a  new  trial  on  the  ground 
that  the  judgment  was  obtained  by  the  perjury  of  the  successful 
party;  but  this  is  perhaps  because,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
ease,  the  existence  of  the  fraud  or  perjury  could  not  be  estab- 
lished otherwise  than  by  trying  anew  the  issue  tried  and  deter- 
mined in  the  action  in  which  the  new  trial  is  sought;  and  neither 
®*  the  equity  rule  nor  the  code  authorizes  the  vacation  of  a 
judgment  after  the  term  at  which  it  was  rendered  and  the 
granting  a  defeated  party  a  new  trial  for  fraud  practiced  upon 
him,  save  where  the  fraud  was  practiced  in  connection  with  the 
trial. 

In  Laithe  v.  McDonald,  12  Kan.  340,  Laithe  brought  an  ac- 
tion against  McDonald  for  a  failure  to  deliver  goods  which  he 
eharged  were  received  by  McDonald  as  a  common  carrier  and 
lost  through  his  negligence.  McDonald  answered  by  a  general 
■denial  and  did  not  appear  further  in  the  case.  On  the  trial 
Laithe  willfully,  corruptly,  and  falsely  swore  that  McDonald 
was  a  common  carrier;  had  received  the  goods  in  that  capacity 
and  failed  to  deliver  them;  and  that  they  were  worth  something 
over  five  thousand  dollars,  for  which  sum  he  obtained  a  judg- 
ment. The  supreme  court  of  Kansas  affirmed  a  judgment  of 
the  district  court  vacating  the  judgment  in  the  law  action  on  the 
ground  that  Laithe  obtained  it  by  fraud,  the  fraud  consisting 

AX.  ST.  RXF.,  Vol.  LXX.-24 


870  MuNKO  V.  Callahan.  [Nebraska^ 

of  his  perjury.  The  court  held  that  a  defendant  was  not  en- 
titled to  have  a  judgment  vacated  on  account  of  any  innocent 
mistake  or  want  of  recollection  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  or 
his  witnesses,  nor  even  on  account  of  the  perjury  of  other  wit- 
nesses in  the  case,  but  said  that  no  party  was  bound  to  antici- 
pate or  suppose  that  the  other  party  would  commit  willful  and 
corrupt  perjury,  and  that  no  party  was  bound  to  the  exercise- 
of  extraordinary  diligence  in  preparing  to  meet  such  perjury.  It 
will  be  observed  that  in  the  case  cited  the  judgment  rested  en- 
tirely upon  the  perjured  testimony  of  Laithe,  just  as,  in  the  case 
at  bar,  the  judgment  that  Munro  was  the  father  of  Callahan's 
illegitimate  child  depended  entirely  for  support  upon  Callahan's 
evidence  that  he  was  the  father  of  her  child. 

In  Graver  v.  Faurot,  76  Fed.  Eep.  257,  the  complainant 
brought  a  suit  in  equity,  in  a  state  court,  in  which  he  charged 
two  defendants  with  fraudulently  inducing  him  to  purchase 
some  worthless  shares  of  corporate  stock,  and,  in  accordance  with 
the  old  chancery  practice,  he  ®*  required  the  parties  made  de- 
fendants to  answer  certain  allegations  or  interrogatories  in  the 
bill  under  oath.  The  parties  made  defendants  answered.  The 
answers  were  false  and  perjured,  and  the  complainant  suffered 
a  defeat.  He  subsequently  discovered  that  the  answers  made  by 
the  defendants  were  false,  and  then  brought  suit  to  vacate  the 
judgment,  and  the  court  held  that  the  making  of  the  false  an- 
swers was  a  positive  and  actual  fraud  which  vitiated  the  decree. 
Here  again  the  judgment  complained  of  rested  entirely  upon  the 
perjured  testimony  of  the  two  defendants  in  whose  favor  the 
judgment  was  rendered.  For  a  further  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject of  the  power  of  a  court  of  equity  to  vacate  a  judgment  ob- 
tained by  fraud  practiced  by  the  successful  party  at  the  trial  of 
the  case  in  which  it  was  rendered,  see  United  States  v.  Throck- 
morton, 98  U.  S.  61;  Ward  v.  Southfield,  102  N.  Y.  293;  As- 
bury  V.  Frisz,  148  Ind.  513. 

Our  conclusion  therefore  is,  that  the  petition  charges  that 
Miss  Callahan  procured  a  judgment  determining  that  Munro 
was  the  father  of  her  illegitimate  child ;  that  she  obtained  such 
judgment  by  her  own  false  and  perjured  testimony,  and  that  thi» 
was  a  fraud  practiced  by  her  in  and  about  the  trial;  and,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  the  judgment  rests  solely  upon  her  evi- 
dence and  the  petition  sustains  the  decree  of  the  district  court 
vacating  that  judgment,  and  such  decree  is  accordingly  affirmed. 

Irvine,  C,  expresses  no  opinion. 


May,  1898.]     German  Nat.  Bane  v.  Kautter.  371 

JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY.— Relief  from  a  Judgment 
will  be  decreed  In  equity,  upon  there  appearing  any  fact  clearly 
proving  that  it  is  against  conscience  to  execute  the  judgment,  and 
that  the  Injured  party  could  not  have  availed  himself  of  this  fa?i 
in  the  court  of  law,  or  if  he  could  have  so  availed  himself,  that  he 
was  prevented  from  doing  so  by  fraud  or  accident,  unmixed  with 
any  fault  or  negligence  in  himself  or  his  agents:  Ilaudley  v.  Jack- 
son, 31  Or.  552,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  839.  See  the  monographic  note  to 
Little  Rock  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wells,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  218-201. 

JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY— FRAUD.— Equity  has  ju- 
risdiction to  set  aside  a  former  judgment  or  decree  for  perjury  or 
fraud  only  in  those  cases  where  the  perjury  or.  fraud  consists  of  ex- 
trinsic, collateral  acts,  not  examined  and  determined  in  the  former 
action:  Friese  v.  Hummel,  26  Or.  145,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  610. 

JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY— PERJURY.— The  rule  es- 
tablished by  the  weight  of  authority  is  that  a  court  of  equity  will 
not  set  aside  a  judgment  at  law  because  It  was  founded  on  a  fraudu- 
lent Instrument  or  perjured  testimony,  nor  for  any  matter  that 
was  actually  presented  and  considered  In  the  judgment  assailed: 
Camp  V.  Ward,  69  Vt.  286.  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  929,  and  note;  Pico  v. 
Cohn,  91  Cal.  129,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  159,  and  monographic  note  there- 
to. Perjury  may,  however,  be  considered  in  connection  with  other 
circumstances  tending  to  disclose  a  f;*audulent  schfeme  on  the  part 
of  one  party  to  put  it  out  of  the  power  of  the  other  party  to  defend 
the  action:  Colby  v.  Colby,  59  Minn.  432,  50  Am.  St  Rep.  420. 


German  National  Bank   v,   Kautter. 

[55  Nebraska,  108.] 

ATTACHMENT— JUDGMENT  BY  CONSTRUCTIVE  SER- 
VICE—ATTACK UPON.— If  plaintiff  in  attachment  seizes  a  resi- 
dent's property  as  that  of  a  nonresident,  and  sells  it  under  a  judg- 
ment rendered  upon  constructive  service,  the  judgment  defendant 
may,  In  the  absence  of  an  appearance  In  that  suit,  attack  such 
judcmont  in  a  subsequent  suit  by  him,  wherein  the  attachment 
plaintiff  Invokes  such  judgment  as  a  defense,  and  show  that  It  la 
void  for  the  reason  that  at  the  time  of  the  Inception  of  the  attach- 
ment suit  and  judgment  he  was  a  resident  of  the  state  and  then 
therein.  This  may  be  done  although  the  record  in  the  attachment 
suit  is  regular  on  its  face. 

ATTACHMENT  —  FALSE  AFFIDAVIT.  —  An  attachment 
based  on  a  false  affidavit  of  the  nonresidence  of  the  debtor  is  void. 

Boehmer  &  Rummons  and  Abbott,  Selleck  &  Lane,  for  the  ap- 
pellants. 

Norval  Brothers,  D.  C.  McKillip,  and  J.  C.  Johnston,  for  the 
appellee. 

1**  HARRISON,  C.  J.  In  the  petition  filed  in  this  action, 
commenced  for  Ernest  Boise  in  the  district  court  of  Seward 
county,  it  waa  pleaded  that  on  February  27,  1889,  he  executed 


372  German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautter.        [Nebraska, 

and  delivered  to  John  Kautter  a  promissory  note  in  the  sum  of 
$1,138.36,  payable  April  1,  1894,  and  he  and  his  wife  as  security 
for  the  payment  of  the  note,  at  the  same  time  executed  and  de- 
livered to  the  said  party  a  mortgage  on  certain  land  in  Seward 
county,  Nebraska;  that  thereafter  the  note  was  by  the  payee 
indorsed  and  transferred  to  the  German  National  Bank  of 
Lincoln;  that  the  petitioner  paid  at  various  dates  the  sums  of 
interest  due  on  the  note,  and  on  May  3,  1894,  paid  to  the  bank 
the  whole  amount  ©f  principal  and  interest  then  due  and  re- 
ceived from  it  the  note  and  mortgage,  the  note  marked  paid  with 
a  stamp  then  in  use  by  the  bank  for  cancellation  of  paid  instru- 
ments of  indebtedness;  that  the  pleader  had  offered  and  ten- 
dered payment  of  the  fees  and  expenses  of  the  execution,  et 
cetera,  of  a  release  of  the  mortgage,  but  had  been  by  the  bank 
and  other  parties  apparently  interested  in  the  matter  refused  the 
satisfaction  or  release.  He  impleaded  with  the  bank  John 
Kautter,  Henry  Schwake,  George  F.  H.  Schwake,  George  T. 
Meier,  and  Frank  A.  Boehmer,  as  each  having  or  asserting  an 
interest  in  the  note  and  mortgage  as  assignee,  purchaser,  or 
pledgee  ^^^  thereof,  or  otherwise.  He  also  stated  that  he  had 
sold  the  land  described  in  the  mortgage  and  could  not  complete 
the  sale  by  reason  of  the  nonrelease  of  the  mortgage.  He 
prayed  that  the  parties  named  be  ordered  to  release  the  mort- 
gage of  record  or  that  it  be  decreed  canceled.  All  the  defend- 
ants except  Kautter  filed  a  joint  answer,  in  which  they  dis- 
claimed any  interest  in  or  to  the  real  estate  described  in  the 
petition  or  to  the  stated  mortgage  thereon. 

For  Kautter  an  answer  was  filed,  and  subsequently  an  an- 
swer and  cross-petition.-  His  first  answer  was,  during  the  course 
of  the  proceedings,  on  motion  of  some  of  the  parties  to  the  ac- 
tion, stricken  from  the  files.  In  the  answer  and  cross-petition 
Kautter  both  admitted  and  pleaded  affirmatively  the  execution, 
et  cetera,  of  the  note  and  mortgage  referred  to  in  the  petition ; 
also  admitted  that  the  mortgage  was  unreleased  of  record.  It 
was  further  pleaded  in  such  cross-petition  that  the  note  and 
mortgage  were  by  Kautter  delivered  to  the  bank  as  collateral 
security  for  the  payment  of  his  indebtedness  thereto.  This  was 
for  moneys  loaned  to  him  at  different  times,  in  the  aggregate 
$238.  That  at  some  date  in  the  month  of  March  or  April,  1891, 
he  gave  to  the  bank  a  promissory  note  for  the  total  sum  of  the 
loans,  due  three  months  after  date,  and  the  bank  retained  the 
collaterals,  and,  soon  after,  he  went  to  the  state  of  Kansas  to 
attend  to  some  business;  that  he  was  not  again  at  the  bank 


May,  1898.]     German  Nat.  Banc  v.  Kautteb.  878 

until  June,  1893,  at  which  time  he  asked  to  settle  his  mdehted- 
ness  and  that  he  receive  the  Boise  note  and  mortgage  and  the 
bank  account  for  the  interest,  if  any,  collected  thereon.  (The 
interest  on  the  Boise  note  was  payable  annually.)  He  was  then 
informed  by  the  bank  that  the  Boise  note  and  mortgage  had 
been  sold  and  the  proceeds  of  the  sale  applied  in  payment  of  the 
indebtedness — the  $238.  He  further  pleaded  that  on  or  about 
December  9,  1891,  the  bank  made  a  pretended  sale  and  transfer 
of  the  note  and  mortgage;  that  the  same  was  done  with  the 
intent  to  cheat  and  defraud  him  and  to  wrongfully  and  fraudu- 
lently deprive  ****  him  of  his  interest  in  xhe  note  and  mortgage; 
that  Frank  A.  Boehmer,  Henry  Schwake,  George  F.  H.  Schwake, 
and  George  T.  Meier,  who  each  during  the  life  of  the  mortgage 
had  appeared  of  record  as  an  assignee  and  apparent  purchaser 
thereof,  had  none  of  them  paid  any  consideration  for  the  note 
and  mortgage,  but  had  figured  as  such  purchasers  pursuant  to 
an  agreement  and  intent  to  aid  the  bank  in  its  fraudulent  pur- 
pose relative  to  the  pleader's  rights  in  the  instruments  appar- 
ently transferred.  He  alleged  further  that  if  Boise  had  paid 
the  amount  due  on  the  note  for  $1,138.36  to  the  bank,  it  was 
done  with  a  full  knowledge  of  Kautter's  continued  interest  or 
right  -thereto  and  therein,  and  also  of  the  sale  by  the  bank  of 
the  note  and  mortgage  and  its  purpose  with  which  it  made  the 
transfer.  The  prayer  of  the  cross-petition  was  that  the  amount 
due  on  the  note  and  mortgage  might  be  ascertained,  and  after 
a  deduction  therefrom  of  the  sum  of  the  pleader's  indebtedness 
to  the  bank,  the  balance  be  adjudged  a  first  lien  against  the 
land  described  in  the  petition  in  the  action;  that  if  it  should 
appear  that  the  money  due  on  the  note  and  mortgage  had  been 
paid  to  the  bank,  a  judgment  be  accorded  the  cross-petitionet 
against  the  bank  for  the  amount  his  due,  and  also  against  any 
other  of  defendants  who  were  shown  to  have  participated  with 
the  bank  in  the  wrongful  and  fraudulent  purposes  and  acts  rela- 
tive to  the  rights  of  the  pleader. 

To  the  extent  the  rights  of  Ernest  Boise,  the  original  plain- 
tiff, were  involved,  the  issues  were  tried  and  determined  and  the 
cause  was  continued.  Time  was  asked  by  and  allowed  to  the 
bank  and  others,  against  whom  the  cross-petition  declared  and 
demanded  af?irmative  relief,  to  answer  its  allegations.  The 
bank,  in  answer  to  the  cross-petition,  admitted  the  creation  and 
existence  of  the  note  and  mortgage  by  Boise  in  favor  of  the 
cross-petitioner  and  alleged  that  the  latter,  on  March  16,  1890, 
executed  and   delivered  to  the  bank  a  promissory  note  in  the 


374  German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kauttee.        [Nebraska, 

Bum  of  $340.75,  due  June  16,  1890,  which  was  not  paid  at  *<"" 
its  maturity  and  was  unpaid  on  August  3,  1891;  that  on  the 
last-mentioned  date  the  bank  caused  an  action  to  be  commenced 
in  the  .county  court  of  Lancaster  county  to  recover  the  amount 
due  it,  the  indebtedness  evidenced  by  the  note  to  which  we  have 
last  referred,  and  also  caused  a  writ  of  attachment  to  issue  in 
said  action  on  the  ground  that  John  Kautter  was  a  nonresident 
of  the  state  of  Nebraska;  that  the  writ  of  attachment  was  levied 
on  the  note  and  mortgage  of  Boise  to  the  defendant  in  the  at- 
tachment suit;  that  such  action  proceeded  regularly  as  provided 
by  law  to  its  termination,  inclusive  of  a  public  sale  of  the  note 
and  mortgage  under  order  of  the  court  and  the  application  of 
the  proceeds  to  the  payment  of  the  note  on  which  the  attach- 
ment cause  was  predicated.  It  was  further  answered  that  no 
proceeding  had  been  had  or  taken  to  modify,  reverse,  change,  or 
annul  the  adjudication  of  the  county  court.  Frank  A.  Boehmer, 
in  answer  to  the  cross-petition,  admitted  the  execution  and  de- 
livery of  the  $1,138.36  note,  and  its  accompanying  mortgage  by 
Boise  to  Kautter;  alleged  his  purchase  thereof  in  good  faith  at 
the  sale  by  the  ofBcer,  and  denied  generally  all  other  allegation? 
of  such  pleading.  Henry  Schwake,  George  F.  H.  Schwake,  and 
George  T.  Meier  each  admitted  the  $1,138.36  note  and  mortgage 
as  pleaded,  and  alleged  its  bona  fide  purchase  for  a  valuable 
consideration,  and  its  ownership  for  a  time;  and  for  further 
answer  denied  the  other  statements  of  the  cross-petition. 

For  the  cross-petitioner  there  was  filed  a  reply  to  the  answer 
of  the  bank,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  bank  and  the  other 
parties,  who,  during  the  life  of  the  $1,138.36  note,  became  ap- 
parently its  owners  and  holders,  and  who  were  either  officers  or 
employes  of  the  bank  or  were  of  its  stockholders,  combined  or 
planned  to  cheat  or  defraud  the  cross-petitioner  and  used  the 
suit  by  attachment  as  a  means  through  which  to  effect  the  pur- 
pose, and  thereby  procured  a  sale  of  the  note  and  mortgage  to 
be  made,  at  which  a  purchas'e  thereof  was  effected  for  the  bank 
for  *****  the  sum  of  $322,  when  their  value  was  more  than 
$1,300;  that  at  the  time  the  attachment  suit  was  begun  and  dur- 
ing its  progress,  the  pleader  was  a  resident  of  Seward  county, 
Nebraska,  which  fact  and  his  whereabouts  at  the  time  were  well 
known  to  the  bank  and  the  other  parties  interested,  but  they 
purposely  avoided  any  notice  to  him  of  the  action,  attachment, 
and  sale  thereunder,  and  he  had  no  notice  thereof,  and  that  the 
county  court  was  without  jurisdiction  to  act  in  the  suit. 

A  jury  was  waived,  and  there  was  a  trial  of  the  issues  to  the 


May,  1898.]     German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kauttbb.  875 

court.  The  court  determined  as  matters  of  fact  that  Kautter 
borrowed  of  the  bank  the  sum  of  $340.75  on  March  16,  1890, 
and  as  evidence  of  the  indebtedness  so  created,  executed,  and  de- 
livered to  it  a  promissory  note,  also  turned  over  to  it  the 
^1,138.36  note  and  mortgage  as  collateral  security  for  the  pay- 
ment of  his  debt;  that  several  sums  at  different  times  were  paid 
by  Ernest  Boise  to  the  bank  on  the  mortgage  note,  and  the  bal- 
ance due  thereof,  $1,224,  was  paid  May  3,  1894,  to  the  bank; 
that  at  the  time  of  the  suit  and  attachment  and  the  pretended 
sale  of  the  note  and  mortgage  under  order  of  the  court  in  such 
suit  "the  said  cross-petitioner,  John  Kautter,  was  an  actual  bona 
£de  resident  of  Seward  county,  Nebraska,  and  still  resides  there- 
in, and  that  he  had  no  notice  whatever  of  the  pendency  of  said 
-action,  and  that  no  notice  or  summons  was  served  upon  him  in 
said  action;  and  the  court  further  finds  that  said  pretended  ac- 
tion and  attachment,  and  the  pretended  sale  of  said  note,  was 
colla'^ive  and  fraudulent  and  was  made  for  the  purpose  of  cheat- 
ing and  defrauding  said  cross-petitioner,  John  Kautter,  out  of 
said  note  and  mortgage." 

Judgment  was  rendered  against  the  bank  and  George  F.  H. 
Schwake  for  $1,198. 6G  and  costs,  to  reverse  which  is  the  purpose 
of  the  present  proceeding  in  this  court. 

We  deem  it  proper  here  to  notice  some  of  the  facts  in  con- 
nection with  the  findings  of  the  court  relative  thereto.  There 
was  ample  evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  note  and  mortgage  were 
in  the  possession  of  the  bank  as  collateral  **^  security  for  the 
payment  of  the  indebtedness  of  the  payee  thereof  to  the  bank. 
Of  the  testimony  relative  to  the  residence  of  John  Kautter,  it 
may  be  said  to  have  been  established  that  he  was  an  unmarried 
man  and  during  several  years  prior  to  the  sale  of  his  farm  in 
Seward  county  to  Boise,  lived  thereon;  after  the  sale  he  kept 
his  trunk,  some  of  his  belongings  and  effects  .at  the  house  of 
Frank  Thomas,  in  Seward  county,  this  state;  that  he  had  some 
business  interests  or  affairs  in  Kansas,  and  would  go  there  and 
stay  during  some  months  of  probably  each  year;  that  at  one 
time  when  in  Kansas  he  voted  at  a  presidential  election;  that  he 
always  returned  to  Seward  county  as  his  home  and  was  ihere 
several  months  of  each  year,  with  the  exception  possibly  of  one; 
that  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  and  pendency  of  the  at- 
tachment suit  in  Lancaster  county  he  was  in  Seward  county. 
All  the  facts  and  attendant  circumstances  considered,  there  waa 
sufficient  testimony  to  sustain  the  finding  of  the  court  that  the 
oross-petitioner  was  a  resident  of  Seward  county.     There  was  no 


376  German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautter.        [Nebraska, 

other  than  constructive  service  in  the  attachment  suit.  There 
was  also  testimony  in  support  of  a  determination  that  the  mort- 
gage note  was  at  the  time  of  its  sale  in  the  attachment  proceed- 
ings of  the  value  of  the  amount  shown  on  its  face.  It  was  also  of 
the  testimony  that  the  attorney  who  commenced  and  prosecuted 
the  action  and  attachment  for  the  bank  then  had  the  mortgage 
note  in  his  possession  for  collection  and  that  it  was  levied  on  in 
his  office;  that  he  purchased  it  at  the  sale  for  $322  and  held  it 
thereafter  for  thirty  or  sixty  days;  then,  as  he  states,  he  needed 
some  money  and  turned  it  back  to  the  bank  and  received  of  the 
bank  $322,  the  same  amount  he  paid  for  it  at  the  sale.  The 
foregoing  statements  in  relation  to  the  evidence  and  facts  of  the 
case  we  deem  sufficient,  except  to  the  extent  they  may  be  fur- 
ther noticed  in  discusssion  of  the  points  of  the  arguments  made 
by  counsel  for  the  parties. 

It  is  contended  for  the  plaintiffs  in  error  that  the  demand 
for  relief  by  the  cross-petitioner  involves  a  collateral  **®  at- 
tack on  a  domestic  judgment  or  adjudication,  the  judgment  in 
the  attachment  suit;  and,  while  it  was  in  form  a  personal  judg- 
ment against  John  Kautter,  it  must  be  regarded  as  but  an  ad- 
judication by  -which  the  property  attached  was  subjected  to  the 
payment  of  the  debt  in  suit,  and  so  considered  was  authorized 
if  jurisdiction  of  the  res  had  been  obtained.  It  is  of  the  conten- 
tion that  such  an  attack  is  not  allowable  where  the  record  dis- 
closes, as  did  that  of  the  county  court  in  the  attachment  suit, 
the  performance  of  all  acts  and  the  existence  of  all  facts  neces- 
sary to  confer  jurisdiction  and  its  due  exercise;  and  further,, 
in  this  connection,  that  the  defendant  in  error,  not  having  at- 
tacked the  judgment  in  the  county  court  in  any  of  the  methods, 
of  which  there  were  several  afforded  him  by  law,  could  not  be 
heard  to  urge  its  invalidity  in  the  present  action.  This  suit,  as 
instituted  by  Boise,  directly  involved  the  rights  of  John  Kaut- 
ter to  the  note  and  mortgage  and  asked  that  he  be  deprived 
thereof,  and  the  reason,  if  tenable,  for  the  relief  against  him 
had  its  origin  in  what  he  asserted  in  his  answer  and  cross-peti- 
tion were  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  bank  and  other  parties  to  the 
suit  in  respect  to  some  of  the  subject  matters  of  the  action  re- 
lative to  his  rights  thereto  or  therein.  Tn  answer  to  this,  such 
parties  pleaded  the  attachment  proceedings  and  adjudication, 
and  he  replied  facts  to  show  its  invalidity.  In  this  state,  where- 
under  the  code  there  is  but  one — a  civil — action  in  which  mat- 
ters which  may  be  denominated  legal  or  equitable  may  be  liti- 
gated, the  cross-petitioner  could  be  heard  in  defense  to  the  suit 


May,  1898.]     German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautteb.  377 

of  Boise;  also  in  the  cross-action  against  the  bank  and  other 
parties,  to  assert  and  show  the  invalidity  of  the  adjudication 
in  the  attachment  suit.  It  is  true  that  the  record  of  the  attach- 
ment case,  on  its  face,  disclosed  that  the  county  court  had  Jur- 
isdiction to  proceed  as  it  did;  but  the  affidavit  which  gave  it 
jurisdiction  to  entertain  the  suit,  which  became  one  against  tho 
thing  attached,  and  not  against  the  person  of  the  debtor — for 
of  the  person  there  was  no  jurisdiction — contained  in  the  state- 
ment, the  ***  groundwork  of  the  jurisdiction,  that  the  debtor 
was  a  nonresident  of  the  state  and  this  was  not  true.  Unless 
it  was  a  fact  his  property  could  not  be  reached  in  the  suit,  and 
as  it  was  not  a  fact,  the  adjudication  by  which  his  property  was 
appropriated  was  void.  Whether  the  debtor  would  be  allowed 
to  assert  its  invalidity  and  show  the  facts  not  apparent  of  record 
in  litigation  between  him  and  some  third  person  we  need  not 
and  do  not  decade,  but  in  a  contest  between  him  and  the  bank, 
the  plaintiff  in  the  attachment  suit,  we  think  it  was  competent 
and  allowable.  This  view  has  in  its  support  the  argument  that 
when  the  bank  was  called  to  account  by  the  allegations  and  de- 
mands of  the  cross-petition,  it  invoked  in  its  aid  as  a  defense 
the  adjudication  in  the  attachment  suit,  and  thus,  it  may  be  said, 
placed  such  proceedings  and  adjudication  in  issue. 

The  circumstances  of  this  case  as  to  the  question  now  under 
consideration  bring  it  within  the  principle  of  the  rule  announced 
by  this  court  in  Eayrs  v.  Nason,  54  Neb.  143,  wherein  it  was 
stated:  "1.  Though  the  record  in  which  a  judgment  is  pro- 
nounced discloses  upon  its  face  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction 
both  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of  the  parties  thereto, 
still,  a  party  made  liable  by  such  a  judgment,  who  has  never 
appeared  in  the  action,  and  who  was  never  given  legal  notice 
of  the  pendency  of  such  action,  may,  in  a  proper  proceeding, 
either  as  a  cause  of  action  or  defense,  show  that  the  recitals 
of  the  record  that  he  was  served  with  the  process  of  the  court 
are  false;  2.  Suit  was  brought  to  foreclose  a  real  estate  mort- 
gage, the  owner  of  the  equity  of  redemption  of  the  land  involved 
made  defendant  thereto,  and  constructive  service  had  on  him  by 
publication,  he  being  at  the  time  a  resident  of  the  state  and  ac- 
tually present  therein.  He  did  not  appear  in  the  action  per- 
sonally or  by  attorney.  After  the  decree  the  defendant  died. 
Held,  that  in  a  suit  brought  by  his  heir  against  the  purchaser 
of  the  land  at  the  sale  under  the  foreclosure  decree,  to  quiet 
the  heir's  title  and  redeem  from  the  mortgage,  ***  that  the 
heir  might  show  that  the  averments  of  the  affidavit    filed  to 


S78  German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautteb.        [Nebraska, 

procure  constructive  service  upon  his  ancestor,  that  he  was  then 
&  nonresident  of  the  state  and  that  service  of  summons  could 
not  be  made  on  him  in  the  state,  was  false":  See  also  Mastin  v. 
Gray,  19  Kan.  458,  27  Am.  Eep.  149;  McNeill  v.  Edie,  24  Kan. 
108;  Norwood  v.  Cobb,  15  Tex.  500;  Goudy  v.  Hall,  30  111.  109; 
Garleton  v.  Bickford,  13  Gray,  591,  74  Am.  Dec.  652;  Needham 
V.  Thayer,  147  Mass.  536;  Dozier  v.  Eichardson,  25  Ga.  90. 

The  ground  for  the  issuance  of  the  writ  has  no  existence 
•and  the  attachment  was  wrongful  (Stiff  v.  Fisher,  85  Tex.  556; 
McLaughlin  v.  Davis,  14  Kan.  168;  Connelly  v.  Woods,  31  Kan. 
559;  Mayer  v.  Zingre,  18  Neb.  458),  and  afforded  no  forceful 
defense  for  the  bank  against  Kautter's  demand  for  his  col- 
laterals or  the  value  thereof. 

It  is  urged  that  the  cross-petition  was  insufficient  and  the 
relief  afforded  was  not  warranted  or  supported  by  the  pleading 
of  the  prayer  thereof.  The  cross-petition  was  not  the  subject 
of  an  attack  for  insufficiency  of  allegations  until  at  the  time 
of  the  trial.  The  question  was  raised  by  a  demurrer  ore  tenus. 
It  was  also  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  motion  for  a  new  trial. 
The  cross-petition,  we  think,  was  sufficient  in  its  allegation  to 
warrant  the  relief  given,  especially  construed  favorably  as  is  the 
rule  when  the  demurrer  is  delayed,  as  was  this,  until  the  incep- 
i;ion  of  the  introduction  of  evidence.  There  are  some  other 
points  made  in  argument  for  plaintiffs  in  error  which  refer  to  the 
admission  of  evidence.  The  trial  was  to  the  court  without  a  jury. 
That  improper  evidence  was  admitted  is  not  in  and  of  itself 
ground  for  reversal.  There  was  evidence  to  sustain  the  find- 
ings of  the  court:  Tolerton  v.  McClure,  45  Neb.  368. 

It  is  also  asserted  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  allowing  a 
designated  line  of  interrogatories  to  be  asked  of  two  of  the  wit- 
nesses during  their  cross-examination.  There  were  but  few  ob- 
jections interposed  to  any  portions  of  the  cross-examination  to 
which  this  complaint  refers,  and  the  **^  testimony  elicited  by 
the  questions  to  which  objections  were  made  was  either  imma- 
terial or,  for  other  reasons,  wholly  without  prejudice  to  the 
Tights  of  the  complainants. 

It  is  argued  that  it  was  error  to  allow  F.  C.  Thomas  and 
Frank  Thonms  to  testify  on  rebuttal  in  regard  to  the  place  of 
residence  of  John  Kautter.  Of  this  argument  it  may  be  said 
that  Frank  Thomas  was  not  called  and  did  not  testify  in  re- 
buttal. "When  F.  C.  Thomas  was  called  to  testify  in  rebuttal, 
there  was  no  objection  that  it  would  be  improper  that  he  should 
give  testimony  at  that  stage  of  the  trial,  nor  was  his  testimony 


May,  1898.]  Brown  v.  Bose.  379 

objected  to  as  a  wHole.  Of  a  few  questions  asked  of  him  it  was 
made  of  record  that  they  called  for  improper  rebuttal  testi- 
mony, and  the  court  was  asked  to  reject  it,  but  the  testimony 
allowed  to  be  given  in  such  instances  was  either  immaterial  or 
nonprejudicial;  hence  the  assignments  are  without  force. 

Of  the  judgment  as  against  the  plaintiff  in  error,  George 
F.  H.  Schwake,  we  must  say  that  it  is,  in  our  view  of  the  cause, 
without  proof  to  sustain  it.  Anything  he  did  was  in  his  capacity 
as  employe  of  the  bank  and  not  personally,  unless  it  was  his  pur- 
chase of  the  note  and  mortgage,  and  we  do  not  believe  from  the 
€vidence  that  this  portion  of  the  affair  was  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  render  him  personally  liable  to  the  cross-petitioner.  The 
judgment  against  the  bank  is  affirmed,  and  as  to  George  F.  H. 
Schwake  it  is  reversed. 

Judgment  accordingly. 

Nerval,  J.,  offered  no  opinion. 


ATTACHMENT  PROCEEDINGS  AGAINST  NONRESIDENTS 
are  regulated  and  governed  by  statute,  and  such  statutory  provisions 
must  be  strictly  adhered  to:  Note  to  Mudge  v.  Steinhart,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  22. 

ATTACHMENT— FALSE  AFFIDAVIT.— If  an  attachment  Is  pro- 
•cured  by  the  plaintiff's  filing  an  affidavit  that  the  debt  upon  which 
he  sues  is  not  secured,  and  a  bond  is  given  to  release  property  from 
a  levy  made  under  such  attachment,  the  obligors  in  the  bond  may 
successfully  resist  the  action  against  them  thereon  by  establishing 
the  falsity  of  such  affidavit:  Murphy  v.  Montandon,  2  Idaho,  1(HS,  33 
Am.  St.  Rep.  279. 


Brown'  v.  Boss. 

[55  Nebraska,  200.] 

ATTACHMENT  SALES— TITLE  OF  PURCHASER— COL- 
LATERAL ATTACK.— A  purchaser  at  execution  sale  of  the  real 
property  of  a  nonresident  defendant  taken  under  attachment  ae- 
<iuire8  a  title  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  In  another  action, 
although  the  publication  of  notice  preceding  the  Judgment  in  the 
attachment  proceeding  was  irregular  and  might  have  been  attacked 
therein. 

C.  F.  Tuttle,  W.  D.  Beckett,  and  D.  F.  Hayden,  for  the  appel- 
lants. 

J.  C.  Watson,  for  the  appellees. 

200  RYAN,  C.    This  was  an  action  of  ejectment  in  which 
there  was  final  judgment  in  favor  of  the  defendants  in  the  dis- 


380  Brown  v.  Bose.  [Nebraska, 

trict  court  of  Otoe  county.  The  trial  was  to  the  court  with- 
out a  jury,  and  the  correctness  of  its  conclusion  depends  upon 
a  single  question,  which  is  presented  by  the  following  facts: 
Previous  to  March  14,  1890,  the  real  property  in  controversy 
was  owned  by  the  ancestor  of  the  plaintiffs  in  error.  On  that 
day  there  were  two  petitions  and  other  proper  showings  for  an 
attachment,  which  issued  against  said  owner  of  the  real  prop- 
erty in  dispute  in  as  many  actions.  The  attachment  defend- 
ant, at  the  time  of  all  the  transactions  herein  referred  to,  was 
a  nonresident  of  this  state.  The  levies  of  the  writs  of  attach- 
ment were  made  respectively,  on  March  20,  ^^^  1890,  and  March 
25, 1890.  The  publications  of  notice  to  the  nonresident  defend- 
ant were  made  March  14,  March  21,  March  28,  April  4  and  April 
11, 1890.  By  stipulation  on  the  trial  of  this  case  it  was  admitted 
that  the  two  above-mentioned  actions  were  begun  against  the  de- 
fendant Brown  to  cause  to  be  sold  the  premises  in  dispute  for  the 
payment  of  debts  owing  by  him;  that  said  property  was  purchased 
at  sheriff's  sale,  and  that  through  the  purchaser  at  said  sale  the 
defendant  in  the  district  court,  as  an  innocent  purchaser,  derived 
his  title,  under  which,  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the 
action,  he  was  in  possession.  The  contention  of  plaintiffs  in 
error  is,  that  no  publication  could  properly  be  made  of  the 
notice  to  the  nonresident  defendant  until  after  a  levy  of  attach- 
ment; that  after  such  levy  there  were  not  four  publications  of 
the  notice,  and  consequently  the  court,  at  the  time  it  directed 
a  sale  of  the  property,  had  no  Jurisdiction  to  order  a  sale  there- 
of, from  which  premises  it  is  argued  that  the  sale  pursuant  to 
such  order  was  not  effective  to  vest  title. 

In  Darnell  v.  Mack,  46  Neb.  740,  this  exact  question  wai 
not  involved,  but  arguendo  there  were  cited  several  cases  in 
support  of  the  proposition  that  jurisdiction  to  order  a  sale  de- 
pends upon  the  lawful  seizure  of  the  property,  and  that  subse- 
quent defects  may  render  the  judgment  erroneous,  but  not  void. 
We  have  again  examined  these  cases  and  find  that  they  sustain 
the  proposition  in  support  of  which  they  were  cited:  Cooper  v. 
Reynolds,  10  Wall.  308;  Paine  v.  Mooreland,  15  Ohio  435,  45 
Am.  Dec.  585;  In  re  Clark,  3  Denio,  167;  Beech  v.  Abbott,  6 
Vt.  586;  Williams  v.  Stewart,  3  Wis.  678,  *773;  Field  v.  Dortcli, 
34  Ark.  339;  Hardin  v.  Lee,  51  Mo.  241.  We  could  add  nothing 
of  value  by  going  over  the  propositions  considered  in  Darnell  v. 
Mack,  46  Neb.  740,  and  hence  refrain  from  any  attempts  in 
that  direction.  The  reasoning  meets  our  approval,  as  appiicd 
to  the  facts  of  this  case,  and  it  is  necessary  merely  to  refe;  to 


May,  1893.]     Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller,  881 

that  reasoning  for  a  discussion  of  the  pivotal  question  with 
which  we  are  dealing. 

^"^  The  irregularities  complained  of  by  plaintiffs  in  error 
were  of  such  a  nature  that,  possibly,  they  might  have  been 
available  in  the  actions  in  which  they  occurred.  They  can- 
not now  be  invoked  to  sustain  a  collateral  attack  upon  the  judg- 
ments rendered  in  those  actions  and  upon  the  proceedings  after- 
ward had  for  the  enforcement  of  said  judgments.  There  is 
found  no  error  in  the  record  and  the  judgment  of  the  district 
court  is  affirmed. 


ATTACHMENT— COLLATERAL  ATTACK  ON  JUDGMENT. 
A  court  acquires  jurisdiction  In  attachment  by  Issuing  process  and 
attacliing  the  property,  and  If,  after  acquiring  jurisdiction,  It  ren- 
ders judgment  without  the  publication  of  notice  required  by  law, 
such  judgment  Is  irregular  only,  and  cannot  be  attacked  collaterally, 
but  can  only  be  corrected  by  writ  of  error:  Paine  v.  Mooreland,  15 
Ohio,  435.  45  Am.  Dec.  585.  But  see  German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautter, 
55  Neb.  103,  ante,  p.  371,  where  a  judgment  against  a  supposed  non- 
resident was  attacked  collaterally. 


Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Milleb. 

[55  Nebraska,  243.] 

MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT  OP  TITLE  DEEDS.— A  mortgage 
cannot  be  created  by  the  deposit  of  title  deeds  without  a  writing,  as 
«uoh  mortgage  is  contrary  to  the  statute  of  frauds  and  the  recording 
acts. 

STATUTE  OP  PRAUDS.— An  exception  to  the  statute  of 
frauds  taking  out  of  its  operation  estates  arising  by  act  or  opera- 
tion of  law  does  not  include  a  case  where  the  creation  of  the  estate 
depends  solelv  upon  the  Intention  of  the  parties  to  a  contract. 

STATUTE  OP  PRAUDS  — ORAL  CONTRACT.— A  court  of 
oqulty  cannot  make  valid  a  contract  .void  under  the  statute  of 
frauds,  under  pretense  of  aiding  an  Imp'erfect  attempt  to  execute  a 
contract. 

MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT  OP  TITLE  DEEDS.— A  mortgage 
attempted  to  be  made  by  the  deposit  of  title  deeds  cannot  be  en- 
forced, although  the  loan  secured  by  such  deposit  has  been  actually 
received  by  the  depositor. 

A.  A.  "Welch,  for  the  appellant. 

Carter  &  Brown,  for  the  appellee. 

«*»  IRVINE,  C.  D.  C.  Main  held  a  contract  with  th^  state 
for  the  purchase  of  the  northwest  quarter  of  section  32,  town- 
ship 32  north,  of  range  3  west,  in  Knox  county,  eaid  land  be- 
ing state  educational  land.     He  also  held  a  number  of  leases  of 


382  Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Millek.     [Nebraska^ 

other  educational  land  in  the  vicinity.  In  1892  he  entered  into- 
contracts  with  H.  N.  Miller,  which  had  for  their  effect  the 
transfer  to  Miller  of  Main's  rights  to  the  land,  payment  of  the 
consideration  or  a  part  thereof  being  deferred.  The  contract 
first  referred  to,  and  out  of  which  this  action  arises,  was  as- 
signed to  Miller  by  a  separate  instrument.  January  20,  1893, 
Miller  made  his  note  to  the  Bloomfield  State  Bank  for  five 
hundred  dollars,  representing  in  part  an  overdraft  and  in  part 
a  loan  made  at  that  time  by  the  bank  to  Miller.  At  the  same 
time  Miller  wrote  his  name  on  the  back  of  the  assignment  from 
Main  to  himself,  and  delivered  the  assignment  in  that  condi- 
tion to  the  bank,  intending  thereby  to  have  it  operate  as  security 
for  the  note.  Prior  thereto  he  had,  by  formal  written  assign- 
ments, transferred  his  rights  to  the  other  lands  to  French,  to 
secure  a  debt  he  owed  the  latter.  In  April  or  May,  1893,  find- 
ing that  he  would  be  unable  to  meet  the  payments  to  Main,  Mil- 
ler negotiated  for  the  sale  of  his  rights  to  Sexton,  Comstock 
&  Co.  Sexton,  Comstock  &  Co.  not  being  prepared  or  not  desir- 
ing to  make  immediate  payment  to  Main,  an  arrangement  was 
made  among  Miller,  Main,  French,  and  Sexton,  Comstock  & 
Co.,  evidenced  by  a  preliminary  memorandum  agreement,  ^^® 
two  formal  contracts,  and  certain  letters.  No  single  contract 
wa5  joined  in  by  all  the  parties  to  the  transaction,  but  the 
nature  of  the  arrangement  is  made  plain  by  a  comparison  of 
the  different  documents.  Its  precise  nature  is  not  material; 
its  general  object  was  to  procure  contracts  of  purchase  in  lieu 
of  the  leases,  to  pass  all  rights  eventually  to  Sexton,  Comstock 
&  Co.,  and  to  this  end  that  French  should  pay  to  Main  all  moneys 
accruing  to  him  under  his  contracts  with  Miller,  obtain  the  as- 
signed contracts  from  Main  and  hold  them  until  Sexton,  Com- 
stock &  Co.  should  repay  French  his  advances  to  Miller  and  to 
Main,  when  he  should  assign  them  to  Sexton,  Comstock  &  Co. 
Accordingly,  French  paid  Main  what  was  due  him,  including 
the  money  due  on  the  contract  first  mentioned.  Down  to  this 
point  neither  Main,  French,  nor  Sexton,  Comstock  &  Co.  knew 
of  the  transactions  between  Miller  and  the  bank.  Learning 
thereof,  Main  refused  to  transfer  the  contract  with  the  state 
to  French.  The  bank  on  its  part,  learning  of  the  other  trans- 
actions, wrote  above  Miller's  signature  on  the  assignment  an 
assignment  thereof  to  itself.  Then  it  began  this  action  against 
Miller,  Main,  and  French,  alleging  in  its  petition  the  debt  to 
the  bank  and  that  to  secure  the  payment  thereof  Miller  agreed 
to  assign  the  contract  with  Main,  that  he  wrote    his  name  on 


May,  1898.]     Bloom  field  State  Bank  v,  Millee.  385 

the  back  thereof  and  delivered  it  to  the  hank  with  authority 
to  fill  in  above  the  signature  a  formal  assignment.  It  prayed 
a  foreclosure.  Miller  made  default.  French  answered,  deny- 
ing all  the  material  averments  of  the  petition  and  alleging 
that,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  title  and  conveying  to  Sexton, 
Comstock  &  Co.  in  accordance  with  his  contract  obligations,  he 
had  bought  the  land  of  Main  and  paid  him  therefor,  all  in 
ignorance  of  any  claim  by  plaintiff.  By  way  of  cross-petitioa 
he  prayed  that  Main  be  required  to  assign  tne  contract  to  him. 
Main  in  his  answer  pleaded  his  good  faith  and  offered  to  assign 
to  whomsoever  the  court  might  determine,  and  to  refund  to 
French  what  he  had  paid  if  the  court  should  so  order.  **''  The- 
findings  were  against  the  plaintiff,  and  the  court  ordered  a 
conveyance  by  Main  to  French.     Plaintiff  alone  appeals.  • 

By  comparing  the  statement  of  facts  with  the  issues,  it  will 
be  seen  that  neither  of  the  contesting  parties  succeeded  in 
establishing  the  facts  precisely  as  he  pleaded  them.  The  bank 
wholly  failed  to  show  that  it  had  any  authority  to  write  the- 
assignment  over  Miller's  signature,  or  that  the  signature  was 
placed  there  for  such  a  purposie.  Even  if  there  had  been  such, 
authority,  the  assignment  was  not  written  until  after  French's- 
rights  had  accrued  in  his  ignorance  of  the  bank's.  The  bank, 
therefore,  can  claim  nothing  under  the  written  assignment.  On 
the  other  hand,  French  pleaded  only  an  assignment  from  Main. 
Main  had  already  assigned  to  Miller,  so  that  under  that  plead- 
ing French  could  claim  only  a  subrogation  to  Main's  right  to 
the  unpaid  purchase  money,  provided  the  bank  had  any  right 
derived  from  Miller,  although  under  the  evidence  French,  or 
Sexton,  Comstock  &  Co.,  whom"  he  represented,  was  shown  to 
have  acquired  Miller's  rights  also.  If  the  bank  obtained  no 
right,  then  it  cannot  complain  of  the  decree  between  the  other 
parties.  If  it  did  obtain  any  right  from  Miller,  then  the  decree 
must  at  least  be  modified.  The  proof  showing  that  the  written 
assignment  to  the  bank  was  unavailing,  but  also  showing  that 
the  contract  between  Main  and  Miller  was  by  the  latter  deposited 
with  the  bank  with  the  clear  intention  on  the  part  of  both  that 
it  should  stand  as  security  for  a  debt  in  part  then  contracted, 
we  have  thus  distinctly  presented  for  the  first  time  in  this  stata 
the  question  whether  the  doctrine  of  an  equitable  mortgage  by 
a  deposit  of  title  deeds  is  sound. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  review  the  English  cases.  When  the 
doctrine  was  there  first  announced  it  provoked  much  opposi- 
tion, being  justly  considered  a  further  invasion  of  the  statute 


584  Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Milleb.    [Nebraska, 

■of  frauds.  Lord  Eldon  expressed  his  emphatic  disapproval 
of  it,  but  considered  the  rule  too  well  fixed  in  his  time  to  justify 
its  overthrow.  It  must  therefore  ^'*^  be  accepted  as  the  estab- 
lished doctrine  of  the  English  courts,  and  as  a  part  of  the  law  of 
England.  The  common  law  is  not  with  us  an  estate  by  in- 
heritance, but  one  by  purchase.  It  is  here  in  force  by  virtue 
of  statute,  which  provides:  "So  much  of  the  common  law  of 
England  as  is  applicable  and  not  inconsistent  with  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States,  with  the  organic  law  of  this  territory, 
or  with  any  law  passed  or  to  be  passed  by  the  legislature  of  this 
territory"  is  adapted  and  declared  to  be  law  within  said  terri- 
tory: Comp.  Stats.,  c.  15,  sec.  1.  No  one  would  assert 
that  the  phrase  "common  law"  was  there  used  in  contradistinc- 
tion to  the  rules  of  equity;  it  undoubtedly  includes  the  law  de- 
rived from  the  English  court  of  chancery.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  was  not  the  whole  body  of  the  English  law  which  was  adopted, 
but  only  so  much  thereof  as  is  applicable  (to  the  nature  of  our 
institutions),  and  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  constitutions  or 
statutes,  past  or  future.  There  is  certainly  nothing  in  the  con- 
stitution which  conflicts  with  the  doctrine  of  parol  mortgages, 
hut  when  we  examine  the  statutes  the  question  assumes  a  dif- 
ferent aspect.  We  have  a  statute  of  frauds  in  the  main  follow- 
lowing  the  outline  of  the  famous  statute  of  Charles  II.  By  this 
"No  estate  or  interest  in  lands,  other  than  leases  for  a  term  not 
exceeding  one  year,  nor  any  trust  or  power  over  or  concerning 
lands,  or  in  any  manner  relating  thereto,  shall  hereafter  be  cre- 
ated, granted,  assigned,  or  surrendered  or  declared,  unless  by  act 
or  operation  of  law,  or  by  a  deed  or  conveyance  in  writing,  sub- 
scribed by  the  party  creating,  granting,  assigning,  surrendering, 
or  declaring  the  same":  Comp.  Stat.,  c.  32,  sec.  3.  By  section  4 
of  the  same  chapter,  section  3  shall  not  be  construed  "to  prevent 
any  trust  from  rising  or  being  extinguished  by  implication  or 
operation  of  law."  By  section  5  every  contract  for  the  sale  of 
lands  or  any  interest  in  lands  shall  be  void  unless  the  contract 
or  some  note  or  memorandum  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the 
party  by  whom  the  sale  is  made.  By  section  23  the  term  "estate 
^'^^  and  interest  in  lands"  shall  be  construed  to  embrace  every 
•estate  and  interest,  freehold  and  chattel,  legal  and  equitable, 
present  and  future,  vested  and  contingent.  The  language  of 
these  sections  is  so  clear  that  it  would  be  immediately  conclu- 
sive against  the  theory  of  parol  liens,  were  it  not  for  the  fact 
that  much  of  the  language  is  taken  from  the  English  statute, 
which,  in   spite   of   its   plain   provisions,   the   English   courts 


May,  1898.]    Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Milleb.  885 

straiglitway  set  themselves  to  evade  and  fritter  away  by  a  process 
of  misconstruotion  as  systematic  as  it  was  ingenious.  For  years 
the  mischief  of  that  policy  has  been  realized  and  the  danger  of 
further  pursuing  it  has  been  by  most  courts  carefully  avoided. 
The  spirit  of  the  statute  should  certainly  be  preserved  so  far 
as  possible.  Its  purpose  and  policy,  no  doubt,  is  to  prevent  the 
creation  or  transfer  of  estates  in  or  liens  upon  lands,  except 
by  -wrriting  definite  and  complete  in  its  terms.  To  en- 
force a  mortgage  created  by  the  mere  deposit  of  title  deeds  is 
:ji  the  plainest  violation  of  such  purpose  and  policy.  It  directly 
■offends  the  very  letter  of  the  law. 

Again,  in  this  state  we  have  created  by  statute  a  system  wliere- 
by  conveyances,  including  mortgages,  must  be  registered  in  a 
public  office.  The  purpose  of  this  system  is  to  afford  security  to 
titles  by  a  public  record  which  parties  dealing  with  land  may, 
and  for  their  own  protection  must,  examine,  and  on  which  they 
may  rely.  Secret  transfers  and  liens  are  sought  thereby  to  be 
prevented.  A  mortgage  by  deposit  of  title  deeds  tends  to  defeat 
this  purpos:e.  The  recording  acts  have  another  bearing  on  the 
question.  In  England  title  deeds  followed  the  land.  The  evi- 
dence of  title  lay  not  only  in  the  delivery  of  a  deed,  but  in  its 
continued  possession  by  the  grantee.  When,  therefore,  the 
owner  parted  with  his  muniments  of  title  he  parted  with  the 
means  of  disposing  of  the  land.  When  the  deposit  was  by  way 
of  pledge,  the  pledgee,  by  his  manual  possession  of  the  deeds, 
had  the  effective  power  to  prevent  an  untoward  disposition  of 
the  land,  either  such  as  would  defraud  him  or  such  as  would 
defraud  ^'***  others  ignorant  of  his  rights.  But  under  our  sys- 
tem it  is  not  usual  to  consult  or  even  to  inquire  about  the  origi- 
nal conveyances.  They  have  performed  their  chief  office  when 
they  have  been  recorded.  Thenceforth  the  records  become  the 
practical  evidence  of  title.  By  a  deposit  of  the  deeds  the  pledgee 
does  not  obtain  that  effective  control  over  the  thing  pledged 
which  is  essential  to  such  a  security  when  not  evidenced  by  writ- 
ing, whether  that  thing  be  real  or  personal. 

For  the  reasons  above  stated  this  court  has  held  that  the  ven- 
dor of  land,  who  delivers  to  his  vendee  a  deed  absolute,  does 
not  retain  a  lien  thereon  for  the  unpaid  purchase  money:  Ed- 
minster  V.  Higgins,  6  'Neb.  265;  Ansley  v.  Pasahro,  22  Neb. 
€62.  In  Folsom  v.  McCague,  29  Neb.  124,  Judge  Nerval,  speak- 
ing of  an  assignment  of  a  land  contract  where  the  place  for  the 
vendee's  name  was  left  blank,  said :  **To  make  a  valid  assignment 
Ail  8r.  Rep..  You  LXX.— 2» 


386  Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller.     [Nebraska^ 

of  tliese  coiitracts,it  was  as  necessaryto  hare  an  assignee  as  it  was 
the  signature  of  the  assignor.  Until  some  one's  name  was  filled 
in  these  blanks  as  assignee  the  appellees  appeared  to  be  and 

were  the  real  owners These  assignments  of  the  contracts 

in  blank  were  in  violation  of  the  statute  of  frauds  and  void.'* 
"While  none  of  these  cases  is  decisive  of  that  before  us,  they  all 
recognize  the  principles  already  stated.  We  would,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  authority  elsewhere,  say  without  hesitation  that  the 
doctrine  of  equitable  mortgages  by  the  deposit  of  title  deeds^ 
although  a  part  of  the  law  of  England,  is  not  here  applicable,. 
is  contrary  to  our  statutes,  and  was,  therefore,  not  adopted  by 
the  legislature  of  the  territory.  This  conclusion  is  reinforced 
by  an  examination  of  the  decisions  in  other  states,  where  by  cus- 
tom or  by  statute  the  common  law  hai  been  acquired.  For 
some  or  all  of  the  reasons  suggested  the  doctrine  has  been  re- 
pudiated in  the  following  cases:  Probasco  v.  Johnson,  2  Disn. 
96;  Lehman  v.  Collins,  69  Ala.  127;  Bower  v.  Oyster,  3  Penr. 
&  W.  239;  Vanmeter  v.  McFaddin,  8  B.  Mon.  435;  Bicknell 
V.  Bicknell,  31  Vt.  498;  Meador  v.  Meador,  3  Heisk.  562;  Goth- 
ard  v.  Flynn,  25  Miss.  58. 

^'^^  While  the  courts  of  many  states  have  to  some  extent  in- 
timated an  adherence  to  the  English  rule,  it  has  always  been 
on  a  citation  of  the  English  cases,  without  any  discussion  on 
principle  of  the  objections  to  the  "enforcement  of  that  rule  in 
this  country.  Moreover,  these  cases  are  by  no  means  so  formid- 
able as  their  bare  citation  in  digests  and  text-books  would  in- 
dicate. New  York  invariably  leads  the  list  of  states  in  these 
compilations,  and  the  first  case  cited  isJacksonv.Dunlap,lJohns. 
Cas.  114,  1  Am.  Dec.  100.  There  land  had  been  sold;  the  deed 
had  not  been  delivered,  but  was  retained  by  the  grantor  as  se- 
curity for  the  purchase  money.  Four  judges  held  that  there  had 
been  no  delivery  and  that  title  had  never  passed.  Kent  alone 
thought  that  title  had  passed,  but  that  an  equitable  mortgage 
had  been  created.  He  does  not  discuss  the  question  and  his 
opinion  was  a  dissent,  but  the  case  is  cited  as  upholding  the 
English  rule.  Jackson  v.  Parkhurst,  4  Wend.  369,  merely  holds 
that  an  equitable  mortgage  is  not  available  as  a  defense  in  eject- 
ment. The  validity  of  such  a  mortgage  for  other  purposes  was 
not  involved  in  the  case.  Rockwell  v.  Hobby,  2  Sand.  Oh.  10, 
was  a  case  where  a  son  had  paid  his  mother's  mortgage  and 
retained  an  unrecorded  deed  to  her.  It  was  there  held  that 
the  retention  of  the  deed  made  an  equitable  mortgage,  but  the 
case  loses  force  from  the  further  holding  that,  independently 


May,  1898.]     Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller.  887 

of  the  deed,  the  son  was  suhrogated  to  the  rights  of  the  mort- 
gagee whom  he  had  paid.  Chase  v.  Peck,  21  N.  Y.  581,  was  a 
case  of  a  deed  absolute;  the  remarks  about  deposits  of  title  deeda 
were  obiter. 

In  New  Jersey  a  very  peculiar  thing  has  occurred.  Griffin 
V.  Griffin,  18  N".  J.  Eq.  104,  was  a  bill  to  compel  the  defendant 
to  surrender  to  plaintiff  deeds  to  plaintiff's  ancestor  of  land 
in  New  York.  It  appeared  that  -they  had  been  deposited  as 
security.  The  court,  citing  the  New  York  cases  we  have  men- 
tioned, took  them  as  indicating  that  such  a  deposit  operated 
in  New  York  as  a  mortgage,  and  therefore  very  properly  re- 
fused to  decree  ^^^  their  surrender,  without  any  reference  to 
the  New  Jersey  law  on  the  subject.  But  in  Gale  v.  Morris,  29 
N.  J.  Eq.  222,  the  court  announced  the  English  rule  as  in  force 
in  New  Jersey  and  cited  Griffin  v.  Griffin,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  104,  and 
also  Brewer  v.  Marshall,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  637,  97  Am.  Dec.  679,  a 
case  where  the  doctrine  was  not  involved,  but  mentioned  by  way 
of  remote  illustration  of  a  general  equitable  principle.  More- 
over, even  Gale  v.  Morris,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  222,  did  not  require  a 
decision  of  the  question.  That  was  a  suit  to  reform  a  mortgage 
on  a  life  estate  so  as  to  embrace  the  fee;  the  mistake  as  between 
the  parties  was  admitted,  and  the  issue  was  whether  a  subse- 
quent mortgagee  was  charged  with  noitice  so  that  the  reforma- 
tion could  cut  him  out  as  to  the  reversion. 

Hackett  v.  Eeynolds,  4  E.  I.  612,  enforces  such  a  mortgage 
in  a  hard  case,  with  the  preliminary  observation  that  the  fraudu- 
lent design  of  the  debtors  was  so  transparent  "that  a  court  of 
equity  would  be  disposed  to  find  or  to  make  a  way  to  thwart 
them.*'  From  a  peculiarly  apologetic  tone  in  the  opinion  it  is 
evident  that  the  court  realized  tha;t  it  was  making  a  way. 

Hutzler  v.  Phillips,  26  S.  C.  136,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  687,  often 
cited  as  sustaining  the  rule,  holds  distinctly  that  the  case  was 
not  within  it.  There  was  a  dissent  to  the  intimation  that  the 
rule  might  be  in  force. 

The  following  cases,  frequently  cited,  will  be  found  on  in- 
vestigation to  involve  no  such  question,  and  the  remarks  of  the 
judges  on  the  subject  either  to  be  obiter  or  made  for  the  purpose 
of  excluding  the  question  from  the  case:  Mowry  v.  Wood,  12 
Wis.  (*413)  460;  Jarvis  v.  Butcher,  16  Wis.  (*307)  326;  Abbott 
V.  Godfroy,  1  Mich.  179;  Peckham  v.  Haddock,  36  111.  38;  Rob- 
erts V.  Richards,  36  111.  339;  Carpenter  v.  Black  Hawk  Gold 
Min.  Co.,  65  N.  Y.  43;  Hall  v.  McDuff,  24  Me.  311;  Wright 
V.  Troutman,  81  111.  374. 


388  Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller.     [Nebraska, 

Williams  v.  Stratton,  10  Smedes  &  M.  418,  says:  "Such  a 
mortgage  is  in  direct  opposition  to  the  statute  of  frauds,  in  re- 
gard to  which  we  have  said  that  we  will  create  no  exceptions 
not  found  in  the  statute." 

^^  Mandeville  v.  Welch,  5  Wheat,  277,  does  not  sustain  the 
doctrine.  Judge  Story  merely  says  in  that  case:  "It  may  he 
admitted  that  according  to  the  course  of  the  authorities  in  Eng- 
land, and  as  applicable  to  the  state  of  land  titles  there,"  a  de- 
posit of  title  deeds  creates  a  mortgage.  Whatever  inference 
might  be  drawn  from  that  language  as  to  the  position  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States  is  dispelled  by  the  emphatic 
words  of  Justice  Campbell  in  Williams  v.  Hill,  19  How.  246: 
"ISTor  can  the  real  property  conveyed  in  the  deed  be  retained  as 
security  for  advances  or  debts  subsequently  made, on  the  strength 
of  a  parol  engagement." 

The  case  of  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Caldwell,  4  Dill.  314,  is  en- 
titled to  more  than  passing  consideration,  not  only  from  the 
eminent  ability  of  the  judge  who  decided  it,  but  as  being  a  case 
from  this  federal  district  and  to  which  the  law  of  Nebraska  was 
applicable.  There  certain  railroad  coupons  were  held  as  a 
pledge.  They  were  exchangeable  for  land,  and,  by  arrangement 
of  the  debtor  and  creditor,  they  were  exchanged,  land  contracts 
being  issued  in  the  name  of  the  debtor  but  delivered  to  the  cred- 
itor. The  court  held  that  the  pledgee  had  a  lien  superior  to 
that  of  a  judgment  creditor.  Judge  Dillon,  however,  declined 
to  pass  on  the  question  whether  a  lien  could  be  created  by  the 
mere  deposit  of  title  deeds.  The  fact  that  there  they  stood  in 
lieu  of  coupons  held  in  perfect  pledge  was  the  controlling  fact 
in  his  mind.  Giving,  however,  due  weight  to  his  apparent 
opinion  in  favor  of  the  English  rule,  we  do  not  feel  that  we  can 
adopt  it  in  the  face  of  what  seems  to  us  the  overwhelming  rea- 
son and  weight  of  authority  against  it. 

The  plaintiff  argues  that  so  far  as  the  reasons  urged  for  de- 
nying the  lien  are  founded  on  the  statute  of  frauds  they  are 
of  no  force,  because  our  statute  excepts  from  its  operation  es- 
tates arising  by  act  or  operation  of  law.  This  phrase  occurs  twice 
in  the  statute — once  in  section  3,  already  quoted,  and  again  in 
section  4,  with  reference  to  trusts:  Comp.  Stats.,  c.  32,  The 
phrase  is  ^*  twice  found  in  the  statute  of  29  Charles  II,  chapter 
3,  and  in  the  same  connection;  in  section  3  in  very  similar  words 
to  our  section  3;  in  section  8  with  regard  to  trusts:  Section  8 
of  the  English  statute  excepts  trusts  arising  by  implication  or 
construction  of  law  and  extinguishments  or  transfers  by  act  or 


May,  1898.]     Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller,  389 

operation  of  law,  while  our  section  4  excepts  trusts  arising  or 
extinguished  by  implication  or  operation  of  law.  It  is  nianifest 
from  the  closeness  of  context  that  the  phrase  was  used  in  our 
statute  in  the  English  sense.  We  have  not  found  any  exact 
definition  thereof.  Chancellor  Kent,  in  Simonds  v.  Catlin,  Cole. 
&  C.  Cas.  346,  said :  "These  words  are  strictly  technical,  and  refer 
to  certain  definite  estates,  such  as  those  by  curtesy  and  dower 
and  those  created  by  remittitur."  In  Bouvier's  Law  Dictionary 
it  is  said  that  the  term  indicates  the  manner  in  which  a  party 
acquires  rights  without  any  act  of  his  own.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  parliament  intended  no  more  than  these  statements 
imply,  at  least  in  the  third  section  of  the  statute.  In  the  eighth 
section  trusts  were  involved,  and  the  object  of  the  exception 
seems  to  have  been  to  avoid  the  destruction  of  the  ingenious 
method  of  conveyancing  derived  from  the  doctrine  of  trusts  and 
the  construction  which  had  been  placed  on  the  statute  of  uses, 
and  to  preserve  resulting  and  constructive  trusts.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  precise  idea  in  the  legislative  mind,  it  is  clear 
that  the  exception  was  not  meant  to  give  effect  to  contracts 
which  the  parties  had  failed  to  express  in  the  form  required  by 
the  statute.  Such  an  interpretation  would  render  the  exception 
wholly  destructive  of  the  statute.  Yet  it  requires  that  interpre- 
tation to  bring  this  case  within  the  exception.  The  lien  here 
arises  if  at  all  solely  from  the  contract  of  the  parties.  It  is  not 
a  result  flowing  by  law  independent  of  their  contract  or  even 
derivative  from  any  valid  contract  which  they  made. 

Finally,  it  is  insisted  that  a  court  of  equity  will  enforce  the 
lien  as  the  result  of  an  imperfect  attempt  to  *^**  create  a  legal 
mortgage.  Certain  California  cases  are  cited  in  support  of  the 
argument.  The  power  of  equity  is  frequently  asserted  to  reform 
instruments  and  to  compel  their  execution  under  certain  circum- 
stances. But  neither  the  petition  nor  the  evidence  presents  a 
case  for  the  reformation  of  an  instrument  or  the  specific  per- 
formance of  a  contract.  There  is  not  made  out,  as  suggested, 
a  ease  for  the  specific  performance  of  an  oral  contract  on  the 
ground  of  part  performance.  The  plaintiff  has  not  altered  its 
position  except  by  paying  the  consideration,  and  that  alone  is 
not  such  a  part  performance  as  will  take  a  case  out  of  the  statute 
of  frauds.  Moreover,  there  was  no  contract  to  specifically 
enforce.  Miller  did  not  promise  to  execute  a  mortgage.  He 
indorsed  the  contract  and  delivered  it,  which  was  all  that  his 
contract  contemplated.  Nothing  more  could  be  required,  at 
least  where  the  rights  of  third  persons  have  intervened.    In  no 


390  United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geeb.     [Nebraska, 

way  can  the  Lank  be  given  any  relief  except  by  giving  effect  to 
a  transaction  which  the  law  has  denounced  as  void. 
Affirmed. 


MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT  OF  TITLE  DEEDS.— Where  title 
deeds  are  deposited  as  present  security,  and  with  Intent  thereby  to 
create  a  lien  upon  the  land  therein  conveyed,  an  equitable  mort- 
gage is  created,  notwithstanding  the  statute  of  frauds.  But  an 
equitable  mortgage  is  not  created  by  the  deposit  of  title  deeds  in 
pursuance  of  a  parol  agreement  to  make  a  mortgage:  Hutzler  v. 
Phillips,  26  S.  C.  136,  4  Am.  St.  Eep.  687,  and  especially  see  the 
monographic  note  thereto. 

STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS— PAROL  AGREEMENT— COURTS  OF 
EQUITY.— Equity  will  at  all  times  lend  its  aid  to  defeat  fraud,  not- 
withstanding the  statute  of  frauds:  Ryan  v.  Dox,  34  N.  Y.  307,  90 
Am.  Dec.  696.  But  no  case  can  be  found  where  a.  contract  has  been 
taken  out  of  the  statute  in  favor  of  a  party  who  had  no  existing 
Interest  in  the  property,  Avho  had  done  no  act  of  part  performance, 
who  had  parted  with  nothing  under  the  contract,  simply  upon  the 
ground  that  the  other  party  was  guilty  of  a  fraud  in  refusing  to 
perform  his  verbal  agreement:  See  the  note  to  Ryan  v.  Dox,  90  Am. 
Dec.  709. 


United  States  National  Bank  v,  Geeb. 

[55  NKBRilSKA,  462.] 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENT  —  EVI- 
DENCE.—If  commercial  paper  is  indorsed  in  blank,  parol  evidence 
Is  admissible  to  show  that  the  terms  of  the  agreement  between  the 
parties  are  other  and  different  from  those  which  arise  by  presump- 
tion of  law. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENT  —  EVI- 
DENCE.—A  restrictive  indorsement  to  commercial  paper  unam- 
biguous In  Its  terms,  cannot  be  contradicted  or  explained  by  parol 
evidence. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENT  —  EVI- 
DENCE.—A  certificate  of  deposit  indorsed  for  collection  for  the 
account  of  the  indorser  is  a  restrictive  indorsement  which  vests  no 
general  property  In  the  paper  in  the  indorsee,  but  makes  him  merely 
a  collection  agent;  and  pai'ol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  that 
the  transfer  of  the  title  was  intended  to  be  absolute. 

J.  C.  Cowin  and  "W.  D.  McHugh,  for  the  appellant. 

O.  H.  Scott  and  Cobb  &  Harvey,  for  the  appellee. 

*03  NORVAL  and  SULLIVAN,  JJ.  At  the  last  term  of 
this  court  a  decision  was  entered  in  this  case  reversing  the  judg- 
ment of  the  trial  court.  Upon  a  proper  application  a  rehearing 
was  granted,  and  the  cause  has  been  a  second  time  submitted 
for  our  consideration.     The  issues  involved  and  the  essential 


June,  1898.]     United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer.  391 

facts  of  the  case  are  stated  with  suflBcient  accuracy  in  the  for- 
mer decision  reported  in  United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer,  53 
Neb.  67.  In  reversing  the  judgment  below  we  proceeded  upon 
the  theory  that  the  form  of  the  indorsement  of  the  certificate 
of  deposit  was  ambiguous  and  not  conclusive  as  to  the  inten- 
tions of  the  parties;  that  it  was  permissible  to  show  by  parol 
evidence  the  exact  nature  of  the  contract,  and  that  the  only 
inference  to  be  drawn  from  the  proofs  established  a  sale  of 
the  draft  and  not  a  bailment  for  collection.  A  careful  re- 
examination of  the  record  and  questions  thereby  presented, 
assisted  by  the  able  argument  of  counsel,  has  convinced  us 
that  the  former  decision  was  erroneous.  In  the  opinion  it 
was  said:  "Whatever  may  be  the  law  elsewhere,  it  is  the 
law  of  this  state  that  as  between  the  immediate  parties  the 
true  relationship  may  be  shown,  notwithstanding  the  form  or 
terms  of  the  indorsement  itself":  Citing  Roberts  v.  Snow,  27 
Neb.  425;  Dusenbury  v.  Albright,  31  Neb.  345;  Salisbury  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  37  Neb.  872,  40  Am.  St.  Eep.  527;  Holmes  v. 
First  Nat.  Bank,  38  Neb.  326,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  733;  Corbett 
V.  Fetzer,  47  Neb.  269.  The  adjudications  of  this  court  do  not 
warrant  the  statement  of  the  rule  as  broadly  as  above  indicated, 
nor  do  the  decisions  elsewhere  support  such  a  doctrine.  The 
general  rule  is,  and  it  has  been  frequently  asserted  by  this  court, 
that  the  terms  of  a  written  contract  cannot  be  contradicted, 
varied,  or  explained  by  parol  evidence  of  a  prior  or  contempo- 
raneous oral  agreement  between  the  parties :  Hamilton  v.  Thrall, 
7  Neb.  210;  Dodge  v.  Kiene,  28  Neb.  216;  Watson  v.  Roode, 
30  Neb.  264;  Kaserman  v.  Fries,  33  Neb.  427;  Mattison  v. 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  42  Neb.  545;  Clarke  v.  Kelsey,  41  Neb.i 
766;  Maxwell  v.  Burr,  44  ***  Neb.  31;  Commercial  State  Bank 
V.  Antelope  County,  48  Neb.  496;  Waddle  v.  Owen,  43  Neb. 
489;  Nebraska  Exposition  Assn.  v.  Townley,  46  Neb.  893.  It 
is  true  this  court  has  more  than  once  decided  that  when  the 
rights  of  bona  fide  purchasers  of  negotiable  paper  for  value  be- 
fore maturity  are  not  involved,  it  is  competent  to  show  by  parol 
evidence,  in  cases  of  indorsement  in  blank  of  such  paper,  that 
the  terms  of  the  agreement  between  the  parties  were  other  and 
different  from  those  which  arise  by  presumption  of  law:  Holmes 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  38  Neb.  326,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  733;  Corbett 
y.  Fetzer,  47  Neb.  269.  The  principle  underlying  these  cases 
does  not  contravene  the  general  rule,  recognized  and  applied 
by  this  and  other  courts,  that  parol  contemporaneous  evidence 
cannot  be  received  to  contradict  or  vary  the  terms  of  a  written 


892  United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer.     [Nebraska^ 

instrument,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  the  contract  of  a  blank 
indorsement  is  not  expressed  in  writing,  but  rests  in  legal  im- 
plications, and  this  prima  facie  presumption  of  law  may  h& 
overthrown,  as  between  the  original  parties  to  such  an  indorse- 
ment, by  the  admission  of  competent  parol  evidence  establish- 
ing the  real  terms  of  the  agreement.  If  the  law  conclusively 
presumed  the  liability  created  by  an  iridorsement  in  blank  of 
commercial  paper,  then,  of  course,  the  actual  terms  of  the 
contract  would  not  be  a  proper  subject  of  inquiry,  and  neither 
party  would  be  permitted  to  show  by  parol  the  true  agreement. 
But  the  presumption  of  liability  arising  from  such  an  indorse- 
ment is  prima  facie  merely,  and  not  conclusive;  hence,  as  against 
all  except  bona  fide  holders  for  value,  the  true  terms  of  the  con- 
tract may  be  shown  by  evidence  resting  in  parol.  The  indorse- 
ment of  the  Hebron  bank  on  the  certificate  of  deposit  involved 
herein  was  an  express  written  contract,  not  open  to  contradic- 
tion or  explanation  by  proof  of  extrinsic  facts,  and  conclusively 
proves  an  agency  merely,  and  that  the  title  and  ownership  of 
the  paper  never  passed  to  the  Capital  National  Bank.  This 
doctrine  is  sustained  by  an  unbroken  line  of  authorities. 

In  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Eeno  County  Bank,  3  ^^^  ped.  Eep. 
257,  it  was  distinctly  decided  that  an  indorsement  of  a  bill  of 
exchange  directing  the  drawee  to  pay  to  another  "on  account | 
of*  the  indorser,  or  "for  collection,"  is  a  restrictive  indorse- 
ment carrying  with  it  notice  that  the  indorser  did  not  there- 
by part  with  title  to  the  paper  or  to  its  proceeds  when  collected. 
To  the  same  effect  are  Beal  v.  Somerville,  60  Fed.  Eep.  647; 
Hoffman  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  46  N.  J.  L.  605;  Cecil  Bank  v. 
Farmers  Bank,  22  Md.  148;  1  Morse  on  Banks  and  Banking, 
see.  217;  Blaine  v.  Bourne,  11  E.  I.  119,  23  Am.  Eep.  429; 
Sweeny  v.  Easter,  1  Wall.  166;  Balbach  v.  Frelinghuysen,  15 
Fed.  Eep.  675;  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Crown  Point  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Eichmond,  76  Ind.  561,  40  Am.  Eep.  261;  White  v. 
Miners  Nat.  Bank,  102  U.  S.  658. 

Leaxy  v.  Blan  chard,  48  Me.  269,  was  an  action  upon  a  prom- 
issory note  indorsed  by  the  payee,  "Pay  to  Arthur  Leary,  or 
order,  for  account  of  the  Atlas  Mutual  Insurance  Co."  It  was 
ruled  that  the  indorsement  was  restrictive  and  parol  evidence 
was  inadmissible  to  show  that  the  transfer  was  absolute. 

A  draft  bore  the  following  indorsement:  *Tay  Penn  Bank,, 
or  order,  for  account  of  People's  Bank,  McKeesport,  Pa.  C. 
R.  Stuckslager,  Cashier.  D.  Gardner,  As.  Cash."  This  indorse- 
ment was  before  the  court  for  consideration  in  Freeman's  Nat.. 


June,  1898.]    United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gees.  305 

Bank  v.  National  Tube  Works  Co.,  151  Mass.  413,  21  Am.  St. 
Eep.  461,  and  it  was  held  to  be  restrictive  for  collection,  merely 
giving  notice  that  the  title  and  ownership  of  the  paper  had  not 
passed  from  the  indorser. 

Third  Nat.  Bank  v.  Clark,  23  Minn.  263,  was  an  action  on  a  . 
promissory  note  made  payable  to  the  order  of  the  Williams 
Mower  &  Reaper  Company  and  indorsed  by  the  payee  to  the 
Third  National  Bank  of  Syracuse,  or  order,  for  collection.  It 
was  adjudicated  in  that  case  that  the  indorsement  was  restric- 
tive and  that  parol  evidence  was  not  admissible  to  prove  it 
absolute:  Eock  County  Nat.  Bank  v,  HoUister,  21  Minn.  385. 

In  Armour  Bros.  Banking  Co.  v.  Eiley  County  Bank,  30  Kan. 
163,  there  was  involved  the  scope  and  effect  of  the  "^^^  follow- 
ing indorsement  on  a  draft :  "Pay  W.  H.  Wynants,  Esq.,  Cashier, 
or  order,  for  account  of  the  Eiley  County  Bank  of  Manhattan, 
Kansas.  J.  K.  Winchip,  Cashier.**  Parol  evidence  was  offered 
to  contradict  the  indorsement,  which,  upon  objection,  was  ex- 
cluded by  the  trial  court.  Brewer,  J.,  in  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court  on  review,  used  this  language:  "The  ruling  of  the 
district  court  was  founded  upon  the  idea  that  this  indorsement « 
is  a  restrictive  indorsement,  defining  the  rights  and  title  of 
the  indorsee,  and  not  open  to  contradiction  or  explanation  by 
parol  testimony.  In  other  words,  this  indorsement  is  a  writ- 
ten contract,  conclusive  as  against  any  parol  testimony,  and 
which  shows  absolutely  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  owner, 
the  real  property  in  interest,  but  only  held  the  draft  as  agent, 
and  for  the  purposes  of  collection.  That  this  is  a  restrictive 
indorsement,  and  that  it  operated  to  transfer  the  draft  to  the 
plaintiff  only  as  agent  for  purposes  of  collection,  cannot  be 
doubted:  Byles  on  Bills,  152;  1  Daniel  on  Negotiable  Instru- 
ments, sec.  698;  Blaine  v.  Bourne,  11  E.  IT  119,  23  Am.  Eep. 
429,  and  cases  cited  in  the  opinion.  In  this  latter  case,  speak- 
ing of  an  indorsement  almost  identical  with  the  one  at  bar,  the 
court  says:  *The  indorsee  is  rather  an  agent  of  the  indorser  with 
power  of  substitution,  and  the  bill  is  still  in  the  possession  of 
the  indorser  by  his  agent.'  And  again :  *The  words  are  notice 
that  the  restricted  indorsee  has  no  property  in  the  bill.*  It  will 
be  perceived  that  this  is  not  a  mere  blank  indorsement,  but  one 
in  which  the  contract  is  written  out  in  full,  and,  therefore,  like 
any  other  written  contract,  not  to  be  contradicted  or  varied  by 
parol  evidence:  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  sees.  277,  281,  282;  1 
Daniel  on  Negotiable  Instruments,  sec.  717;  so  that  upon  the 


394  United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geeb.     [Nebraska, 

face  of  the  paper  it  appears  affirmatively  that  the  plaintiff  is 
not  the  owner,  but  only  an  agent  for  collection." 

No  case  has  come  within  the  range  of  our  vision  which  is  in 
conflict  with  the  adjudications  already  mentioned,  nor  is  it  be- 
lieved that  any  decision  can  be  found  which  lends  support  to 
the  doctrine  that  it  is  competent  to  ^''  prove,  in  case  of  a  re- 
strictive indorsement  like  the  one  before  us,  that  the  actual 
contract  was  different  from  the  one  expressed  in  writing  on  the 
back  of  the  certificate  of  deposit. 

It  is  argued  by  counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error  that  the  con- 
tractual rights  of  the  parties  are  not  expressed  in  the  indorse- 
ment in  question;  that  the  law  infers  a  contract  therefrom.  "We 
quote  from  the  brief  :"When  one  writes  upon  the  back  of  a 
negotiable  instrument  'pay  to  the  order  of  A.  B.,  for  account 
of,'  and  signs  it,  his  contract  is  not  set  forth  in  the  writing. 
His  obligations  under  this  indorsement,  and  the  rights  and 
duties  of  the  indorsee  under  this  enforcement,  are  not  in  any- 
wise set  forth  in  the  indorsement.  It  is  not  a  written  contract 
statiug  the  mutual  rights  and  obligations  of  the  parties.  The 
law  merchant  in  the  case  of  this  indorsement,  as  in  the  case  of 
one  in  blank,  infers  from  the  indorsement  a  certain  contract, 
and  it  is  this  inferred  contract  which  the  law  enforces  when 
it  holds  the  signer  to  the  usual  obligations.  From  a  restrictive 
indorsement  the  law  infers  a  certain  contract.  From  an  un- 
restricted indorsement  the  law  infers  a  certain  other  contract. 
In  both  cases,  it  must  be  clear  the  contract  is  inferred,  and  in 
no  sense  written."  In  this  contention  counsel  are  in  error. 
This  indorsement,  in  unequivocal  language,  shows  that  the  title 
to  the  paper,  except  for  the  purposes  of  collection,  was  to  remain 
in  the  Hebron  bank,  and  that  the  indorsee,  the  Capital  National 
Bank,  was  agent  merely  for  collection.  The  rights  of  the  par- 
ties, under  this  indorsement,  do  not  rest  upon  any  implication 
of  law,  but  are  determined  by  the  contract  of  the  parties  as 
expressed  in  the  indorsement.  And  to  permit  oral  evidence  to 
be  received  to  show  the  agreement  was  different  from  that  in- 
dicated by  the  language  used  would  be  in  violation  of  the  prin- 
ciple that  a  written  contract  may  not  be  varied  by  parol.  The 
same  result  would  be  reached  whether  the  indorsement  be  re- 
garded the  entire  contract  or  said  indorsement  and  letter  trans- 
mitting the  certificate  of  deposit  be  construed  '***®  together. 
The  letter  of  transmittal  states  that  the  certificate  was  "for  col- 
lection and  credit."  These  words  clearly  indicate  that  the  trans- 
mission was  for  the  purpose  of  collection,  and  when  collected 


June,  1898.]     United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geeb.  895 

the  proceeds  were  to  be  credited  to  the  transmitting  bank.  Un- 
til the  collection  was  made  the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor 
•was  not  to  exist.  To  hold  otherwise  would  disregard  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  "collection."  In  Branch  v.  United  States  Nat. 
Bank,  50  Neb.  470,  it  was  decided  that  the  legal  title  of  com- 
mercial paper  indorsed  "for  collection"  rests  in  the  indorsee 
only  to  the  extent  of  authorizing  him  to  demand  and  enforce 
payment,  and  that  the  true  owner  of  the  paper  so  indorsed 
may  control  the  same  until  paid  in  full,  and  may  intercept  the 
proceeds  thereof  in  the  hands  of  an  intermediate  agent. 

The  writlen  contract  is  unambiguous,  and  it  is  unnecessary 
to  resort  to  parol  evidence  to  ascertain  the  true  intention  of 
the  parties.  An  explicit  written  agreement  cannot  be  con- 
tradicted or  qualified  by  proof  of  any  usage,  custom,  or  course 
of  dealing,  while  proof  thereof  is  permissible  in  cases  of  doubt 
where  the  contract  is  expressed  in  vague  and  ambiguous  lan- 
guage. The  indorsement  in  question  and  the  letter  of  transmit- 
tal, neither  singly  nor  when  considered  together,  show  that  the 
Hebron  bank  was  divested  of  its  title  to  the  certificate  of  deposit 
in  question.  This  is  conceded  by  counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error, 
but  they  rely  upon  the  prior  course  of  dealing  and  the  acts  and 
conduct  of  the  parties  to  overthrow  the  plain  and  unambiguous 
written  contract  of  the  parties  and  to  establish  a  transfer  of 
title  to  the  paper.  As  we  have  seen,  evidence  of  such  matters 
is  not  admissible.  The  fact  that  the  Hebron  bank  repeatedly 
cent  remittances  to  the  Capital  National  Bank,  the  paper  con- 
taining restrictive  indorsements  the  same  as  this,  and  from  time 
to  time  drew  against  its  remittances  and  was  allowed  interest 
from  the  Capital  National  Bank  on  its  average  balances,  is 
insufficient  to  establish  that  the  transfer  of  this  paper  was  ab- 
solute: Scott  V.  Ocean  Bank,  23  N.  Y.  289;  Fifth  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Armstrong,  40  Fed.  Eep.  46. 

***  Upon  principle  and  authority  we  are  fully  persuaded  that 
the  court  below  did  not  err  in  finding  that  the  Hebron  bank 
never  parted  with  its  title  to  this  certificate  of  deposit.  The 
judgment  of  reversal  entered  herein  is  vacated,  and  the  judg- 
ment of  the  district  court  is  affirmed. 

MR.  CHIEF  JUSTICE  HARRISON  AND  JUSTICES  RYAN  AND 
IRVINE  dissented  and  adhered  to  their  former  opinion,  and  Mr. 
Justice  Irvine,  who  wrote  the  dissenting  opinion.  In  the  course  of 
his  remarks,  said  that:  "To  show-  that  the  reasons  for  allowlnj; 
€xtrlnslc  evidence,  as  between  the  parties,  apply  as  well  to  re- 
fitrictive  as  to  general  Indorsements,  the  followng  language  from 


396  United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer.     [Nebraska, 

Dye  V.  Scott,  35  Ohio  St.  194,  35  Am.  Eep.  604,  which  has  been 
quoted  with  approval  by  this  court  in  Holmes  v.  First  Nat.  Banli,  3& 
Neb.  326,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  733,  is  pertinent:  'If  there  was  a  contem- 
poraneous contract  between  the  parties  upon  which  the  indorse- 
ment was  made,  both  reason  and  justice  require  that,  as  between 
themselves,  the  actual  and  not  the  presumed  contract  should  be  en- 
forced; and,  as  between  them,  oral  testimony  should  be  admissible 
to  prove  the  contemporaneous  contract.  This  will  not  necessarily, 
or  even  probably,  impair  currency  or  credit  of  the  instrument  as 
commercial  paper.  Prior  parties  to  it  will  not  be  affected,  nor  will 
the  rights  of  subsequent  indorsees  without  notice  be  impaired  or 
limited  in  any  degree." 


NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENTS  —  PAROL 
EVIDENCE  TO  VARY.— The  authorities  seem  to  be  divided  upon 
the  question  whether  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  vary  the  legal 
effect  of  an  indorsement  by  showing  an  agreement,  contemporane- 
ously made,  varying  the  liability  created  by  law.  That  parol  evi- 
dence is  not  admissible,  see  Alabama  Nat.  Banlj  v.  Rivers,  116  Ala. 
1,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  95;  Ewan  v.  Brooks-Waterfield  Co.,  55  Ohio  St. 
596,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  719,  and  note.  The  rule  in  the  principal  case, 
that  parol  evidence  is  admissible,  is  supported  by  Roads  v.  Webb, 
91  Me.  406,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  246,  and  note;  Cools  v.  Brown,  62  Midi. 
473,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  870.  Some  courts  seem  to  draw  the  distinction 
that  as  between  the  parties  to  a  negotiable  instrument  parol  evi- 
dence is  admissible,  but  where  the  instrument  has  been  transferred, 
before  due,  to  a  bona  fide  holder  in  the  due  course  of  business,  a 
blank  indorsement  establishes  a  liability  which  cannot  be  varied  by 
parol  evidence:  Holmes  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  38  Neb.  326,  41  Am.  St. 
Rep.  733,  and  note.  A  restrictive  indorsement,  such  as  an  indorse- 
ment "without  recourse,"  creates  an  express  and  complete  contract, 
which  cannot  be  varied  or  contradicted  by  parol  evidence  of  a  con- 
temporaneous agreement:  Youngberg  v.  Nelson,  51  Minn.  172,  38  Am. 
St.  Rep.  497,  and  note. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS-INDORSEMENT  FOR  COL- 
LECTION.—An  indorsement  for  collection  does  not  pass  the  title 
or  the  right  to  the  proceeds  of  the  property,  but  It  makes  the  in- 
dorsee a  collecting  agent  or  trustee  of  the  holder:  Moore  v.  Louisi- 
ana Nat.  Bank,  44  La.  Ann.  99,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  332,  and  note; 
Poonie's  Bank  v.  Jefferson  County  Sav.  Bank,  106  Ala.  524,  54  Am. 
St.  Rep.  59. 

CERTIFICATE  OF  DEPOSIT.— PAROL  EVIDENCE  cannot  be 
Introduced  to  explain  or  vary  a  certificate  of  deposit:  Bickley  ▼. 
Ck)mmercial  Bank,  89  S.  O.  281,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  721. 


June,  1698.1  Wehn  v.  Pall.  397 


Wehn  v.  Fall. 

[56  ^EBBA8KA,  647.] 

JUDGMENTS— LIEN  OP— VENDOR  AND  VENDEE— AP- 
PLICATION OP  PAYMENTS.— A  judgment  against  a  vendor  of 
land,  who  retains  the  legal  title  under  a  contract  of  sale,  attaches  as 
a  lien  to  such  land,  and,  as  against  the  vendee  in  possession  with 
actual  notice,  may  be  enforced  to  the  extent  of  the  unpaid  pur- 
'Chase  money. 

JUDGMENTS— LIEN  OP— VENDOR  AND  VENDEES-AP- 
PLICATION OP  PAYMENTS.— The  mere  docketing  of  a  judgment 
against  the  vendor  of  land  is  not  notice  of  the  lien  to  a  purchaser 
in  possession  under  a  contract  of  sale,  and  payments  subsequently 
made  by  him  to  the  judgment  debtor,  pursuant  to  the  contract, 
without  actual  notice  of  the  judgment,  are  valid  as  against  Its  lien 
upon  the  land. 

CORPORATIONS  —  LIABILITY  OP  STOCKHOLDERS  — 
COUNTERCLAIM.— In  an  action  by  a  stockholder  of  an  insolvent 
corporation  to  enjoin  an  execution  sale  of  real  estate  which  has 
been  purchased  by  him  from  the  members  of  a  firm  against  whom 
the  defendant  has  recovered  the  judgment  on  which  the  execution 
Issued,  an  answer  charging  that  all  the  stockholders  of  such  cor- 
poration are  liable  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  on  which  the  judg- 
ment is  based  and  asking  that  they  be  brought  in  and  required 
to  pay  does  not  set  up  a  counterclaim. 

CORPORATIONS  — INSOLVENCY  — LIEN  OP  CREDITOR 
ON  ASSETS.— A  creditor  of  an  Insolvent  corporation  does  not  ac- 
quire any  specific  Hen  on  its  assets,  and  cannot  proceed  against  one 
having  possession  of  such  assets  without  first  reducing  his  claim  to 
judgment. 

CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY.— CREDITORS  of  an  in- 
solvent corporation  must  first  obtain  judgment  on  their  claims  be- 
fore attempting  to  reach  property  transferred  by  the  corporation 
in  fraud  of  their  rights. 

CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— RIGHTS  OP  CREDIT- 
ORS—lilARILITY  OP  STOCKHOLDERS.— A  creditor  of  an  insol- 
vent and  dissolved  corporation  must  first  exhaust  his  legal  rem- 
edy  against  it.  before  he  can  sue  to  obtain  satisfaction  of  his  claim 
against  a  stockholder  who  has  come  into  possession  of  corporate  as- 
sets. 

Hainer  &  Smith,  for  the  appellants. 

A.  W.  Agee  and  H.  M.  Kellogg,  for  the  appellee. 

«»*»  SULLIVAN,  J.  In  January,  1888,  the  Phillipe  Biiild- 
ing  &  Loan  Association  drew  a  check  on  the  Bank  of  Phillips 
in  favor  of  Samuel  Spanogle  for  four  hundred  and  ninety-five 
dollars.  Spanogle  indorsed  the  check  to  Jerome  H.  Smith, 
who  deposited  it  for  collection  with  the  First  National  Bank 
of  Aurora.  In  due  time  the  Aurora  hank  presented  it  for  pay- 
ment to  the  Phillips  bank,  which,  being  then  unable  to  meet 
its  obligations,  was  compelled  to  refuse  payment.  Smith  there- 
upon sued  John  Fonner,  A.  J.  Spanogle,  Samuel  Spanogle,  and 


398  Wehn  v.  Fall.  [Nebraska, 

Charles  L.  Crane,  as  members  of  the  firm  of  John  Fonner  & 
Co.  and  owners  of  the  Bank  of  Phillips.  This  suit  ripened  into 
a  judgment  in  the  district  court  of  Hamilton  county  on  the 
twelfth  day  of  February,  1889.  On  January  ^"^^  30,  1888,  the 
firm  of  John  Fonner  &  Co.  suspended  its  banking  business  at 
Phillips  and  turned  orer  its  entire  assets  to  Chris  Schlotfeldt,. 
of  Grand  Island,  with  written  authority  to  sell  the  same  and 
apply  the  proceeds  in  payment  of  the  partnership  indebtedness. 
Schlotfeldt  accepted  the  trust  or  agency,  and,  on  March  9,  1888, 
contracted  with  the  plaintiff,  John  W.  Wehn,  Jr.,  to  sell  him 
the  real  estate  in  controversy,  being  a  town  lot  in  the  village 
of  Phillips,  in  Hamilton  county.  Wehn  was  given  immediate 
possession  of  the  property,  but  did  not  obtain  a  deed  therefor 
nor  pay  any  part  of  the  purchase  price  until  after  Smith  had 
recovered  his  judgment  against  the  members  of  the  firm  of 
John  Fonner  &  Co.  Upon  this  judgment  an  execution  was 
issued,  and  Fall,  as  sheriff  of  Hamilton  county,  was  proceed- 
ing thereunder  to  sell  the  real  estate  in  question  when  this 
action  was  commenced  to  enjoin  the  sale.  A  temporary  injunc- 
tion was  granted  and  on  the  final  hearing  made  perpetual. 

It  is  first  insisted  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that  the  instru- 
ment executed  by  John  Fonner  &  Co.  was  an  irreguJar  assign- 
ment and  of  no  validity.  Whether  or  not  it  was  intended  as 
an  assignment  is  quite  immaterial.  Between  the  parties  to  the 
transaction  it  was  valid.  It  conferred  on  Schlotfeldt  power 
to  take  possession  of  the  assets  of  the  bank  and  sell  the  same. 
Consequently,  the  contract  made  with  Wehn  for  the  sale  of  the 
lot  in  Phillips  was  within  the  soope  of  his  authority  and  was  a 
binding  contract.  It  thus  appears  that  Wehn  was  a  purchaser 
of  the  lot  and  in  possession  of  the  same  without  having  paid 
any  part  of  the  purchase  price  when  Smith's  judgment  at- 
tached as  a  lien.  Under  these  circumstances.  Smith  became 
entitled  to  intercept  the  purchase  money  and  have  the  same  ap- 
plied in  satisfaction  of  his  judgment  upon  giving  Wehn  notice 
of  his  rights.  It  is  not  claimed  that  there  was  any  actual 
notice,  and  constructive  notice  from  the  docketing  of  the  judg- 
ment, we  think,  was  not  sufficient.  In  Courtnay  v.  Parker,  16 
Neb.  311,  it  is  said:  "Where  a  judgment  is  recovered  against  one 
who  has  **°**  agreed  to  sell  land,  but  made  no  deed  nor  received 
the  whole  of  the.  purchase  money,  it  is  a  lien  on  the  vendor's  in- 
terest in  the  land,  and  a  purchaser  under  the  judgment  is  en- 
tilled  to  the  mbney  remaining  unpaid."  Neither  the  question 
of  notice  or  possession  was  considered  in  that  case.     In  Olander 


June,  1898.]  Wehn  v.  Fall.  899 

v.  Tighe,  43  Neb.  344,  the  rule  on  this  subject  is  stated  in  the 
syllabus  as  follows:  A  judgment  recovered  in  the  district  court 
against  the  vendor  of  land  which  is  situate  in  the  county  in  and 
for  which  the  court  is  held,  who  has  not,  at  the  time  of  the  re- 
covery of  the  judgment,  executed  and  delivered  a  deed  for  the 
land  or  received  all  the  purchase  money,  is  a  lien  upon  the  in- 
terest of  the  vendor  in  the  land,  viz.,  the  unpaid  purchase 
money;  and  a  levy  of  an  execution  issued  upon  such  judgment 
on  the  land,  and  a  sale  thereunder,  will  pass  to  the  purchaser 
the  interest  of  the  vendor."  In  this  case  it  was  held  that  the 
rights  of  the  judgment  creditor  were  superior  to  the  rights  of 
a  vendee  in  possession  who  had  paid  a  portion  of  the  purchase 
price  after  the  recovery  of  the  judgment;  but  it  does  not  ap- 
pear from  the  statement  of  facts  that  the  purchaser  was  without 
actual  notice,  and  the  question  of  notice  is  not  considered  or 
discussed.  The  question  was,  however,  very  thoroughly  con- 
sidered in  the  case  of  Filley  v.  Duncan,  1  Neb.  134,  93  Am.  Dec. 
337,  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  while  a  judgment  recov- 
ered against  the  vendor  of  lands  is  a  lien  to  the  extent  of  the 
unpaid  purchase  price  due  from  the  vendee  in  possession,  "the 
entry  of  such  judgment  will  not,  of  itself,  compel  the  vendee 
in  possession  under  contract  to  make  subsequent  payments  ta 
the  creditor,"  Discussing  this  question,  Mr.  Freeman,  in  his 
work  on  Judgments,  fourth  edition,  section  364,  says:  "While 
it  is  everywhere  conceded  that  a  judgment  lien  accruing  against 
a  vendor  after  the  making  of  the  contract  of  sale  extends  to  all 
his  interest  remaining  in  the  land,  and  entitles  the  purchaser 
at  the  sale  to  all  sums  still  to  be  paid  by  the  vendee,  yet  it  is 
well  settled  that  the  latter,  if  in  possession  of  the  lands  sold,  is 
not  bound  to  ascertain,  before  making  each  payment,  ^^^  that 
no  judgment  has  been  obtained  against  his  vendor.  Whoever 
takes  and  keeps  possession  of  land,  by  these  acts  of  ownership 
gives  such  notice  of  his  rights  to  the  whole  world  that  no  one 
can  safely  assume  to  act  in  ignorance  of  them.  He  is  so  far 
exempted  from  the  operation  of  the  registry  acts  that  a  deed 
made  by  his  grantor  can  in  no  event  prejudice  his  interests;  and 
so  far  exempted  from  the  operation  of  the  law  charging  all  per- 
sons with  notice  of  the  lien  arising  from  the  docketing  of  a 
judgment  that  such  docketing,  while  he  is  in  possession  of  the 
land,  is  not  notice  to  him  of  the  charge  thereby  created  on  the 
purchase  money  remaining  unpaid.  He  may,  therefore,  from 
time  to  time,  pay  to  this  vendor  such  sums  as  fall  due;  and  he 
will  always  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  such  payments,  unless 


400  Wehn  v.  Fall.  [Nebraska, 

it  can  he  shown  that  they  were  made  with  actual  knowledge  of 
s.  lien  on  the  vendor's  interest  in  the  land.  This  construction 
■of  the  law  seems  to  have  been  dictated  by  a  consideration  of  the 
hardship  to  be  inflicted  on  the  vendee  in  possession  by  estab- 
lishing a  different  rule/'  In  support  of  the  rule  thus  announced 
the  author  cites  Filley  v.  Duncan,  1  Neb.  134,  93  Am.  Dec.  337; 
Parks  V.  Jackson,  11  Wend.  442,  25  Am.  Dec.  656;  Moyer  v. 
Hinman,  13  N.  Y.  180;  Hampson  v.  Bdelen,  2  Har.  &  J.  64, 
-3  Am.  Dec.  530.  No  case  is  cited  as  holding  a  contrary  doc- 
trine. In  section  438  of  1  Black  on  Judgments  it  is  said:  "At 
^ny  rate,  it  appears  to  be  well  settled  that  the  docketing  of  the 
judgment  is  not  notice  of  the  lien  to  the  purchaser  in  posses- 
sion, since,  after  he  has  taken  his  contract  for  the  purchase,  ho 
is  not  bound  to  keep  the  run  of  the  dockets;  and  payments 
subsequently  made  by  him  to  the  judgment  debtor,  pursuant  to 
the  contract,  without  actual  notice  of  the  judgment,  are  valid 
■as  against  its  lien  upon  the  land" :  See,  also,  to  the  same  effect, 
12  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  1st  ed.,  113. 

There  is  another  question  in  the  case.  The  appellant  Smith 
in  his  answer  alleged  that  the  Phillips  Building  &  Loan  Asso- 
ciation was  indebted  to  him  as  drawer  of  the  check  on  which 
his  judgment  against  the  members  of  the  '^^^  firm  of  John 
Eonner  &  Co.  is  based;  that  said  association  has  dissolved  and 
divided  its  entire  assets  among  the  stockholders;  that  "Wehn 
and  a  number  of  other  persons  named  in  the  answer  were  stock- 
holders at  the  time  of  the  dissolution  and  received  some  portion 
of  the  corporate  property.  There  was  a  prayer  that  the  persons 
alleged  to  be  stockholders  be  made  parties  to  the  action  and  re- 
quired to  pay  the  amount  due  on  the  check.  Proceedings  were 
afterward  had  in  the  case  which  resulted  in  a  trial  of  issues 
formed  by  said  stockholders  pleading  to  the  matters  contained 
in  Smith's  answer.  The  findings  and  judgment  of  the  court 
were  in  favor  of  the  stopkholders.  The  only  question  presented 
for  decision  by  the  petition  was  whether  Smith's  judgment  was 
a  lien  on  Wehn's  real  estate.  The  primary  and  controlling 
question  presented  by  the  answer  was  whether  the  loan  associa- 
tion was  under  a  contractual  liability  as  drawer  of  the  check. 
Between  these  questions  there  was  no  such  legal  relationship  as 
to  justify  their  trial  in  the  same  action.  But  the  court  having 
tried  them  together  and  found  in  favor  of  the  stockholders,  we 
will  inquire  whether  the  conclusion  reached  on  the  merits  was 
•correct.  The  assets  of  a  corporation,  which,  of  course,  includes 
tmpaid  stock  subscriptions,  constitute  a  fund  to  which  creditors 


June,  1898.]  Wehn  v.  Fall.  401 

may  resort  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  claims.  But  to  reach 
assets  in  the  hands  of  stockholder  creditors  must  pursue  the 
remedy  prescribed  by  law.  By  section  4,  article  11  (miscel- 
laneous corporations),  of  our  constitution  it  is  provided:  'In  all 
cases  of  claims  against  corporations  and  joint  stock  associations, 
the  exact  amount  justly  due  shall  be  first  ascertained,  and  after 
the  corporate  property  shall  have  been  exhausted,  the  original 
subscribers  thereof  shall  be  individually  liable  to  the  extent  of 
their  unpaid  subscription,  and  the  liability  for  the  unpaid  sub- 
scription shall  follow  the  stock."  Of  this  provision  of  the  con- 
stitution it  was  said  by  Kagan,  C,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
oourt  in  Globe  Pub.  Co.  v.  State  Bank,  41  Neb.  175:  **We  think, 
therefore,  that  the  ^'^  creditors  of  a  de  jure  corporation  have 
no  right  of  action  against  the  stockholders  thereof  until  they 
have  reduced  their  claims  against  the  corporation  to  judgment, 
and  until  an  execution  issued  upon  such  judgment  has  been  re- 
turned wholly  or  in  part  unsatisfied."  But  it  is  contended  that 
the  constitutional  provision  above  quoted  isnot  applicable  to  this 
case,  for  the  reason  that,  the  corporation  being  insolvent  and 
having  ceased  to  exist,  the  recovery  of  a  judgment  against  it  waa 
neither  necessary  nor  possible.  A  creditor  of  an  insolvent  cor- 
poration does  not  acquire  any  specific  lien  on  its  assets,  and  no 
sufficient  reason  is  perceived  for  holding  that  he  may  proceed 
against  one  having  possession  of  snch  assets  without  first  reduc- 
ing his  claim  to  judgment.  The  reason  for  the  rule  which  re- 
quires the  creditors  of  an  insolvent  individual  to  obtain  judg- 
ment on  their  claims  before  attempting  to  reach  property  trans- 
ferred by  him  in  fraud  of  their  rights  seems  to  be  entirely  ap- 
plicable where  the  debtor  is  an  insolvent  corporation  against 
which  a  suit  may  be  maintained:  Hollins  v.  Brierfield  Coal  etc. 
Co.,  150  U.  S.  371.  There  was  in  this  case  no  impediment  in 
the  way  of  a  suit  against  the  corporation.  Section  68  of  chapter 
16  of  the  Compiled  Statutes  of  1897  provides  for  the  bringing 
of  actions  against  dissolved  corporations,  and  makes  ample  pro- 
vision for  the  service  of  process  upon  them.  What  we  conceive 
to  be  the  correct  rule  on  this  subject  is  stated  in  3  Thompson 
on  Private  Corporations,  section  3355,  as  follows:  **Where  the 
ordinary  theory  of  equitable  remedies  prevails,  under  which  it 
is  necessary,  before  resorting  to  a  court  of  equity,  for  the  com- 
plainant to  exhaust  his  remedies  in  a  legal  forum,  the  mere  in- 
aolvency  of  the  corporation  does  not  dispense  with  the  necessity 
of  a  creditor  reducing  his  demand  to  a  judgment  at  law  against 
it  before  bringing  a  suit  in  equity  to  charge  its  shareholders. 

AM.  St.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.-26 


402  Wehn  v.  Fall.  [Nebraskaj 

Kor  will  it  "be  any  excuse  for  not  obtaining  such  a  Judgment  at 
law  that  the  charter  has  expired  by  limitation,  providing  the 
law  govemng  the  corporation  is  such  that  this  fact  does  not 
prevent  the  '^^  obtaining  of  a  judgment  at  law  against  it. 
....  As  has  been  said  in  a  leading  case,  a  judgment  can  no- 
more  be  recovered  against  a  dead  corporation  than  against  a 
dead  man.  But  according  to  the  usual  theory,  a  de  facto  dis- 
solution of  a  corporation,  which  consists  usually  in  a  permanent 
suspension  of  its  business  and  abandonment  of  its  franchises,  by 
reason  of  insolvency,  is  no  obstruction  to  obtaining  a  judgment 
at  law  against  it,  and  therefore  does  not  relieve  the  creditor  of 
the  necessity  of  obtaining  such  a  judgment  before  applying  for 
equitable  relief."  A  recent  case  decided  on  facts  almost  identi- 
cal with  those  in  the  case  before  us  and  fully  sustaining  Judge- 
Thompson's  statement  of  the  rule  is  Lamar  v.  Allison,  101  Ga. 
270.  See,  also.  Swan  Land  etc.  Co.  v.  Frank,  39  Fed.  Eep. 
456.  Our  conclusion  is,  that  the  answer  of  Smith  did  not  state 
a  cause  of  action  against  the  stockholders  of  the  Phillips  Build- 
ing &  Loan  Association,  and  the  entire  judgment  of  the  district 
court  is,  therefore,  affirmed. 


JUDGMENTS— LIEN-VENDOR  AND  VENDEE.— A  vendor's  In- 
terest In  lands  contracted  to  be  sold  Is  bound  by  the  lien  of  a  judg- 
ment recovered  against  him  while  the  contract  is  unexecuted,  to 
the  extent  to  which  It  Is  unexecuted:  Kinports  v.  Boynton,  120  Pa. 
St.  306,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  706.  A  judgment  creditor  has  no  lien  UDon 
purchase  money  due  to  the  judgment  debtor  for  lands  sold  by  him 
and  which  are  subject  to  the  judgment  lien:  Blal?emore  v.  Wise,  95 
Va.  269,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  781,  and  note;  monographic  note  to  Filley 
V.  Duncan,  93  Am.  Dec.  353. 

CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— RIGHTS  OF  CREDITORS. 
The  creditors  of  a  corporation  have  no  lien  upon  its  assets  as  a  trust 
fund  held  for  their  benefit:  Ames  v.  Heslet,  19  Mont.  188,  61  Am. 
St.  Rep.  496.  As  between  a  corporation  and  Its  creditors.  It  does 
not  hoid  Its  property  In  trust,  or  subject  to  a  lien  in  favor  of  cred- 
itors, In  any  other  sense  than  does  an  individual  debtor:  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Dovetiiil  etc.  Co.,  143  Ind.  550,  52  Am.  St  Rep.  435. 

CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY  —  LIABILITY  OF  STOCK- 
HOLDERS—RIGHTS OF  CREDITORS.— The  authorities  are  di- 
vided upon  the  question  whether  the  liability  of  a  stockholder  is 
primary,  or  whether  it  Is  subject  to  proceedings  first  taken  against 
the  corporation:  Monographic  note  to  Thompson  v.  Reno  Sav. 
Bank,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  850,  where  the  opposing  authorities  are  col- 
lected. That  the  stockholder's  liability  Is  primary,  see  McGowan 
V.  McDonald,  111  Cal.  57,  52  Am.  St.  Rp.  149.  In  Ohio,  It  Is  held 
that  where  a  corporation  continues  to  do  business,  a  creditor  must 
first  obtain  judgment  against  it  before  he  can  proceed  against  the 
stockholder.  But  where  the  corporation  hns  become  wholly  Insol- 
vent, and  has  ceased  to  do  business,  and  has  made  an  assignment 
of  Its  property  for  the  benefit  of  Its  creditors,  a  creditor  may  pro- 
ceed directly  and  primarily  against  the  stockholder:  Barrick  v.  Gif- 
ford,  47  Ohio  St.  180,  21  Am.  St.  Rep.  798,  and  note. 


June,  1898,]  Latimer  v.  State.  403 


Latimer  v.  State. 

[55  NEBBA8KA    609.] 

CEIMINAL  LAW  —  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION  — 
WAIVER.— If  a  person  accused  of  crime,  on  being  arrested  and 
brought  before  an  examining  magistrate,  voluntarily  pleads  guilty, 
he  thereby  waives  his  right  to  a  preliminary  examination. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION;— DIS- 
TRir/r  COURTS  ARE  WITHOUT  JURISDICTION  to  try,  on  in- 
formation, one  accused  of  crime,  except  he  be  a  fugitive  from  jus- 
tice, unless  he  has  first  been  accorded  the  privilege  of  a  prelimin- 
ary examination  or  has  waived  that  privilege. 

CRIMINAL  LAW.— A  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION  ia 
In  no  sense  a  trial  of  a  person  accused  of  crime.  It  is  not  even 
necessary  that  the  person  charged  with  a  crime,  on  being  brought 
before  a  magistrate,  should  be  asked  to  plead,  or  that  Le  should 
plead. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION.— The 
object  of  a  preliminary  examination  Is  to  ascertain  whether  the 
crime  charged  has  been  committed,  and,  If  so,  whether  there  is 
probable  cause  to  believe  that  the  accused  committed  It. 

CRIMINAL  LAW.— A  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION  Is  a 
right  accorded  and  a  privilege  granted  by  law  to  everyone  accused 
of  crime,  but  it  is  a  privilege  which  the  accused  may  waive. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION— REC- 
OGNIZANCE.—If  an  accused,  on  being  brought  before  the  examin- 
ing magistrate,  waives  his  right  to  a  preliminary  examination,  or 
pleads  guilty  to  the  crime  with  which  he  Is  charged,  the  magis- 
trate should  recognize  him  to  appear  In  the  district  court,  and  en- 
ter upon  his  docket  the  proceedings  that  actually  occur,  and  a  duly 
certified  transcript  of  this  record  filed  In  the  office  of  the  clerk  of 
the  district  court  Invests  that  court  with  jurisdiction  to  try  the  ac- 
cused on  information  for  the  crime  with  which  he  was  accused  be- 
fore the  examining  magistrate. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— DRUNKENNESS  AS  DEFENSE.— While 
voluntary  intoxication  is  not  of  itself  a  complete  defense  for  one 
who  is  charged  with  the  commission  of  an  'offense,  yet  evidence 
that  the  accused  was  Intoxicated  when  It  is  alleged  he  committed 
the  crime  is  admissible  as  a  circumstance  tending  to  show  that  the 
act  of  the  accused  was  not  premeditated,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  and  determining  the  status  and  condition  of  his  mind 
at  that  time. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— DRUNKENNESS  AS  DEFENSE.— If  an 
accused  was  so  drunk  at  the  time  he  Is  alleged  to  have  committed 
the  crime  charged  as  to  render  him  unconscious  of  his  act,  incapa- 
ble of  controlling  his  will,  and  forming  and  entertaining  a  felonious 
Intent,  his  Intoxication  is  a  defense. 

CRIMINAL  LAW-EVIDENCE— GOOD  CHARACTER— Pre- 
vious good  character  of  the  accused  in  a  criminal  case  Is  a  fact 
which  he  Is  entitled  to  have  submitted  for  the  consideration  of  the 
jury,  precisely  as  any  other  circumstance  favorable  to  him,  without 
any  disparagement  by  the  court. 

J.  H.  Brown  and  Brome  &  Burnett,  for  the  appellant. 

C.  J.  Smythe,  attorney  general,  and  E.  P.  Smith,  assistant 
attorney  general,  for  the  state. 


404  Latimer  v.  State.  [Nebraska, 

®*®  EAGAN,  C.  The  prosecuting  attorney  of  Stanton 
county  filed  an  information  in  the  district  court  thereof  in 
which  he  charged  Edwin  Melick,  James  Latimer,  and  Eohert 
Forsythe  with  having  forcibly  and  violently  assaulted  one  Louis 
Mick,  and  with  "forcibly  and  feloniously,  and  against  his  will, 
taking  from  him  the  sum  of  thirty-eight  dollars  in  money,  with 
the  intent  to  feloniously  steal  the  same.  It  seems  that  Melick 
and  Forsythe  pleaded  guilty  to  this  information  and  were  sen- 
tenced to  the  penitentiary  for  six  years,  although  this  fact  is 
not  disclosed  by  the  record.  Latimer  pleaded  not  guilty  to  the 
information,  was  tried  by  a  jury,  found  guilty,  and  sentenced 
to  a  term  of  seven  and  one-half  years  in  the  state  penitentiary. 
To  review  this  judgment  Latimer  has  filed  in  this  court  a  peti- 
tion in  error. 

®^*  1.  To  the  information  Latimer  filed  a  plea  in  abatement, 
alleging  that  he  had  not  been  accorded  a  preliminary  examina- 
tion of  the  crime  with  which  he  stood  charged  in  the  informa- 
tion. To  this  plea  the  state  filed  a  replication,  and  the  issues 
made  by  such  plea  and  replication  were  tried  to  a  jury,  which 
returned  a  verdict  in  favor  of  the  state,  upon  which  the  district 
court  entered  a  judgment  that  the  information  be  not  abated. 
It  is  not  claimed  by  the  prisoner  that  a  complaint  was  not  filed 
against  him  before  an  examining  magistrate  charging  him  with 
the  identical  offense  with  which  he  was  charged  in  the  informa- 
tion; but  the  issue  of  fact  raised  by  the  plea  in  abatement  and 
the  state's  replication  thereto  was  whether  the  prisoner  had,  in 
fact,  been  accorded  a  preliminary  examination.  The  evidence 
shows  without  conti^diction  that  a  complaint  was  filed  before 
the  county  judge  of  said  county  charging  Forsythe,  Melick,  and 
Latimer  with  having  committed  the  crime  of  robbery,  and  that 
the  three  parties  were  arrested  on  a  proper  warrant  and  brought 
before  the  county  judge.  A  transcript  of  the  proceedings  had 
before  that  officer  was  put  in  evidence,  and  disclosed  that  the 
three  parties  were  asked  by  the  county  judge  whether  they  were 
guilty  or  not  guilty  of  the  crime  charged  in  the  complaint,  and 
that  they  then  and  there  entered  a  plea  of  guilty.  Whereupon 
the  magistrate  adjudged  that  they  enter  into  a  recognizance  for 
their  appearance  before  the  district  court  in  said  county  at  the 
first  day  of  its  next  term  to  answer  such  charge. 

The  evidence  on  behalf  of  Latimer  tended  to  show  that 
though  he  was  arrested  and  brought  before  the  county  judge 
with  Forsythe  and  Melick,  he  was  not  asked  whether  he  was 
guilty  or  not  guilty  of  the  crime  charged  in  the  complaint,  and 


June,  1898.]  Latimer  v.  State.  405 

that  he  did  not  plead  thereto.  The  evidence  is  undisputed  that 
no  witnesses  were  sworn  or  examined  before  the  comity  judge. 
In  other  words,  that  oflScer  did  not  make  any  judicial  inquiry 
as  to  whether  the  crime  of  robbery  Lad  been  committed  and 
whether  **^  there  was  probable  cause  for  believing  the  accused 
committed  it.  We  are  of  opinion  that  the  evidence  in  the 
record  establishes,  beyond  all  question,  that  Latimer,  when 
brought  before  the  county  judge,  informed  that  officer  that  he 
was  guilty  of  the  crime  with  which  he  stood  charged  in  the  com- 
plaint. 

The  first  question,  then,  is  whether  Latimer,  by  pleading 
guilty  before  the  county  judge,  waived  a  preliminary  examina- 
tion. The  district  court  charged  the  jury  trying  the  issues 
made  by  the  plea  in  abatement  and  the  replication  thereto  that 
if  Latimer,  when  brought  before  the  county  judge,  pleaded 
guilty  to  the  crime  charged  against  him  in  the  complaint,  such 
plea  amounted  to  a  waiver  by  Latimer  of  his  right  to  a  prelimin- 
ary examination,  and  it  was  upon  this  instruction  that  the  jury 
found  that  Latimer  had  had  a  preliminary  examination.  .  We 
think  the  instruction  of  the  district  court  was  correct.  Section 
685  of  the  Criminal  Code  provides:  **No  information  shall  be 
filed  against  any  person  for  any  offense  until  such  person  shall 
have  had  a  preliminary  examination  therefor  as  provided  by  law 
before  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  other  examining  magistrate  or 
officer,  unless  such  person  shall  waive  his  right  to  such  examina- 
tion." Because  of  this  provision  of  the  Criminal  Code  the  dis- 
trict courts  are  without  jurisdiction  to  try,  on  information,  one 
accused  of  crime,  except  he  be  a  fugitive  from  justice,  unless  he 
has  been  first  accorded  the  privilege  of  a  preliminary  examina- 
tion: White  v.  State,  28  Neb.  341;  Coffield  v.  State,  44  Neb. 
417. 

But  the  preliminary  examination  provided  for  by  said  section 
585  of  the  Criminal  Code  is  in  no  sense  a  trial  of  a  person  ac- 
cused of  crime.  It  is  not  even  necessary  that  the  person 
charged  with  having  committed  a  crime,  on  being  brought 
before  a  magistrate,  should  be  asked  to  plead  or  enter  a  plea  of 
guilty  or  not  guilty  to  the  complaint.  The  object  of  the  pre- 
liminary examination  is  to  asceri;ain  whether  the  crime  charged 
has  been  committed,  and,  if  so,  whether  there  is  probable  cause 
to  believe  ^^^  that  the  acccused  committed  it:  In  re  Garst,  10 
Neb.  78;  State  v.  Kobertson,  55  Neb.  41.  The  statute  award- 
ing one  accused  of  crime  the  right  to  a  preliminary  examination 
was  enacted  for  the  benefit  of  the  accused.     The  preliminary 


406  Latimer  v.  State.  [Nebraska, 

examination  is  a  right  accorded — a  personal  privilege  granted 
by  law  to  everyone  accused  of  crime — ^but  it  is  a  privilege  which 
the  accused  may  waive:  Coffield  v.  State,  44  Neb.  417. 

In  the  case  at  bar  Latimer  was  accorded  the  privilege — the 
Tight — of  a  preliminary  examination.  He  did  not  demand  the 
taking  of  evidence,  and  the  judgment  of  the  county  judge  as  to 
its  effect;  but  upon  inquiry  as  to  whether  he  was  guilty  of  the 
crime  with  which  he  was  charged  in  the  complaint  he  volun- 
tarily stated  to  the  magistrate  that  he  was  guilty;  and  by  so  do- 
ing he  waived  the  swearing  and  examination  of  witnesses, 
iivaived  the  right  given  him  by  statute  to  have  the  county  judge 
make  judicial  inquiry  as  to*  whether  the  crime  of  robbery  had 
been  committed,  and  as  to  whether  the  accused  probably  com- 
mitted it. 

2.  But  it  is  insisted  that  th'e  district  court  erred  in  entering 
a  judgment  that  the  information  be  not  abated,  as  the  court  was 
without  jurisdiction  to  try  the  accused  on  that  information,  be- 
cause the  record  of  the  examining  magistrate  certified  to  the 
district  court  does  n:ot  recite  that  he  found  that  the  crime  of 
robbery  had  been  committed  and  that  there  was  probable  cause 
for  believing  that  the  accused  committed  such  crime;  in  other 
words,  that  in  order  to  invest  the  district  court  with  jurisdiction 
to  try  the  accused  of  a  crime  on  information,  the  proceedings 
of  the  examining  magistrate  certified  to  the  district  court  must 
contain  a  statement  that  that  officer  found  that  the  crime 
charged  in  the  information  had  been  committed  and  that  there 
was  probable  cause  for  believing  that  the  accused  committed  it, 
and  that  the  magistrate  reached  such  conclusions  after  the  ex- 
amination of  witnesses.  We  cannot  subscribe  to  this  conten- 
tion. In  support  of  it  counsel  for  Latimer  have  **'*  cited  U3| 
to  People  V.  Smith,  25  Mich.  497;  People  v.  Chapman,  63  Mich. 
280,  4  Am.  St.  Eep.  857,  and  People  v.  Evans,  72  Mich.  367. 
None  of  these  cases  is  in  point  here.  A  statute  of  Michigan 
required  the  evidence  taken  on  a  preliminary  examination  to  be 
reduced  to  writing  and  signed  by  the  witnesses,  and  the  exam- 
ining magistrate  to  transmit  this  evidence  to  the  district  court 
with  the  proceedings  had  by  him  on  the  preliminary  examina- 
tion. In  the  Smith  case  cited  by  counsel,  the  information  was 
quaahed;  but  in  that  case  the  accused  had  not  waived  a  pre- 
liminary examination.  One  had  been  in  fact  held,  and  the  court 
quashed  the  information,  not  because  the  record  of  the  examin- 
ing magistrate  did  not  contain  a  finding  that  a  crime  had  been 
committed  and  there  was  probable  cause  for  believing  the  ac- 


June,  1898.]  Latimer  v.  State.  407 

cused  committed  it,  but  because  the  depositions  or  evidence  re- 
duced to    writing  on  the    preliminary    examination  were  not 
fiigned  by  the   witnesses  as  rec^uired  by  the   Michigan  statute. 
In  the  Chapman  case,  the  information  was  quashed  because  it 
was  filed  before  the  filing  in  the  district  court  of  the  depositions 
of  the  witnesses  who  testified  before  the  examining  magistrate. 
In  the  Evans  case,  a  preliminary  examination  was  held  and  the 
proceedings  certified  to  the  circuit  court  by  the  examining  mag- 
istrate.    An  information  was  then  filed  against  Evans,  to  which 
he  pleaded  in  abatement  that  the  justice  before  whom  the  ex- 
amination was  held  had  not  stated  in  his  return  that  any  offense, 
not  triable  before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  had  been  committed; 
nor  had  such  justice,  by  said  return,  stated  that  there  was  prob- 
able cause  to  believe  the  respondent  guilty  of  the  crime  charged, 
nor  of   any  offense  or  crime;  but  that,  on  the   contrary,  said 
justice  expressly  declared  that  he  did  not  believe  that  said  of- 
fense had  been  committed  or  that  respondent  was  guilty  there- 
of, and  that  he  only  required  respondent  to  recognize  to  appear 
for  trial  in  the  circuit  court  in  deference  to  and  by  reason  of  the 
intense  public  feeling  in  reference  to  and  against  respondent. 
■On  the  day  this  plea  ^^'^  was  filed  in  the  circuit  court  the  ex- 
amining magistrate  filed  an  amended  return  of  the  proceedings 
had  before  him,  in  which  it  was  recited :  'It  appeared  to  me  that 
an  offense  not  cognizable  by  a  justice  of  the  peace  had  been 
committed,  and  that  there  is  prohable  cause  to  believe  the  pris- 
oner guilty  thereof."    When  this  amended  return  was  filed  in 
the  circuit  court,  that  tribunal  overruled  the  plea  in  abatement 
interposed  to  the  information.     Evans  was  put  upon  trial  and 
convicted,  and  the  supreme  court  held  that  the  circuit  court 
erred  in  overruling  the  plea  in  abatement;  and  that  the  record 
of  an  examining  magistrate  must  show  that  a  crime  had  been 
■committed  and  that  there  was  reasonable  ground  to  believe  that 
the  accused  had  committed  it,  in  order  to  invest  the  circuit  court 
with  jurisdiction  to  try  the  accused  on  information.     But  the 
Evans  case  is  not  an  authority  for  the  contention  of  counsel  here. 
Evans  did  not  waive  a  preliminary  examination,  and  the  case 
does  not  decide — nor  any  other  that  I  have  been  able  to  find — 
that  notwithstanding  an  accused  waives  a  preliminary  examina- 
tion, still  the  record  of  the  examining  magistrate  must  disclose 
that  he  examined  witnesses  and  made  a  finding  that  the  crime 
charged  had  been  committed  and  that  there  was  probable  cause 
to  believe  the  accused  committed  it,  in  order  to  invest  the  dis- 
trict court  with  jurisdiction  to  try  the  accused  for  the  crime  on 


408  Latimer  v.  State.  [Nebraska, 

information.  If  one  is  charged  before  a  magistrate  with  the 
commission  of  a  felony,  arrested  and  brought  before  this  magis- 
trate, and  a  preliminary  examination  is  held,  then  it  may  be 
that  the  district  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  try  the  accused,, 
on  information  for  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged,  unlesa 
the  proceedings  had  before  the  examining  magistrate  disclose 
that  he  found,  after  hearing  the  evidence  produced  on  said  ex- 
amination, that  a  crime  had  been  committed  and  that  there  was 
probable  cause  for  believing  the  accused  committed  it;  but, 
where  the  accused  appears  before  the  magistrate  and  expressly 
waives  his  right  to  a  preliminary  examination,  or  voluntarily 
***  says  to  the  magistrate  that  he  is  guilty  of  the  crime  with 
which  he  is  charged,  we  know  of  no  law  which  makes  it  the 
duty  of  the  magistrate  to  then  proceed  to  call  and  examine  wit- 
nesses and  make  an  inquiry  as  to  whether  a  crime  has  been  com- 
mitted, and  if  so,  whether  the  accused  probably  was  .the  guilty 
party.  If  the  accused,  on  being  brought  before  the  examining 
magistrate,  waives  his  right  to  a  preliminary  examination,  or 
pleads  guilty  of  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged,  then  the 
magistrate  should  recognize  him  to  appear  in  the  district  court 
and  enter  upon  his  docket  the  proceedings  that  actually  oc- 
curred; and  a  duly  certified  transcript  of  this  record  filed  in  the 
office  of  the  clerk  of  the  district  court  will  invest  that  court 
with  jurisdiction  to  try  the  accused  on  information  for  the 
crime  with  which  he  was  accused  before  the  examining  magis- 
trate: Hedges  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  420;  State  v.  Eitty,  23  Ohio 
St.  562. 

3.  The  evidence  in  this  case  tends  to  show  that  at  the  time 
Latimer  committed  the  crime  with  which  he  was  convicted  he 
was  intoxicated;  but  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  record  which 
tends  to  show  that  he  formed  the  intention  of  committing  this 
robbery  and  then  voluntarily  became  intoxicated.  The  court 
gave  to  the  jury  the  following  instruction  twice :  "The  jury  are 
instructed  that  voluntary  intoxication  or  drunkenness  is  no 
excuse  for  crime  committed  under  its  influence;  nor  in  any 
state  of  mind  resulting  from  drunkenness  short  of  actual  in- 
sanity or  loss  of  reason  any  excuse  for  a  criminal  act."  It  is 
the  law  that  when  one  is  charged  with  a  crime  he  is  not  en- 
titled to  go  acquit  of  the  charge  simply  by  showing  that  at  the 
time  he  committed  the  offense  he  was  intoxicated;  but  we  do 
not  understand  that,  though  it  appears  that  when  one  com- 
mitted a  crime  he  was  intoxicated,  the  jury  are  not  at  liberty  to 
give  any  weight  to  this  fact,  unless  it  appears  that  the  accused 


June,  1898.]  Latimer  v.  State.  40^ 

at  the  time  was  actually  insane.  One  might  be  «o  Jrunk  as  not 
to  be  conscious  of  what  he  was  doing,  so  drunk  as  to  have  no 
•*''  control  of  his  will,  and  yet  not  be  actually  insane.  In  the 
case  at  bar,  the  accused  was  on  trial  for  robbery;  and  the  in- 
tent with  which  he  assaulted  and  took  from  the  prosecuting 
witness  his  money  was  an  essential  ingredient  of  the  crime  for 
which  the  prisoner  was  on  trial.  The  court,  in  effect,  said  ta 
them  that  the  evidence  before  them  on  the  subject  of  the  pris- 
oner's intoxication  should  count  for  nothing,  unless  it  estab- 
lished that  at  the  time  of  the  assault  the  prisoner  was  actually 
insane.  The  instruction  given  by  the  district  court  in  this  case 
was  given  by  the  district  couri;  in  O'Grady  v.  State,  36  Neb. 
320,  and  the  Judgment  of  the  district  couri;  was  reversed.  Th© 
feature  of  the  instruction  which  we  are  discussing  was  not  com- 
mented on  by  the  court  in  the  opinion  in  that  case;  but  the 
judgment  of  the  district  court  was  reversed  because  the  court 
in  the  instruction  also  told  the  jury  that  if  the  prisoner's  in- 
toxication was  voluntary,  then  evidence  of  his  intoxication 
could  not  be  considered  for  the  purpose  of  proving  that  he  did 
not  premeditate  or  intend  to  commit  the  crime  with  which  he 
was  charged.  But  the  court  did  not  approve  of  the  other  part 
of  the  instruction  which,  in  effect,  forbade  the  jury  to  give  any 
weight  to  the  evidence  of  intoxication,  unless  it  established  that 
the  prisoner,  at  the  time  he  committed  the  offense,  was,  by  rea- 
son of  such  intoxication,  actually  insane.  The  doctrine  of  this 
court  is,  that  while  voluntary  intoxication  is  not  of  itself  a  com- 
plete defense  for  one  who  is  charged  with  the  commission  of  a 
crime,  still  the  evidence  that  the  accused  was  intoxicated  when 
it  is  alleged  he  committed  the  crime  is  admissible  as  a  circum- 
stance tending  to  show  that  the  act  of  the  accused  was  not  pre- 
meditated: Hill  v.  State,  42  Neb.  503;  Head  v.  State,  43  Neb. 
30;  Debney  v.  State,  45  Neb.  856;  Ford  v.  State,  46  Neb.  390. 
In  the  case  at  bar,  the  prisoner  was  entitled  to  have  the  jury 
consider  the  evidence  which  tended  to  show  that  he  was  intoxi- 
cated at  the  time  it  was  alleged  he  committed  the  crime,  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  and  determining  the  status  and  con- 
dition "*^  of  the  prisoner's  mind  at  that  time.  If  he  was  so 
drunk  at  that  time  that  he  was  not  conscious  of  what  he  was 
doing,  so  drunk  that  he  had  no  control  of  his  will,  and  was  in- 
capable of  forming  and  entertaining  a  felonious  intent,  then  his 
act  did  not  render  him  guilty  of  robbery,  and  it  was  for  the 
jury  to  determine  whether  he  was  at  the  time  so  drunk  as  to 
be  unconscious  of  his  act,  incapable  of  controlling  his  will,  and 


410  Latimeb  v.  State.  [Nebraska, 

forming  and  entertaining  a  felonious  intent;  and  though  he 
might  have  been  by  reason  of  his  intoxication  in  such  state  of 
mind,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  was  then  actually  insane.  We 
think  the  court  erred  in  refusing  to  give  the  instruction  asked 
■and  in  giving  the  one  quoted. 

4.  As  this  case  is  to  be  tried  again,  we  have  thought  it  our 
•duty  to  call  the  attention  of  the  district  court  to  its  charge  on 
the  subject  of  the  prisoner's  good  character.  The  prisoner  pro- 
•duced  before  the  jury  evidence  of  good  character  previous  to  the 
time  of  the  alleged  commission  of  the  crime  for  which  he  was 
on  trial.  On  this  subject  the  district  court  gave  to  the  jury 
three  instructions,  as  follows: 

"3.  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  good  character  is  no 
€xcuse  for  crime;  that  it  is  only  a  circumstance  bearing  indi- 
rectly upon  the  question  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused  which  you 
•are  to  consider;  and  this  you  will  consider  in  connection  with 
all  the  other  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case;  and  if,  not- 
withstanding you  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant 
has  proved  a  good  character,  you  still  believe  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  accused  is  guilty  of  the  crime 
charged  in  the  information  filed  against  him,  then  it  is  your 
duty  so  to  find  and  your  verdict  should  be  guilty. 

"4.  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  good  character  raises 
the  presumption  that  the  accused  was  not  likely  to  have  com- 
mitted the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged;  but  the  force  of  the 
presumption  depends  upon  the  strength  of  the  opposing  evi- 
dence to  produce  conviction  ®*®  of  the  truth  of  the  charge.  And 
if  the  evidence  establishing  the  charge  is  of  such  a  nature  as 
not,  upon  principles  of  reason  and  good  sense,  to  be  overcome 
by  the  fact  of  good  character,  then  the  fact  that  the  defendant 
may  have  proven  himself  to  have  had  a  good  character  will  be 
unavailing  and  immaterial." 

"14.  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that  evidence  of  a  person's 
^ood  character  is  competent  evidence  in  favor  of  the  party  ac- 
cused, as  tending  to  show  that  he  would  not  be  likely  to  commit 
the  crime  charged  against  him.  And  in  this  case,  if  the  jury 
believes  from  the  evidence  that  prior  to  the  commission  of  the 
alleged  crime  the  defendant  had  always  borne  a  good  character 
among  his  acquaintances  and  in  the  neighborhood  where  he 
lives,  then  this  is  a  fact  proper  to  be  considered  by  the  jury, 
with  all  the  other  evidence  in  the  case,  in  determining  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  witnesses  who  have  testified  to  the  fact  tending 
to  criminate  him  have  been  mistaken  or  have  testified  falsely 


June,  1898.]  Latimer  v.  State.  411 

or  untruthfully;  and  if,  after  a  careful  consideration  of  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case,  including  that  bearing  on  his  previous 
good  character,  the  jury  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the 
-defendant's  guilt,  then  it  is  their  sworn  duty  to  acquit  him.  If, 
however,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  beyond  a  reasonable 
-doubt,  that  the  defendant  committed  the  crime  in  question 
as  charged  in  the  information,  it  will  be  your  sworn  duty  to 
£nd  the  defendant  guilty,  even  though  the  evidence  may  satisfy 
your  minds  that  the  defendant,  previous  to  the  commission  of 
the  crime,  has  sustained  a  good  reputation  and  character." 

When  one  is  accused  of  crime,  evidence  of  his  previous  good 
character  is  admissible,  in  his  behalf,  upon  the  theory  that,  being 
of  good  character,  it  is  improbable  that  he  would  have  committed 
the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged;  and  it  is  for  the  jury  to 
■weigh  and  consider,  and  give  such  effect  as  they  think  it  en- 
titled, to  this  evidence,  in  considering  and  determining  whether 
the  accused  is  guilty  of  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged. 
But  this  ^^^  evidence  is  not  submitted  to  the  consideration  of 
the  jury  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  them  to  determine  whether 
witnesses  who  have  testified  for  the  state  have  been  mistaken 
or  testified  falsely,  as  the  court  told  the  jury  in  instruction  No. 
14.  Another  criticism  of  the  instructions  is  that  they  savor 
of  argument  in  favor  of  the  state,  and  their  effect  is  to  caution 
the  jury  not  to  let  the  evidence  of  the  accused's  good  character 
have  too  much  weight  in  their  deliberations.  "Good  character 
is  an  important  fact  with  every  man;  and  never  more  so  than 
when  he  is  put  on  trial  charged  with  an  offense  which  is  ren- 
dered improbable  in  the  last  degree  by  a  uniform  course  of  life 
wholly  inconsistent  with  any  such  crime.  There  are  cases  when 
it  becomes  a  man's  sole  dependence,  and  yet  may  prove  sufficient 
to  outweigh  evidence  of  the  most  positive  character":  Judge 
€ooley  in  People  v.  Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9,  97  Am.  Dec.  163.  In 
the  case  at  bar,  there  was  before  the  jury  evidence  of  the  pris- 
oner's good  character,  and  it  was  the  province  of  the  jury  to 
■consider  this  evidence,  as  all  the  other  evidence  in  the  case,  and 
to  give  it  such  weight  as  they  deemed  it  entitled,  and  they  should 
have  been  left  free  and  untrammeled  in  this  respect.  In  Johnson 
v.  State,  34  Neb.  257,  it  was  distinctly  ruled:  *Trevious  good 
character  of  the  accused  in  a  criminal  prosecution  is  a  fact  which 
he  is  entitled  to  have  submitted  for  the  consideration  of  the 
jury  precisely  as  any  other  circumstance  favorable  to  him,  with- 
out any  disparagement  by  the  court."  To  the  same  effect  see 
Vincent  y.  State,  37  Neb.  672. 


412  Manfull  v.  Graham.  [Nebraska^ 

The  Judgment  of  the  district  court  is  reversed  and  the  causo 
remanded  with  instructions  to  grant  the  prisoner  a  new  trial. 


CRIMINAL  LAW— DRUNKENNESS  AS  A  DEFENSE— Volun- 
tary drunkenness  ordinarily  constitutes  no  excuse  for  a  crime  com- 
mitted under  its  influence,  even  though  the  intoxication  is  so  extreme 
as  to  make  the  person  unconscious  of  what  he  is  doing  or  as  to 
create  a  temporary  insanity.  If,  however,  the  habit  of  drunkenness 
has  created  a  fixed  frenzy  or  insanity,  whether  permanent  or  tem- 
porary, as,  for  instance,  delirium  tremens,  such  frenzy  or  insanity 
Is  not  deemed  voluntary,  and  he  who  acts  under  its  influence  is 
to  be  judged  as  if  his  condition  had  not  been  brought  about  by  his 
bad  habits:  State  v.  Kraemer,  49  La.  Ann.  766,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  664, 
and  note.  Intoxication,  to  excuse  cripie,  must  be  of  such  a  degree  as 
to  render  the  offender  incapable  of  entertaining  an  intent  to  com- 
mit such  crime.  If  it  falls  short  of  this  it  is  worthless  as  a  defense: 
Warner  v.  State,  56  N.  J.  L.  686,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  415,  and  note. 
Temporary  insanity  produced  by  the  recent  use  of  ardent  spirits 
on  the  part  of  an  accused  at  the  time  he  commits  a  crime  is  not 
ground  for  his  acquittal,  but  may  go  in  mitigation  of  Eis  punish- 
ment: Howard  v.  State,  37  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  494,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  812, 
and  note.  If  a  person  suffering  under  delirium  tremens  Is  so  far 
insane  as  to  be  irresponsible,  the  law  does  not  punish  him  for  any 
crime  he  may  commit  while  in  that  state:  Carter  v.  State,  12  Tex. 
BOO,  62  Am.  Dec.  539.  But  see  State  v.  Kraemer,  49  La.  Ann.  766, 
62  Am.  St  Rep.  664. 


Manfull  v.  Graham. 

[55  Nebraska,  645.] 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS.— If  infant  defendants  In 
a  case  have  been  regularly  summoned,  the  failure  to  appoint  a 
guardian  ad  litem  is  error  only,  and  does  not  render  void  the  judg- 
ment entered. 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS— VACATING.— Under  a 
statute  providing  that  "it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  reserve  In  a 
Judgment  or  order,  the  rigjit  of  an  infant  to  show  cause  against 
It  after  his  attaining  full  age,  but  in  any  case  in  which,  but  for 
this  section,  such  reservation  would  have  been  proper,  the  infant, 
within  one  year  after  arriving  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  may 
show  cause  against  such  judgment,"  the  infant  does  not,  on  his 
arriving  at  majority,  have  an  absolute  right  to  have  the  judgment 
set  aside,  but  only  to  show  cause  against  it,  and  does  not  extend 
that  right  beyond  the  cases  mentioned,  and  under  such  statute  an 
Infant  is  not  entitled  to  a  day  In  court  after  reaching  his  majority 
to  show  cause  against  a  judgment  ordering  a  sale  of  his  lands. 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS-VACATING.— Under 
section  602  of  the  code  of  Nebraska,  an  infant,  against  whom  an 
erroneous  judgment  has  been  entered,  may  have  It  set  aside,  pro- 
vided his  disability  does  not  appear  In  the  record  nor  the  error  In 
the  proceedings,  but,  If  these  facts  appear,  his  remedy  Is  by  writ 
of  error. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— TITLE  OF  PURCHASER.— The  title  of 
a  stranger  derived  through  sale  under  judgment  is  not  subject  to 
defeat  by  the  subsequent  vacation  of  such  judgment. 


Jane,  1898.]  Manfull  v.  Graham.  418 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS— VACATING.— An  origi- 
nal action  to  vacate  an  erroneous  judgment  against  an  infant  can- 
not be  maintained  witliout  showing  a  good  defense  to  the  first 
action  and  judgment. 

L.  G.  Hurd,  for  the  appellant. 
B.  0.  Hostetler,  for  the  appellee. 

®*«  IRVINE,  C.  Graham  brought  suit  against  Manfull  and 
his  wife  to  foreclose  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  alleging 
that  Manfull  had  failed  to  make  the  payments  of  purchase- 
money  as  provided.  A  decree  was  rendered  directing  the  sale 
of  the  land  to  satisfy  the  amount  found  due  under  the  contract. 
It  is  conceded  that  Mrs.  Manfull's  interest  is  only  such  as  re- 
sults from  the  marital  relation.  The  defense  interposed  by  Man- 
full  was  that  Graham's  contract  required  him  to  tender  a  good 
title  in  fee  simple,  and  that  he  was  unable  to  do  so  because 
he  claimed  under  a  purchaser  at  a  sale  foreclosing  a  mortgage, 
and  the  foreclosure  was  ineffective.  The  defect  in  the  fore- 
closure proceedings  was  that  an  undivided  half  interest  was  in 
certain  minors  and  that  no  guardian  ad  litem  had  been  ap- 
pointed to  represent  them. 

While  the  answer  alleges  a  failure  to  serve  process  on  the  in- 
fants, the  stipulation  of  facts  on  which  the  case  was  tried  dis- 
closes no  such  defect.  Where  infants  are  ^^"^  regularly  sum- 
moned, the  failure  to  appoint  a  guardian  ad  litem  is  an  error 
only  and  does  not  render  void  the  judgment  entered.  Such  has 
been  the  rule  with  regard  to  insane  defendants:  McAlister  v. 
Lancaster  County  Bank,  15  Neb.  295;  McOormick  v.  Paddock, 
20  Neb.  486.  In  the  former  case,  it  was  intimated  that  there 
might  be  a  distinction  as  to  infants,  but  it  was  afterward  held 
that  there  is  no  such  distinction,  and  that  the  rule  as  to  infants 
is  the  same:  Parker  v.  Starr,  21  Neb.  680.  Parker  v.  Starr,  21 
Neb.  680,  establishes  a  rule  of  property,  and  moreover  is  in  ac- 
cord with  the  best  considered  cases.  It  will  not  now  be  departed 
from. 

From  the  foregoing  it  follows  that  the  sale  made  under  the 
foreclosure  decree  was  not  void,  and  that  it  passed  title  to  the 
purchaser.  But  it  is  said  that  the  infant  defendants  have  not 
yet  reached  their  majority  and  may  still  be  heard  to  question 
the  regularity  of  the  proceedings;  that  therefore  the  defendant 
is  not  required  to  accept  a  title  that  may  be  so  attacked.  The 
briefs  do  not  indicate  very  clearly  what  procedure  is  still  deemed 
open  to  the  infants.  We  can  conceive  of  no  possible  remedy 
which  may  remain  open  unless  it  be  by  virtue  of  section  443 


414  Manfull  v.  Graham.  [Nebraska,'* 

or  section  602  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  by  proceedings 
in  error,  or  by  original  action  in  the  nature  of  a  bill  in  equity. 

Section  442  provides:  "It  shall  not  be  necessary  to  reserve, 
in  a  judgment  or  order,  the  right  of  an  infant  to  show  cause 
against  it  after  his  attaining  full  age;  but  in  any  case  in  which, 
but  for  this  section,  such  reservation  would  have  been  proper, 
the  infant,  within  one  year  after  arriving  at  the  age  of  twenty- 
one  years,  may  show  cause  against  such  order  or  judgment."  For 
several  reasons  no  right  could  be  claimed  by  these  infants  under 
that  section.  In  the  first  place,  the  right  there  protected  is  not 
an  absolute  right  to  have  the  judgment  set  aside,  but  it  is  only 
to  show  cause  against  it.  It  is  not  here  disclosed  by  pleading* 
or  by  proof  that  any  such  cause  exists.  The  failure  to  appoint 
a  guardian  ad  litem  is  not  **^*  such  cause.  The  section  quoted 
recognizes  the  old  chancery  rule,  based  not  on  formal  defects 
in  the  proceedings,  but  on  the  theory  that  the  infant  was  not 
bound  by  the  answer  of  the  guardian  ad  litem,  and  might  show 
cause  against  a  decree  as  well  where  he  had  been  represented 
by  guardian  as  where  he  had  not,  and  this  by  showing  either 
substantial  error,  or  a  defense  which  had  not  been  interposed. 
The  relief  accorded  was  entirely  independent  of  representation 
by  guardian,  and  the  fact  that  no  guardian  had  been  appointed 
would  be  immaterial  under  this  section.  Again,  it  was  not  in 
all  cases  that  the  infant  was  so  accorded  his  day  in  court  after 
reaching  his  majority.  The  statute  does  not  extend  his  former 
rights  in  that  respect,  but  merely  makes  it  unnecessary  to  ex- 
pressly reserved  the  right  in  the  decree,  and  allows  the  right 
to  be  asserted  only  in  such  cases  as,  according  to  the  old  practice, 
such  express  reservation  would  be  proper.  Where  the  decree 
directed  the  sale  of  the  infant's  lands,  it  was  under  the  former 
practice  binding  on  the  infant,  and  he  had  no  day  in  court  to 
show  cause  against  it:  Booth  v.  Kich,  1  Vern  !<i95;  Mills  v.  Den- 
nis,  3  Johns.  Ch.  367.  In  this  respect  there  was  a  distinction 
between  a  decree  ordering  a  sale  and  a  strict  foreclosure. 

That  portion  of  section  602  which  might  be  applicable  is  as 
follows:  "A  district  court  shall  have  power  to  vacate  or  modify 
its  own  judgments  or  orders,  after  the  term  at  which  such  judg- 
ment or  order  was  made 5.  For  erroneous  proceedings 

against  an  infant,  married  woman,  or  person  of  unsound  mind, 
where  the  condition  of  such  defendant  does  not  appear  in  the 
record  nor  the  error  in  the  proceedings."  It  will  be  observed 
that  it  is  only  where  the  condition  of  the  defendant  does  not 
appear  of  record  nor  the  error  in  the  proceedings  that  this  sec- 


June,  1898]  Manfull  v.  Graham.  415 

tion  applies.  The  object  of  the  exception  is  not  at  first  mani- 
fest. The  supreme  court  of  Ohio,  construing  a  similar  provi- 
sion, said  the  reason  seemed  to  be  that  if  the  defendant's  con- 
dition appeared  of  record  it  would  attract  the  attention  of  the 
court  and  so  insure  due  scrutiny:  *****  Carey  v.  Kemper,  45 
Ohio  St.  93.  We  think,  however,  that  a  better  reason  is,  that 
proceedings  in  error  may  be  brought  within  one  year  after  such 
a  disability  is  removed,  and,  if  the  condition  of  the  defendant 
and  the  error  are  disclosed  by  the  record,  such  proceedings  af- 
ford a  remedy.  Otherwise  section  602  becomes  available.  This- 
seems  to  be  the  construction  implied  in  Jennings  v.  Simpson, 
12  Neb.  558,  from  the  citation  therein  of  Yaple  v.  Titus,  41  Pa- 
st. 195,  80  Am.  Dec.  604.  In  the  present  case,  whether  the 
condition  of  the  infants  appeared  of  record  is  not  disclosed,  but 
that  fact  is  not  material.  If  it  was  disclosed,  and  the  foreclos- 
ure decree  should  ultimately  be  reversed  on  error,  the  purchaser 
would  be  protected  by  the  express  terms  of  section  508  of  the- 
Code  of  Civil  Procedure:  McAusland  v.  Pundt,  1  Neb.  211,  93- 
Am.  Dec.  358;  Green  v.  Hall,  43  Neb.  275,  47  Am.  St.  Eep. 
761.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  their  condition  did  not  appear  of 
record,  we  still  think  that  section  508  applies,  and  that  the  title- 
of  the  purchaser  would  not  be  defeated  or  affected  by  a  subse- 
quent vacation  of  the  judgment.  Vacating  judgments  under 
section  602  is  referred  to  under  the  title  of  "reversals"  by  the 
court  rendering  the  judgment,  and  we  do  not  think  that  section 
508,  in  using'  the  word  "reversal,"  contemplated  only  a  reversal 
by  an  appellate  court.  It  meant  a  reversal  by  any  court  author- 
ized to  set  aside  the  judgment.  Its  policy  was  to  protect  pur- 
chasers at  sales  under  judgments  which  had  been  rendered  by 
courts  of  competent  jurisdiction  in  the  premises,  no  matter  how 
erroneous  might  be  the  proceedings  leading  to  the  judgment. 
Independent  of  any  statute,  a  title  so  derived  is  not  defeated 
by  a  subsequent  vacation  of  the  judgment:  Allman  v.  Taylor,. 
101  111.  185;  England  v.  Garner,  90  N.  C.  197. 

A  sufficient  reason  why  the  title  is  not  hazarded  by  an  original 
action  is  that  the  defendant  suggests  no  equity  in  favor  of  the- 
minors  or  no  defense  to  the  foreclosure.  This  would  be  nec- 
essary to  maintain  an  original  case,  and  it  would  indeed  be  nec- 
essary to  a  proceeding  under  section  602. 

****  As  it  was  not  shown  that  the  plaintiff's  title  was  defective 
or  even  threatened,  the  judgment  of  the  district  court  was 
right. 

Affirmed. 


416  Welton  v.  Atkinson.  [Nebraska, 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS.— An  Infant  Is  bound  by  a  de- 
cree  against  him  as  much  as  a  person  of  full  age,  and  can  impeach 
it  only  upon  grounds  which  would  invalidate  it  if  against  an  adult: 
Harrison  v.  Wallton,  95  Va.  721,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  830;  Joyce  y.  Mc- 
Avoy,  31  Cal.  273,  89  Am.  Dec.  172,  and  monographic  note. 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS  WHERE  NO  GUARDIAN 
AD  LITEM.— A  judgment  against  an  infant  duly  served  with  sum- 
mons, but  without  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  ad  litem,  though 
irregular  and  erroneous,  is  not  void,  and  is  not  open  to  impeach- 
ment on  collateral  attacli:  Levystein  v.  O'Brien,  106  Ala.  352,  54 
Am.  St.  Rep,  56,  and  note;  Childs  v.  Lanterman.  103  Cal.  387.  42 
Am.  St.  Rep.  121;  note  to  Parker  v.  Parker,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  55; 
Brandon  v.  Carter,  119  Mo.  572,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  673;  Eisenmenger 
T.  Murphy,  42  Minn.  84,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  493. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— TITLE  OF  PURCHASER.- If  a  judgment 
and  execution  are  void,  no  title  passes  to  the  purchaser  thereunder, 
and  the  defendant  therein  may  replevin  the  property  from  such 
purchaser:  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lowder,  138  Mo.  533,  60  Am.  St. 
505.  Courts  go  very  far  in  favoring  and  maintaining  titles  of  pur- 
chasers under  judicial  sales.  Thus  purchasers  under  subsisting 
judgments  and  decrees  acquire  a  good  title,  although  such  judg- 
ments and  decrees  may  afterward  be  reversed;  and  fraud  on  the 
part  of  others  will  not  affect  or  taint  the  title  of  an  innocent  pur- 
chaser at  a  judicial  sale:  Wilson  v.  Miller.  30  Md.  82,  96  Am.  Dec. 
568;  Sutton  v.  Schonwald,  86  N.  C.  198,  41  Am.  Rep.  455;  Seguin  v. 
Maverick,  24  Tex.  526,  76  Am.  Dec.  117,  and  note;  Joyce  v.  McAvoy, 
SI  Cal.  273,  89  Am.  Dec.  172.  But  though  real  estate  sold  under  a 
judgment  has  passed  to  third  parties,  this  will  not  defeat  the  right 
of  the  plaintiff  to  avoid  such  sales  by  showing  want  of  jurisdiction 
in  the  court  entering  such  judgment:  Great  West  Min.  Co.  v.  Min- 
ing Co.,  12  Colo.  46,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  204. 

JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS— "GIVING  DAY."— The  In- 
sertion of  a  clause  "giving  day,"  et  cetera,  in  a  decree  for  convey- 
ance by  an  infant  of  his  estate  was  so  strictly  insisted  upon  in  all 
cases  under  the  English  equity  practice  that  the  omission  of  It  was 
-considered  as  error  in  the  decree.  Such  omission,  however,  did  not 
make  the  decree  void:  Joyce  v.  McAvoy,  31  Cal.  273,  89  Am.  Dec. 
172.    See  Walsh  v.  Walsh,  116  Mass.  377,  17  Am.  Rep.  162. 


Welton  v.  Atkinson. 

[S5  Nebraska,  674.] 

EVIDENCE— PRESUMPTION  AS  TO  LAW  OF  ANOTHER 
€TATE.— The  law  of  another  state  on  a  subject  Involved  In  litigation 
Is  presumed  to  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  state  in  which  the  litiga- 
ftlon  is  being  carried  on. 

NOTARIES  PUBLIC— OFFICIAL  SEAL.— A  notary  public  la 
required  to  attach  his  official  seal  to  his  official  acts,  and  his  certlfl- 
•cate,  unauthenticated   by  the  Impression  of  such  seal.  Is  void. 

S.  B,  Pound,  R.  Pound,  and  A.  N.  Sullivan,  for  the  appellant. 

D.  K.  BaiT,  G.  W.  Clark,  Beeson  &  Boot,  and  Mockett  & 
Polk,  for  the  appollee. 


€ept  1898.]  Welton  v.  Atkinson.  417 

•'''*  HARRISON,  C.  J.  In  error  proceedings  in  tliis  action 
it  is  complained  that  the  trial  court  refused,  on  motion  of 
plaintiff,  to  suppress  certain  depositions  and,  over  objections, 
admitted  them  in  evidence.  An  examination  of  the  transcript 
inclusive  of  the  correction  thereof  discloses,  by  fair  reading, 
that  the  motion  to  suppress  the  depositions  was  properly  pre- 
sented, both  in  point  of  manner  and  time.  The  addition  to  the 
transcript  allowed  on  motion  of  defendant  was  evidently  made 
with  a  purpose  to  make  it  appear  that  the  motion  for  suppres- 
sion of  the  depositions  was  not  interposed  until  after  the  trial 
had  commenced,  but  we  think  a  perusal  of  all  the  record  which 
refers  to  this  subject  leads  to  the  conclusion  we  have  heretofore 
announced.  The  certificate  attached  to  the  depositions  ^^ 
was  signed,  "D.  Shafer,  Notary  Public,"  but  there  was  no  im- 
pression of  his  official  seal.  At  the  close  of  the  testimony  of 
each  witness  the  name  of  each  witness  was  written,  and  just 
below  there  was  a  jurat  which  was  signed  officially  by  the  notary 
public,  and  in  each  of  such  places  there  was  the  impression  of 
the  official  seal  of  the  notary;  but  these  jurats  were  not  nec- 
essary, and  possessed  no  significance  relative  to  the  authenticar 
don  of  the  depositions. 

In  the  absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  it  must  be  presumed 
that  the  law  of  Arkansas — ^the  state  in  which  the  depositions 
were  taken — in  regard  to  notaries  public  is  the  same  as  this 
state;  and  in  this  state  it  is  provided,  among  other  things,  that 
each  notary  public  shall  provide  himself  with  an  official  seal, 
....  with  which  seal,  by  impression,  all  his  official  acts  shall 
be  authenticated:  See  Comp.  Stats.  1897,  c.  61,  sec.  5.  And 
in  section  384  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  it  is  provided:. 
"Depositions  taken  pursuant  to  this  article,  by  any  judicial  or 
other  officer  herein  authorized  to  take  depositions,  having  a  seal 
of  office,  whether  resident  in  this  state  or  elsewhere,  shall  be 
admitted  in  evidence  on  the  certificate  and  signature  of  such 
officer  under  the  seal  of  the  court  of  which  he  is  an  officer,  or 
his  official  seal,  and  no  other  or  further  act  of  authentication 
shall  be  required."  If  an  officer  is  required  to  attach  his  official 
seal  to  his  acts,  a  certificate  unauthenticated  by  the  impression 
of  such  seal  is  invalid:  Byrd  v.  Cochran,  39  Neb.  118;  Neese  v. 
Farmers  Ins.  Co.,  55  Iowa,  604;  Hewitt  v.  Morgan,  88  Iowa, 
468;  De  Graw  v.  King,  28  Minn.  118.  The  depositions  were 
not  sufficiently  authenticated  and  should  not  have  been  ad- 
mitted :  Neese  v.  Farmers  Ins.  Co.,  55  Iowa,  604. 

There  were  other  assignments  of  error,  but  they  were  of  mat- 

Aif.  St  REP.,  Vol.  LXX.— 27 


418  In  be  Fanton.  [Nebraska^ 

ters  which  we  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  discuss  at  presents 
For  the  error  hereinbefore  indicated  the  judgment  must  be  re- 
versed and  a  new  trial  awarded,  during  ^''^  which,  if  it  occurs,, 
these  further  matters,  if  erroneous,  will  doubtless  be  corrected, 
or  not  be  again  parts  of  the  trial.  The  judgment  is  reversed 
and  the  cause  remanded. 


EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION  AS  TO  LAW  OF  ANOTHER 
STATE.— In  the  absence  of  an  allegation  to  the  contrary,  a  court 
will  assume  that  the  law  of  another  state  is  the  same  as  the  law  of 
this  state:  Schultz  v.  Howard,  63  Minn.  196,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  470,  and 
note;  Goodwin  v.  Provident  Savings  etc.  Assn.,  97  Iowa,  226,  59  Am. 
St.  Rep.  411;  Peet  v.  Hatcher,  112  Ala.  514,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  45.  It 
Is  presumed  that  the  common  law  prevails  in  a  sister  state:  Bur- 
diet  V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  123  Mo.  221,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  528; 
Myers  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  69  Minn.  476,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  579. 
But  this  applies  only  to  states  having  a  common  origin  or  popu- 
lated by  citizens  coming  from  states  having  a  common  origin:  Peet 
V.  Hatcher,  112  Ala.  514,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  45. 

NOTARIES  PUBLIC— OFFICIAL  SEAL.— All  official  acts  of  a 
notary  public  should  be  authenticated  by  his  signature  and  official 
seaL  An  affidavit  is  not  proved  to  have  been  made  unless  the 
jurat  has  been  authenticated  by  both  such  seal  and  signature:  Tunis 
V.  Withrow,  10  Iowa,  305,  77  Am.  Dec.  117.  But  see  Sonfield  v. 
Thompson,  42  Ark.  46,  48  Am.  Rep.  49.  An  unsigned  certificate  of 
acknowledgment  by  a  notary  public  is  void,  though  it  is  attested  by 
his  seal:  Clark  v.  Wilson,  127  111.  449,  11  Am.  St.  Rep.  143.  But  see 
Lake  Erie  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Whitham,  155  111.  514,  46  Am.  St  Eep» 
855,  and  note. 


In  re  Fanton. 

[55  Nebraska,  703.] 

HABEAS  CORPUS-REVIEW  OP  BRRORS.-Habeas  cor> 
pus  Is  not  an  appropriate  proceeding  to  review  mere  errors  and  Ir- 
regularities in  a  judgment  of  an  inferior  court  In  a  criminal  case. 

HABEAS  CORPUS— VOID  JUDGMENT.— If  a  person  Is  re- 
strained of  his  liberty  by  virtue  of  an  absolutely  void  judgment,  he 
may  be  discharged  on  habeas  corpus,  but  the  judgment  must  be 
void  and  not  merely  erroneous. 

HABEAS  CORPUS.- AN  EXCESSIVE  SENTENCE  imposed 
by  a  court  having  jurisdiction  Is  merely  erroneous  and  not  void, 
and  habeas  corpus  does  not  lie  on  behalf  of  the  convicted  prisoner 
to  obtain  relief  therefrom.    His  remedy  Is  by  writ  of  error. 

R.  R.  Dickson  and  G.  A.  Day,  for  the  petitioner. 

C.  J.  Smyth,  attorney  general,  and  E,  P.  Smith,  deputy  attor- 
ney general,  for  the  state. 

''***  NORVAL,  J.    An  information  was  filed  in  the  district 
court  of  Holt  county,  charging  "that  one  John  Fanton,  late  of 


Sept.  1898.]  In  rb  Fanton.  419 

the  county  aforesaid,  on  the  twentieth  day  of  December,  1895, 
in  the  county  of  Holt  and  state  of  Nebraska  aforesaid,  the  said 
John  Fanton  then  and  there  being,  did  unlawfully  and  feloni- 
ously steal,  take,  and  drive  away  eighteen  (18)  head  of  mixed 
cattle,  described  as  follows:  ....  All  of  said  cattle  being  of 
the  value  of  three  hundred  dollars,  and  the  personal  property  of 
one  Timothy  Cross;  contrary  to  the  form  of  the  statute  in  such 
cases  made  and  provided,  and  against  the  peace  and  dignity  of 
the  state  of  Nebraska."  A  trial  was  had  tljereunder,  the  accused 
was  found  guilty  as  charged  in  the  information,  the  value  of 
the  property  stolen  was  fixed  by  the  jury  at  three  hundred  dol- 
lars, and  a  sentence  of  eight  years'  imprisonment  in  the  peni- 
tentiary was  imposed  by  the  court.  Error  proceeding  was  prose- 
cuted to  this  court,  which  resulted  in  the  affirmance  of  the  judg- 
ment and  sentence  below:  Fanton  v.  State,  50  Neb.  351.  After- 
ward this  application  was  made  for  his  discharge  from  imprison- 
ment upon  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 

''**'  It  is  insisted  that  the  petitioner  was  prosecuted  under 
chapter  77  of  the  Session  Laws  of  1895  (Crim.  Code,  sec.  117a), 
and  that  his  conviction  is  illegal  and  void,  because  said  chapter 
failed  to  pass  both  branches  of  the  state  legislature.  The  chap- 
ter assailed  purports  to  make  cattle-stealing  a  distinctive  crime; 
and  whether  such  legislation  was  adopted  in  the  constitutional 
mode  it  is  unnecessary  to  now  determine,  since  it  will  be  observed 
that  the  information  under  which  the  conviction  was  obtained 
alleged  every  ingredient  of  the  crime  of  grand  larceny,  as  de- 
fined by  section  114  of  the  Criminal  Code.  The  district  court 
having  jurisdiction  of  the  crime  charged,  as  well  as  over  the 
person  of  the  petitioner,  its  judgment  and  sentence  are  not  void : 
In  re  Ream,  54  Neb.  667. 

The  maximum  sentence  authorized  to  be  imposed  by  section 
114  of  the  Criminal  Code  upon  a  conviction  of  grand  larceny  is 
seven  years*  imprisonment,  while  the  petitioner  was  adjudged 
to  be  confined  in  the  penitentitary  for  the  term  of  eight  years. 
It  is  argued  that  the  sentence  of  the  court,  being  in  excess  of 
the  maximum  limit  authorized  by  law,  is  void.  The  soundness 
of  this  contention  depends  upon  the  fact  whether  or  not  the  de- 
fect indicated  constituted  an  error  or  irregularity  merely,  since 
it  is  firmly  established  in  this  state  that  habeas  corpus  is  not 
the  appropriate  proceeding  to  review  mere  errors  and  irregulari- 
ties in  a  judgment  of  an  inferior  court  in  a  criminal  case.  The 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  cannot  operate  as  a  proceeding  in  error: 
Ex   parte   Fisher,  6   Neb.  309;  In   re   Balcom,  12    Neb.  316; 


420  In  re  Fanton.  [Nebraska, 

Buchanan  v.  Mallalieu,  25  Neb.  201;  In  re  Betts,  36  Neb.  282; 
State  V.  Crinklaw,  40  Neb.  759;  In  re  McVey,  50  Neb.  481;  In 
re  Eeam,  54  Neb.  667.  If  a  person  is  restrained  of  his  liberty 
by  virtue  of  an  absolutely  void  judgment,  he  may  be  discharged 
on  habeas  corpus.  To  obtain  release  by  such  a  proceeding,  the 
judgment  or  sentence  must  be  more  than  merely  erroneous;  it 
must  be  an  absolute  nullity:  In  re  Havlik,  45  Neb.  747. 

Mr.  Church,  in  his  valuable  treatise  on  Habeas  Corpus,  ''*'** 
states:  "The  general  rule  is,  that  when  a  court  has  jurisdiction 
by  law  of  the  offense  charged,  and  of  the  party  who  is  so 
charged,  its  judgments  are  not  nullities.  It  is  only  when  the 
court  pronounces  a  judgment  in  a  criminal  case  which  is  not 
authorized  by  law,  under  any  circumstances,  in  the  particular 
case  made  by  the  pleadings,  whether  the  trial  has  proceeded 
regularly  or  otherwise,  that  such  judgment  can  be  said  to  be 
void  so  as  to  justify  the  discharge  of  the  defendant  held  in  cus- 
tody by  such  judgment.  Thus  a  judgment  of  conviction  is  not 
void  because  of  the  failure  to  inform  the  accused  of  his  right  to 
an  appeal  or  because  of  the  fact  that  there  were  gross  irregulari- 
ties committed  during  the  trial,  in  the  impaneling  of  the  jury, 
in  the  introduction  of  evidence,  and  in  the  rendition  of  the  ver- 
dict, or  because  an  excessive  punishment  has  been  imposed — 
except  as  to  the  excess":  Church  on  Habeas  Corpus,  sec.  370. 
And  at  section  373  the  same  author  uses  this  language:  "The 
prevailing  rule  is,  that  an  excessive  sentence  is  merely  erro- 
neous and  voidable;  that  the  whole  sentence  is  not  illegal  and 
void  because  of  the  excess;  that  it  is  not  void  ab  initio;  and 
that  it  is  good  on  habeas  corpus  so  far  as  the  power  of  the  court 
extends,  and  invalid  only  as  to  the  excess."  Numerous  decisions 
are  cited  by  the  author  which  fully  sustain  the  doctrine  an- 
nounced in  the  foregoing  excerpts.  The  following  are  in  point: 
People  V.  Liscomb,  60  N.  Y.  559,  19  Am.  Kep.  211;  People  v. 
Jacobs,  66  N.  Y.  8;  People  v.  Baker,  89  N.  Y.  460;  Ex  parte  Hen- 
ehaw,  73  Cal.  486;  In  re  Graham,  138  U.  S.  461;  In  re  Crandall, 
34  Wis.  177;  In  re  Graham,  74  Wis.  450,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  174,  76 
Wis.  366;  In  re  Pikulik,  81  Wi8.158;  Ex  parte  Mooney,  26  W.Va. 
36,  53  Am.  Rep.  59;  Feeley's  case,  12  Cush.  598;  Ex  parte 
Crenshaw,  80  Mo.  447;  People  v.  Markham,  7  Cal.  208;  Ex 
parte  Shaw,  7  Ohio  St.  81,  70  Am.  Dec.  55;  Ex  parte  Van 
Hagan,  25  Ohio  St.  427.  A  judgment  imposing  sentence  to 
imprisonment  for  a  longer  period  than  authorized  by  statute  is 
not  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  but  erroneous  merely.  It  is 
the  excessive  portion  of  the  sentence  alone  that  is  invalid,  and 


Sept  1898.]  In  be  Fanton.  421 

relief  cannot  be  had  therefrom  ^**''  upon  habeas  oorpug  until 
the  valid  portion  has  been  served. 

In  In  re  Graham,  and  in  In  re  McDonald,  74  "Wis.  451,  17 
Am.  St.  Eep.  174,  the  petitioners  were  convicted  of  a  felonious 
assault  and  robbery,  and  sentenced  to  the  penitentiary  for  the 
term  of  thirteen  years  each,  while  the  maximum  punishment 
allowed  by  statute  for  that  crime  was  ten  years.  They  applied 
for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  on  the  ground  of  excessive  sentences. 
The  writ  was  denied,  the  court,  through  Cole,  C.  J.,  saying: 
'*We  deny  the  writs,  for  the  reason  that  the  error  in  the  judg- 
ments does  not  render  them  void,  or  the  imprisonment  under 
them  illegal,  in  that  sense  which  entitles  them  to  be  discharged 
on  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  The  judgments  are  doubtless 
erroneous,  and  would  be  reversed  on  a  writ  of  error  (Fitzgerald 
V.  State,  4  Wis.  (*395)  412;  Haney  v.  State,  5  Wis.  529;  Bene- 
dict V.  State,  12  Wis.  314;  Peglow  v.  State,  12  Wis.  (*534) 
595);  but  the  judgments  are  not  void:  State  v.  Sloan,  65  Wis. 
647.  The  court  had  jurisdiction  of  the  persons  and  subject 
matter  or  offense,  but  made  a  mistake  in  the  judgment.  For 
mere  error,  no  matter  how  flagrant,  the  remedy  is  not  by  habeas 
corpus.  The  law  is  well  settled  in  this  court  that  on  habeas 
corpus  only  jurisdictional  defects  are  inquired  into.  The  writ 
does  not  raise  questions  of  errors  in  law,  or  irregularity  in  the 
proceedings." 

Ex  parte  Van  Hagan,  25  Ohio  St.  426,  was  an  application  for 
discharge  on  habeas  corpus,  where  an  excessive  sentence  was 
imposed.  The  court  say:  "The  punishment  inflicted  by  the 
sentence,  in  excess  of  that  prescribed  by  the  law  in  force,  was 
erroneous  and  voidable,  but  not  absolutely  void.  It  follows  that 
a  writ  of  error  to  reverse  the  proceedings  or  sentence  is  the 
remedy  that  the  relator  should  have  resorted  to  in  order  to  ob- 
tain a  discharge  from  illegal  imprisonment,  and  not  habeas 
corpus,  which  is  not  the  proper  mode  of  redress  where  the  relator 
was  convicted  of  a  criminal  offense,  and  erroneously  sentenced  to 
excessive  imprisonment  therefor  by  a  court  of  competent  juris- 
diction: Ex  parte  Shaw,  7  Ohio  St.  81,  70  Am.  Dec.  55,  ap- 
proved and  followed  on  this  point." 

708  rpjjg  (jefect  in  the  sentence  imposed  on  John  Fanton  was 
not  jurisdictional,  but  merely  erroneous,  since  the  district  court 
acquired  jurisdiction  over  his  person  and  of  the  subject  matter, 
and  the  judgment  rendered  was  of  the  kind  authorized  by  the 
statute.  In  re  McVey,  50  Neb.  481,  is  not  in  conflict  with  the 
oonclusion  reached  herein,  although  there  is  to  be  found  in  the 


422  In  re  Fanton.  [Nebraska, 

report  of  that  case  language  apparently  opposed  to  the  doctrine 
announced  in  the  case  at  bar.  In  the  McVey  case  it  was  asr 
Berted  that  the  court  must  possess  jurisdiction  to  impose  the 
particular  sentence  adjudged,  else  the  same  will  be  void.  When 
that  thought  was  expressed,  the  court  did  not  have  in  mind, 
or  under  consideration,  a  sentence  inflicted  in  excess  of  the  limit 
authorized  by  the  legislature.  There  the  petitioner  has  been 
found  guilty  of  the  statutory  ofl;ense  of  breaking  and  entering 
a  building  in  the  daytime,  while  the  information  under  which 
he  was  tried  did  not  charge  him  with  having  committed  that 
crime,  but  did  charge  a  burglary  committed  in  the  night  season. 
He  was  prosecuted  for  one  offense,  and  convicted  for  another, 
so  that  the  court  did  not  have  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter, 
or  of  the  power  to  impose  that  particular  sentence  at  that  time 
in  that  case,  and  the  sentence  was  void.  If,  upon  a  conviction 
for  burglary,  the  court  should  sentence  the  accused  to  be  hanged, 
the  judgment  would  be  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
to  impose  a  sentence  of  that  kind  in  that  case.  But  it  would  be 
otherwise  if  the  court  should  adjudge  an  imprisonment  in  the 
penitentiary  for  a  longer  period  than  fixed  by  statute  for  the 
crime  of  burglary.  In  the  latter  case,  the  sentence  would  be 
erroneous  merely,  but  not  void.  In  the  one  case  the  court  had 
no  jurisdiction  to  impose  that  particular  kind  of  a  sentence  upon 
conviction  of  burglary,  w'hile  in  the  other  the  statutory  kind  of 
punishment  was  meted  out,  although  the  time  of  imprisonment 
exceeded  the  statutory  bounds.  A  sentence  of  a  different  char- 
acter than  that  authorized  by  law  to  be  imposed  for  the  crime 
of  which  the  accused  has  been  found  guilty  is  void,  while  ''<*® 
a  sentence  which  imposes  the  statutory  kind  of  punishment  i3 
not  absolutely  void,  although  excessive.  In  the  former  case, 
the  entire  punishment  is  invalid,  while  as  to  the  latter  the  ex- 
cessive portion  is  alone  erroneous,  and  not  void  in  such  a  sense  as 
to  be  available  on  habeas  corpus,  at  least  until  after  the  valid 
portion  of  the  judgment  has  been  executed.  The  writ  is  de- 
nied. 


HABEAS  CORPUS-REVIEW  OF  ERRORS.-If  a  court  has 
Jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter,  although  its  Judgment  may  be 
erroneous,  It  is  not  void  and  cannot  be  reviewed  on  habeas  corpus: 
Ex  parte  Tinsley,  37  Tex.  Grim.  Rep.  517,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  818.  Ha- 
beas corpus  cannot  be  used  as  a  writ  of  error  to  review  proceedings 
under  which  a  party  Is  imprisoned  for  contempt  of  court:  In  re  Co- 
penhaver,  118  Mo.  377.  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  382,  and  note;  Smith  v. 
Clausmeier.  136  Ind.  105.  43  Am.  St  Rep.  311;  Ex  parte  Mitchell, 
104  Mo.  121,  24  Am.  St  Rep.  324. 


Sept.  1898.]  In  be  Fanton.  428 

HABEAS  CORPUS-VOID  PROCEEDINGS.— A  writ  of  habeas 
«orpu8  cannot  reach  errors  or  Irregularities  which  render  proceed- 
ings voidable  merely,  but  only  such  defects  In  substance  as  renders 
the  process  or  judgment  absolutely  void:  Barton  v.  Saunders,  16 
Or.  51,  8  Am.  St  Rep.  261;  Ex  parte  Keeler,  45  S.  O.  537,  55  Am.  St. 
Bep.  785;  State  y.  Klnmore,  54  Minn.  135,  40  Am.  St  Rep.  805. 

HABEAS  CORi^US— EXCESSIVE  SENTENCE.— One  Imprisoned 
for  violating  an  order  or  Judgment  In  excess  of  the  Jurisdiction  of 
the  court  rendering  It  can  be  discharged  by  writ  of  habeas  corpus: 
Ex  parte  Arnold,  128  Mo.  256»  49  Am.  St  Rep.  557.  A  Judgment 
sentencing  a  prisoner  for  a  longer  time  than  the  statute  warrants 
Is  erroneous,  but  not  void,  and  he  is  not  entitled  to  be  discharged 
on  habeas  corpus:  In  re  Graham,  74  Wis.  460,  17  Am.  St  Rep.  174^ 
And  not6b 


CASES 

IN  THB 


SUPKEME  COURT 


ov 


NEW  yore: 


Steinbaok  v.  Diepenbrook. 

(158  New  Yobk,  24.] 

INSUKANCB,  IJFE— POLICY  OF,  MAY  BE  ASSIGNED  TO 
ONE  HAVING  NO  INSURABLE  INTEREST.— A  valid  policy  of 
life  insurance  is  assignable.  Hence,  if  a  policy  is,  in  good  faith 
and  not  for  the  purpose  of  assignment,  taken  out,  either  by  the  in- 
sured himself,  or  by  another,  who  has  an  insurable  intei'est  in  his 
life,  it  may  be  lawfully  assigned  to  one  who  has  no  insurable  in- 
terest In  the  life  of  the  insured,  and  the  assignee  may,  therefore, 
enforce  collection  of  the  full  amount  of  the  policy  from  the  com- 
pany, where  the  assignment  is  general  and  absolute. 

INSURANCE,  LIFE— CONTRACT  OF,  AND  ITS  ASSIGN- 
MENT—CONSTRUCTION—INTENTION —  WAGERING  POLICY. 
The  Intention  of  the  parties  procuring  a  life  Insurance  determines; 
its  character.  Hence,  if  one  sLonld  take  out  such  a  policy  to  him- 
self, and  at  once  assign  It  to  a  person  having  no  insurable  Interest 
In  his  life,  the  courts  would  unhesitatingly  declare  In  accordance 
with  the  facts,  reading  the  policy  and  the  assignment  together,  as 
forming  part  of  one  transaction,  for  the  purpose  of  frustrating  a 
wagering  policy. 

INSURANCE,  LIFE— POLICY  OP— RIGHT  TO  ASSIGN- 
FAILURE  OF  HEALTH.— A  person  whose  life  Is  Insured  is  not 
deprived  of  the  right  to  realize  on  his  policy,  by  Its  assignment, 
whenever  his  necessities  press  him,  because  of  a  falling  condition 
of  health. 

Action  brought  to  recover  the  proceeds  of  a  certain  policy  of 
insurance  for  ten  thousand  dollars,  issued  on  the  life  of  Alois 
Diepenbrock,  appellant's  testator.  The  amount  due  thereon 
was  claimed,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  plaintiff,  Erwin  Stein- 
back,  as  assignee,  and  on  the  other  hand  by  the  defendant  Louise 
Diepenbrock,  as  executrix  of  the  estate  of  Alois  Diepenbrock, 
deceased.  Suit  was  brought  against  the  insurance  company  to- 
recover  the  amount  due  upon  the  policy,  and  the  company  ad- 
mitted its  liability  to  some  one.     The  policy  had  been  originalljj 


Jan.  1899.]  Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock.  425 

assigned  to  "William  Erdtmann,  who  had  assigned  it  to  the 
plaintifif.  The  company,  therefore,  paid  the  money  into  court 
and  had  the  defendant  Louise  Diepenbrock,  as  executrix,  and 
William  Erdtmann  substituted  as  defendants.  A  judgment  in 
favor  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  Erdtmann  was  aflfinned, 
and  the  defendant  Louise  Diepenbrock  appealed. 

A.  Edward  Woodruff,  William  Phlippeau,  and  Max  Meyer, 
•for  the  appellant. 

James  Cowder  Meyers,  Louis  C.  Kaegener,  and  Thomas  M. 
Eowlette,  for  the  respondents. 

*«  PARKER,  C.  J.  The  coung-el  for  the  appellant  in  his 
argument  insisted  with  great  earnestness  and  force  that  the  posi- 
tion several  times  asserted  by  this  court  in  support  of  the 
legality  of  the  assignment  of  a  policy  of  insurance  to  a  person 
having  no  insurable  interest  in  the  life  of  the  insured  is  a  mis- 
taken one  and  in  conflict  with  the  decisions  of  the  United 
States  supreme  court  and  the  court  of  last  resort  in  many  o# 
the  states. 

Warnock  v.  Davis,  104  U.  S.  775;  Franklin  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Hazzard,  41  Ind.  116,  13  Am.  Rep,  313;  Missouri  Co.  v. 
Sturges,  18  Kan.  93,  26  Am.  Rep.  761;  Schonfield  v.  Turner, 
75  Tex.  324;  Basye  v.  Adams,  81  Ky.  368,  and  Helmetag  v. 
Miller,  76  Ala.  183,  52  Am.  Rep.  316,  furnish  support  for  his 
assertion  as  to  the  rule  in  the  United  States  supreme  court  and 
in  some  of  the  other  states.  Supported  by  these  authorities,  the 
counsel  challenged  the  correctness  of  the  rule  that  concededly 
has  been  long  acquiesced  in  in  this  state  by  the  courts  and  the 
profession.  Indeed,  Mr.  Justice  Field  in  his  opinion  in  War- 
nock V.  Davis,  104  U.  S.  775,  stated  the  rule  in  this  state  to  be 
that  a  valid  assignment  of  a  policy  of  ^^  insurance  could  be 
made  to  a  person  without  interest  in  the  insured.  But  the  ap- 
pellant contends  that,  while  this  may  be  the  rule  here,  the  de- 
cisions in  other  jurisdictions  demonstrate  that  our  position  is 
wrong  as  a  matter  of  sound  public  policy,  and  therefore  the  true 
rule  should  be  laid  down,  notwithstanding  that  expressions  in- 
ducing the  belief  that  the  above  rule  obtained  may  have  been 
made  by  our  courts.  It  is  urged  that  this  task  will  not  be  a 
difficult  one,  for  the  reason,  as  the  appellant  contends,  that 
there  have  been  no  cases  in  this  state  where  the  question  was 
necessarily  up  for  decision,  and  therefore  all  that  has  been  said 
upon  that  subject  by  this  court  is  mere  dictum. 


426  Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock.         [New  York, 

In  St.  John  y.  American  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  13  N".  Y.  31,  64 
Am.  Dec.  529,  a  recovery  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  against  an  in^ 
curance  company  was  sustained  where  it  appeared  that  one 
Noyes  had  effected  policies  of  insurance  upon  his  own  life  and 
shortly  afterward  assigned  them  to  the  plaintiff  for  a  valuable 
consideration.  In  the  answer  the  defendant  alleged,  by  way  of 
defense,  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  only  the 
amount  of  money  that  he  had  advanced  as  a  consideration  of 
the  transfer  .of  the  policy  to  him,  and  that  if  defendant  was' 
liable  beyond  such  amount  upon  the  policy,  the  personal  repre^ 
centatives  were  interested  in  the  excess,  and  therefore  necessary 
parties  to  the  suit.  And  upon  the  close  of  the  evidence  the 
counsel  for  the  defendant  pressed  fhe  point  that  the  plaintiff 
had  no  insurable  interest  in  the  life  of  the  insured,  and  there- 
fore was  not  entitled  to  judgment.  The  court  regarded  the 
question  as  one  necessary  to  be  passed  upon  in  the  final  disposi- 
tion of  the  case,  and,  after  considering  it,  held  that  the  policies 
in  question  were  valid  in  their  inception  and  that  the  assign- 
ment of  them  to  the  plaintiff  did  not  affect  the  liability  of  the 
company,  and  that  to  entitle  the  assignee  to  a  recovery  it  was 
not  necessary  for  him  to  have  had  an  insurable  interest  in  the 
life  of  the  insured. 

The  next  case  was  Valton  v.  National  etc.  Assur.  Co.,  20  N. 
Y.  32,  where  Schumacher  obtained  a  policy  on  his  life  for  ten 
thousand  dollars,  and  by  his  articles  of  copartnership  agreed  that 
the  plaintiff  and  another  partner  should  become  the  owners  of 
the  ^^  policy  and  all  due  thereon  in  the  event  of  his  death  be- 
fore the  termination  of  the  partnership.  This  contingency  hap- 
pened, and  the  court  held  that  it  operated  to  vest  absolutely  the 
title  to  the  policy  in  the  plaintiff  and  his  other  partner,  and  a 
recovery  could  be  had  thereon  as  against  the  defendants. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  the  cases  cited  the  contest  was 
between  the  assignee  and  the  company  issuing  the  policy,  and 
the  question  was  not  squarely  presented  whether,  as  between 
the  assignor  and  the  assignee,  the  assignee  would  be  entitled 
to  retain  more  than  the  sum  actually  invested  by  him,  which 
is  the  rule  in  some  jurisdictions.  But  it  necessarily  was  decided 
that  the  policy  was  not  rendered  invalid  by  the  assignment, 
and  further  that  the  assignee  acquired  thereby  the  right  to  en- 
force collection  of  the  full  amount  of  the  policy  from  the  com- 
pany. 

In  Olmsted  v.  Keyes.  85  N.  Y.  593,  the  plaintiff,  havinsr  ob- 
tained the  proceeds  of  a  policy  of  life  insurance,  brought  an 


Jan.  1899.]  Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock.  427 

Action  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  and  determining  the 
■conflicting  claims  of  various  defendants  to  the  moneys  paid  on 
the  policy.  It  appeared  that  Keyes  procured  a  policy  of  insur- 
ance on  his  life,  payable  to  the  plaintiff  as  trustee  for  his  wife 
lluldah;  Huldah  died  intestate  a  few  years  later;  afterward 
Iveyes  married  again,  and  thereupon  the  plaintiff  for  value  as- 
signed the  policy  to  Keyes'  second  wife  at  his  request.  Keyea 
subsequently  died  intestate,  leaving  him  surviving  his  widow 
-and  one  child  by  her  £Lnd  several  children  by  his  first  wife.  Ifc 
was  held  that  during  the  life  of  the  first  wife  the  policy  was  her 
property;  upon  her  death  the  title  vested  in  her  husband  as 
survivor,  and  he  having  caused  it  to  be  assigned  to  his  second 
wife,  the  assignment  vested  the  title  in  her,  and  she  alone  was 
entitled  to  the  money  due  thereon.  There  was  a  difference  of 
view  in  the  court  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  case,  and  the  argu- 
ment that  led  to  the  decision  considered  with  care  the  assigna- 
bility of  a  policy  of  life  insurance  like  any  other  contract;  in 
the  course  of  the  argument  the  court  referred  to  and  considered 
many  authorities  in  England  and  in  this  country,  and  ** 
reached  the  conclusion  that  while  an  insurable  interest  is  nec- 
essary to  enable  one  to  take  out  a  policy  of  insurance  on  the 
life  of  another,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  assignee  of  a  policy 
validly  issued  should  have  such  an  interest.  After  careful  ex- 
amination of  tbat  opinion  we  find  it  impossible  to  reach  any 
other  conclusion  than  that  it  was  intended  to  put  at  rest  what- 
ever controversy  there  may  have  been  in  this  state  touching 
the  assignability  of  a  valid  policy  of  insurance.  The  case  at  bap 
is  the  only  one  we  know  of  where  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  case 
last  referred  to  has  been  seriously  questioned,  although  it  is 
true  that  some  discussion  of  the  principle  was  had  in  Wright 
V.  Mutual  etc.  Assn.,  118  N.  Y.  237,  16  Am.  St.  Eep.  749,  where 
the  defendant  unsuccessfully  challenged  the  right  of  the  as- 
signee to  recover  on  the  ground,  among  others,  that  the  plain- 
tiff had  not  an  insurable  interest  in  the  life  of  the  insured  at 
the  time  of  the  assignment;  the  court  in  its  opinion  cited  the 
case  of  Olmsted  v.  Keyes,  85  N.  Y.  593.  * 

The  result  of  our  further  examination  persuades  us  that  whit 
has  been  understood  to  be  the  rule  in  this  state  is  not  only  in 
line  with  the  authorities  in  most  jurisdictions  upon  that  sub- 
ject, but  is  sound  as  a  matter  .of  public  policy.  It  was  formerly 
the  rule  in  England  that  while  a  policy  of  insurance  could  not 
be  assigned  at  law  it  could  in  equity.  By  the  act  of  1807  (30 
•&  31  Vict.,  c.  144)  a  policy  of  life  insurance  was  made  assigna- 


428  Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock.  [New  York, 

ble  at  law,  and  in  some  of  the  decisions  it  was  said  by  the  court 
that  the  object  of  the  statute  was  to  enable  the  assignee  to  sue 
in  his  own  name;  but  it  did  not  in  any  other  way  improve  the 
position  of  the  assignee,  who  could  before  that  secure  the  money 
in  equity:  B.  E.  Ins.  Co.  v.  G.  W.  K.  Co.,  38  L.  J.  Ch,  133;  In 
re  Turcan,  L.  E.  40  Ch.  Div.  5. 

The  rule  asserted  by  this  court  has  also  been  held  to  be  the 
law  in  many  of  our  sister  states  in  a  number  of  cases  where 
the  question  has  been  raised  either  in  actions  brought  by  per- 
sonal representatives  of  the  assignor  to  recover  the  money  re- 
ceived by  the  assignee  on  a  policy,  or  in  suits  brought  by  the 
company  issuing  the  policy  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
whether  the  personal  representatives  or  the  assignee  were  ^®  en- 
titled to  the  proceeds,  all  claimants  being  made  parties  defend- 
ant: Mutual  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  138  Mass.  24,  52  Am.  Kep. 
245;  Eckel  v.  Eenner,  41  Ohio  St.  232;  Martin  v.  Stubbings, 
126  111.  387,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  620;  Eitzpatrick  v.  Hartford  etc. 
Ins.  Co.,  56  Conn.  116,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  288;  Clark  v.  Allen,  11 
R.  I.  439,  23  Am.  Rep.  496;  Murphy  v.  Red,  64  Miss.  614,  60 
Am.  Rep.  68;  Rittler  v.  Smith,  70  Md.  261.  These  authorities 
are,  it  seems  to  us,  well  grounded  in  principle.  They  recognize 
not  only  the  existence  of,  but  the  necessity  for,  the  rule  that 
forbids  any  insurance  upon  the  life  of  a  person,  in  which  the 
person  for  whose  benefit  the  insurance  is  made  has  no  interest. 
Such  a  policy  constitutes  what  is  termed  a  wager  policy,  or  a 
mere  speculative  contract  upon  the  life  of  the  insured,  with 
a  direct  interest  in  favor  of  its  early  termination.  It  is,  in  terms, 
forbidden  by  statute  in  England  (14  Geo.  Ill,  c.  48)  and  in 
many  other  jurisdictions,  including  this  state  (Laws  1892,  c. 
690,  sec.  55),  and  this  court  held  in  Ruse  v.  Mutual  Benefit  etc. 
Ins.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  516,  that  such  insurance  is  void  at  common 
law,  and  that  the  English  statute,  in  so  far  as  it  prohibits  such 
insurance,  is  merely  a  declaratory  act.  But  the  question  we  are 
considering  presupposes  a  valid  contract  of  insurance,  the  policy 
being  issued  either  for  the  benefit  of  the  assured  personally, 
or  for  the  benefit  of  some  one  having  an  insurable  interest  in 
the  assured  at  the  time  of  the  taking  out  of  the  policy.  Such 
a  policy  constitutes  a  contract  to  pay  a  certain  amount  of  money 
to  the  payee  on  the  death  of  the  assured.  It  is  a  chose  in 
action  with  all  the  ordinary  incidents  belonging  thereto,  and  as 
such  may  be  assigned  either  as  collateral  or  absolutely,  as  the 
payee  may  elect.  While  an  insurable  interest  in  the  payee  is 
necessary,  in  the  first  instance,  to  the  creation  of  a  valid  contract, 


Jan.  1899.]  Steinback  «.  Diepenbroce.  429 

it  is  not  necessary  that  such  interest  should  continue.  The 
case  of  a  wife  divorced  from  her  husband  will  serve  as  an  illus- 
tration. The  policy  taken  out  for  her  benefit  during  the  exist- 
ence of  the  married  relation  is  not  affected  by  a  subsequent 
severance  of  that  relation  through  a  decree  of  a  court  of  compe- 
tent jurisdiction  by  which  she  ceases  to  have  an  insurable  in- 
terest in  his  life:  Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schaefer, 
D4  U.  S.  457.  The  ^^  materiality  of  the  value  of  the  interest 
has  relation  to  the  question  whether  the  policy  is  taken  out 
in  good  faith,  and  not  as  a  gambling  transaction.  If  it  be  taken 
out  in  good  faith,  then  a  sound  public  policy  would  g^eem  to 
require  that  the  payee  should  be  permitted  to  treat  it  as  he 
may  any  other  chose  in  action  and  go  to  the  best  market  he 
can  find,  either  to  e'en  it  or  borrow  money  on  it.  It  would  sub- 
stantially confine  him  to  such  terms  as  the  company  issuing  the 
policy  should  choose  to  make  with  him, if  he  should  be  limited  in 
his  choice  of  a  purchaser  to  the  party  having  an  interest  in  the 
continuance  of  the  life  of  the  assured. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  said  that  if  the  payee  of  a  policy  be 
allowed  to  assign  it,  a  safe  and  convenient  method  is  provided 
by  which  a  wagering  contract  can  be  safely  made.  The  insured, 
instead  of  taking  out  a  policy  payable  to  a  person  having  no 
insurable  interest  in  his  life,  can  take  it  out  to  himself  and  at 
once  assign  it  to  such  person.  But  such  an  attempt  would  not 
prove  successful,  for  a  policy  issued  and  assigned  under  such 
circumstances  would  be  none  the  less  a  wagering  policy  because 
of  the  form  of  it.  The  intention  of  the  parties  procuring  the 
policy  would  determine  its  character,  which  the  courts  would 
unhesitatingly  declare  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  reading  the 
policy  and  the  assignment  together,  as  forming  part  of  one 
transaction. 

Cammack  v.  Lewis,  15  "Wall.  643,  and  "Wamock  y.  Davis,  104 
TJ.  S.  775,  were  cases  where  the  policies  were  taken  out  in  order 
that  they  might  be  assigned  to  the  assignees^,  through  their  pro- 
curement, under  circumstances  that  might  well  be  held  to  be 
in  evasion  of  the  law  prohibiting  gaming  policies. 

In  "Wamock's  case,  the  agreement  touching  the  procurement 
of  the  policy  and  the  use  to  be  made  of  it,  including  the  promise 
to  assign  it,  was  in  writing,  and  executed  the  very  day  the  policy 
was  applied  for,  and  the  day  following  the  assured  executed  an 
assignment  of  the  policy,  which  had  in  the  meantime  been  is- 
sued in  pursuance  of  such  an  agreement.  The  insurance  com- 
pany paid  over  the  money  to  the  assignee,  and  the  court  held 


430  Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock.  [New  York^ 

that  tlie  personal  representatives  of  the  assured  ^^  were  entitled 
to  receive  from  the  assignees  all  the  money  except  the  sums  ad- 
vanced by  them  under  the  agreement,  plus  the  sum  paid  by  them 
to  the  widow.  In  the  opinion  it  is  said  that  the  assignment 
of  the  policy  to  a  party  not  having  an  insurable  interest  is  as 
objectionable  as  the  taking  out  of  a  policy  in  his  name.  That 
remark  was  clearly  true  as  applied  to  the  facts  of  that  case,  for 
the  policy  was  taken  out  in  pursuance  of  an  agreement  to  assign 
it.  It  was,  therefore,  in  fact  a  policy  taken  out  for  the  benefit 
of  parties  having  no  insurable  interest,  although  in  form  issued 
to  the  assured  and  by  him  assigned  to  such  parties.  In  such 
case,  the  court  will  always  declare  the  fact  to  be  as  it  is,  without 
regard  to  the  effort  of  the  parties  to  hide  the  truth  and  cheat 
the  law.  But  the  language  employed  by  the  court,  and  evidently 
advisedly,  is  broad  enough  to  cover  all  assignments  of  policies 
to  parties  not  having  an  insurable  interest,  including  as  well 
those  taken  out  in  good  faith  and  kept  up  as  long  as  the  finan- 
cial condition  of  the  insured  permits,  as  those  deliberately  taken 
out  for  the  purpose  of  speculation  upon  a  life  that  the  intended 
beneficiar)',  whether  as  payee  in  the  policy  or  by  assignment,  has 
no  interest  in  prolonging.  The  point  of  actual  separation  be- 
tween the  cases  asserting  the  assignability  and  those  asserting 
the  nonassignability  of  policies  of  insurance  to  persons  not  in- 
terested in  the  continuance  of  the  life  of  the  assured,  s'eem* 
to  be  that  those  asserting  nonassignability  proceed  on  the  as- 
sumption that  the  question  is  one  of  law,  and  that  if  a  policy  is 
not  assignable  in  one  case,  it  cannot  be  in  any  case;  while  in 
the  other  line  of  cases  the  underlying  principle  is  that  all  valid 
contracts  are  assignable,  but  that  contracts  are  not  necessarily 
valid  and  free  from  the  taint  of  gambling  because  upon  their 
face  they  appear  to  be  regularly  and  properly  issued.  In  order 
to  ascertain  the  truth,  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  may  bo 
proved,  and  if  it  then  appear  that  the  parties  intended  by  the 
contract  to  enable  a  third  and  uninterested  party  to  speculate 
upon  the  life  of  another,  the  court  will  declare  such  contract 
invalid,  not  because  of  the  assignment,  but  in  spite  of  it. 

''^  Warnock's  case  and  this  one  are  very  wide  apart  in  their 
facts  and  serve  very  well  to  illustrate  the  necessity  for  the  posi- 
tion taken  by  the  courts  of  this  state  upon  this  general  subject. 

In  December,  1887,  Alois  Diepenbrock  took  out  a  policy  of 
insurance  on  his  life  in  the  Equitable  Life  Assurance  Society. 
He  paid  the  premiums  regularly  down  to  December,  1892,  a 
period  of  about  five  years,  at  which  time  the  surrender  value  of 


Jan.  1899.]  Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock.  431 

the  policy  was  about  four  hundred  and  eighty-five  dollars.  He 
was  pressed  for  money,  and  finally  sold  the  policy  to  the  de- 
fendant Erdtmann  for  six  hundred  dollars,  or  something  like 
one  hundred  and  fifteen  dollars  more  than  he  would  have  re- 
ceived by  the  surrender  of  the  policy  to  the  company.  He  had 
paid  a  much  larger  sum  in  premiums,  something  over  two  thou- 
sand dollars,  and  there  seems  to  be  no  good  reason  why  a  person 
owning  such  a  policy,  and  obliged  to  sell  it,  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  get  back  as  much  as  possible  of  the  money  that  he 
has  paid  out  for  insurance.  His  condition  of  health  may  have 
changed  very  materially,  of  which  fact  the  company  can  take 
no  advantage;  for  in  its  contract  it  made  allowance  for  that  pos- 
sibility. There  is  no  good  reason  for  saying  that  an  insured 
person  should  not  have  the  right,  whenever  his  necessities  press 
him  because  of  a  failing  condition  of  health  that  assures  a  speedy 
death,  to  realize  on  his  policy  and  obtain  for  it  something  like  a 
fair  price,  which  may,  perhaps,  be  almost  equal  to  its  face  value. 

The  personal  representatives  of  the  assured  contested  the  as- 
signment also,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  intended  as  collateral, 
although  in  form  a  valid  assignment,  but  the  special  term  found 
otherwise,  and  the  appellate  division  approved  that  finding,  so 
that  question  is  no  longer  open  for  consideration. 

Other  questions  are  presented  by  the  appellant,  but  after  & 
careful  examination  of  them  we  conclude  that  no  error  was  com- 
mitted below  that  will  support  a  reversal  of  the  judgment. 

The  judgment  should  be  affirmed,  with  costs. 

•  All  concur,  except  Martin,  J.,  absent. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  IJFE  INSURANCE  POLICY  TO  ONE  HAV- 
ING NO  INSURABLE  INTEREST.— The  assignee  of  a  policy  of  life 
insurance  need  not  have  an  insurable  interest  in  the  life  of  the  In- 
oured  In  order  to  entitle  him  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  insurance: 
Note  to  Cheeves  v.  Anders,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  114,  where  authorities 
fo  the  contrary  are  collected.  Compare  the  extended  note  to  Equi- 
table Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hazlewood,  16  Am.  St.  Rep,  907,  where  the 
subject  is  discussed.  A  man  may  insure  his  own  life,  payinisr  the 
premium  himself,  for  the  benefit  of  another,  who  has  no  insurable 
Interest,  as  such  a  transaction  is  not  a  wagering  contract:  Hill  v. 
United  Life  Ins.  Assn.,  154  Pa.  St  29,  35  Am.  St  Rep.  807. 


432  Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut.     [New  York, 


Jackson  Arohiteotural  Fron  Works  v.  Hurlbut. 

[158  New  York,  34.] 
A  COMMON  CARRIER  IS  ONE  WHO,  by  virtue  of  his  call- 
ing, undertakes,  for  compensation,  to  transport  personal  property 
from  one  place  to  another  for  all  such  as  may  choose  to  employ  him, 
and  everyone  who  undertakes  to  carry  for  compensation  the  goods 
•of  all  persons  Indifferently  is,  as  to  liability,  to  be  deemed  a  com- 
mon carrier. 

CARRIERS,  COMMON— WHO  ARE.— TRUCKMEN,  wagon- 
ers, cartmen,  and  porters  who  undertake  to  carry  goods  for  hire  as 
a  common  employment  in  a  city,  or  from  one  town  to  another,  are 
common  carriers,  although  carrying  is  not  the  exclusive  business 
of  the  parties. 

CARRIERS,  COMMON— TRUCKMEN,  WHO  MOVE  HEAVY 
MACHINERY.- If  persons  advertise  themselves  as  general  truck- 
men, their  particular  specialty  being  the  moving  of  heavy  machin- 
ery, and  they  keep  and  maintain  for  this  purpose  a  large  number 
•of  trucks  and  horses,  and  the  necessary  help  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  business,  there  is,  in  an  action  against  them  for  damages  caused 
by  injury  to  such  machinery,  during  its  transportation,  no  error  in 
the  refusal  of  the  trial  judge  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  defend- 
ants are  not  common  carriers.  The  circumstance  that  the  defend- 
ants have  no  regular  tariff  of  charges  for  their  work,  birt  that  a 
special  price  is  fixed  by  agreement,  does  not  change  the  relation. 
The  necessity  for  a  different  charge  in  each  case  arises,  of  course, 
out  of  the  difference  in  labor  in  handling  articles  of  great  bulk.  The 
charge  in  each  case  may  be  proportioned  to  the  risk  assumed  and 
•commensurate  with  the  carrier's  responsibility  as  such. 

NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING  OF  HEAVY  MA- 
CHINERY— COMMON  CARRIERS.— It  is  not  material,  in  an  action 
against  truckmen  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  to  heavy  ma- 
chinery, which  they  have  been  employed  to  transport,  whether  the 
defendants  are  answerable  as  common  carriers,  where  the  case  is 
tried  and  submitted  to  the  jury,  not  upon  the  theory  that  the  de- 
fendants are  liable  as  insurers  of  the  safety  of  the  property,  but 
tipon  the  theory  that  they  were  negligent  in  unloading  the  machine, 
■a.ud  thus  caused  the  injuries.  It  was  not,  therefore,  prejudicial  to 
the  defendants  for  the  trial  court  to  refuse  to  charge  that  they  were 
■not  common  carriers. 

NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING  OP  HEAVY  MA- 
CHINERY—LIABILITY.— If  truckmen  are  employed  to  transport  a 
large  and  heavy  planing  machine,  used  for  planing  iron,  they  must 
use,  at  least,  ordiuaiT  diligence  and  care,  and  are  answerable  if 
they  negligently  break  and  seriously  injure  the  machine  while  un- 
loading it. 

DAMAGES  —  INJURY  TO  HEAVY  MACHINERY 
THROUGH  NEGLIGENCE  OF  TRUCKMEN— PUTTING  IN  CON- 
DITION FOR  USE.— If  truckmen,  In  moving  a  large  and  heavy  ma- 
chine for  planing  iron,  negligently  break  and  Injure  it,  the  expense 
of  restoring  it  to  a  condition  for  use  is  a  proper  element  of  damage, 
in  an  action  for  such  injury,  for  it  Is  plain  that  the  machine  is  not 
an  article  that  tlie  plaintiff  can  procure  In  the  market  at  any  time. 
Hence,  if  that  item  of  expense  alone  exceeds  the  verdict,  it  Is  un- 
necessary to  consider  or  discuss  other  items  admitted  in  evidence 
<ipon  the  question  of  damages. 


Jan.  1899.]      Jackson  etc.  Works  t;.  Hurlbut.  433 

Action  to  recover  damages  for  the  breaking  of  a  planing  ma- 
chine belonging  to  the  plaintiff  while  in  the  custody  of  de- 
fendants, Hurlbut  and  others,  for  transportation  to  the  plain- 
tiff's factory.  The  defendants  were  truckmen  of  New  York  city. 
There  was  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  and  the  defendants  ap- 
pealed. 

Charles  A.  Collin,  for  the  appellants. 

Jesse  Grant  Rowe,  for  the  respondent. 

*^  O'BRIEN,  J.  The  question  in  this  case  involved  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  defendants  for  an  injury  to  property  while  it 
was  in  their  custody  as  bailees  for  hire  or  reward.  They  were 
employed  by  the  plaintiff  in  February,  1892,  to  transport  a  large 
planing  machine,  used  for  planing  iron,  over  thirty  feet  long  and 
weighing  over  ten  tons,  from  the  foot  of  Twenty-third  street  on 
the  North  river  to  the  plaintiff's  factory  at  East  Twenty-eighth 
street  in  the  city  of  New  York.  The  agreed  compensation  for 
•the  service  was  sixty  dollars.  They  undertook  to  perform  the 
work,  and  while  unloading  the  machine  at  the  factory  it  was 
broken  and  seriously  damaged,  and  hence  it  is  alleged  that  they 
failed  to  perform  the  service  which  they  undertook  to  perform, 
since  they  did  not  deliver  the  property  according  to  the  duty 
imposed  upon  them  by  law.  The  plaintiff  recovered  a  verdict 
of  five  hundred  dollars  as  damages  for  the  injury  to  the  machine 
and  for  the  loss  of  the  use  of  it  while  it  was  being  repaired, 
and  the  judgment  entered  on  the  verdict  has  been  affirmed  at 
the  general  term. 

The  principal  question  discussed  in  the  case  concerns  the  duty 
or  obligation  which  the  law  imposes  upon  the  defendants  when 
they  undertook  to  perform  the  service.  The  learned  counsel  for 
the  defendants  contends  that  their  responsibility  was  not  that 
of  a  common  carrier,  and  that  they  were  not  subject  to  the  strict 
liability  which  is  an  incident  of  that  relation.  In  other  words, 
that  they  were  not  insurers  for  the  safe  delivery  of  the  machine 
as  a  common  carrier  is  for  the  delivery  ^"^  of  the  goods  or  prop- 
erty which  he  undertakes  to  carry  and  deliver.  At  the  trial,  the 
court  was  requested  in  behalf  of  the  defendants  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  were  in  this  transaction  carriers  for  hire  and  not 
common  carriers.  This  request  was  refused  and  an  exception 
taken.  It  will  be  seen  hereafter  that  it  is  not  very  important 
to  determine  whether  the  defendants  were  common  carrier?,  or 
merely  engaged  under  a  contract  with  the  plaintiff  to  transport 

Jlu.  St.  R«p.,  Vol.  LXX.— 28 


434  Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Huelbut.     [New  York, 

the  macliine  for  a  stipulated  compensation.  The  question  with 
respect  to  the  true  legal  relation  in  which  the  defendants  stood 
to  the  plaintiff,  whether  a  common  carrier  or  something  else,  is 
an  ahstract  one.  But  since  the  defendants  complain  of  the  re- 
fusal of  the  learned  trial  judge  to  give  to  the  jury  the  instruction 
requested,  and  insist  that  this  error,  if  it  be  one,  may  have  preju- 
diced the  defendants  on  the  whole  case,  it  may  be  proper  to 
examine  it  briefly  in  order  to  see  how  much  of  substance  there  is 
in  the  exception.  The  defendants  advertised  themselves  asgeneral 
truckmen,  their  particular  specialty  being  the  moving  of  heavy 
machinery.  They  kept  and  maintained  for  this  purpose  a  largo 
number  of  trucks  and  horses,  and  the  necessary  help  for  the 
prosecution  of  this  business.  On  this  state  of  facts  there  was 
no  legal  error  in  the  refusal  of  the  learned  judge  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  the  defendants  were  not  common  carriers. 

Truckmen,  wagoners,  cartmen,  and  porters  who  undertake  to 
carry  goods  for  hire  as  a  common  employment  in  a  city  or  from 
one  town  to  another,  are  common  carriers.  It  is  not  necessary 
that  the  exclusive  business  of  the  parties  shall  be  carrying. 
"Where  a  person  whose  principal  pursuit  is  farming  solicits  goods 
to  be  carried  to  the  market  town  in  his  wagon  on  certain  oc- 
casions, he  makes  himself  a  common  carrier  for  those  who  "em- 
ploy him.  The  circumstance  that  the  defendants  had  no  regular 
tariff  of  charges  for  their  work,  but  that  a  special  price  was  fixed 
by  agreement,  does  not  change  the  relation.  The  necessity  for  a 
different  charge  in  each  case  arises,  of  course,  out  of  the  differ- 
ence in  labor  in  handling  articles  of  great  bulk.  The  charge 
in  each  case  may  be  proportioned  ^*  to  the  risk  assumed  and 
commensurate  with  the  carrier's  responsibility  as  such.  A  com- 
mon carrier  is  one  who,  by  virtue  of  his  calling,  undertakes,  for 
compensation,  to  transport  personal  property  from  one  place  to 
another  for  all  such  as  may  choose  to  employ  him,  and  everyone 
who  undertakes  to  carry  for  compensation  the  goods  of  all  per- 
sons indifferently  is,  as  to  liability,  to  be  deemed  a  common  car- 
rier: Bank  of  Orange  v.  Brown,  3  Wend.  158;  Schouler  on  Bail- 
ments and  Carriers,  2d  ed.,  351;  Story  on  Bailments,  sees.  495, 
496;  2  Kent's  Commentaries,  4th  ed.,  598,  599;  3  Parsons  on 
Contracts,  165,  175;  Angell  on  Carriers,  870;  Allen  v.  Sackrider, 
37  N.  Y.  341;  Lough  v.  Outerbridge,  143  N.  Y.  271,  42  Am. 
St.  Bep.  713.  While,  therefore,  the  question  as  to  whether  tho 
defendants  were  subject  to  the  responsibility  of  common  carriers 
was  not  very  material  in  this  case,  yet  we  think  it  would  be 
diffcult  to  show  that  there  was  any  legal  error  in  the  chargo 
of  the  learned  trial  judge  in  that  respect. 


Jan.  1899.]       Jackson  etc.  Wobks  v.  Hurlbut.  435 

This  was  not  an  action  against  the  defendants  as  common 
•carriers.  They  were  not  held  liable  upon  the  ground  that  they 
were  insurers  of  the  safety  of  the  property  which  they  undertook 
to  deliver,  but  on  the  ground  of  negligence.  It  must  be,  and 
is,  admitted  that  they  were  bound  by  their  contract  to  exercise 
at  least  reasonable  care  in  the  transportation  and  delivery  of 
the  machine,  and  that  they  are  liable  for  damages  caused  by 
their  negligence  in  the  discharge  of  the  duty  which  they  under- 
took to  perform.  The  case  was  tried  upon  the  theory  that  the 
defendants  failed  to  use  reasonable  care  in  unloading  the  ma- 
-chine  after  it  had  reached  its  destination,  and  through  this  neg- 
ligence the  damage  and  injury  occurred.  In  the  complaint  the 
defendants  are  charged  with  negligence  in  the  performance  of 
this  duty,  and  this  allegation  was  sustained  by  evidence  at  the 
trial.  At  all  "events,  the  evidence  was  sufficient  to  require  its 
fiubmission  to  the  jury,  and  the  finding  on  that  question  having 
been  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  it  is  not  open  to  question  or 
review  here.  All  this  is,  we  think,  very  clear  from  the  charge 
and  requests  made  in  behalf  of  the  defendants.  The  court  was 
requested  by  the  ^®  defendants'  counsel  to  charge  that,  as  car- 
riers for  hire,  they  were  not  liable  for  loss  or  injury  which  could 
not  have  been  prevented  by  the  use  of  ordinary  diligence,  and 
that  they  were  not  liable  for  any  loss  or  injury  occasioned  by 
unavoidable  accident.  These  propositions  were  charged  as  re- 
quested, and,  hence,  it  plainly  appears  that,  although  the  court 
refused  to  charge  that  the  defendants  were  not  common  carriers, 
yet  he  did  charge  that  they  were  not  liable  for  any  loss  or  injury 
which  could  not  hare  been  prevented  by  ordinary  diligence.  So 
the  measure  of  liability  which  the  defendants  were  held  to  was 
that  of  ordinary  diligence  and  care.  This  was  certainly  the 
most  favorable  view  of  the  case  that  the  defendants  had  any 
right  to  expect;  and  since  the  jury  has  found  upon  sufficient 
evidence  that  they  were  wanting  in  the  exercise  of  such  care 
in  unloading  the  machine  from  the  truck  at  the  factory,  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  are  not  open  to  review  in  this  court. 

It  is  also  urged  that  the  plaintiff,  through  its  servants  or 
employes,  present  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  of  the  machine, 
was  guilty  of  negligence  contributing  to  the  injury.  It  seems 
that  the  truck  with  this  machine  arrived  at  the  factory  some 
time  after  dark,  and  it  is  said  that  the  defendants  advised 
against  unloading  such  a  heavy  machine  at  that  time,  but  that 
the  plaintiff's  superintendent  said  that  it  could  not  remain  oat 
doors  all  night,  and  that  it  should  be  delivered;    This  is  the 


436  Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut.     [New  York> 

interference  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff's  agents  that  is  said  to 
constitute  contributory  negligence.  It  is  quite  sufficient  to  say, 
with  respect  to  that  branch  of  the  defense,  that  the  evidence 
was  of  such  a  character  that  required  the  court  to  submit  it  to 
the  jury,  and  it  was  submitted  with  instructions  that,  if  it  was 
shown  that  the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff  or  its  agents  contrib- 
uted in  any  way  to  the  injury,  there  could  be  no  recovery.  So 
the  questions  of  negligence  and  contributory  negligence  have 
been  removed  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury  from  the  domain  of 
controversy  in  this  court. 

There  remains  one  other  question  to  be  considered,  and  that 
arises  upon  an  exception  taken  to  the  admission  in  behalf  of  the 
plaintiff  of  certain  evidence  on  the  question  of  damages.  ^^  It 
is  urged  that  the  trial  court  admitted  evidence  on  that  subject 
to  show  the  loss  of  profits  from  inability  to  use  the  machine 
after  the  injury  and  until  repaired.  But  no  evidence  as  to  loss 
of  profits  was  given.  Some  proof  was  given  that  the  plaintiff 
was  compelled,  on  account  of  the  injury  to  the  machine,  to  send 
work  out  of  the  shop  in  order  to  complete  contracts  they  had 
on  hand  at  the  time  of  the  breaking  of  the  machine,  and  that 
for  such  work  they  were  compelled  to  pay  a  sum  amounting 
to  four  hundred  and  thirty-five  dollars.  This  was  not  proof  of 
the  loss  of  profits,  but  of  the  loss  occasioned  to  the  plaintiff  by 
inability  to  use  the  machine  on  account  of  the  defendants'  neg- 
ligence. We  are  not  prepared  to  say  that  this  evidence  was  not 
entirely  competent  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case :  Allen  v. 
Fox,  51  N.  Y.  5G2,  10  Am.  Rep.  641;  Redmond  v.  American 
Mfg.  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  418.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider 
that  question,  since  it  appears  that  the  evidence  was  immaterial, 
and  could  not  very  well  have  operated  to  the  injury  of  the  de- 
fendants, even  if  not  admissible.  The  verdict  of  the  jury  was 
for  five  hundred  dollars.  The  proof  was  substantially  uncontra- 
dicted that  a  new  bed  was  absolutely  necessary  to  repair  the 
machine  and  render  it  fit  for  use,  and  that  the  cost  of  this  was 
eight  hundred  and  fifty-five  dollars.  It  is  plain  that  the  machine 
was  not  an  article  that  the  plaintiff  could  procure  in  the  market 
at  any  time,  and  hence  the  expense  of  restoring  it  to  a  condi* 
tion  for  use  was  a  proper  element  in  the  estimation  of  the  dam- 
ages, and  that  item  of  expense  alone  exceeds  the  verdict.  The 
defendants'  counsel  requested  the  court  to  charge  the  jury  that 
the  measure  of  damage  is  that  compensation  which  will  fit  the 
actual  loss  sustained  and  which  was  the  natural  and  proximate 
consequence   of    the   defendants'  act.    Also,  that  no  damage* 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  t;.  Walser.  437 

which  might  fairly  be  supposed  not  to  have  been  the  natural 
and  necessary  consequence  of  the  defendants'  act  could  he  re- 
covered. These  propositions  were  charged  by  the  court  as  re- 
quested. The  item  of  the  expense  of  restoring  the  machine 
to  a  condition  that  would  render  it  fit  for  use  is  certainly  within 
the  principle  of  this  request.  The  cost  of  procuring  necessary 
work  to  be  done  outside  the  factory  in  order  to  enable  the  plain- 
tiff to  fill  **  its  contracts  resulting  from  inability  to  use  the 
machine,  would  seem  to  be  within  the  same  principle  also.  But 
since  proof  of  the  first  item  is  sufficient  to  sustain  the  verdict 
rendered,  the  right  to  recover  the  other  item  need  not  be  con- 
sidered or  discussed.  On  the  whole  case  it  is  apparent  that  the 
rulings  at  the  trial  and  in  the  charge  were  quite  as  favorable 
to  the  defendants  as  the  law  permits,  and  the  amount  of  the 
verdict  was,  under  the  circumstances,  extremely  moderate. 
The  judgment  is  right  and  should  be  affirmed,  with  costs.  . 

All  concur  (Vann,  J.,  in  result),  except  Martin,  J.,  absent. 

COMMON  CARRIERS  are  persons  who  undertake  for  hire  or  re- 
ward to  transport  the  goods  of  such  as  choose  to  employ  them  from 
place  to  place:  Doty  v.  Strong,  1  Pin.  313,  40  Am.  Dec.  773.  A  wag- 
oner carrying  goods  for  hire  is  a  common  carrier,  though  that  is  not 
his  principal  business,  but  only  an  occasional  and  Incidental  em- 
ployment: Philleo  v.  Sanford,  17  Tex.  227,  67  Am.  Dec.  654;  Cheval- 
lier  v.  Straham,  2  Tex.  115,  47  Am.  Dec  639;  Gordon  v.  Hutchinson, 
I  Watta  &  S.  285,  37  Am.  Dec.  464. 


Culliford  v.  Walseb. 


[158  New  York,  65.] 

SURETIES— DIFFERENT  SETS  OF,  INCLUDING  BAII^ 
ORDER  OF  LIABILITY.— As  between  different  sets  of  sureties 
•Who  undertake  to  secure  the  same  debt,  although  In  different  stages 
of  legal  proceedings,  the  primary  liability  rests  ujlbn  the  last  set; 
and  bail,  belnsr  sureties,  are.  therefore,  within  the  same  rule. 

SURETIES— APPEAL  BONDS  AND  BAII^PRIMARY  LIA- 
BILITY— ILLUSTRATION— RELEASE  OF  SURETIES— REIM- 
BURSEMENT.—If  the  plaintiff  in  a  civil  action  obtains  an  order 
for  the  arrest  of  the  defendant,  who  Is  discharged  upon  giving  bail, 
and  the  action  results  In  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  whereupon 
undertakings  on  appeal  are  given,  one  to  the  general  term,  and  the 
other  to  the  court  of  appeals,  with  conditions  that  the  sureties  in 
oach  case  will  pay  the  amount  of  the  judgment  and  costs  in  the 
event  of  an  affirmance,  the  pl.iintlCf,  in  the  event  of  an  affirmance 
at  the  general  term  and  of  a  judgment  for  costs  In  the  court  of  ap- 
peals, cannot,  where  he  collects  from  the  general  term  sureties  the 
■whole  amount  due  him,  except  on  the  judgment  for  costs  In  the 
•court  of  appeals,  recover  thereafter  from  the  ball,  either  for  his 
own  benefit  or  that  of  a  general  term  surety,  anything  more  than 


438  CuLLiFORD  V.  Walser.  [New  York^ 

the  amount  due  on  the  judgment  for  costs  In  the  court  of  appeals, 
and  not  even  that  if  he  has  released  the  court  of  appeals  sureties; 
and,  if  he  recovers  the  amount  of  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the 
court  of  appeals,  from  the  bail,  the  latter  will  have  the  right  of  re- 
imbursement from  the  court  of  appeals  sureties. 

Action  brought  by  Elizabeth  A.  Culliford  to  recover  the  sum 
of  one  thousand  dollars,  with  interest,  upon  an  undertaking 
given  by  defendants,  as  bail,  to  discharge  one  Montgomery  Gadd 
from  arrest  in  an  action  instituted  against  him  by  the  plaintift 
in  this  case.  A  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  was  aflBrmed^ 
and  the  defendants  appealed. 

John  A.  Grow,  for  the  appellants. 

F.  Spiegelberg  and  S.  L.  Wolff,  for  the  respondent. 

««  PARKEK,  C.  J.  The  facts,  so  far  as  they  need  be  stated 
in  order  to  present  the  point  we  are  to  decide,  are  as  follows: 
Culliford,  this  plaintiff,  in  a  civil  action  against  Gadd,  obtained 
an  order  of  arrest;  to  secure  the  latter's  discharge  therefrom 
Walser  and  McHugh  (these  defendants)  became  bail  in  the  ^'" 
sum  of  one  thousand  dollars  that  Gadd  would  at  all  times  ren- 
der himself  amenable  to  the  process  of  the  court  during  the 
pendency  of  the  action  and  to  any  mandate  issued  to  enforce 
the  final  judgment  against  him;  the  result  of  the  action  was  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  in  the  sum  of  one  thirteen 
hundred  and  thirty-eight  dollars  and  ninety  cents;  from  such 
judgment  an  appeal  was  taken  to  the  general  term,  upon  which 
an  undertaking  was  given  for  the  purpose  of  staying  the  judg- 
ment, with  Ellis  and  Wands  as  sureties,  whereby  they  agreed 
to  pay  the  amount  of  such  judgment  and  costs  in  case  of  the 
affirmance  thereof;  the  general  term  affirmed  the  judgment, 
with  costs,  and  thereafter  executions  were  duly  issued  on  the 
judgment  against  Gadd  to  the  sheriff,  and  by  him  returned  un- 
satisfied; Culliford  then  commenced  an  action  against  Ellis  and 
Wands  as  sureties  upon  the  undertaking  given  on  appeal  to  the 
general  term;  the  day  following  the  commencement  of  such 
action  an  appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals  was  perfected,  upon 
which  an  undertaking  was  given  by  Gadd,  with  two  sureties,  to 
pay  the  judgment  and  costs  in  the  event  of  an  affirmance;  not- 
withstanding this  appeal  judgment  was  taken  by  default  in  the 
action  brought  against  Ellis  and  Wands  on  the  undertaking- 
given  upon  the  appeal  to  the  general  term,  and  an  execution 
was  thereafter  issued  thereon  to  the  sheriff,  who  levied  upon 
the  real  property  of  Ellis  situated  within  the  county.    Ellis  thea 


Jan.  1899.]  Cullifoed  t>.  Walseb.  439 

paid  to  this  plaintiff,  Culliford,  a  sum  equal  to  the  amount  of 
the  judgment  recovered  against  him,  an  arrangement  being  made 
between  them  that  Culliiord  should  commence  'an  action  in  her 
own  name,  partly  for  her  benefit,  but  mainly  for  the  benefit 
of  Ellis,  against  these  defendants,  the  bail  of  Gadd,  and  that 
she  should  account  to  Ellis  for  all  moneys  received  by  her  in 
such  action  for  his  benefit ;  hence  this  action,  which  has  resulted 
in  a  judgment  at  the  trial  term  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  in  the 
penal  sum  of  the  bond,  with  interest  and  costs  and  an  affirmance 
by  the  general  term. 

The  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  but  one  satisfaction;  she  could 
have  collected  the  entire  amount  of  the  judgment  from  the  *** 
sureties  on  appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals,  or  from  the  sureties 
on  the  appeal  to  the  general  term,  with  the  exception  of  the 
judgment  for  costs  entered  in  the  court  of  appeals,  which  she 
might  have  recovered  from  the  sureties  on  the  bond  given  to 
perfect  the  appeal  to  that  court,  or  she  could  have  recovered 
the  sum  of  one  thousand  dollars  from  the  bail,  these  defend- 
ants, on  their  failure  to  cause  Gadd  to  render  himself  amenable 
to  the  mandate  which  the  plaintiff  caused  to  be  issued  against 
him  to  enforce  final  judgment.  The  plaintiff  chose  to  proceed 
against  Ellis  and  Wands,  the  sureties  on  the  general  term  judg- 
ment, and  she  has  received  from  Ellis  all  that  is  her  due,  ex- 
cept on  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the  court  of  appeals.  At  the 
time  of  the  commencement  of  this  action,  therefore,  the  only 
sum  that  she  was  personally  entitled  to  recover  against  these 
defendants  was  the  sum  due  on  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the 
court  of  appeals,  which,  at  the  time  of  the  entry  thereof,  was 
one  hundred  and  ten  dollars  and  thirty-four  cents.  She  has  been 
allowed  to  recover,  however,  a  judgment  in  the  penal  sum  of  the 
bond,  for  the  benefit  of  Ellis,  who  claims  that  the  primary  lia- 
bility rests  upon  the  bail,  and  hence  that  he  is  entitled  to  all 
the  rights  that  this  plaintiff  had  as  against  them  when  she 
elected  to  prosecute  Ellis  and  "Wands  on  their  undertaking. 

These  defendants  challenge  the  position  taken  by  the  plaintiff 
and  Ellis,  and  insist  that,  as  between  the  several  sets  of  sureties, 
the  sureties  upon  the  appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals  were  pri- 
marily liable,  the  sureties  upon  the  undertaking  to  the  general 
term  were  secondarily  liable,  and  these  defendants  were  liable 
last  of  all.  So  if  the  plaintiff  had  elected  to  collect  of  these 
defendants  in  the  first  instance,  they  would  have  been  entitled 
to  be  reimbursed  by  the  sureties  on  the  bond  upon  the  appeal 
to  the  court  of  appeals,  and  if  a  sufficient  amount  could  not 


440  CuLLiFORD  V,  Walser.  [New  York, 

have  been  collected  from  them,  then  the  defendants  could  have 
jesorted  to  the  sureties  on  the  hond  upon  the  appeal  to  the 
general  term  for  the  sum  remaining  unpaid. 

In  Hinckley  v.  Kreitz,  58  N.  Y.  583,  this  court  held  that,  as 
"between  the  two  sets  of  sureties  upon  appeals  to  the  general  ^'^ 
term  and  to  the  court  of  appeals,  the  primary  liability  rests  upon 
sureties  on  appeals  to  the  latter  court.  In  that  case  a  judgment 
creditor  released  the  sureties  upon  appeal  to  the  court  of  ap- 
peals, and  attempted  to  collect  from  the  general  term  sureties 
the  amount  of  the  judgment  and  costs,  but  the  court  held  that 
the  effects  of  the  release  of  the  sureties  upon  the  appeal  to  the 
court  of  appeals  was  to  discharge  all  liability  upon  the  part  of 
the  general  term  sureties  upon  the  undertaking  which  they  had 
given  to  pay  the  judgment.  In  the  course  of  the  opinion  the 
court  said :  "We  think,  upon  principle  and  authority,  that  the 
later  sureties  are  primarily  liable  as  between  them  and  the  first 
sureties,  and  it  follows  that  the  release  of  such  later  sureties  by 
the  creditor  discharging  the  defendants,  because  it  deprived 
them  of  a  remedy  to  which  they  would  otherwise  have  been  en- 
titled." That  case  has  been  recognized  by  the  profession  as  es- 
tablishing the  rule  which  fixes  the  liability  of  different  sets  of 
sureties  as  against  each  other,  and  it  has  not,  so  far  as  we  have 
observed,  been  departed  from. 

In  Chester  v.  Broderick,  131  N.  Y.  549,  an  appeal  was  taken 
to  the  general  term  from  a  judgment  of  foreclosure  and  sale, 
the  amount  of  the  bond  to  stay  execution  of  the  judgment  on 
appeal  being  fixed  at  seven  thousand  dollars.  The  judgment  was 
affirmed,  and  on  appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals  the  amount  of 
the  bond  was  fixed  at  nine  thousand  dollars.  The  decree  was 
affirmed  in  this  court  and  a  sale  of  the  property  had,  which  re- 
flulted  in  a  deficiency  of  between  eleven  and  twelve  thousand 
dollars.  Thereupon  the  plaintiffs  collected  from  the  sureties  on 
the  second  or  court  of  appeals  bond  the  full  amount  thereof,  and 
then  brought  action  against  the  sureties  on  the  first  or  general 
term  bond  for  the  deficiency,  which  was  about  two  thousand  five 
hundred  dollars.  The  defense  interposed  was  that,  by  collect- 
ing the  full  amount  of  the  bond  on  appeal  to  the  court  of  ap- 
peals, the  plaintiffs  had  exhausted  the  liability  of  the  sureties 
who  were  primarily  liable  for  the  debts  secured  by  both  bonds, 
and  thereby  the  sureties  on  the  first  bond  were  discharged.  But 
this  position  was  ''**  held  by  this  court  not  well  taken,  and  the 
recovery  had  was  sustained. 

The  rule  then  being  settled  that,  as  between  different  sets  of 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  r.  Walseb.  441 

sureties  who  undertake  to  secure  the  same  debt,  although  in 
different  stages  of  legal  proceedings,  the  primary  liability  rests 
upon  the  last  set,  the  inquiry  next  in  order  is  whether  bail  are 
sureties  and,  therefore,  within  the  same  rule. 

In  Rathbone  v.  "Warren,  10  Johns.  587,  after  judgment  had 
gone  against  the  principal  in  a  bail  bond,  his  creditor  agreed 
with  him  not  to  issue  the  execution  for  several  months,  and 
it  was  held  that  the  agreement  operated  to  discharge  the  bail, 
who  are  by  act  and  operation  of  law  sureties  and  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  the  general  principles  relative  to  sureties.  In 
that  case,  as  in  this,  an  effort  was  made  to  convince  the  court 
that  bail  should  not  be  so  regarded,  and  Mr.  A.  Van  Vechten, 
the  attorney  general,  insisted  that  the  respondent  did  not  stand 
precisely  in  the  light  of  a  surety,  and  he  advanced,  among  other 
arguments,  the  proposition  that  the  bail  could  exonerate  him- 
self from  liability  at  any  time  by  surrendering  his  principal, 
while  in  cases  of  suretyship  generally  the  surety  has  not  the 
power  to  relieve  himself;  but  the  court  held  otherwise. 

In  Melvill  v.Glendining,  7  Taunt.  126,  the  bail  asked  the  court 
to  be  discharged  because,  as  he  claimed,  the  creditor  had,  for 
a  consideration,  extended  the  time  of  the  principal,  and  the 
court  asserted  as  applicable  to  that  case  the  doctrine  that  where 
a  creditor  gives  time  to  the  original  debtor,  the  sureties  will 
be  discharged,  and  stated  that  the  principle  underlying  it  was 
that  every  -surety  has  the  right  to  come  into  equity  and  sue 
in  the  name  of  the  original  creditor,  which  he  cannot  do  ef- 
fectively if  the  creditor  gives  time  to  the  original  debtor. 

In  Toles  v.  Adee,  84  K  Y.  222-238,  the  court,  having  under 
consideration  a  bond  accepted  by  the  sheriff  in  discharge  of  the 
defendant  from  arrest  in  a  civil  action,  said:  "Bail  are  sureties, 
with  the  rights  and  remedies  of  sureties  in  other  cases." 

If  authority  then  be  needed  to  establish  that  bail  are  sureties, 
^*  and  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  general  principles  appli- 
cable to  the  relation  which  they  bear  toward  their  principal  and 
his  creditor,  as  well  as  toward  other  sets  of  sureties,  it  is  at 
hand  in  this  state,  and  thus  they  are  brought  necessarily  within 
the  rule  laid  down  in  Hinckley  v.  Kreitz,  58  N.  Y.  583,  and  it 
is  well  that  it  is  so,  for  the  sake  of  uniformity  and  the  necessary 
avoidance  of  confusion  incident  to  divergent  rules  in  correspond- 
ing relations.  No  good  reason  has  been  presented  why  bail 
should  constitute  an  exception  to  the  general  rule.  An  attempt 
has  been  made  to  lay  hold  of  the  argument  made  by  the  court 
in  support  of  the  rule  established  in  Hinckley's  case,  to  sustain 


4.42  CuLLiFORD  V.  Walser.  [New  York, 

the  claim  that  the  rule  should  not  apply  to  hail,  hecause  some 
of  the  reasoning  that  led  to  its  adoption  is  not  applicable.  Fre- 
quent attempts  of  this  character  are  made  to  break  down  rule* 
established  by  the  courts  for  the  guidance  of  the  profession  and 
the  public,  but  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  succeed  unless 
a  substantial  reason  exists  for  the  creation  of  an  exception,  and 
no  such  reason  exists  in  this  case.  Moreover,  an  examination 
of  the  authorities  considered  in  that  case  make  it  apparent  that 
the  court  was  attempting  to  ascertain  and  establish  the  true  rule 
as  to  the  primary  liability  of  sureties  where  more  than  one  set 
is  obligated  to  pay  the  same  debt.  Among  the  cases  cited  with 
approval  in  support  of  the  rule  laid  down  by  that  case,  in  so 
far  at  least  as  it  treats  of  the  superior  obligation  between  two 
sets  of  sureties  to  pay  a  debt,  was  Parsons  v.  Briddock,  2  Yern. 
608. 

Where  the  principal  in  a  bond,  upon  which  were  sureties,  was 
sued  and  arrested  and  then  gave  bail,  the  sureties  in  the  original 
bond  having  been  sued  and  paid  the  judgment,  it  was  decreed 
that  they  were  entitled  to  an  assignment  of  the  judgment  against 
the  bail  to  secure  reimbursement  for  what  they  had  paid. 

The  court  next  considered  certain  Pennsylvania  cases  which 
arose  under  a  suit  authorizing  a  stay  of  execution  for  a  year 
upon  giving  security,  it  being  there  held  that  the  surety  for 
the  original  debt  upon  payment  was  entitled  to  the  remedy  of 
the  creditor  against  the  surety  upon  the  stay:  Burns  v.  '^''^ 
Huntingdon  Bank,  1  Penr.  &  W.  395;  Pott  v.  Nathans,  1  "Watts 
&  S.  155,  37  Am.  Dec.  456;  Schnitzel's  Appeal,  49  Pa.  St.  23. 

Without  further  referring  to  the  authorities  considered  by  the 
learned  judge  who  wrote  the  opinion  of  the  court,  we  observe 
that  he  was  without  direct  authority  establishing  the  primary 
liability  as  between  two  sets  of  sureties  who  have  promised  to 
pay  the  same  judgment,  one  set  on  one  stay  on  an  appeal  to 
the  general  term  and  the  other  on  another  stay  on  an  appeal 
to  the  court  of  appeals.  He  therefore  presented  some  of  the 
authorities  bearing  upon  the  general  subject  affecting  the  ques- 
tion of  primary  liability  as  between  different  sets  of  sureties, 
to  the  end  that  the  rule  should  be  clearly  pointed  out,  as  well 
as  applied  to  the  case  in  hand,  thus  preventing  future  legal  con- 
troversy by  making  it  possible  for  wouUl-be  sureties  to  be  cor- 
rectly advised  of  the  character  of  their  liability  as  between  them- 
selves and  prior  sureties. 

This  plaintiff,  therefore,  is  not  entitled  to  a  recovery  against 
these  defendants  for  anything  more  than  the  amount  due  od 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  v.  Walseb.  445 

the  judgment  for  costs  in  the  court  of  appeals,  and  not  even 
to  that  if  she  has  released  the  sureties  on  the  court  of  appeals 
bond,  as  these  defendants  claim.  So  far  as  we  are  advised  by 
the  present  record,  we  are  inclined  to  the  view  that  this  claim 
is  not  well  founded,  though  we  refrain  from  passing  upon  it,  as 
additional  facts  may,  perhaps,  be  presented  upon  a  new  trial;  but 
if  the  amount  of  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the  court  of  appeals^ 
shall  in  this  action  be  recovered  of  these  defendants,  they  in 
turn  will  have  the  right  to  reimbursement  from  the  sureties  on 
appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals. 

The  judgment  should  be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  granted  to 
defendants,  with  costs  in  this  court  and  the  court  below. 

All  concur,  except  Gray  and  Martin,  JJ.,  absent. 

Liability  as  Between  Different  Sets  of  Sureties.* 
Primary  LiaMUty.—ks  between  different  sets  of  sureties  who  un- 
dertake to  secure  the  same  debt,  although  in  different  stages  of 
legal  proceedings,  the  New  Yorlc  cases  are  clear  that  the  "primary 
liability"  rests  upon  the  last  set:  See  principal  case.  And  we  un- 
derstand that  the  one  who  is  "primarily"  liable  upon  an  obligation  is 
the  one  who,  in  equity  and  good  conscience,  should  be  first  called 
upon  to  discharge  it.  See  the  principal  case.  Thus,  If  a  new 
undertaking  is  given  in  that  state  upon  an  appeal  to  the  court 
of  appeals,  for  the  judgment  and  costs,  the  "primary  liability,"^ 
as  between  the  two  sets  of  sureties,  rests  upon  the  latter,  and 
If  the  Judgment  creditor  releases  them,  his  act  discharges  the- 
former  sureties:  Hinckley  v.  Kreltz,  58  N.  Y.  583.  If  a  sure- 
ty becomes  dissatisfied  with  his  responsibility,  and  seeks  tt> 
be  relieved,  the  court  cannot  substitute  a  new  surety  so  as  to 
discharge  the  former  from  his  contract.  But  there  Is  noth- 
ing to  forbid  Its  requiring  a  new  security,  which,  as  between 
the  sureties  themselves,  shall  be  the  "primary"  •  one,  leaving  the 
former  only  collateral:  Glenn  v.  Wallace,  4  Strob.  Eq.  149,  53  Am. 
Dec.  657.  Tlie  doctrine  of  primary  and  secondary  liability  has  been 
applied  to  administration  bonds,  where  more  than  one  bond  has 
been  given.  "As  a  general  principle,"  says  Simpson,  C.  J.,  In  Bobo 
V.  Vaiden,  20  S.  C.  271,  278,  "it  has  been  settled  that  the  second 
bond  becomes  the  primary  security,  and  the  first  Is  at  least  sus- 
pended until  the  second  Is  exhausted.  True,  the  first  bond  cannot 
be  entirely  discharged,  so  far  as  the  parties  interested  in  the  estate 
are  concerned;  but  as  between  the  sureties  to  the  two  bonds,  the 
second  stands  in  the  front  rank  and  must  protect  the  first."  Hence, 
If  a  surety  on  an  administration  bond  petitions  for  relief,  and  a  new- 
bond  is  required  and  given,  the  second  bond  becomes  the  primary 

♦bkferenck  to  monographic  notes 
Right  of  one  surety  to  enforce  contribution  from  another,  and  the  remedies  for 
Its  enforcement:  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  639-647. 
LiabUities  of  sureties  oa  appeal  bunds:  88  Am.  St  Rep.  702-719l 


444  CuLLiFORD  V.  Walseb.  [New  York, 

security,  not  only  as  to  the  surety  who  petitioned,  but  also  as  to  the 
other  sureties  on  the  first  bond:  Bobo  v.  Vaiden,  20  S.  C.  271.  The 
effect  of  releasing  an  administrator's  sureties,  who  petition  for  re- 
lease, is  to  malie  the  second  set  of  sureties  primarily  liable  to  the  ex- 
tent of  their  bond.  If  they  prove  insufficient,  the  first  sureties  are 
4inswerable  to  the  date  of  their  release.  The  second  set  must,  it  is 
said,  account,  first,  for  any  default'  after  their  suretyship,  and  then 
for  any  that  may  have  occurred  before:  Morris  y.  Morris,  9  Heisk. 
«14,  822. 

Cosureties— Different  Bonds- Contribution.— It  is  a  general  rule  of 
«fluity  that  all  persons  liable  for  the  same  debt,  although  by  differ- 
ent obligations,  executed  at  different  times,  are  regarded  as  co- 
eureties,  and  will  be  compelled  to  contribute  to  the  payment  of  any 
loss  that  a  cosurety  may  sustain  by  having  discharged  the  debt. 
In  other  words,  the  relation  of  cosuretyship  may  be  said  to  exist 
where  it  appears  that  there  are  two  or  more  sureties  for  the  same 
principal  debtor,  and  for  the  same  debt  or  obligation,  whether  on 
the  same  or  on  different  Instruments.  Nor  does  it  alter  the  relation, 
or  affect  the  right  to  compel  contribution,  that  the  sureties  are 
Jointly  or  severally,  or  jointly  and  severally  bound;  nor  that  they 
are  boimd  at  different  times  and  by  different  instruments.  The 
•duty  of  contribution  among  sureties  results  from  equitable  princi- 
ples, and  not  from  contract.  Hence,  it  exists,  whether  they  are 
bound  jointly  or  severally,  by  the  same  or  different  instruments, 
4ind  although  one  did  not  linow  the  other  was  bound  with  him;  nor 
is  the  order  in  which  they  become  bound  material,  or  the  relative 
number  of  sureties  on  the  several  different  obligations  or  instru- 
ments of  any  consequence.  The  only  question  as  to  such  duty  is, 
whether  they  are,  in  fact,  sureties  for  a  common  principal,  in  rela- 
tion to  one  and  the  same  obligation:  Deering  v.  Earl  of  Winchelsea, 
2  Bos.  &  P.  270,  1  Cox,  318;  Snow  v.  Brown,  100  Ga,  117,  120; 
Thompson  v.  Del<um,  32  Or.  506,  512;  Kellar  v.  Williams,  10  Bush, 
216;  Whiting  v.  Burlie,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  539;  Bosley  v.  Taylor,  5  Dana, 
157,  30  Am.  Dec.  677;  Hutchison  v.  Roberts,  6  Del.  Ch.  112;  Norton 
T.  Coons,  3  Denio,  130;  Wells  v.  Miller,  66  N.  Y.  255;  Mayhew  v. 
€rlcliett,  2  Swanst.  185,  1  Wils.  Ch.  418;  Pendlebury  v.  Walker,  4 
Younge  &  C.  424;  Harrison  v.  Lane,  5  Leigh,  414,  27  Am.  Dec.  607; 
Armltage  v.  Pulver,  37  N.  Y.  494. 

Thus,  a  bond  given  by  an  administrator,  upon  being  ruled  to  give 
Additional  security.  Is  simply  additional  security.  The  sureties  In 
earh  bond  are,  therefore,  cosureties  and  may  be  compelled  to  con- 
tribute: Cobb  V.  Haynes,  8  B.  Mon.  137,  139.  So,  where  successive 
bonds,  with  the  same  penalties,  given  by  an  executor  for  the  per- 
formance of  his  duties,  are  cumulative  security,  the  liability  of  the 
sureties  thereon,  for  contribution,  is  the  same  as  if  all  had  signed 
the  same  bond:  Thompson  v.  Dekum,  32  Or.  506,  513;  and,  where 
successive  bonds  are  given  for  the  faithful  discharge  of  a  trust, 
such  as  performing  the  duties  of  an  administrator,  all  the  bonds 
given  during  the  continuance  of  the  office  are  cumulative,  and  the 
«uretles  on  each  bond  stand  In  the  relation  of  cosureties  to  the  sure- 
ties on  all  the  other    bonds:  Pickens  v.  Miller,  83    N.  0.  543,    547. 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  v.  Walseb.  445 

So,  If  an  administrator  gives  two  bonds,  one  when  letters  are  Issned, 
and  the  other  when  real  estate  is  about  to  be  sold,  the  sureties  on 
the  two  bonds  are  liable  to  contribution  inter  sese,  where  each 
bond  has  the  same  condition,  and  the  sureties  have  assumed 
a  common  burden:  Powell  v.  Powell,  48  Cal.  234.  The 
second  bond  of  an  administrator,  being  an  additional  and  cu- 
nnilative  security  for  the  faithful  discharge  of  his  duties,  have  been 
held  to  be  retrospective  as  to  pre-existing  and  continuous  breaches: 
Picliens  v.  Miller,  83  N.  C.  543,  547. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  bonds  of  a  guardian.  If  he  gives 
several  successive  bonds  for  the  faithful  discharge  of  his  trust,  the 
sureties  on  each  bond  stand  in  the  relation  of  cosureties  to  the 
sureties  on  every  other  bond:  Jones  v.  Hays,  3  Ired.  Eq.  502,  44  Am. 
Dec.  78;  Jones  v.  Blanton,  6  Ired.  Eq.  115,  51  Am.  Dec.  415;  Loring  v. 
Bacon,  3  Cush.  4Go;  State  v.  Fields,  53  Mo.  474.  A  surety  on  a  guard- 
ian's bond  is  not  discharged  from  his  liability  by  the  guardian's  giv- 
ing a  new  bond  with  other  sureties,  whether  the  new  bond  is  volun- 
tary or  given  by  order  of  the  court:  Jones  v.  Blanton,  6  Ired.  Eq.  115, 
51  Am.  Dec.  415;  Forbes  v.  Harrington,  171  Mass.  38G;  Field  v.  Pelot, 
McMull.  Eq.  369;  Loring  v.  Bacon,  3  Cush.  465.  The  court  cannot 
substitute  a  new  surety  so  as  to  discharge  the  old  one  from  his  con- 
tract: Field  V.  Pelot,  McMull.  Eq.  369.  If  a  guardian,  having  given 
a  bond  as  such,  with  surety,  afterward,  on  the  death  of  the  surety 
and  upon  order  of  tlie  court,  gives  an  additional  bond,  with  other 
sureties,  conditioned  lilie  the  first,  but  with  a  larger  penalty,  the 
sureties  on  both  bonds  are  cosureties,  and,  as  such,  mutually  liable 
to  contribution:  Stevens  v.  Tuclier,  87  Ind.  109.  If  the  sureties  of  a 
guardian  petition,  under  the  statute,  for  relief,  and  the  court  orders 
new  sureties  to  be  given,  the  obligation  of  the  bond  given  by  the 
new  sureties  extends  to  the  entire  guardianship,  retrospective  as 
well  as  prospective.  Such  a  bond  is,  at  least,  an  additional  and 
cumulative  security  for  the  ward:  Bell  v.  Jasper,  2  Ired.  Eq.,  597; 
Field  V.  Pelot,  McMull,  Eq.  369.  If  a  guardian  has  given  a  bond 
as  such,  but  subsequently  receives  other  funds,  and  Is  afterward  re- 
quired to  give  an  additional  bond,  the  sureties  upon  the  first  and 
second  bonds  are  liable  to  pro  rata  contribution:  Odom  v.  Owen,  2 
Baxt  446. 

If  a  slierlfC  Is  required,  by  statute,  to  renew  his  bond  annually, 
the  sureties  on  his  official  bond,  and  the  sureties  on  his  additional 
or  renewal  bond,  are  cosureties  from  the  date  of  the  execution  of 
the  renewal  bond,  and  are  jointly  bound  to  answer  for  the  acts  of 
their  principal.  A  surety  on  his  renewal  bond  is,  therefore,  an- 
swerable. In  an  action  for  contribution,  to  a  surety  on  the  sheriffs 
oiliclal  bond:  Ketler  v.  Thompson,  13  Bush,  287.  The  sureties  upon 
the  general  tax  bond  of  a  sheriff  are  answerable  for  all  taxes  col- 
lected by  him,  whether  general  or  special.  The  sureties  on  his 
general  bond  are  answerable  for  any  defalcation  in  the  general 
taxes,  and  are  also  answerable  for  a  ratable  share  and  share  all^e 
with  the  sureties  on  the  sheriff's  special  tax  bond,  as  If  they  had 
signed  it,  for  any  defalcation  in  the  special  taxes:  Cherry  v.  Wilson, 


446  CuLLiFOBD  V.  Walser.  [New  York, 

78  N.  C.  164;  but,  if  the  entire  defalcation  as  to  the  special  taxes  is 
collected  out  of  the  sureties  on  the  general  bond,  they  are  entitled 
to  contribution,  share  and  share  alilie,  from  the  sureties  on  the 
special  tax  bond,  as  if  they  had  signed  it:  Cherry  v.  Wilson,  78  N. 
C.  166.  A  surety  who  pays  the  whole  amount  for  which  he  and 
other  sureties  are  bound  to  the  same  person,  for  the  performance  of 
the  same  conditions,  may  compel  contribution  from  such  other  sure- 
ties, although  they  are  not  bound  by  the  same  bond:  Bosley  v.  Tay- 
lor, 5  Dana,  157,  30  Am.  Dec.  677. 

An  examination  of  the  principal  case  will  show  that  where  two 
undertaliings  on  appeal  in  the  same  cause  have  been  given  in  the 
fitate  of  New  Yorli,  one  on  an  appeal  to  the  general  term,  and  the 
•oiher  on  an  appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals,  both  undertaliings  being- 
given  to  pay  the  judgment  and  costs,  in  the  event  of  any  affirmance, 
the  fact  that  the  liability  of  the  sureties,  who  are  primarily  liable 
tor  the  judgment  secured  by  both  bonds,  becomes  exhausted,  does 
not  discharge  the  sureties  on  the  other  or  first  bond;  that  the  en- 
tire amount  of  the  judgment,  in  case  of  affirmance,  may  be  col- 
lected from  the  sureties  on  appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals,  or  from 
the  sureties  on  the  appeal  to  the  general  term,  with  the  exception 
of  the  judgment  for  costs  entered  in  the  court  of  appeals;  and  that, 
if  the  amount  of  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the  court  of  appeals  Is 
recovered  from  the  bail  upon  a  discharge  from  an  order  of  arrest, 
the  latter  are  entitled  to  reimbursement  from  the  sureties  on  the  ap- 
peal to  the  court  of  appeals:  See,  also,  Chester  v.  Brodericls;,  131 
N.  Y.  549,  commented  upon  in  the  principal  case.  The  liability  of 
sureties  on  appeal  bonds  is  the  subject  of  a  monographic  note  to 
Howell  V.  Alma  Milling  Co.,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  702-719. 

A  new  probate  bond  given  simply  as  an  additional  security  does 
not  displace  the  original  bond,  without  some  action  as  to  it,  or  as 
to  the  lial)ility  of  the  sureties  thereon,  notwithstanding  a  misap- 
prehension of  the  judge  and  of  the  parties  as  to  the  reason  for  filing 
it.  Both  bonds  are  valid,  and  the  sureties  on  each,  after  a  breach 
thereof,  are  answerable  in  proportion  to  the  several  liabilities  as- 
sumed by  them:  Broolcs  v.  Whitmore,  142  Mass.  399. 

If  a  judgment  is  enjoined  by  the  principal  debtor,  who  executes 
an  injunction  bond,  with  a  third  person  as  surety,  the  surety,  upon 
a  dissolution  of  the  Injunction,  is  answerable  for  the  debt  enjoined 
before  the  surety  In  the  judgment,  where  the  latter  was  not  a  party 
to  the  injunction;  but,  where  the  surety  on  the  Injunction  bond  is 
adjudged  Insufficient,  and  another  bond  Is  executed  with  other  sure- 
ties, the  sureties  on  both  bonds,  upon  a  dissolution  of  the  injunc- 
tion, are  equally  answ(  rable:  Bentley  v.  Harris,  2  Gratt.  357.  Com- 
pare Harnsberger  v.  Yancey,  33  Gratt.  527,  540. 

The  original  sureties  on  an  Instrument  are  sometimes  expressly 
released  by  statute  whore  a  new  obligation  Is  given.  Thus,  by  ex- 
pre.ss  provisions  of  the  statute  of  Virginia,  a  new  bond  given  by  ad- 
Bfiinistrators  relates  bade  to  the  time  of  the  qualification  of  the  ad- 
ministrators, and  binds  the  obligors  therein  for  the  faithful  dis- 
charge of  the  duties  of  their  office,  from  t^at  time,  as  efCectually  as 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  v.  Walser.  447 

it  tlie  new  bond  had  then  been  executed:  Llngle  v.  Cook,  32  Gratt 
262.  So  where  the  statute,  In  terms,  renders  the  sureties  on  the 
new  bond  liable  for  all  of  the  administrators,  from  the  date  of  the 
grant  of  their  letters,  this  seems  clearly  to  manifest  an  intention  to 
release  the  securities  on  the  original  bond,  by  the  execution  of  the 
«ew  one,  not  only  from  subsequent,  but  from  all  past  acts,  of  their 
principals.  The  evident  design  of  such  a  statute  is  to  render  the 
first  bond  as  inoperative  as  though  It  had  never  been  given,  and  to 
transfer  the  liability  to  the  new  sureties:  People  v.  Lett,  27  111. 
215,  223. 

Who  are  not  Cosiirctiea— Contribution.— While  It  Is  true  that.  If  there 
are  two  or  more  sureties  for  the  same  principal  debtor,  and  for 
the  same  debt  or  obligation,  whether  on  the  same  or  on  different 
instruments,  and  one  of  them  has  actually  paid  or  satisfied  more 
than  his  proportionate  share  of  the  debt  or  obligation,  he  Is  entitled 
to  a  contribution  from  each  and  all  his  cosureties,  In  order  to  re- 
imburse him  for  the  excess  paid  over  his  share,  and  thus  to  equalize 
their  common  burdens,  this  doctrine  does  not  apply  where  the  debt 
or  obligation,  for  which  there  are  two  or  more  sureties  for  the  same 
principal  debtor,  is  not  the  same:  Hutchison  v.  Roberts,  6  Del.  Ch. 
112;  Rosenbaum  v.  Goodman,  78  Va.  121;  Harrison  v.  Lane,  5  Leigh, 
414,  27  Am.  Dec.  G07;  Langford  v.  Perrin,  5  Leigh,  552.  Thus,  the 
rule  does  not  apply  to  a  case  where  some  are  sureties  on  a  replevin, 
and  others  on  a  supersedeas,  bond,  as  the  liabilities  Imposed  by  the 
respective  bonds  are  of  different  natures:  Kellar  v.  Williams,  10 
Bush,  216.  So  a  surety  on  a  replevin  bond  is  not  a  cosurety  with 
a  surety  on  an  injunction  bond,  and  Is  not  answei-able  by  way  of 
contribution  to  him:  Brandenburg  v.  Flynn,  12  B.  Mon.  397,  398. 
So,  a  surety  upon  a  guardian's  bond,  after  obtaining  his  discharge 
under  section  1S17  of  the  Code  of  Georgia,  "although  liable  to  the 
ward  for  any  past  default  of  the  guardian,  is  not  liable  to  a  surety 
of  the  guardian  upon  a  second  bond  who  has  answered  for  that 
default  In  consequence  of  his  own  statutory  liability  upon  the  sec- 
ond bond.  This  liability  of  the  second  surety  is  primary,  as  be- 
tween himself  and  the  first  surety,  and  he  has  no  right  either  of 
Indemnity  or  of  contribution  from  the  latter":  Tittle  v.  Bennett, 
94  Ga.  405.  And  a  surety  on  a  second  bond  given  by  the  guardian 
under  the  provisions  of  section  2533  of  the  Civil  Code  of  that  state, 
after  making  good  a  devastavit  of  the  guardian  which  occurred 
prior  to  the  release  of  a  surety  on  the  first  bond  executed,  Is  not 
•entitled  to  contribution  from  such  first  surety  on  account  of  such 
•devastavit:  Snow  v.  Brown,  100  Ga.  117,  119. 

In  this  case.  Little,  J,  In  rendering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said: 
*'In  view  of  the  fact  that,  under  our  statute,  section  2533  of  the 
Oivil  Code,  the  surety  on  the  first  bond  who  applies  for  his  release 
is  not  and  could  not  legally  be  released  from  any  liability  arising 
from  a  breach  of  the  bond  anterior  to  such  release,  so  far  as  the 
rights  of  the  obligee  In  the  bond  are  concerned,  and  that  the  surety 
on  the  second  bond,  by  the  terms  thereof.  Is  made  liable  likewise 
for  any  devastavit  occurring  while  the  first  bond  was  in  force  and 


448  CuLLiFOED  V.  Walsee.  [New  York 

prior  to  the  release  of  the  surety  on  the  latter,  it  might  be  ar- 
gued, plausibly,  that  as  to  such  a  devastavit  there  is  a  common  lia- 
bility, relatively  to  the  obligee  of  the  respective  bonds,  as  between 
the  first  and  second  surety;  that  the  first  surety  being  still  bound 
for  all  breaches  occurring  prior  to  his  release,  and  the  obligatioQ 
of  the  second  surety  relating  bacli  so  as  to  embrace  liability  also 
for  such  breaches,  there  is  established  a  several  liability,  as  be- 
tween the  first  and  second  surety,  springing  from  the  same  princi- 
pal and  growing  out  of  the  same  transactions;  and  therefore  as  to  all 
such  transactions  the  relation  of  cosurety  would  exist.  As  a  gen- 
eral proposition,  we  are  inclined  to  the  opinion  that,  under  such 
a  state  of  facts,  the  doctrine  would  be  applicable.  The  rule 
cannot,  in  reason,  be  limited  to  a  case  where  the  liability  of 
each  surety  is  equal  as  to  amount  and  equally  comprehensive 
as  to  the  subject  matter  upon  which  the  suretyship  operates. 
The  liability  may  be  common  as  to  a  given  transaction  and 
separate  and  distinct  as  to  others.  It  maizes  no  difference  that 
they  are  bound  in  different  sums,  except  that  contribution  could  not 
be  required  beyond  the  sum  for  which  they  had  become  bound: 
Craythorne  v.  Swinburne,  14  Ves.  160,  169;  Mayhew  v.  Cricliett,  2 
Swanst.  185,  192;  Stirling  v.  Forrester,  3  Bligh,  575,  59G.  The  fact 
that  the  obligations  of  the  second  surety  embrace  transactions 
which  are  distinct  and  foreign  to  the  liability  of  the  first  surety 
does  not  render  the  liability,  rela'tively  to  the  obligee  in  the  re- 
spective bonds,  for  which  the  first  surety  is  held  liable,  any  the 
less  common  to  the  first  and  second  surety.  The  first  and  second 
sureties  are  severally  liable  for  all  defalcations  prior  to  the  release 
of  the  first  surety,  and  the  second  surety  separately  liable  for  all 
defalcations  occurring  after  such  release.  But  for  our  statute,  we 
should  be  Inclined  to  hold  that,  as  to  a  devastavit  occurring  prior 
to  the  release  of  the  first  surety,  the  first  and  second  sureties  were 
cosureties  and  hence  entitled  to  contribution  between  themselves. 
However,  under  our  interpretation  of  the  statute,  we  feel  con- 
strained to  hold  the  converse  of  the  proposition.  It  is  clearly  the 
purpose  of  the  statute  to  release  the  outgoing  surety  as  far  as 
possible.  It  is  obvious  that,  as  between  himself  and  the  obligee 
of  the  bond,  he  cannot  be  released  from  liabilities  springing  from 
breaches  of  the  bond  occurring  before  his  release;  but  whenever 
such  circumstances  exist  as  will  allow  him  to  be  released  from 
further  liability,  he  is  entitled  to  as  full  protection  as  Is  obtainable 
at  the  time  of  his  release.  The  privilege  to  the  guardian  to  con- 
tinue his  trust  by  giving  another  bond  and  surety  has  the  effect 
to  postpone  the  right  of  the  first  surety  to  have  an  accounting  from 
his  principal,  and  thus  possibly  deprive  him  of  means  and  meas- 
ures of  protection  afterward  lost.  The  original  bond  being,  pre- 
sumably at  least,  ample  to  protect  the  obligee  thereof  for  all 
devastavit  occurring  while  it  is  of  force,  It  could  not  be  said  that 
It  was  the  pui-pose  of  the  statute,  In  making  the  second  surety  lia- 
ble for  past  waste,  to  alone  protect  the  Interests  of  the  obligee  of 
the  respective  bonds,  but  the  principal  object  sought  to  be  accom- 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  v.  Walseb.  449 

pllshed  by  this  retroactive  feature  of  the  second  bond  Is  to  afford 
to  the  released  surely  as  much  Indemnity  as  possible,  In  view  of  the 
disadvantages  to  him  attendant  upon  the  postponing  of  his  right 
to  have  his  principal  brought  to  an  accounting.  The  release  of 
the  first  surety  could  not  operate  to  exonerate  him  from  liability 
to  the  obligee  of  the  bond  for  breaches  made  prior  to  such  release, 
for  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  respective  parties  were  then 
fired  and  vested,  but  there  Is  no  legal  obstacle  to  imposing  upon  a 
4surety,  who  voluntarily  assumes  liability  under  a  second  bond,  a 
primary  liabilivy,  as  between  himself  and  the  first  surety,  for  all 
past  as  well  as  future  waste.  Such  a  construction  has  heretofore 
been  placed  on  the  statute  now  under  review,  by  this  court,  In  the 
<;ase  of  Sutton  v.  Williams,  77  Ga.  570,  In  which  It  was  held  that 
'where  a  guardian  was  appointed  and  gave  bond,  and  subsequently 
one  of  the  sureties,  upon  application,  was  released  and  discharged, 
and  the  guardian  was  required  to  give  a  new  surety,  which  he 
did,  on  a  subsequent  proceeding  by  bill  in  equity  on  behalf  of  the 
%vards,  to  recover  from  all  the  sureties  for  a  devastavit  of  the 
guardian,  the  liability  of  the  discharged  surety  and  the  second 
surety  was  not  joint,  but  several,  both  being  primarily  liable  to 
the  wards,  and,  as  between  themselves,  the  last  surety  being  first 
bound.'  In  commenting  upon  the  statute.  Justice  Blandford  says: 
'It  Is  manifest  that  the  last  surety  shall  be  liable  first  for  any 
waste  of  the  guardian,  and  while  the  sureties  on  both  bonds  are 
liable  to  the  wards  severally,  primarily,  as  between  themselves, 

the  last  sureties  on  the  bond  are  first  bound It  Is  apparent, 

therefore,  not  only  that  the  first  and  last  sureties  are  not  cosure- 
ties, but  that  the  bond  of  the  last  surety  stands  as  an  Indemnity 
to  the  first  surety,  and  that.  If  the  latter  is  forced  to  pay  off  and 
■discharge  -any  devastavit  of  the  guardian  occurring  before  his  re- 
lease, he  is  entitled  to  recover  the  same  of  the  second  surety.  Of 
course.  If  it  should*  appear  that  fraud  or  deceit  In  concealing  a  past 
devastavit  had  been  practiced  by  the  first  surety  upon  the  last 
surety,  a  different  question  would  arise":  Snow  v.  Browii,  100  Ga. 
117. 

If  two  parties  are  bound  as  principal  and  surety  for  a  debt  or 
other  engagement,  and  a  third  afterward,  at  the  request  of  the 
principal,  binds  himself  as  surety  for  such  debt  or  engagement, 
the  two  sureties.  In  the  absence  of  any  agreement  to  the  contrary, 
become  cosureties  of  the  same  principal  and  for  the  same  debt  or 
engagement.  "But,  where  there  is  a  judgment  or  decree  against 
a  principal  debtor  and  his  surety,  and  a  third  party,  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  principal  and  for  his  sole  benefit,  and  without  the 
assent  of  the  surety,  enters  as  surety  for  the  principal  In  an  ob- 
ligation, the  effect  of  which  Is  to  suspend  the  execution  of  the 
judgment  or  decree  and  thus  prejudice  the  rights  of  the  first  surety, 
the  equity  of  the  latter  is  superior;  and  It  seems  to  be  well  settled 
that.  In  such  case,  the  second  surety  would  not  be  entitled  to  con- 
tribution from  the  first,  and  there  Is  much  authority  for  the  propo- 
filtion  that  the  first  would  be  entitled  to  Indemnity  from  the  sec- 
AM.  ST.  Kkp.,  you  l.vx..— 2a 


450  CuLLiFORD  V.  Walser.  [NewYork^ 

ond.  This  principle  has  been  applied  to  Injunction  bonds,  bail 
bonds,  prison-bounds  bonds,  forthcoming  bonds,  and  appeal  bonds": 
Harnsberger  v,  Yancey,  33  Gratt.  527,  540. 

Where  the  obligations  of  the  different  classes  of  sureties  are 
for  wholly  distinct  things,  and  have  no  relation  to,  nor  operation 
upon  one  another,  though  they  may  arise  out  of  the  same  princi- 
pal indebtedness,  there  is  no  claim  from  one  class  upon  the  other 
either  for  contribution  or  indemnity:  Rosenbaum  v.  Goodman,  7S 
Va.  121,  127.  So,  if  sureties  are  bound  by  different  instrument* 
for  equal  portions  of  a  debt  due  from  the  same  principal,  and  tho 
Buretyshlp  of  each  is  a  separate  and  distinct  transaction,  there  ia- 
no  liability  for  contribution  between  them:  Coope  v.  Troynam,  1 
Turn.  &  R,  426. 

Controlling  Liability  by  Contract.— It  several  persons  are  sureties 
for  the  payment  of  one  sum  of  money,  though  by  distinct  instru- 
ments, and  one  pays  more  than  an  equal  share  of  that  sum,  he 
may  have  contribution  from  his  cosureties;  but  the  sureties  may 
arrange  their  liabilities  and  priorities  as  they  will,  and  they  may, 
by  contract,  arrange  that  each  surety  shall  be  answerable  only  for 
a  given  portion  of  one  sum  of  money.  In  such  a  case  there  is  no 
liability  of  contribution  between  them:  Pendlebury  v.  Walker,  4 
Younge  &  C.  424;  Glenn  v.  Wallace,  4  Strob.  Eq.  149,  53  Am.  Dec» 
G57.  A  surety  may  stand  upon  the  express  terms  of  his  contract. 
Note  to  Howell  v.  Alma  Milling  Co.,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  703;  and  the 
liability  of  contribution  among  cosureties  is  limited  by  the  extent 
of  their  respective  contracts;  as,  where  they  are  for  different  sums: 
Craythorne  v.  Swinburne,  14  Ves.  160,  165.  Sureties  may,  by  agree- 
ment among  themselves,  so  far  sever  their  unity  of  interest  and 
obligation  as  to  terminate  the  right  of  contribution:  Robertson  v. 
Deatherage,  82  111.  511.  A  second  surety  may  qualify  his  obliga- 
tion in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  be  liable  to  the  first;  but  then,  If 
he  has  the  debt  to  pay,  he  cannot  call  upon  the  others:  Norton  v. 
Coons,  3  Denio,  130.  So  a  surety  on  one  bond  is  not  entitled  to 
contribution  from  a  surety  on  another.  If  the  latter  bond  was  not  to 
be  pursued,  unless  the  principal  could  not  obtain  payment  from  the 
sureties  on  the  former:  Harrison  v.  Lane,  5  Leigh,  414,  27  Am.  Dec. 
607. 

Contribution— Basis  of  Riffht  and  Liability— General  Principles.— The 
right  to  contribution  between  cosureties  depends  upon  principles  of 
equity  rather  than  upon  contract:  White  v.  Banljs,  21  Ala.  705,  5& 
Am.  Dec.  283;  McBride  v.  Potter-Lovell  Co.,  169  Mass.  7,  61  Am.  St. 
Hep.  265;  and  the  foundation  of  the  doctrine  is  the  fact  that  one 
has  paid  more,  and  another  less,  than  his  share:  Wells  v.  Miller^ 
66  N.  Y.  255;  Gross  v.  Davis,  87  Tenn.  226,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  635;  and 
monographic  note  thereto  on  the  right  of  one  surety  to  enforce  con- 
tribution from  another,  and  the  remedies  for  its  enforcement.  A 
surety's  right  to  contribution  from  his  cosurety  Is  an  equity  whicl* 
springs  up  where  the  relation  is  created,  and  is  fully  consummated 
when  the  surety  pays  the  debt:  Wayland  v.  Tucker,  4  Gratt.  267, 
60  Am.  Dec.  76;  Nally  v.  Long,  56  Md.  567;  Chenault  v.  Bush.  84 


Jan.  1899.]  Culliford  v.  Walser.  461 

Ky.  528.  A  surety's  right  of  action  for  contribution  against  his 
cosurety  does  not  accrue  until  he  has  paid  In  excess  of  his  propor- 
tionate share  of  liability:  Magruder  v.  Admire,  4  Mo.  App.  13.3;  Tay- 
lor V.  Reynolds,  53  Cal.  686.  A  surety  upon  an  official  bond  may 
pay  a  judgment  thereon  without  compulsion,  and  at  once  sue  his 
cosurety  for  contribution  without  demand  or  notice:  Mason  v.  Pier- 
ron,  69  Wis.  585.  So,  in  an  action  for  contribution  by  a  surety 
against  four  different  guardian  bonds,  with  different  penalties  anj 
different  sureties,  some  solvent  and  others  insolvent,  prior  notice  fa 
unnecessary:  Bright  v.  Lennon,  83  N.  C.  183.  The  estate  of  a  de- 
ceased surety  is  liable  to  contribute  in  a  suit  by  a  cosurety:  Johnson 
V.  Harvey,  84  N.  Y.  3(53.  38  Am.  Rep.  515;  Camp  v.  Bostwick,  20  Ohio 
St.  337,  5  Am.  Rep.  669;  Conover  v.  Hill,  76  111.  342;  and  a  bill  may 
be  filed  against  his  administrator  and  heirs:  Stephens  v.  Meek,  6 
Lea,  226;  and  a  surety  may  maintain  a  bill  In  equity  against  his 
cosurety  for  contribution,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a  court  of 
law  would  grant  similar  relief.  The  jurisdictions  are  simply  concur- 
rent: Broughton  v.  Wimberly,  65  Ala.  549.  The  principles  above 
stated  in  this  subdivision  directly  concern  sureties  on  one  instru- 
ment only,  but  they  are  applicable  to  cases  where  two  or  more  in- 
struments, with  sureties,  have  been  given  to  the  same  person,  for 
the  performance  of  the  same  conditions,  for  we  have  shown  that  the 
sureties,  in  such  cases,  are  cosureties. 

Amount  of  Liahilitp.— It  Is  admitted  that  sureties  for  the  same  debt 
or  obligation  must  divide  the  loss  between  themselves,  though  they 
are  liable  on  obligations  of  different  dates  and  with  different  pen- 
alties, even  though  one  bond  was  given  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  sureties  on  the  other  bond  and  the  authorities  show  that  the 
right  of  contribution  between  cosureties  Is  limited  by  the  extent  of 
their  contract,  and  is  not  to  be  extended  beyond  it:  Craythorne  v. 
Swinburne,  14  Ves.  160,  165;  Stull  v.  Hance,  62  111.  52;  United  States 
V.  Boyd,  15  Pet  187;  United  States  v.  Hough,  103  U.  S.  71,73;  that  the 
rights  and  obligations  of  sureties,  Inter  sese,  are  the  same,  where 
they  undertake  to  secure  the  same  debt,  whether  they  are  bound  In 
one  or  several  like  obligations:  and  that  where  there  are  several 
distinct  bonds,  in  different  penalties,  they  are  bound  to  contribute 
•  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  the  penalties  of  their  respective 
'bonds;  or,  as  some  of  the  cases  say,  they  are  liable  "only  for  their 
I  proportion  of  the  debt,"  or  "for  the  amount  of  their  respective 
bonds":  Armitage  v.  Pulver,  37  N.  Y.  494;  Smith  v.  State,  46  Md. 
617,  619;  Jones  v.  Hays,  3  Ired.  Eq.  502,  44  Am.  Dec.  78;  Jones  v. 
Blanton.  6  Ired.  Eq.  115,  51  Am.  Dec.  415;  Loring  v.  Bacon,  3  Gush. 
465;  Stirling  v.  Forrester,  3  Bligh,  575,  591;  White  v.  Banks,  21  Ala. 
705,  56  Am.  Dec.  283.  The  contract  of  a  surety  Is  the  measure  and 
limit  of  his  liability:  Getty  v.  Binnsse,  49  N.  Y.  385,  10  Am.  Rep.  379; 
and.  If  sureties  are  answerable  on  dlfTerent  and  separate  penal 
bonds,  each  set  of  sureties  is  answerable  in  proportion  to  tho 
amount  of  the  penalties  of  the  respective  bonds:  Bell  v.  Jasper,  2 
Ired.  Eq.  597.  But  a  surety  cannot  be  made  to  pay  more  than  the 
penalty  of  his  bond:  Leggett  y.  Humphreys,  21  How.  66;  Clark 


452  CuLLiFORD  V.  Walser.  [New  York, 

V.  Bush,  3  Cow.  151;  Fairlie  v.  Lawson,  5  Cow.  424;  Rayner  v.  Clark, 
7  Barb.  581.  The  penalty  only  can  be  recovered  of  sureties  on  appeal 
bonds:  Note  to  Howell  v.  Alma  Milling  Co.,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  715. 
Where  the  right  to  contribution  exists  between  the  sureties  on  a 
sheriff's  official  bond  and  those  on  his  bond  as  tax  collector,  the 
sureties  on  either  bond  should  contribute  equally  for  the  default 
to  the  extent  of  the  lesser  penalty,  and,  after  that  is  exhausted, 
the  excess  must  be  settled  between  the  sureties  on  the  larger  bond: 
Burnett  v.  Millsaps,  59  Miss.  333,  337.  Compare  Cherry  v.  Wilson, 
78  N.  C.  164,  1G6. 

If  the  penalties  of  several  bonds  are  the  same,  the  obligation  of 
the  sureties,  as  between  themselves,  is  the  same  as  if  all  were  bound 
by  the  same  instrument:  Deering  v.  Earl  of  Winchelsea,  2  Bos.  & 
r.  270;  Thompson  v.  Dekum,  32  Or.  506,  513;  and  this  is  true  of 
official  bonds.  When  a  bond  given  by  an  official  is  regarded  as 
inadequate  in  amount,  he  is  sometimes  required  to  give,  and  does 
give,  what  is  commonly  known  as  an  "additional  bond,"  in  such 
further  amount  as  may  be  required  by  competent  authority.  The 
liability  of  the  sureties  on  this  "additional  bond"  does  not  extend 
to  any  defalcation  committed  by  their  principal  prior  to  its  date, 
nor  does  it  release  the  sureties  on  the  prior  bond  given  by  him  from 
liability  for  any  of  his  defalcations,  past  or  future.  If  moneys 
have  been  collected  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  additional  bond, 
and  the  principal  converts  them  afterward,  the  sureties  upon  the 
additional,  as  well  as  those  upon  the  original,  bond  are  liable  for 
such  conversion.  The  additional  bond  and  that  previously  existing 
become  concurrent  securities  for  the  faithful  discharge  of  the  official 
duties  of  the  principal  after  the  giving  of  the  last  bond.  The  term 
•'additional  bond"  must  not  be  understood  as  indicating  that  it  is 
a  bond  to  which  resort  can  be  had  only  after  the  remedies  under 
the  previous  bond  have  been  exhausted.  On  the  contrary,  the  lia- 
bility o'f  the  sureties  on  the  two  bonds  is,  with  respect  t6  matters 
occurring  after  giving  the  last  bond,  the  same  as  though  they  had 
become  sureties  for  their  principal  at  one  time  and  by  one  bond: 
Note  to  Crawn  v.  Commonwealth,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  860. 

The  obligation  of  one  of  two  cosureties  is  to  pay  the  whole  debt. 
If  he  does  so,  he  is  entitled  to  demand  contribution  from  the  others 
for  whatever  he  has  paid  more  than  his  aliquot  part.  In  other 
words,  if  he  pays  the  wGole  debt,  he  may  recover  one-half  from  his 
cosurety,  or  the  whole  from  the  principal:  Aiken  v.  Peay,  5  Strob. 
15,  53  Am.  Dec.  684;  Morgan  v.  Smith,  70  N.  Y.  537,  541.  But  If  he 
pays  loss  than  the  whole  debt,  he  cannot  recover  from  his  cosurety, 
though  he  may  from  the  principal,  more  than  the  amount  which  he 
has  paid  In  excess  of  the  moiety  which,  as  between  him  and  his 
cosurety,  it  was  his  duty  to  pay:  Morgan  v.  Smith,  70  N.  Y.  537,  542. 

Insolvency.— At  common  law,  the  liability  of  a  surety,  where  his 
cosurety  had  paid  the  debt,  was  his  aliquot  or  proportional  part  of 
the  payment  thus  made,  ascertained  by  the  number  of  sureties; 
and  this  was  the  sole  measure  of  recovery,  notwithstanding  the 
death  or  insolvency  of  one  or  more  of  the  sureties,  as  this  did  not 


Jan.  1899.]  Cdlliford  v.  Walseb.  463 

enlarge  the  other's  liabilities:  Powell  v.  Matthls,  4  Ired.  83,  40  Am. 
Dec.  427;  Stothofif  v.  Dunham,  19  N.  J.  L.  181,  185;  Van  Petten  v. 
Kichardson,  08  Mo.  379,  381;  Browne  v.  Lee,  6  Barn.  &  C.  689.  9 
Dowl.  &  R.  700.  In  some  of  the  states,  a  surety  could  not  formerly 
maintain  an  action  against  a  cosurety  at  law:  Powell  v.  Matthis,  4 
Ired.  83,  40  Am.  Dec.  427;  but  now,  if  one  of  two  sureties  pays  the 
whole  debt,  he  can,  either  at  law  or  in  equity,  call  upon  the  other 
for  contribution,  and  thus  recover  a  half  of  what  he  has  paid: 
Moore  v.  Baker,  34  Fed.  Rep.  1,  4.  Thus,  where  one  of  three  sure- 
ties is  Insolvent,  and  another  pays  the  whole  debt,  he  may  recover 
at  law  one- half  thereof  from  the  third  surety:  Henderson  v.  Mc- 
Duffee,  5  N.  H.  38,  20  Am.  Dec.  557.  The  jurisdiction  now  assumed 
by  courts  of  law  to  enforce  contribution  in  some  cases  does  not 
affect  the  jurisdiction  belonging,  originally,  to  courts  of  equity: 
Wayland  v.  Tucker,  4  Gratt.  267,  50  Am.  Dec.  76.  In  some  cases, 
however,  the  remedy  at  law  Is  utterly  Inadequate;  as,  if  there  are 
several  sureties,  and  one  Is  Insolvent,  and  another  pays  the  debt, 
he  can,  at  law,  recover  from  the  other  solvent  sureties  only  the  same 
share  as  he  could  if  all  were  solvent.  Thus,  If  there  are  four  sure- 
ties, and  one  is  insolvent,  a  solvent  surety  who  pays  the  whole  debt 
can  recover  only  one-fourth  part  thereof,  and  not  a  third  part, 
aorainst  the  other  two  solvent  parties.  But,  in  a  court  of  equity  he 
will  be  entitled  to  recover  one-third  part  of  the  debt  against  each 
of  them;  for  In  equity  the  insolvent's  share  is  apportioned  among 
all  the  other  solvent  sureties:  Moore  v.  Baker,  34  Fed.  Rep.  1.  4. 
Contribution,  In  equity,  Is  based  upon  the  number  of  solvent  cosure- 
ties. In  other  words,  the  insolvent  ones  are  to  be  excluded,  and  the 
burden  must  be  distributed  equally  between  those  who  are  solvent: 
Smith  V.  Mason,  44  Neb.  610,  016;  Bosley  v.  Taylor,  5  Dana,  157,  30 
Am.  Dec.  677;  Van  Petten  v.  Richardson,  68  Mo.  379;  Cobb  v. 
Haynes,  8  B.  Mon.  137,  140;  Henderson  v.  McDuffee,  5  N.  H.  38,  20 
Am.  Dec.  557;  Hitchman  v.  Stewart,  3  Drew.  271;  Burroughs  v.  Lott, 
19  Cal.  120;  Morrison  v.  Poyntz,  7  Dana,  307,  32  Am.  Dec.  92;  Acers 
V.  Curtis,  68  Tex.  423;  Liddell  v.  Wiswell,  59  Vt.  365;  Young  v. 
Lyons,  8  Gill,  162.  Compare  Whiting  v.  Burke,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  539— L. 
R.  6  Ch.  App.  342.  It  Is  evident  that  a  cosurety,  in  equity,  is  bound 
to  contribute  more  than  an  aliquot  portion  of  the  debt,  regard  be- 
ing had  to  the  number  of  sureties,  wherever  one  or  more  of  the 
sureties  happens  to  be  Insolvent.  The  engagement  of  each  surety 
Is  for  the  whole  debt,  and,  as  each  may  be  made  liable  for  the 
whole,  it  Is  for  this  reason  that  a  court  of  equity  Insists,  when  one 
surety  has  paid,  that  he  may  recover  from  such  of  his  cosureties 
as  are  solvent  that  proportion  of  the  sum  paid  as  will  establish  a 
perfect  equality  between  the  solvent  sureties,  and  distribute  the 
l>urden  between  them.  Independently  of  any  contract  to  that  ef- 
fect: Young  V.  Clark,  2  Ala.  264. 

The  cases  above  cited  In  this  subdivision  do  not  directly  concern 
sureties  to  the  same  person  on  separate  Instruments  for  the  same 
debt,  but  the  principles  stated  are  applicable  to  such  cases.  Thus, 
in  Whiting  y.  Burke,  L.  B.  6  Ch.  App.  842,  a  bond  was  executed 


454  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  [New  York, 

by  a  principal  and  two  sureties,  with  a  stipulation  tliat  the  sure* 
ties  should  not  be  discharged  by  any  new  arrangement  between 
the  creditor  and  the  principal.  One  of  the  sureties  did  compound 
with  his  creditors,  and,  by  the  terms  of  the  bond,  the  moneys  se- 
Bured  became  immediately  payable.  Subsequently,  the  plaintiff 
signed  a  separate  bond  to  become  answerable  for  the  entire  amount. 
The  principal  became  insolvent,  the  creditor  sued  the  plaintiff,  and 
obtained  payment  of  the  amount  due.  The  plaintiff  then  filed  his 
bill  against  the  solvent  surety  in  the  first  bond  for  contribution, 
and  it  was  held,  affirming  Whiting  v.  Burke,  L.  R.  10  Eq.  539,  that 
the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  contribution  from  the  defendant.  If 
one  surety  pays  the  debt,  all  others  who  are  bound  to  the  same 
party  for  the  performance  of  the  same  conditions,  whether  by  the 
same  or  different  bonds,  are  liable  for  contribution;  and  if  two 
bonds  have  been  given  to  the  same  party  for  the  performance  of 
the  same  conditions  those  of  the  sureties  in  each  bond  who  are 
solvent  must  equally  bear  the  burden:  Bosley  v.  Taylor,  5  Dana, 
157,  30  Am.  Dec.  677;  Breckinridge  v.  Taylor,  5  Dana,  110.  The 
proper  method  of  compelling  contribution  among  sureties  in  a  suit  in 
equity,  where  more  than  one  of  the  sureties  have  made  payments  on 
the  joint  Indebtedness,  is  to  add  all  payments  together  and  divide 
the  aggregate  among  the  solvent  sureties.  It  must  be  observed, 
however,  that  while  a  plaintiff  surety,  who  has  overpaid  his  share, 
may  recover  the  excess  of  his  cosureties  equally,  there  being  no  in- 
tervening equity,  if  it  does  not  subject  any  of  them  to  the  payment 
of  more  than  his  proper  share  of  the  entire  joint  liability,  a  surety 
who  has  paid  less  than  his  ratable  share  of  the  joint  liability  cannot 
enforce  contribution,  even  against  cosureties  wno  have  paid  nothing: 
Gross  V.  Davis,  87  Tenn.  226,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  635.  The  right  of  con- 
tribution in  equity  exists  between  cosureties,  when  the  principal  Is 
Insolvent,  and  that,  whether  they  are  so  by  separate  Instruments, 
or  by  the  same  Instrument:  Bell  v.  Jasper,  2  Ired.  Eq.  597.  A  surety 
suing  in  equity  for  contribution  must  sustain  his  proportion  of  the 
loss  resulting  from  insolvency:  Acers  v.  Curtis,  68  Tex.  423. 


Buchanan  v.  Tilden. 

[168  Nkw  York,  109.] 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— CONSIDERATION  FOR  COVE- 
NANT ON  BEHALF  OF  WIFE.— It  is  not  the  full  measure  of  the 
legal  and  moral  obligations  imposed  upon  a  husband  by  the  com- 
mon law  simply  to  provide  for  his  wife  the  necessaries  of  life,  such 
as  food,  raiment  and  shelter,  but  it  Is  his  duty,  If  opportunity  offers, 
to  ninke  provision  for  her  against  that  day  when  he  may  be  In- 
capac-Itated  by  disease  or  removed  by  death;  and  this  obligation  is 
one  that  a  court  will  recognize  as  a  sufficient  consideration  to  sup- 
port a  covenant  on  her  behalf. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— UNITY  OF.  TO  AID  ENFORCE. 
MENT  OF  COVENANT  FOR  WIFE'S  BENEFIT.— The  common- 


Jan.  1S99.]  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  456 

law  unity  of  husband  and  wife  survives  for  the  purpose  of  aiding 
the  wife  to  enforce  a  covenant  for  her  benefit  made  by  her  hus- 
band, and  which  equity  and  good  conscience  approve. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIPli-PROMISE  TO  HIM  FOR  HEH 
BENEFIT— WIFE'S  RIGHT  OF  ACTION  ON.— If  an  heir-at-law 
and  next  of  kin  of  one  who  died  testate  desires  to  contest  a  be- 
quest, in  the  will,  of  a  large  amount  of  property,  which,  if  Invalid, 
would  fall  to  the  next  of  kin,  but  has  no  means  to  conduct  the  liti- 
gation, and  obtains  a  loan  of  money,  for  the  purpose,  from  a  man 
whose  wife  has  an  equitable  interest  in  the  suit,  by  reason  of  her 
>adoption  by  a  relative  of  the  testator,  upon  a  promise  to  the  hus- 
band that.  In  case  of  success,  the  contestant  will  pay  to  the  wife 
the  sum  of  fifty  thousand  dollars,  the  wife  is  entitled  to  recover 
on  the  contract,  where  the  contestant  succeeds  in  obtaining  the 
fund  for  the  next  of  kin,  whether  the  mere  relation  of  husband 
and  wife  would  alone  constitute  a  sufficient  consideration  to  en- 
able her  to  maintain  the  action,  for  her  equities  are  such,  when 
considered  in  connection  with  the  duty  of  her  husband  to  provide 
for  her  future,  and  with  the  fact  that,  with  that  purpose  in  view, 
the  money  was  procured  for  the  contestant  to  institute  and  pur- 
«ue  the  necessary  litigation  to  secure  the  fund  to  which  her  equities 
related,  that,  all  taken  together,  they  are  sufficient  to  sustain  her 
action. 

Action  on  contract.  The  defendant,  George  H.  Tilden,  needed 
money  in  order  to  prosecute  an  action  to  set  aside  certain  pro- 
visions of  the  will  of  Samuel  J.  Tilden,  deceased.  He  applied 
to  the  plaintiff's  husband  for  that  purpose,  and  the  latter  pro- 
<;ured  a  man  named  Dun  to  advance  the  money.  The  agree- 
ment between  the  defendant  and  the  plaintiff's  husband  was 
that,  in  the  event  of  the  success  of  the  action,  in  view  of  the 
assistance  rendered  by  the  latter,  as  well  as  by  Dun,  the  defend- 
ant would  become  responsible  for  the  payment  to  the  plaintiff, 
Adelaide  E.  T.  Buchanan,  of  the  sum  of  fifty  thousand  dollars. 
The  action  was  successful,  and  the  defendant  repaid  the  money 
loaned.  In  addition,  he  gave  to  the  plaintiff  a  snm  of  eight 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  but  she  brought  this  action  to 
compel  the  payment  by  the  defendant  of  the  whole  sum  men- 
tioned in  the  agreement.  A  judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  for  fifty- 
four  thousand,  four  hundred  and  twenty-one  dollars  and  eigh- 
teen cents,  entered  upon  a  directed  verdict,  was  reversed  by  the 
court  below,  and  the  plaintiff  appealed. 

Louis  S.  Phillips  and  William  B.  McNiece,  for  the  appellant. 

Delos  McCurdy,  for  the  respondent. 

"*  BARTLETT,  J.  At  the  close  of  plaintiff's  case  both 
parties  moved  for  a  directed  verdict,  and  neither  asked  to  go 
to  the  jury  on  any  question. 

**^  The  trial  judge  thereupon  directed  a  verdict  for  the  plain- 
tiff.   The  appellate  division,  with  a  divided  court,  reversed  the 


456  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  [New  Yorky 

Judgment  in  plaintiff's  favor  entered  upon  the  verdict  and  or- 
dered a  new  trial.  The  plaintiff  has  appealed  from  that  order, 
stipulating  for  judgment  absolute  in  case  of  affirmance,  and  pre- 
sents for  our  determination  a  single  question  of  law  arising 
upon  undisputed  facts. 

Before  stating  that  question  reference  will  be  made  to  the 
material  facts.  The  plaintiff  is  the  adopted  daughter  of  Moses 
Y.  Tilden,  a  brother  of  the  late  Samuel  J.  Tilden.  The  defend- 
ant is  an  heir-at-law  and  next  of  kin  of  Samuel  J.  Tilden. 

On  the  twentieth  day  of  October,  1886,  the  defendant  began 
an  action  against  the  executors  of  the  estate  of  Samuel  J.  Tilden 
and  others,  praying  judgment  that  the  thirty-fifth  article  of 
Mr.  Tilden's  will  be  adjudged  void,  and  that  the  property  there- 
in mentioned  be  declared  undisposed  of  by  any  provision  thereof. 

The  defendant,  being  without  means  to  prosecute  this  action, 
applied  to  Robert  D.  Buchanan,  the  husband  of  the  plaintiff,  for 
assistance  in  raising  the  funds  necessary  to  carry  on  the  litiga- 
tion. Buchanan  expressed  his  willingness  to  aid  defendant  if 
certain  arrangements  were  made,  and  said  that  his  uncle,  Robert 
G.  Dun,  might  be  willing  to  advance  the  money  required. 

The  defendant  expressed  himself  as  willing  "to  do  anything 
in  the  world  to  raise  the  money — to  make  any  arrangement  that 
was  reasonable,*'  and  said  to  Buchanan  that  if  the  contest  was 
successful  Mrs.  Buchanan  "should  come  in  share  alike  with  the 
rest  of  them."  It  was  evidently  within  the  contemplation  of 
the  parties  that  if  this  action  of  the  defendant  was  successful 
the  result  would  be  that  as  to  a  very  large  part  of  his  estate 
Mr.  Tilden  died  intestate,  and  that  while  the  plaintiff,  as  an 
adopted  child  of  Moses  Y.  Tilden  and  not  of  Samuel  J.  Tilden'a 
blood,  might  take  no  part  thereof,  yet  there  were  the  strongest 
moral  and  family  reasons  why  she  should  be  regarded  as  an  heir- 
at-law  and  next  of  kin. 

^^^  Buchanan  induced  Dun  to  make  certain  necessary  ad- 
vances to  the  extent  of  five  thousand  dollars,  and  Dun  consented 
to  do  so  solely  on  the  ground  that  plaintiff  was  to  share  the  fruits 
of  a  successful  contest,  he  being  unacquainted  with  the  de- 
fendant. 

This  portion  of  the  money  was  advanced  by  Dun  about  the 
time  defendant  began  his  action,  and  he  was  then  presented  to- 
Dun  and  repeated  to  him  the  promise  in  regard  to  plaintiff  shar- 
ing alike  with  the  rest  of  the  heirs  that  he  had  made  to  her 
husband.  In  February,  1887,  the  defendant  asked  Buchanan  if 
be  could  raise  more  money. 


Jan.  1899.J  Buchanan  v,  Tilden,  457 

Buchanan  testified  that  in  response  to  this  application,  'T.  told 
him  that  I  thought  before  any  more  money  was  talked  about 
that  the  arrangement  that  had  been  talked  about  had  better  be 
whipped  into  line,  ....  and  he  said  they  Were  all  perfectly 
■willing  to  share  and  share  alike  in  that  matter.  I  said  that  does 
not  satisfy  me;  that  is  not  what  I  want;  I  want  some  positive 
agreement.  After  considerable  further  talk  he  said  that  his 
brothers  and  sisters  were  scattered;  that  he  could  not  get  it 
into  shape  Just  then,  but  that  he  had  to  have  some  more  money 
and  had  to  have  it  right  away,  and  in  order  to  get  the  money 
and  have  it  right  away  he,  on  his  own  personal  behalf,  having 
nothing  to  do  with  his  brothers  or  sisters  in  any  sense,  would 
obligate  himself  to  pay  personally  fifty  thousand  dollars."  There- 
upon defendant  and  Buchanan  went  to  the  office  of  counsel, 
where  the  following  letter  was  drawn  up,  signed  by  defendant, 
and  delivered  by  Buchanan  to  Dun: 

"New  York,  February  19, 1887. 
"Robert  G.  Dun,  Esq.,  No.  314  B'way,  N.  Y.  City. 

"^ly  Dear  Sir:  It  is  understood  between  Mr.  E.  D.  Buchanan 
and  myself  that  in  the  event  of  the  success  of  the  proceedings 
now  pending,  or  any  which  may  be  taken,  to  practically  set 
aside  the  thirty-fifth  section  of  the  will  of  my  late  uncle,  Samuel 
J.  Tilden,  in  view  of  the  assistance  looking  ^^*  to  that  end,  which 
has  been  and  may  be  rendered  by  Mr.  Buchanan,  as  well  as  by 
yourself,  that  I  will,  and  hereby  do,  become  responsible  for  the 
payment  to  Mrs.  Adelaide  E.  Buchanan,  or  her  order,  of  the 
sum  of  fifty  thousand  dollars. 

"It  is  further  understood  between  us  that,  while  I  am  not 
strictly  authorized  to  speak  in  behalf  of  ray  brothers  and  sisters 
in  that  respect,  that  from  what  has  already  transpired  between 
me  and  them,  in  the  event  of  such  success  they  will  be  disposed 
to  act  generously  with  Mrs.  Buchanan  in  the  premises. 
'TTours  very  resp'y, 

"GEORGE  H.  TILDEN." 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  letter,  while  charging  defendant 
in  a  fijxed  sum,  leaves  open  the  general  adjustment  between 
plaintiff  and  defendant's  brothers  and  sisters.  After  receivinpf 
this  written  declaration  of  the  defendant.  Dun  continued  his 
advances  until  they  aggregated  over  twenty  thousand  dollars. 
A  long  contest  followed  in  the  courts;  defendant  succeeded  in 
his  action,  and  he  and  others  became  entitled  to  a  very  large 
sum  of  money  that  the  late  Samuel  J.  Tilden  supposed  he  had 
dedicated  to  public  uses  under  the  thirty-fifth  article  of  his  will. 


458  Buchanan  v.  Tildkn.  [New  York, 

Dun  testified  that  the  defendant  had  repaid  his  advances;  that 
they  were  collected  through  his  attorney,  but  he  thought  an  ac- 
tion was  brought  against  him.  Defendant  paid  plaintiff  eight 
thousand  one  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  on  account  of  the  fifty 
thousand  dollars  under  the  letter  of  February  19,  1887.  As 
nothing  more  was  paid,  and  plaintiff  received  no  recognition 
from  the  heirs-at-law  and  next  of  kin  of  Mr.  Tilden,  she  brought 
this  action  to  recover  the  balance  of  the  fifty  thousand  dollars 
^nd  interest. 

One  of  the  learned  judges  of  the  appellate  division  thus  states 
the  question  of  law  presented  in  this  case:  "Can  a  wife  enforce 
payment  in  her  own  name  where  the  husband  renders  valuable 
services  and  stipulates  with  the  person  to  whom  the  ^^^  same 
Are  rendered  that  compensation  therefor  shall  be  made,  not  to 
Jiim,  but  to  her?"  In  answering  this  question  in  the  negative, 
the  main  positions  of  the  court  below  may  be  briefly  stated. 

While  admitting  that  there  is  a  distinct  class  of  cases  where 
promises  have  been  made  to  a  father,  or  other  near  relative  for 
the  benefit  of  a  child,  or  other  dependent  relative,  in  which  the 
person  for  whose  benefit  the  promise  was  made  has  been  per- 
mitted to  maintain  an  action  for  the  breach  of  it,  and  further 
-admitting,  for  argument's  sake,  that  the  duty  and  obligation 
•of  the  husband  to  the  wife  is,  as  a  consideration,  quite  equal 
to  the  duty  and  obligation  of  the  father  to  the  child,  yet  the 
fact  still  remains  in  the  case  at  bar  that  this  is  not  a  contract 
looking  toward  the  discharge  of  the  obligation  which  the  hus- 
band owed  to  support  the  wife,  and  must,  therefore,  be  sup- 
ported, if  at  all,  upon  the  mere  relation  of  husband  and  wife. 

The  learned  court  then  states  that  it  has  found  no  authority 
for  holding  that  a  promise  made  to  the  husband  by  a  third 
person  for  the  benefit  of  his  wife,  which  was  not  intended  to 
provide  for  her  support,  or  to  discharge  the  husband's  duty  in 
that  regard,  could  be  enforced  by  the  wife. 

It  is  also  intimated  that  there  is  no  disposition  to  extend  the 
principle  of  some  of  the  cases  relating  to  father  and  child  to 
«ny  other  relationship.  As  to  this  latter  suggestion  we  do  not 
think  it  will  be  seriously  questioned,  on  principle,  that  the  rela- 
tion of  husband  and  wife  is  fully  equal  to  that  of  parent  and 
■child  as  a  consideration  to  support  a  promise. 

Before  discussing  this  appeal  in  the  light  of  the  authorities, 
we  have  to  say  that,  in  our  judgment,  the  learned  appellate  di- 
vision have  failed  to  give  due  weight  to  certain  controlling  fea- 
tures of  this  case.    In  the  first  place,  the  question  formulated 


Jan.  1899.]  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  459 

ty  the  court  below  does  not  contain  what  we  regard  as  one  of 
the  most  important  points  disclosed  by  the  evidence,  to  wit,  the 
large  equitable  interest  the  plaintiff  had  in  this  scheme  to  at- 
tack **"  the  will  under  the  provisions  of  the  agreement  made  to 
raise  funds  for  that  purpose.  This  is  not  the  case  simply  of 
a  husband  rendering  valuable  services  to  a  third  party  upon  the 
latter's  promise  to  pay  the  compensation,  not  to  him,  but  to 
his  wife.  While  this  case  embraces  that  feature  it  involves  the 
further  element  of  the  wife's  joint  interest  in  the  scheme  to 
attack  the  will. 

It  may  fairly  be  inferred  from  this  record  that  the  defend- 
ant was  powerless  to  conduct  the  action  he  had  begun  unless 
some  one  furnished  him  the  funds.  This  assistance  was  ren- 
dered by  Buchanan  and  Dun,  upon  the  express  agreement  and 
understanding  that  the  plaintiff  should  receive,  in  case  of  suc- 
cess, fifty  thousand  dollars  from  defendant  as  part  of  her  share 
■of  the  estate,  and  generous  treatment  from  his  brothers  and 
listers.  Plaintiff,  in  equity  and  good  conscience,  as  an  adopted 
child  of  Moses  Y.  Tilden,  was  entitled  to  come  in  and  share 
with  the  other  heirs  and  next  of  kin  the  large  fund  that  had 
been  freed  from  the  provisions  of  the  will.  When  this  equitable 
right,  or  interest,  is  coupled  with  the  relation  of  husband  and 
wife,  we  have  presented  a  situation  that  affords  ample  con- 
sideration for  the  contract  sued  upon — ^a  situation  that  dis- 
tinguishes this  action  from  any  of  the  cases  where  the  party 
suing  upon  a  promise  rests  exclusively  upon  a  debt  or  duty 
owed  him  by  the  promisee. 

Another  general  feature  of  this  case,  to  which  we  think  the 
court  below  has  failed  to  give  due  prominence,  is  the  extent 
of  the  legal  and  moral  obligation  resting  upon  a  husband  to 
support  and  provide  for  his  wife. 

A  brief  quotation  from  one  of  the  opinions  below  will  make 
ibis  point  clear.  The  court  says:  "It  is  quite  true  that  the 
husband  is  under  an  obligation  to  support  the  wife,  and  it  may 
be  that  any  contract  which  he  makes  with  a  third  party,  having 
for  its  object  the  carrying  out  of  that  obligation,  would  be  en- 
forced in  the  courts.'* 

Then  coming  to  the  case  at  bar  the  court  continues:  "There 
*'^''  is  no  obligation,  legal  or  equitable,  here  on  the  part  of  the 
husband  toward  the  wife  to  entitle  her  to  the  performance  of 
this  contract.  This  was  not  a  contract  for  her  support,  nor 
was  it  one  to  do  anything  which,  under  any  circumstances,  the 
husband  could  be  compelled  to  do.    It  was  simply  an  obliga- 


460  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  [New  York, 

tion  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  pay  the  plaintiff  a  sum  of 
money,  as  an  independent  fortune  for  her  separate  estate,  in 
case  the  husband  rendered  some  service  to  him.  So  far  as  the 
plaintiff  and  her  husband  were  concerned,  as  to  this  contract 
there  were  no  legal  relations  between  them;  they  occupied  no 
different  relations  from  that  of  any  other  man  and  woman,'* 
et  cetera. 

It  seems  to  us  that  this  is  an  entire  misconception  of  the 
duties  and  relations  existing  between  man  and  wife.  It  is,  in 
effect,  said  that  it  is  only  the  duty  of  bare  maintenance  that 
is  a  consideration  sufficient  to  support  the  promise  of  a  third 
party.  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  a  husband  rests  under  other 
and  far  higher  moral  and  legal  obligations  that  the  law  will 
recognize  as  a  sufficient  consideration  to  support  a  convenant 
in  favor  of  the  wife. 

There  is  no  evidence  in  this  case  to  bear  out  the  statement 
that  this  was  not  a  contract  for  the  wife's  support;  but  assum- 
ing that  she  had  food,  raiment,  and  shelter  —  the  necessaries 
of  life — can  it  be  said  that  these  represent  the  full  measure 
of  the  moral  and  legal  obligations  imposed  upon  a  husband  by 
the  common  law?  Is  it  not  his  bounden  duty,  if  opportunity 
offers,  to  provide  for  his  wife  against  that  day  when  he  may  be 
incapacitated  by  disease  or  removed  by  death.  If,  as  in  the 
case  at  bar,  the  husband  seeks  to  provide  for  his  wife,  beyond 
the  duty  of  furnishing  food  and  shelter,  by  securing  a  fund  to 
which  she  is  equitably  entitled,  that  may  perpetuate  his  pro- 
tecting care  after  he  has  departed  this  life,  shall  it  be  said  that 
this  is  not  an  obligation  that  a  court  can  recognize  as  a  sufficient 
consideration  to  support  a  covenant  on  her  behalf?  We  are 
of  opinion  that  this  broader  view  of  the  duties  and  obligations 
of  ^^^  a  husband  is  to  be  invoked  in  determining  the  rights  of 
this  plaintiff. 

We  come  then  to  a  consideration  of  this  case  in  the  light  of 
precedent.  The  court  below  recognized  the  strong  equities  of 
the  plaintiff's  case  and  expressed  regret  that  the  action  is  not 
sustainable  in  her  behalf.  Our  full  discussion  of  the  facts  and 
the  position  of  the  court  below  discloses,  we  think,  a  very  strong 
case  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  maintaining  this  action. 

While  it  is  true  that  for  more  than  two  hundred  years  the 
courts  of  England  and  this  country  have  been  discussing  the 
vexed  question  of  when  a  party  may  sue  upon  a  promise  made 
for  his  benefit  to  a  third  party,  yet  we  are  of  opinion  that, 
nnder  the  peculiar  facts  of  this  case,  the  plaintiff  can  recover  by 


Jan.  1899.]  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  461 

invoking  legal  principles  that  are  well  established  by  authority. 

In  order  to  maintain  the  plaintiil's  cause  of  action,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  invoke  the  principle  established  by  Lawrence  v. 
Fox,  20  N.  y.  268,  and  the  cases  that  have  followed  it  in  this 
state,  to  the  effect  that  an  action  lies  on  a  promise  made  by  the 
defendant  upon  valid  consideration  to  a  third  person  for  the 
benefit  of  the  plaintiff,  although  the  latter  was  not  privy  to  il. 
It  will  be  recalled  in  that,  case  one  Holly  loaned  the  defendant 
Fox  money,  stating  at  the  same  time  that  he  owed  the  amount 
to  the  plaintiff  Lawrence  for  money  borrowed  which  he  had 
agreed  to  pay  the  then  next  day;  the  defendant,  in  considera- 
tion of  the  loan  to  him,  agreed  to  pay  plaintiff  the  then  next  day. 

This  court,  in  holding  that  the  plaintiff  Lawrence  could  en- 
force that  promise  in  an  action  at  law,  established  a  legal  prin- 
ciple that  the  courts  of  England  have  never  recognized. 

The  plaintiff  in  the  case  at  bar,  if  driven  to  it,  might  doubt- 
less derive  aid  and  comfort  from  the  doctrine  laid  down  in 
Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20  N.  Y.  268,  by  parity  of  reasoning,  but  we 
think  her  case  rests  upon  very  different  principles. 

The  first  case  to  be  considered  is  Button  v.  Poole,  1  Vent., 
318-333,  decided  in  England  in  the  reign  of  Charles  II.  The 
plaintiff  declared  in  assumpsit  that  his  wife's  father  being  seised 
of  certain  lands  now  descended  to  the  defendant,  **®  and  be- 
ing about  to  cut  a  thousand  pounds*  worth  of  timber  to  raise  a 
portion  for  his  daughter,  the  defendant  promised  to  the  father, 
in  consideration  that  he  would  forbear  to  fell  the  timber,  that 
he  would  pay  the  daughter  one  thousand  pounds. 

After  verdict  for  the  plaintiff  on  nonassumpsit,  it  was  moved 
in  arrest  of  judgment  that  the  father  ought  to  have  brought 
the  action,  and  not  the  husband  and  wife.  The  court  said: 
*'It  might  have  been  another  case  if  the  money  bad  been  to  have 
been  paid  to  a  stranger;  but  there  is  such  a  nearness  of  relation 
between  the  father  and  the  child,  and  'tis  a  kind  of  debt  to  the 
child  to  be  provided  for,  that  the  plaintiff  is  plainly  concerned." 
The  judgment  was  affirmed  in  the  exchequer:  Dut^ton  v.  Poole, 
2  Lev.  212,  Eaym.  302. 

In  one  of  the  opinions  of  the  appellaite  division  in  the  case 
at  bar,  it  is  stated  that  Button  v.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318,  has  been 
repudiated  by  the  English  courts  in  Tweddle  v.  Atkinson,  101 
Eng.  C.  L.  K.  393.  A  careful  examination  of  this  latter  case 
shows  that  Justice  Blackburn,  while  attacking  Button  v.  Poole, 
1  Vent.  318,  says:  ""We  cannot  overrule  a  decision  of  the 
exchequer  chamber."    Lord  Mansfield  said  of  Button  y.  Poole, 


462  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  [New  York^ 

1  Vent.  318,  a  hundred  years  later,  that  it  was  difficult  to  con- 
ceive how  a  doubt  could  have  been  entertained  about  the  case: 
Martyn  v.  Hind,  Cowp.  443,  Doug.  142.  It  has  also  been 
repeatedly  followed  in  this  state. 

The  learned  counsel  for  the  defendant,  in  an  able  and  com- 
prehensive brief,  complains  that  Dutton  v.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318^ 
has  on  several  occasions  been  cited  to  sustain  the  broad  doctrine 
that  a  stranger  to  the  consideration  and  to  the  promise  may 
maintain  an  action  on  a  contract.  He  points  out  that  such  an 
alleged  erroneous  citation  appears  in  Schermerhorn  v.  Vander- 
heyden,  1  Johns.  139,  3  Am.  Dec.  304,  and  that  it  has  led  to 
confusion  in  subsequent  cases.  We  are  not  concerned  at  thia 
time  whether  this  is  a  just  criticism  or  not,  as  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Dutton  v.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318,  rests  upon  the  nearness 
of  the  relation  between  father  and  child,  and  to  this  extent  ia 
undoubted  authority. 

^o  In  Shepard  v.  Shepard,  7  Johns.  Ch.  57,  11  Am.  Dec. 
396,  Dutton  v.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318,  is  approved  and  followed, 
and  Chancellor  Kent  al&o  recognizes  the  principle  contended 
for  in  this  case,  that  the  consideration  of  natural  affection,  and 
to  make  sure  the  maintenance  of  a  wife  in  case  she  survived 
her  husband,  is  "very  meritorious." 

There  were  two  principal  points  decided  by  Chancellor  Kent 
in  this  case — ^the  first  being  that  although  a  deed  from  a  hus- 
band directly  to  his  wife  is  void  in  law,  yet,  where  the  con- 
veyance of  the  husband  is  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  suitable 
provision  for  the  wife  "in  case  she  should  survive  him,"  equity 
will  lend  its  aid  to  enforce  its  provisions.  The  second  point 
held  that  where  a  husband  conveyed  land  to  his  son,  for  a 
nominal  sum,  on  his  covenanting  to  pay  an  annuity  to  his. 
mother  during  her  widowhood,  that  the  wife  could  sue  on  thi» 
covenant  so  made  for  her  benefit,  and  that  an  attempted  release 
of  the  son  from  the  covenant  by  the  husband,  in  his  lifetime, 
was  fraudulent  and  void. 

The  learned  chancellor  said:  "But  if  the  deed  of  1808  was 
out  of  the  question,  I  should  then  have  no  difficulty  in  declar- 
ing that  the  defendant  was  bound  to  pay  her  the  stipulated 
annuity,  or  the  gross  sum  of  four  hundred  dollars  in  lieu  of  it, 
on  her  releasing,"  et  cetera.  "The  relationship  between  hus- 
band and  wife  was  sufficient  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  her  action 
upon  the  covenant  to  her  husband,  and  which  was  made  for  her 
benefit.  The  consideration  inured  from  the  husband,  and  arose 
from  the  obligations  of  that  relation,"  et  cetera. 


Jan.  1899.]  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  463 

The  chancellor  then  comments  approvingly  and  at  length 
upon  Button  v.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318,  points  out  the  subsequent 
commendation  of  it  by  Lord  Mansfield,  and  concludes  by  say* 
ing:  "The  same  doctrine  appears  in  the  more  early  case  of 
Starkey  v.  Mill,  Style,  29G,  and  it  has  had  the  sanction  also  of 
Mr.  Justice  Buller  in  Marchington  v.  Vernon,  1  Bos.  &  P.  101, 
in  notes,  but  it  is  quite  unnecessary  to  dwell  longer  on  thi* 
second  point." 

*^*  "While  the  chancellor  allowed  relief  to  the  plaintiff  by  en- 
forcing her  deed  in  equity,  yet  he  distinctly  held  that  she  had 
the  additional  remedy  of  an  action  on  the  covenant  between 
her  husband  and  the  son  if  there  were  no  deed,  by  reason  of  thd^ 
relations  and  obligations  of  husband  and  wife,  resting  his  deci- 
sion squarely  on  the  case  of  Dutton  v.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318. 

With  this  case  approved  by  Lord  Mansfield,  Justice  Buller,. 
and  Chancellor  Kent,  and  followed  in  this  state,  it  is  not  of 
controlling  importance  that  the  doctrine  of  this  and  other  early 
cases  is  said  to  be  questioned  in  England  at  the  present  day. 

In  a  jurisdiction  where  the  doctrine  of  Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20 
N.  Y.  268,  is  the  settled  law,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  sustaining 
both  in  law  and  equity  the  kindred  principle  announced  in  Dut- 
ton V.  Poole,  1  Vent.  318. 

It  is  quite  impossible  to  follow  the  learned  counsel  on  both 
sides  of  this  case  in  the  exceedingly  interesting  and  exhaustive 
discussion  of  the  questions  involved,  as  the  limits  of  an  ordi- 
nary opinion  forbid  it. 

We  shall  content  ourselves  with  the  citation  of  but  one  more 
case.  In  Todd  v.  Weber,  95  N.  Y.  181,  47  Am.  Rep.  20,  this- 
court  held  that  the  relation  of  parent  and  child,  even  between 
a  father  and  his  illegitimate  daughter,  was  a  sufficient  consid- 
eration for  a  contract  made  by  him  with  the  relatives  of  his  un- 
fortunate child  to  pay  for  her  support  and  maintenance,  and 
that  she  could  enforce  it  by  action.  The  learned  judge  writing 
for  the  court  in  that  case,  in  an  opinion  that  does  honor  to  hi& 
heart  as  well  as  his  intellect,  quotes  with  approval  Dutton  t. 
Poole,  1  Vent.  318. 

We  see  no  valid  distinction  in  principle  between  the  relation 
of  parent  and  child  and  husband  and  wife  as  affording  an  ample 
consideration  for  covenants  inuring  to  the  benefit  of  the  child 
or  wife.  The  relation  of  husband  and  wife  has  been  twice 
recognized  in  this  state  in  cases  just  cited  as  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration for  supporting  a  covenant  in  the  wife's  favor,  anci 
amply  sustains  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  in  the  case  at  bar. 


464  Buchanan  t;.  Tilden.  [New  York, 

This  court  has  recently  held  that  while  the  common-law  rule 
that  husband  and  wife  are  one  has  been  to  some  extent  abro- 
gated *^^  by  special  legislation,  yet  there  are  situations  where 
that  unity  still  exists:  Wetmore  v.  "Wetmore,  149  N".  Y.  530, 
529,  52  Am.  St.  Eep.  752;  Bertles  v.  Kunan,  92  K  Y.  152,  44 
Am.  Eep.  361. 

The  case  before  us  illustrates  a  situation  where  that  unity 
survives  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  wife  to  enforce  a  cove- 
nant for  her  benefit  made  by  her  husband,  and  which  equity 
and  good  conscience  approve. 

The  appellate  division  refer  to  Durnherr  v.  Rau,  135  N.  Y. 
219,  as  "a  ca&e  while  not  directly  in  point  is  in  its  controlling 
principles  adverse  to  the  plaintiff's  right  to  maintain  this  ac- 
tion." 

We  think  that  case  has  no  application  to  the  one  before  us. 
The  husband  of  plaintiff  conveyed  to  the  defendant  certain 
premises,  the  latter  covenanting  to  pay  all  encumbrances  on 
the  premises  '^y  mortgage  or  otherwise.'* 

The  deed  declared  that  the  wife  (the  plaintiff)  reserved  her 
right  of  dower.  By  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  on  the  prem- 
ises, existing  at  the  time  of  the  conveyance  and  in  which  the 
wife  joined,  her  dower  interest  was  extinguished.  The  wife 
sued  on  the  defendant's  covenant  in  the  deed  to  pay  all  encum- 
brances, and  sought  to  recover  the  value  of  her  dower  interest 
cut  off  by  the  foreclosure.  This  court  held  that  the  covenant 
was  with  the  husband  alone,  as  the  wife  was  not  bound  to  pay 
the  mortgages,  and  that  the  joinder  of  the  wife  in  the  mort- 
gages was  a  voluntary  surrender  of  her  right  of  dower  for  the 
benefit  of  the  husband,  and  bound  her  interest  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  protect  the  securities. 

It  is  perfectly  clear  under  this  state  of  facts  that  the  hus- 
band rested  under  no  duty  to  protect  the  wife's  dower  interest. 
There  was  no  legal  or  equitable  obligation  which  the  wife  could 
lay  hold  of  to  enable  her  to  sue  on  the  covenant.  The  court 
points  out  that  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  performance  of  a 
covenant  may  benefit  a  third  person,  but  it  must  have  been 
entered  into  for  his  benefit. 

The  case  at  bar  is  decided  upon  its  peculiar  facts.  We  do 
not  hold  that  the  mere  relation  of  husband  and  wife  alone  con- 
-gtituted  a  sufficient  consideration  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  *^* 
maintain  this  action.  We  deem  it  unnecessary  to  decide  that 
<luestion  at  this  time.  What  we  do  hold  is,  that  the  equities 
of  the  plaintiff  were  such  that  when  considered  in  connection 


Jan.  1899.]  Buchanan  v.  Tilden.  465 

with  the  duty  of  her  husband  to  provide  for  her  future,  and 
with  that  purpose  in  view,  the  money  was  procured  for  the  de- 
fendant to  institute  and  pursue  the  necessary  litigation  to  se- 
cure the  fund  to  which  her  equities  related,  all  taken  together, 
were  sufficient  to  sustain  the  plaintiff's  action. 

The  order  of  the  appellate  division  granting  a  new  trial  and 
the  judgment  entered  thereon  should  be  reversed  and  the 
original  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  and  against  the  de- 
fendant affirmed,  with  costs  in  all  the  courts. 


GRAY,  .T.,  dissented.  He  thought  that  the  order  appealed  from 
should  be  affirmed,  and  that  any  other  doctrine  than  that  laid  down 
by  the  appellate  division  would  be  without  support  In  principle, 
or  in  the  cases.  "The  question  is,"  he  said,  "whether  the  plaintiff 
had  a  cause  of  action  upon  the  contract  It  seems  to  me  that  this 
case  Is  not  brought  within  that  class  of  cases  wherein  a  third 
person  Is  entitled  to  enforce  a  promise  which  has  been  made  by  one 
person  to  another,  because  of  the  absence  of  the  essential  element 
thaf  some  liability  or  duty  must  exist  frotn  the  promisee  to  such 
third  person  in  connection  therewith.  As  it  was  held  In  Durnherr 
T.  Ran,  135  N.  Y.  219,  the  rule  is  that  to  permit  a  third  party  to  en- 
force such  a  promise,  the  promisee  must  have  a  legal  Interest  that 
the  covenant  be  performed  in  favor  of  the  party  claiming  per- 
formance. How  was  that  the  case  here?  Could  It  be  because  of 
the  general  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff's  husband  to 
support  and  maintain  her?  That,  of  course,  is  a  well-recognized 
obligation  In  the  law;  but  did  the  contract  in  question  have  that 
for  Its  object?  I  cannot  so  regard  It.  It  related  solely  to  the  pay- 
ment of  a  large  sum  of  money  contingently  upon  the  success  of 
s.  certain  litigation,  of  which  the  defendant  was  the  promoter,  and 
promised  a  reward  or  compensation  to  the  party  with  whom  made 
for  his  aid  in  furnishing  the  needed  moneys.  It  is  perfectly  clear 
that  this  contract  was  not  based  upon  marital  obligations;  but 
that  It  was  simply  a  mode,  suggested  by  the  husband  and  adopted 
by  both  parties,  for  the  payment,  by  the  defendant,  of  the  consld- 
■eration  for  his,  the  plaintiff's  husband's,  services  In  the  matter.  It 
<ioes  not  appear  that  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  has  any  other 
basis  than  the  mere  fact  of  the  marital  relation.  While  that  re- 
lation Imposes  strong  legal  and  moral  obligations  upon  the  hus- 
band, it  Is  difficult  to  see  that  they  Involve  a  liability  on  his  part 
to  provide  a  separate  estate  for  his  wife,  and  yet,  if  there  Is  not 
that  liability,  what  liability  was  there  toward  ihe  plaintiff,  which 
furnished  the  element  required  to  exist  in  order  that  the  third  per- 
son, the  plaintiff  here,  might  claim  the  right  to  enforce  the  prom- 
ise? It  Is  not  necessary  that  the  wife  should  be  privy  to  the  con- 
sideration of  the  promise;  but  it  is  necessary  that  the  promisee, 
tier  husband,  should  owe  some  debt  or  duty  to  her,  in  connection 
with  the  promise,  to  enable  her  to  sue  upon  it. 
AM.  ST.  RKP.,  \  oL.  Lxx.— ao 


466  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson.    [New  York, 

"I  think  that  the  insuperable  legal  objection  to  the  plaintiff'* 
cause  of  action  is,  that  the  contract  in  question  was  not  on* 
which  looked  toward  the  discharge  of  any  obligation  owing  by  him. 
to  her,  and,  therefore,  is  not  enforceable  upon  the  doctrine  which 
underlies  the  cases  where,  as  in  the  relation  of  parent  and  child, 
the  promisee  owed  a  duty  which  the  contract  was  supposed  to 
meet.  I  am  prepared  to  admit,  as  it  is  argued,  that  we  should 
recognize  the  obligation  of  the  husband  to  support  the  wife  to  be- 
as  meritorious  as  the  obligation  of  the  parent  to  support  the  child,, 
and,  if  this  contract  could  be  regarded  in  that  light,  I  might  be 
prepared  to  extend  to  the  present  case  the  principle  of  the  case» 
referred  to.  But,  as  previously  suggested,  the  relationship  betweea 
the  parties  here  does  not  help  us  out  in  endeavoring  to  find  sup- 
port for  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  for  the  reason  that  the  con- 
tract which  is  sought  to  be  enforced  does  not  bear  upon  the  hus- 
band's obligation  and  is  not  connected  with  it,  but  simply  provide* 
for  the  payment  of  a  sum  of  money  as  a  compensation  for  his  ser- 
vices in  the  event  of  success." 


CONTRACT  FOK  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PERSON— ACTION.-^ 
A  person  for  whose  benefit  an  express  promise  is  made  in  a  valid 
contract  between  others  may  maintain  an  action  thereon  in  his  owo 
name,  although  made  without  his  knowledge  and  without  any 
consideration  moving  from  him:  Brown  v.  Markland,  16  Utah,  360,. 
67  Am.  St.  Rep.  629,  and  note.  Compare  Jefferson  v.  Asch,  53 
Minn.  446.  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  618;  Hicks  v.  Hamilton,  144  Mo.  495» 
66  Am.  St.  Rep.  431;  and  see  monographic  note  to  Linnerman  v. 
Moross,  39  Am.  St.  Hep.  531-535,  on  promise  for  the  benefit  of  a 
third  person. 


Fall  Beook  Coal  Company  v.  Hewson. 

[158  New  Yoek,  160.] 

WITNESSES— IMPEACHING  ONE'S  OWN.— A  party  caiinot 
Bhow  inconsistent  statements  made  by  his  own  witness  for  the  pur- 
pose of  impeaching  him. 

WITNESSES— OFFER  OF— WHEN  COMPLETE.- A  persott 
is  not  made  a  witness  so  as  to  burden  the  party  calling  him  with 
the  necessity  of  supporting  his  character  to  the  end  of  the  trials 
until  he  is  called,  sworn,  and  some  material  question  is  asked  and 
answered. 

WITNESSES-OFFER  OF— IMPEACHMENT.— If  a  party 
calls  a  witness,  but  excuses  him  after  he  is  sworn,  but  before  any 
material  question  is  asked,  he  is  not  afterward  precluded  from  Im- 
peaching his  credibility  by  contradicting  him,  where  the  witness- 
gives  material  testimony  for  the  other  side. 

APPEAL—EXCEPTION  TO  PART  OF  CHARGE.— An  ex- 
ception to  part  of  a  charge  cannot  be  made  to  apply  to  any  other 
portion  than  that  to  which  it  apparently  relates. 

Action  to  recover  money  alleged  to  be  due  for  cold  storage^ 
service   rendered  by  the  plaintiff    company  to  the   defendants 


Feb.  1899.]      Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson.  467 

As  a  counterclaim,  the  defendant  interposed  that  the  services 
rendered  were  worthless  because  of  the  plaintiff's  neglect,  and 
that  he  had  been  damaged  to  the  amount  of  two  thousand  dol- 
lars, for  which  he  demanded  an  affirmative  judgment.  There 
was  a  judgment  below  for  the  defendant,  and  the  company  ap- 
pealed. 

Albert  H,  Harris,  for  the  appellant. 

C.  W.  Kimball,  for  the  respondent. 

i«*  PARKER,  C.  J.  The  defendant  called  as  a  witness  one 
Wilson,  who,  after  being  sworn,  testified  as  follows:  "I  reside 
in  Penn  Yan.  I  know  the  defendant.  I  did  not  work  for  him 
in  the  spring  of  1893;  I  was  at  the  cold  storage  at  that  time 
about  ten  minutes  in  the  fore  part  of  April."  No  other  ques- 
tions were  asked  him,  nor  did  he  give  any  further  testimony, 
and  the  testimony  quoted  had  no  bearing  whatever  upon  the 
issues  on  trial.  It  is  suggested  that  he  was  called  under  a  mis- 
apprehension, but  be  that  as  it  may,  we  shall  assume  merely 
in  passiDg  on  the  question  growing  out  of  his  being  called  and 
Bwom,  that  before  any  material  question  was  asked,  the  party 
calling  the  witness  excused  him  from  the  witness  stand.  When 
the  plaintiil  came  to  present  evidence  in  rebuttal  of  the  testi- 
mony adduced  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  it  ^^^  called  Wil- 
son to  the  stand,  and  he  gave  material  testimony  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff.  The  defendant,  claiming  the  right  to  cross-examine 
liim,  asked  him  whether  he  had  not,  at  specified  times  and 
places,  made  to  other  persons  statements  tending  to  contradict^ 
the  testimony  given  by  him  upon  the  plaintiff's  examination. 
Wilson  denied  having  made  them,  and  the  defendant  afterward 
called  witnesses  who  testified  that  Wilson  had  made  the  con- 
tradictory statements  that  he  specifically  denied  having  made; 
to  this  evidence  the  plaintiff  objected,  upon  the  ground  that  it 
was  incompeent,  in  that  the  defendant,  having  first  sworn  and 
examined  Wilson  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  could  not  be 
allowed  to  discredit  him  by  giving  testimony  that  he  had  made 
statements  out  of  court  differing  from  his  statements  as  a  wit- 
ness in  court.  The  exception  to  the  ruling  of  the  court  admit- 
ting the  evidence  notwithstanding  the  objection,  presents  one 
of  the  opinions  which,  on  this  review,  it  is  urged,  call  for  a  re- 
versal of  the  judgment.  Upon  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  this 
question  was  very  carefully  considered  by  Mr.  Justice  Rumsey, 
who  reached  the  conclusion  that  no  error  had  been  committed, 
and  the  general  term  has  affirmed  the  position  thus  taken. 


468  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson.      [New  York, 

As  the  question  is  a  novel  one,  we  shall  briefly  state  the  rea- 
sons that  persuade  us  that  the  view  taken  by  the  learned  court 
was  the  correct  one. 

The  rule  is  well  settled  in  this  state  that  a  party  cannot  show 
inconsistent  statements  made  by  his  own  witness  for  the  pur- 
pose, of  impeaching  him :  Coulter  v.  American  etc.  Ex.  Co.,  56 
K  Y.  585;  Nichols  v.  White,  85  N.  Y.  531;  Hankinson  v. 
Vantine,  152  N.  Y.  20,  27.  This  rule,  which  was  originally  es- 
tablished by  authority,  came  to  us  from  England,  where,  as  in 
some  of  our  sister  states,  it  has  since  been  either  abrogated  or 
modified  by  statute:  Stephen  on  Evidence,  Chase's  ed.,  329, 
note;  Selover  v.  Bryant,  54  Minn.  434,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  349, 
21  L.  E.  A.  418,  note;  2  American  Law  Review,  261.  Green- 
leaf  on  Evidence,  volume  1,  section  442,  states  the  reason  for 
the  rule  as  follows:  "When  a  party  offers  a  witness  in  proof  of 
his  cause  he  thereby,  in  general,  represents  him  as  worthy  of 
belief.  He  is  presumed  *'*'*  to  know  the  character  of  the  wit- 
nesses he  adduces;  and  having  thus  presented  them  to  the 
court  the  law  will  not  permit  the  party  afterward  to  impeach 
their  general  reputation  for  truth,  or  to  impugn  their  credibility 
by  general  evidence  tending  to  show  them  to  be  unworthy  of  be- 
lief. For  this  would  enable  him  to  destroy  the  witness  if  he 
spoke  against  him,  and  to  make  him  a  good  witness  if  he  spoke 
for  him,  with  the  means  in  his  hand  of  destroying  his  credit  if 
he  spoke  against  him":  See,  also,  Wharton  on  Evidence,  sec. 
549.  The  rule  being  established  beyond  change,  save  by  legis- 
lative enactment,  that  one  cannot  impeach  his  own  witness,  the 
question  presented  here  is,  whether  Wilson  became  the  defend- 
ant's witness  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule.  Would  he  have 
become  such  had  his  name  been  simply  called  without  admin- 
istering the  oath  ?  If  not,  would  he  have  become  such  through 
the  additional  act  of  administering  the  oath  ?  If  the  propound- 
ing of  questions  be  also  necessary,  would  an  inquiry  as  to  his 
name  and  residence  have  made  him  the  party's  witness  in  such 
a  sense  that  he  would  be  bound  to  support  his  character  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  trial,  or  would  that  have  hap- 
pened only  upon  some  questions  being  asked  him  material  to 
the  issues  on  trial? 

It  often  happens  that  a  witness  is  intentionally  but  unad- 
visedly called,  the  counsel  for  the  moment  laboring  under  the 
impression  that  the  witness  has  knowledge  of  some  fact  it  is 
desirable  to  establish,  but  before  his  examination  has  proceeded 
far  enough  to  bring  about  an  inquiry  touching  any  material 


Feb.  1899.]      Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson.  469 

fact  to  the  controversy,  counsel  is  advised  by  an  associate,  op 
by  the  party,  that  the  wrong  witness  has  been  called,  and  that 
some  other  person  is  possessed  of  the  information  he  desires  to 
have  given  to  the  court.  In  such  a  case  it  would  clearly  seem 
to  be  a  hardship  that  an  error  thus  committed,  which  quite 
frequently  happens,  in  the  press  of  trial,  should  burden  a  party 
with  the  responsibility  of  having  the  person  called  treated  as 
a  witness  for  that  purpose  throughout  the  trial. 

So  far  as  the  diligence  of  the  counsel  and  our  examination 
have  disclosed,  this  precise  question  has  not  been  before  the 
**^  court  of  last  resort  in  any  of  the  states  except  Connecticut, 
where,  many  years  ago,  in  the  case  of  Bebee  v.  Tinker,  2  Root, 
160,  a  witness  was  called  and  sworn;  as  to  the  point  regarding 
which  the  plaintiff  had  called  him  to  testify,  the  court  ruled 
that  it  was  not  relevant  to  the  issue,  and  thereupon  the  defend- 
ant took  the  witness  and  asked  him  several  questions,  the  an- 
swers made  by  him  being  against  the  plaintiff.  Thereupon  the 
plaintiff  offered  to  introduce  witnesses  to  impeach,  which  was 
objected  to  on  the  ground  that  he  was  the  plaintiff's  witness. 
The  report  of  the  case  concludes  with:  "The  court  admitted 
the  witnesses  to  impeach  his  character,  on  the  ground  that,  al- 
though the  plaintiff  introduced  him,  yet  as  the  defendant  only 
improved  him,  in  that  respect  he  was  to  be  considered  as  the 
defendant's  witness." 

In  England,  where  the  rule  originated,  the  tendency  of  the 
courts  seems  to  have  been  not  to  apply  it  unless  the  party  has 
proceeded  so  far  with  the  witness  as  to  ask  him  some  question 
bearing  upon  the  issues  on  trial.  In  Creevy  v.  Carr,  7  Carr. 
&  P.  64,  a  witness  was  called  for  the  defendant  and  asked: 
"Are  you  the  landlord  of  the  house  at  which  the  fire  occurred  ?'* 
The  witness  answered:  "I  am,  sir."  Thereupon  the  court 
asked  the  defendant's  counsel:  "What  do  you  propose  to  prove 
more?"  and  he  replied:  "My  lord,  I  will  close  my  case  here." 
The  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  said:  "I  wish  to  cross-examine 
the  landlord";  and  the  court  said:  "Oh,  no,  I  stopped  his  evi- 
dence." Counsel:  "He  was  asked  a  question  and  he  answered 
it,  and  I  have,  therefore,  a  right  to  cross-examine  him."  The 
court:  "Not  where  the  witness,  as  here,  has  only  been  asked 
an  immaterial  question  and  his  evidence  is  stopped  by  the 
judge." 

In  "Wood  v.  Mackinson,  2  Moody  &  R.  273,  a  witness  was 
called  for  the  plaintiff  and  sworn  in  the  usual  way,  but  before 
he  had  put  any  questions  to  the  witness,  counsel  stated  that  he 


470  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson.     [New  York, 

had  been  misinstructed  as  to  what  the  witness  was  ahle  to 
prove,  and  he  should  not  examine  him  at  all.  The  witness 
being  about  to  retire,  counsel  for  the  defendant  claimed  the 
right  to  cross-examine  him,  but  the  court  said:  "Here  the  ^^^ 
learned  counsel  explains  that  there  has  been  a  mistake,  which 
consisted  in  this,  that  the  witness  is  found  not  to  be  able  to 
speak  at  all  as  to  the  transaction  which  was  supposed  to  be 
within  his  knowledge.  This  is,  I  think,  such  a  mistake  as  en- 
titles the  party  calling  the  witness  to  withdraw  him  without  his 
being  subject  to  cross-examination." 

In  Bracegirdle  v.  Bailey,  1  Fost.  &  F.  636,  the  plaintiff  was 
sworn  and  tendered  as  a  witness  for  cross-examination,  but  was 
not  examined  in  chief.  The  defendant's  counsel  asked  several 
questions  touching  his  conduct  and  life;  but  the  court  ruled 
that  these  questions  could  not  be  asked,  inasmuch  as  he  has 
proved  nothing  "that  you  could  cross-examine  him  on  to  dis- 
credit him." 

In  Eush  V.  Smith,  1  Cromp.,  M.  &  R.  94,  it  was  held  that 
a  witness  called  to  produce  documents,  and  sworn  by  mistake, 
and  a  question  put  to'him  that  he  does  not  answer,  does  not  en- 
title the  opposite  party  to  cross-examine  him. 

■The  general  view  upon  which  these  cases  proceeded  is  that 
a  party  does  not  necessarily  make  a  person  his  witness  by 
merely  calling  and  swearing  him,  and  we  are  not  able  to  dis- 
cover any  good  reason  for  disagreeing  with  them.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  seems  to  us  that  the  rule  is  not  properly  applicable, 
save  in  cases  where  a  party  attempts  to  elicit  from  a  witness 
called  to  the  stand,  testimony  material  to  the  issues  upon  trial ; 
that  until  such  an  attempt  is  made,  the  party  has  done  nothing 
that  can  by  any  possibility  affect  the  trial  either  to  his  own 
benefit  or  to  the  harm  of  his  opponent,  and,  therefore,  he  has 
not  offered  a  witness  in  proof  of  his  cause  and  is  not  within 
the  reason  of  the  rule  that  burdens  him  with  the  necessity  of 
supporting  the  character  of  the  witness  to  the  end  of  the  trial. 
His  mistake,  however  caused,  has  not  harmed  the  other  party, 
and  the  interests  of  justice  can  in  nowise  be  promoted  by  per- 
mitting that  other  party  to  take  such  advantage  of  the  mistake 
as  will  fasten  upon  his  opponent  the  responsibility  of  vouching 
for  the  character  of  a  witness  actually  hostile  and  from  whom 
he  has  not  attempted  to  secure  any  proof  in  the  cause. 

150  rpj^g  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  urges  that  his  ex- 
ception taken  to  that  portion  of  the  charge  in  which  the  court 
stated  "that   the  plaintiff   was  not   entitled  to   recover  if  the 


Feb.  1899.]      Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson,  471 

plant  was  not  properly  run,"  calls  for  a  reversal  of  the  judg- 
ment. The  defendant  admitted  the  making  of  the  contract 
upon  which  the  plaintiff  sued,  but  alleged  that  the  contract 
had  not  been  properly  performed  by  the  plaintiff  and  sought 
to  recover  his  damages.  In  the  charge  to  the  jury  the  oourt 
did  say  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover  for  the  services 
unless  it  convinced  the  jury  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  evidence 
that  it  did  keep  the  apples  in  proper  cold  storage,  et  cetera. 
But  as  we  read  the  exception  it  was  not  intended  to  have,  nor 
is  it  likely  it  had,  the  effect  of  calling  the  attention  of  the  court 
to  the  fact  that  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  claimed  that  there 
was  error  in  the  charge  as  to  the  burden  of  proof.  The  lan- 
guage of  the  exception  apparently  related  solely  to  another 
portion  of  the  charge,  in  which  the  court  said  that  if  the  jury 
should  find  "that  the  rotting  was  the  result  of  the  plant  hav- 
ing been  improperly  run,  it  follows  that  the  plaintiff  has  not 
performed  its  contract;  it  also  follows  that  whatever  damage 
has  been  thus  caused  to  the  defendant,  he  should  be  compen- 
sated for  in  this  action."  This  portion  of  the  charge  was  not 
■error,  and  the  exception  to  which  our  attention  is  called  pointed 
to  this  and  to  no  other  part  of  the  charge. 
The  judgment  should  be  affirmed  with  costs. 

All  concur. 


WITNESS— IMPEACHMENT  BY  PARTY  CALLING.— A  wltneM 
<;annot  be  impeached  by  the  party  calling  him,  but  such  party  may 
prove  the  truth  by  other  witnesses,  even  though  they  contradict  the 
vfitness  first  called:  Blackwell  v.  Wright,  27  Neb.  2G9,  20  Am.  St. 
Rep.  062:  notes  to  Phoenix  Assur.  Co.  v.  McAuthor,  67  Am.  St.  Rep. 
156;  Selover  v.  Bryant,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  353. 

WITNESSES  — IMPEACHMENT  — MATERIALITY  OF  TESTI- 
MONY.—After  a  witness  is  sworn  and  testifies,  the  adverse  party 
is  entitled  to  impeach  his  general  reputation  for  truth,  without  ref- 
erence to  the  materiality  of  his  testimony:  Davis  v.  Commonwealth, 
95  Ky.  19,  44  Am.  St  Rep.  201. 

EXCEPTIONS  ON  APPEAL  must  be  specific,  pointed,  and  ex- 
plicit; and,  if  indefinite,  cannot  be  considered:  Atkins  t.  Field,  8ft 
Me.  2S1,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  424. 


472  Weston  v.  Sybacusb,  [New^York, 


Weston  v.  Syracuse. 

[158  New  York.  274.] 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
POWER  OF  CITY  COUNCIL  TO  WAIVE  COMPLIANCE  WITH. 
If  the  charter  of  a  city  does  not  make  all  details  in  the  construc- 
tion of  sewei-8  the  basis  of  the  consent  of  property  owners,  but 
leaves  such  details  to  the  common  council,  that  body  has  power  to 
waive  the  performance  of  any  of  the  requirements  of  a  sewer  con- 
tract. Hence,  after  part  of  the  work  under  a  sewer  contract  has 
been  done,  but  not  in  conformity  with  the  contract,  the  common, 
council  may,  before  the  completion  of  the  work,  so  modify  the  con- 
tract as  to  make  it  conform  with  the  work  already  done,  leaving- 
the  remaining  portion  of  the  work  to  be  constructed  according  tO' 
the  terms  of  the  original  contract,  without  modification. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  — SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
CERTIFICATE  OF  CITY  ENGINEER— SUFFICIENCY  OF.-If 
part  of  the  work  under  a  sewer  contract  has  been  done,  but  not  in 
conformity  with  the  specifications,  and  the  city  council  passes  a 
resolution  modifying  the  contract  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  the 
work  already  done,  a  requirement  in  the  contract  that  the  con- 
tractor shall  obtain  the  city  engineer's  certificate  of  compliance 
with  the  contract  as  a  prerequisite  to  payment,  is  satisfied  by  a 
certificate  that  the  work  done  before  the  resolution  complies  with 
the  contract  as  modified,  while  the  remainder  complies  with  it,  as 
unmodified. 

PAYMENT— EFFECT  OF  PRESCRIBING  WAY  OF.— If  a 
way  of  payment  is  prescribed  by  statute,  or  by  contract,  that  way 
must  be  strictly  pursued. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT 
WITH— REMEDIES  TO  ENFORCE  PAYMENT.— If  a  city  con- 
tracts  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  or  other  local  improvement,, 
and  the  only  way  provided  for  payment  is  through  a  special  as- 
sessment, it  is  the  duty  of  the  city  to  collect  the  assessment  and 
turn  over  the  proceeds  to  the  contractor;  and,  if  It  does  not  pro- 
ceed with  reasonable  diligence  to  do  so,  he  may  and  should  pro- 
ceed by  mandamus  to  compel  such  action  on  its  part;  but,  if  the 
city  disables  itself  from  performing  the  contract  by  some  act  which 
renders  the  assessment  void  and  uncollectible,  or  if  it  refuses  to 
perform  the  contract,  then  the  contractor's  remedy  against  the  city 
Is  by  action  for  breach  of  the  contract. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
CONTRACTOR'S  RIGHT  OF  ACTION  FOR  BREACH  OF.— If  a 
city  contracts  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  or  other  local  im- 
provement, provision  being  made  in  the  contract  that  no  payment 
shall  be  made  until  the  cost  has  been  collected  by  a  special  assess- 
ment, and  the  work  Is  done  according  to  the  contract  as  originally 
executed,  or  as  lawfully  modified,  the  contractor  Is  entitled  to  main- 
tain an  action  against  the  cily  for  breach  of  contract  where  the 
latter  Ignores  the  plaintiff's  rights  In  the  premises,  not  only  by  re- 
fusing to  make  the  assessment,  but  by  repudiating  the  contract^ 
and  entering  into  an  agreement  with  others  for  reconstructing  a 
portion  of  the  sewer. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
WHAT  ACT  IS  ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  NOT  LEGISLATIVE- 
POWER  OP  COURTS.— If  a  contract  for  the  construction  of  a 
fiewer  is  modified  by  a  city  council,  by  resolution,  the  action  takea 


Feb.  1899.]  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  473 

by  sucB  resolution  Is  not  a  legislative  act,  but  an  administrative 
one,  and  is  not  free  from  direct  review  or  collateral  attacl^  in  tli» 
courts. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
RESOLUTION  MODIFYING  IS  VITIATED  BY  FRAUD  AND 
CORRUPTION— INVALIDITY  OF,  AS  A  DEFENSE.— A  resolutloa 
passed  by  a  city  council,  modifying  a  contract  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  sewer  can,  if  adopted  by  means  of  fraud  and  corruption, 
be  declared  of  no  effect  by  tlie  courts;  and  the  invalidity  of  the- 
resolution  is  a  good  defense,  on  the  part  of  the  city,  to  an  action 
brought  by  the  contractor,  especially  if  he  was  a  guilty  participant 
in  the  fraud. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  DEFENSE  TO  CON- 
TRACTOR'S SUIT— WHAT  MAY  BE  INTERPOSED.— That  which 
a  taxpayer  can  accomplish  for  the  protection  of  a  city,  by  a  suit 
under  the  "taxpayer's  act,"  the  officers  of  the  city,  whose  duty  it 
is  to  protect  its  property  from  waste  and  Injury,  may  bring  about 
by  a  defense  to  an  action  brought  by  a  contractor  to  recover  on  a 
contract  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  or  other  local  inprovement. 

ESTOPPEL  AGAINST  CITY— SEWER  CONTRACT— BRIB- 
ERY—KNOWLEDGE  OF  OFFICERS.— A  city  is  not  estopped  by 
the  conduct  of  its  officers  from  denying  the  validity  of  a  resolu- 
tion passed  by  the  city  council,  modifying  a  contract  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  sewer,  alleged  to  have  been  brought  about  by  bribery^ 
where  it  does  not  appear  that  the  officers  of  the  city  knew  of  the 
alleged  bribery  at  the  time  of  the  several  acts  which  the  plaintiff 
relies  upon  to  create  an  estoppel. 

Action  brought  by  John  "Weston,  the  survivor  of  his  dcceasecl 
partner,  Charles  Utting,  to  recover  a  balance  alleged  to  be  due 
upon  a  contract  entered  into  between  the  firm  of  Weston  & 
Utting  and  the  city  of  Syracuse  for  the  construction  of  the 
Kennedy  street  sewer.  Shortly  after  the  contract  was  entered 
into,  about  fourteen  hundred  and  fifty-three  feet  of  the  sewer 
were  constructed,  and  a  change  in  the  city  government  took 
place,  which  resulted  in  a  change  of  city  engineers,  and  the 
new  engineer,  after  some  investigation,  reported  to  the  common 
council  that  the  sewer  was  not  being  constructed  in  accordance 
with  the  contract.  The  council  suspended  the  work,  and,  after 
investigation,  passed,  on  July  29,  1890,  a  resolution  amending 
the  contract  for  the  work  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  the  work 
already  done,  but  leaving  the  remaining  portion  of  the  sewer  te 
be  constructed  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  contract  as 
it  originally  stood.  The  nature  of  the  certificate  required  of 
the  engineer  appears  in  the  opinion.  The  other  part  of  the 
sewer,  it  was  conceded  on  all  sides,  was  completed  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  the  contract,  but  the  city  failed  to  levy  and 
collect  an  assessment  to  pay  for  the  work,  and  it  was  resolved 
by  the  city  council  on  December  12,  1892,  that  the  contractors, 
having  failed,  upon  notice,  "to  take  the  necessary  steps  within 
three  days  to  put  their  work  in  a  condition  to  fulfill  the  term» 


474  Weston  v.  Syeacusb.  [New  York, 

of  their  contract/'  had  abandoned  the  contract.  The  city  au- 
thorities not  only  refused  to  accept  the  contract  as  completed, 
but  formally  declared  it  not  completed.  The  court  decided 
that,  as  to  the  variations  in  the  construction  of  the  sewer  re- 
ferred to  in  the  resolution  of  July  29,  the  common  council  had 
waived  strict  performance  and  modified  the  contract  to  that  ex- 
tent, and  that  they  had  also  waived  such  defects  as  had  come 
to  the  knowlege  of  the  common  council  before  passing  this  reso- 
lution, although  the  defects  were  not  mentioned  therein,  and 
he  submitted  to  the  jury  the  question  whether  in  all  other  re- 
spects there  was  a  substantial  performance  of  the  contract  by 
the  contractors,  and  the  verdict  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  con- 
stituted an  affirmative  answer  to  that  question.  The  judgment 
thereon  was  affirmed  at  the  general  term,  and  the  city  appealed. 

Charles  E.  Ide,  for  the  appellant. 

■George  H.  Sears,  for  the  respondent. 

281  PARKER,  C.  J.  On  this  review  it  must  be  taken  as 
established  by  the  verdict  of  the  jury  that  the  plaintiffs  sub- 
stantially performed  their  contract  with  the  defendant,  ex- 
cept as  to  the  construction  of  the  first  fourteen  hundred  and 
fifty-three  feet  of  the  sewer,  the  work  upon  which  was  done 
prior  to  the  investigation  by  the  common  council.  That  in- 
vestigation resulted  in  a  resolution  waiving  performance  so  far 
as  the  work  done  was  not  in  conformity  with  the  plans  and 
specifications,  and  modifying  the  contract  to  the  extent  that  it 
should  be  in  conformity  with  the  work  already  done.  The 
trial  court  decided  that  the  resolution  of  July  29,  1890,  ef- 
fected that  result.  The  appellant  concedes  that  such  was  the 
purpose  of  the  common  council,  but  nevertheless  insists  that  it 
was  beyond  the  power  of  that  body  to  waive  performance  of  any 
of  the  requirements  of  the  contract  or  specifications,  and  that  in 
holding  otherwise  error  was  committed. 

2®^  The  result  of  our  examination  of  the  charter  of  the  city 
of  Syracuse  lead«  us  to  the  conclusion  that  it  does  not  place  any 
limitations  upon  the  powers  of  the  common  council  in  respect 
to  such  acts  as  the  common  council  undertook  to  perform  by 
means  of  the  resolution  in  question.  Aside  from  certain  limi- 
tations that  we  need  not  specify,  all  details  are  left  to  the  com- 
mon council,  and  not  made  the  basis  of  the  consent  of  the  prop- 
erty owners.  The  modification  attempted,  therefore,  was  within 
the  power  of  the  common  council  under  the  ruling  of  this  court 


Feb.  1899.]  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  476 

in  Meech  v.  Buffalo,  29  N.  Y.  198;  Moore  v.  Albany,  98  K  Y. 
396;  and  Voght  v.  Buffalo,  133  N.  Y.  463. 

The  appellant  next  contends  that  the  failure  to  obtain  the 
certificate  of  the  engineer  entitled  the  defendant  to  a  dismissal 
of  the  complaint.  \Ve  think  the  certificate  obtained  was  in  com- 
pliance with  the  contract  as  modified  by  the  resolution  of  July 
^9,  1890.  The  engineer  could  not  certify  that  the  work  was 
performed  in  accordance  with  the  original  contract  and  specifi- 
cations, because  such  was  not  the  fact,  but  he  did  certify  in 
effect  that  the  work  done  after  the  twenty-ninth  day  of  July, 
1890,  was  in  accordance  with  the  contract  and  specifications, 
while  the  work  done  prior  to  that  date  was  in  conformity  with 
the  resolution  adopted  by  the  common  council,  by  which  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  modify  the  contract.  It  was,  in  effect,  there- 
fore, a  certificate  that  the  work  had  been  performed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  original  contract  as  modified  by  the  resolution  of 
July  29,  1890,  and  was  sufficient. 

The  appellant  also  insists  that  the  action  was  prematurely 
brought,  because  no  part  of  the  contract  price  has  been  assessed 
or  collected.  The  contract  provides:  "No  payment  shall  be 
made  to  the  party  of  the  first  part  under  this  contract,  until 
the  cost  of  such  work  shall  have  been  ascertained  and  assessed 
upon  and  collected  from  the  taxpayers  liable  to  local  taxation 
for  the  same  ....  and  as  soon  thereafter  as  the  costs  of  said 
work  shall  have  been  collected  from  said  taxpayers,  the  party 
of  the  first  part  shall  be  entitled  to  receive  the  amount  due 
on  said  final  account."  This  clause  *®^  in  the  contract  is 
not  an  unusual  one,  nor  is  it,  or  at  least  an  equivalent  provision, 
a  stranger  to  the  courts.  As  long  ago  as  the  action  of  Hunt  v. 
TJtica,  18  N.  Y.  442,  the  court  had  under  consideration  a  con- 
tract of  this  character.  After  its  completion,  and  on  the  six- 
teenth day  of  November,  the  claim  for  compensation  was  al- 
lowed by  the  common  council,  "payable  when  collected  by  as- 
sessment.'* On  the  7th  of  December  following,  the  common 
council  made  the  necessary  assessment,  and  directed  that  meas- 
ures be  taken  for  the  collection  thereof.  On  January  26th  the 
cissignee  of  the  contractor  commenced  an  action  to  recover  the 
contract  price.  At  that  time  no  part  of  the  assessment  had 
been  paid,  but  five  days  later  the  treasurer  issued  a  warrant  for 
its  collection,  which  was  in  the  hands  of  the  collector  at  the 
time  of  the  commencement  of  the  action.  It  was  held  that  the 
plaintiff  could  not  recover.  The  decision  of  the  court  in  that 
case  has  not  been  questioned  in  any  subsequent  case,  and  the  de- 


476  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  [NewYork^ 

cision  of  many  succeeding  cases  has  been  governed  by  the  prin- 
ciple enunciated  in  that  case,  viz.,  that  where  a  way  of  payment 
is  prescribed  by  statute  or  by  contract  that  way  must  be  strictly 
pursued:  People  v.  Mayor  etc.,  144  N.  Y.  63;  Swift  v.  Mayor 
etc.,  83  N.  Y.  528,  533;  Howell  v.  Buffalo,  15  N.  Y.  513,  519  i 
Baldwin  v.  Oswego,  1  Abb.  App.  Dec.  62,  68;  Beard  v.  Brooklyn, 
31  Barb.  142,  149;  Dannat  v.  Mayor  etc.,  66  N.  Y.  585. 

Such  a  provision  as  to  work  of  this  character  is  usual  and 
reasonable,  for,  as  the  municipal  ^  authorities  have  no  right  to 
make  such  improvements  at  the  expense  of  the  taxpayers  gen- 
erally, it  follows:  1.  That  no  money  is  raised  by  general  tax- 
ation that  is  available  for  the  payment  of  such  expenses;  and 
2.  That  it  is  necessary  to  make  the  avails  of  the  special  assess- 
ment meet  the  obligations  of  the  city  under  the  contract.  All 
this  is  known  to  the  contractor  when  he  makes  his  bid  and  enters 
into  the  contract,  and  presumably  he  has  provided  suitable  com- 
pensation to  himself  for  the  loss  of  the  use  of  the  sums  due 
under  his  contract  until  a  reasonable  time  shall  have  ^*** 
elapsed  in  which  to  levy  the  assessment  and  make  collection.  If 
he  finds,  as  in  the  case  of  People  v.  Mayor  etc.,  144  N.  Y.  63, 
that  the  city  has  not  proceeded  with  reasonable  diligence  to 
collect  the  assessment  and  turn  over  the  proceeds  to  him,  he 
may  and  should  proceed  by  mandamus  to  compel  such  action 
on  its  part.  But  where  a  municipality  disables  itself  from  per- 
forming the  contract  by  such  action  on  its  part  as  makes  void 
and,  therefore,  uncollectible,  an  assessment  for  the  purpose  of 
providing  compensation,  or  refuses  to  perform  the  contract  on 
its  part,  as  in  Reilly  v.  Albany,  112  N.  Y.  30,  then  an  action 
against  the  city  for  the  damages  sustained  by  reason  of  its  fail- 
ure to  perform  the  contract  on  its  part  may  be  maintained. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  two  cases  last  referred  to  are  in 
conflict,  but  they  are  not.  The  Eeady  case  points  out  that  prior 
to  the  breach  of  the  contract  by  the  municipality  the  contract- 
or's remedy  is  to  apply  for  a  mandamus  to  hasten  municipal 
action  in  the  absence  of  due  diligence;  while  the  Eeilly  case, 
with  equal  clearness,  marks  out  the  path  to  be  pursued  by  the 
contractor,  where  the  other  party,  to  wit,  the  municipality, 
either  designedly  or  accidentally  puts  itself  in  a  position  where 
it  will  not  or  cannot  perform  the  contract  on  its  part.  In  such 
a  case,  the  remedy  is  against  the  city  for  breach  of  the  contract. 

As  we  must  regard  the  facts  as  found  by  the  verdict  of  the 
jury,  this  case  comes  under  the  rule  in  Eeilly's  case,  for  the 
plaintiffs  have  fully  performed  the  contract  as  modified  by  the 


Feb.  1899.]  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  477 

resolution  of  July  29,  1890,  and  are  entitled  to  compensation 
therefor.  But  the  defendant,  instead  of  recognizing  the  plain- 
tiffs' rights  in  the  premises  and  proceeding  with  reasonable 
diligence  to  levy  the  assessment,  collect  and  turn  it  over  to  the 
plaintiffs,  has  declared,  by  resolution,  that  the  contractors  have 
not  only  not  performed,  but  have  abandoned  the  contract,  has 
let  to  other  contractors  the  rebuilding  of  a  portion  of  the  sewer 
constructed  by  these  plaintiffs,  and  has  refused  to  take  any  steps 
looking  to  the  making  of  an  assessment  upon  the  property 
benefited  for  the  purpose  of  raising  the  ^®*  money  with  which 
to  pay  the  plaintiffs,  as  provided  by  the  contract.  The  plain- 
tiffs' right,  therefore,  to  pursue  the  defendant  for  a  breach  of 
the  contract  is  established. 

(  We  are  thus  brought  to  the  last,  "but  not  the  least,  of  the 
interesting  questions  presented  by  the  appellant,  which  is  that 
the  court  ought  to  have  permitted  the  defendant  to  prove  that 
the  passage  of  the  resolution  of  July  29,  1890,  was  corruptly 
procured.  The  importance  of  this  question  in  this  particular 
case  is  readily  apparent.  It  is  not  pretended  that  the  contract 
was  substantially  performed  as  to  the  construction  of  the  first 
fourteen  hundred  and  fifty-three  feet  of  the  sewer.  The  certi- 
ficate of  the  engineer,  which  the  contract  says  must  be  given  in 
order  to  entitle  the  plaintiffs  to  the  compensation  provided  for  by 
the  contract,  does  not  assert  that  as  to  the  portion  of  the  sewer 
above  referred  to  the  contract  was  performed.  On  the  contrary, 
the  certificate  is  to  the  effect  that  performance  in  that  respect 
is  in  accordance  with  the  contract  as  modified  by  the  resolution 
of  July  29,  1890.  If  that  resolution  be  void  and  of  no  effect, 
then  the  plaintiffs  have  not  established  their  right  to  recover  in 
this  action,  for  they  have  not  only  failed  to  prove  the  making  of 
the  necessary  certificate  by  the  engineer,  but  they  have  failed 
to  prove  substantial  performance  on  their  part. 

The  question  is  also  an  important  one  in  its  public  aspects, 
for,  so  far  as  we  have  observed,  it  has  seldom  been  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  courts.  The  counsel  for  the  respondent 
insists  that  the  question  was  not  before  the  court  in  such  a 
manner  as  required  it  to  pass  upon  the  point  involved.  Let  us 
inquire  of  the  record  whether  he  is  right  or  not.  The  answer 
alleges,  among  other  things,  "that  the  said  resolution,  purport- 
ing to  modify  said  contract,  passed  by  the  common  council  on 
the  twenty-ninth  day  of  July,  1890,  as  set  forth  in  said  com- 
plaint, was  passed  collusively,  corruptly,  and  fraudulently,  and 
is  the  result  of  a  corrupt  bargain,  in  and  by  which  it  was  agreed 


478  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  [New  York^ 

that  a  large  stun  of  money  should  he  paid  hy  said  contractors 
for  a  vote  in  favor  of  said  resolution,  which  said  money  was  paid, 
and  that  said  resolution  by  reason  thereof  is  null  and  void  and 
of  no  effect  as  a  modification  of  said  contract." 

*****  During  the  progress  of  the  trial  the  counsel  for  the  cor- 
poration asked  several  questions  which  brought  to  the  atten- 
tion of  the  court  and  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiffs  the  defense 
relied  upon  by  the  city,  and  which  we  have  in  part  quoted. 
The  court  was  inclined  to  the  view  that  the  resolution  was 
a  legislative  act  and  could  not  be  thus  attacked,  whereupon 
the  defendant's  counsel,  for  the  purpose  of  raising  the  question 
in  the  briefest  form,  said:  "I  desire  to  show  that  Mr.  Weston 
(plaintiff)  procured  a  vote  of  one  member  of  the  common 
council  by  corrupt  means ;  that  a  sum  of  money  was  paid  by  the 
plaintiff  and  accepted  by  a  member  of  the  common  council  in 
consideration  of  his  vote  for  the  adoption  of  that  resolution,  and 
that  the  vote  of  such  member  was  obtained  and  cast  by  him  in 
consideration  of  the  payment  of  such  sum  of  money."  This 
offer  was  denied  and  the  evidence  excluded  by  the  court,  the 
defendant  excepting.  It  is  not,  of  course,  claimed  that  if  the 
resolution  was  in  fact  procured  to  be  passed  by  bribery,  it  would 
nevertheless  constitute  a  valid  and  effective  modification  of  the 
contract.  That  it  would  be  void  as  against  public  policy  is  toe 
clear  to  admit  of  discussion;  but  tbe  contention  rather  is  that 
the  courts  are  without  power  to  inquire  into  the  matter.  The 
reason  assigned  is  that  the  act  of  the  common  council  in  passing 
this  resolution  was  legislative  in  character,  and  hence  the 
motives  that  induced  the  members  to  vote  for  its  passage, 
whether  honest  or  corrupt,  are  not  the  subject  of  judicial  inves- 
tigation. It  is  true  that  the  legislative  department  of  the  state 
government  is  sovereign,  and  hence  the  motives  that  induce  its 
action  cannot  be  the  subject  of  judicial  investigation.  The 
constitution  also  empowers  the  legislature  by  general  laws  to 
confer  upon  boards  of  supervisors  of  the  counties  of  the  state 
such  powers  of  local  legislation  and  administration  as  the  legis- 
lature may,  from  time  to  time,  deem  expedient:  Const.,  art.  3, 
sec.  27.  It  has  been  held  that  the  action  of  a  board  of  super- 
visors, in  undertaking  to  establish  a  fire  district  in  a  town  under 
section  37  of  the  county  law,  is  legislative  in  character,  and 
therefore  not  subject  to  review  by  certiorari,  because  the  affi- 
davits verifying  ***''  the  petition  did  not  state  that  the  petition 
complied  with  the  requirements  of  the  statute:  People  v.  Super- 
Tisors,  153  N.  Y.  370. 


Feb.  1899.]  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  479 

In  People  v.  Mclntyre,  154  N.  Y.  628,  it  was  held  that  withia 
the  limits  of  the  power  delegated  to  supervisors  by  the  legisla- 
ture under  the  authority  conferred  upon  it  by  the  section  referred 
to,  each  board  of  supervisors  is  clothed  with  the  sovereignty  of 
the  state  to  legislate  as  to  all  details,  precisely  the  same  as  the^ 
legislature  might  have  done  in  the  premises.  While  that  is  so, 
there  are  many  duties  devolved  upon  boards  of  supervisors  by 
the  legislature  which  are  not  legislative  in  character,  but  are 
administrative,  and  in  some  instances  quasi  judicial  in  nature 
and  not  at  all  impressed  with  the  character  of  sovereignty. 
Among  other  duties  they  are  required  to  audit  and  allow  claima^ 
against  the  county.  If  they  arbitrarily  refuse  to  audit  a  claim, 
the  court  may,  by  mandamus,  require  them  to  take  action 
thereon:  People  v.  Supervisors  of  Delaware  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  196, 
199,  So,  where  the  board  of  supervisors  audit  and  allow  to  a. 
public  officer  a  sum  in  excess  of  that  legally  due  him,  the  court 
will,  by  mandamus,  and  upon  the  application  of  a  taxpayer,  re- 
quire the  board  to  reconsider,  revoke,  and  annul  the  audit  as  to^ 
such  excess:  People  v.  Supervisors,  73  N.  Y.  173. 

While  the  acts  of  boards  of  supervisors,  or  boards  of  town 
auditors,  in  auditing  the  accounts  within  their  jurisdiction,  are,, 
in  the  absence  of  fraud  and  collusion,  final  and  conclusive  and 
not  the  subject  of  attack  in  a  collateral  proceeding,  they  may,, 
nevertheless,  be  attacked  in  such  a  proceeding  in  an  action 
brought  by  a  taxpayer  under  chapter  161  of  the  Laws  of  1872 :; 
Osterhoudt  v.  Eigney,  98  N.  Y.  222. 

Many  cases  might  be  cited  where  boards  of  supervisors  have- 
been  compelled  to  act  by  mandamus,  where  they  have  failed  to- 
perform  the  duties  which  the  law  enjoined  upon  them,  as  well 
as  cases  where  their  action,  involving  legal  errors  as  distin- 
guished from  discretionary  matters,  have  been  reviewed  by  cer- 
tiorari, and  also  where  the  audit  has  been  attacked  in  a  collateral 
action  brought  under  the  taxpayers'  *®®  statute,  so  called.. 
But  it  would  serve  no  good  purpose,  as  the  cases  already  cited 
are  sufficient  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  there  are  many 
administrative  duties  of  boards  of  supervisors  that  are  not  im- 
pressed with  the  character  of  sovereignty.  So,  too,  the  legis- 
lature may  confer  upon  common  councils  of  cities  authority  to 
pass  municipal  ordinances.  Such  as  are  passed  in  pursuance  of 
such  authority  have  the  force  of  law,  and  are  as  obligatory  as  if 
enacted  by  the  legislature  itself :  Buffalo  v.  New  York  etc.  E.  E. 
Co.,  152  N.  Y.  276.  But,  like  boards  of  supervisors,  a  common 
council  has  many  administrative  duties  that  are  not  legislative 


480  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  [New  York, 

in  character,  performance  of  wliicli,  at  times,  has  to  be  compelled 
by  the  courts.  Not  infrequently,  in  the  case  of  special  assess- 
ments for  local  improvements,  such  as  the  case  at  bar,  actions 
-are  successfully  prosecuted  by  taxpayers  to  set  aside  assessments 
against  property  on  the  ground  that  the  assessments  are  illegal 
-and  void.  In  Miller  v.  Amsterdam,  149  N.  Y.  288,  in  pursu- 
•ance  of  legislative  authority,  the  common  council  undertook  to, 
«,nd  did,  pave  a  certain  street,  and  to  defray  the  expense  thereof 
made  an  assessment  against  the  property  specially  benefited, 
hut  the  statute  under  which  the  common  council  attempted  to 
act  provided  that  the  street  could  be  paved  only  upon  a  petition 
therefor  of  the  owners  of  a  majority  of  the  lineal  feet  fronting 
■on  the  street.  The  petition  presented,  and  upon  which  the  com- 
mon council  acted,  turned  out  not  to  have  the  requisite  number 
•of  consents.  This  court  held  that  the  action  of  the  common 
^council  was  without  jurisdiction,  and  affirmed  the  judgment 
netting  aside  the  assessment  against  the  property  of  the  plain- 
tiff, upon  the  ground  that  it  was  void. 

If  the  common  council  in  Miller's  case,  in  the  institution  of 
proceedings  to  pave  the  street,  had  been  acting  in  a  legislative 
capacity,  and  was  sovereign  in  that  which  it  did,  then,  neces- 
sarily, it  would  not  have  been  open  for  inquiry  by  the  courts 
whether  it  had  acquired  jurisdiction  to  legislate  at  all  by  the 
petition  of  the  requisite  number  of  lotowners.  But  it  was  not 
sovereign.  It  had  no  authority  to  act  at  all  in  the  absence  of 
a  petition  signed  by  the  owners  of  a  majority  of  the  ^^*  lineal 
■feet  fronting  on  the  street,  and  therefore  its  proceedings  were 
not  in  accordance  with  the  directions  of  the  charter;  and,  in 
attempting  to  act  as  it  did,  its  proceedings  were  the  subject  of 
-direct  review  by  certiorari  or  to  attack  in  a  collateral  action  such 
as  was  made.  If  the  action  taken  by  a  common  council  under 
the  statute  to  pave  a  street  be  not  sovereign  and  free  from  direct 
review  or  collateral  attack  in  the  courts,  no  more  is  the  action  of 
•a  common  council,  under  a  similar  statute,  to  build  a  sewer;  and 
it  is  yet  more  absurd  to  claim  that  the  resolution  by  which  the 
<;ommon  council  undertook  to  effect  a  compromise  and  settle- 
ment with  a  contractor  to  whom  something  was  equitably  due, 
"though,  perhaps,  nothing  legally,  because  of  his  failure  to  per- 
•form  the  contract  in  all  respects,  constituted  a  legislative  act. 

Having  established  by  authority,  to  which  very  many  cita- 
tions in  point  in  this  state  might  be  added,  that  the  resolution 
in  question  constituted  a  part  of  the  administrative  duties  of 
the  common  council,  we  come  next  to  the  question  whether 


Feb.  1899.]  Wbston  v.  Syracuse.  ^Sl 

such  a  resolution,  if  passed  by  means  of  fraud  and  corruption, 
can  be  declared  of  no  effect  by  the  courts.  This  question  is 
answered  in  the  affirmative  by  Talcott  v.  Buffalo,  125  N.  Y.  280. 
That  was  an  action  by  a  taxpayer  to  prevent  waste  of  or  injury 
to  the  property  of  the  municipality,  the  claim  being  that  the 
common  council  of  the  city  of  Buffalo  had  passed  the  resolution 
over  the  mayor's  veto,  providing  for  the  substitution  of  electric 
lights  for  gas,  and  that  in  pursuance  of  it  the  proper  officers 
had  entered  into  a  contract  with  the  electric  light  company,  by 
which  it  had  been  agreed  to  pay  an  exorbitant  price,  and  it  was 
charged  that  the  acts  of  the  common  council  and  its  officers  in' 
the  matter  were  illegal.  The  court  held  that,  inasmuch  as  the 
action  taken  by  the  common  council  was  clearly  within  its  power 
and  discretion,  such  an  action  could  not  be  maintained  without 
any  charge  or  allegation  of  fraud,  collusion,  corruption,  or  bad 
faith.  "While  upon  this  proposition  there  was  a  dissent,  all  were 
agreed  that,  under  the  taxpayers'  act,  so  called,  the  complaint 
would  not  have  been  demurrable  had  it  alleged  that  the  acts 
complained  **®  of  were  without  power,  or  that  they  were  the 
result  of  corruption,  fraud,  or  bad  faith  amounting  to  fraud. 
That  action,  it  is  true,  was  brought  under  and  by  virtue  of  the 
provision  of  the  statute  giving  to  taxpayers  the  right  by  action 
in  a  proper  case  to  interfere  with  the  conduct  of  municipal 
officers.  The  title  of  the  act  first  passed  (Laws  1872,  c.  161) 
was,  "An  act  for  the  protection  of  taxpayers  against  the  frauds, 
embezzlements,  and  wrongful  acts  of  public  officers  and  agents.'* 
It  has  since  been  amended  and  supplemented  by  various  enact- 
ments, which  need  not  now  be  referred  to.  This  statute  did  not 
take  away  any  right  of  action  that  the  municipality  had;  and 
to  avoid  any  possible  opportunity  for  such  a  suggestion,  the 
last  sentence  of  the  statute  provided  that  it  should  not  be  so 
construed  as  to  take  away  any  right  of  action  from  any  county, 
town,  or  municipal  corporation.  The  history  attending  the 
passage  of  this  act,  and  of  chapter  49  of  the  Laws  of  1875,  is  a 
matter  of  common  knowledge,  and  was  well  stated  by  Judge 
Andrews  in  People  v.  New  York  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  84  N".  Y.  565,  569, 
«8  follows:  It  "was  passed  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  city  of 
New  York  had  been  grossly  defrauded  by  the  acts  of  municipal 
officers  and  others  acting  in  collusion  with  them,  and  that  large 
sums  had  been  taken  from  the  municipal  treasury  in  the  perpe- 
tration of  the  frauds  committed.  These  sums  the  city  or 
<^ounty,  one  or  both  of  them,  might  sue  for  and  recover,  but  re- 

AM.  St.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— 81 


482  Weston  v.  Syracuse.  [New  York, 

Bort  to  this  remedy  was  embarrassed  by  the  fact  that  the  city 
and  county  governments  were  to  a  considerable  extent  under  the 
control  of  the  guilty  participants  in  the  fraud." 

The  effect  of  the  legislation  is  to  enable  a  taxpayer  of  the 
municipality,  threatened  with  injury  from  its  ofificers,  and  In 
certain  cases  the  state,  to  accomplish  by  action  not  more  than 
the  proper  municipal  authorities  can  at  all  times  accomplish,, 
but  such  results  as  the  municipal  authorities  can  and  should,, 
but  because  of  carelessness  or  willful  purpose  will  not. 

If  it  be  the  fact  that  the  passage  of  this  resolution  wa» 
brought  about  by  bribery  of  the  members  of  the  common 
council,  a  taxpayer,  under  the  authority  of  Talcott's  case  ^'^^ 
could  have  maintained  a  suit  against  the  city  to  enjoin  it  from 
paying  to  the  contractors  the  amount  claimed  by  them  to  be 
due  under  their  contracts,  for  the  reason  that  the  statute  confers 
upon  him  the  authority  to  thus  interfere  for  the  protection  of 
the  municipal  corporation,  and  that  which  he  can  accomplish  by 
such  a  suit,  the  officers  of  the  municipal  corporation,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  protect  the  corporate  property  from  waste  and  in- 
jury, may  bring  about  by  a  defense  to  an  action  brought  by  th^> 
contractor.  It  is  urged  by  the  respondent  that  the  defendant  is 
estopped  by  the  conduct  of  its  officers  subsequent  to  the  discov- 
ery i)y  the  common  council  of  the  alleged  acts  of  bribery.  '  But 
the  difficulty  with  this  contention  is  that  it  does  not  appear  that 
the  officers  of  the  defendant  knew  of  the  alleged  bribery  at  the 
time  of  the  several  acts  which  the  plaintiffs  rely  upon  to  create 
an  estoppel.  It  does  appear  that  before  the  commission  of  some 
of  the  acts  the  common  council  caused  an  investigation  of  the 
charge  of  corruption  to  be  made,  but  it  is  not  shown  that  one 
of  the  outcomes  of  the  investigation  was  the  disclosure  of  the 
alleged  acts  of  bribery  that  the  defendant  upon  the  trial  offered 
to  prove,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  action  taken 
by  the  common  council  was  with  full  knowledge  of  the  situation. 

The  judgment  should  be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  granted^ 
with  costs  to  abide  the  event. 

All  concur,  except  Bartlett,  J.,  dissenting,  and  Martin  and 
Vann,  JJ.,  not  sitting. 

MTTNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  REVOCATION  OF  CON- 
TRACT—FRAUD— BRIBERY.— A  municipal  corporation  has  a  right 
to  revoke  a  contract  Into  which  It  has  entered,  where  It  act3>  upott 
cause,  In  good  faith,  and  without  any  fraud  or  collusion:  Note  to 
Schenley  v.  Commonwealth,  78  Am.  Dec.  371;  but  fraud  vitiates  all 


Feb.  1899.]  Perkins  v.  Heest.  483 

transactions  Into  which  It  enters:  Fleming  v.  Townsend,  6  Ga.  103, 
50  Am.  Dec.  318;  and  a  contract  growing  out  of  an  illegal  act  will  . 
not  be  enforced.  Hence,  a  contract  procured  by  the  bribery  of  an 
officer  will  not  be  enforced  against  a  contractor  nor  against  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  represented  by  him:  Honaker  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation, 42  W.  Va.  170,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  847. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— MANDAMUS.— The  duty  of  a 
city  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  a  debt  becomes  perfect,  when 
the  creditor  obtains  a  Judgment,  and  then.  If  the  Judgment  can  be 
paid  In  no  other  way,  it  must  be  done  by  levy  and  collection  of  a 
tax  for  that  purpose,  and  this  duty  will  be  enforced  by  mandamus: 
See  extended  note  to  Coy  v.  City  Council,  85  Am.  Dec.  544,  dis- 
cussing the  subject. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— POWER  OF  COURTS  OVER 
PROCEEDINGS  OF.— A  subordinate  municipal  body,  although 
clothed  to  some  extent  with  legislative  and  even  political  poweis, 
is  nevertheless,  in  the  exercise  of  all  Its  powers,  just  as  subject  to 
the  authority  and  control  of  courts  of  Justice  as  any  other  body  or 
person,  natural  or  artificial:  Spring  Valley  Water  Works  v.  San 
Francisco,  82  Cal.  286,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  116. 

ESTOPPEI^MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.— The  doctrTne  of 
estoppel  has  been  extended  to  municipal  corporations:  Hutchinson 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Board  of  Commrs.,  48  Kan.  70,  30  Am.  St.  Rep. 
273;  but  to  create  an  estoppel,  in  any  case,  the  facts  which  give  rise 
to  it  must  be  such  as  to  make  it  unjust  and  Inequitable  to  allow 
the  party  estopped  to  assert  what  would  otherwise  be  his  right,  or 
to  make  proof  of  matters  tending  to  establish  such  right:  Gillett 
V.  WUey,  126  lU.  310,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  687. 


Perkins  v.  Heeet. 

[168  New  Yobk,  306.] 

STATUTES-GENERAL  LAW— ILLUSTRATION— WORK- 
MEN'S UNION  LABEL  ACT.— An  "act  for  the  better  protection 
of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  registration  of  labels,  marks,  names, 
brands,  or  devices  covering  the  products  of  such  labor  of  associa- 
tions or  unions  of  workingmen  or  women,"  where  there  is  nothlngf 
in  it  limiting  its  provisions  to  any  particular  locality  of  the  state, 
or  to  any  designated  association  or  union  of  workingmen  or 
women.  Is  not  a  local  or  private  law,  but  a  general  one,  and  does 
not,  therefore,  contravene  a  constitutional  provision  that  the  legis- 
lature shall  not  pass  a  private  or  local  bill  granting  any  exclusive 
privilege  or  franchise. 

STATUTES— ACT  HAVING  BUT  ONE  SUBJECT  EX- 
PRESSED IN  ITS  TITLE— ILLUSTRATION.— One  subject  only  is 
mentioned  in  the  title  of  an  act  entitled,  "An  act  for  the  better 
protection  of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  registration  of  labels,  marks, 
names,  brands,  or  devices  covering  the  products  of  such  labor  of 
associations  or  unions  of  workingmen  or  women,"  and  that  is  the 
better  protection  of  skilled  labor  by  the  registration  of  labels,  et 
cetera,  covering  the  products  of  such  labor. 

STATUTES  NOT  CONTRARY  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY— 
WORKMEN'S  UNION    LABEL    ACT— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— 


484  Perkins  v.  Heert.  [New  York, 

An  "act  for  the  better  protection  of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  regis- 
tration of  labels,  marks,  names,  brands,  or  devices  covering  the  pro- 
ducts of  such  labor  of  associations  or  unions  of  vporkingmen  or 
women"  is  not  unconstitutional  and  void,  for  the  reason  that  it  is 
contrary  to  public  policy,  in  that  it  unjustly  discriminates  m  favor 
of  the  labor  of  members  of  associations  or  unions  as  against  that  of 
nonunion  workmen. 

STATUTES— GRANT  OF  EXCLUSIVE  PRIVILEGE  UINl/ER 
GENERAL  LAW.— An  exclusive  privilege  or  franchise  is  author- 
ized, if  obtained  under  general  laws,  where  the  state  constitution 
authorizes  the  legislature  to  pass  general  laws,  under  which  such 
a  privilege  or  franchise  may  be  granted. 

STATUTES- GRANT  OP  EXCLUSIVE  PRIVILEGE  — 
STATE  POLICY.— If  a  state  constilution  authorizes  a  grant, through 
legislative  action,  of  an  exclusive  privilege,  it  must  be  deemed  to 
be  in  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  state. 

Action  brought  by  the  plaintiff,  Perkins,  against  Heert  and 
Ehlen,  for  an  injunction,  which  was  awarded,  with  damages  and 
costs,  and  the  defendants  appealed. 

John  A.  Straley  and  Morris  S.  Wise,  for  the  appellants. 

Antonio  Knauth  and  Tracy  C.  Becker,  for  the  respondents. 

308  HAIGHT,  J.  This  action  was  brought  by  the  plaintiff, 
as  president  of  the  Cigar  Makers'  International  Union  of  Amer- 
ica, under  the  provisions  of  chapter  385  of  the  Laws  of  1889,  for 
an  injunction  to  restrain  the  defendants  from  using  an  alleged 
imitation  of  the  union's  label,  a  copy  of  which  had  been  filed  in 
the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state  under  the  provisions  of  that 
law,  and  also  for  an  accounting  for  profits. 

The  Ciger  Makers'  International  Union  of  America  is  a  vol- 
untary unincorporated  association,  consisting  of  a  large  number 
of  persons  who  are  practical  cigar  makers  residing  in  the 
United  States,  with  its  principal  office  located  at  Buffalo.  The 
purpose  of  their  organization  is  the  promoting  of  the  mental, 
moral,  and  physical  welfare  of  its  members  by  assisting  them  to 
obtain  labor  at  remunerative  wages  and  by  affording  them  pecu- 
niary aid  in  case  of  sickness,  and  generally  to  maintain  a  high 
standard  of  workmanship.  They  adopted  a  label  upon  blue 
paper  with  an  ornamental  border,  containing  the  following: 

8«»  "Sept.,  1880. 
"Issued  by  authority  of  the  Cigar  Makers'  International  Union 
of  America.  Union  Made  Cigars,  This  certifies  that  the  cigars 
contained  in  this  box  have  been  made  by  a  first  class  workman, 
a  member  of  the  Cigar  Makers'  International  Union  of  America, 
an  organization  opposed  to  inferior  ratshop,  coolie,  prison,  or 
filthy    tenement-house  workmanship.     Therefore,    we    recom- 


Feb.  1899.]  Perkins  v.  Heert.  485 

mend  these  Cigars  to  all  smokers  throughout  the  world.     All 
infringements  upon  this  label  will  be  punished  according  to  law. 

"G.  W.  PERKINS, 
'Tresident  C.  M.  I.  U.  of  America." 

On  one  end  was  a  copy  of  the  seal  of  the  union,  and  on  the 
other  end  a  place  was  reserved  for  a  local  stamp.  After  the 
passage  of  the  act  in  question,  they  caused  a  copy  of  this  label 
to  be  filed  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state. 

The  defendants  are  cigar  manufacturers  in  the  city  of  New 
York,  and  are  not  members  of  the  union.  They  caused  to  be 
printed  counterfeits  of  the  blue  label  adopted  by  the  union, 
and  pasted  it  upon  boxes  containing  the  cigars  manufactured 
by  them,  and  then,  through  their  agents,  sold  their  cigars  to 
the  public  with  the  intent,  as  has  been  found,  to  defraud  the 
union  and  the  purchasers  and  to  impose  upon  the  public. 

The  case  was  tried  before  the  court  without  a  jury,  and  a 
decision  was  rendered  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  awarding  a 
perpetual  injunction  against  the  defendants  and  for  damages 
and  costs. 

It  is  claimed  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that  the  label  had 
been  abandoned  by  the  union;  that  it  contained  matter  libelous 
and  defamatory,  which  a  court  of  equity  would  not  protect,  and 
that  the  statute  in  question  had  been  repealed.  These  questions 
were  fully  considered  by  the  learned  appellate  division,  and  we 
fully  concur  with  the  views  of  that  court,  as  expressed  in  the 
prevailing  opinion,  with  reference  thereto.  The  only  questions 
which  we  deem  it  necessary  to  here  consider  are  those  raised 
with  reference  to  the  constitutionality  of  the  act. 

»io  The  statute  is  as  follows:  "Sec.  1.  Every  union  or  asso- 
ciation of  workingraen  or  women,  adopting  a  label,  mark,  name, 
brand,  or  device,  intended  to  designate  the  products  of  the  labor 
of  members  of  such  union  or  association  of  workingmen  or 
women,  shall,  in  order  to  obtain  the  benefits  of  this  act,  file 
duplicate  copies  of  such  label,  mark,  name,  brand,  or  device  in 
the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state,  who  shall,  under  his  hand  and 
seal,  deliver  to  the  party  filing  or  registering  the  same  a  certified 
copy  and  a  certificate  of  the  filing  thereof,  for  which  he  shall 
receive  a  fee  of  one  dollar.  Sec.  2.  Every  union  or  association 
of  workingmen  or  women  adopting  such  label,  mark,  name, 
brand,  or  device,  and  filing  the  same,  as  specified  in  the  first 
section  of  this  act,  may  proceed,  by  suit  in  any  of  the  courts  of 
record  of  the  state,  to  enjoin  the  manufacture,  use,  display,  or 


48S  Perkins  v.  Heebt.  [New  York, 

sale   of  counterfeits   or   colorable .  imitations   of   such  label," 
et  cetera. 

It  is  claimed  that  the  act  in  question  is  void,  for  the  reason 
that  it  grants  an  exclusive  privilege  to  a  private  association  in 
contravention  of  the  provisions  of  the  constitution:  Const.,  art. 
3,  sec.  18.  That  section  of  the  constitution,  so  far  as  material, 
provides  as  follows:  "The  legislature  shall  not  pass  a  private  or 
local  bill  in  any  of  the  following  cases,  ....  granting  to  any 
private  corporation,  association,  or  individual  any  exclusive  privi- 
lege, or  franchise  whatever The  legislature  shall  pass 

general  laws  providing  for  the  cases  enumerated  in  this  section, 
and  for  all  other  cases  which  in  its  judgment  may  be  provided 
for  by  general  laws." 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  prohibition  contained  in  this  pro- 
vision  of  the  constitution  has  reference  to  private  or  local  bills, 
and  that  it  requires  the  legislature  to  pass  general  laws  provid- 
ing for  the  cases  in  which  private  and  local  bills  are  prohibited. 
The  question,  therefore,  arises  as  to  whether  the  act  in  question 
is  a  general  law  or  a  private  and  local  bill.  It  is  entitled,  "An 
act  for  the  better  protection  of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  regis- 
tration of  labels,  marks,  names,  brands,  or  devices  covering  the 
products  of  such  labor  of  associations  or  unions  of  workingmen 
or  women."  There  is  nothing  in  the  ^^*  title  or  the  provisions 
of  the  act  that  in  any  manner  limits  its  provisions  to  any  par- 
ticular locality  of  the  state  or  to  any  designated  association  or 
union  of  workingmen  or  women.  Instead,  the  provisions  are  all 
general,  including  every  locality  in  the  entire  state,  and  em- 
bracing every  association  or  union  of  workingmen  or  women 
existing  or  that  may  be  thereafter  organized.  It  is  in  no  sense 
local  or  private,  but  is  in  every  sense  a  general  law. 

Again,  it  is  claimed  that  the  act  is  within  the  condemnation 
of  section  16,  article  3,  of  the  constitution,  which  provides  that 
"no  private  or  local  bills,  which  may  be  passed  by  the  legislature, 
shall  embrace  more  than  one  subject,  and  that  shall  be  expressed 
in  the  title."  We  have  already  shown  that  the  act  is  a  general 
law,  and  not  a  private  nor  local  bill.  It,  consequently,  is  not 
brought  in  conflict  with  this  provision.  Furthermore,  we  think 
but  one  subject  is  mentioned  in  the  title,  and  that  is  the  better 
protection  of  skilled  labor  by  the  registration  of  labels,  et  cetera, 
covering  the  products  of  such  labor. 

Finally,  it  is  insisted  that  the  act  is  unconstitutional  and 
Toid,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  contrary  to  public  policy,  in  that 


Feb.  1899.]  Perkins  v.  Heert.  487 

it  unjustly  discriminates  in  favor  of  the  labor  of  members  of 
associations  or  unions  as  against  that  of  nonunion  workmen. 
The  questions  arising  under  this  contention  are  more  serious 
-and  require  deliberate  consideration.  While  private  and  local 
hills,  granting  to  a  private  corporation,  association,  or  individual 
any  exclusive  privilege,  immunity,  or  franchise  whatever  is  pro- 
hibited, the  constitution  authorizes  the  legislature  to  pass  general 
laws  under  which  grants  may  be  made  to  corporations,  associa- 
tions, or  individuals  of  an  exclusive  privilege,  immunity,  or 
franchise.  An  exclusive  privilege  or  franchise  is,  therefore, 
authorized  if  obtained  under  general  laws.  Among  the  exclu- 
€ive  privileges  and  franchises  which  have  been  made  the  subject 
of  grants  to  private  corporations,  and  with  which  we  are  all 
familiar,  are  those  made  by  municipal  governments  under  the 
authority  of  general  laws  of  the  right  to  occupy  streets  or  high- 
ways for  the  construction  and  operation  of  street  railroads.  ^*^ 
In  all  of  these  grants  there  is,  of  necessity,  discrimination. 
Some  particular  corporation  is  singled  out,  to  which  the  grant 
is  given,  and  which,  thereafter,  enjoys  the  exclusive  privilege  of 
operating  its  railroad  through  the  streets  or  highways  specified 
in  the  grant ;  but  the  grant  being  authorized,  the  discrimination 
is  not  unlawful.  It  is  not  contrary  to  public  policy,  for  the 
reason  that  the  constitution  is  the  foundation  upon  which  thq 
public  policy  of  the  state  is  based.  It  embodies  the  policy  of  oup 
government.  It  authorizes  that  which  is  politic  and  prohibits 
that  which  is  deemed  impolitic.  "Where,  therefore,  the  consti- 
tution grants  or  authorizes  a  grant  through  legislative  action  of 
an  exclusive  privilege,  it  must  be  deemed  to  be  in  accord  with 
the  policy  of  the  state.  As  we  have  seen,  the  label  authorized 
was  by  a  general  and  not  a  local  act.  No  particular  association 
or  union  has  been  given  the  exclusive  privilege  of  adopting  a 
label,  but  every  association  or  union  of  every  kind  of  working- 
men  or  women  is  given  the  right  to  adopt  its  own  label,  which 
may  indicate  its  own  workmanship.  It  consequently  follows- 
that  whatever  discrimination  there  may  be  is  authorized,  and 
therefore  not  unjust,  and  that  the  privilege  granted  under  the 
general  law  is  in  accord  with  public  policy. 

"We  are  aware  that  the  courts  of  sister  states  have  had  trouble 
with  similar  legislation  in  their  states;  that  very  much  has  been 
written  upon  the  subject,  and  that  the  conclusions  reached  by 
the  courts  in  the  different  states  have  widely  differed.  "V\^e  have 
not  thought  it  profitable  to  enter  upon  an  elaborate  discussion 
of  these  cases.     The  questions  here  presented  arise  under  oxa 


488  Perkins  v.  Heebt.  [New  York^ 

own  constitution  and  are  confined  within  narrow  limits.  We- 
have  not  overlooked  the  intimation  that  the  passage  of  this  act 
was  procured  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  union  labor  organiza- 
tions to  boycott  nonunion  laborers  and  to  deprive  them  of  the 
legitimate  fruits  of  their  labors.  "We  cannot,  however,  assume 
that  such  was  the  purpose  and  intent  of  the  legislature,  or  that 
the  association  of  which  the  plaintiff  is  president  will  resort  ta 
acts  which  are  unlawful  and  criminal.  The  act  allows  the  mem- 
bers of  the  ^*^  union  to  send  the  products  of  their  labors  intO' 
the  markets  of  the  country  marked  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate 
the  character  of  their  workmanship.  This  is  legitimate  and 
proper.  It  is  a  right  that  the  law  accords  to  every  manufac- 
turer. We  must  assume,  therefore,  that  the  legislature,  in  pass- 
ing the  act,  had  in  view  the  lawful  and  legitimate  purpose,  and 
that  they  did  not  contemplate  that  the  provisions  of  the  act 
might  be  used  for  illegitimate  purposes.  These  views  render  it 
unnecessary  to  consider  the  question  as  to  whether  the  label  waa 
a  valid  trade-mark  at  common  law. 

No  question  is  raised  as  to  the  right  of  the  plaintiff  to  prose- 
cute the  action  as  president  of  the  association. 

The  judgment  should  be  affirmed,  with  costs. 

All  concur. 


STATUTES— GENERAL  AND  LOCAL  LAWS.— A  general  law» 
as  distinguisBed  from  a  special  or  local  law,  is  a  law  that  embracer 
a  class  of  subjects,  or  places,  and  does  not  omit  any  subject,  or 
place,  naturally  belonging  to  such  class.  The  test  of  the  generality 
of  a  iaw  is  that  it  shall  embrace  all  and  exclude  none  whose  con- 
ditions and  wants  render  such  legislation  equally  appropriate  ta 
them  as  a  class:  Wanser  v.  Hoos,  60  N.  J.  L.  482,  64  Am.  St.  Rep. 
600;  note  to  State  v.  Bargus,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  632.  The  legislature 
may  enact  general  laws,  which,  from  their  nature,  will  be  capa- 
ble of  enforcement  in  particular  portions  of  the  state  only;  and 
the  fact  that  an  act  is  applicable  to  the  conditions  existing  in  a 
single  city  in  the  state  will  not  necessarily  render  it  local  or  spec- 
ial legislation:  Note  to  Wanser  v.  Hoos,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  615.  A 
statute  which  relates  to  persons  or  things  as  a  class  is  a  general 
law,  while  one  that  relates  to  particular  things  or  persons  of  a 
class  Is  spocial:  See  monographic  note  to  State  v.  Ellet,  21  Am. 
St.  Rep.  781,  on  what  is  a  general  law.  A  law  Is  unconstitutional 
and  void  where  It  is,  In  fact,  local  In  Its  application,  though  gen- 
eral In  form:  State  v.  Ellet,  47  Ohio  St.  90,  21  Am.  St  Rep.  772, 
and  note  at  788. 

STATUTES  —  CONSTITUTIONALITY  —  GRANT  OP  EXCLU- 
SIVE PRIVILEGE— WORKMEN'S  UNION  LABEL  ACT.— A  Stat- 
ute  authorizing  a  union  or  association  of  workmen  to  adopt  a  trade- 
mark or  label,  to  be  used  only  on  goods  prepared  by  members  of 
that  association,  does  not  conflict  with  the  provisions  of  the  state 
constitution  Inhll)itlng  the  granting  to  any  corporation,  association^ 
or  Individual  of  any  special  or  exclusive  right,  privilege,  or  Immun- 


April,  1899.]  Matter  op  Strykeb.  48^ 

Ity:  state  v.  Bishop,  12S  Mo.  373,  49  Am.  St  Rep.  569,  and  note, 
showing  that  a  statute  entitled,  "An  act  to  protect  associations, 
unions  of  workmen,  and  persons  in  their  labels,  trademarlis,  and 
forms  of  advertising,"  does  not  violate  a  constitutional  provision 
prohibiting  the  passage  of  local  or  special  laws  and  the  granting  of 
special  privileges. 

STATUTES— SUFFICIENCY  OF  TITLE.— The  title  of  an  act  is 
sufficient  where  it  declares  the  general  purpose  of  the  statute,  and 
the  provisions  of  the  act  are  germane  to  the  purpose  expressed  In 
the  title:  See  monographic  note  to  Bobel  v.  People,  64  Am.  St  Rep. 
75,  on  the  sufficiency  of  the  title  to  a  statute. 


Matter  op  Strykeb. 

[168  NEW  York,  626.] 

STATUTES  —  CONSTRUCTION  —  ANALOGOUS  WORDS.  — 
When  two  or  more  words  of  analogous  meaning  are  employed  to- 
gether in  a  statute,  they  are  understood  to  be  used  in  their  cognate 
sense,  to  express  the  same  relations  and  to  give  color  and  expression 
to  each  other. 

WAGES— PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— LIMITATION 
UPON  WORD  "EMPLOYES."— In  determining  what  claims  shall  be 
preferred,  under  a  statute  which  gives  a  preference  to  "the  wages 
of  the  employes,  operatives,  and  laborers"  of  corporations  In  the 
hands  of  a  receiver,  the  general  and  comprehensive  word  "employes'* 
must  be  limited  by  the  more  specific  words,  "operatives  and  labor- 
ers." 

WAGES— PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— CONSTRUC- 
TION OF  STATUTE.— A  statute  giving  a  preference  to  "the  wages 
of  the  employes,  operatives,  and  laborers"  of  corporations  In  the 
hands  of  a  receiver  Is  intended  to  limit  the  preference  to  the  par- 
ticular class  whose  claims  would  be  properly  expressed  by  the  use 
of  the  word  "wages." 

WAGES— APPLICATION  OF  TERM— SALARY— FEE.— The 
word  "wages"  is  applied,  in  common  parlance,  specifically  to  the 
payment  made  for  manual  labor,  or  other  labor  of  a  menial  or  me- 
chanical kind,  as  distinguished  from  salary,  and  from  fee,  each  of 
which  denotes  compensation  paid  to  professional  men, 

WAGES— PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— CONSTRUC- 
TION OF  STATUTP:- SALARY.— The  word  "wages,"  in  a  statute 
giving  a  preference  to  "the  wages  of  the  employes,  operatives,  and 
laborers"  In  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  conveys  the  idea,  in  its  appli- 
cation to  laborers  and  employes,  of  subordinate  occupation  which 
Is  not  very  remunerative.  Such  a  statute  Is  not,  therefore,  designed 
to  give  a  preference  to  the  salaries  and  compensation  due  to  officers 
and  employSs  of  a  corporation  occupying  superior  positions  of  trust 
or  nrofit. 

WAGES— PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— SALARIED 
PERSONS  WHO  CANNOT  CLAIM.— Under  a  statute  which  gives 
a  preference  to  "the  wages  of  the  employe's,  operatives,  and  labor- 
ers" of  corporations  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  the  claims  of  those  in 
the  employ  of  an  insolvent  manufacturing  company,  such  as  a  clerk 
and  bookkeeper,  the  superintendent,  shop  foreman,  and  a  draftsman. 


490  Matter  op  Stryker.  [New  York, 

all  under  salaries  ranging  from  one  hundred  to  two  hundred  and 
twenty-five  dollars  per  month,  are  not  entitled  to  preference  as 
<daims  for  wages. 

Petition  to  have  certain  claims  paid  as  claims  for  wages.  The 
nature  of  these  claims  appear  in  the  opinion.  An  order  was 
made  directing  the  receivers  of  the  New  York  Locomotive 
'Works  not  to  pay  these  claims  as  preferred  claims,  and  not  to 
treat  them  as  claims  for  wages.    The  applicants  appealed. 

Charles  Carmichael,  for  the  appellants. 

Leslie  W.  Kernan,  for  the  respondents. 

Bair  O'BRIEN,  J.  The  courts  below  have  determined,  hy  the 
•order  appealed  from,  that  four  different  and  distinct  claims 
presented  to  the  receivers  were  not  entitled  to  the  preference 
provided  by  chapter  376  of  the  Laws  of  1885.  One  of  the  claims 
was  presented  by  a  clerk  and  bookkeeper,  who  had  been  em- 
ployed in  the  office  of  the  corporation  at  a  salary  of  one  hundred 
-dollars  a  month,  payable  at  the  end  of  each  month.  Another  by 
the  superintendent  of  the  corporation,  who  had  been  employed 
at  a  salary  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  dollars  a  month. 
Another  by  a  draftsman  employed  in  the  office  of  the  corpora- 
tion at  a  salary  of  one  hundred  and  twenty -five  dollars  a  month, 
and  the  other  claim  was  made  by  two  foremen  employed  by  the 
corporation,  one  of  the  boiler  shop  at  a  salary  of  two  hundred 
and  twenty-five  dollars  a  month,  and  the  other  in  some  other 
department  at  a  salary  of  one  hiindred  and  twenty-five  dollars 
■a  month. 

The  question  is,  whether  these  claims  were  entitled  to  a  pref- 
erence under  the  provisions  of  the  statute  which  reads  as  fol- 
lows: "Where  a  receiver  of  a  corporation  created  or  organized 
^^^  under  the  laws  of  this  state  and  doing  business  therein  .... 
shall  be  appointed,  the  wages  of  the  employes,  operatives,  and 
laborers  thereof  shall  be  preferred  to  every  other  debt  or  claim 
against  such  corporation,  and  shall  be  paid  by  the  receiver  from 
the  moneys  of  such  corporation  which  shall  first  come  to  his 
hands."  It  is  said  that  the  applicants  were  employes  of  the  cor- 
poration, and  doubtless  that  assertion  is  correct.  But  the  word 
**employe"  would  include  every  person  in  the  service  of  the  cor- 
poration, without  regard  to  his  grade  or  rank,  or  the  nature  of 
his  duties.  If  preference  should  be  given  to  the  claims  of 
these  parties  on  the  ground  that  they  were  employes  of  the 
corporation,  we   would   necessarily   have  to   exclude  the  other 


April,  1899]  Matter  of  Stryker.         '  491 

words,  "operatives  and  laborers."  When  two  or  more  words  of 
Analogous  meaning  are  employed  together,  they  are  under- 
fitood  to  be  used  in  their  cognate  sense,  to  express  the  same  rela- 
tions and  give  color  and  expression  to  each  other.  Hence,  al- 
though the  word  "employe"  is  general  and  comprehensive,  it 
must  be  limited  by  the  more  specific  words,  "operatives  and 
laborers,"  which  are  found  in  the  statute:  Wakefield  v.  Fargo, 
SO  K  Y.  218;  People  v.  Board  of  Police,  75  K  Y.  44. 

The  most  important  word  in  the  statute  is  the  word  "wages." 
It  was  wages  that  the  legislature  intended  to  prefer  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  assets  of  the  insolvent  corporation,  not  sala- 
ries, nor  earnings,  nor  compensation.  It  was  not  intended  to 
prefer  the  claims  of  all  employes,  but  it  was  manifestly  in- 
tended to  limit  the  preference  to  the  particular  class  whose 
claims  would  be  properly  expressed  by  the  use  of  the  word 
wages.  This  word  is  applied  in  common  parlance  specifically 
to  the  payment  made  for  manual  labor,  or  other  labor  of 
menial  or  mechanical  kind,  as  distinguished  from  salary  and 
from  fee,  which  denotes  compensation  paid  to  professional  men : 
Century  Dictionary.  In  its  application  to  laborers  and  em- 
ployes it  conveys  the  idea  of  subordinate  occupation  which  ia 
not  very  remunerative,  of  not  much  independent  responsibility, 
but  rather  subject  to  immediate  supervision.  This  was  the 
construction  which  this  court  placed  upon  the  statute  in  '*^"* 
the  case  of  People  v.  Remington,  45  Hun,  338;  affirmed  here  on 
the  opinion  below,  109  N.  Y.  631.  It  was  said  in  that  case  that 
the  statute  was  designed  to  secure  the  prompt  payment  of  the 
wages  of  persons  who,  as  a  class,  are  dependent  upon  their  earn- 
ings for  the  support  of  themselves  and  their  families,  and  it  was 
not  designed  to  give  a  preference  to  the  salaries  and  compensa- 
tion due  to  officers  and  employes  of  a  corporation  occupying 
superior  positions  of  trust  or  profit.  I  cannot  doubt  that  this 
is  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  statute  which  conforms  to  the 
purpose  which  the  legislature  evidently  had  in  view  in  its  enact- 
ment. In  order  to  give  the  preference  provided  by  the  statute, 
the  claim  must  be  for  wages  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  that  term. 
It  was  not,  we  think,  the  purpose  of  the  statute  to  secure  a 
preference  for  claims  due  to  the  clerical  force  engaged  in  trans- 
acting the  business,  nor  to  the  superintendent,  foremen,  or  offi- 
cers of  the  corporation  who  are  compensated  by  a  fixed  yearly 
salary.  Although  the  word  "employes"  is  used,  yet  the  purpose 
of  the  statute  was  to  protect  mechanics,  operatives,  or  laborers 
from  loss  of  their  wages  in  the  event  of  the  insolvency  of  the 


492  *         Mattbr  of  Stryker.  [New  York^ 

corporation.  It  is  significant  to  note  tliat  insurance  and  mon- 
eyed corporations  are  excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  stat- 
ute. There  was  no  reason  for  excepting  these  corporations  but 
for  the  fact,  well  known,  that  they  do  not  employ  labor,  in  the 
ordinary  sense  of  that  word.  The  conduct  of  the  business  of 
these  corporations  requires  a  large  clerical  force,  graded  and 
organized  according  to  the  extent  and  necessities  of  the  'busi- 
ness. If  it  was  intended  to  protect  the  claims  of  this  class  of 
employes,  there  was  no  reason  why  all  corporations  should  not 
be  included  within  the  scope  of  the  statute.  But  it  evidently 
was  not.  It  was  supposed  that  that  class  of  employes  could  pro- 
tect themselves,  whereas  the  common  laborer,  operative,  or 
mechanic  would  be  left  by  the  failure  of  the  business  in  a  much 
more  helpless  condition.  The  wages  of  laborers,  mechanics,  and 
domestic  servants  has  in  modern  times  become  the  subject  of 
protective  legislation  in  this  and  many  other  countries,  and 
whenever  the  law  has  been  extended  °^®  beyond  these  classes, 
60  as  to  include  the  claims  of  parties  performing  clerical  duties 
or  work  of  a  like  character,  it  was  by  judicial  construction  based 
upon  language  much  broader  than  is  to  be  found  in  the  enact- 
ment in  question.  As  was  observed  in  the  case  of  People  v, 
Remington,  109  N.  Y.  631,  45  Hun,  338,  legislation  of  this  char- 
acter confers  upon  a  class  of  persons,  having  a  specific  con- 
tractual relation  with  corporations,  new  and  unusual  privileges 
and  securities  at  the  expense  of  other  creditors  whose  distribu- 
tive share  of  the  assets  is  diminished.  It  is  in  derogation  of 
the  common  law,  and  should  not  be  extended  to  cases  not  within 
the  reason  as  well  as  within  the  words  of  the  statute.  In  the 
distribution  of  the  assets  of  an  insolvent  corporation  by  courts 
of  equity,  the  maxim  that  equality  is  equity  is  a  fundamental 
rule,  and  it  is  only  by  force  of  legislation  that  this  principle  can 
be  departed  from,  and  then  only  in  favor  of  the  class  of  creditors 
that  come  within  the  scope  of  the  statute  when  fairly  and  rea- 
sonably interpreted.  In  a  very  recent  case  we  were  required  to 
pass  upon  the  claim  of  an  attorney  at  law  which  it  was  con- 
tended was  entitled  to  preference  under  the  terms  of  the  stat- 
ute. In  a  general  sense,  it  might  well  be  said  that  he  was  an 
employ^  since  he  was  retained  or  employed  in  the  business  of 
the  corporation,  but  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  a  laborer  or 
servant  within  the  scope  or  policy  of  the  statute:  Bristor  v. 
Smith,  158  N".  Y.  157.  While  the  claim  in  that  case  was  not 
based  upon  tbe  statute  in  question,  but  upon  another  of  a  kin- 
dred nature,  the  reasoning  applies  to  the  claims  in  question. 


April,  1899.]  Matter  op  Strykeb.  493 

We  adhere  to  the  doctrine  there  announced  in  the  opinion  of 
Judge  Gray  as  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  statute. 

These  views  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  case  of  Palmer  v. 
Van  Santvoord,  153  N.  Y.  612.  The  claimant  in  that  case 
was  not  a  superintendent,  or  foreman,  or  bookkeeper,  or  clerk. 
The  courts  below  had  held  that  he  was  a  laborer  or  operative 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and  this  court  affirmed  the 
decision.  It  will  be  seen  by  a  careful  reading  of  the  facts 
that  the  duties  performed  by  the  person  who  presented  the 
claim  in  that  case  were  those  of  a  mechanic  or  laborer,  and  '''^*- 
while  it  appears  that  he  sometimes  solicited  and  made  sales  of 
the  machines  manufactured  by  the  company,  yet  that  was 
merely  incidental  to  his  other  duties.  He  was  employed  to  go 
from  place  to  place  and  set  up  mowing  machines  for  farmers 
to  whom  they  had  been  sold.  He  was  required  to  unpack  the 
machines  and  repack  them,  and  ship  to  the  company  when  nec- 
€8sary.  He  was  required  to  put  the  machines  together  and  fit 
them  for  operation.  All  this  was  mechanical  and  manual  labor, 
and  hence  his  claim  was  within  the  scope  of  the  statute.  His 
claim  differed  from  those  of  the  other  laborers  and  mechanics 
in  the  employ  of-  the  company  only  in  the  circumstance  that  his 
compensation  was  measured  by  the  month  instead  of  the  day, 
and  the  fact  that  he  sometimes  acted  as  a  salesman  was  regarded 
as  a  mere  incident  of  the  principal  employment,  and  hence  not 
affecting  his  right  to  the  preference  secured  by  the  statute. 

We  think  that  the  case  was  correctly  decided  below,  and 
that  the  order  should  be  affirmed,  but  since  the  question  seems 
to  have  been  presented  in  the  first  instance  at  least  by  the  peti- 
tion of  the  receivers  themselves,  no  costs  are  awarded  either 
party. 

GRAY,  J.  The  reasoning  in  Palmer  v.  Van  Santvoord,  153 
N.  Y.  612,  in  my  opinion,  embarrasses,  not  a  little,  the  deci- 
sion of  this  case,  inasmuch  as  Chief  Judge  Andrews  attributed 
a  larger  import  to  the  word  "employ^"  than  to  the  words  "op- 
eratives and  laborers,'*  which  follow  it,  and  he  thought  that  it 
should  not  be  confined  to  those  persons  who  performed  manual 
labor  only.  He,  also,  held  that  this  act  proceeded  upon  a 
broader  legislative  policy,  as  to  the  persons  to  be  protected,  than 
did  the  act  of  1848,  which  imposed  a  certain  liability  upon 
stockholders  of  corporations  for  debts  due  to  employes.  I 
think  that  his  opinion  conflicts  somewhat  with  the  case  of 
People  v.  Remington,  109  N.  Y.  631,  affirming  46  Hun,  338, 


494  Matter  of  Stryker.  [New  York, 

on  the  opinion  there,  and,  if  the  opinion  is  followed,  it  might 
compel  a  reversal  of  the  judgment.  I  did  not  take  part  in  the 
decision  of  the  case  of  ^^^  Palmer  v.  Santvoord,  153  N.  Y.  613, 
which,  on  its  facts,  I  regard  as  having  been  correct,  and  I  shall 
concur  with  Judge  O'Brien  in  his  conclusion,  for  the  affirmance 
of  this  judgment,  because  the  construction  of  this  statute  as 
therein  given  accords  with  my  views. 

I  have  some  doubt  as  to  the  cases  of  the  foremen  in  the  ma^ 
chine  shops,  who  are  shown  to  have  performed  the  manual  labor 
of  mechanics,  although  holding  position^  as  foremen  and  being 
paid  b}'-  the  month.  But  I  am  willing  to  waive  the  doubt  m 
favor  of  a  more  restricted  construction  of  a  statute,  which  create* 
an  exception  in  the  equal  distribution  of  the  assets  of  an  in- 
solvent corporation. 

All  concur  (Gra}^,  J.,  in  memorandum,  and  Bartlett,  J.,  in 
result)  except  Haight,  J.,  who  concurs  except  as  to  the  book« 
keeper  and  draftsman,  as  to  whom  he  favors  a  reversal  on  the 
authority  of  Palmer  v.  Van  Santvoord,  153  N.  Y.  613. 


WAGES— PREFERENCE  IN  FAVOR  OF  EMPLOYES— LABOR- 
ERS.—The  term  "employes"  embraces  laborers  and  servants,  and 
those  occupying  Inferior  positions:  Johnston  v.  Barrills,  27  Or.  251, 
50  Am.  St.  Rep.  717,  and  note,  showing  that  "laborers"  are  those 
■who  earn  a  livelihood  by  their  own  manual  labor.  See  monographic 
note  to  Oliver  v.  Macon  Hardware  Co.,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  303,  on  who 
are  laborers.  Under  a  statute  making  debts  for  labor  preferred 
claims  against  the  estate  of  an  insolvent,  a  debt  due  from  an  in- 
solvent newspaper  corporation  to  a  mailing  clerk,  for  mechanical 
and  manual  work,  is  a  debt  due  for  labor.  A  claim  for  labor,  at 
least  within  the  meaning  of  exemption  and  lien  laws,  has  reference- 
to  manual  labor,  and  clerks,  agents,  and  like  employSs,  whose  em- 
plo^'ment  is  associated  with  mental  labor  and  skill,  are  not  deemed 
laborers:  Michigan  Trust  Co.  v.  Grand  Rapids  Democrat,  113  Mich. 
615,  G7  Am.  St.  Rep.  48G,  and  note.  As  to  what  wages  are  not  sub- 
ject to  garnishment  or  execution,  see  note  to  Abrahams  v.  Anderson^ 
12  Am.  St  Rep.  276. 


April,  1899.J  People  v.  Fielding.  495 


People  v.  Fielding. 

[168  New  York,  6I2.] 

TRIAT^CRIMINAL  CASES— ARGUMENT— PROSECUTIxa 
ATTORNEY— DUTY  OF —The  prosecuting  attorney,  in  a  criminal 
case,  represents  tlie  majesty  of  the  people,  and,  having  no  respon- 
Blbillty,  except  fairly  to  discharge  his  duty,  should  put  himself  un- 
der proper  restraint,  and  should  not,  in  his  remarks  before  the  jury^ 
go  beyond  the  evidence  or  the  bounds  of  a  reasonable  moderation. 
If  he  lays  aside  the  impartiality  that  should  characterize  his  official 
action  to  become  a  heated  partisan,  and  by  vituperation  of  the  pris- 
oner and  appeals  to  prejudice  seeks  to  procure  a  conviction  at  all 
hazards,  he  ceases  to  properly  represent  the  public  interest. 

APPEAI^CRIMINAL  CASES-IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO- 
JURY— REVERSAL  OF  CONVICTION.— If  a  conviction  in  a  crim- 
inal case  follows  an  improper  and  dangerous  appeal  to  the  prejudice 
of  the  jurors,  made  by  the  prosecuting  attorney,  and  it  is  reason- 
ably certain  that  his  course  brought  about  such  result,  the  judgment 
•will  be  reversed  for  such  error  whenever  it  is  raised  by  a  proper 
exception. 

EVIDENCE>-RBASONABLB  CERTAINTY— STRONG  PROB- 
ABILITIES.—A  proposition  is  reasonably  certain  when  It  is  sup- 
ported by  the  strong  probabilities. 

TRIALr-IMPIlOPER  APPEAL  TO  JURY— CURING  OP" 
ERROR.— INSTRUCTIONS  to  the  jury  do  not  always  neutralize, 
either  as  a  matter  of  law  or  fact,  the  effect  of  improper  remarks  in- 
their  presence. 

APPEAL— CRIMINAL  CASES-IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO 
JURY-ILLUSTRATION— REVERSAL  OF  CONVICTION.— When. 
a  city  officer  is  being  prosecuted  for  conniving  at  the  allowance  of  a 
fraudulent  claim  against  the  city,  and  the  prosecuting  attorney, 
in  summing  up,  makes  harsh  and  unjust  statements  to  the  jury, 
not  founded  upon  evidence,  but  resting  wholly  on  his  unsupported- 
declarations;  draws  vivid  pictures  of  suffering  and  want,  of  wrongs- 
done  to  widows  and  their  broods  of  little  children,  with  "pinched 
and  hagfiard"  faces,  by  the  defendant,  and  of  a  multitude  of  peop'e 
waiting  outside  the  courthouse  for  his  conviction;  depicts  the  hard- 
ships of  small  taxpayers;  urges  the  privations  of  the  poor  and  the 
overwhelming  influence  of  public  opinion  against  the  defendant; 
describes  him  as  a  thief,  living  in  a  palace  on  the  proceeds  of  public 
plunder;  and  even  attempts  to  intimidate  the  jury  by  telling  them 
that  they  will  commit  "the  unpardonable  sin"  unless  they  convict 
him,  there  is,  in  case  of  conviction,  presented  a  situation  In  which, 
there  should  be  a  reversal,  particularly  where  the  record  shows  that 
such  statements  were  persisted  in  after  repeated  objections,  under 
the  claim,  sustained  by  the  trial  court,  that  it  was  ri£;ht  to  make 
them. 

TRIAL— CRIMINAL  CASES-OBJECTION  TO  GENERAL. 
COURSE  PURSUED  BY  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY.— If  a  prose- 
cuting attorney,  in  a  criminal  case,  persists,  after  repeated  objec- 
tions, in  making  improper  statements  during  his  address  to  the 
Jury,  and  such  objections  go  to  the  general  course  pursued  by  him. 
no  further  objection  or  exception  is  necessary  after  the  court  sanc- 
tions such  course,  pronouncing  it  "perfectly  proper." 

TRIAL— CRIMINAL  CASES— IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO 
JURY-CORRECTION  OF  ERROR.— When  a  prosecuting  attorney, 
in  a  criminal  case    makes  improper  statements  in  his  address  to- 


49 G  People  v.  Fielding.  [New  York, 

the  jury,  and  the  court  seeks  to  correct  them,  the  correction  should 
be  as  broad  as  the  error,  and  cover  substantially  the  same  ground. 
It  should  be  clear  and  specific  enough  to  repel  the  presumption  of 
iujury.    Otherwise,  the  error  is  not  cured. 

The  defendant  was  convicted  of  the  crime  of  consenting  to, 
and  conniving  at,  the  auditing  or  allowance  of  a  false  or  fraudu- 
lent bill  or  claim  against  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  in  violation  of 
-section  165  of  the  Penal  Code,  he  being  at  the  time  deputy 
■commissioner  of  city  works  of  that  city. 

Charles  J.  Patterson,  for  the  appellant. 

Hiram  R.  Steele,  for  the  respondent. 

®**  VANN",  J.  We  think  that  the  record  before  us  is  free 
from  reversible  error,  except  as  to  a  single  question  which  is 
raised  by  the  following  extract  from  the  appeal  book,  transcribed 
literally  so  that  it  may  speak  for  itself. 

The  district  attorney,  in  summing  up,  said:  '^Defendant 
<;hanged  his  style  of  living  from  a  frame  house  on  Prospect 
avenue  to  a  palatial  residence  on  Eighth  avenue,  whicli  every 
man  knows  cannot  be  maintained  in  the  style  of  that  neigh- 
borhood for  less  than  ten  thousand  dollars  a  year."  Objected 
to.  The  court:  "There  is  no  evidence  of  that."  By  the  dis- 
trict attorney :  "I  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  the  jury." 
The  court:  "There  is  no  other  comment  required  than  the  *''** 
statement  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  case  as 
to  how  much  it  cost  to  maintain  an  establishment  on  Eighth 
-avenue."  By  the  district  attorney:  "There  is  no  evidence,  but 
you  will  not  prohibit  their  using  their  experience,  et  cetera." 
In  further  summing  up,  he  said:  "Go  and  spend  an  hour  in 
the  tax  collector's  office  the  day  after  the  tax  levy  is  confirmed, 
and  look  at  the  long  line — "  Objected  to  by  the  defendant. 
The  court:  "I  do  not  think  this  interruption  is  called  for." 
By  defendant's  counsel :  "I  will  take  an  exception  if  your  honor 
will  permit  him  to  proceed  on  that  line."  The  court:  "  I  will 
hear  what  he  says  first."  By  defendant's  counsel:  "I  ask  to 
have  it  taken  down.  I  ask  you  to  stop  him  at  this  point,  and 
take  an  exception."  The  court:  "1  cannot  do  both;  I  cannot 
have  it  taken  down  and  have  him  stopped  also.  Proceed." 
By  the  district  attorney:  "I  say,  visit  the  tax  office  on  the  day 
after  the  annual  taxes  are  confirmed,  and  look  at  the  long  line, 
that  stretches  out  into  and  down  the  street,  of  people  that  aro 
"willing  to  stand  there  all  day  in  order  to  save  the  little  rebate 
tphich  early  payment  secures.     Those  people  are  the  victims  of 


April,  1899.]  Pkople  v.  Fieldinq,  497 

the  defendant's  fraud."  By  defendant's  counsel:  'T)oe8  your 
honor  permit  him  to  proceed  in  this  fashion?"  The  court: 
■'^Yes."  By  defendant's  counsel:  "I  will  take  an  exception." 
By  the  district  attorney:  "This  interruption  is  outrageous. 
Counsel  should  he  instructed  to  take  his  exception  when  I  have 
finished."  By  defendant's  counsel :  "Have  I  right  to  take  it — " 
The  court:  "I  do  not  think  it  is  called  for;  that  is  all  I  can 
say.  I  can  only  say  that  I  do  not  think  these  continual  inter- 
ruptions are  called  for."  By  defendant's  counsel:  "I  have  a 
right  to  take  an  exception."  The  court :  'TTes,  you  have."  By 
the  district  attorney:  "But  at  a  later  time."  By  defendant's 
counsel:  "I  think  not."  By  the  district  attorney:  "The  pur- 
pose is  to  break  the  effect  of  anything  I  may  say  to  you.  He 
knows  it  is  improper."  By  defendant's  attorney:  "I  do  not."  By 
the  district  attorney:  "I  say  the  people  that  you  will  find  there 
in  a  line  on  that  day  are  the  victims  of  the  defendant's  crime. 
You  will  find  there  the  widow,  that  has  ^^^^  starved  her  brood  of 
little  children  and  seen  their  faces  get  pinched  and  haggard,  in 
order  that  she  might  be  sure  that  tax  day  should  not  find  her 
with  empty  hands.  It  is  that  woman's  money,  coined  out  of  her 
blood  and  the  blood  of  her  children,  that  the  defendant  has  stolen 
and  squandered.  If  you  will  indulge  the  pitiful  sentiments  of 
your  hearts,  think  of  her.  Oh,  there  are  unwritten  tragedies  of 
that  sort  enacted,  not  in  the  luxurious  habitations  of  Eighth  ave- 
nue, but  behind  the  shabby  front  doors  of  poor  neighborhoods. 
Look  at  the  old  man,  standing  in  line,  clutching  in  his  knotted 
fingers  his  last  year's  receipt — "  By  the  defendant's  counsel: 
"'*T)oes  your  honor  permit  this?  Is  this  in  your  ruling?"  The 
•court:  "I  am  going  to  permit  him  to  sum  up  his  case."  By 
defendant's  counsel :  "  I  ask  you  to  stop  him  at  this  point  about 
the  deseri{)tion8  of  the  old  man  with  the  knotted  fingers."  The 
•court:  'Troceed."  By  defendant's  counsel:  "I  will  take  an 
exception."  By  the  district  attorney:  "You  ought  to  be 
ashamed."  By  defendant's  counsel :  'TTou  ought  to  be  ashamed 
-of  yourself  to  talk  to  a  jury  like  this."  The  court:  **I  think 
it  is  perfectly  proper,  but  there  is  nothing  I  can  do  to  compel 
the  attorney  of  the  defendant  to  take  the  ruling  of  the  court.'* 
By  defendant's  counsel :  "Let  him  go  on.  I  shall  not  interrupt 
liim  with  another  word.  Let  him  describe  all  the  knotted 
fingers  in  the  land."  By  the  district  attorney :  "And  the  claque 
that  stands  behind  the  rail — "  The  court:  "Proceed,"  By  the 
district   attorney:  **!  say  you  will   see  old   men  in   that  line 

An.  St.  £kp..  Vol.  LXX.— 32 


498  People  v.  Fielding.  [New  York, 

clutching  in  their  knotted  fingers  rolls  of  dirty  one-dollar  bills- 
Look  at  their  worn  and  shabby  garments;  look  at  the  marks  of 
painful  labor  written  all  over  their  aged  and  clumsy  limbs;  it 
is  the  money  of  these  people  which  the  defendant  has  stolen  and 
squandered.  These  are  the  people  whose  cause  I  plead.  These- 
are  the  victims  of  the  defendant's  crime.  These  are  the  people- 
who  now,  by  tens  of  thousands,  are  waiting  outside  for  your 
verdict.  Will  you  do  them  justice,  or  will  you  not?  If  you 
shall  let  this  man,  loaded  with  his  guilty  plunder,  escape,  then* 
I  say  you  have  committed  the  unpardonable  sin." 

*****  It  did  not  appear  that  the  defendant's  counsel,  by  his^ 
method  of  summing  up,  incited  these  remarks  on  the  part  of  the- 
district  attorney. 

In  charging  the  jury  the  court  said :  "Some  things  have  beei> 
said  about  the  newspapers,  about  a  popular  clamor,  and  about  the 
burden  of  the  taxpayers.  Those  are  considerations  which  are- 
not  to  control  or  influence  you  in  deciding  this  case.  What 
the  clamor  may  be,  I  do  not  know;  I  have  never  heard  of  it. 
What  the  newspapers  may  have  said,  I  do  not  care;  I  have 
never  read  it.  How  much  the  people  may  or  may  not  be  bur- 
dened, no  matter.  If  the  times  were  prosperous,  a  public  offi- 
cial has  no  right  to  make  an  assault  upon,  the  public  treasury 
or  to  aid  others  in  doing  so,  and  he  must  be  tried  only  for  the 
crime  he  has  committed,  if  he  has  committed  one,  and  it. 
would  be  wrong  in  the  extreme  to  assume  anything  and  allow 
it  to  weigh  against  this  defendant  because  of  hard  times,  or 
because  of  difficulties  which  the  people  who  pay  money  into 
the  city  treasury  may  or  may  not  have  in  acquiring  the  mean* 
of  making  the  payment."  Upon  the  request  of  the  defendant 
he  further  charged:  "That  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  case 
which  would  justify  the  jury  in  finding  that  it  was  more  expen- 
sive to  live  upon  Eighth  avenue  than  in  Prospect  avenue,"  and 
"they  are  not  to  consider  any  facts  but  those  which  have  been 
proven  by  the  witnesses  or  the  exhibits." 

We  do  not  wish  to  express  any  views  which  would  restrict 
counsel  in  fair  argument,  comment,  or  appeal.  We  object,  how- 
ever, to  the  assertion  by  the  learned  district  attorney  of  facta 
not  proved,  to  his  inflammatory  appeals  to  passion  and  preju- 
dice, and  to  his  threat  to  the  jury  of  popular  denunciation,  all 
under  the  sanction  of  the  trial  court.  If  the  record  in  this  case 
is  sustained  by  the  deliberate  judgment  of  the  court  of  last  re- 
sort, it  is  difficult  to  see  the  limit  to  intemperate  language,  un* 


April,  1899.]  People  v.  Fielding.  499 

proved  assertion,  or  pernicious  appeals  on  the  part  of  counsel 
for  the  prosecution,  except  their  own  sense  of  propriety.  The 
law,  in  our  judgment,  does  not  thus  leave  an  accused  person, 
presumed  to  be  innocent  until  proved  to  be  guilty,  bound  and 
helpless  in  the  hands  of  his  accuser. 

'*'*''  Even  in  a  civil  action,  when  counsel  are  permitted,  under 
objection  and  exception,  while  summing  up,  to  read  to  the  jury 
an  abstract  from  a  pamphlet  or  newspaper,  or  to  exhibit  a 
cartoon,  not  in  evidence,  it  is  good  ground  for  reversal:  Koel- 
ges  V.  Guardian  Life  Ins.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  638;  Williams  v.  Brook- 
lyn Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  126  N.  Y.  96;  McKeever  v.  Weyer,  11 
Week.  Dig.  258.  So  statements  made  by  counsel,  outside  of  the 
evidence  and  subject  to  objection,  which  strongly  tend  to  arouse 
sympathy,  prejudice,  or  resentment  in  the  minds  of  the  jury, 
require  a  new  trial,  even  if  the  court  charges  that  they  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  case,  and  must  be  disregarded:  Halpem 
V.  Nassau  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  App.  Div.  90;  Bagully  v.  Morning 
Journal  Assn.,  38  App.  Div.  522. 

Language  which  might  be  permitted  to  counsel  in  summing 
up  a  civil  action  cannot,  with  propriety,  be  used  by  a  public 
prosecutor,  who  is  a  quasi  judicial  officer,  representing  the 
people  of  the  state,  and  presumed  to  act  impartially  in  the  in- 
terest only  of  justice.  If  he  lays  aside  the  impartiality  that 
should  characterize  his  official  action  to  become  a  heated  par- 
tisan, and  by  vituperation  of  the  prisoner  and  appeals  to  preju- 
dice seeks  to  procure  a  conviction  at  all  hazards,  he  ceases  to 
properly  represent  the  public  interest,  which  demands  no  vic- 
tim, and  asks  no  conviction  through  the  aid  of  passion,  sjrm- 
pathy,  or  resentment.  By  such  a  course,  in  the  long  run,  he 
throws  away  much  of  his  strength  because  his  violent  and  repre- 
hensible language  betrays  his  bias  and  finally  weakens  his  in- 
fluence with  the  jury.  As  was  said  by  Judge  Earl  in  People  v. 
Green  wall,  115  N".  Y.  520,  526,  "the  district  attorney,  represent- 
ing the  majesty  of  the  people,  and  having  no  responsibility,  ex- 
cept fairly  to  discharge  his  duty,  should  put  himself  under 
proper  restraint,  and  should  not,  in  his  remarks,  in  the  hearing 
of  the  jury,  go  beyond  the  evidence  or  the  bounds  of  a  reasonable 
moderation."  Neither  in  that  case  nor  in  People  v.  Brooks,  131 
N.  Y.  321,  329,  was  any  objection  made  or  exception  taken. 
In  the  former,  which  was  a  capital  case,  the  court  was  not  bound 
to  interfere,  while  in  the  latter,  ***  which  was  an  appeal  from 
the  general  term,  it  had  no  power  to  interfere  without  an  ex- 


500  People  v.  Fielding.  [New  York, 

ception.  As  the  admonition  of  the  court  has  not  proved  suffi- 
cient to  prevent  improper  and  dangerous  appeals  to  the  preju- 
dice of  jurors,  it  has  become  necessary,  as  we  think,  to  rigidly 
enforce  the  general  rule  of  this  and  many  other  states  that  re- 
quires a  reversal  whenever  the  error  is  raised  by  a  proper  ex- 
ception. 

Abuse  of  the  defendant  by  the  prosecuting  officer  in  his  ad- 
dress to  the  jury,  which  was  calculated  to  arouse  their  passions 
against  him  and  materially  prejudice  him  in  tlie  trial,  has  been 
held  such  error  as  would,  of  itself,  cause  a  reversal:  Stone  v. 
State,  23*  Tex.  Ct.  App.  185.  Where  the  prosecuting  attorney 
was  permitted  to  comment  on  the  personal  appearance  of  the 
defendant,  not  as  a  witness,  nor  on  account  of  his  manner  and 
bearing  as  such,  but  as  indicating  a  probability  of  guilt,  it  was 
deemed  sufficient  to  reverse  a  judgment  of  conviction:  Bessette 
V.  State,  101  Ind.  85. 

In  Tucker  v.  Henniker,  41  N.  H.  317,  323,  the  court  said: 
'It  would  seem  utterly  vain  and  quite  useless  to  caution  jurors, 
in  the  progress  of  a  trial,  against  listening  to  conversations  out 
of  the  courtroom  in  regard  to  the  merits  of  a  cause,  if  they 
are  to  be  permitted  to  listen  in  the  jury  box  to  statements  of 
facts  calculated  to  have  a  bearing  upon  their  judgment,  enforced 
and   illustrated   by  all   the   eloquence  and   ability  of  learned, 

zealous,  and  interested  counsel Statements  of  facts  not 

proved  and  comments  thereon  are  outside  of  a  cause;  they  stand 
legally  irrelevant  to  the  matter  in  question,  and  are,  therefore, 
hot  pertinent.  If  not  pertinent,  they  are  not  within  the  privi- 
lege of  counsel.'' 

In  Laubach  v.  State,  12  Tex.  Ct.  App.  583,  the  prosecuting 
attorney,  when  commenting  upon  the  evidence  in  his  closing 
argument,  was  interrupled  by  the  defendant  in  person  with  the 
statement  that  if  he  had  certain  absent  witnesses  he  could  show 
a  different  state  of  facts.  Thereupon  the  attorney,  addressing 
the  jury,  stated  that  a  brother  of  the  absent  witnesses  told  him 
that  they,  if  present,  would  testify  against  the  defendant.  Ob- 
jection was  promptly  made  to  this  remark,  and  '*'*®  the  district 
attorney  at  once  told  the  jury  not  to  regard  anything  he  or  de- 
fendant had  said.  The  judgment  was  reversed  upon  the  ground, 
among  others,  that  the  remark  was  unwarranted  by  the  law  or 
the  facts  and  was  calculated  to  injure  the  rights  of  the  defend- 
ant by  prejudicing  his  case  in  the  minds  of  the  jury. 

In  Brown  v.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  282,  292,  28  Am.  Rep.  582, 
counsel,  in  summing  up,  commented  upon  the  appellant's  connec- 


April,  1899.]  People  v.  Fielding.  601 

tion  with  a  railroad  company  and  his  ability  on  that  account  to 
pay  any  judgment  which  might  be  rendered  against  him.  The 
court  reversed  the  judgment  and  after  referring  to  the  adjudged 
cases  remarked,  "All  of  them  support  the  rule  now  adopted  by 
this  court,  that  it  is  error  sufficient  to  reverse  a  judgment  for 
counsel,  against  objection,  to  state  facts  pertinent  to  the  issue 
and  not  in  evidence,  or  to  assume  arguendo  such  facts  to  be  in 
the  case  when  they  are  not." 

In  State  v.  Smith,  75  K  C.  306,  the  prosecuting  attorney, 
addressing  the  jury,  said:  "The  defendant  was  such  a  scoun- 
drel that  he  was  compelled  to  move  his  trial  from  Jones  county 
to  a  county  where  he  was  not  known."  The  conviction  was 
reversed  and  the  court  said  that  "the  purpose  and  natural  effect 
of  such  language  was  to  create  a  prejudice  against  the  defend- 
ant not  arising  out  of  any  legal  evidence  before  them,  for  the 
jury  were  precluded  from  inquiry  into  the  causes  or  motives  for 
moving  the  trial  and  even  from  the  knowledge  whether  the  trial 
was  moved  by  the  state  or  the  defendant." 

In  Kea  v.  Harrington,  58  Vt.  181,  190,  56  Am.  Rep.  561,  the 
court  said:  "It  has  been  repeatedly  held  in  other  jurisdictions, 
and  recently  in  this,  that  when  counsel  persistently  travel  out  of 
the  record,  basing  arguments  on  facts  not  appearing  and  appeal- 
ing to  prejudice,  irrelevant  to  the  case  and  outside  of  the  proof, 
it  not  only  merits  the  severe  censure  of  the  court,  but  is  valid 
ground  for  exception." 

In  Newton  v.  State,  21  Fla.  63,  it  was  held  that  where  coun«. 
sel  for  the  prosecution,  upon  the  trial  of  a  cause  before  a  jury, 
abusing  his  privilege  to  the  manifest  prejudice  of  the  ^^^  de- 
fendant, makes  statements  with  regard  to  evidence  being  ad- 
duced not  pertinent  and,  therefore,  not  within  his  privilege,  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  stop  him  at  once,  and  if  he 
fails  to  do  so  and  the  impropriety  is  great  it  is  ground  for  a  new 
trial  upon  appeal. 

In  Moore  v.  State,  21  Tex.  Ct.  App.  666,  the  district  attorney, 
in  his  address  to  the  jury,  said  that  the  defendant  had  been  con- 
victed of  the  offense  for  which  he  was  on  trial  "upon  a  former 
and  previous  indictment,"  and  upon  appeal  it  was  reversed  on 
a  trifling  technicality  in  drawing  the  indictment,  and  he  urged 
the  jury  to  give  him  such  a  term  in  the  penitentiary  as  would 
make  up  for  the  great  expense  he  had  caused  upon  a  mere 
technicality.  The  court,  in  reversing  the  judgment,  said:  "In 
many  decisions  this  court  has  urged  upon  counsel,  whose  duty 


502  People  v.  Fieldinq.  [New  York, 

it  is  to  prosecute  the  pleas  of  the  state,  to  refrain  from  inject- 
ing into  trials  of  cases  of  this  kind  any  matter  calculated  to 
inflame  the  minds  or  excite  the  prejudice  of  the  jury.  If  we 
could  add  anything  to  what  has  heen  said,  or  could  use  any 
language  calculated  to  reach  the  minds  and  consciences  of  those 
to  whom  such  admonitions  are  addressed,  we  would  avail  our- 
selves of  the  present  occasion  to  do  so.  As  we  cannot,  we  can 
only  reverse  and  remand  the  case,  in  the  hope  that  the  accused 
may  secure  a  fair  and  impartial  trial,  according  to  law  and  ac- 
cording to  those  methods  alike  ancient  and  honorable  which 
still  obtain  in  all  enlightened  courts/'  See,  also,  as  to  the  effect 
of  a  departure  from  legitimate  course  of  argument,  the  follow- 
ing cases:  Rudolph  v.  Landwerlen,  92  Ind.  34;  School  Town 
of  Eochester  v.  Shaw,  100  Ind.  268;  Hall  v.  Wolff,  61  Iowa,  559; 
Bremmer  v.  Green  Bay  etc.  R.  E.  Co.,  61  "Wis.  114. 

In  a  case  that  is  free  from  doubt  upon  the  merits,  the  appel- 
late courts  disregard  errors  of  the  trial  court,  even  in  a  criminal 
ease,  when  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  they  could  not  have 
affected  the  result.  A  proposition  is  reasonably  certain  when 
it  is  supported  by  the  strong  probabilities,  but  here  the  strong 
probabilities  are  that  the  errors  did  affect  the  result.  The  ®^* 
average  man  cannot  read  the  eloquent  but  inflammatory  lan- 
guage of  the  district  attorney  without  being  impressed  by  it, 
and  it  is  safe  to  presume  that  the  effect  would  be  heightened 
by  hearing  those  words  spoken  with  animation  and  enthusiasm 
under  the  exciting  circumstances  surrounding  an  important 
criminal  trial.  The  jury  might  be  told  by  the  court  to  forget 
them,  but  could  they  forget  them?  They  might  be  told  to  dis- 
regard them,  but  how  can  we  be  certain  that  they  did  disregard 
them?  Moreover,  some  of  the  most  objectionable  language 
was  not  alluded  to  by  the  court  in  its  charge,  and  instructions 
to  the  jury  do  not  always  neutralize,  either  as  a  matter  of  law 
or  fact,  the  effect  of  improper  remarks  in  their  presence:  People 
V.  Corey,  157  N.  Y.  332,  346;  Brooks  v.  Rochester  Ry.  Co.,  156 
K  Y.  244,  252;  People  v.  Hill,  37  App.  Div.  327;  Swan  v. 
Keongh,  35  App.  Div.  80. 

From  our  observation  of  jurymen  we  think  the  language 
under  consideration  would  be  apt  to  turn  their  minds  against 
the  defendant,  divert  their  attention  from  the  evidence,  and 
prevent  the  exercise  of  sound  and  dispassionate  judgment  upon 
the  merits.  It  brought  before  them  vivid  pictures  of  suffering 
and  want,  of  wrongs  done  to  the  widow  and  orphan  by  the  de- 
fendant, and  of  a  multitude  of  people  waiting  outside  the  court- 


April,  1899.]  People  v.  Fielding.  503 

house  for  his  conviction.  The  hardships  of  small  taxpayers,  the 
privations  of  the  poor,  and  the  overwhelming  influence  of  pub- 
lic opinion  were  urged  against  him,  and  he  was  described  as  a 
thief,  living  in  a  palace  on  the  proceeds  of  public  plunder. 
There  was  even  an  attempt  to  intimidate  the  jury  by  telling 
them  that  they  would  commit  "the  unpardonable  sin"  unless 
they  convicted  him.  The  cause  of  complaint  by  the  appellant 
is  not  a  single,  inadvertent  remark,  which  might  well  be  over- 
looked, but,  after  repeated  objections,  improper  statements  were 
persisted  in  under  the  claim,  sustained  by  the  court,  that  it  waa 
right  to  make  them. 

The  harsh  and  unjust  statements  of  the  district  attorney  were 
not  founded  upon  evidence,  but  rested  wholly  on  his  unsup- 
ported declarations.  The  most  of  them  would  have  been  ruled 
out  as  immaterial  or  incompetent  if  evidence  had  *"*^  been  of- 
fered to  show  that  they  were  true.  They  violated  the  reason 
upon  which  the  law  of  evidence  is  founded  by  spreading  facts 
before  the  jury  without  any  proof,  and  virtually,  also,  the  rule 
of  evidence  which  prohibits  immaterial  and  incompetent  facts 
from  being  proved.  There  was  no  evidence  that  it  cost  ten 
thousand  dollars  a  year  to  live  in  the  style  of  Eighth  avenue, 
•where  the  defendant  resided,  and  when  the  point  was  raised  the 
•court  so  ruled.  The  district  attorney,  however,  in  disregard 
of  the  ruling,  appealed  to  the  common  sense  of  the  jury,  and 
the  court  very  properly  tried  to  check  him,  but  he  was  allowed 
to  appeal  to  their  experience  without  rebuke.  After  that  he 
met  with  no  attempt  at  restraint  by  the  court.  Whatever  ho 
said,  whether  it  was  about  the  widow  starving  her  little  children 
until  their  faces  got  pinched  and  haggard  in  order  that  she 
might  pay  the  taxes  stolen  by  the  defendant,  or  about  aged  men, 
deformed  by  painful  labor,  whose  money  the  defendant  had 
squandered,  met  with  the  approval  of  the  court.  Instead  of  re- 
pressing these  unfounded  and  dangerous  assertions,  when  re- 
peatedly requested  to,  at  first  he  condemned  the  efforts  of  the 
defendant's  counsel  to  prevent  them,  and  finally  pronounced  the 
course  of  the  district  attorney  "perfectly  proper,"  and  expressed 
regret  that  his  ruling  to  that  effect  was  not  acquiesced  to. 
Even  the  threat  of  popular  denunciation  and  the  attempt  to 
frighten  the  jury  by  declaring  that  they  would  commit  the  un- 
pardonable sin  if  they  found  for  the  defendant  met  with  neither 
remonstrance  nor  reproof.  The  language  of  the  prosecuting  ol- 
ficer,  thus  indorsed  by  the  highest  authority  known  to  the  jury, 
must  have  gone  home  to  their  minds  with  powerful  and  con- 


504  People  v.  Fielding.  [New  York, 

vincing  effect,  while  the  counsel  for  the  defendant  was  left  in 
the  attitude  of  a  wrongdoer,  trying  to  disturb  the  proceedings 
of  the  court.  After  persisting  in  his  efforts  to  protect  his  client 
until  the  court  held  that  he  was  out  of  order,  he  was  not  obliged 
to  run  the  risk  of  punishment  for  contempt  by  continuing  ta 
object,  for  all  that  was  said  by  the  district  attorney  after  the 
court  had  taken  this  position  should  be  held  subject  to  the  ex- 
ceptions already  interposed.  The  court  should  even  allow  an 
exception  **^^  upon  appeal  where  counsel  were  prevented  from 
excepting  at  the  trial.  Moreover,  the  objections  taken  were  to 
the  general  course  pursued  by  the  district  attorney,  and  when 
the  court  had  sanctioned  this,  no  further  objection  or  exception 
was  necessary.  This  method  of  summing  up  should  have  been 
sternly  interrupted  by  the  court  of  its  own  motion,  so  as  to  ex- 
clude improper  statements  and  comments  from  the  consideration 
of  the  jury,  for  objections  made  after  the  district  attorney  had 
said  what  he  wanted  to  were  objections  made  after  the  harm 
was  done. 

After  what  took  place  during  the  summing  up,  how  can  we 
be  sure  that  the  general  and  placid  language  of  the  charge  wholly 
counteracted  the  pointed  and  vigorous  words  of  the  district  at- 
torney, indorsed  as  they  had  been  by  the  court  itself?  When 
improper  evidence  has  been  received  or  improper  statements 
made  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,  if  the  court  seeks  to  correct 
them,  the  correction  should  be  as  broad  as  the  error,  and  cover 
substantially  the  same  ground,  as  was  the  case  in  Cole  v.  Fall 
Brook  Coal  Co.,  159  N.  Y.  59,  decided  at  the  present  term.  The 
court  in  its  charge  said  nothing  about  the  improper  appeals  to 
sympathy,  prejudice,  or  passion,  the  starvation  of  children  by 
their  widowed  mothers,  the  knotted  fingers  and  bent  forms  of 
old  men,  the  denunciation  of  the  defendant  as  a  thief,  or  the 
bugbear  of  the  unpardonable  sin  held  up  before  the  jury  so  forci- 
bly. The  correction  did  not  cure  the  errors,  because  it  did  not 
go  far  enough  and  was  not  sufficiently  clear  and  specific.  It 
did  not  repel  the  presumption  of  injury:  Coleman  v.  People,  5& 
N.  Y.  555,  561;  People  v.  Fernandez,  35  N.  Y.  49,  59. 

Whether  the  defendant  be  innocent  or  guilty,  in  our  opinion 
he  has  not  been  adjudged  guilty  in  accordance  with  law  be- 
cause he  has  not  had  the  fair  and  impartial  trial  which  the  law 
prescribes  for  a  person  charged  with  crime.  If  wo  disregard 
a  sound  and  well  established  rule  in  his  case  because  we  think 
he  is  guilty,  we  tear  down  one  of  the  safeguards  provided  by 
Bocicty  for  the  protection  of  its  citizens,  and  the  ^'^  precedent 


April,  1899.]  People  v.  Fielding.  505 

may,  at  some  time,  aid  in  depriving  an  innocent  man  of  his 
liberty  or  his  life. 

The  judgment  should  be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  ordered. 

HAIGHT,  J.,  Dissented,  upon  the  one  question  only  which  he 

thought  it  his  duty  to  consider,  namely,  that  pertaining  to  the  re- 
marlvs  of  the  district  attorney  who  tried  the  case,  and  which  are 
quoted  In  the  prevailing  opinion.  He  referred  to  the  monographic 
notes  to  Martin  v.  State,  56  Am.  Rep.  814,  and  to  McConnell  v. 
State,  58  Am.  Rep.  (548,  as  ones  in  which  many  cases  concerning  the 
privilege  of  counsel,  and  improper  comments  by  them  In  addressing 
a  jury,  are  collected.  But  he  specifically  referred  to,  and  quoted 
from,  Williams  v.  Brooklyn  Elevated  R.  R.  Co..  126  N.  Y.  96,  102,  as 
expressing  his  views  upon  the  subject.  "In  that  case,  Andrews,  J., 
In  delivering  t"he  opinion  of  the  court,  says:  'It  is  the  privilege  of 
counsel,  In  addressing  a  jury,  to  comment  upon  every  pertinent  mat- 
ter of  fact  bearing  upon  the  questions  which  the  jury  have  to  de- 
cide. This  privilege  it  is  most  important  to  preserve,  and  it  ought 
not  to  be  narrowed  by  any  close  construction,  but  should  be  Inter- 
preted In  the  largest  sense.  The  right  of  counsel  to  address  the 
jury  upon  the  facts  is  of  public  as  well  as  private  consequence,  for 
its  exercise  has  always  proved  one  of  the  most  effective  aids  in  the 
ascertainment  of  truth  by  juries  in  courts  of  justice,  and  this  con- 
cerns the  very  highest  interest  of  the  state.  The  jury  system  would 
fail  much  more  frequently  than  it  now  does  If  freedom  of  advocacy 
should  be  unduly  h.impered  and  counsel  should  be  prevented  from 
exercising  within  the  four  corners  of  the  evidence  the  widest  lati- 
tude by  way  of  comment,  denunciation,  or  appeal,  In  advocating  his 
cause.  This  privilege  is  not  beyond  regrulation  by  the  court.  It  is 
subject  to  be  controlled  by  the  trial  judge  In  the  exercise  of  a  sound 
discretion,  to  prevent  undue  prolixity,  waste  of  time,  or  unseemly 
criticism.  The  privilege  of  counsel,  however,  does  not  justify  the 
Introduction  in  his  summing  up  of  matters  wholly  immaterial  and 
Irrelevant  to  the  matter  to  be  decided,  and  which  the  jury  have  no 
right  to  consider  in  arriving  at  their  verdict.  The  jury  are  sworn 
to  render  their  verdict  upon  the  evidence.  The  law  sedulously 
guards  against  the  introduction  of  Irrelevant  or  incompetent  evi- 
dence, by  which  the  rights  of  a  party  may  be  prejudiced.  The  pur- 
pose of  these  salutary  rules  might  be  defeated  if  jurors  were  allowed 
to  consider  facts  not  in  evidence,  and  the  privilege  of  counsel  can 
never  operate  as  a  license  to  state  to  a  jury  facts  not  in  evidence, 
or  to  present  considerations  which  have  no  legitimate  bearing  upon 
the  case  and  which  the  jury  would  have  no  right  to  consider. 
"Where  counsel.  In  summing  up,  proceeds  to  dilate  upon  facts  not  in 
evidence,  or  to  press  upon  the  jury  considerations  which  the  jury 
would  have  no  right  to  regard.  It  Is,  we  conceive,  the  plain  duty  of 
the  court,  upon  objection  made,  to  Interpose,  and  a  refusal  of  the 
court  to  Interpose,  where  otherwise  the  right  of  the  party  would  be 
prejudiced,  would  be  legal  error.' 


€06  People  v.  Fielding.  [New  York, 

"The  district  attorney,"  the  learned  Justice  Halght  continued,  "Is 
«,  high  public  officer,  representing  the  state,  which  seeks  equal  and 
impartial  justice,  and  it  is  as  much  his  duty  to  see  that  no  innocent 
man  suffers  as  it  is  to  see  that  no  guilty  man  escapes.  In  the  djs- 
<;harge  of  these  most  important  duties  he  commands  the  respect  of 
the  people  of  the  county  and  usually  exercises  a  great  influence  upon 
jurors.  In  discussing  the  evidence,  he  is,  as  we  have  seen  in  the 
■case  alluded  to,  given  the  widest  latitude  within  the  four  corners  of 
the  evidence  by  way  of  comment,  denunciation,  or  appeal,  but  he 
•has  no  right  to  call  to  the  attention  of  the  jury  matters  or  considera- 
tions which  the  jurors  have  no  right  to  consider.  Verdicts  obtained 
through  duress,  bias,  or  prejudice,  are  illegal,  and  will  be  set  aside. 
This  is  also  true  with  reference  to  verdicts  based  upon  popular 
■clamor." 

I'he  comments  of  the  prosecuting  attorney  were  then  referred  to, 
and  the  dissenting  justice  thought  that  they  went  too  far  and  could 
not  be  approved.  "He  departed  from  his  line  of  duty,  which  was 
a,  discussion  of  the  evidence  and  a  demand  of  a  conviction  based 
thereon,  and  appealed  to  the  jury  for  a  conviction  upon  considera- 
tions which  had  no  legitimate  bearing  upon  the  case,  and  which 
the  jury  had  no  right  to  consider."  He  was  inclined  to  the  view, 
however,  that  a  new  trial  was  not  required.  "Under  the  constitu- 
tion," he  said,  "we  are  limited  in  our  review  to  questions  of  law. 
The  defendant's  counsel  took  a  number  of  exceptions  to  the  state- 
ments made  by  the  district  attorney,  but  when  he  came  to  his  last 
«nd  final  statement,  in  which  the  real  vice  occurred,  the  defendant  8 
counsel  neglected  to  take  an  exception.  That  which  preceded  the 
final  remarks  of  the  district  attorney  may  not  have  been  In  good 
taste,  but  we  do  not  regSrd  it,  standing  plone,  to  be  such  a  departure 
from  the  line  of  discussion  permissible  within  the  privilege  of  the 
■district  attorney  as  to  warrant  a  reversal."  He  regarded  the  ques- 
tion as  very  much  relieved  by  the  charge  of  the  court,  given  in  the 
opinion,  and  which  he  quoted.  "Under  section  542  of  the  Code  of 
Criminal  Procedure,"  he  said,  "we  are  required  to  give  judgment 
without  regard  to  technical  errors  or  defects,  or  to  exceptions  which 
do  not  aflFect  the  substantial  rights  of  the  parties.  Under  the  circ  im- 
stances,  therefore,  we  think  the  Judgment  and  conviction  should  be 
•affirmed." 


TIIIAI/-APPEAD-IMPROPER  REMARKS  OP  COUNSEL- 
CRIMINAL  LAW.— Prosecuting  officers  should  avoid  remarks  or 
arguments  which  are  calculated  to  improperly  Influence  juries  to  go 
outside  the  evidence  and  instructions:  State  v,  Warford,  106  Mo. 
55.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  322,  and  note,  showing  that  Inflammatory  and 
inipropor  language  hy  tlie  prosecuting  officer  during  the  trial  of  a 
<:rlinlnal  offense  will  cause  a  conviction  to  be  set  aside.  Langunge 
usod  by  counsel  which  evinces  a  studied  purpose  to  arouse  the  preju- 
dice of  the  jury,  based  upon  facts  not  in  the  case,  is  ground  for 
reversal  of  the  verdict  and  judgment:  Cluett  v.  Rosenthal,  lOO 
Mich.  193,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  446.    Comments  of  counsel  In  arguing  a 


April,  lby9.]         VViTHEROw  v.  Slayback.  507 

case  before  a  jury  are  controllable  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court. 
This  discretion  is  subject  to  review,  and  when  counsel  makes  mate- 
rial statements,  outside  the  evideuce,  liliely  to  do  the  accused  an  in- 
jury, it  is  deemed  an  abuse  of  discretion  when  not  stopped  J)y  the 
court  on  objection  made  at  the  time:  Notes  to  Kearny  v.  State,  65 
Am.  St  Rep.  349;  Cluett  v.  Kosenthal,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  452.  But,  to  be 
reviewable  on  appeal,  though  such  comments  are  excepted  to  when 
made,  the  court  must  have  been  requested  to  take  some  action,  and 
have  erred  in  granting  or  refusing  the  request:  Note  to  Kearney  v. 
State,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  349;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Beebe,  174 
111.  13.  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  253;  note  to  Murray  v.  Doud,  59  Am.  St. 
Rep.  301.  In  order  to  save  any  question  In  relation  to  the  miscon- 
duct of  counsel  during  the  progress  of  the  trial,  the  court  must  be 
<jalled  upon  to  correct  the  injury  done;  if  the  court  refuses  to  do 
so,  the  injured  party  may  then  except,  and  thus  save  the  question 
involved  for  the  consideration  of  the  appellate  court:  Chicago  etc. 
K.  R.  Co.  V.  Champion,  9  Ind.  App.  510,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  357.  As  to 
improper  remarks  of  counsel,  generally,  compare  Olfermann  v. 
Union  Depot  R.  R.  Co.,  125  Mo.  408,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  483;  Monmouth 
Min.  etc.  Co.  v.  Erling,  148  111.  521,  39  Am.  St  Rep.  187;  Cheatham 
V.  State,  67  Miss.  335,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  310.  As  to  when  the  mis- 
conduct of  counsel  in  argument  is  so  seriously  Improper  as  to  call 
for  a  reversal  of  judgment,  see  the  monographic  note  to  McDonald 
V.  People,  9  Am.  St.  Rep.  559-570,  devoted  to  that  subject. 


WiTHERow  V.  Slayback. 

[158  New  Yoek,  649.] 

APPEAL  — DISMISSAL  OF  COMPLAINT— RIGHTS  OP 
PLAINTIFF.— If  the  question  as  to  whether  a  corporation  Is  an- 
swerable upon  a  promissory  note,  payable  to  the  plaintiff's  order, 
otherwise  than  as  an  indorser,  is  raised  by  the  pleadings  and  proofs 
In  a  suit  upon  the  note,  and  the  complaint  Is  dismissed  at  the  close 
of  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  an  exception  taken,  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  i)laintiff,  upon  his  proofs,  was  entitled  to  go  to  the 
jury,  is  open  for  review  on  appeal,  although  It  was  not  urged  on  the 
motion  to  dismiss. 

CORPORATIONS— STATUTORY  ACTION  TO  RECOVER 
DEBT  OP  DIRECTORS  WHERE  COMPANY  FAILS  TO  FILE  AN 
ANNUAL  REPORT.— In  a  suit  wherein  It  is  sought  to  charge  tlie 
defendants,  as  directors  of  a  corporation,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions 
of  a  statute,  which  provides  that,  in  case  of  failure  to  tile  an  annual 
report,  "all  the  directors  thereof  shall  be  jointly  and  severally  liable 
for  all  the  debts  of  the  corporation  then  existing,  and  for  all  that 
shall  be  contracted  before  such  report  shall  be  made,"  the  plaintiff 
must,  in  order  to  succeed,  prove  either  that,  at  the  time  of  default 
!n  filing  the  annual  report,  the  debt  in  suit  existed,  or  that  it  was 
contracted  before  the  report  was  filed. 

EVIDENCE  — CONTRACT  OF  INDORSEMENT— INTEN- 
TION.—PAROL  EVIDENCE  is  admissible,  as  between  the  immedi- 
ate parties  to  a  contract  of  Indorsement,  to  ascortaiu  their  intendon; 
all  the  facts  and  circumstances  which  took  place  at  the  time  of  the 
transaction  may  thus  be  shown. 

EVIDENCE— NOTE  INDORSED  BY  CORPORATION-HIS- 
TORY  OF  INDEBTEDNESS— PAROL.— If  the  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  on 


508  WiTHEROW  V.  Slayback.  [New  York^ 

a  promissory  note,  of  which  he  is  the  payee,  seeks  to  charge  the 
directors  of  a  corporation  upon  a  contract  of  Indorsement  made 
Ijy  the  corporation  when  the  note  was  executed,  parol  evidence  of 
the  history  of  the  indebtedness,  which  resulted  in  the  note,  should 
"be  received  and  submitted  to  the  jury. 

EVIDENCE  —  NOTE  INDORSED  BY  CORPORATION— 
PAROL  PROOB^  THAT  COMPANY  IS  PRINCIPAL  DEBTOR. 
The  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  on  a  promissory  note,  of  which  he  is  the 
payee,  and  which  is  indorsed  by  a  corporation,  through  its  treas- 
urer, has  a  right  to  show,  if  he  can,  by  parol  evidence,  to  the  satis- 
faction of  a  jury,  that  the  corporation  is  really  his  principal  debtor 
In  the  transaction. 

CORPORATIONS— FAILURE  TO  FILE  ANNUAL  REPORT 
—DIRECTOR'S  LIABILITY— INDORSEMENT  OF  NOTE  BY  COR- 
PORATION AND  PAROL  PROOF  OF  COMPANY'S  LIABILITY. 
If  the  superintendent  and  an  officer  of  an  incorporated  company 
signs  a  promissory  note  given  in  payment  of  a  preceding  indebted- 
ness due  by  the  company,  which,  by  its  treasurer,  indorses  the  note, 
and  the  payee  seelis  to  charge  the  directors  of  the  corporation  with 
the  debt  for  having  failed  to  file  an  annual  report,  under  a  statute 
which  malies  them  answerable  for  all  debts  existing  or  contracted 
before  the  annual  report  is  made,  and  the  directors  seek  to  avoid 
liability  by  standing  on  a  strict  contract  of  indorsement,  and  insist- 
ing that  they  are  only  contingently  answerable  when  the  note  is 
due  and  the  indorser  charged,  and  that  protest  was  after  the  time 
of  the  filing  of  the  report,  the  plaintiff  should  be  permitted  to 
show,  by  parol  evidence,  the  real  transaction— that  the  corporation 
was,  in  reality,  the  principal  debtor,  and  that  the  company  was, 
therefore,  answerable  to  the  plaintiff  before  the  default  in  filing  the 
report  was  cured. 

CORPORATIONS— FAILURE  TO  FILE  ANNUAL  REPORT 
—ACTION  FOR  DEBT— ABANDONMENT  OF  BUSINESS  AS  A 
DEFENSE.— If  a  statute  makes  the  directors  of  a  corporation  an- 
swerable for  its  existing  debts,  and  those  contracted  before  the  com- 
pany makes  an  annual  report,  it  is  no  defense  to  an  action  brought 
to  charge  them  with  corporate  debts  by  virtue  of  the  company's 
failure  to  file  a  report  that  the  company  had  ceased  to  exist,  by 
abandoning  its  business  and  turning  over  its  property  to  its  cred- 
itors, before  the  time  for  filing  the  report,  if  it  is  shown  that  such 
transfer  did  not  embrace  all  of  its  property,  and  that  the  company 
continued  to  exercise  acts  of  absolute  ownership  over  other  omitted 
property,  and  subsequently  filed  a  report  of  full  payment  of  its  cap- 
ital stock,  as  well  as  two  annual  reports. 

Appeal  from  a  judgment  affirming  a  judgment  dismissing  the 
complaint  at  the  close  of  the  plaintiff's  case.  The  action  wa» 
brought  by  Witherow  against  Slayback  and  others. 

Edward  C.  Perkins,  for  the  appellant. 

Henry  Bacon  and  Charles  Strauss,  for  the  respondents. 

««»  BARTLETT,  J.  This  action  is  brought  against  three  of 
the  directors  of  the  Port  Henry  Steel  &  Iron  Company,  Limited, 
to  charge  them  with  a  debt  of  the  corporation  for  having  failed, 
as  such  directors,  to  file  an  annual  report  in  January  1886,  and 
in  January,  1887.    These  two  defaults  are  stated,  respectively. 


April,  1899.]  Witherow  v.  Slayback.  509 

in  the  first  and  second  causes  of  action.  The  complaint  contains 
five  causes  of  action,  but  on  this  appeal  only  the  first  and  second 
are  involved. 

The  debt  which  the  plaintiff  in  this  action  seeks  to  collect  of 
defendants  is  represented  by  a  promissory  note,  dated  October 
6,  1886,  made  by  T.  F.  Witherbee  to  the  plaintiff's  order  for 
■eleven  thousand  and  seventy-two  dollars  and  sixty-eight  cents, 
payable  six  months  after  date,  and  indorsed  by  the  Port  Henry 
Steel  &  Iron  Company  through  its  treasurer,  Andrew  Dickey.  This 
note  was  a  renewal  of  a  similar  note  dated  six  months  earlier, 
to  wit,  April  3,  1886.  The  report  due  January,  1886,  was  not 
filed.  The  report  that  was  due  January,  1887,  was  filed  on  Feb- 
ruary 16,  1887. 

The  Port  Henry  Steel  &  Iron  Company  was  incorporated  un- 
der the  Laws  of  1875,  chapter  611,  and  it  is  sought  to  charge 
the  defendants,  as  directors,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  sec- 
tion 18,  which  provides,  in  case  of  failure  to  file  the  annual  re- 
port, that  "all  the  directors  thereof  shall  be  jointly  and  severally' 
liable  for  all  the  debts  of  the  corporation  then  existing,  and  for 
all  that  shall  be  contracted  before  such  report  shall  be  made.'* 

If  the  plaintiff  is  to  succeed  in  this  action,  he  is  bound  to 
prove  either  that,  at  the  time  of  default  in  filing  the  annual 
report,  the  debt  in  suit  existed,  or  that  it  was  contracted  before 
the  overdue  report  was  filed.  The  default  continued  from  Janu- 
ary, 1886,  to  February  16,  1887. 

^*  The  position  of  the  defendants  is,  that  whatever  obliga- 
tion was  assumed  by  the  Port  Henry  Steel  &  Iron  Company  is 
expressed  by  the  indorsement  on  the  back  of  the  note,  and  the 
relation  of  the  company  to  the  debt  is  thereby  fixed;  that,  in 
order  to  make  the  company  liable  upon  this  contract,  it  was 
necessary  that  the  note  should  become  due;  that  the  maker 
should  refuse  to  pay  it;  that  payment  of  it  should  be  demanded 
and  the  note  duly  protested;  that,  as  protest  was  not  made  until 
April  9,  1887,  no  debt  of  the  corporation  existed,  or  was  con- 
tracted, during  the  period  of  default  in  filing  the  annual  report. 

The  position  of  the  plaintiff  is,  that  when  the  original  note 
and  the  renewal  note  were  given  by  T.  F.  Witherbee,  he  was  the 
superintendent  and  an  officer  of  the  company,  and  that  the  note 
was  indorsed,  delivered,  and  accepted  in  payment  for  a  balance 
due  plaintiff  for  material  furnished  and  labor  done  prior  .to  De- 
cember 12,  18^5,  in  constructing  a  steel  plant  for  the  manufac- 
ture of  steel  and  iron  on  the  land  of  the  corporation  under  a 
contract  with  Witherbee;  that  the  plant  was  intended  for  and 


510  WiTHEROW  V.  Slayback.  [New  York, 

was  used  by  the  corporation;  that  the  contract  was  adopted  by 
it;  that  it  made  various  payments  to  the  plaintiff  on  account^ 
and  that  it  indorsed  the  note  in  suit,  intending  to  become  surety 
for  its  payment  and  to  procure  credit  for  Witherbee  and  itselL 
The  pleadings  and  the  proofs  will  be  examined  more  in  detail 
later. 

The  case  was  tried  at  a  jury  term,  and  the  plaintiff  gave  evi- 
dence tending  to  prove  the  position  already  outlined.  At  the 
close  of  plaintiff's  case,  the  counsel  for  defendants  moved 
to  dismiss  the  complaint  on  a  number  of  grounds  covering  the 
five  separate  causes  of  action.  As  to  the  first  and  second  causes 
of  action,  the  only  ones  involved  on  this  appeal,  the  court 
granted  the  motion  on  the  ground  that  during  the  period  of 
default  in  filing  the  annual  report  the  liability  of  the  corpora- 
tion to  the  plaintiff  was  merely  contingent,  and  did  not  ripen 
into  a  debt  until  the  protest  of  the  note  in  April,  1887,  when  the 
default  no  longer  existed. 

G34  q^ij^g  plaintiff  duly  excepted  to  this  ruling,  and  the  general 
term  of  the  superior  court  of  the  city  of  New  York  affirmed 
the  judgment  entered  at  the  trial.  A  preliminary  point  is  taken 
here  by  defendants,  that  the  question  whether  the  corpora- 
tion is  liable  otherwise  than  as  an  indorser  is  not  open  on  this 
appeal,  as  it  was  not  urged  on  the  motion  to  dismiss. 

The  question  is  raised  by  the  pleadings  and  the  proofs,  and 
the  exception  to  the  ruling  dismissing  the  complaint  calls  upon 
us  to  determine  whetlier,  upon  the  plaintiff's  proofs,  he  was 
entitled  to  go  to  the  jury:  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dana,  7  N.  Y. 
108;  East  Hampton  v.  Kirk,  68  N.  Y.  459;  Frecking  v.  Rolland,. 
53  N.  Y.  424;  Stone  v.  Flower,  47  N.  Y.  566. 

It  becomes  necessary  to  examine  the  issues  and  the  evidence 
more  in  detail.  The  complaint  avers  as  to  the  first  and  second 
causes  of  action  as  follows:  "That  said  Port  Henry  Steel  &  Iron 
Company,  Limited,  by  its  treasurer,  or  agent,  thereto  duly  au- 
thorized, with  the  intent  and  purpose  of  becoming  surety  for 
the  payment  of  said  note,  and  with  the  intent  and  purpose  of 
inducing  this  plaintiff  to  give  credit  to  said  Witherbee  and  to 
said  corporation,  and  to  forbear  action  against  them,  and  each 
of  them,  upon  said  indebtedness,  duly  indorsed  said  note  at  or 
before  the  delivery  thereof  to  this  plaintiff,  intending  that  this 
plaintiff  should  accept  the  same  upon  the  strength  of  said  in- 
dorsement. That  this  plaintiff,  upon  the  strength  of  said  in- 
dorsement, did  accept  said  note,  and  gave  credit  to  said  Wither- 
bee and  said  corporation,  and  forebore  action  upon  such  indebt- 


April,  1899.]  Witherow  v.  Slayback.  611 

edness  against  them,  and  each  of  them,  as  is  hereinafter  stated/* 

The  answer  denies  these  allegations  of  the  complaint,  and  at 
the  trial  the  plaintiff  offered  proof  tending  to  sustain  them. 
It  appears  that  the  case  contains  all  the  evidence  and  that  plain- 
tiff's proofs  were  admitted  without  ohjection. 

The  salient  facts  established  by  the  plaintiff  are  as  follows^ 
viz, :  The  Port  Henry  Steel  &  Iron  Company,  Limited,  was  not 
fully  organized  until  the  latter  part  of  May,  1885,  and  ^^^  earliel^ 
in  that  month  a  proposition  was  drawn  by  plaintiff  and  ad- 
dressed to  the  company  offering  to  deliver  to  the  latter  its  steel 
plant  for  twenty-one  thousand,  four  hundred  and  fifty  dollars. 

This  proposition  was  accepted  by  T.  F.  Witherbee  as  super- 
intendent of  the  company.  It  was  then  discovered  that  this 
contract  antedated  the  formation  of  the  company,  and  there- 
upon a  second  proposition  was  made  out,  being  like  the  former 
one,  except  it  was  addressed  to  T.  F.  Witherbee  individually, 
and  was  subsequently  accepted  by  him  in  that  capacity.  The 
plaintiff  went  on  and  erected  this  steel  plant  on  the  premises 
leased  by  the  company  for  the  transaction  of  its  business,  and 
Witherbee  never  paid  anything  on  the  contract,  but  several  pay- 
ments were  made  by  the  company,  reducing  the  indebtedness 
to  the  amount  of  the  note  referred  to  in  the  complaint,  which 
is  the  balance  due  plaintiff. 

Plaintiff,  about  April,  1886,  was  pressing  for  his  money,  and 
it  was  finally  arranged  that  Witherbee  should  give  him  his  note,, 
which  was  dated  April  3,  1886,  indorsed  by  the  company.  At 
or  about  this  time  Witherbee  assigned  to  the  company  his  con- 
tract with  plaintiff  to  furnish  the  steel  plant. 

Mr.  Dickey,  the  treasurer  of  the  company,  testified:  "I  told 
Witherbee  that  we  had  paid  about  half  the  price  of  the  plant, 
that  we  gave  a  note  for  the  balance  or  indorsement  on  the 
note  for  the  balance,  and  we  must  have  the  plant  for  security 
for  that,  and  Witherbee  agreed  to  do  so — to  transfer  it,  to  make 
such  transfer — which  he  did.  I  think  it  was  a  few  days  before- 
I  indorsed  that  note  that  I  obtained  this  transfer.  The  company 
was  then  in  possession  of  this  plant,  and  continued  in  possession 
of  it  until  some  time  in  August,  1886;  it  was  operating  the  plant 
up  to  that  time,  At  the  time  this  note  was  indorsed  that  plant 
was  the  only  plant  the  company  had  for  manufacturing  steel,, 
and  the  only  one  they  ever  had,  to  my  knowledge. 

Witherbee  refused  to  give  the  original  note  of  April  3,  1886, 
to  plaintiff  unless  it  was  indorsed  by  the  company,  as  he  had 
no  interest  in  the  transaction. 


612  WiTHERow  V.  Slayback.  [New  York, 

*^^  Witherbee  swears  that  he  made  out  the  note  of  April  3, 
1886,  and  the  renewal  thereof  October  6,  1886,  upon  the  di- 
rection of  the  treasurer  of  the  company,  and  that  he  never  re- 
■ceived  any  consideration  therefor. 

The  company  used  this  steel  plant  as  its  own  from  the  time 
it  was  delivered,  and,  when  financially  involved,  executed  a  mort- 
gage thereon  to  its  creditors  before  the  first  note  matured.  The 
■company  seems  to  have  exercised  exclusive  dominion  over  the 
property  in  every  way. 

The  plaintiff  and  appellant  now  insists  that,  in  this  condition 
of  the  record,  it  was  error  to  have  dismissed  the  complaint. 
While  the  question  now  presented  is  somewhat  novel  and  not 
without  its  difficulties,  we  are  of  opinion  that,  in  accordance 
■with  well-settled  general  principles,  parol  evidence,  as  between 
the  original  parties,  was  admissible  to  show  the  real  transaction. 
"The  liability  of  the  defendant  directors  depends  upon  what  the 
real  relations  of  the  company  are  to  this  matter.  The  issues  in- 
volve the  entire  history  of  this  transaction  between  the  original 
parties — no  rights  of  third  persons  have  intervened. 

Mr.  Daniel,  in  his  work  on  Negotiable  Instruments,  section 
710,  in  commenting  on  the  general  admissibility  of  parol  evi- 
•dence  to  ascertain  intention  as  between  immediate  parties,  uses 
this  language:  "When  the  note  is  negotiable,  the  quipstion  is 
by  no  means  capable  of  such  easy  and  satisfactory  solution;  but 
■whatever  diversities  of  interpretation  may  be  found  in  the  au- 
thorities on  the  subject,  they  very  generally  concur,  though  not 
with  entire  unanimity,  that,  as  between  the  immediate  parties, 
the  interpretation  ought  to  be  in  every  case  such  as  will  carry 
their  intention  into  effect,  and  that  their  intention  may  be  made 
■out  by  parol  proof  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  which  took 
place  at  the  time  of  the  transaction." 

In  section  711  the  same  writer  says:  "The  ground  upon  which 
parol  proof  of  intention  and  agreement  in  such  cases  is  *''''  ad- 
mitted is  that  the  position  of  the  name  upon  the  paper  is  one 
of  ambiguity  in  itself — that  it  is  not  a  complete  contract  as  in 
the  case  of  indorsement  by  the  payee,  which  imports  a  distinct 
and  certain  liability;  but  rather  evidence  of  authority  to  write 
over  it  the  contract  that  was  entered  into,  and  that  parol  proof 
merely  discloses  and  brings  to  light  the  terms  of  the  unwritten 
■contract  that  was  made  beween  the  parties." 

A  large  number  of  cases  in  this  state  have  recognized  the  above 
principle,  and  the  contract  of  indorsement  haw  been  varied  and 
<jualified  by  parol  evidence. 


April,  1899.]  Witherow  v.  Slayback.  613 

In  Moore  v.  Cross,  19  N.  Y.  227,  75  Am.  Dec.  326,  it  was 
held  that  one  who,  for  the  acommodation  of  the  maker,  indorses 
his  note  payable  to  a  third  person,  is  liable  thereon  to  such  payee 
as  indorser.  The  plaintiff  alleged  in  his  complaint  and  proved 
at  the  trial  that  the  note  and  indorsement  were  made  with  full 
knowledge  that  plaintiff  took  it  in  payment  for  coal  sold  and 
delivered  to  the  maker. 

In  Bank  of  Genesee  v.  Patchin  Bank,  19  N.  Y.  312,  S.  B.  S., 
a  cashier,  sent  to  the  plaintiff  to  be  discounted  a  bill  of  ex- 
change of  S.  B.  S.,  Cash.,  indorsed  by  him,  with  the  same  addi- 
tion to  his  signature,  and  inclosed  in  a  letter  dated  at  the  bank- 
ing house,  and  signed  S.  B.  S.,  Cash. 

It  was  held,  after  receiving  parol  evidence  of  the  entire  trans- 
action, that  the  circumstances  imported  that  the  indorsement 
was  that  of  the  bank  in  the  regular  course  of  business,  and  not 
that  of  S.  B.  S.  individually. 

In  Meyer  v.  Hibsher,  47  N.  Y.  265,  the  action  was  upon  a 
promissory  note  brought  by  the  payee  against  the  indorser;  the 
complaint  alleged  that  the  note  was  executed  and  indorsed  as  a 
condition  of  a  loan  by  the  payee  to  the  makers,  and  as  security 
for  the  payment  thereof,  and  then  set  out  the  note  which,  by 
its  terms,  was  given  "for  value  received." 

This  court  held  that  the  averments  were  sufBcient  to  author- 
ize evidence  of  the  indorser's  privity  with  the  negotiation,  and 
that  if  he  indorsed  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  he  was 
placed  in  the  same  condition  to  the  payee  as  though  it  had  been 
done  by  agreement. 

«S8  In  Coulter  v.  Richmond,  59  N.  Y.  478,  it  was  held  that 
the  presumption  that  one  who  has  indorsed  a  promissory  note 
in  blank,  before  the  delivery  to  the  payee,  intended  to  become 
liable  simply  as  second  indorser  and  so  not  liable  to  the  payee, 
may  be  rebutted  by  parol  proof  that  the  indorsement  was  made 
to  give  the  maker  credit  with  the  payee.  To  the  same  effect 
are  Jaffray  v.  Brown,  74  N.  Y.  393;  Good  v.  Martin,  95  TJ.  S. 
90;  Patch  v.  Washburn,  16  Gray,  82.  The  same  principle  is 
recognized  in  the  following  cases:  Phelps  v.  Vischer,  50  N.  Y. 
69,  10  Am.  Rep.  433;  Clothier  v.  Adriance,  51  N".  Y.  322;  Hub- 
bard V.  Matthews,  54  N.  Y.  43,  13  Am.  Rep.  562;  Hubbard  v. 
Gurney,  64  K  Y.  457;  Breneman  v.  Fumiss,  90  Pa.  St.  186,  35 
Am.  Rep.  651. 

We  thus  see  that  betweon  the  original  parties  the  apparent 
rights  of  the  indorser  on  the  face  of  the  note  and  contract  of 

AM.  St.  Rep.,  Vol.  LXX.-83 


514  WiTHEBow  V,  Slayback.  [New  York, 

indorsement  are  constantly  qualified  and  changed  by  parol  evi- 
dence. 

In  the  case  at  bar,  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  charge  the  directors 
of  a  corporation,  and  the  latter. endeavor  to  avoid  liability,  by 
insisting  that  on  the  face  of  the  note  and  indorsement  the  cor- 
poration is  a  strict  indorser,  only  contingently  liable  when  the 
paper  is  due  and  the  company  is  charged;  also  that  protest  was 
after  annual  report  filed. 

This  plaintiff,  payee,  urges  that  both  on  principle  and  au- 
thority he  should  be  allowed  to  show  the  real  transaction,  the 
true  situation,  in  order  to  establish  that  this  corporation  was 
privy  to  the  consideration  of  the  note,  and  was  on  the  facts 
liable  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  its  directors  cannot  shield  them- 
selves behind  the  technical  defense  of  the  strict  contract  of  in- 
dorsement. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  the  parol  evidence  showing  the  history 
of  the  indebtedness  which  resulted  in  the  notes  in  question  was 
properly  received  and  should  have  been  submitted  to  the  jury. 

The  defendants'  counsel  has  cited  the  case  of  Hall  v.  New- 
comb,  3  Hill,  233,  7  Hill,  416,  42  Am.  Dec.  82,  as  a  controlling 
authority  ^^^  against  the  plaintiff  on  this  appeal.  The  question 
in  that  case  was  whether  a  person  who  puts  his  name  in  blank 
upon  the  back  of  a  negotiable  note,  which  is  drawn  in  such 
form  that  he  may  be  charged  as  indorser  in  the  usual  mode,  if  a 
demand  is  made  and  notice  of  nonpayment  given,  can  be  charged 
as  a  general  surety,  without  such  demand  and  notice  by  parol 
evidence  merely.  It  appeared  that  the  holder  of  the  note  had 
neglected  to  make  demand  and  give  notice  of  nonpayment  to  tlie 
indorser,  and  then  sought  to  hold  him,  after  he  was  discharged, 
by  showing  a  different  contract. 

On  the  special  facts  of  that  case  it  was  well  decided  and  is 
not  in  conflict  with  plaintiff's  position  here,  or  the  cases  to  which 
reference  has  already  been  made. 

In  the  case  at  bar,  the  note  was  duly  protested,  and  the  ques- 
tion here  does  not  concern  protest,  but  is  one  between  the  plain- 
tiff and  the  directors  of  the  corporation,  based  on  the  real  re- 
lations of  the  corporation  to  the  plaintiff's  claim. 

In  Hall  V.  Newcomb,  3  Hill,  233,  7  Hill,  416,  42  Am.  Dec.  82, 
no  such  question  arose  as  is  here  presented.  It  was  not  claimed 
that  Newcomb  had  received  the  consideration  of  the  debt — was, 
in  fact,  the  debtor.  It  was  an  effort  to  hold  him  as  guarantor 
when,  under  the  facts,  he  was  a  strict  indorser.  Spies  v.  Gil- 
more,  1  N.  Y.  321,  is  to  same  effect. 


April,  1899.]  Withebow  v.  Slayback.  515 

The  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  has  -Bought,  on  this  appeal,  to 
maintain  two  distinct  propositions,  among  others,  viz. :  The  first 
one  is  that  the  ordinary  contract  of  indorsement  creates  a  debt 
when  entered  into  without  regard  to  the  subsequent  maturity 
of  the  note,  demand  and  due  protest. 

The  case  of  Barclay  y.  Weaver,  19  Pa.  St.  396,  57  Am.  Dec. 
661,  and  other  cases  in  foreign  jurisdictions,  are  cited  to  the 
«ffect  that  demand  and  notice  are  no  part  of  the  contract, 
but  only  steps  in  the  legal  remedy  upon  it.  We  express  no 
opinion  on  this  proposition  as  to  its  correctness,  or  whether  it  ia 
an  open  question  in  this  state. 

The  other  proposition  is,  in  substance,  that  if,  as  between 
the  parties,  the  indorser  is  shown  to  be  the  principal  debtor, 
the  note  having  been  made  for  his  accommodation,  or,  in  ®*** 
other  words,  that  he  has  no  recourse  against  the  maker,  then  de- 
mand and  notice  were  not  necessary;  that  it  was  not  the  strict 
•contract  of  indorsement. 

In  Commercial  Bank  v.  Hughes,  17  Wend.  94,  Judge  Cowen 
says:  "Where  the  indorser  or  drawer  has  plainly  suffered  noth- 
ing, and  can  sustain  no  mischief  for  want  of  demand  and  notice, 
none  need  be  made  or  given;  and  it  accords  with  the  true  and 
only  reason  why  such  demand  and  notice  are  called  for.  The 
question  seems  to  be  merely  one  of  evidence.  The  drawer  or 
indorser  is  presumed  to  have  been  injured  by  the  omission,  until 
the  plaintiff,  by  proof  on  his  side,  remove  all  chance  of  damage." 

In  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Griswold,  7  Wend.  168,  Judge  Nelson, 
in  speaking  of  when  notice  to  the  indorser  is  not  necessary,  goes 
on  to  say:  "Thus,  where  the  indorser  is  himself  the  debtor,  as 
where  the  note  is  discounted  fof  his  accommorldtion,  and  the 
money  raised  upon  it  is  received  by  him,  and  therefore  he  ulti- 
mately holden  to  pay  it,  it  is  obvious  that  the  reason  of  the  rule 
cannot  apply":  See,  also,  Eay  v.  Smith,  17  Wall.  415;  Story  on 
Promissory  Notes,  sees.  268,  357. 

The  plaintiff's  counsel  bases  on  this  second  proposition  the  ar- 
gument that  if  he  succeeds  in  establishing  a  state  of  facts  that 
shows  the  indorser  was  himself  the  debtor  and  not  entitled  to 
due  notice  of  protest,  then  the  debt  that  is  sought  to  be  collected 
of  the  defendants,  as  directors  of  the  corporation,  was  either 
contracted  when  the  first  note  was  given,  April  3,  1886,  or  was 
at  that  time  an  existing  debt,  having  its  origin  when  the  steel 
plant  was  delivered  by  plaintiff  to  the  corporation. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  this  is  a  question  that  the  plaintiff 
is  entitled  to  litigate  on  a  new  trial,  and  if  he  succeeds  in  show- 


516  WiTHEBOw  V.  Slayback.  [New  York, 

ing  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  jury  that  the  corporation  is  really 
the  principal  debtor  of  the  plaintiff  in  this  transaction,  then 
the  debt  did  not  arise  at  the  time  of  due  notice  of  protest,  but 
existed  when  the  original  note  was  given  on  the  third  of  Aprils 
1886. 

6G1  ijijjQ  defendants  raised  the  point  at  general  term  and 
again  urge  it  here,  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  recover 
under  the  second  cause  of  action,  to  wit,  the  failure  to  file  a 
report  within  twenty  days  after  the  first  day  of  January,  1887, 
for  the  reason  that  in  August,  1886,  the  company  abandoned 
its  business  and  franchises,  and  turned  over  all  its  property  ta 
its  creditors. 

It  is  sufficient  answer  to  this  point  that  the  plaintiff's  debt, 
if  this  action  is  to  be  maintained,  was  contracted  and  existed 
prior  to  August,  1886,  when  it  is  alleged  that  the  corporation 
ceased  to  exist.  As  the  record  now  stands,  however,  it  is  quite 
clear  that  the  corporation  did  not  cease  to  exist  in  August,  1886. 
On  August  13,  1886,  the  corporation  released  and  surrendered 
to  certain  creditors  property  described,  in  consideration  of  ex- 
tending payment  of  its  indebtedness,  with  covenant  on  part  of 
creditors  that  they  would  return  the  property  to  the  corpora- 
tion at  any  time  prior  to  January  1,  1887,  on  conditions  named. 
On  the  twenty-fourth  day  of  August,  1886,  the  corporation  mort- 
gaged certain  personal  property  to  the  same  creditors. 

It  was  proved  that  these  transfers  did  not  embrace  all  of  the 
property  of  the  corporation,  and  some  of  the  omitted  portion  was 
hypothecated  to  secure  other  creditors.  The  real  significance 
of  these  transactions  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  company  ex- 
ercised acts  of  absolute  ownership  and  dominion  over  certain  of 
the  property  involved  in  this  action. 

In  addition  to  this  the  record  discloses  that  the  corporation 
filed  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state  on  the  twenty-eighth 
day  of  January,  1887,  a  certificate  of  payment  of  the  entire  capi- 
tal stock  of  the  company,  and  that  on  the  eighteenth  day  of 
February,  1887,  and  in  January,  1888,  filed  in  the  same  office  its 
annual  reports.  It  thus  appears  that  the  company  did  not  cease 
to  exist  in  August,  1886. 

The  counsel  for  the  appellant  argues  one  exception  to  the  re- 
jection of  evidence.  ****  The  deposition  of  the  makers  of  the  note 
was  read  on  the  trial  and  the  witness  was  asked  this  question:  "Q. 
T)id  the  company  agree  to  relieve  you  from  the  payments  which 
youwere  to  make?"  Thiswas  objected  to  as  immaterial, irrelevant^ 


April,  1899.]  Hebteb  v.  Mullen,  517 

and  incompetent,  because  it  is  not  the  best  evidence.  Thero 
was  no  evidence  that  the  agreement  referred  to  was  in  writing. 
The  proper  objection  to  the  question  was  that  it  called  for  a 
conclusion  as  to  the  nature  of  the  agreement.  As  the  error  in 
this  ruling  was  at  best  technical  the  plaintiff  is  not  in  a  position 
to  urge  his  exception.  The  information  sought  for  was  relevant 
under  a  proper  form  of  question. 

The  judgment  appealed  from  should  be  reversed  and  a  new 
trial  granted,  and  with  costs  to  the  plaintiff  in  all  the  courts 
to  abide  the  event. 

All  concur,  except  Parker,  C.  J.,  and  O'Brien,  J.,  not  voting. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  OORPORATIONS-PABOL 
EVIDENCE  TO  VARY  CONTRACT  OF  INDORSEMENT.— Parol 
evidence  is  always  competent  to  show  the  real  agreement  and  re- 
lations of  the  parties  to  a  note.  If  the  Indorsement  upon  the  bacls 
of  it  is  in  blanlv,  or  the  names  of  the  parties  are  so  placed  upon  it, 
or  the  contract  is  so  ambiguous  upon  its  face,  as  to  leave  it  doubtful 
what  the  real  intention  of  the  parties  is,  parol  testimony  may  be 
resorted  to  in  order  to  establish  the  true  relation  of  the  parties  to 
•the  note  and  to  each  other:  Notes  to  Ewan  v.  Brooks- Waterfield  Co., 
60  Am.  St  Rep.  727;  Kulenkamp  v.  Groflf,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  287,  288. 
■Compare  note  to  Drennan  v.  Bunn,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  366.  As  between 
the  parties  to  a  negotiable  instrument,  a  blank  indorsement  may  be 
modified  by  parol  evidence,  and  the  entire  transaction  may  be  thus 
shown,  although  resting  partly  in  writing  and  partly  in  parol: 
Holmes  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  38  Neb.  326,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  733.  A 
negotiable  note  given  by  a  corporation  Is  binding:  Mott  v.  Hicks,  1 
Oow.  513,  13  Am.  Dec.  550;  but  whether  a  corporation  alone  Is  bound 
by  a  writing  signed  by  its  officers,  or  whether  the  latter  incur  per- 
sonal liability.  Is  a  question  of  intention  to  be  determined  from  what 
appears  on  the  face  of  the  writing:  Yowell  v.  Dodd,  3  Bush,  581,  96 
Am.  Dec.  266. 


Herter  V.  Mullen. 

[169  New  Yokk,  28.] 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT-HOLDING  OVER— WHAT 
NECESSARY  TO  CONSTITUTE.— A  holding  over  by  a  tenant  after 
the  expiration  of  his  lease  for  a  year,  so  as  to  render  him  liable  for 
another  year's  rent,  must  be  by  such  voluntary  act  that  the  law  im- 
plies a  contract  on  his  part,  or  leasing  of  the  premises  for  another 
year.  Such  implication  does  not  arise  from  his  act  due  to  any  stress 
of  circumstances  which  involves  peril  to  his  life,  or  that  of  some 
member  of  his  family. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT-HOLDING  OVER-RETEN- 
TION  OF  POSSESSION  CAUSED  BY  SICKNESS.— If  a  tenant 
t)y  the  year,  intending  to  surrender  the  premises  at  the  end  of  his 
term.  Is  obliged  to  retain  a  room  in  the  leased  house  for  a  short 
period  of  time  after  his  lease  expires  in  order  to  avoid  the  peril  of 
«xpo8lng  a  sick  member  of  his  family  to  danger  or  death,  this  Is  not 


518  Herter  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

a  Lolding  over  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  that  if  the  tenant 
holds  over  the  landlord  may  continue  the  lease  and  recover  rent  for 
another  year. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT— HOLDING  OVER— OMISSION 
TO  SURRENDER  PREMISES,  WHAT  EXCUSES.— The  failure  or 
the  tenant  to  surrender  the  premises  upon  the  expiration  of  his  term 
is  excused  when  rendered  impossible  by  act  of  God,  unavoidable 
accident,  or  stress  of  circumstances  imperiling  his  life,  or  that  of 
some  member  of  his  family,  so  far  as  his  liability  to  pay  rent  for 
another  term  is  involved  by  his  holding  over  under  such  circum- 
stances. 

B,  J.  Tinney,  for  the  appellants. 

G.  P.  Smith,  for  the  respondent. 

^®  O'BKIEISr,  J.  The  plaintiff's  action  was  to  recover  rent 
alleged  to  be  due  upon  the  lease  of  certain  premises  for  the 
month  of  May,  1895,  and  the  six  following  months  of  that  year. 
The  lease  was  executed  in  March,  1894,  and  was  to  terminate  in 
one  year  from  the  1st  of  May  following.  The  defendants,  who 
were  the  tenants  under  the  lease,  vacated  the  premises  on  May 
15,  1895,  but  as  it  was  claimed  that  they  held  over  after  the 
expiration  of  the  lease  for  fifteen  days,  it  was  held  that  they 
were  liable  for  the  rent  for  another  year,  and  the  plaintiff  re- 
covered for  the  seven  months  of  the  year  that  had  elapsed  before 
the  commencement  of  the  action.  The  rent,  by  the  terms  of 
the  lease,  was  payable  monthly,  and  the  court  directed  a  verdict 
for  the  plaintiff  for  five  hundred  and  fifty-eight  dollars  and  six- 
ty-three cents,  being  the  stipulated  rent  for  the  seven  months^ 
with  interest. 

The  complaint  alleged  the  making  of  the  lease,  the  possession 
thereunder  by  the  defendants,  and  that  they  had  continued  in 
possession  until  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  action. 
The  defendants,  in  their  answer,  allege  that  they  surrendered 
possession  of  the  premises  to  the  plaintiff  on  May  15,  1895,  and 
that  he  accepted  such  surrender;  that  they  had  notified  him  in 
the  month  of  February  preceding  that  they  would  not  take  or 
keep  the  house  for  another  year  after  May  1,  1895,  when  the 
term  fixed  by  the  lease  expired;  ^*  that  after  this  notice  the 
plaintiff  was  permitted  to  show  the  premises  to  persons  wishing 
to  hire  or  purchase  them,  and  to  place  upon  the  house  the  usual 
notice  that  it  was  to  let;  that  the  defendants  moved  from  the 
house  with  all  their  property  and  belongings,  and  that  of  the  fam- 
ily, on  the  first  day  of  May,  1895,  before  the  lease  expired,  ex- 
cept from  the  bedroom  where  their  mother  was  confined  by  a 
dangerous  illness  until  the  15th  of  May  following,  when  she 


April,  1899.]  Herter  v.  Mullen.  519 

was  removed  and  the  premises  wholly  vacated,  and  that  they 
were  forbidden  by  the  physician  in  charge  from  moving  or  dis- 
turbing the  mother  during  the  fifteen  days,  and  were  informed 
by  him  that  it  would  imperil  her  life  if  an  attempt  was  made 
to  remove  her.  These  affirmative  allegations  in  the  answer  were 
pleaded  together  as  a  single  defense.  On  the  trial  it  was  con- 
ceded that  the  defendants  had  the  affirmative  of  the  issues,  since 
the  written  lease  was  produced  and  admitted  by  the  pleadings 
and  the  possession  under  it. 

It  appears  from  the  record  that  the  defendants'  counsel  then 
proceeded  to  open  the  case  to  the  jury,  and  at  the  close  of  the 
opening  the  court  suggested  that  the  controversy  would  resolve 
itself  into  a  pure  question  of  law,  and  that  the  facts  should  be 
agreed  upon.  The  plaintiff's  counsel  then  admitted  that  the 
notice  from  the  tenants  of  their  intention  to  surrender  up  the 
premises  on  the  1st  of  May  had  been  given  in  February,  as  al- 
leged in  the  answer.  The  defendants'  counsel  then  stated  that 
the  reason  for  holding  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  lease 
was  the  sickness  of  the  defendants'  mother,  she  then  being  a 
member  of  their  family,  and  he  stated  that  unless  he  could  have 
it  admitted  as  it  is  pleaded  that  he  wanted  no  admission  what- 
ever. The  plaintiff's  counsel  then  admitted  that  fact,  as  set 
forth  in  the  answer.  The  last  clause  of  the  answer  contained 
an  allegation  that  the  holding  over  was  with  the  knowledge 
and  permission  of  the  plaintiff,  the  landlord,  and  at  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  plaintiff's  counsel  this  allegation  was  withdrawn. 
The  case  then  states  that  upon  the  record  and  the  defendants* 
counsel's  opening,  the  court,  at  the  request  of  the  plaintiff's 
counsel,  directed  a  verdict  against  the  defendants  ^^  for  five 
hundred  and  fifty-eight  dollars  and  sixty-three  cents,  and  that 
the  defendants  excepted  to  this  direction. 

It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  ascertain  from  the  record  just  what 
questions  were  passed  upon  by  the  court  at  the  trial.  It  is  clear 
enough  that  he  held  that  the  defendants  were  liable  for  an- 
other year's  rent  from  the  1st  of  May,  1895,  notwithstanding 
the  facts  alleged  in  the  answer  in  respect  to  the  illness  of  the 
defendants'  mother,  and  the  impossibility  of  her  removal  with- 
out endangering  her  life. 

The  learned  court  must  also  have  held  that  the  other  allega- 
tions of  the  answer  pleaded  in  connection  with  the  fact  just 
referred  to,  that  upon  the  removal  of  the  mother  on  the  fifteenth 
day  of  May,  1895,  the  defendants  surrendered  the  premises  to 
the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  latter  accepted  such  surrender,  waa 


520  Herter  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

• 

not  available  as  a  defense.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  defend- 
ants were  requested  to  withdraw  a  particular  clause  in  the  an- 
srer,  which  was  complied  with,  and  of  the  further  fact  that  the 
case  states  that  a  verdict  was  directed  upon  the  record  and  the 
opening  of  the  defendants'  counsel,  it  must,  I  think,  be  as- 
sumed that  the  decision  was  that  the  answer  contained  no  de- 
fense after  the  allegation  had  been  withdrawn,  which  stated  that 
the  holding  over  was  with  the  consent  of  the  landlord.  After 
the  defendants'  counsel  had  withdrawn  this  allegation  he  stated 
that  he  desired  to  have  the  other  facts  admitted  just  as  he  had 
pleaded  them,  and  this  request  was  complied  with.  The  admis- 
sion, therefore,  must  be  held  to  cover  all  the  facts  affirmatively 
pleaded  in  the  answer,  except  the  particular  allegation  which 
had  been  withdrawn.  After  verdict  was  directed  against  the 
defendants  it  would  not  be  a  fair  construction  of  what  took  place 
at  the  trial  to  hold  that  the  admission  applied  only  to  the  single 
fact  of  holding  over  on  account  of  the  sickness  of  the  motiier. 
It  must,  think,  be  held  that  it  was  an  admission  of  all  the  facts 
affirmatively  pleaded,  except  the  single  allegation  which  the 
plaintiff's  counsel  requested  to  be  withdrawn.  The  direction 
having  been  made  upon  the  opening  of  the  plaintiff's  counsel, 
which  does  not  appear  in  the  case,  and  upon  the  record,  the 
fair  construction  is  that  a  verdict  ^**  was  directed  upon  the  an- 
swer, after  modification  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  allegation  re- 
ferred to  and  upon  the  opening  of  counsel.  The  record  in  this 
connection  must  mean  the  pleadings  in  the  case :  Kley  v.  Healy, 
127  K  Y.  555. 

It  was,  therefore,  admitted  by  the  plaintiff's  counsel  that  fif- 
teen days  after  the  expiration  of  the  term  provided  by  the  lease 
the  tenants  surrendered  the  premises  to  the  landlord  and  that 
the  latter  accepted  tlie  surrender.  After  the  surrender  there 
could  be  no  recovery  of  rent,  since  the  landlord  could  not  have 
the  use  of  the  premises  and  the  stipulated  rent  at  the  same  time. 
When  a  landlord  accepts  a  surrender  of  the  premises,  this  act 
operates  to  discharge  the  tenant  from  all  liability  for  rent  in  the 
future,  and  if  the  construction  of  the  proceedings  at  the  trial 
suggested  be  the  correct  one,  then  the  direction  of  a  verdict 
against  the  defendants  was  error. 

But  perhaps  the  most  important  question  in  the  case  arises 
upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  which  it  is  claimed  constitute 
a  holding  over  by  the  tenant  after  the  expiration  of  the  term 
epecificd  in  the  lease.  For  every  purpose  necessary  to  the  deter- 
mination of  that  question  we  must  assume  that  the  facts  are  as 


April,  1899.]  Hebter  v.  Mullen.  521 

alleged  in  the  answer,  since  it  must  have  been  upon  that  assump- 
iion  that  the  verdict  was  directed.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  rule  of  law  is  settled  beyond  debate  or  controversy  which 
permits  the  landlord,  at  his  election,  to  treat  the  tenant  as  hold- 
ing for  another  year  when  the  latter  remains  in  possession  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term.  When  the  demise  is  for  a  definite 
term  of  one  year  at  a  fixed  rent  and  the  tenant  holds  over  after 
that  term  expires,  the  landlord  may  treat  him  as  a  tenant  for 
another  year  and  collect  rent  accordingly:  Haynes  v.  Aldrich, 
133  N.  Y.  287,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  G36;  Adams  v.  Cohoes,  127  K 
Y.  182.  But  the  question  is  whether  the  tenant  did  in  fact  hold 
over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  within  the  meaning  of 
that  rule.  If  it  is  an  arbitrary  one,  applicable  under  all  circum- 
stances and  conditions,  and  to  be  enforced  in  every  case  without 
regard  to  the  reason  upon  ^*  which  it  is  founded,  it  may  be  said 
that  in  a  strict  sense  there  was  a  holding  over  in  this  case.  But 
this  rule  that  obtains  in  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant 
is  a  part  of  the  common  law,  the  chief  merit  of  which  is  sup- 
posed to  consist  in  its  adaptability  to  changing  circumstances 
and  new  conditions  as  developed  in  the  progress  of  time.  It  is 
not  an  unchangeable  code,  like  that  of  the  Medes  and  Persians, 
but  a  system  that  has  grown  up  with  the  growth  of  civiliza- 
tion, and  is  capable  of  being  molded  to  meet  the  wants  of  society 
in  every  stage  of  its  progress.  _  From  the  facts  disclosed  by  the 
answer  in  this  case  the  tenant  vacated  the  house  at  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term,  except  one  bedroom  in  which  a  member  of  his 
family  was  confined  by  illness  so  serious  that  he  was  warned 
by  the  physician  that  any  attempt  to  remove  her  would  imperil 
her  life.  The  decision  of  the  learned  trial  court  in  the  case  vir- 
tually holds  that  on  the  last  day  of  the  tenant's  term  he  was 
placed  in  a  position  where  he  must  either  pay  rent  for  another 
year  for  a  house  that  he  did  not  intend  to  occupy,  or  to  take 
the  risk  of  becoming,  in  a  certain  sense,  responsible  for  the 
death  of  his  mother  by  attempting  to  remove  her  from  a  sickroom 
against  the  protest  of  a  physician.  This  would  seem  to  be  push- 
ing a  rule  of  law  applicable  to  the  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant  to  a  point  which  makes  it  very  unreasonable,  if  not  ab- 
surd, and,  before  assenting  to  such  an  application  of  it,  we  are 
naturally  forced  to  inquire  whether  there  was  in  fact  any  such 
holding  over  by  the  tenant  in  this  case  as  the  rule  fairly  con- 
templates. Does  a  tenant  who,  on  the  last  day  of  the  term  is 
upon  his  deathbed,  or  is  quarantined  in  his  house  by  the  pub- 
lic authorities  to  prevent  the  spread  of  some  dangerous  or  in- 


522  Herteb  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

fectious  disease,  or  is  insane  or  compelled  to  remain  in  the  house 
against  his  will  by  some  superior  force  or  stress  of  circumstances^ 
hold  over  within  the  meaning  of  the  law,  or  in  the  sense  that 
permits  the  landlord  to  treat  him  as  a  tenant  for  another  year  ? 
The  principle  upon  which  the  rule  is  founded  is  that  the  hold- 
ing over  is  such  an  act  of  the  tenant  that  the  law  implies  a 
contract  on  his  part,  or  leasing  of  the  premises  for  another  year. 
But  whenever  the  law  ^^  implies  a  contract  from  the  act  or  con- 
duct of  the  party,  the  act  itself,  whatever  it  may  be,  must  b& 
voluntary.  The  law  does  not  imply  a  contract  or  obligation  from 
an  act  of  the  party  which  proceeds  from  mistake  or  fraud,  or 
which  results  from  force  or  coercion  of  any  kind,  or  is  due  to 
any  stress  of  circumstances  which  involves  peril  to  his  life  or 
that  of  some  member  of  his  family.  To  infer  a  promise  or  con- 
tract from  any  act  plainly  resulting  from  such  causes  would 
manifestly  be  contrary  to  reason  and  justice.  The  question, 
therefore,  occurs  whether  the  tenant  in  this  case,  by  failing  to 
remove  his  mother  from  the  bedroom  in  the  house,  or  by  her 
presence  there  during  the  fifteen  days  after  the  expiration  of  the 
term,  should  be  held  for  another  year's  rent,  on  the  principle 
that  an  agreement  to  hold  for  another  year  is  to  be  implied 
by  law  from  his  conduct  under  the  circumstances.  If  this  ques- 
tion must  necessarily  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  there  would 
be  no  grounds  for  any  further  discussion.  But  it  seems  to  me 
that,  upon  reason  and  all  the  analogies  of  the  law,  a  hiring  foi 
another  year  cannot  and  should  not  be  implied  against  the  ten- 
ant under  such  circumstances.  The  case  is  not  within  the  rea- 
son of  the  rule,  and,  therefore,  is  not  governed  By  it.  While  this 
court  has  firmly  adhered  to  the  principle  that  the  landlord  is 
entitled  to  treat  the  tenant  who  holds  over  as  lessee  for  another 
year,  it  is  plain,  from  what  was  said  in  one  of  the  most  recent 
cases,  that  the  rule  was  not  considered  an  arbitrary  one.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  intimated  that  it  was  not  so  rigid  that  it  could 
not  properly  be  made  to  bend  in  exceptional  and  peculiar  cases: 
Haynes  v.  Aldrich,  133  N'.  Y.  287,  28  Am.  St.  Kep.  G36.  Where 
the  holding  over  is  wrongful  or  voluntary,  and  not  unavoidable 
in  the  strictest  sense,  the  rule  must  be  permitted  to  have  full 
application.  But  where  the  tenant,  as  in  this  case,  is  obliged 
to  retain  a  room  in  the  house  for  a  short  period  of  time  in  order 
to  avoid  the  peril  of  exposing  a  member  of  his  family  to  danger 
and  death,  it  cannot  properly  be  said  that  it  is  a  holding  over 
within  the  meaning  of  the  law.  Where  a  party  acts  under  such 
a  stress  of  circumstances,  the  act  cannot  be  said  to  proceed  from 


April,  1899.]  IIerter  v.  Mullen.  625 

his  own  volition  any  more  than  if  he  '**  had  been  detained  in 
the  house  by  the  police  under  the  direction  of  the  health  au- 
thorities. 

In  Haynes  v.  Aldrich,  133  K  Y.  287,  28  Am.  St.  Eep.  636^ 
this  court  enforced  the  rule  in  a  case  where  the  facts  were  quitt*^ 
different  from  those  appearing  in  the  record  now  before  us.  In 
that  case,  however,  the  learned  judge  who  spoke  for  the  court 
evidently  had  in  mind  some  case  which  might  be  considered  an 
exception  to  the  rule.  That  is  the  plain  inference  from  the  fol- 
lowing paragraph  of  the  opinion:  "I  do  not  mean  to  say  that 
whether  there  has  been  a  holding  over  at  all  may  not  some  times^ 
be  80  doubtful  upon  the  facts  as  to  require  a  submission  to  the- 
jury.  I  mean  to  say  that  there  is  no  such  doubt  in  the  present 
case.  I  reserve  the  question,  also,  whether  there  might  not  be- 
an unavoidable  delay,  in  no  manner  the  fault  of  the  tenant, 
directly  or  indirectly,  which  would  serve  as  a  valid  excuse.  It  is- 
enough  that  here  was  a  holding  over  not  unavoidable,  which 
might  have  been  provided  against,  and  where  the  chief  difficulty 
grew  directly  out  of  the  tenant's  own  wrongful  act."  In  Jones 
V.  Shears,  4  Ad.  &  E.  832,  the  defendants  had  rented  a  coal  mine- 
for  twenty-one  years,  with  the  proviso  that  they  migftt  terminate 
the  tenancy  at  any  time  by  giving  a  previous  notice  to  that  ef- 
fect. The  term  commenced  in  April,  1825,  and  four  years 
thereafter  the  defendants  gave  the  notice  provided  for.  Tlrey^ 
however,  continued  in  possession  for  two  months  after  the  expi- 
ration of  the  time  limited  by  the  notice,  working  the  mine.  The 
landlord  brought  an  action  for  the  rent,  claiming  that  the  hold- 
ing over  gave  him  the  right  to  treat  them  as  tenants  at  the 
former  rent.  The  defendants  claimed  that  this  holding  over 
was  not  with  any  intent  to  waive  the  notice  and  renew  the  ten- 
ancy, and  that  they  had  the  right  to  show  the  circumstances 
under  which  they  so  held  over.  Upon  this  question  of  intent 
they,  therefore,  proposed  to  show  that  the  coal  worked  by  them 
during  those  two  months  was  taken  from  pillars  of  coal  which- 
supported  the  roof  of  the  mine,  and  that  it  was  customary  for 
the  tenant,  on  leaving  the  mine,  to  cut  away  as  much  coal  as 
could  with  safety  be  removed.  This  evidence  "was  allowed,  and 
Coleridge,  J.,  left  ^"^  it  to  the  jury  to  say  whether,  under  the 
circumstances,  the  defendants  held  over  with  the  intent  to  waive 
the  notice  and  continue  the  tenancy  or  not.  The  jury  found  a 
verdict  for  the  defendants,  and  a  subsequent  motion  for  a  new 
trial  was  denied.  Upon  appeal  to  the  king's  bench,  the  ruling 
at  the  trial  was  affirmed,  Lord  Denman,  chief  justice,  saying  r 


£24  Herter  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

''It  was  impossible  upon  this  issue  not  to  leave  the  question  to 
the  jury,  and  it  was  for  them  to  decide  whether  the  parties,  by 
their  mode  of  continuing  in  possession,  showed  an  intention  to 
waive  their  notice  to  quit  and  to  remain  tenants  as  before." 
Littledale,  J.,  also  said:  "I  do  not  know  that  where  a  tenant 
holds  over  he  is  always  to  be  considered  as  bound  to  hold  upon 
the  same  terms  as  far  as  they  are  applicable Here,  how- 
ever, the  question  was  not  whether  the  parties  held  over  on  the 
terms  of  the  original  tenancy,  but  whether  they  held  over  as  ten- 
-ants  at  all.  It  was  for  the  jury  to  say  whether  the  defendants 
intended  to  avail  themselves  of  their  notice  to  quit,  or  whether 
the  acts  done  by  them  amounted  to  a  waiver  of  such  notice."  In 
dhitty  on  Contracts,  eighth  American  edition,  pages  286,  287, 
^fter  discussing  the  effect  of  the  receipt  by  the  landlord  of  rent 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  and  a  holding  over  by  the  ten- 
ant, the  learned  author  adds:  "And  both  the  fact  of  holding 
over  and  the  payment  of  rent  may  be  explained  so  as  to  rebut 
the  presumption  that  the  parties  intended  thereby  to  create  a 
tenancy  from  year  to  year."  The  law  in  many  cases  excuses  a 
party  from  the  performance  of  a  contract  or  some  other  act  when 
-disabled  by  sickness.  Such  was  the  decision  of  this  court  in  a 
•case  where  a  party  had  contracted  to  render  personal  services  for 
a  specified  time,  but  after  a  partial  performance  was  disabled  by 
sickness.  It  was  held  that,  notwithstanding  the  nonperform- 
ance by  reason  of  this  disability,  the  person  rendering  the  ser- 
vices was  entitled  to  recover  upon  a  quantum  meruit:  Wolfe  v. 
Howes,  20  N.  Y.  197,  75  Am.  Dec.  388.  The  disability  of  a 
party  to  do  the  particular  tb".ng,  or  to  perform  tbe  contract  by 
reason  of  sickness  is  held  to  be  a  disability  by  the  act  of  God. 
So  it  has  been  held  that  sureties  upon  a  recognizance  to  secure 
the  ^**  attendance  of  the  principal  at  court  to  answer  to  a  crim- 
inal charge  may,  when  sued  upon  the  recognizance,  defend  upon 
the  ground  that  the  principal  was  disabled  from  attending  by 
reason  of  sickness:  People  v.  Tubbs,  37  N.  Y.  686.  The  gen- 
■eral  rule  is,  that  where  the  performance  of  a  duty  or  charge  cre- 
ated by  law  is  prevented  by  unavoidable  accident  without  the 
fault  of  the  party,  he  will  be  excused :  Dexter  v.  Norton,  47  N. 
Y.  62,  7  Am.  Hep.  415;  Mill  Dam  t'oundry  v.  Hovey,  21  Pick. 
441. 

It  is  important  to  note  with  more  distinctness  the  wide  dif- 
ference between  this  case  and  Haynes  v.  Aldrich,  133  N.  Y.  287, 
28  Am.  St.  Pep.  636.  In  that  case,  the  tenant  violated  one  of 
the  covenants  of  the  lease  by  subletting  the  premises.    The  sub- 


April,  1899.]  Heetee  v.  Mullen.  625 

tenant  held  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  and  the  tenant 
was  sued  for  rent  upon  the  principle  that  the  holding  over  cre- 
ated a  tenancy  for  another  year.  The  tenant  sought  to  excuse 
the  holding  over  by  the  allegation  that  a  distant  relative  of  th& 
subtenant,  who  was  in  possession,  was  detained  in  the  house  after 
the  expiration  of  the  term  by  sickness.  This  court  held  that  in- 
asmuch .as  the  subletting  was  in  violation  of  the  lease  and  was  a 
wrongful  act  on  the  part  of  the  tenant,  that  he  could  not  be  ex- 
cused by  a  situation  which  was  plainly  the  result, of  his  own  vio- 
lation of  a  covenant  of  the  lease.  It  is  plain  that  the  situation 
which  it  was  claimed  excused  the  tenant  was  of  his  own  creation 
by  putting  another  party  in  possession  of  the  premises.  The 
holding  over  in  that  case  was  very  properly  attributed  to  the 
wrongful  act  of  the  tenant  in  putting  a  stranger  into  possession 
of  the  demised  premises. 

When  a  tenant  for  a  year  actually  holds  over  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term,  the  legal  consequences  which  follow  are  well 
settled  and  understood.  The  landlord  may,  at  his  election,  treat 
him  either  as  a  trespasser  or  a  tenant  for  another  year,  but  in 
any  case  the  fact  of  holding  over  must  be  established.  The 
landlord  cannot  treat  him  as  a  tenant  and  collect  the  rent  for 
another  year,  unless  the  facts  are  such  as  to  justify  him  in  pro- 
ceeding against  him  as  a  trespasser.  An  act  which  might  ordi- 
narily constitute  a  trespass,  when  done  or  committed  ^®  inten- 
tionally or  voluntarily,  cannot  always  be  such  when  done  or  com- 
mitted involuntarily:  Moak's  Underbill  on  Torts,  10,  15.  The 
mere  fact  that  the  tenant  or  some  member  of  his  family  is 
■obliged  to  remain  in  a  room  in  the  house  after  the  expiration  of 
the  demised  term  may  not  necessarily  amount  to  a  trespass. 
Whether  it  does  or  not  must  depend  upon  circumstances.  If  he 
is  detained  there  by  the  act  of  God  or  of  some  superior  legal 
power,  or  some  unavoidable  necessity,  he  is  not  ordinarily 
deemed  to  be  a  trespasser.  A  trespass  presupposes  some  wrong- 
ful act  toward  the  person  or  property  of  another.  If  the  ten- 
ant in  this  case  actually  held  over,  the  plaintiff  could  maintain 
ejectment  against  him;  but  since  his  intention  to  remove  on  the 
day  the  lease  expired  is  clear,  and  this  purpose  was  defeated 
only  by  the  dangerous  illness  of  a  member  of  his  family,  it  would 
would,  I  think,  be  difficult  to  say  that  he  had  such  a  possession 
of  the  house  as  would  support  an  action  of  ejectment,  and  the 
same  facts  and  circumstances  that  would  protect  him  from  such 
an  action  would  also  defeat  the  present  claim,  which  is  based 
upon  the  theory  of  an  implied  agreement  to  lease  for  an'olher 


526  Herteb  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

jear.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  facts  stated  in  the  answer 
would  be  a  defense  to  an  action  by  the  landlord  for  damages 
based  upon  the  breach  of  the  covenant  in  the  lease  to  surrender 
the  demised  premises  at  the  expiration  of  the  term.  A  duty  or 
•obligation  imposed  by  law  and  one  created  by  contract  or  cove- 
nant  stand  upon  different  grounds  when  the  party  seeks  to  be 
■excused  by  the  act  of  God  or  unavoidable  accident,  or  stress  of 
circumstances.  But  in  this  case  the  right  of  the  landlord  to 
-collect  rent  for  the  second  year  does  not  depend  upon  any  ex- 
press contract  or  covenant.  It  rests  wholly  upon  the  legal  im- 
plication derived  from  the  wrongful  act  of  the  tenant  in  hold- 
ing over,  and  if  that  act  was  not  in  fact  wrongful,  but,  under 
the  circumstances,  excusable,  then  there  is  no  basis  for  any  im- 
plied promise  or  agreement.  I  assume  that  if  the  tenant,  or 
«ome  member  of  his  family,  should  die  on  the  last  day  of  the 
term,  that  no  one  would  then  contend  that  the  continued  occu- 
pation of  the  house  for  a  few  '*®  days  during  the  funeral  would 
;amount  to  a  wrongful  holding  over  within  the  meaning  of  the 
law.  Such  an  interpretation  of  a  principle  of  the  common  law 
would  shock  not  only  our  sense  of  justice,  but  every  feeling  of 
•decency  and  humanity.  The  case  before  us  differs  from  that 
•only  in  degree.  Both  cases  must  be  governed  by  a  common 
principle.  It  is  obvious  that  in  the  application  of  the  rule  now 
under  consideration  to  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  there 
must  be  a  point  beyond  which  we  cannot  go,  and  that  point  is 
reached  when  the  alleged  holding  over  cannot  be  attributed  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  to  some  fault  on  the  part  of  the  tenant. 
There  may  be  cases  in  which  the  occupation  of  a  room  in  a  house 
after  the  lease  has  terminated  will  not  amount  to  a  trespass  or 
warrant  the  implication  of  a  lease  for  another  year.  Since  a 
party  cannot,  as  a  general  rule,  commit  a  trespass  or  make  a  con- 
tract without  some  effort  of  volition  on  his  part,  an  act  due  to 
unavoidable  accident  or  resulting  from  some  overruling  neces- 
sity or  stress  of  circumstances  can  form  no  basis  for  imputing  a 
wrong  or  inferring  a  contract.  It  is  reasonable,  therefore,  to 
conclude  from  the  facts  and  circumstances  stated  in  the  answer 
that  the  defendant  was  not  a  trespasser  during  the  fifteen  days 
that  his  mother  occupied  the  room  in  the  house  and  could  not  be 
removed  without  endangering  her  life,  nor  a  tenant  for  another 
year.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled 
to  recover  rent  from  the  time  when  the  house  was  completelj 
vacated. 


April,  1899.]  Hebteb  v.  Mullen.  627 

It  may  be  said  that  this  conclusion  is  a  departure  from  prece- 
dent, but  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  it  is.  No  case  has  been  cited 
«nd  none  has  been  found  where  it  was  held  that  such  a  state  of 
facts,  or  such  a  situation  as  is  disclosed  by  the  answer,  amounted 
to  a  holding  over  by  the  tenant  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule 
that  is  invoked  by  the  landlord  to  sustain  this  action.  Legal 
rules  may  sometimes  be  pushed  to  a  point  where  they  accomplish 
the  grossest  injustice,  and  it  then  becomes  the  duly  of  the  courts 
to  limit  their  application  to  cases  that  are  within  their  true 
€Cope  and  fair  meaning.  We  go  no  further  than  to  say  that, 
upon  the  facts  stated  in  the  "**  answer,  if  conceded  or  estab- 
lished, there  was  no  holding  over  by  the  tenant  within  any  fair 
or  reasonable  meaning  of  the  rule  which  permits  the  landlord 
to  continue  the  lease  for  another  year. 

The  judgment  should  be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  granted, 
•with  costs  to  abide  the  event. 

MARTIN,  J.  This  action  was  to  recover  seven  months'  rent 
of  a  dwelling-house  situated  upon  Madison  avenue  in  the  city  of 
New  York.  There  was  a  lease  between  the  parties  by  which  the 
defendants  rented  the  premises  from  May  1, 1894,  for  the  period 
of  one  year,  the  rent  payable  in  monthly  installments  in  ad- 
vance. The  rent  for  that  term  has  been  paid.  By  this  action 
the  plaintiff  seeks  to  recover  rent  for  a  portion  of  the  succeed- 
ing year,  on  the  ground  that  the  defendants  held  over  after  the 
expiration  of  their  term,  and  thus  became  liable  for  the  rent  of 
the  premises  for  that  time. 

The  facts  are  undisputed.  The  defendants  alleged  as  a  de- 
fense to  the  action  the  making  of  the  contract  or  lease  with  the 
plaintiff;  that  in  the  month  of  February,  1895,  before  the  expi- 
ration of  their  term,  they  notified  the  plaintiff  that  they  would 
not  retain  the  premises  for  another  year,  and  that  after  such 
notice  the  plaintiff  and  his  agents  were  permitted  to  show  the 
premises  and  to  place  the  usual  notice  "To  Let"  upon  them, 
which  remained  during  the  balance  of  the  term.  The  defend- 
ants then  specially  alleged  that  on  May  1,  1895,  the  defendants 
were  prevented  from  yielding  up  the  possession  of  the  premises 
by  the  act  of  God  in  afflicting  their  mother,  who  was  a  member 
of  their  family,  with  a  disease  which,  at  that  time,  previously 
and  subsequently,  including  May  15th.  confined  her  to  her  bed 
60  that  it  would  have  endangered  her  life  to  take  her  from  the 
house;  that  for  that  reason  and  no  other,  of  which  the  plaintiff 
had  full  knowledge  and  notice,  the  defendants  were  obliged  to 


528  Hebter  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

and  did  occupy  a  small  portion  of  the  premises  until  May  15tlij 
that  all  their  property,  furniture  and  belongings  and  their  fam- 
ily were  removed  from  the  premises,  and  every  part  thereof  on 
May  1,  1895,  except  *^  from  the  sickroom  in  which  their 
mother  was  confined,  and  that  they  were  forbidden  by  the  phy- 
sician in  charge  to  remove  her  until  May  15th,  when  she  was  at 
once  removed. 

Upon  the  trial  it  was  admitted  that  upon  the  1st  of  February^ 
1895,  the  defendants  notified  the  plaintiff  that  on  the  1st  of 
May  they  would  give  up  and  surrender  the  possession  of  the 
premises.  That  they  were  occupied  under  the  lease  was  ad- 
mitted, also  the  rate  of  rent,  and  the  fact  that  the  defendants 
from  necessity  held  over  after  the  expiration  of  the  lease  some 
fifteen  days.  The  plaintiff  then  admitted  the  facts  set  up  in  the 
answer  as  to  the  impossibility  of  the  defendants'  surrendering 
possession  at  the  expiration  of  the  year,  so  that  the  question 
presented  is  whether,  notwithstanding  the  facts  alleged  in  the 
answer,  the  plaintiff  was  entitled,  as  a  matter  of  law,  to  recover 
rent  for  the  succeeding  year,  upon  the  ground  that  the  defend- 
ants held  over  after  the  expiration  of  their  term. 

The  admission  of  the  plaintiff  amounts  to  a  concession  that 
by  reason  of  the  sickness  of  the  defendants'  mother  it  was  im- 
possible for  them  to  surrender  up  the  possession  of  the  premises 
to  the  plaintiff;  that  so  far  as  it  was  possible  they  did  so;  and 
hence  that  their  retention  was  wholly  involuntary.  If  there 
was  any  doubt  as  to  the  question  of  impossibility,  it  should  have 
been  submitted  to  the  jury,  and  the  defendants'  exception  to  the 
direction  of  a  verdict  was  well  taken.  Thus,  in  a  word,  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  that  impossibility  justified  the  defendants* 
action,  or  whether,  although  it  was  impossible  to  surrender  the 
entire  premises,  the  holding  of  a  small  part  for  a  few  days  im- 
posed upon  them  a  liability  for  rent  for  the  succeeding  year. 

It  is  well  settled  that  where  a  tenant  voluntarily  holds  over 
after  the  expiration  of  his  term,  he  may  be  held  as  upon  an 
agreement  to  hold  for  a  year  upon  the  terms  of  the  prior  lease: 
Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  114;  Commissioners  of  Pilots 
V.  Clark,  33  IST.  Y.  251;  Haynes  v.  Aldrich,  133  N.  Y.  287,  289, 
28  Am.  St.  Rep.  636. 

The  basis  of  this  liability  is  often  said  to  be  an  implied  agree- 
ment *^  upon  the  part  of  the  tenant  to  hold  for  another  year. 
"While  I  doubt,  as  I  always  have,  the  propriety  of  calling  this 
class  of  oblifrations  implied  contracts,  but  think  they  are  to  be 
regarded  as  duties  which  the  law  imposes,  yet,  whether  they  bo 


April,  1899.]  Hebteb  v.  Mullen.  529 

denominated  implied  contracts  or  duties  created  by  law,  in  either 
case  the  right  arises  upon  an  implication  of  law  and  in  no  sense 
upon  an  express  or  absolute  contract. 

It  is  also  well  settled  that  where  a  duty  or  charge  is  created  by 
law,  and  the  performance  is  prevented  by  inevitable  accident  or 
the  act  of  God,  without  fault  of  the  party  sought  to  be  charged, 
lie  will  be  excused,  but  where  a  person  absolutely  and  by  express 
•contract  binds  himself  to  do  a  particular  thing  which  is  not  at 
the  time  impossible  or  unlawful,  he  will  not  be  excused,  unless 
through  the  fault  of  the  other  party.  The  reason  given  for  the 
latter  portion  of  this  rule  is  that  he  might  have  provided  by  his 
contract  against  inevitable  accident  or  the  act  of  God :  Harmony 
V.  Bingham,  12  N.  Y.  99,  62  Am.  Dec.  142;  Tompkins  v.  Dud- 
ley, 25  N.  Y.  272,  82  Am.  Dec.  349;  Dexter  v.  Norton,  47  N.  Y. 
€2,  7  Am.  Eep.  415. 

Thus  the  most  that  can  be  said  of  the  obligation  that  arises 
from  the  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  and  follows  by  a  gen- 
eral lease,  is  that  the  tenant  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  vacat- 
ing the  premises  at  the  end  of  his  term.  If  he  fails,  it  is  a 
breach  of  his  duty,  and  ordinarily  the  law  implies  or  creates  a, 
liability  on  his  part  for  another  year's  rent.  This  being  a  duty 
implied  or  created  by  law  and  not  by  an  express  or  absolute 
agreement,  it  falls  within  the  first  part  of  the  foregoing  rule, 
and  hence  it  is  obvious  that  if  the  tenant's  removal  was  ren- 
dered impossible  by  inevitable  accident  or  the  act  of  God,  he 
is  excused  for  his  omission  to  surrender  the  premises,  at  least 
€0  far  as  it  creates  a  liability  for  a*  year's  rent  which  is  implied 
by  law. 

The  reason  for  the  distinction  between  the  effect  of  impossi- 
bility of  performance,  occasioned  by  inevitable  accident  or  the 
act  of  God,  upon  an  obligation  created  by  express  contract,  and 
upon  an  obligation  which  the  law  implies,  has  been  held  to  rest 
""upon  the  unwillingness  of  the  law  to  at  once  ■**  create,  impose, 
and  exact  the  performance  of  an  obligation  forbidden  or  ren- 
dered impracticable  by  the  interposition  of  Providence":  School 
Dist.  V.  Dauchy,  25  Conn.  530,  68  Am.  Dec.  371.  Under  the 
principle  of  the  authorities  relating  to  this  subject,  I  think  it  is 
clear  that,  as  the  obligation  sought  to  be  enforced  was  one  cre- 
ated by  law  and  not  by  the  agreement  of  the  parties,  impossi- 
bility of  performance  was  a  valid  excuse,  and  the  defendants 
cannot  be  held  for  the  rent  for  the  subsequent  year. 

Moreover,  the  same    result  may    be    reached  upon  another 

Ax.  St.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— 84 


630  Herteb  v.  Mullen  [New  Yorky 

ground.  There  are  many  cases  where  the  courts  have  implied' 
a  condition  in  a  contract  to  the  effect  that  a  party  is  relieved 
from  its  terms  where  its  performance  has,  without  his  fault,  be- 
come impossible.  The  principle  upon  which  those  cases  are- 
based  is  that,  when  the  contract  was  made,  the  parties  contem- 
plated  that  the  condition  which  subsequently  existed  might 
arise  and  render  performance  impossible,  and  that  the  implied 
condition  is  to  be  construed  as  a  part  of  the  existing  contract, 
and  thus  relieves  the  party  from  liability  in  case  that  condition 
arises:  Dexter  v.  Norton,  47  N.  Y,  62,  7  Am.  Eep.  415;  Loril- 
lard  V.  Clyde,  142  N.  Y.  456,  462;  Stewart  v.  Stone,  127  N.  Y. 
507;  Spalding  v.  Eosa,  71  N.  Y.  40,  44,  27  Am.  Eep.  7;  Taylof 
V.  Caldwell,  3  Best  &  S.  826;  Eobinson  v.  Davison,  L.  E.  6  Ex, 
269;  Kein  v.  Tupper,  52  N.  Y.  650,  555;  Dolan  v.  Eodgers,  149- 
N.  Y.  489,  492. 

To  hold  in  this  case  that  this  agreement  was  made  upon  an 
implied  condition  that  the  defendants  should  not  be  required 
to  vacate  the  premises  at  the  expiration  of  their  term  in  the 
event  that  it  was  rendered  impossible  by  inevitable  accident  or 
the  act  of  God  is  quite  within  the  principle  of  the  authorities 
cited.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  manifest  that  the  charge  or 
liability  which  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  enforce  was  created  by  law 
and  not  by  agreement,  and  that  as  its  performance  was  pre- 
vented without  the  defendants'  fault,  they  were  excused  from 
the  onerous  liability  which  the  plaintiff  now  seeks  to  enforce. 

It  may  well  be,  and  doubtless  is,  true  that  the  plaintiff  may 
recover  "**  for  the  time  the  premises  were  occupied  by  the  de- 
fendants, or,  if  by  reason  of  their  failure  to  surrender  up  the 
premises  additional  damages  follow,  that  they  may  be  recovered 
in  a  proper  action  so  that  all  damages  caused  by  the  defendants*" 
misfortune  would  be  borne  by  them,  but  that  he  cannot  recover 
the  rent  for  the  subsequent  year  upon  the  implied  contract  op 
duty  imposed  by  law,  seems  to  me  clear. 

These  considerations  lead  me  to  the  conclusion  that  the  judg- 
ment in  this  action  should  be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  ordered,^ 
with  costs  to  abide  the  event. 

MR.  JUSTICE  GRAY  dissented  and  maintained  that  the  present 
case  should  form  no  exception  to  the  rule  that  where  there  Is  a 
holding  over  by  a  tenant  after  the  expiration  of  his  lease  for  a  year;, 
the  law  implies  an  agreement  to  hold  for  another  year  upon  the 
terms  of  the  prior  lease.  Such  rule  cannot  "be  affected  by  the  fact 
that  the  holding  over  by  the  defendants  was  by  reason  of  the  Illness- 
of  their  mother,  as  a  member  of  the  family,  and,  therefore.  In  that 


April,  1899.]  IIerter  «.  Mullen.  531 

sense,  Involuntary.  The  doctrine  has  been  long  a  settled  one  In  this 
state  that  a  tenant  who  holds  over  his  term,  either  Is  a  trespasser, 
or  continues  to  be  a  tenant,  at  the  sole  election  of  the  landlord,  and 
that,  in  the  latter  case,  the  legal  implication  Is  that  he  holds  at  the 
former  rent.  As  this  appeal  should  be  disposed  of  upon  authority, 
1  shall  advert  to  a  few  cases  and  to  the  opinions  which  have  been 
expressed.  The  question  was  early  discussed  in  what  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  leading  case  of  Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio, 
113,  where  the  tenant  held  over  his  term  for  the  period  of  two 
weeks.  Bronson,  C.  J.,  In  his  opinion,  laid  down  the  rule  with  con- 
siderable pertinency  and  said  that  'the  tenant  has  no  such  election 
as  that  which  belongs  to  the  landlord.  If  he  holds  over,  though  for 
a  very  short  period,  without  any  unequivocal  act  at  the  time  to  give 
his  holding  the  character  of  a  trespass,  he  is  not  afterward  at  lib- 
erty to  deny  that  he  Is  In  as  a  tenant,  if  the  landlord  chooses  to 
hold  him  to  that  relation.  If  the  tenant  may  hold  over  for  two 
weeks  and  then  say  he  is  not  a  tenant,  I  see  no  reason  why  he  may 
not  give  the  same  answer  after  holding  over  as  many  months  or 
years.  The  plaintiff's  counSel  regards  the  holding  over  as  only  pre- 
sumptive evidence  of  the  continuance  of  the  tenancy,  which  would 
have  been  sufficiently  rebutted  by  the  offered  proof  that  the  plaintiff, 
before  his  term  ended,  refused  to  keep  the  property  another  year, 
even  at  a  reduced  rent.  But  such  are  not  my  views.  I  do  not 
think  this  a  case  for  balancing  presumptions;  but  one  where  the  act 
of  the  plaintiff  In  holding  over  has  given  the  defendants  a  legal 
right  to  treat  him  as  tenant;  and  that  It  Is  not  In  his  power  to  throw 
off  that  character,  however  onerous  it  may  be.'  A  number  of  years 
later,  in  the  case  of  Schuyler  v.  Smith,  51  N.  Y.  309,  10  Am.  Rep. 
609,  the  defendants  had  held  over  for  the  period  of  three  weeks 
after  the  expiration  of  the  lease  and  they  opposed  the  claim  of  the 
plaintiff  to  hold  them  as  tenants  for  the  whole  year  upon  the  ground 
that  they  had  given  him  notice,  before  the  expiration  of  the  term, 
that  they  did  not  Intend  to  keep  the  premises  for  another  year,  and, 
wifh  his  knowledge,  had  made  arrangements  to  occupy  other  prem- 
ises. Judire  Earl,  relying  on  the  rule  of  law  as  settled  by  Conway 
V.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  113,  and  since  recognized  by  other  cases, 
that  where  a  tenant  holds  over  after  the  expiration  of  his  term 
the  law  will  imply  an  agreement  to  hold  for  a  year  upon  the  terms 
of  the  prior  lease,  overruled  their  contention  and  said:  'The  safe 
and  just  rule  I  believe  to  be  the  one  established  by  authority,  that 
a  tenant  holds  over  the  term  at  his  peril;  and  the  owner  of  the 
premises  may  treat  him  as  a  trespasser  or  as  a  tenant  for  another 
year  upon  the  terms  of  the  prior  lease,  so  far  as  applicable.'  Still 
later,  In  Adams  v.  Cohoes,  127  N.  Y.  175,  Judge  Potter,  delivering 
the  opinion  of  this  court,  in  the  second  division,  discussed  this  ques- 
tion In  the  light  of  the  authorities,  and  observed  that,  'so  absolute 
is  the  implication  from  holding  over  for  a  few  days  only,  of  a  hiring 
for  another  year,  that  the  tenant  will  not  be  excused  from  the  pay- 


532  Herteb  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

ment  of  rent,  even  where  he  gave  the  landlord  notice  before  the 
end  of  the  term  that  he  did  not  intend  to  hire  for  another  year, 
and  had  hired  other  premises  which  would  be  ready  for  his  occu- 
pancy in  a  few  days.'  Finally,  we  have  the  case  of  Haynes  v. 
Aldrich,  133  N.  Y.  287,  28  Am.  St.  Kep.  636,  where  the  holding  ovet 
by  the  defendant  was  from  the  1st  to  the  4th  of  May,  and  it  was 
sought  to  be  excused  upon  these  facts,  viz.,  that  the  first  day  of  May 
was  a  holiday;  that  on  the  second  day  of  May  there  was  difficulty 
in  engaging  trucks,  and  that  a  sick  boarder  could  not  be  moved  with 
safety  until  the  fourth  day.  Judge  Finch  discusses,  in  his  opinion, 
the  efficacy  of  such  a  defense  somewhat  elaborately,  and,  referring 
to  the  rule  as  well  settled  by  authority  that,  where  there  is  a  holding 
over  by  the  tenant,  the  law  will  imply  an  agreement  to  hold  for  a 
year  upon  the  terms  of  the  prior  lease,  makes  the  following  observa- 
tions upon  the  argument  of  the  appellant:  'The  appellant  does  not 
deny  the  rule,  but  seeks  to  qualify  it  so  as  to  mean  that  it  is  only 
when  the  tenant  holds  over  voluntarily  and  for  his  own  convenience 
that  the  landlord's  right  arises,  and  that  it  does  not  so  arise  when 
the  tenant  holds  over  involuntarily,  not  for  his  own  convenience, 
but  because  he  cannot  help  it.  I  am  averse  to  any  such  qualifica- 
tion. It  would  introduce  an  uncertainty  into  a  rule  whose  chief 
value  lies  in  its  certainty.  The  consequent  confusion  would  be  very 
great.  Excuses  would  always  be  forthcoming,  and  their  sufficiency 
be  subject  to  the  doubtful  conclusions  of  a  jury,  and  no  lessor  would 
ever  know  when  he  could  safely  promise  possession  to  a  new  ten- 
ant.' Again,  he  says  that,  'if  the  rule  in  this  case  seems  to  involve 
a  hardship,  that  is  sometimes  true  of  every  general  rule,  however 
just  and  wise,  but  does  not  justify  its  abrogation.  To  sustain  this 
defense  would  open  the  door  to  a  destruction  of  the  settled  doctrine 
and  tend  to  involve  the  rights  of  both  lessor  and  lessee  in  uncer- 
tainty and  confusion.'  This  is  pretty  strong  language;  but  the  ap- 
pellants, nevertheless,  seek  to  distinguish  the  case  as  an  authority; 
because  there  is  was  a  subtenant,  w'hose  illness  prevented  the  sur- 
render of  possession,  and  the  question  was  reserved  whether  there 
might  not  be  an  inevitable  delay,  in  no  manner  the  fault  of  the 
tenant,  which  would  serve  as  a  valid  excuse.  It  Is  true  that  there 
Is  that  much  of  a  distinction  between  the  two  cases;  but  I  think  the 
distinction  to  be  somewhat  shadowy,  so  far  as  the  excuse  for  not 
yielding  tip  the  premises  promptly  Is  concerned,  and  I  agree  with 
the  reasoning  of  the  opinion  at  the  appellate  division  in  the  present 
case,  that  'no  such  qualification  should  be,  or  could  safely  be,  im- 
ported into  the  absolute  rule  of  law.  It  would  make  the  landlord 
rather  than  the  tenant  suffer  by  reason  of  a  misfortune  to  the  tenant, 
which  he,  and  not  the  landlord,  should  bear  the  burden  of.' "  Mr. 
Justice  Gray  also  cited  as  supporting  his  view:  Clinton  Wire  Cloth 
Co.  V.  Cnrdner.  99  111.  lf>l;  Moore  v.  Beasley,  3  Oliio.  294;  Vrooraan 
V.  McKalg,  4  Md.  4ij0,  50  Am.  Dec.  88;  Bacon  v.  Brown,  9  Conn.  3.34; 
Hemphill  v.  Flynn,  2  Ta.  St.  144;  Wolffe  v.  WolCfe,  69  Ala.  549,  44 
Am.  Dec.  526. 


April,  1899.]  IIerier  v,  Mullen.  633 

Mr.  Justice  Bartlett  and  Mr.  Justice  Yann  concurred  In  the  dis- 
senting opinion. 


liandlord  and  Tenant— Holdine:  Over.  Tenant,  When  Guilty  of. 
It  is  a  universal  rule  that  if  premibes  are  let  for  a  year,  or  from 
year  to  year,  and  the  tenant  holds  over,  the  landlord  may  elect  to 
treat  him  as  a  tenant  from  year  to  year,  or,  when  the  renting  Is 
for  a  shorter  period,  and  the  tenant  holds  over,  he  may  be  deemed 
to  hold  upon  the  terms  upon  which  he  entered,  and  the  landlord 
may  recover  rent  of  him  according  to  the  terms  of  the  original 
contract  or  lease:  Noel  v.  McCrory,  7  Cold.  623;  Hall  v.  Myers,  43 
Md.  446;  Burbanli  v.  Dyer,  54  Ind.  392;  Parker  v.  Hollis,  50  Ala.  411; 
Usher  v.  Moss,  50  Miss.  208;  Gardner  v.  Commissioners,  21  Minn. 
33;  Bacon  v.  Brown,  9  Conn.  334;  Quinette  v.  Carpenter,  35  Mo.  502; 
Laguerenne  v.  Dougherty,  35  Pa.  St.  45;  Schuyler  v.  Smith,  51  N.  Y. 
309.  10  Am.  Rep.  609;  Hayes  v.  Aldrich,  133  N.  Y.  287,  28  Am.  St. 
Rop.  636;  Adams  v.  Cohoes,  127  N.  Y.  182.  Or  the  landlord  may,  at 
his  election,  treat  the  tenant  holding  over  as  a  trespasser,  and  may 
bring  ejectment  against  him  without  any  previous  notice,  unless  the 
holding  over  has  been  such  that  It  may  be  presumed  that  the  land- 
lord has  assented  thereto:  Smith  v.  Littlefield,  51  N.  Y.  539;  Blain  r. 
Everitt,  36  Md.  73;  Hemphill  v.  Flynn,  2  Pa.  St.  144;  Jackson  v. 
Salmon,  4  Wend.  327;  Brown  v.  Kellar,  32  111.  151,  83  Am.  Dec.  258; 
Crommelin  v.  Theiss,  31  Ala.  412,  70  Am.  Dec.  499;  Schuyler  v. 
Smith,  51  N.  Y.  300,  10  Am.  Rep.  609. 

These  rules  being  settled,  it  sometimes  becomes  a  very  Interest- 
ing question  as  to  whether  the  tenant  has  been  guilty  of  such  a 
holding  over  as  to  bring  him  within  their  operation.  Upon  this 
topic  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion.  In  a  case  very  similar  to 
that  of  the  principal  case,  a  contrary  rule  was  maintained  In  Michi- 
gan. In  that  case.  Mason  v.  Wierengo,  113  Mich.  152,  It  appeared 
that  the  plaintiff,  being  the  owner  of  a  building,  leased  It  for  a  term 
of  years,  at  an  annual  rental,  to  Wierengo,  who  occupied  It  as  a 
store.  A  short  time  before  the  expiration  of  the  lease  Wierengo 
rented  another  building  and  informed  plaintiff  that  he  would  vacate 
the  building  owned  by  him  at  the  expiration  of  the  lease. 

Preparation  for  removal  began  September  19th,  and  actual  re- 
moval began  before  September  26th.  Counsel  for  the  defendant 
claimed  that  the  lease  expired  October  1st  at  midnight.  On  Sep- 
tember 26th,  after  the  removal  began,  Wierengo  was  taken  sick. 
The  work  of  removal  was  continued  by  his  clerks,  but,  because  of 
his  continued  iUuess,  It  was  not  completed  until  October  11th. 
Wierengo  died  October  6th.  Counsel  for  the  defense  claimed  that 
the  presumption  of  a  renting  for  another  year  was  rebutted  by  tfie 
circumstances,  and  that  it  was  made  impossible  for  Wierengo  to 
vacate  by  the  act  of  God. 

In  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Mr.  Justice  Hooker  said: 
"If  it  Is  contended  that  the  act  of  God  excuses  one  from  the  per- 
formance of  his  express  contract  to  yield  possession  at  the  expira- 


534  Herteb  t;.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

tlon  of  his  lease,  we  are  unable  to  acquiesce  in  the  contention.  It 
is  only  in  those  contracts  which  the  act  of  God  renders  impossible 
of  performance,  as  where  the  subject  matter  of  the  contract  dies, 
or  is  destroyed,  or  where  personal  labor  is  contracted  for,  and  the 
person  dies  or  becomes  incapacitated  through  the  act  of  God,  that 
a  party  is  excused  from  performance.  If,  therefore,  the  sicliness  of 
Mr.  Wierengo  has  any  bearing  upon  the  case,  it  is  as  a  circumstance 
bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  rebuttal  of  the  presumption.  Coun- 
sel urge  strenuously  that  the  presumption  of  an  intention  to  renew 
the  lease  for  a  year  arising  from  a  holding  over  is  not  conclusive, 
and  that  it  may  be  rebutted.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  undoubtedly  It 
may  be,  but  it  is  not  so  clear  that  It  would  constitute  a  defense 
against  the  claim  of  the  landlord  who  should  acquiesce  and  elect  to 
treat  the  holding  over  as  a  renewal  of  the  lease  for  a  year,  rather 
than  as  a  trespass.  In  the  absence  of  qualifying  circumstances  im- 
plying consent  to  a  holding  over  under  some  new  arrangement,  the 
holding  over  is  a  legal  trespass,  and  does  not  depend  upon  the  In- 
tention of  the  tenant.  It  is  a  wrongful  holding,  whatever  the  cause, 
though  perhaps  not  culpable  In  a  moral  sense,  and  the  rights  of  the 
landlord  are  definitely  fixed  by  the  law.  We  thinli  that  there  is  a 
uniformity  in  the  decisions  against  the  contention  that  the  inten- 
tion to  vacate  as  soon  as  possible  can  affect  the  right  of  the  land- 
lord to  elect  to  treat  the  holding  over  as  a  renewal  of  the  lease  for  a 
year.  It  requires  some  express  or  implied  consent  upon  his  part  to 
a  holding  over  upon  other  conditions.  This  is  wanting  here.  Coun- 
sel urge  the  hardship  of  the  application  of  the  rule  In  this  case,  but 
we  cannot  say  that  there  is  or  is  not  hardship,  or  that  we  would  be 
justified  in  Imposing  a  burden  upon  the  plaintiff  to  relieve  the  de- 
fendant from  a  legal  obligation.  He  appears  to  have  tried  to  rent 
the  place,  and  has  given  defendant  credit  for  what  he  has  been  able 
to  tlerive  from  the  building.  Had  Wierengo  lived,  he  might  have 
made  the  same  claim  if  asl^ed  to  pay  the  rent  for  another  year,  but 
it  would  not  have  relieved  him.  The  situation,  as  It  is,  only  differs 
In  the  degree  of  Inconvenience,  Intensified  as  It  Is  by  the  death  of 
Wierengo,  and  the  change  In  his  affairs  naturally  resulting.  It  is 
unfortunate  for  his  representatives  that  the  store  was  not  vacated, 
but  we  discover  no  legal  reason  for  lifting  the  burden  of  misfortune 
from  them,  and  Imposing  It  upon  another,  who  Is  in  no  way  respon- 
sible for  it":  Mason  v.  Wierengo,  113  Mich.  153. 

In  a  case  where  the  tenant  went  into,  possession  under  a  parol 
lease  of  a  brick  yard  and  dwelling-house  for  one  year,  with  the 
privilege  of  four  years  at  his  option,  and  continued  in  possession 
fur  two  years,  It  was  held  that,  althougli  the  lease  was  void  as  to  the 
four  years,  yet,  by  the  entry  of  the  tenant  and  his  holding  over 
after  tlie  first  year.  It  became  a  lease  from  year  to  year,  subject  to 
all  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  verbal  lease,  except  as  to  the 
ti'rm;  and  if.  at  the  end  of  the  second  year,  the  tenant  notifies  the 
landlord  that  he  intends  to  leave  and  abandons   the  house  and   re- 


April,  1899.]  Herteb  v.  Mullen.  535 

moves  most  of  the  brick,  but  leaves  a  portion  of  It  In  a  shed  which 
he  has  erected  upon  the  premises  to  protect  the  brick  from  the  effects 
of  the  weather,  and  does  not  remove  it  until  some  time  afterward, 
these  facts,  transpiring  without  the  consent  of  the  landlord,  operate 
as  such  a  continuance  of  his  tenancy  as  to  enable  the  landlord  to 
treat  him  as  a  tenant  for  another  year:  Dorr  v.  Barney,  12  Ilun, 
259.  The  New  York  cases,  It  seems  to  us,  are,  in  principle  at  least, 
•opposed  to  the  ruling  in  the  principal  case.  In  the  early  case  of 
Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  113,  the  rule  was  announced  that 
if  a  tenant  under  a  lease  for  a  year  or  more,  holds  over  after  the  end 
of  the  term  without  any  new  agreement  with  the  landlord,  he  may, 
at  the  election  of  the  latter,  be  treated  either  as  a  trespasser  or  as  a 
tenant  holding  upon  the  terms  of  the  original  lease,  and  that  dis- 
training for  rent  payable  after  the  expiration  of  the  original  lease 
is  an  election  by  the  landlord  to  consider  him  a  tenant.  In  this  case 
the  court  said:  "The  tenant  has  no  such  election  as  that  which  be- 
longs to  the  landlord.  If  he  holds  over,  though  for  a  very  short 
period,  without  any  unequivocal  act  at  the  time  to  give  his  holding 
the  character  of  a  trespass,  he  Is  not  afterward  at  liberty  to  deny 
that  he  is  a  tenant,  if  the  landlord  chooses  to  hold  him  to  that  rela- 
tion. If  the  tenant  may  hold  over  for  two  weeks  and  then  say  that 
he  Is  not  a  tenant,  I  see  no  reason  why  he  may  not  give  the  same 
-answer  after  holding  over  as  many  months  or  years.  The  plaiutiCf's 
counsel  regards  the  holding  over  as  only  presumptive  evidence  of  tne 
-continuance  of  tne  tenancy,  which  would  have  been  sufficiently  re- 
butted by  the  offer  of  proof  that  the  plaintiff,  before  his  term  ended, 
refused  to  keep  the  property  for  another  year,  even  at  a  reduced 
rent.  But  such  are  not  my  views.  I  do  not  think  this  is  a  case  for 
balancing  presumptions;  but  one  where  the  act  of  the  plaintiff  in 
holding  over  has  given  the  defendants  a  legal  right  to  treat  him  as 
a  tenant;  and  that  it  is  not  In  his  power  to  throw  off  that  character, 
however  onerous  It  may  be":  C!onway  v.  Starkweather,  1  DenIo, 
115.  In  Schuyler  v.  Smith.  51  N.  Y.  3C9,  10  Am.  Rep.  009,  It  ap- 
peared that  the  tenant*  held  over  for  three  weeks  after  the  expira- 
tion of  the  lease,  and  then  opposed  the  claim  of  the  landlord  to  hold 
them  as  tenants  for  the  whole  year,  upon  the  ground  that  they  had 
given  him  notice,  before  the  term  expired,  that  they  did  not  Intend 
to  keep  the  premises  for  another  year,  and,  with  his  knowledge, 
had  made  arrangements  to  occupy  other  premises.  Mr.  Justice 
Earl,  In  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  reaffirming  the  de- 
cision In  Conway  v.  Starkweather,  1  Denio,  113,  said:  "The  safe 
and  just  rule  I  believe  to  be  the  one  established  by  authority,  that 
a  tenant  holds  over  the  term  at  his  peril,  and  the  owner  of  ih"  prem- 
ises may  treat  him  as  a  trespasser  or  as  a  tenant  for  another  year 
upon  the  terms  of  the  prior  lease,  so  far  as  applicable":  Schuyler  v. 
Smith,  51  N.  Y.  .^09.  10  Am.  Rep.  609.  Again  In  Adams  v.  Cohoes, 
127  N.  Y.  175,  the  court,  through  Potter,  judge,  said  that:  'So  ab- 
solute Is  the  Implication  from  holding  over  for  a  few  days  only  of  a 


536  Herter  v.  Mullen.  [New  York, 

hiring  for  another  year,  that  the  tenant  will  not  be  excused  from 
the  payment  of  rent,  even  where  he  gave  the  landlord  notice  before 
the  end  of  the  term  that  he  did  not  intend  to  hire  for  another  year, 
and  had  hired  other  premises  which  would  be  ready  for  his  occu- 
pancy in  a  few  days."  In  Hayes  v.  Aldrich,  133  N.  Y.  287,  28  Am. 
St.  Rep.  636,  it  appeared  that  the  term  of  the  tenant  expired  oa 
May  first,  and  before  that  time  he  notified  the  landlord  that  he  did 
not  desire  to  renew  his  lease  for  another  year.  The  1st  of  May  was 
a  holiday  and  possession  was  retained  until  May  4th,  the  excuse 
being  inability  to  get  trucks  to  do  the  moving  on  the  second  day  of 
the  month,  and  that,  on  the  third  one  of  the  boarders  was  sicli  and 
could  not  then  be  moved  with  safety.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  4th 
of  the  month  the  lieys  to  the  premises  were  tendered  to  the  land- 
lord, but  refused,  and,  in  an  action  to  recover  rent,  it  was  held  that 
the  landlord  was  entitled  to  consider  the  lease  renewed  for  another 
year.  II  a  tenant,  after  the  expiration  of  his  term,  supposing  there 
is  no  hurry  in  getting  out,  remains  in  possession  of  the  leased  prem- 
ises four  days  after  the  expiration  of  his  term,  slowly  removing  his 
goods  to  other  premises  previously  hired  by  him,  which  could  have 
been  removed  in  a  much  shorter  time,  but  giving  instructions  to  his 
employes  to  move  his  goods  at  once  if  the  landlord  or  his  agent 
asi^ed  for  the  liey  to  the  premises,  the  tenant  is  guilty  of  holding 
over,  and  the  landlord  may  elect  to  treat  him  as  a  tenant  upon  the 
condiiicns  of  the  first  lease,  although  during  negotiations  for  a  new 
term  before  the  expiration  of  the  lease  he  has  posted  a  notice  "Ta 
Let"  on  the  premises,  and  has  allowed  it  to  remain  aftei'  the  expira- 
tion of  the  term:  Shanahan  v.  Shanahan,  23  Jones  &  S.  339. 

A  tenant  for  years  who  holds  over  only  a  few  days  may  be  treated 
as  a  tenant  for  another  year,  the  landlord  having  given  him  notice 
to  quit,  although  he  has  refused  to  renew  the  lease  and  has  notified 
tlie  landlord  that  he  has  rented  other  premises,  nor  is  he  excused  by 
the  fact  that  such  other  premises  are  not  ready  for  his  occupancy: 
Wolffe  V.  Wolff,  69  Ala.  549,  44  Am.  Rep.  526.  A  tenant  from  year 
to  year,  who  gives  notice  of  his  intention  to  terminate  his  tenancy 
at  the  expiration  of  the  current  year,  tendering  the  keys  of  the 
premises  to  the  landlord  on  the  last  day  of  that  year,  and,  upon  his 
refusal  to  receive  them,  putting  them  into  the  doors  of  the  buildings, 
but  who  nevertheless  continues  for  two  weeks  or  more  to  use  a  por- 
tion of  the  premises  for  storing  some  of  his  goods  previously  placed 
thereon,  and  for  delivering  it  to  his  customers  by  means  of  velilcles 
of  his  own,  loaded  at  the  premises,  and  unloaded  to  customers  at 
other  places,  Is  guilty  of  holding  over  so  as  to  subject  himself,  at 
the  landlord's  election,  to  be  treated  as  taking  the  premises  and  be- 
coming liable  for  rent  at  the  prior  contract  rate  for  another  year: 
Cavanaugh  v.  Clinch,  88  Ga.  610. 

Although  the  tenant  gives  notice  prior  to  the  termination  of  his 
lease  of  his  Intention  to  vacate,  If  he  remains  In  possession  after 
the  expiration  of  his  term  he  becomes  a  tenant  for  another  year,, 
and  liable  as  such  under  the  terms  of  the  old  lease.    "A  tenant  can- 


p 


April,  1899.]  Hebteb  v.  Mullen.  637 

not  escape  liability  for  the  rent  of  another  term  by  giving  notlc» 
that  he  Is  going  out  at  the  end  of  his  year,  and  then  not  going": 
Graham  v.  Dempsey,  169  Pa.  St.  460. 

In  Smith  V.  Snyder,  168  Pa.  St.  541,  It  appeared  that  the  tenant, 
after  giving  notice  of  his  Intention  to  quit  the  premises  at  the  end 
of  his  yearly  term,  Informed  the  agent  of  the  landlord  that  he  would 
be  willing  to  remain  on  the  premises  as  tenant  from  month  to  month, 
the  agent  informed  him  that  he  would  communicate  with  the  land- 
lord and  let  him  know  before  the  expiration  of  the  term.  This  he 
failed  to  do.  The  tenant  remained  In  possession  for  about  a  month 
over  his  term,  when  he  was  Informed  by  the  landlord  that  he  would 
not  be  accepted  as  a  tenant  from  month  to  month,  and  It  was  held 
that  he  was  guilty  of  such  a  holding  over  as  to  create  another  ten- 
ancy from  year  to  year. 

Although  the  rule  is  everywhere  recognized  that  if  a  tenant  for  a 
year  or  more  holds  over  the  term  the  landlord  has  the  option  to 
treat  him  as  a  trespasser,  or  as  a  tenant  for  another  year  upon  the 
same  terms  as  those  of  the  original  lease,  some  cases  hold  that 
the  above  rule  is  only  a  rule  of  presumption,  which  may  be  rebutted 
by  proof  of  a  different  agreement  or  of  facts  Inconsistent  with  such 
presumption,  and  that  every  continued  occupjition  of  the  premises 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term  Is  not  a  holding  over  within  the 
meaning  of  this  rule.  Thus,  If,  before  the  expiration  of  a  lease  for 
a  year  the  tenant  Informs  the  landlord  that  he  will  not  remain  for 
another  year,  but  will  remain  for  a  short  period,  and  pay  rent  at 
t£e  old  rate  for  the  length  of  time  he  remains  In  possession,  and  the 
landlord  acquiesces,  and  thereafter  receives  the  rent,  a  tenancy 
from  year  to  year,  or  for  another  year.  Is  not  created:  Montgomery 
v.  Willis,  45  Neb.  434.  And  if  the  tenant,  with  the  consent  of  the 
landlord,  remains  over  only  pending  negotiations  for  a  new  lease, 
with  the  understanding  that  If  a  new  lease  Is  not  made  the  tenant 
shall  surrender  the  premises  and  not  be  liable  for  rent  thereafter, 
he  cannot  be  held  liable  for  another  year's  rent:  Smith  v.AUt,  7  Daly, 
492,  4  Abb.  N.  C.  205.  If  a  tenant  talies  a  lease  of  other  premises 
from  Tils  landlord,  he  to  take  possession  of  them  upon  the  expira- 
tion of  his  present  lease,  and,  they  not  then  being  ready  for  occu- 
pancy, he  surrenders  his  lease,  but  remains  in  possession  of  the  old 
premises  for  a  few  days  over  his  term,  when,  upon  receiving  notice 
from  his  landlord  that  he  is  regarded  as  holding  over,  he  vacates 
them,  such  holding  over  does  not  raise  an  implied  tenancy  for  an- 
other year,  and  the  tenant  Is  liable  for  rent  only  for  the  time  he 
actually  occupied  the  premises  beyond  his  term:  Wilcox  v.  Raddln, 
7  111.  App.  594.  If  a  tenant,  upon  the  expiration  of  his  term,  leaves 
furniture  and  other  property  on  the  premises  to  be  used  by  the  ten- 
ant succeeding  him,  under  an  agreement  that  It  shall  be  returned 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  outgoing  tenant,  the  landlord  cannot,  after 
using  such  tenant's  property  for  several  months  through  8ucc<'ed- 
Ing  tenancies,  refuse  to  permit  it*  removal  without  the  payment  of 


538    Bush  t;.  Board  OF  Supervisors  OF  Orange  Co.    [New  York, 

-a  yearly  rental  of  the  premises.  As  there  was  no  possession  of  any 
part  of  the  premises  by  the  outgoing  tenant,  there  was  no  holding 
over  by  him  from  which  a  contract  to  pay  the  rent  demanded  could 
be  implied:  Love  v.  Peirson,  10  Daly,  272.  Under  the  Kentucky 
statute,  when  the  renting  is  for  a  year  or  more,  to  expire  on  a  named 
■day,  the  tenant  may  abandon  the  premises  within  ninety  days  next 
succeeding  the  expiration  of  the  term,  and  is  not  liable  for  a  longer 
period  than  he  holds,  unless  by  express  contract  he  agrees  to  hold 
the  premises  for  a  longer  time:  Mendel  v.  Hall,  13  Bush,  232. 


UusH  V,  Board  op  Supervisors  op  Orange  County. 

[169  New  York,  212.] 

constitutional    law— payments    to    drafted 

MEN  BY  TAXATION.— A  statute  which  empowers  and  directs  the 
supervisors  of  several  counties,  upon  a  petition  of  the  majority  of 
the  taxpayers,  to  raise  by  ordinary  taxation  the  money  needed  to 
pay  to  auy  drafted  man  who  served  personally  in  the  Civil  War, 
•or  paid  commutation  money, or  to  his  heirs  a  specified  sum  of  money, 
with  interest  for  a  period  of  years,  is  void  as  being  beyond  the  tax- 
ing power  of  the  legislature,  and  as  being  in  violation  of  a  state 
.  constitution  forbidding  any  coimty,  city,  town,  or  village  to  give 
any  money  to  or  in  aid  of  any  individual,  or  to  incur  any  indebted- 
ness except  for  county,  city,  town,  or  village  purposes. 

F.  E.  Gilbert  and  W.  Hull,  for  the  appellants. 

W.  D.  Guthrie  and  C.  A.  De  Gersdorff,  for  the  respondent. 

^**  PER  CURIAM.  This  was  a  taxpayer's  action  to  restrain 
the  board  of  supervisors  from  proceeding  to  levy  a  tax  upon  ono 
of  the  towns  of  Orange  county,  in  order  to  pay  the  claims  of  cer- 
tain persons  or  their  heirs,  who  were  drafted  into  the  military  ser- 
vice of  the  United  States,  or  had  commuted  in  lieu  of  such  ser- 
vice, under  the  act  of  Congress  of  March  3,  1803,  entitled,  "An 
act  for  enrolling  and  calling  out  the  national  forces  and  for  other 
purposes."  The  parties  seeking  to  enforce  the  claims  proceeded 
regularly  under  the  provisions  of  chapter  664  of  the  Laws  of 
1892.  It  will  be  seen  that  under  the  provisions  of  this  statute 
the  supervisors  are  directed  to  levy  the  tax  in  certain  cases,  and 
upon  due  proof  that  certain  conditions  specified  have  been  com- 
plied with. 

The  courts  below  have  sustained  the  action  and  restrained  the 
supervisors  and  the  authorities  of  the  town  from  proceeding 
under  the  act.  on  the  sole  ground  that  the  enactment  in  its  en- 
tire scope  and  purpose  is  in  conflict  with  the  constitution   and 


June,  '99.]    Bush  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  Orange  Co.    539 

therefore  void.  That  is  the  only  question  necessary  to  consider 
upon  this  appeal.  The  statute,  in  substance,  empowers  and  di- 
rects the  supervisors  of  the  several  counties,  upon  a  petition  of 
a  majority  of  the  taxpayers,  to  raise  by  ordinary  taxation  the 
money  needed  to  pay  to  any  drafted  man  who  served  person- 
ally  in  the  Civil  War,  or  paid  commutation  money,  or  to  the 
heirs  of  any  such  man,  the  sum  of  three  hundred  dollars,  with 
the  interest  thereon,  for  a  period  of  about  thirty  years. 

*^**  Every  government  must  possess  the  inherent  right  or 
power  to  call  upon  its  citizens  to  perform  military  duty  in  time 
of  war.  The  exercise  of  this  power  involves  the  right  of  self- 
preservation,  and  that  right  in  the  government  imposes  upon 
the  citizen  a  corresponding  duty  to  render  such  services  when- 
ever the  emergency  arises,  and  it  is  demanded  of  him.  The  gov- 
ernment must  necessarily  be  the  judge  of  the  necessity  for  re- 
■quiring  the  performance  of  this  duty.  This  power*  was  called 
into  action  by  the  act  of  Congress  referred  to,  since  it  provided 
for  a  conscription  to  recruit  the  army.  The  individuals  selected 
in  the  manner  provided  by  the  act  were  under  obligations  to 
serve,  but  they  were  permitted  to  commute  such  services,  or  pay, 
in  lieu  thereof  to  the  government,  a  specified  sum  of  money. 
The  legislation  which  the  courts  below  have  condemned  at- 
tempted to  authorize  taxation  for  the  purpose  of  refunding  to 
the  person  who  paid,  or  his  heirs,  the  moneys  expended,  with 
interest,  and  to  pay  to  the  person  who  personally  served  under 
the  call,  or  to  his  heirs,  a  like  sum,  with  interest. 

The  power  to  impose  taxes,  general  or  local,  which  rests  witH 
the  legislature,  is  without  much  express  restriction  in  the  con- 
stitution, and  yet  even  this  power  cannot  be  said  to  be  absolute. 
On  general  principles,  it  has  at  least  one  limitation,  and  that  is, 
that  the  money  to  be  raised  must  be  required  for  some  purpose 
that  in  some  sense,  at  least,  can  be  said  to  be  public.  The  legis- 
lature cannot  authorize  taxation  for  the  purpose  of  making  gifts, 
or  paying  gratuities  to  private  individuals.  It  is  quite  clear 
that  this  was  the  purpose  of  the  act  in  question.  The  individ- 
uals for  whose  benefit  the  tax  was  to  be  levied  under  the  act,  had 
no  claim,  legal  or  equitable,  against  the  town  or  county  where  the 
money  was  to  be  raised  by  taxation.  Those  who  actually  served 
tinder  the  conscription  only  discharged  their  obligations  to  the 
g;eneral  government.  Those  who  commuted  simply  paid  so 
much  money  in  order  to  be  relieved  from  the  obligation  to  ren- 
der military  service.  In  either  case  the  individual  did  nothing 
more  than  to  discharge  his  obligations  to  the  government  as  a 


640   Bush  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of  Orange  Co.   [New  York> 

citizen  and  ^^"^  hence  he  had  no  claim  against  the  locality  to 
reimburse  him  for  what  he  was  obliged  to  do.  The  fact  that  a 
majority  of  the  taxpayers  requested  the  supervisors  to  levy  the 
tax  is  of  no  importance.  Majorities,  however  potent  in  many  re- 
spects, have  no  power  to  impose  taxes  upon  the  minority  for  the 
purpose  of  raising  money  to  be  devoted  to  gifts  or  gratuities  to 
individuals.  We  think  that  under  the  general  principles  which 
control  the  exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation  the  legislature  had 
no  power  to  pass  the  act  in  question. 

It  did  not  attempt  to  authorize  taxation  for  any  public  pur- 
pose, but  was,  in  effect,  a  method  of  taking  private  property,  not 
for  any  public  use,  but  for  the  benefit  of  private  individuals. 
Legislation  of  this  character  has  often  been  questioned  in  the 
courts  and  quite  uniformly  condemned :  Taber  v.  Supervisors  of 
Erie  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  432;  Perkins  v.  Milford,  59  Me.  315;  Moul- 
ton  V.  Eaymond,  60  Me.  121;  Freeland  v.  Hastings,  10  Allen, 
570;  Mead  v.  Acton,  13D  Mass.  341;  Kelly  v.  Marshall,  69  Pa.  St. 
319;  Ferguson  v.  Landram,  1  Bush,  548. 

The  amendments  to  the  constitution  of  this  state,  adopted  in 
1874,  imposed  an  additional  limitation  upon  the  power  of  the 
legislature  to  authorize  taxation  in  counties  or  towns  for  pri- 
vate or  local  purposes.  By  section  10,  article  8,  it  was  enacted 
that  no  county,  city,  town,  or  village  shall  hereafter  give  any 
money  or  property  to  or  in  aid  of  any  individual,  association,  or 
corporation.  Nor  shall  any  such  county,  city,  town,  or  village 
be  allowed  to  incur  any  indebtedness  except  for  county,  city, 
town,  or  village  purposes.  The  statute  in  question  provides  for 
the  imposition  of  the  tax  upon  the  town  to  raise  money  for  the 
payment  of  claims  which  there  was  no  legal  or  moral  obligation 
on  the  part  of  the  town  to  pay,  and  hence  it  is  in  conflict  with 
the  provision  of  the  constitution  above  referred  to  which  forbids 
the  town  from  giving  any  money  to  or  in  aid  of  an  individual. 
The  action  of  the  town  authorities  in  auditing  or  recognizing 
the  claims  as  obligations  to  be  paid  by  taxation,  or  similar  action 
by  the  supervisors,  all  of  which  is  contemplated  by  the  statute, 
also  violates  the  restriction  *^^  against  incurring  obligations 
for  other  than  county  or  town  purposes. 

Whatever  other  merit  these  demands  may  have,  it  is  quite 
clear  that  money  raised  to  pay  them  by  taxation  on  the  county 
or  town  cannot,  with  any  propriety,  be  said  to  be  raised  for  a 
county  or  town  purpose. 

So  we  think  that  the  courts  below  were  right  in  deciding  that 


Jane,  1899.]  Stoddard  v.  Ldm.  541 

the  statute  was  violative  of  the  constitution.    The  judgment 
must,  therefore,  be  affirmed,  with  costs. 

All  concur. 


TAXATION— BOUNTIES  FOR  SOLDIERS-CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW.— The  payment  of  bounties  to  volunteers  to  fill  quotas  and 
avoid  drafts  is  such  a  public  purpose  as  will  authorize  state  or 
municipal  taxation.  The  bounty  is  not  a  private  transaction  in 
"Wliich  the  Individual  alone  is  benefited.  The  object  is  not  to  obtain 
money  for  the  volunteer,  but  for  the  community  which  Is  to  be  re- 
lieved by  the  volunteer:  Brodhead  v.  Milwaukee,  19  Wis.  624,  88 
Am.  Dec.  711;  Kuukle  v.  Franklin,  13  Minn.  127,  97  Am.  Dec.  226. 
While  the  legislature  may  authorize  a  town  to  levy  a  tax  to  raise 
money  to  pay  for  substitutes  for  drafted  men,  it  cannot  authorize 
fiuch  taxation  to  raise  money  to  refund  to  individuals  sums  of  money 
paid  by  them  for  substitutes:  See  the  note  to  Zigler  v.  Menges,  16 
Am.  St  Rep.  36Q. 


Stoddard  v,  Lum. 

[159  New  York,  266,] 

'  CORPORATIONS  —  STOCKHOLDERS  LIABILITY  —EN- 
PORCEMENT  OF  IN  ANOTHER  STATE,— An  assignee  of  an  in- 
solvent corporation  of  another  state,  appointed  therein  and  author- 
ized by  the  law  thereof  to  maintain  any  suit  which  the  corporation 
could  have  maintained,  may  maintain  an  action  in  another  state 
against  all  the  original  stockholders  residing  therein  to  enforce  their 
common-law  contractual  liability  to  pay  the  subscription  price  of 
their  stock  and  to  compel  them  to  contribute  their  pro  rata  share  of 
the  Indebtedness  of  tbe  corporation  to  the  extent  of  their  unpaid 
stock  subscriptions.  This  remedy  exists  Independently  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  of  the  former  state. 

W.  C.  Eamsdale,  for  the  appellant. 

Signor  &  Wage  and  Pitts  &  Sherwood,  for  the  respondents. 

*««  BARTLETT,  J.  This  action  is  brought  by  the  plaintiff, 
as  the  general  assignee  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  of  the  Sol- 
diers' World's  Fair  Hotel  Association,  a  corporation  organized 
under  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Illinois,  with  a  capital  stock  of 
$200,000,  divided  into  2,000  shares  of  $100  each. 

The  following  facts,  among  others,  appear  in  the  complaint: 
The  corporation  became  financially  involved  early  in  its  history, 
and  on  the  fifth  day  of  May,  1893,  executed  to  the  plaintiff  a 
general  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors. 

At  the  September,  1893,  term  of  the  Cook  county  court,  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  of  general  assignment  matters,  it  was  found  that 
the  corporation  was  indebted  in  the  total  sum  of  $9,973.19;  that 
the  amount  realized  from  the  tangible  assets  was  only  $795.19, 


542  Stoddard  v.  Ldm.  [New  York, 

and  that  the  assets  of  the  corporation  had  been  exhausted;  that 
the  stockholders  were  still  indebted  in  the  sum  of  $36,407.15  on 
their  stock;  that  it  was  necessary  that  each  stockholder  should 
be  required  to  pay  his  pro  rata  share  of  the  debts  and  liabilities. 

It  was  then  averred  that  these  findings  of  the  court  were  in 
fact  true.  The  court,  by  order,  directed  the  plaintiff,  as  as- 
signee,  to  bring  suit  in  behalf  of  all  the  creditors  of  the  corpora- 
tion against  all  the  stockholders  who  had  not  yet  paid  the  entira 
face  of  the  stock. 

It  is  further  alleged  that  plaintiff,  in  compliance  with  this 
order,  brought  an  action  in  the  superior  court  of  Cook  county 
against. the  stockholders  for  the  purpose  mentioned;  that  up  ti> 
the  time  of  filing  this  complaint  the  suit  in  Illinois  had  realized 
only  $1,759.54,  and  that  the  necessary  disbursements  left  a  bal- 
ance of  $326.50;  that  at  the  time  the  decree  was  entered  in  the 
Illinois  suit  the  liabilities  of  the  corporation  amounted  to  $11,- 
670.21,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  recover  ^^^  this  sum  from 
the  stockholders  in  order  to  pay  the  debts  of  the  company;  that 
only  two  stockholders  in  the  state  of  Illinois  proved  to  be  solv- 
ent, and  that  from  them  only  $1,039.18  was  collected;  that  there 
is  still  unpaid  to  the  creditors  of  the  corporation  the  sum  of  $10,- 
432.70. 

The  complaint  then  sets  forth  the  names  of  some  fifteen  or 
more  stockholders  residing  in  the  state  of  New  York  and  made 
defendants  in  this  action. 

It  is  further  averred  that  some  of  the  New  York  stockholders 
are  solvent  and  some  are  not,  but  which  of  them  are  or  which 
are  not,  is  unknown  to  plaintiff ;  that  all  of  the  stockholders  re- 
siding outside  of  the  states  of  Illinois  and  New  York  are  in- 
solvent. 

It  is  also  alleged  that  plaintiff  made  a  report  to  the  Cook 
county  court,  and  upon  the  same  the  court  ordered  that  he  in- 
stitute a  suit  in  the  state  of  New  York  against  the  stockholders 
of  the  corporation  residing  there,  to  recover  the  amount  justly 
due  from  them;  that  the  plaintiff  represents  one  hundred  and 
fifteen  of  the  creditors  of  the  corporation,  and  this  suit  is 
brought  on  their  behalf. 

It  is  then  alleged  that  in  the  suit  in  the  superior  court  of 
Cook  county,  the  execution  of  one  creditor  on  a  judgment 
against  the  corporation  was  returned  wholly  unsatisfied  before 
the  institution  of  that  action;  that  the  corporation  has  ceased 
doing  business,  being  insolvent;  that  under  the  laws  of  the 
stale  of  Illinois,  a  domestic  corporation  of  that  state  may  make 


June,  1899.]  Stoddard  v.  Ldm.  645 

a  general  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  its  creditors,  and  that 
the  assignee  thereunder  may  maintain  any  suit  or  action  that 
the  insolvent  debtor  making  the  assignment  could  have  main* 
tained  if  such  assignment  had  not  been  made. 

There  is  annexed  to  the  complaint  a  schedule  marked  "C/*" 
which  contains  portions  of  the  statutes  of  the  state  of  Illinois^ 
dealing  with  the  liabilities  of  stockholders  of  corporations  or- 
ganized under  the  laws  of  that  state. 

It  is  asked  in  the  prayer  for  relief  that  the  court  determine 
the  amount  of  the  liabilities  of  each  defendant  resident  in  tho 
state  of  New  York,  by  reason  of  the  premises,  and  prays  th& 
appointment  ^"^^  of  a  receiver  in  this  state  to  aid  him  in  the 
carrying  out  of  the  decree  of  the  court. 

The  complaint  was  demurred  to  on  three  grounds:  that  it 
appears  upon  the  face  of  the  complaint  the  court  has  no  juris- 
diction of  the  subject  matter  of  the  action;  that  the  complaint 
does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action^ 
that  plaintiff  has  no  legal  capacity  to  sue. 

The  demurrer  was  overruled  at  special  term,  the  trial  judge 
holding  that  the  action  was  well  brought. 

The  appellate  division  reversed  this  interlocutory  judgment 
with  a  divided  court,  two  of  the  learned  justices  dissenting. 

The  point  presented  by  the  demurrer  is  a  very  narrow  one^ 
and  is  in  substance  this :  that  an  action  against  these  stockhold- 
ers to  recover  a  balance  due  on  their  subscriptions,  or  such  pro 
rata  share  of  it  as  is  necessary  to  pay  the  indebtedness  of  the 
company,  can  only  be  maintained  in  the  state  of  Illinois  where 
the  corporation  is  located,  as  the  laws  of  Illinois  provide  a  special 
and  peculiar  remedy  which  can  be  enforced  only  in  that  state. 

Chapter  32  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  state  of  Illinois  con^ 
tains  the  provisions  involved  in  this  controversy.  Section  8^ 
among  other  things,  enacts  that  each  "stockholder  shall  be  lia- 
ble for  the  debts  of  the  corporation  to  the  extent  of  the  amount 
that  may  be  unpaid  upon  the  stock  held  by  him,  to  be  collected 

in  the  manner  herein  provided Whenever  any  action  ia 

brought  to  recover  any  indebtedness  against  a  corporation,  it 
shall  be  competent  to  proceed  against  any  one  or  more  stock- 
holders at  the  same  time,  to  the  extent  of  the  balance  unpaid  by- 
such  stockholders  upon  the  stock  owned  by  them  respectively^ 
whether  called  in  or  not,  as  in  cases  of  garnishment."  This  ia 
clearly  an  exclusive  remedy  available  only  in  the  state  of  Uli- 
nois. 


541  Stoddard  v.  Lum.  [New  York. 

We  then  come  to  section  25  of  this  chapter,  which  is  to  be 
read  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  a  corporation  may  make 
^  general  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  its  creditors  in  the  state 
of  Illinois. 

^''^  This  section  provides,  among  other  things,  that  if  a  cor- 
poration "shall  dissolve  or  cease  doing  business  leaving  debts  un- 
paid, suits  in  equity  may  be  brought  against  all  persons  who 
were  stockholders  at  the  time,  or  liable  in  any  way  for  the  debts 
of  the  corporation,  by  joining  the  corporation  in  such  suit,  and 
each  stockholder  may  be  required  to  pay  his  pro  rata  share  of 
such  debts  or  liabilities  to  the  extent  of  the  unpaid  portion  of 
his  stock  after  exhausting  the  assets  of  such  corporation.  And 
if  any  stockholder  shall  not  have  property  enough  to  satisfy  his 
portion  of  such  debts  or  liabilities,  then  the  amount  shall  be  di- 
Tided  equally  among  all  the  remaining  solvent  stockholders/' 

The  balance  of  section  25  provides  for  the  winding  up  of  a 
corporation  by  a  court  of  equity  and  the  appointment  of  a  re- 
ceiver, et  cetera.  This  portion  of  the  statute  is  not  involved  in 
the  present  action. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  plaintiif  in  the  case  at  bar, 
■clothed  with  the  ample  powers  of  a  general  assignee  for  the 
benefit  of  creditors,  is  duly  authorized  by  the  first  portion  of  this 
section  to  proceed  against  stockholders  and  all  persons  liable 
in  any  way  for  the  debts  of  the  corporation  in  the  interest  of  the 
<;reditors,  the  corporation  having  ceased  to  do  business  and  leav- 
ing debts  unpaid. 

This  provision  of  the  statute  evidently  authorizes  the  general 
assignee  to  bring  an  omnibus  suit  in  the  state  of  Illinois  in  the 
interest  of  creditors  against  stockholders  and  others  in  any  way 
liable  to  contribute  to  the  payment  of  the  corporate  debts.  The 
statutory  limitation  of  recovery  against  a  stockholder  to  his  pro 
rata  share  of  the  debts,  if  it  be  less  than  the  amount  unpaid  upon 
liis  stock  subscription,  is  merely  stating  the  rule  in  equity  when 
marshalling  the  assets. 

If  a  stockholder  of  an  insolvent  corporation  owed  a  balance  on 
his  stock  subscription  of  five  thousand  dollars,  and  it  was  made 
to  appear  that  three  thousand  dollars  was  his  pro  rata  share  of 
the  indebtedness,  judgment  could  only  go  against  him  for  the 
latter  amount. 

The  liability  now  sought  to  be  enforced  does  not  rest  npon 
*'^*  the  provisions  of  the  statutes  cited,  but  is  wholly  contrac- 
tual and  has  for  its  foundation  the  principles  of  the  common  law. 


June.  1899.]  Stoddard  v.  Lum.  645 

We  do  not  approve  the  position  of  appellant  as  set  forth  in 
the  complaint  and  his  brief,  that  he  depends  to  any  extent  upon 
the  Illinois  statute  cited  in  order  to  maintain  this  action. 

The  provisions  of  section  25  of  the  Illinois  statute,  above 
■quoted,  may  be  regarded,,  as  far  as  this  action  is  concerned,  as 
enacting  the  existing  rule  of  the  common  law  as  to  the  right 
of  a  creditor,  or  his  representative,  in  case  of  insolvency,  to  en- 
force outstanding  contracts,  and  also  as  putting  into  statutory 
form  these  equitable  principles  applicable  to  a  stockholder 
whose  unpaid  subscription  exceeds  the  pro  rata  amount  due 
from  him  in  paying  the  debts  of  the  corporation. 

The  fact  that  the  corporation  and  its  general  assignee  for  the 
benefit  of  its  creditors  are  the  creatures  of  the  statute  does  not 
<jualify  the  rule  as  stated.  A  corporation  is  a  legal  entity  with 
the  unlimited  right  to  sue  and  be  sued  within  the  lines  of  its 
■charter  powers. 

An  examination  of  the  principles  underlying  this  action  and 
those  cases  that  are  supposed  to  condemn  it  will  lead  to  a 
clearer  apprehension  of  the  present  situation. 

The  demurrer  to  the  complaint  admits  that  these  defendants, 
residents  of  this  state,  are  original  subscribers  to  the  stock  of 
this  Illinois  corporation,  and  that  they  are  still  indebted  for 
balance  due  on  the  subscription. 

This  is  a  contract  liability  pure  and  simple  and  one  that  the 
corporation,  if  solvent,  could  have  enforced  in  the  courts  ot 
this  state.  This  cause  of  action,  in  the  event  of  corporate  in- 
«olvency,  vests  in  the  general  assignee  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 
itors, or  in  a  receiver  duly  appointed. 

It  has  been  held  that  a  right  of  action  to  enforce  a  personal 
liability  of  the  stockholder  for  the  debts  of  a  corporation,  given 
and  created  only  by  the  statutes  of  the  state  of  the  corpora^ 
tion's  domicile,  is  not  enforceable  in  another  state  where  the 
stockholder  resides,  upon  any  obligation  of  comity;  but  it  has 
frequently  been  adjudged  that  the  contract  obligation  assumed 
ty  subscribing  to  the  stock  of  a  corporation  can  be  ^'^^  thus  en- 
forced: Dayton  v.  Borst,  31  N".  Y.  435,  and  cases  cited. 

Subscribers  to  the  stock  of  a  corporation  incur  a  debt  which 
may  be  enforced  by  any  common-law  or  equitable  remedy: 
Mann  v.  Cooke,  20  Conn.  178.  The  capital  stock  of  a  corpora- 
tion is  a  fund  set  apart  for  the  payment  of  its  debts.  It  is  a 
substitute  for  the  personal  liability  which  subsists  in  private 
copartnerships.     The  creditors  have  a  lien  upon  it  in  equity. 

Am.  St.  Rkp..  Vol.  LXX.-35 


546  Stoddard  v.  Lum.  [NewYorky 

TJnpaid  stock  is  as  much  a  part  of  this  pledge  and  as  much  st 
part  of  the  assets  of  the  company  as  the  cash  which  has  been 
paid  in  upon  it:  Sanger  v.  Upton,  Assignee,  91  U.  S.  56. 

At  pages  60  and  61  of  case  last  cited,  the  United  States  su- 
preme court  says,  in  speaking  of  unpaid  stock  subscriptions: 
"Creditors  have  the  same  right  to  look  to  it  as  to  anything  else,- 
and  the  same  right  to  insist  upon  its  payment  as  upon  the  pay- 
ment of  any  other  debt  due  to  the  company.  As  regards  cred- 
itors, there  is  no  distinction  between  such  a  demand  and  any^ 
other  asset  which  may  from  a  part  of  the  property  and  effects- 
of  the  corporation":  Citing  many  cases. 

It  would  speak  ill  for  state  comity  if  a  citizen  of  New  York 
could  go  to  Illinois  and  in  good  faith  subscribe  to  the  capital 
stock  of  a  corporation  and  later  repudiate  his  obligation  to  pay 
a  balance  due  on  the  subscription  and  yet  not  be  liable  to  an 
action  at  law  or  a  suit  in  equity  in  our  own  courts  in  the  name 
of  the  corporation  to  compel  him  to  perform  his  contract. 

Fortunately  for  state  comity  and  commercial  integrity  no 
such  rule  of  law  exists,  and  a  creditor  whose  rights  rest  in  con- 
tract may  pursue  his  debtor  into  the  courts  of  the  latter's  domi- 
cile. Several  cases  are  cited  as  holding  that  this  action  is  not 
maintainable,  but  that  they  are  all  clearly  distinguishable. 

In  Marshall  v.  Sherman,  148  N.  Y.  9,  51  Am.  St.  Kep.  654^ 
a  creditor  of  a  Kansas  banking  corporation  brought  an  action  at 
law  against  a  single  stockholder,  residing  in  this  state,  to  en- 
force a  liability  of  defendant  to  plaintiff  created  by  the  constitu- 
tion and  statutes  of  Kansas,  which  imposed  upon  the  stock- 
holder a  *'''*  liability  for  the  debts  of  the  company,  in  addition 
to  his  unpaid  subscription,  in  an  amount  equal  to  the  stock 
owned  by  him.  Judge  O'Brien,  in  an  exhaustive  opinion,  dealt 
with  this  general  question,  expressing  the  unanimous  opinion  of 
the  court  that  the  liability  sought  to  be  enforced  was  statutory 
and  not  contractual  and  could  only  be  enforced  in  the  domi- 
cile of  the  corporation. 

It  was  also  intimated  that  if  the  action  was  maintainable 
under  any  circumstances  it  could  not  be  instituted  at  law  by  a 
single  creditor  against  a  single  stockholder,  but  the  proper 
remedy  would  be  a  suit  in  equity  on  behalf  of  all  the  creditors 
against  all  the  stockholders. 

In  Barnes  v.  Wheaton,  80  Hun,  8,  in  which  Mr.  Justice 
Martin,  now  a  member  of  this  court,  wrote  a  carefully  consid- 
ered opinion,  there  is  nothing  that  militates  against  the  main- 
tenance of  this  action.     That  action  was  brought  by  the  plain- 


June,  1899.]  Btoddakd  v.  Lum.  647 

tiff  for  the  benefit  of  himself  and  the  creditors  of  an  Ohio  cor- 
poration to  ascertain  the  pro  rata  share  of  the  indebtedness  of 
the  corporation  for  which  the  defendant  was  severally  liable 
and  judgment  was  prayed  for  the  amount. 

The  defendant's  liability  was  not  contractual,  but  imposed 
by  the  constitution  of  Ohio,  which  provided  that  a  stockholder 
should  be  liable  over  and  above  the  stock  owned  by  him,  and 
any  amount  unpaid  thereon,  in  a  further  sum,  at  least  equal 
in  amount  to  such  stock.  It  was  held  that  this  liability  could 
only  be  enforced  in  the  courts  of  Ohio  in  an  action  conforming 
to  the  provisions  of  the  statute  enacted  to  carry  out  the  con- 
stitutional provision  creating  it. 

In  Cleveland  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Kent,  87  Hun,  329,  the  action 
was  brought  by  the  creditor  of  a  corporation  to  enforce  against 
two  New  York  stockholders  the  constitutional  and  statutory 
liability  existing  in  the  state  of  Ohio  as  pointed  out  above  in 
Barnes  v.  Wheaton,  80  Hun,  8.  The  complaint  was  dismissed 
upon  demurrer  and  the  judgment  afiirmed  on  appeal. 

Returning  to  the  case  at  bar,  we  have,  in  brief,  this  situation 
^""^  presented  under  the  demurrer  to  the  complaint:  This  ac- 
tion is  brought  on  behalf  of  all  the  creditors  of  the  corporation, 
who  number  one  hundred  and  fifteen  or  more,  and  is  against  all 
the  original  stockholders  in  this  state,  they  being  the  only  ones 
now  liable,  as  all  stockholders  residing  in  states  other  than  Illi- 
nois and  New  York  are  insolvent;  the  legal  remedy  has  been 
exhausted  against  the  Illinois  stockholders  except  that  a  por- 
tion of  the  amount  due  from  one  defendant  may  be  collected; 
that  some  of  the  New  York  stockholders  are  solvent  and  some 
are  not,  but  which  of  them  are,  and  which  are  not,  is  unknown 
to  the  plaintiff;  that  the  present  indebtedness  of  the  corpora- 
tion, after  crediting  all  amounts  collected  from  stockholders, 
has  been  ascertained  in  the  Illinois  proceedings;  that  under  the 
law  of  Illinois  a  domestic  corporation  may  make  an  assignment 
for  the  benefit  of  its  creditors,  and  the  assignee  thereunder  may 
maintain  any  suit  or  action  that  the  insolvent  company  making 
the  assignment  could  have  maintained  if  such  assignment  had 
not  been  made. 

The  sole  question  to  be  determined  by  ns  at  this  time  is 
whether  this  action  can  be  maintained,  and  we  are  not  con- 
cerned with  the  practical  difficulties  that  plaintiff  may  en- 
counter in  establishing  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  trial  court  the 
just  pro  rata  share  of  the  defendant  stockholders  in  the  pay- 
ment of  the  indebtedness  of  this  insolvent  corporation. 


548  Stoddard  v.  Lum,  [New  York, 

We  are  of  opinion  that  this  action  is  clearly  maintainable 
upon  principle  and  on  authority.  A  subscription  to  the  stock 
of  a  corporation  creates  a  debt  enforceable  at  law,  or  in  equity, 
by  the  corporation  or  its  legal  representative :  Sagory  v.  Dubois, 
3  Sand.  Ch.  466;  Mann  v.  Pentz,  2  Sand.  Ch.  257;  Herkimer 
etc.  Co.  V.  Small,  2  Hill,  127;  Troy  etc.  E.  11.  Co.  v.  McChesney, 
21  Wend.  296;  Mann  v.  Cooke,  20  Conn.  178;  Hartford  etc 
R.  E.  Co.  V.  Kennedy,  12  Conn.  499;  Hartford  etc.  E.  R.  Co. 
V.  Boorman,  12  Conn.  530;  Ward  v.  Griswoldville  Mfg.  Co.,  16 
Conn.  593. 

The  receivers  and  assignees  of  individuals  and  corporations 
domiciled  in  another  state  are  permitted  under  interstate  ^''^ 
comity  to  enforce  the  contracts  of  such  individuals  and  cor- 
porations in  the  state  of  the  debtor's  residence. 

In  Dayton  v.  Borst,  31  N.  Y.  435,  this  court  held  the  capital 
stock  of  a  'New  Jersey  bank  a  trust  fund  for  the  security  of  its 
creditors  and  permitted  the  receiver  of  the  bank,  appointed  in 
Xew  Jersey,  to  recover  of  a  New  York  defendant  the -amount 
remaining  unpaid  of  his  subscription  to  the  capital  stock. 

In  Petersen  v.  Chemical  Bank,  32  N.  Y.  21,  88  Am.  Dec.  298, 
it  was  held  that  the  assignee  of  a  foreign  executor  may  main- 
tain an  action  in  the  courts  of  this  state  upon  a  chose  trans- 
ferred to  the  assignee  by  the  executor;  also  that  the  title  of  the 
foreign  executor  to  the  assets  of  the  estate  is  perfect  though 
conferred  by  the  law  of  the  domicile.  Judge  Denio  says  at 
page  43:  "Foreign  corporations  may  become  parties  to  con- 
tracts in  this  state,  and  may  sue  or  be  sued  in  our  courts  on 
contracts  made  here  or  within  the  jurisdiction  which  created 
them." 

In  Toronto  General  Trust  Co.  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  123 
N.  Y.  37,  it  was  held  that  a  foreign  testamentary  trustee,  hav- 
ing title  to  the  trust  estate,  may  recover  any  portion  thereof 
that  has  been  converted,  or  damages  for  the  conversion,  without 
having  the  will  admitted  to  probate  here.  Judge  Earl  pointed 
out  that  the  trustee  stood  on  his  legal  title  and  his  position 
was  to  be  distinguished  from  that  of  foreign  executors  or  ad- 
ministrators who  cannot  sue  here  for  reasons  of  public  policy, 
as  the  courts  will  not  aid  them  in  the  removal  of  the  assets 
from  this  state  to  the  possible  prejudice  of  domestic  creditors. 

In  the  very  recent  case  of  Mabon  v.  Ongley  Electric  Co.,  156 
N.  Y.  196,  this  court  held,  Judge  Vann  writing  the  opinion, 
that  while  a  foreign  receiver  of  a  foreign  corporation  cannot 
maintain  an  action  in  this  state  against  the  corporation  as  sole 


June,  1899.]  Stoddard  v.  Lum.  649 

defendant  for  the  sole  purpose  of  procuring  tlie  appointment 
in  this  state  of  an  ancillary  receiver,  that  notes  and  accounts 
may  be  collected  bjr  the  usual  proceedings  in  our  courts,  which 
regard  a  foreign  receiver  as  representing  the  original  owner, 
and  open  their  *'''"  doors  to  him  as  they  do  to  a  domestic  re- 
ceiver. The  learned  judge  cites,  at  page  201,  Barth  v.  Backus, 
140  K  Y.  230,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  545,  Vanderpoel  v.  Gorman,  140 
N.  Y.  563,  37  Am.  St.  Ecp.  601,  and  many  other  cases  sustain* 
ing  the  point  now  considered. 

In  Mann  v.  Cooke,  20  Conn.  178,  a  New  York  receiver  of  an 
insolvent  corporation  was  permitted  to  sue  in  Connecticut  for 
balance  due  on  a  stock  subscription. 

In  Cooke  v.  Orange,  48  Conn,  401,  the  receiver  of  an  insol- 
vent New  Jersey  corporation  was  allowed  to  complete  the  con- 
tract of  a  manufacturing  corporation  he  represented  with  the 
town  defendant  and  afterward  to  sue  for  work  and  materials 
in  the  courts  of  Connecticut;  also  to  attack  the  garnishee  pro- 
cess sued  out  by  the  creditors  of  the  local  defendant:  Pond  v. 
Cooke,  45  Conn.  126,  29  Am.  Eep.  668;  Blake  Crusher  Co.  v. 
New  Haven,  46  Conn.  473. 

The  case  at  bar  is  not  to  be  distinguished  in  principle  from 
the  authorities  cited.  The  plaintiff,  as  the  general  assignee  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors  of  an  insolvent  corporation,  is  vested 
with  the  legal  title  of  all  its  property  and  the  power  to  reduce 
its  assets  to  possession,  and  his  title  is  perfect,  though  con- 
ferred by  the  law  of  the  domicile:  Petersen  v.  Chemical  Bank, 
32  N.  Y.  21,  88  Am.  Dec.  298. 

If,  as  in  Dayton  v.  Borst,  31  N.  Y.  435,  the  receiver  of  a 
bank  in  New  Jersey  was  allowed  to  come  into  our  court  and 
recover  the  amount  remaining  unpaid  of  a  stock  subscription, 
why  should  not  this  plaintiff,  as  a  general  assignee,  be  permitted 
to  institute  a  similar  action?  Can  it  be  said  that  there  is  any 
legal  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  a  receiver  created  by  the 
order  of  a  foreign  court  and  a  general  assignee  created  by  a 
foreign  legislature?  The  plaintiff  does  not  come  here  seeking 
to  remove  assets  from  this  state  to  the  possible  prejudice  of 
domestic  creditors,  but  asks  that  he  be  permitted  to  enforce 
against  our  own  citizens  the  performance  of  contracts  into  which 
they  have  entered  in  another  jurisdiction. 

Public  policy  and  state  comity  both  require  that  this  request 
should  be  granted. 

^''^  The  judgment  appealed  from  should  be  reversed,  that  of 
special  term   affirmed,  with  costs,  and  the   questions  certified 


550  Garvey  v.  LoNa  Island  R.  R.  Co.     [New  York, 

answered  as  follows :  The  first  question  is  answered  in  the  nega- 
tive; the  second  question  is  answered  in  the  afBrmative;  the 
third  question  is  answered  in  the  negative. 

All  concur,  except  Gray  and  Martin,  JJ.,  not  voting. 

CORPORATIONS— STOCKHOLDER'S  LIABILITY-ENFORCE- 
MENT IN  ANOTHER  STATE.— If  the  liability  imposed  by  statute 
upon  stockholders  in  a  corporation  is  contractual,  it  may  be  enforced 
outside  the  limits  of  the  state:  Gushing  v.  Perot,  175  Pa.  St.  66,  52 
Am.  St.  Rep.  835.  Generally,  if  the  liability  of  a  stockholder  is  ab- 
solute and  unconditional,  such  liability  may  be  enforced  anywhere; 
but  if  the  statutory  liability  is  penal,  it  is  not  enforceable  outside 
the  state  of  incorporation:  See  the  monographic  note  to  Fowler  v. 
Lamson,  37  Am.  St,  Rep.  1G8.  In  Massachusetts,  on  the  contrary, 
the  courts  will  generally  refuse  to  enforce  the  individual  liability 
of  a  stockholder  in  a  foreign  corporation:  Bank  of  North  America  v. 
Rindge,  154  Mass.  203,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  240;  Post  v.  Toledo  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  144  Mass.  341,  59  Am.  Rep.  86.  But  if  the  laws  of  a  state  pro- 
vide that  a  stockholder  is  liable  to  judgment  creditors  of  the  cor^ 
poration  as  upon  a  contract  for  an  amount  equal  to  the  par  value  of 
the  stock  owned  by  him,  which  is  suable  anywhere,  such  liability 
may  be  enforced  by  an  action  brought  in  another  state:  Hancock 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis,  166  Mass.  414,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  414.  See,  also, 
Aldrlch  V.  Anchor  etc.  Co.,  24  Or.  32,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  831. 


Garvey  v.  Long  Island  Raileoad  Company. 

[159  New  York,  823.] 

EMINENT  DOMAIN.— THE  LEGISLATURE  CANNOT  AU- 
THORIZE permanent  and  substantial  injury  to  private  property 
•without  making  compensation. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURY  TO  PRIVATE  PROP- 
EITTY- COMPENSATION.— If  the  convenience  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany requires  a  change  In  Its  terminal  yard,  so  that  what  has  been 
flone  In  one  part  thereof  with  one  kind  of  appliances  without  In- 
jui-y  to  private  property,  when  done  In  another  part  with  another 
kind.  Inflicts  serious  injury  upon  the  buildings  on  adjoining  land,  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  the  company  to  acquire  the  right  to  thus  vir- 
tually use  the  neighboring  property  either  by  purchase  or  through 
the  power  of  eminent  domain. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— IN.TURY  TO  PRIVATE  PROP- 
ERTY—NUISANCE.— A  statute  simply  authorizing  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  construct  and  operate  a  steam  surface  railroad  does  not 
confer  power,  either  express  or  implied,  to  construct  and  use,  with- 
out making  compensation,  a  turntable  In  Its  terminal  yard  In  the 
Immediate  vicinity  of  dwelling-houses  on  private  property,  so  as  to 
seriously,  continuously,  and  permanently  Injure  such  premises  and 
Impair  their  enjoyment.  Such  construction  and  use  of  a  turntable 
Is  a  nuisance  which  may  be  enjoined. 

TRESPASS- IN.7UNCTI0N  AGAINST.— If  strong  and  ag- 
gravated instances  of  continuing  trespass  are  shown,  which  must 


June,  1899.]    Gaevey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  661 

necessarily  result  In  substantial  damages  to  plaintiCfs  property  that 
are  in  no  way  offset  by  benefits,  a  permanent  injunction  may  be 
issued,  although  the  amount  of  damages  is  not  fixed. 

Action  to  recover  damages  sustained  by  plaintiff  as  the  owner 
of  a  dwelling-house  in  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  on  account  of  a 
continuous  nuisance  committed  by  the  defendant,  a  railroad 
company,  upon  its  premises  immediately  in  the  rear  of  those  of 
the  plaintiff,  and  to  restrain  the  further  commission  thereof. 
The  nuisance,  as  described  in  the  complaint,  consisted  in  the 
fact  that,  'locomotives  enter,  move  about  in,  and  leave  the  yard 
to  the  number,  during  the  summer,  of  about  two  hundred  daily, 
■each  making  its  characteristic  noises,  such  as  the  hissing  and 
pounding  of  escaping  steam,  the  rumble  of  wheels,  the  clatter 
of  irons,  the  clanging  of  bells,  and  other  irritating  noises.  Each 
locomotive  which  enters  the  yard  is  run  upon  a  turntable  con- 
structed in  the  immediate  rear  of  plaintiff's  house,  making  a 
noise  as  it  goes  on  like  an  explosion,  and  shaking  and  jarring 
plaintiff's  house.  Steam,  smoke,  cinders,  ashes,  and  noxious 
and  unwholesome  gases  are  set  free  in  the  defendant's  yard, 
and  cast  upon  the  plaintiff's  premises  and  into  the  plaintiff's 
doors  and  windows."  The  defendant  company  claimed  that  tlie 
acts  complained  of  were  done  by  it  "lawfully,  carefully,  and  for 
the  purposes  of  its  incorporation  only.'*  Judgment  for  the 
plaintiff,  and  the  defendant  appealed. 

A.  A.  Gardner,  for  the  appellant. 

G.  S.  Billings,  for  the  respondent. 

838  VANN,  J.  From  the  evidence  appearing  in  the  record, 
especially  when  it  is  amplified  by  the  view  of  the  premises  taken 
by  the  trial  judge  at  the  request  of  both  parties,  and  from  the 
nature  of  the  findings,  which  have  the  effect  of  a  general  verdict 
for  the  plaintiff,  we  are  compelled  to  assume,  after  affirmance 
by  the  appellate  division,  the  existence  of  a  nuisance  upon  the 
defendant's  premises  that  seriously  injures  the  premises  of  the 
plaintiff:  Amherst  College  v.  Hitch,  151  K  Y.  282,  320. 

It  is  claimed  that  the  judgment  below  cannot  be  sustained 
because  no  property  right  of  the  plaintiff  was  invaded,  inas- 
much as  the  defendant  had  authority  for  what  it  did  in  the 
statute  which  created  it.  That  statute  conferred  no  unusual 
power  upon  the  defendant,  but  simply  authorized  it  to  con» 
struct  and  operate  a  steam  surface  railroad.  It  did  not  author- 
ize it  to  construct  this  particular  turntable,  or  to  maintain  thi» 


552  Gabvey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.     [New  York^ 

particular  yard,  or  to  concentrate  the  particular  evils  of  iLs- 
terminal  station  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  inhabited  dwell- 
ings. The  implied  powers  springing  from  the  express  power 
to  maintain  a  railroad  do  not  extend  to  the  grievances  com- 
plained of  by  the  plaintiff  nor  permit  the  ruin  of  his  prop- 
erty without  compensation.  While  the  welfare  of  the  pub- 
lic and  the  necessities  of  travel  require  that  the  plaintiff  should 
submit  to  annoyances  caused  by  a  reasonable  use  of  the  prop- 
erty of  the  defendant,  he  is  not  obliged  to  submit  to  those  caused 
by  an  unreasonable  use,  all  the  circumstances  being  taken  into 
account.  Slight  injuries  and  annoyances  to  people  living  along 
the  line  of  a  railroad  are  a  necessary  incident  to  its  maintenance 
and  operation,  but  when  the  company  ^^^  does,  even  upon  its 
own  land,  such  acts  as  seriously  impair  the  enjoyment  of  the^ 
adjoining  land,  to  a  certain  extent  it  takes  such  land  and  must 
discontinue  the  practice  or  make  compensation:  Pumpelly  v. 
Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall.  166,  "The  legislature  may  authorize 
small  nuisances  without  compensation,  but  not  great  ones": 
Bacon  v.  Boston,  154  Mass.  100.  As  the  legislature  cannot 
authorize  the  total  destruction  of  private  property  without  mak- 
ing compensation,  so  it  cannot  authorize  permanent  and  sub- 
stantial injury  to  such  property  without  making  compensation, 
and  it  did  not  assume  to  do  so  in  the  statute  upon  which  the 
defendant  relies.  If  the  convenience  of  the  defendant  required 
a  change  in  its  terminal  yard,  so  that  what  had  been  done  m 
one  part  thereof  with  one  kind  of  appliances  without  injury  to 
private  property,  when  done  in  another  part  with  another  kind, 
inflicted  serious  injury  upon  the  buildings  on  adjoining  land, 
it  became  its  duty  to  acquire  the  right  to  thus  virtually  use  tho 
neighboring  property,  either  by  purchase  or  through  the  power 
of  eminent  domain.  It  could  not  so  conduct  its  business  as  to 
crack  the  walls  and  ceilings  of  adjoining  houses,  awaken  people 
from  their  sleep  by  shaking  their  beds,  smoke  them  out  of  their 
rooms,  or  injure  their  personal  property  kept  on  the  premises 
by  easting  dust,  ashes,  and  cinders  upon  them,  and  appeal  to 
the  statute  for  protection,  "Where  the  legislature  authorize!* 
a  thing  to  be  done  which  can  fairly  be  accomplished  without 
causing  a  nuisance,  it  will  be  assumed  that  the  legislature  in- 
tends that  it  shall  be  done  in  that  way" :  Randolph  on  Eminent 
Domain,  sec.  140.  The  statute  does  not  authorize  acts  that 
amount  to  a  partial  appropriation  of  property  without  requiring 
payment.  The  injuries  complained  of  are  not  the  natural  or 
unavoidable  result  of  the  exercise  of  the  statutory  authority. 


June,  1899.]    Gaevey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  565 

and  are  outside  of  the  line  of  legislative  protection.  Thus,  an 
engine-house,  although  a  necessary  incident  to  the  operation  of 
a  railroad,  when  so  used  as  to  cause  smoke,  soot,  cinders,  and 
coal  dust  to  necessarily  damage  a  dwelling-house  erected  upon 
an  adjoining  lot,  was  held  a  nuisance,  and  not  within  legisla- 
tive sanction,  and  an  action  to  recover  damages  and  restrain 
^'^^  the  nuisance  was  upheld :  Cogswell  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  103  N.  Y.  10,  57  Am.  Rep.  701.  It  was  further  held  in 
that  case  that  where  the  terms  of  a  statute  giving  authority 
to  the  corporation  are  not  imperative  but  permissive,  it  does 
not  confer  license  to  commit  a  nuisance,  although  what  is  con- 
templated by  the  statute  cannot  be  done  without  it. 

So  when  general  authority  had  been  conferred  upon  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  to  build  a  pumping  station  as  a  part  of  an 
extensive  system  to  supply  a  city  with  water,  but  leaving  the 
site  to  the  selection  of  the  corporation,  it  was  held  not  to  con- 
fer power,  either  express  or  implied,  to  construct  it  so  near  the 
lands  of  another  as  to  seriously  affect  the  houses,  subsequently 
built  thereon,  through  the  vibrations  and  noise  of  machinery; 
Morton  v.  Mayor  etc.,  140  N".  Y.  207.  In  that  case  the  court 
said:  "The  legislature  undoubtedly  authorized  the  defendant  to 
construct  a  building,  and  to  place  in  it  the  necessary  machinery 
to  accomplish  the  purpose  in  view.  Btlt  that  is  not  the  act 
complained  of,  or  which  produced  the  injury  to  the  plaintiff's 
property.  The  WTong  consisted  in  placing  the  building  and 
machinery  so  near  the  adjoining  property  as  to  injuriously 
affect  it  by  the  noise  and  vibration.  The  city  has  a  right  to 
build  upon  its  own  land,  but  there  was  nothing  in  the  statute 
that  required  it  to  place  the  structure  where  it  did.  It  could 
perform  every  duty  imposed  by  the  statute  by  building  the 
pumping  station  at  such  distance  from  the  adjoining  houses  as 
to  avoid  the  results  of  which  the  plaintiff  justly  complains.  If 
it  was  not  possible  or  practicable  to  do  that  upon  the  land  that 
the  defendant  owned,  then  more  could  have  been  acquired  for 
the  purpose." 

The  use  by  the  defendant  of  its  property  to  the  injury  of  the 
plaintiff  was  not  temporary,  for  the  purpose  of  adapting  it  to 
its  business,  but  regular,  continuous,  and  in  the  nature  of  a 
partial  but  permanent  appropriation.  The  distinction  between 
a  permanent  invasion  of  land  and  a  temporary  annoyance,  as 
by  blasting,  was  carefully  pointed  out  in  Booth  v.  Rome  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  140  K  Y.  267,  279,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  552. 

When  the  odor  from  gasworks  was  found  to  so  pollute  the 


554  Garvey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.     [New  York, 

^^*  air  as  to  substantially  render  the  plaintiff's  property  unfit 
for  comfortable  enjoyment,  it  was  held  to  be  a  nuisance,  al- 
though the  acts  complained  of  were  inseparably  connected  with 
the  carrying  on  of  the  business  itself,  and  that  it  was  not  essen- 
tial to  a  right  of  action  that  the  owner  should  be  driven  from 
his  dwelling:  Bohan  v.  Port  Jervis  Gas  Light  Co.,  122  N.  Y. 
18. 

In  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth  Baptist  Church,  108 
XT.  S.  317,  328,  the  court  said:  "Plainly  the  engine  house  and 
repair  shop,  as  they  were  used  by  the  railroad  company,  were 
a  nuisance  in  every  sense  of  the  term That  is  a  nui- 
sance which  annoys  and  disturbs  one  in  the  possession  of  his 
property,  rendering  its  ordinary  use  or  occupation  physically 
uncomfortable  to  him.  For  such  annoyance  and  discomfort  the 
■courts  of  law  will  afford  redress  by  giving  damages  against  the 
wrongdoer,  and  when  the  cause  of  the  annoyance  and  discomfort 
are  continuous,  courts  of  equity  will  interfere  and  restrain  the 

'nuisance It  is  no  answer  to  the  action  of  the  plaintiff 

that  the  railroad  company  was  authorized  by  act  of  Congress  to 
bring  its  track  within  tbe  limits  of  the  city  of  Washington,  and 
to  construct  such  works  as  were  necessary  and  expedient  for 
the  completion  and  maintenance  of  its  road,  and  that  the  engine- 
house  and  repair  shop  in  question  were  thus  necessary  and  ex- 
pedient; that  they  are  skillfully  constructed;  that  the  chim- 
neys  of  the  engine-house  are  higher  than  required  by  the  build- 
ing regulations  of  the  city,  and  that  as  little  smoke  and  noise 
are  caused  as  the  nature  of  the  business  in  them  will  permit. 
....  The  authority  of  the  company  to  construct  such  works  i 
as  it  might  deem  necessary  and  expedient  for  the  completion 
and  maintenance  of  its  road  did  not  authorize  it  to  place  them 
wherever  it  might  think  proper  in  the  city,  without  reference 
to  the  property  and  rights  of  others.  As  well  might  it  be  con- 
tended that  the  act  permitted  it  to  place  them  immediately  in 
front  of  the  president's  house  or  of  the  capitol,  or  in  the  most 

densely  populated  locality Whatever  the  extent  of  the 

authority  conferred,  it  was  accompanied  with  ^^^  this  implied 
qualification,  that  the  works  should  not  be  so  placed  as  by  their 
use  to  unreasonably  interfere  with  and  disturb  the  peaceful  and 
comfortable  enjoyment  of  others  in  their  property." 

We  close  the  discussion  of  the  point  under  consideration  by 
repeating  the  language  of  Judge  Finch  in  Hill  v.  Mayor  etc., 
139  N.  Y.  495,  505:  "Obviously,  the  general  doctrine  which 
levies  upon  individuals  forced  contributions  for  the  benefit  of 


June,  1899.]     Gabvey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.  555 

the  public,  and  denies  compensation  for  the  injury  done,  is 
vulnerable  at  two  points.  It  is  defeated  sometimes  by  con- 
€truing  the  harm  inflicted  into  a  taking  of  private  property  fop 
■which  compensation  must  be  made,  and  sometimes  by  a  rigid 
construction  of  the  authority  claimed.  Both  methods  indicate 
a  lurking  doubt  of  the  equity  of  the  general  doctrine  and  a  dis- 
position to  narrow  the  field  of  its  operation." 

The  defendant  insists  that  its  appeal  should  be  sustained 
because  the  trial  court  awarded  no  past  damages  to  the  plaintiff. 

A  court  of  equity  has  jurisdiction  of  an  action  to  restrain 
the  commission  of  a  continuing  trespass,  because  the  injunc- 
tion prevents  a  multiplicity  of  actions  at  law,  which  is  a  griev- 
ance to  the  parties  and  a  burden  upon  the  public:  Corning  v. 
Troy  Iron  etc.  Factory,  40  N.  Y.  191;  Williams  v.  New  York 
€tc.  R.  R.  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  97,  111;  69  Am.  Dec.  651;  Henderson 
V.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  78  N.  Y.  423. 

While  in  such  an  action  the  court  may  also  render  judg- 
ment for  the  damages  already  sustained,  that  relief  is. merely 
incidental  and  is  not  an  essential  part  of  the  main  cause  of  ac- 
tion for  a  permanent  injunction.  The  party  entitled  to  dama- 
ges may  waive  them,  if  he  chooses,  by  not  furnishing  evidence 
to  enable  the  court  to  measure  them  in  money,  which  is  an  ad- 
vantage to  the  defendant,  but  does  not  defeat  the  action.  If 
such  substantial  and  continuous  interference  with  the  ordinary 
enjoyment  of  property  is  shown  as  would,  when  properly  meas- 
ured by  evidence,  enable  the  court  to  fix  the  amount  of  the 
damages,  the  injunction  may  be  issued,  although  no  damages 
are  awarded.  The  extent  of  the  injury  is  important,  ^^^  but 
•whether  the  amount  is  admeasured  in  dollars  and  cents  is  un- 
important, unless  there  are  benefits  to  be  offset  against  the 
■damages. 

When,  as  in  certain  actions  against  elevated  railroads,  a 
"wrongful  appropriation  of  easements  appurtenant  to  abutting 
property  appears,  but  it  also  appears  that  the  presence  of  the 
road  has  so  increased  the  va'ue  of  the  property  that  the  actual 
■damages  are  only  nominal,  relief  by  way  of  injunction  may  bo 
refused  because  the  trespass  is  but  technical  and  the  real  injury 
unsubstantial:  O'Reilly  v.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.,  148 
N.  Y.  347.  This  is  upon  the  ground  that  a  court  of  equity  '"'is 
not  bound  to  issue  an  injunction  when  it  will  produce  great 
public  or  private  mischief  merely  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
a  technical  or  unsubstantial  right":  Gray  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co., 
128  N.  Y.  499,  509. 


hbQ  Gabvey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.     [New  York, 

This  is  not  such  a  case,  but  one  where  the  trespass  was  per- 
manent, continuing,  and  grievous,  and  went  to  destroy  the 
value  of  the  property  of  the  owner  with  no  compensating  ad- 
vantages. The  decision  of  the  trial  justice  established  th& 
plaintiff's  right,  the  existence  of  the  nuisance  and  its  injurious 
effect  upon  his  property.  The  case  was  thus  brought  within 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  court,  and  after  united  action  by 
the  courts  below,  we  cannot  interfere.  The  theory  is  not 
tolerable  that,  although  one  party  to  an  action  may  be  gradually 
demolishing  the  house  of  the  other,  the  latter  cannot  have  an 
injunction  to  prevent  its  total  destruction,  because  the  amount 
of  the  damages  already  sustained  has  not  been  admeasured  in 
money. 

Our  conclusion  is,  that  where  strong  and  aggravated  instances 
of  continuing  trespass  are  shown,  which  must  necessarily  result 
in  substantial  damages  to  the  plaintiff's  property  that  are  in  no 
way  offset  by  benefits,  a  permanent  injunction  may  be  issued, 
although  the  amount  of  the  damages  is  not  fixed. 

The  judgment  should  be  affirmed,  with  costs. 

All  concur,  except  Parker,  C.  J,,  and  Haight,  J.,  not  voting. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN.— THE  LEGISLATURE  CANNOT,  in  the 
exercise  of  the  police  power,  take  private  property  for  a  public  use 
without  compensation,  when  such  property  can  be  condemned  and 
paid  for  under  the  power  of  eminent  domain:  People  v.  Elk  River 
etc.  Co.,  107  Cal.  221,  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  125;  Welton  v.  Dickson,  38 
Neb.  767,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  771,  and  note. 

RAILROADS— SPECIAL  DAMAGES  TO  PRIVATE  PROPERTY 
—INJUNCTION.— Where  a  railroad  company  has  obtained  a  deed 
to  a  right  of  way  under  representations  that  it  is  to  be  used  for 
main  line  purposes  alone,  and  it  is  afterward  used  for  sidetracks, 
such  use  will  not  be  enjoined.  The  grantor  is,  however,  entitled  to 
recover  damages  for  the  injury  sustained  in  excess  of  those  which 
arise  from  the  proper  use  of  the  principal  line  of  the  road:  Donls- 
thorpe  V.  Fremont  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  30  Neb.  142,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  387, 
Where  a  statute  authorizes  a  railroad  company  to  take  property  for 
the  purpose  of  running  and  operating  its  road,  it  may  take  prop- 
erty for  depot  purposes:  Matter  of  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kip, 
46  N.  Y.  546,  7  Am.  Rep.  385. 

TRESPASS— IN.TUNCTION  AGAINST.-A  trespass  of  an  ordi- 
nary character  will  not  be  enjoined.  But  where  a  trespass,  or  a 
series  of  trespasses,  operate  in  effect  to  destroy  or  seriously  impair 
the  exercise  of  a  franchise,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  hesitate  to  in- 
terpose to  prevent  the  apprehended  Injury  by  the  aid  of  injunction: 
Port  of  Mobile  v.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  84  Ala.  115,  5  Am.  St. 
Rep.  342.  See,  also,  Lembeck  v.  Nye,  47  Ohio  St.  336,  21  Am.  St 
Rep.  828.  Injunctions  in  cases  of  trespass  were  not  granted  under 
ancient  doctrines  of  the  court  of  chancery.  Parties  were  left  to 
their  legal  remedy;  but  the  more  liberal  practice  now  prevails  of  al- 
lowing them  whore  the  trespass  presents  a  case  of  dostruction  or 
irreparable  mischief:  Burnley  v.  Oook,  13  Tex.  .^)86,  61  Am.  Dec.  79, 
and  note;  Scudder  v.  Trenfon  etc.  Co.,  i  N.  J.  Ea.  694.  23  Am.  Dec 
750. 


June,  1899.]  People  v.  Kennedy.  657 


People   v.  Kennedy. 

[1S9  New  York,  346.] 

HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE.— Before  one  can  justify  the 
taking  of  human  life  in  self-defense  he  must  show  that  there  was 
reasonable  ground  for  believing  that  he  was  In  great  peril,  that  the 
killing  was  necessary  for  his  escape,  and  that  no  other  safe  means 
was  open  to  him.  When  one  believes  himself  about  to  be  attacked 
by  another,  and  to  receive  great  bodily  harm,  it  is  his  duty  to  avoid 
the  attack,  if  in  his  power  to  do  so;  and  the  right  of  attack  for  the 
purpose  of  self-defense  does  not  arise  until  he  has  done  everything 
In  his  power  to  avoid  its  necessity. 

HOMICTDTl—MT-RDER— SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE.— 
If  the  evidence  shows  that,  after  an  encounter  between  the  deceased 
and  the  defendant,  the  latter  obtained  a  knife  in  a  spirit  of  revenge, 
and,  after  being  warned  not  to  return,  did  return  with  intent  to 
kill  the  deceased,  and  thereupon  killed  him,  the  Jury  is  justified  in 
finding  that  the  killing  was  done  with  premeditation  and  delibera- 
tion, and  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  murder  In  the  first  degiee. 

HOMICIDE-MURDER  IN  FIRST  DEGREE.— A  deliberate 
and  premeditated  Intention  to  kill,  followed  by  the  killing  of  a  hu- 
man being,  completes  the  crime  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. 

HOMICIDE— MURDER— SUFFICIENCY  OF  PROOF.— If 
the  proof  justifies  a  jury  in  finding  that  the  homicide  was  inten- 
tional and  resulted  from  sufficient  deliberation  and  premeditation 
to  warrant  a  verdict  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  the  appellate 
«ourt  will  not  Interfere  with  the  determination  upon  the  facts. 

HOMICIDE— MURDER— MOTIVE.— Evidence  showing  that 
there  had  been  a  personal  encounter  between  the  deceased  and  the 
defendant,  and  that  the  latter,  humiliated  by  his  defeat  and  in- 
spired by  a  spirit  of  revenge,  returned  to  the  place  of  the  first  affray 
and  maue  a  second  attack,  which  was  fatal.  Is  sufiicient  to  justify 
the  jury  in  finding  that  the  defendant  had  a  motive  for  the  com- 
mission of  the  crime. 

HOMICIDE— MURDER— REVIEW  OF  EVIDENCE.— It  Is 
not  within  the  province  of  the  appellate  court.  In  reviewing  a  Judg- 
ment of  death,  to  review  or  determine  controverted  questions  of  fact 
arising  upon  confiicting  evidence.  The  Jury  is  the  ultimate  tribunal 
in  such  cases,  and  with  Its  decision  the  appellate  court  may  not  in- 
terfere, unless  It  reaches  the  conclusion  that  Justice  has  not  been 
done. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— CONFESSIONS.— TEST  OF  ADMISSI- 
BILITY of  the  statement  of  a  person  accused  of  crime,  whether 
made  In  the  course  of  Judicial  proceedings  or  not,  is  whether  It  Is 
made  voluntarily,  and  that  must  be  determined  by  Its  nature  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  It  Is  made. 

CRIMINAL  LAW— CONFESSIONS— ADMISSIBILITY  OF 
VOLUNTARY  STATEMENTS.— Voluntary  statements  made  by  a 
man  of  ordinary  intelligence  and  education  to  police  officers  after 
his  arrest,  not  as  evidence  nor  as  the  result  of  an  examination  in  a 
Judicial  proceeding,  afthough  reduced  to  writing  and  verified  by  him, 
are  admissible  in  evidence  on  the  trial  of  the  crime  for  which  he  was 
arrested,  If  not  induced  by  any  promise,  threat,  or  improper  influ- 
ence, although  he  was  not  Informed  by  those  to  whom  he  made  the 
statements  that  they  might  be  used  against  him  on  his  subsequent 
trial. 


558  People  v.  Kennedy.  [New  York, 

CRIMINAL  LAW  — CONFESSIONS  IMPROPERLY  OB- 
TAINED—ADMISSIBILITY.— If  peace  officers,  by  covert  threats, 
doubtful  and  uncertain  promises,  acts  of  intimidation,  or  other 
questionable  means,  procure  incriminating  statements  from  persona 
under  arrest,  and  subsequently  charged  with  crime,  they  are  inad- 
missible against  them. 

H.  L.  Taylor  and  H.  D.  Fitzgerald,  for  the  appellant. 

T.  Penney,  for  the  respondent. 

348  MARTIN,  J.  That  upon  the  ninth  day  of  October, 
1898,  the  defendant  killed  John  Hummings  by  stabbing  him 
with  a  dirk  or  claspknife  was  plainly  established  and  not  denied. 
The  only  question  litigated  upon  the  trial  was  whether  the  homi- 
cide was  committed  under  such  circumstances  as  to  constitute 
a  crime,  or  whether  it  was  justifiable.  The  claim  of  the  de- 
fendant was  that  he  was  attacked  by  the  decedent,  and  that 
he  killed  him  in  the  lawful  defense  of  his  own  person.  Upon 
that  issue  the  jury  found  against  him. 

Before  a  party  can  justify  the  taking  of  life  in  self-defense, 
3"*^  he  must  show  that  there  was  reasonable  ground  for  believ- 
ing he  was  in  great  peril;  that  the  killing  was  necessary  for  his 
escape,  and  that  no  other  safe  means  was  open  to  him.  When 
one  believes  himself  about  to  be  attacked  by  another,  and  to 
receive  great  bodily  injury,  it  is  his  duty  to  avoid  the  attack 
if  in  his  power  to  do  so,  and  the  right  of  attack  for  the  pur- 
pose of  self-defense  does  not  arise  until  he  has  done  everything 
in  his  power  to  avoid  its  necessity:  People  v.  Constantino,  153 
N.  Y.  24;  People  v.  Johnson,  139  N.  Y.  358,  363;  People  v. 
Carlton,  115  N.  Y.  618,  623;  People  v.  Sullivan,  7  N.  Y.  396. 
Applying  these  rules  to  the  proof  in  this  case,  it  is  evident  that 
the  defendant's  claim  that  the  homicide  was  committed  in  his 
own  defense  cannot  be  sustained,  as  it  was,  under  the  evidence, 
at  least  a  question  of  fact,  and  the  finding  of  the  jury  is  con- 
clusive. 

The  first  point  presented  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  de- 
fendant in  his  brief  is  that  the  evidence  was  insufficient  to  jus- 
tify the  jury  in  finding  the  defendant  guilty  of  murder  in  the 
first  degree,  because  it  failed  to  show  any  intent  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  to  kill  the  decedent,  or  that  the  act  was  per- 
formed with  the  premeditation  and  deliberation  required  to 
constitute  that  crime.  Hence,  a  brief  epitome  of  the  facts  and 
circumstances  disclosed  by  the  evidence  seems  necessary  to  tho 
proper  consideration  of  that  question. 

The  record  discloses  that  the  defendant  is  a  colored  man,  who. 


June,  1899.]  People  v.  Kennedy.  65^ 

at  the  time  of  the  honucide,  was  living  at  No.  167  Elm  street, 
in  the  city  of  Buffalo.  He  was  then  twenty-seven  or  twenty- 
eight  years  of  age,  a  waiter  by  occupation,  although  he  had 
not  been  steadily  employed  for  some  months  anterior  to  that 
time.  Between  8  and  9  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  the  day 
of  the  homicide,  the  defendant  and  a  friend,  Eeese  Augustus,, 
were  engaged  to  some  extent  in  drinking  together.  They  then 
went  to  several  places  in  the  neighborhood  where  they  resided,. 
and  on  their  way  each  stopped  at  a  laundry  to  obtain  his  linen 
that  had  been  left  there.  They  then  returned  to  the  rooms  they 
occupied  on  Elm  street,  after  which  they  had  two  more  drinks 
of  whisky,  and  at  ^®  about  10  o'clock  the  defendant  left  to  take 
a  walk  in  the  neighborhood.  After  walking  about  two  blocks 
he  met  Nellie  Davis,  a  colored  woman  of  his  acquaintance,  who- 
was  on  her  way  to  a  room  or  tenement  known  as  No.  13  Gay 
street,  occupied  by  one  Minnie  Lewis.  After  a  short  conversa* 
tion  between  the  defendant  and  Nellie,  the  latter  entered  No. 
13,  and  was  followed  by  the  defendant.  In  the  room  which 
they  entered  there  were  the  decedent  and  Minnie  Lewis,  who 
were  in  bed  together,  a  woman  whose  real  name  was  Fannie- 
Truss,  William  Harris,  Spencer  Quarrells,  and  Robert  Green,  all 
of  whom  were  colored.  While  there  a  dispute  arose  between 
the  defendant  and  one  of  the  women,  whereupon  Minnie  Lewia 
asked  him  to  leave  and  attempted  to  force  him  to  do  so.  A 
quarrel  ensued  and  he  left  the  house,  but  picked  up  a  bottle^ 
and  returned  to  the  doorway.  The  decedent  then  arose  from 
the  bed,  put  on  a  pair  of  trousers  and  came  to  the  door,  where- 
upon a  fight  between  him  and  the  defendant  commenced  and 
continued  until  some  one  called  the  police,  when  they  separated. 
During  the  encounter,  the  defendant  struck  the  decedent  with 
the  bottle,  causing  a  slight  wound  upon  his  head.  Although 
neither  party  was  seriously  injured,  the  advantage  of  the  con- 
test seems  to  have  rested  with  the  decedent.  When  the  parties 
separated,  the  defendant  went  into  Cotton's  saloon,  and  from 
there  to  Gay  street,  then  down  Michigan  to  Vine  street,  and 
then  to  his  room  on  Elm  street.  While  there  he  changed  his 
clothing,  and  soon  after  returned  to  Gay  street,  where  the  affray 
occurred.  While  returning  he  was  warned  not  to  go  to  the  house 
where  the  fight  took  place.  He,  however,  disregarded  the  warn- 
ing, continued  his  course,  and  entered  the  room  occupied  by 
Minnie  Lewis,  where  he  found  the  decedent  upon  the  bed,  with 
Minnie  Lewis  sitting  by  his  side,  and  Fannie  Truss,  bathing  hi» 
head  with  witch  hazel.    When  the  defendant  entered  the  dece- 


560  People  v.  Kennedy.  [New  York, 

dent  arose,  and  another  struggle  followed.  During  the  last  en* 
■counter  the  defendant  drew  a  long  dirk  or  claspknife  he  then 
had,  and  struck  the  decedent  repeatedly  with  it,  inflicting  sev- 
■eral  severe  wounds,  ^^*  which  caused  his  immediate  death.  The 
defendant  then  left  the  house,  wringing  the  blood  from  his 
hands,  went  to  a  saloon  on  the  corner  of  Elm  and  Church  streets, 
-where,  while  he  was  washing,  he  was  arrested.  The  knife  with 
■which  he  stabbed  the  decedent  was  left  in  his  body.  A  wound 
was  found  upon  the  decedent's  neck  four  inches  in  length,  which 
€evered  several  arteries,  and  which  was  of  itself  fatal.  The  de- 
fendant's knife  and  hat  were  found  near  the  body.  He  admitted 
having  killed  the  decedent,  but  claimed  that  when  he  returned 
to  Gay  street  he  was  in  search  of  Nellie  Davis;  that  he  opened 
the  door  and  asked  for  her,  whereupon  the  decedent  jumped 
•from  the  bed,  declared  that  he  would  fix  the  defendant  this  time, 
«nd  struck  at  him,  and  that  thereupon  they  clinched,  and  the 
decedent  attempted  to  strike  him  with  a  piece  of  iron,  when 
he  drew  his  knife,  struck  blindly  at  him,  and  thus  inflicted  the 
wounds  which  caused  the  decedent's  death.  Upon  this  evidence 
the  defendant  based  his  claim  that  he  acted  only  in  self-de- 
lense. 

The  testimony  of  the  witnesses  called  by  the  people  was  to 
the  effect  that  the  defendant  entered  the  room  with  a  rush, 
inquired  for  the  decedent  in  indecent  terms,  whereupon  the  par- 
ties clinched,  and  very  soon  the  defendant  pushed  the  decedent 
from  him,  when  the  latter  staggered  and  fell  to  the  floor,  the 
hlood  spurting  on  to  the  defendant,  and  the  decedent  soon  ex- 
pired. 

After  the  homicide,  no  marks  of  the  struggle  were  found  upon 
the  body  of  the  defendant,  except  a  slight  scratch  between  the 
thumb  and  index  finger  of  his  left  hand.  The  knife  with  which 
the  decedent  was  slain  belonged  to  Reese  Augustus,  from  whom 
the  defendant  borrowed  it  that  day.  Whether  he  obtained  it 
before  the  first  encounter,  or  afterward,  does  not  clearly  appear 
from  the  record.  The  evidence  upon  the  part  of  the  people 
tended  to  show  that  it  was  procured  &fter  the  first  encounter, 
-while  the  defendant  claimed  that  it  was  obtained  before  that 
time  and  for  a  legitimate  purpose.  We  think  the  testimony 
-was  suflicient  to  warrant  the  jury  in  finding  that  it  was  procured 
after  his  first  difficulty  ^^^  with  the  decedent.  Under  the  evi- 
dence given  upon  the  trial,  it  is  quite  obvious  that  whether  the 
homicide  was  perpetrated  under  such  circumstances  as  to  con- 


June,  1899,]  People  v.  Kennedy.  661 

fititute  the  crime  of  murder  in  the  first  degree  was  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury. 

There  was  abundant  evidence  to  justify  the  jury  in  finding 
that  after  the  first  encounter,  the  defendant,  in  a  spirit  of  re- 
venge arising  from  chagrin  or  anger  at  his  defeat,  went  to  the 
room  of  his  friend,  obtained  the  knife,  and  returned,  intending 
to  kill  the  decedent.  If,  however,  it  be  said  that  it  is  uncertain 
whether  he  obtained  the  knife  at  that  time,  or  had  obtained  it 
previously  for  another  purpose,  still  it  is  not  very  material,  aa 
in  either  event  he  had  abundant  opportunity  between  the  first 
occurrence  and  the  time  of  the  homicide  to  form  a  premeditated 
and  deliberate  intent  to  commit  the  crime  of  which  he  was 
convicted. 

Moreover,  he  was  cautioned  by  parties  to  whom  he  was  known 
not  to  return,  thus  showing  that  it  was  evident  to  them  that  he 
was  returning  for  the  purpose  of  renewing  his  contest  with  the 
decedent.  The  facts  and  circumstances  bearing  upon  this  ques- 
tion were  abundantly  sufficient  to  justify  the  jury  in  finding 
that  the  defendant  not  only  intended  to  kill  the  decedent,  but 
that  it  was  done  with  premeditation  and  deliberation. 

The  court  has  so  often  stated  the  rule  as  to  the  intent,  pre- 
meditation, and  deliberation  necessary  to  constitute  the  crime 
of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  that  it  seems  unnecessary  to  re- 
state it  at  this  time.  If  there  was  an  intention  to  kill,  which 
was  deliberate  and  premeditated,  and  the  killing  followed,  the 
crime  was  complete-:  People  v.  Majone,  91  N.  Y.  211;  Leighton 
V.  People,  88  K  Y.  117;  People  v.  Beckwith,  103  N.  Y.  361; 
People  V.  Conroy,  97  N.  Y.  76;  People  v.  Hawkins,  109  N.  Y. 
408;  People  v.  Johnson,  139  N.  Y.  358;  People  v.  Constantino, 
153  N.  Y.  24,  37;  People  v.  Decker,  157  N.  Y.  194. 

Where  the  proof  justifies  a  jury  in  finding  that  the  homicide 
was  intentional,  and  resulted  from  sufficient  deliberation  and 
premeditation  to  warrant  a  verdict  of  murder  in  the  first  ^'^ 
degree,  this  court  will  not  interfere  with  the  determination  of 
the  jury  upon  the  facts:  People  v.  Sutherland,  154  N.  Y.  346. 
The  proof  in  this  case  was  §uch  as  to  justify  the  verdict,  and, 
consequently,  under  the  principle  of  its  former  decisions,  this 
court  should  not  interfere  upon  the  ground  discussed. 

The  defendant  also  claims  that  the  charge  of  the  trial  judgfc 
was  not  impartial,  but  was  highly  prejudicial  to  him.  "We  have 
examined  the  entire  charge,  but  find  in  it  nothing  which  would 
justify  us  in  disturbing  the  judgment  below,  or  which  requires 

AM.  St.  Rep..  Vol.  LXX,— 36 


562  People  v.  Kennedy.  [New  York^ 

Bpecial  discussion.  The  charge,  when  taken  together,  was  fair, 
impartial,  and  correct,  both  as  to  the  law  and  facts,  and  was 
as  favorable  to  the  defendant  as  he  was  entitled  to  under  the 
evidence.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  manifest  that  the- 
defendant's  claim  in  this  respect  cannot  be  upheld  (People  V. 
Constantino,  153  K  Y.  24),  and  that  the  judgment  cannot  be  re- 
versed on  that  ground.  Moverover,  we  find  no  exceptions  to  the 
charge,  and,  consequently,  no  question  of  law  is  presented  for- 
our  determination. 

The  next  ground  of  the  defendant's  appeal  is  that  the  evi-^ 
dence  or  motive  was  insufficient  to  justify  the  jury  in  finding^ 
him  guilty  of  the  crime  charged.  We  think  this  claim  cannot 
be  sustained.  Although  it  may  be  conceded  that  evidence  of 
motive  had  an  important  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  de- 
fendant's guilt,  yet  the  claim  that  no  motive  was  proved  does 
not  seem  to  be  justified.  There  had  been  a  personal  encounter 
between  the  defendant  and  decedent,  in  which  the  former  had  been 
practically  defeated,  and  the  jury  may  well  have  found  that, 
humiliated  by  his  defeat  and  inspired  by  a  spirit  of  revenge, 
he  returned  to  the  place  of  the  first  affray  and  made  a  second 
attack.  One  of  the  usual  incentives  to  the  commission  of  crime 
is  the  desire  of  revengino-  real  or  fancied  wrongs.  We  think  the 
evidence  was  sufficient  to  justify  the  jury  in  finding  that  th© 
defendant  had  a  motive  for  the  commission  of  this  offense. 

The  defendant  also  ^sks  this  court  to  grant  a  new  trial  ^^^ 
under  the  provisions  of  section  528  of  the-  Code  of  Criminal 
Procedure,  which  provides  that  when  the  judgment  is  of  death, 
the  court  of  appeals  may  order  a  new  trial,  if  it  be  satisfied  that 
the  verdict  was  against  the  weight  of  evidence  or  agaiust  law, 
or  that  justice  requires  a  new  trial,  whether  any  exception  shall 
have  been  taken  or  not  in  the  court  below.  This  section  has 
often  been  considered  by  this  court,  and  it  has  uniformly  held 
that  it  is  not  its  province  to  review  or  determine  controverted 
questions  of  fact  arising  upon  conflicting  evidence,  but  that  the 
jury  is  the  ultimate  tribunal  in  such  cases,  and  with  its  decision 
this  court  may  not  interfere,  unless  it  reaches  the  conclusion 
that  justice  has  not  been  done.  We  are  unable  to  reach  any 
such  conclusion  in  this  case,  and,  hence,  must  decline  to  inter- 
fere upon  that  ground. 

The  only  other  question  raised  by  the  defendant  arises  upon 
his  exceptions  to  the  admission  of  statements  previously  made 
by  him,  which  were  permitted  to  be  proved  upon  the  triaL 
After  his  arrest  he  was  taken  to  a  police  station,  and  in  the 


June,  1899.]  People  v.  Kennedy,  669 

afternoon  of  the  day  of  the  tragedy  he  was  shown  the  knife  with 
which  the  decedent  was  killed,  and  asked  by  Sergeant  Holmlund 
if  it  was  his,  to  which  he  replied  it  was.  He  was  also  shown 
the  hat  found  near  the  decedent's  prostrate  body,  and  asked  if 
it  belonged  to  him,  to  which  he  answered  in  the  affirmative. 
He  was  then  taken  upstairs  to  the  police  headquarters,  where 
he  was  questioned  and  his  statements  written  out  by  a  type- 
writer, signed  by  him,  and  verified  by  his  affidavit.  Upon  the 
next  day  he  was  again  interrogated  in  regard  to  the  transaction, 
his  answers  were  taken,  committed  to  paper  by  a  typewriter, 
signed  by  the  defendant  and  verified.  These  confessions  sub- 
stantially correspond  with  the  testimony  which  was  given  upon 
the  trial,  except  as  to  the  manner  in  which  he  obtained  the 
knife  with  which  the  homicide  was  committed. 

When  the  defendant  was  upon  the  stand  as  a  witness  in  his 
own  behalf,  he  was  cross-examined  by  the  district  attorney  as 
to  certain  claimed  discrepancies  between  the  written  statements 
signed  and  verified  by  him,  and  his  testimony  given  upon  the 
*""*  direct  examination.  His  verified  statements  were  also  of- 
fered and  admitted  in  evidence  under  his  objections:  "1.  That 
it  is  incompetent  and  improper,  and  was  improperly  and  involun- 
tarily obtained;  that  this  defendant  was  in  a  state  of  great 
mental  disturbance  and  nervousness  at  this  time,  and  was  not 
competent  to  give  a  statement  voluntarily,  3.  Under  section  395 
of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  that  this  alleged  statement 
was  made  neither  in  the  course  of  a  judicial  proceeding,  nor  to 
a  private  person;  3.  That  section  395  of  the  Criminal  Code  is 
unconstitutional  in  that  it  deprives  this  accused,  or  any  accused, 
of  his  rights,  and  unreasonably  and  unlawfully  restricts  them 
under  section  6  of  article  1  of  the  state  of  New  York,  and  the 
fifth  amendment  to  the  United  States  constitution,  which  de- 
clares that  no  man  shall  be  compelled  to  give  testimony  against 
himself  in  a  criminal  case."  These  objections  were  overruled 
and  an  exception  taken. 

The  defendant's  testimony  as  to  what  occurred  when  these 
statements  were  made  was  in  substance  that  he  was  taken  up- 
stairs into  a  large  room  where  a  gentleman  sat  at  the  table 
with  his  back  to  the  window,  and  had  a  chair  in  front  of  him 
in  which  the  defendant  sat;  that  one  Haller  was  there;  that 
Holmlund  sat  by  a  window,  and  that  a  typewriter  or  stenog- 
rapher was  there,  who  commenced  asking  him  questions,  and 
that  Holmlund,  during  the  second  interview,  said  to  him  that 
he  could  just  as  well  tell  him  the  truth,  as  it  would  save  hiTn 


564  People  v.  Kennedy.  [New  York, 

(Holmlund)  a  lot  of  trouble;  besides  that,  he  could  get  twenty 
people  who  saw  the  defendant  run  across  Michigan  street  to 
get  his  knife.  He  then  testified  that  they  questioned  him  until 
he  supposed  they  got  what  they  wanted,  and  added:  "I  was  glad 
to  tell  them  everything,  because  I  had  been  bothered  by  people 
coming  downstairs."  He  was  then  asked:  "What  do  you  mean 
by  that?  A.  After  I  got  there,  news  was  brought  to  me  I  had 
killed  a  man.  Of  course,  I  didn't  feel  good  about  that.  I  didn't 
have  any  intention  of  killing  anybody,  and  I  was  put  in  my  cell, 
and  didn't  have  anything  on  besides  a  pair  of  pants  and  shoea, 
and  I  tried  to  sleep;  and,  every  time  I  laid  down,  there  was  some 
one  to  see  me  on  some  '^^  pretense  or  other.  If  I  was  laying 
down,  they  coiddn't  see  my  face,  and  they  would  make  a  noiso 
and  rouse  me  and  want  to  know  how  did  I  do  it,  and  all  that 
kind  of  business.  They  kept  me  that  way  all  that  day,  Sunday 
and  Sunday  night,  Monday,  and  partly  Monday  night."  As- 
suming the  correctness  of  the  defendant's  testimony  as  to  what 
transpired  when  his  statements  were  made,  the  question  is  pre* 
sented  whether  they  were  properly  permitted  to  be  used  as  evi- 
dence against  him. 

Although  a  difference  has  always  existed  between  the  civil  and 
the  common  law  in  regard  to  confessions  made  by  persons 
charged  with  crime,  the  former  regarding  them  as  well-nigh 
conclusive,  while  the  latter  treats  that  species  of  evidence  as 
open  to  distrust,  still,  as  the  latter  has  been  adopted  by  the 
courts  of  this  state,  it  is  only  the  common  law  and  statutes 
that  need  be  considered  in  determining  their  bearing  upon  the 
question  of  the  admissibility  of  the  defendant's  confessions  in 
this  case. 

The  first  case  in  this  court,  called  to  our  attention,  where  the 
question  has  arisen,  is  Hendrickson  v.  People,  10  N.  Y.  13,  61 
Am.  Dec.  721.  In  that  case,  Parker,  J.,  said:  "The  general  rule 
is,  that  all  a  party  has  said  which  is  relevant  to  the  questions 
involved  in  the  trial  is  admissible  in  evidence  against  him.  The 
exception  to  this  rule  are  where  the  confession  has  been  drawn 
from  the  prisoner  by  means  of  a  threat  or  a  promise,  or  where 
it  is  not  voluntary,  because  obtained  compulsorily  or  by  improper 
influence."  There  the  defendant  was  on  trial  for  murder,  and  it 
was  held  that  his  stai(.monts  as  a  witness  at  the  coroner's  in- 
quest, made  before  he  had  been  charged  with  the  crime  and 
before  it  was-ascertained  that  a  crime  had  been  committed,  was 
admissible  in  evidence  against  him. 


June,  1899.]  People  v.  Kennedy.  566 

In  People  v.  McMahon,  15  X,  Y.  384,  where  the  defendant 
was  arrested  by  a  constable  without  a  warrant,  on  suspicion  of 
having  murdered  his  wife,  and  was  taken  before  the  coroner 
who  was  holding  an  inquest,  and  was  sworn  and  examined  as  a 
witness,  it  was  held  that  the  evidence  thus  given  was  not  ad- 
missible on  the  prisoner's  trial  for  the  murder. 

^"^  People  V.  Wentz,  37  N.  Y.  303,  is  to  the  effect  that  the 
confessions  of  a  prisoner  voluntarily  made  are  admissible  as  evi- 
dence against  him,  although  made  to  a  policeman  while  the 
prisoner  was  not  in  his  custody,  although  arrested  and  confined 
in  jail. 

In  Teachout  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  7,  it  was  decided  that  the 
statements  made  by  a  prisoner  under  oath  at  a  coroner's  inquest 
were  admissible  against  him  upon  his  trial  for  murder,  although 
he  knew,  at  the  time  he  was  sworn,  that  the  decedent  was  poi- 
soned, that  he  would  probably  be  arrested  for  the  crime,  was 
informed  that  rumors  implicated  him,  and  that  he  had  a  right 
to  refuse  to  testify. 

In  Murphy  v.  People,  63  N".  Y.  590,  after  the  prisoner's  arrest 
and  commitment  to  jail,  he  was  brought  to  the  sheriff's  office 
and  made  certain  statements,  as  to  which  the  witness  was  per- 
mitted to  testify  under  objection.  It  appeared  that  the  prisoner 
was  asked  by  the  officer  making  the  arrest  if  he  desired  to  make 
any  statement  as  to  his  whereabouts  on  the  day  of  the  murder; 
the  witness  replied  he  did,  and  then  made  the  statement  testified 
to.  It  was  offered  in  evidence  on  his  trial,  and  it  was  held 
by  this  court  that  the  statement  was  voluntary,  the  reception 
thereof  did  not  constitute  error,  and  that  a  statement  made  by  a 
prisoner  is  not  involuntary  because  made  after  his  arrest  and 
while  in  the  custody  of  the  officer  arresting  him. 

Cox  V.  People,  80  IT.  Y.  500,  is  to  the  effect  that  evidence 
of  confessions  made  by  a  prisoner,  after  his  arrest,  to  the  police 
officer  making  it,  when  not  induced  by  any  promise  or  threat, 
and  voluntary  upon  his  part,  is  competent,  and  that  it  is  not 
sufficient  to  exclude  a  confession  that  the  prisoner  was  under 
arrest  at  the  time,  or  that  it  was  made  to  the  officer  in  whose 
custody  he  was,  or  in  answer  to  questions  put  by  him. 

In  People  v.  McGloin,  91  N".  Y.  241,  a  statement  or  confession 
made  by  the  prisoner  was  offered  in  evidence  on  the  part  of 
the  prosecution.  He  was  arrested  by  an  inspector  of  police  in 
the  city  of  New  York,  who  informed  him  of  the  crime  for 
■uhich  he  was  arrested,  that  be  was  an  inspector  of  ***®  police, 
had  been  watching  him  since  the  homicide,  told  him  of  his  hav- 


566  People  v.  Kennedy,  [New  York, 

ing  tried  to  steal  a  barrel  of  whisky  the  night  before,  and  about 
pledging  his  pistol  with  which  the  murder  was  supposed  to  have 
been  committed,  whereupon  the  prisoner  said  that  he  would 
make  a  statement.  A  coroner  was  sent  for,  who  came  to  police 
headquarters  where  the  prisoner  was  in  custody,  and  a  confes- 
sion was  made  in  the  presence  of  the  coroner,  who  acted  as  clerk 
to  take  it  down  and  prove  it.  It  was  there  held  that  as  the 
evidence  did  not  disclose  any  threat,  nor  authorize  an  inference 
that  the  confession  was  made  under  any  influence  of  fear,  it 
was  not  a  compulsory  statement  and  was  properly  received  in 
evidence,  although  sworn  to  by  the  accused. 

In  People  v.  Mondon,  103  N.  Y.  211,  57  Am.  Eep.  709,  the 
defendant,  who  was  an  ignorant  Italian,  unfamiliar  with  the 
English  language,  was  arrested,  without  warrant,  as  a  suspected 
murderer.  While  under  arrest,  he  was  taken  before  a  coroner's 
inquest,  and,  after  proof  of  the  homicide,  was  examined,  on 
oath,  by  the  district  attorney  and  the  coroner  as  to  circum- 
stances tending  to  connect  him  with  the  crime.  It  did  not  ap- 
pear that  he  was  informed  that  he  was  not  bound  to  answer 
questions  tending  to  criminate  himself.  On  his  trial  for  the 
commission  of  the  crime  the  prosecution  was  permitted  to  prove, 
under  objection  and  exception,  the  statements  so  made  by  the 
prisoner.  This  was  held  error  upon  the  ground  that  the  evidence 
sought  to  be  excluded  was  not  a  confession,  but  an  official  ex- 
amination on  oath  of  the  prisoner  while  in  custody.  Still,  in 
that  case  the  doctrine  of  the  Hendrickson,  McMahon,  and 
Teachout  cases  was  considered  and  practically  reaffirmed. 

The  question  again  arose  in  People  v.  Chapleau,  121  N".  Y. 
2&6,  where  it  was  held  that  since  the  adoption  of  section  395 
of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  the  test  of  admissibility 
of  the  statement  of  a  party  accused  of  crime,  whether  made 
in  the  course  of  judicial  proceedings  or  not,  is  whether  it  was 
voluntarily  made,  and  that  is  to  be  determined  by  its  nature  and 
the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  made.  It  was  also  held 
that  it  is  no  ground  for  the  exclusion  of  an  ^'^  admission  by  a 
prisoner  charged  with  crime  that  it  was  made  while  he  was  under 
arrest,  if  shown  to  have  been  made  voluntarily  and  without  in- 
fluences of  promises  or  threats.  In  that  case  the  statement  was 
made  before  a  coroner  after  the  defendant  was  informed  as  to 
his  right  to  depose  or  not,  and  that  the  deposition  might  be  used 
flfrainst  him.  He  was  then  sworn  and  made  a  statement,  but 
upon  the  following  day  denied  having  made  it,  and  refused  to 


June,  1899.]  People  v.  Kennedy.  667 

«ign  it.  It  was,  however,  received  in  evidence  and  held  admis- 
€ible. 

In  People  v.  Wright,  136  N.  Y.  625,  632,  it  was  held  that, 
under  the  recent  decisions  of  this  court,  there  was  no  error  in 
proving  the  defendant's  declarations  when  examined  before  the 
■coroner.  This  conclusion  sems  to  have  rested  upon  the  Chapleau 
case  and  the  cases  cited  in  the  opinion  therein. 

In  People  v.  Cassidy,  133  N.  Y.  612,  confessions  by  the  de- 
fendant were  made,  while  he  was  under  arrest  to  Inspector 
Byrnes  of  the  New  York  police  force.  The  inspector  and  others 
present  testified  that  the  confessions  were  voluntary.  The  de- 
fendant testified  that  they  were  made  under  the  influence  of 
fear  produced  by  threats.  The  question  whether  they  were  vol- 
untary and  reliable  was  submitted  to  the  jury  by  the  court, 
which  found  against  the  defendant,  and  it  was  held  that  they 
were  properly  in  the  case  and  sufficient  to  justify  the  verdict. 

In  People  v.  ^McCallam,  3  N.  Y.  Crim.  Rep.  189,  after  the 
defendant  knew  she  was  suspected  of  the  crime  for  which  she  was 
tried,  she  was  told  by  an  officer  that  they  had  found  enough 
•to  convict  her  and  she  might  as  well  own  up,  it  was  held  that 
this  declaration  did  not  constitute  a  threat,  and  that  the  confes- 
sion of  the  defendant  was  voluntary  and  admissible:  People  v, 
Mackinder,  80  Hun,  40. 

If  the  defendant  supposed  there  was  any  conflict  in  the  evi- 
dence as  to  the  circumstances  under  which  his  statements  were 
made,  or  as  to  whether  they  were  voluntary  or  otherwise,  he 
should  have  requested  the  submission  of  that  question  to  the 
jury.  No  such  request  was  made.  We  think,  as  the  defendant's 
counsel  evidently  did  upon  the  trial,  that  no  such  ^®*  conflict 
existed,  and  the  question  whether  the  statements  were  voluntary 
and  admissible  under  the  provisions  of  section  395  was  for  the 
court  and  not  for  the  jury. 

When  we  test  the  question  as  it  arises  in  this  case  by  the 
-authorities  cited,  it  becomes  quite  manifest  that  the  defendant's 
exceptions  were  not  well  taken.  Obviously,  his  statements  were 
admissible  under  the  provisions  of  section  395,  as  there  can  be 
no  pretense  or  claim  that  they  were  made  while  the  defendant 
was  under  the  influence  of  fear  produced  by  threats,  or  upon 
any  stipulation  by  the  district  attorney  that  he  should  not  be 
prosecuted  therefor.  Moreover,  there  was  no  evidence  that  the 
statements  were  in  any  degree  compulsory,  or  that  they  were 
induced  by  any  improper  influence  whatsoever.  Whil^  it  is 
:true  that  the  defendant  was  under  arrest  when  they  were  made. 


568  People  v.  Kennedy.  [New  York^ 

still,  they  were  not  the  result  of  an  examination  in  any  judicial 
proceeding.  Nor  could  he  have  supposed  that  he  was  required 
to  make  any  statement  whatever,  except  such  as  was  entirely 
voluntary  upon  his  part.  It  is  true  he-  was  not  informed  by 
those  interrogating  him  that  what  he  said  might  be  used  against 
him  upon  a  subsequent  trial,  still,  he  must  have  understood 
such  to  have  been  the  case,  as  he  was  a  man  of  ordinary  intel- 
ligence and  education.  Indeed,  if  we  adopt  his  own  version  of 
the  circumstances  under  which  his  statements  were  made,  we 
find  nothing  in  the  nature  of  compulsion  or  improper  influences, 
or  of  a  promise  or  threat  by  which  they  were  induced.  At  the 
second  interview,  Holmlund  said  to  the  defendant  that  he  could 
just  as  well  tell  the  truth,  as  it  would  save  him  (Holmlund)  a 
lot  of  trouble,  and,  besides,  he  could  get  twenty  people  who  saw 
him  run  across  Michigan  street  to  get  it,  evidently  referring 
to  the  knife.  This  falls  far  short  of  constituting  compulsion 
or  improper  influences,  or  a  threat  or  promise  to  the  defendant. 
There  was  in  this  statement  nothing  from  which  such  a  conclu- 
sion could  be  drawn.  Besides,  the  defendant,  in  substance,  tes- 
tified that  he  was  glad  to  tell  the  officers  everything,  because 
he  had  been  bothered  by  the  people,  then  explaining  why  he 
was  glad  to  give  the  ^*^  officers  the  information  he  did.  Thus, 
it  is  manifest  that  these  statements  were  purely  voluntary,  and 
procured  by  no  means  which  would  justify  a  determination  that 
they  were  involuntary,  and,  consequently,  inadmissible. 

This  case  is  clearly  distinguishable  from  the  case  of  People 
v.  Mondon,  103  K  Y.  211,  57  Am.  Eep.  709,  and  other  kindred 
cases  upon  which  the  defendant  relies.  In  those  cases  the  con- 
fessions or  statements  were  obtained  in  a  proceeding  of  a  judi- 
cial character,  or  where  the  defendant  may  well  have  under- 
stood that  he  was  required  to  testify  and  was  not  instructed 
as  to  his  right  to  decline  an  answer,  or  that  his  statements 
might  be  used  against  him.  Here  they  were  statements  made 
to  the  officers  having  him  in  charge,  were  not  given  as  evidence, 
but  were  voluntary,  and,  although  reduced  to  writing,  signed 
by  him  and  verified,  amounted  at  most  to  a  mere  admission  upon 
his  part. 

Under  these  circumstances,  his  statements,  and  the  evidence 
as  to  what  he  said,  were,  we  think,  clearly  admissible  under 
the  principle  of  the  authorities  to  which  we  have  referred. 

While  cases  will  doubtless  arise  in  the  future,  as  they  have 
in  the  past,  where  public  officers,  by  inquisitorial  and  compul- 
sory examination,  may  obtain  from  persons  suspected  of  or  charged 


June,  1899.]  People  v,  Kennedy,  66^ 

with  crime,  statements  which  it  would  be  error  to  admit  in  evi- 
dence against  them,  still  this  is  not  such  a  case,  as  there  was 
no  proof  that  the  defendant's  statements  were  other  than  vol- 
untar}',  and  made  with  a  full  understanding  of  his  situation 
and  an  exact  comprehension  of  his  rights.  The  proof  is  quite 
to  the  contrary.  In  passing,  it  may  be  proper  to  observe  that^ 
when  officers  charged  with  the  enforcement  of  the  law,  through 
undue  zeal  or  an  inordinate  desire  to  obtain  evidence  to  convict 
by  covert  threats,  doubtful  and  uncertain  promises,  acts  of  in- 
timidation, or  other  questionable  means,  procure  incriminating 
statements  from  persons  subsequently  charged  with  crime,  they 
are  inadmissible,  as  they  would  be  regarded  as  involuntary  and 
not  made  without  inducement  or  practical  compulsion.  The 
reception  in  evidence  of  statements  thus  obtained  might  well 
be  a  ground  for  reversal.  Therefore,  district  attorneys  and  other 
executive  ^^'^  and  administrative  officers  should  remember  that 
to  be  admissible  statements  made  by  one  charged  with  or  sus- 
pected of  crime  must  be  voluntary,  fairly  obtained,  and  not  pro- 
cured by  inquisitorial  compulsion  or  other  improper  means. 
When  properly  procured  they  may  be  of  value  and  employed 
as  evidence  against  the  person  making  them,  but  if  procured 
otherwise  they  are  not  admissible,  and  a  judgment  influenced 
by  such  evidence  would  require  reversal. 

Having  thus  examined  all  the  exceptions  to  which  our  at- 
tention has  been  called  by  the  defendant,  and  finding  none  which 
would  justify  a  reversal,  it  follows  that  the  judgment  should 
be  affirmed. 

All  concur  (Bartlett,  J.,  in  result). 

HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE  — DUTY  TO  RETREAT.— Life 
may  be  lawfully  taken  In  self-defense,  but  It  must  appear  thnt 
he  who  takes  It  was  in  imminent  danger  of  death  or  great  bodilv 
harm,  and  that  no  other  way  of  escape  from  the  danger  was  open 
to  him:  Commonwealth  v.  Broyossee.  160  Pa.  St.  451.  40  Am.  St.  R"p. 
729.  The  accused  must  honestly  believe,  without  fault  or  careless- 
ness on  his  part,  that  the  danger  Is  thus  urgent:  Smith  v.  State,  5l> 
Ark.  132,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  20.  One  who  provokes  a  difficulty,  and  by 
his  own  wrong  contributes  to  a  situation  out  of  which  arises  a  ne- 
cessity to  take  the  life  of  another  to  preserve  his  own,  cannot  In- 
voke the  doctrine  of  self-defense  to  justify  a  homicide  committed 
under  such  circumstances:  Dabney  v.  State,  113  Ala.  38,  59  Am. 
St.  Rep.  92,  and  note.  But  the  fact  that  one  person  with  a  grievance 
arms  himself,  and  seeks  an  interview  with  the  man  who  wrongs 
him,  is  not  necessarily  a  provocation  such  as  to  deprive  him  of  the 
right  of  self-defense:  Shannon  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  2,  60 
Am.  St.  Rep.  17.  While  the  duty  to  retreat  Is  necessary  in  general, 
It  has  been  held  that  such  a  duty  is  not  required  of  one  who  Is 
not  the  aggressor:  People  v.  Lewis,  117  Cal.  186,  59  Am.  St.  Rep. 


570  De  Camp  v,  Thomson.  [New  York, 

167,  ana  note.  And  one  Is  not  obliged  to  retreat  If  he  is  attacked 
on  his  own  premises:  State  Vi  Gushing,  14  Wash.  527,  53  Am.  St. 
liep.  883,  and  note. 

HOMICIDE— MURDER  IN  THE  FIRST  DEGREE.— One  cannot 
be  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  unless  the  act  was  perpe- 
trated not  only  with  intent  to  kill,  but  also  with  deliberation  and 
premeditation;  People  v.  Barberi,  149  N.  Y.  256,  52  Am.  St.  Rep. 
717;  State  v.  Norwood,  115  N.  O.  789,  44  Am.  St,  Rep.  498;  Dabney 
V.  State,  113  Ala.  38,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  92. 

CRIMINAL  LAW  —  CONFESSIONS  —  ADMISSIBILITY.  —  In 
■criminal  cases,  confessions  are  prima  facie  inadmissible,  and  will 
not  be  received  in  evidence  until  it  is  shown  to  the  court  that  they 
were  voluntarily  made,  unless  the  objection  Is  waived:  Bradford  v. 
State,  104  Ala.  68,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  24,  and  note.  See  the  mono- 
graphic note  to  Daniels  v.  State,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  242,  for  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  admissibility  of  confessions  in  evidence.  The  con- 
fessions of  a  person  made  under  oath  at  a  coroner's  inquest  are 
regarded  as  voluntary,  and  may  be  admitted  in  evidence:  Wilson  v. 
State,  110  Ala.  1,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  17. 


Db  Camp  v,  Thomson. 

[159  New  York,  444.] 

JUDGMENTS— SETOFF  OF.— A  judgment,  to  be  available  as 
a  setoff,  must  be  a  valid  subsisting  obligation,  final  in  its  nature. 
Hence,  judgments  cannot  be  set  off  against  each  other  where  one  of 
them  has  been  appealed  from  and  the  appeal  is  still  pending  and 
undetermined.. 

SETOFF— CLAIMS  MUST  BE  MUTUAL  AND  DUE.— Claims 
or  demands  sought  to  be  set  off  must  not  only  be  mutual  to  the 
extent  that  they  are  owing  by  each  to  the  other,  but  they  must 
be  due  aud  payable,  and,  therefore,  a  claim  not  due  cannot  be  set 
off  against  one  that  may  be  presently  enforced. 

SETOFF— DISCRETION  OF  COURT  IN  ALLOWING.— The 
question  whether  a  setoff  should  or  should  not  be  decreed,  rests  In 
the  discretion  of  the  court  to  which  the  application  is  made,  and 
Is  not  subject  to  review.  Such  relief  should  be  administered  in 
all  cases  upon  such  equitable  terms  as  will  promote  substantial 
justice,  unless  the  absolute  right  is  created  by  statute,  or  otherwise 
tirmiy  established. 

C.  D.  Adams,  for  the  appellant. 

C.  E.  Snyder,  for  the  respondents. 

-**»  MARTIN,  J.  On  the  twenty-ninth  day  of  June,  ^«!06, 
the  plaintiff  recovered  a  judgment  against  the  defendants  Dix 
and  Thomson,  which  determined  certain  property  rights  then 
at  issue,  and  also  awarded  to  the  plaintiff  eighteen  hundred  and 
five  dollars  and  thirty-four  cents  for  his  costs  in  that  action. 
From  that  judgment  an  appeal  was  taken  to  the  appellate  divi- 


June,  1899.]  Dk  Camp  v.  Thomson.  671 

fiion  in  the  fourth  department,  where,  on  the  twenty-third  day 
of  May,  1897,  it  was  affirmed,  with  costs,  and  a  judgment  of 
Affirmance  duly  entered.  From  the  last  '**''  judgment  the  de- 
fendants appealed  to  the  court  of  appeals  and  gave  the  under- 
taking required  by  section  1327  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Trocedure,  | 
thereby  staying  execution  until  the  decision  of  the  court  of 
appeals.  When  the  appeal  in  the  present  case  was  taken,  and 
also  when  it  was  argued,  the  appeal  in  that  case  had  not  been 
decided. 

On  the  15th  of  April,  1897,  a  second  action  was  commenced 
by  the  plaintiff  against  the  same  defendants,  a  trial  of  which 
resulted  in  a  dismissal  of  the  complaint,  and  judgment  was  duly 
entered  therein  for  costs  amounting  to  three  hundred  and  six 
dollars  and  five  cents.  In  the  last  action  a  temporary  injunction 
was  issued,  the  plaintiff  giving  an  undertaking  in  the  sum  of  one 
thousand  dollars  conditioned  for  the  pa5Tnent  to  the  defendants 
of  any  damages  they  might  sustain  by  reason  thereof.  Upon 
the  entry  of  judgment  therein  the  injunction  was  dissolved. 
From  that  judgment  no  appeal  was  taken,  and  the  time  within 
which  to  appeal  expired  before  the  commencement  of  the  present 
action.  Subsequently,  the  defendants  Dix  and  Thomson  caused 
an  execution  to  be  issued  upon  the  judgment  in  the  second 
action,  delivered  it  to  the  defendant  Eaton,  as  sheriff,  and  di- 
rected hira  to  make  it  out  of  the  property  of  the  plaintiff,  which 
he  was  proceeding  to  do  when  the  present  suit  was  commenced. 

The  purpose  of  the  present  action  was  to  compel  the  defend- 
ants Dix  and  Thomson  to  set  off  their  judgment  for  three  hun- 
dred and  six  dollars  and  five  cents  against  the  judgment  for 
eighteen  hundred  and  five  dollars  and  thirty-four  cents  pre- 
viously obtained  by  the  plaintiff,  and  also  to  restrain  them  from 
collecting,  or  attempting  to  collect,  the  judgment  in  their  favor, 
or  any  part  thereof. 

In  this  action  the  trial  court  held  that  the  judgment  in  favor 
of  the  plaintiff  was  not  due  and  payable  at  the  time  of  the 
trial,  because  of  the  pending  appeal  therefrom  and  the  stay  of 
execution  thereon,  and  that  as  the  judgment  of  the  defendants 
against  the  plaintiff  was  then  due  and  payable  and  the  defend- 
ants were  entitled  to  immediate  payment  thereof,  the  plaintiff 
was  not  entitled  to  the  relief  sought.  It  thereupon  directed 
a  judgment  in  favor  of  the  defendants,  dismissing  *^^  the  com- 
plaint,  with  costs.  This  judgment  was  unanimously  aflBrmed  by 
the  appellate  division. 


672  De  Camp  v.  Thomson.  [New  York^ 

The  first  question  presented  for  our  consideration  is,  whether 
notwithstanding  the  appeal  in  the  first  action  and  the  stay  of 
execution  upon  the  judgment  therein,  the  plaintiff  had  an  ab- 
solute right  to  have  the  judgment  against  him  set  off  against 
the  judgment  from  which  such  appeal  was  taken.  The  authorities 
seem  to  be  quite  uniform  to  the  effect  that  a  judgment,  to  be 
available  as  a  setoff,  must  be  a  valid,  subsisting  obligation  and 
final  in  its  nature,  and  hence  that  judgments  cannot  be  set 
off  against  each  other  where  one  of  them  has  been  appealed 
from  and  the  appeal  is  still  pending  and  undetermined:  De 
Figaniere  v.  Young,  2  Eobt.  670;  Terry  v.  Koberts,  15  How. 
Pr.  65:  Pierce  v.  Tuttle,  51  How.  Pr.  193;  Hardt  v.,  Schulting, 
24  Hun,  345;  Matter  of  Kloster,  40  Hun,  374. 

It  seems  quite  obvious  that  the  plaintiff,  at  the  time  of  the 
trial,  had  no  absolute  legal  right  to  the  setoff  sought  to  be 
enforced  by  this  action.  His  judgment  was  not  then,  and  in- 
deed might  never  become,  payable  or  enforceable.  Whether  it 
would  or  not  depended  entirely  upon  the  future  action  of  the 
court  to  which  the  appeal  had  been  taken.  Although  it  was  in 
form  an  absolute  claim  against  the  defendants,  yet,  in  fact,  it 
was  contingent,  depending  upon  the  action  of  the  court  to  ren- 
der it  efficient  and  enforceable.  Hence,  we  think  the  mutuality 
necessary  to  authorize  such  a  setoff  did  not  exist. 

The  general  rule  relating  to  this  subject  is  that  claims  or 
demands  sought  to  be  set  off  must  not  only  be  mutual  to  the 
extent  that  they  are  owing  by  each  to  the  other,  but  they  must 
be  due  and  payable,  and,  therefore,  a  claim  not  due  cannot  be 
set  off  against  one  that  may  be  presently  enforced.  To  this 
rule  there  are,  perhaps,  some  exceptions,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
insolvency  of  one  of  the  parties,  or  where  an  assignment  has 
been  made.  And  yet,  even  in  those  cases,  the  party  claiming 
the  right  of  setoff  is  not  entitled  to  such  relief,  unless  his  claim 
has  matured  before  the  assignment  or  transfer:  '*^®  Martin  v. 
Kunzmuller,  37  N.  Y.  396,  397;  Jordan  v.  National  etc.  Bank,  74 
N.  Y.  467,  30  Am.  Pep.  319;  Fera  v.  Wickham,  135  N.  Y.  223; 
Matter  of  Hatch,  155  K  Y.  401. 

Moreover,  to  have  one  judgment  set  off  against  another  is 
not  a  matter  of  absolute  right,  but  is  within  the  equitable  dis- 
cretion of  the  court  to  which  the  application  is  made:  Alexander 
V.  Durkee,  112  N.  Y.  655;  Baker  v.  Hoag,  6  How.  Pr.  201;  Zog- 
baum  v.  Parker,  55  N.  Y.  120,  121;  Simson  v.  Hart,  14  Jonns. 
63;  Smith  v.  Lowden,  1  Sand.  696;  Brown  v.  Hendrickson,  39 
N.  J.  L.  23?;;  Tolbert  v.  Harrison,  1  Bail.  599;  Davidson  v, 
Geoghagan,  3  Bibb,  233;  Makepeace  v.  Coates,  8  Mass.  451. 


June,  1899.]  De  Camp  v.  Thomson.  673 

In  some  of  the  cases  relating  to  this  subject  it  is  at  least  inti- 
mated that  the  question  of  discretion  is,  to  some  extent,  con- 
trolled by  the  procedure  adopted  by  the  party  seeking  the  set- 
off. While  it  may  well  be  that  the  relief  awarded  or  claimed 
may  in  some  particulars  be  influenced  or  even  regulated  by  the 
circumstances  and  the  manner  in  which  the  question  is  pre- 
sented, still,  we  think  that,  however  it  is  presented,  the  deter- 
mination of  the  question  whether  the  setoff  should,  or  not,  be 
decreed,  rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  which  the  appli- 
<'ation  is  made,  and  that  such  relief  should  be  administered  in 
all  cases  upon  such  equitable  terms  as  will  promote  substantial 
justice,  unless  the  absolute  right  is  created  by  some  statute,  or 
otherwise  firmly  established.  We  find  no  such  law  or  principle 
which  is  applicable  to  this  case.  Therefore,  as  this  court  can 
review  questions  of  law  only,  and  may  not  review  the  discre- 
tionary action  of  other  courts,  it  follows  that  the  question  chiefly 
argued  cannot  be  reviewed  by  us. 

We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  decision  of  the  court  below 
was  correct,  and  in  view  of  the  clear  and  satisfactory  opinion 
of  the  trial  court,  which  was  adopted  by  the  learned  appellate 
division,  we  deem  it  unnecessary  to  further  discuss  the  questions 
so  ably  presented  by  the  counsel  for  the  resy^ective  parties. 

The  judgment  should  be  affirmed,  with  costs. 

All  concur. 


J"CDGMENTS— SETOFF— MATTER  OF  GRACE.— A  Judgment 
which  represents  the  proceeds  of  exempt  property  cannot  be  set  off 
on  a  judgment  against  the  judgment  creditor:  Cleveland  v.  Mc- 
Canna,  7  N.  Dali.  455,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  670,  and  note.  On  the 
question  of  the  setoff  of  mutual  judgments,  see  the  extended  note 
to  Duncan  v.  Bloomstock,  13  Am.  Dec.  729.  The  jurisdiction  to 
set  off  one  judgmeut  against  another  is  equitable  in  its  nature,  and 
the  application  therefor  is  addressed  to  the  sound  judicial  discre- 
tion of  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  which  equitable  rights  of  per- 
t^ons  not  parties  to  the  suit  will  be  considered  and  protected:  Sim- 
mons V.  Reid,  31  S.  C.  389,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  36;  Thropp  v.  Susque- 
hanna etc.  Ins.  Co.,  125  Pa.  St.  427,  11  Am.  St.  Rep.  909. 

SETOFF— CLAIMS  MUST  BE  MUTUAL  AND  DUE.— The  pay- 
ment of  a  claim  not  yet  due  cannot  be  enforced  by  way  of  setoff 
until  it  is  due:  Hayes  v.  Hayes,  2  Del.  Ch.  191.  73  Am.  Dec.  709; 
Hallecl£  V.  Guy,  9  Cal.  181,  70  Am.  Dec.  643;  Spauldin^  v.  Backus, 
122  Mass.  553,  23  Am.  Rep.  391;  Ainsworth  v.  Bank  of  California, 
119  Cal.  470,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  135.  In  equity,  as  at  law,  setoff  is 
only  allowed  where  there  Is  a  mutuality  in  the  demands,  and  the 
amounts  are  liquidated  and  certain:  Smith  v.  Washington  etc.  Co., 
31  Md.  12,  100  Am.  Dec.  49;  Trafford  v.  Hall,  7  R.  I.  104,  82  Am. 
Dec.  5SG;  Annan  v.  Houck,  4  Gill,  325,  45  Am.  Dec.  133;  Gregg  ▼. 
James,  Breese.  143,  12  Am.  Dec  151,  and  monographic  note  thereto. 


CASES 

IN  THK 

SUPREME   COURT 


ov 


NORTH  CAROLINA. 


JiRowN  V.  Brown. 

[124  North  Carolina,  19.] 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— RIGHT  OP  PARENT  TO  ADVISB 
MARRIED  CHILD.— In  cases  of  unhapplness  and  disagreements 
between  a  married  couple,  the  law  recognizes  the  right  of  a  parent 
to  advise  the  son  or  daughter;  and  when  such  advice  is  given  in 
good  faith  and  results  in  a  separation,  the  act  does  not  give  the 
Injured  party  a  right  of  action. 

TORTS— MALICE— DEFINITION.— The  term  "malice,"  as 
applied  to  torts,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  which  must  pro- 
ceed from  a  spiteful,  malignant,  or  revengeful  disposition,  but  a 
conduct  injurious  to  another,  though  proceeding  from  an  ill-regu- 
lated mind  not  sufficiently  cautious  before  it  occasions  an  tajury  to 
another. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— LIABILITY  OF  PARENT  FOR 
ADVISING  MARRIED  CHILD  TO  ABANDON  HUSBAND  OR 
WIFE.— Before  a  parent  can  be  held  liable  in  damages  for  advis- 
ing his  married  child  to  abandon  his  wife,  or  her  husband,  the  con- 
duct of  tlie  parent  should  be  alleged  and  proved  to  be  malicious. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— PARENT  AND  CHILD— ADVICE 
TO  CHILD— MALICE.— The  malice  necessary  to  be  alleged  and 
proved  against  a  parent  for  advising  his  married  child  to  abandon 
his  wife  or  her  husband,  is  not  alone  such  malice  as  must  proceed 
from  a  malignant  and  revengeful  disposition,  but  that  it  would  be 
sufficient  to  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  the  parent's 
action  was  taken  without  proper  investigation  of  the  facts,  or  where 
the  advice  was  given  from  reclilessness  or  dishonesty  of  purpose, 
the  law  presuming  malice  from  such  conduct  in  actions  of  this 
nature. 

Civil  action  for  damages. 

G.  W.  Ward  and  Pruden  &  Pniden,  for  the  appellant. 

E.  F.  Aydlett,  for  the  appellee. 

(574) 


Feb.  1899.]  Brown  v.  Brown.  57S 

^  MONTGOMEKY,  J.  The  only  question  (raised  by  de- 
murrer to  the  complaint)  for  decision  when  this  case  was  her& 
before  (Brown  v.  Brown,  121  N.  C.  8)  was  whether  a  married 
woman,  abandoned  by  her  husband,  could  maintain,  without  the 
joinder  of  her  husband,  an  action  in  tort.  The  court  held  that 
such  an  action  could  be  maintained.  The  present  appeal  is  be- 
fore us  on  exceptions  to  the  charge  of  his  honor. 

The  complaint  contains  three  alleged  causes  of  action:  1. 
That  the  defendant  unlawfully,  wrongfully,  and  wickedly  in- 
tending to  injure  the  plaintiff  and  to  deprive  her  of  the  society 
and  aid  of  her  husband,  destroyed  the  affection  of  her  husband 
toward  her  and  caused  him  to  leave  and  abandon  her;  2.  That 
he  commenced  against  her  a  false  and  malicious  prosecution  for 
alleged  assault  and  battery  upon  her  *^  husband;  and  3.  For 
the  false  arrest  knd  imprisonment  of  the  plaintiff,  based  upoa 
such  charge. 

The  defendant  is  the  father  of  the  plaintiff's  husband,  and  in 
his  answer  there  is  a  denial  of  the  material  allegations  of  the^ 
complaint. 

The  issues  arising  on  the  pleadings  as  to  the  last  two  causea^ 
of  action  were  found  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  and  therefore 
do  not  concern  the  appeal.  The  first  issue  was  in  these  words: 
"Did  defendants  alienate  the  affection  of  the  plaintiff's  hus- 
band and  cause  him  to  abandon  her,  as  alleged  in  the  com- 
plaint ?"  The  second  issue  was :  "If  so,  what  damage  has  plain- 
tiff sustained?"  His  honor,  in  substance,  instructed  the  jury 
that  if  they  should  find  that  the  defendant  willfully  caused  the 
defendant's  husband  to  forsake  and  abandon  her,  the  plaintiff 
would  be  entitled  to  recover,  and  the  jury  should  answer  the 
first  issue,  **Yes."  And  as  to  the  measure  of  damages,  the  court 
charged  the  jury  that  if  they  should  find  that  the  defendant 
caused  the  plaintiff's  husband  to  willfully  forsake  and  abandon 
her,  and  that  it  was  not  done  with  malice,  they  should  give 
only  such  actual  damages  as  the  plaintiff  had  sustained. 

There  was  error  in  those  instructions.  The  complaint  in  sub- 
stance alleged  that  the  conduct  of  the  defendant  was  malicious. 
The  charge  of  his  honor  was  that,  "if  the  jury  should  find  that 
the  defendant  willfully  caused  the  husband  to  abandon  the  wife^ 
then  the  first  issue  (which  raised  the  question  of  malice  in  the 
defendant)  should  be  answered  in  the  affirmative.  The  word 
'willfully*  does  not  mean  maliciously.  'Willfully'  implies  that 
an  act  done  in  that  spirit  is  done  knowingly  and  obstinately  and 


676  Brown  v.  Brown.  [N.  Carolina, 

persistently,  "but  not  necessarily  maliciously":  State  v.  Massey, 
97  N.  C.  465. 

It  cannot  be  that  the  law  disregards  the  tender  relations  of 
Icinship  and  natural  affection  between  parent  and  child  ^^  and 
the  duties  which  such  relations  impose,  even  though  the  child 
is  married.    In  case  of  unhappiness  and  disagreements  between 
"the  married  couple,  it  is  almost  iippossible  to  conceive  of  the 
indifference  on  the  part  of  the  parent  to  such  conditions,  and 
■certain  it  is  that  the  child  naturally  turns  to  the  parent  for 
comfort  and  advice  under  such  circumstances.    There  are  laws 
of  natural  affection  and  of  natural  duty,  and  municipal  law  will 
not  obstruct  their  free  operation  as  long  as  they  are  not  abused. 
The  presumption  in  fact  and  in  law  in  all  such  cases  must  be, 
and  is,  that  the  parent  will  act  only  for  the  best  interest  of 
the  child  and  for  the  honor  of  the  family.     In  Keed  v.  Eeed, 
■6  Ind.  App.  317,  51  Am.  St.  Eep.  310,  where  the  defendant  was 
the  father  of  the  plaintiff's  husband,  and  the  cause  of  action 
the  same  as  that  in  the  case  before  this  court,  it  was  said:  "The 
law  recognizes  the  right  of  the  parent  in  such  cases  to  advise 
the  son  or  daughter;  and  when  such  advice  is  given  in  good  faith 
and  results  in  a  separation,  the  act  does  not  give  the  injured 
party  a  right  of  action.    In  such  a  case,  the  motives  of  the  pa- 
rent are  presumed  good  until  the  contrary  is  made  to  appear." 
It  was  further  said  in  that  case  that  "These  rules  have  been  gene- 
rally applied  in  cases  where  the  suit  was  brought  by  the  husband 
for  the  alienation  of  his  wife,  and  we  see  no  reason  why  they 
fihould  not,  with  proper  modifications,  prevail  when  the  wife 
is  the  plaintiff."    In  Westlake  v.  Westlake,  34  Ohio  St.  621,  33 
Am.  Eep.  397,  the  plaintiff  was,  as  is  tho  case  in  this  action,  the 
wife  of  the  defendant's  son,  and  the  cause  of  action  like  the 
•one  alleged  in  the  present  case.    The  defendant  there  requested 
the  court  to  charge  the  jury  that:  "If  you  find  that  the  de- 
fendant caused  the  separation,  yet  you  shall  not  render  a  verdict 
for  the  plaintiff,  unless  you    find    the    defendant  maliciously 
•caused  the  separation."    The  court  refused  to  give  the  instruc- 
tion, and  upon  the  appeal  of  the  defendant  ^*  the  appellato 
court  said:  "This  charge  ought  to  have  been  given."    The  term 
"malice,"  as  applied  to  torts,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
which  must  proceed  from  a  spiteful,  malignant,  or  revengeful 
disposition,  but  a  conduct  injurious  to  another,  though  proceed- 
ing from  an  ill-regulated  mind  not  sufficiently  cautious  before 
it  occasions  an  injury  to  another:  Weckerly  v.  Geyer,  11  Serg. 
^  R.  39,  40.    If  the  conduct  of  the  defendant  was  unjustifiable 


March,  1899.]  Yancey's  Case.  577 

and  actually  caused  the  injury  complained  of  by  the  plaintifT, 
which  was  a  question  for  the  jury,  malice  in  law  would  be  im- 
plied from  such  conduct,  and  the  court  should  have  so  charged." 

"We  are  of  the  opinion,  after  having  given  the  matter  the  se- 
rious consideration  which  it  deserves,  that,  before  a  parent  can 
be  held  liable  in  damages  for  advising  his  married  child  to  aban- 
don his  wife,  or  her  husband,  the  conduct  of  the  parent  should 
be  alleged  and  proved  to  be  malicious;  that  the  willful  advice 
and  action  of  the  parent  in  such  a  case  may  not  be  necessarily 
malicious,  for  the  parent  may  be  determined  and  persistent  and 
■obstinate  in  his  purpose  to  cause  the  separation,  and  yet  be  en- 
tirely free  from  malice — in  fact,  have  in  view  the  highest  good 
of  his  child.  Our  opinion,  however,  is  that  the  malice  neces- 
sary to  be  alleged  and  proved  is  not  alone  such  malice  as  must 
proceed  from  a  malignant  and  revengeful  disposition,  but  that 
it  would  be  sufficient  to  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that 
the  parent's  action  was  taken  without  proper  investigation  of 
the  facts,  or  where  the  advice  was  given  from  recklessness  or 
dishonesty  of  purpose — the  law  presuming  malice  from  such  con- 
duct in  actions  of  this  nature. 

Error. 


HUSBAND  AND  WIFE^-RIGHT  OP  PARENT  TO  ADVISE 
MARRIED  CHILD— LIABILITY.— A  father  has  the  right  to  advise 
bis  son,  and.  If  he  acts  with  proper  motives  and  In  good  faith  in  do- 
inff  so,  cannot  be  regarded  as  an  intermeddler;  but  a  father  who, 
maliciously  and  with  a  view  to  separating  his  son  and  the  latter's 
wife,  aids,  advises,  and  assists,  and,  by  promises  or  threats,  pro- 
■cures  his  son  to  leave  his  wife,  Is  liable  to  an  action  by  her:  Ger- 
nerd  v.  Gernerd,  185  Pa.  St.  233,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  646,  and  note. 
Monographic  note  to  Clow  v.  Chapman,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  477.  Aliena- 
tion of  husband's  affections  by  relatives  generally:  Price  v.  Price, 
«1  Iowa,  693,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  360. 


Tanory's  Case. 

ri24  North  Carolina,  161.1 

DEVISE-REMAINDER  TO  PERSONS  NOT  IN  ESSE— 
JURISDICTION— SALE  OF  PROPERTY.— Where  property  Is  de- 
vised  for  life,  with  a  remainder  over  to  persons  not  In  esse,  the  life 
tenant  still  living,  a  court  has  no  power  to  order  a  sale  of  the  prop- 
erty, because  there  can  be  no  one  before  the  court  to  represent  the 
interest  of  the  remaindermen. 

DEVISE— REMAINDER  TO  UNDETERMINED  PERSONS- 
JURISDICTION— SALE  OF  PROPERTY.— Where  property  is  de- 
Tised  for  life,  with  a  remainder  over  to  "such  children  aa  should 

Am.  St.  Kkp.,  You  LXX.— 37 


578  Yancey's  Case.  [N.  Carolina, 

be  living  at  the  death  of  the  life  tenant,"  a  court  has  no  power  to 
order  a  sale  of  the  property,  for  until  the  death  of  the  life  tenant 
it  could  not  be  known  who  would  take. 

DEVISE  —  GENERAL  REMAINDER  —  REMAINDERMEN 
BEFORE  THE  COURT— JURISDICTION— SALE  OF  PROPERTY. 
Where  property  is  devised  for  life,  with  a  general  remainder  over 
in  which  there  is  no  element  of  survivorship,  a  court  may  order  a 
sale  of  the  property  where  all  the  remaindermen  living  are  before 
it,  since  the  remaindermen  represent  a  class,  and  those  who  may 
afterward  be  born  are  concluded  by  the  action  of  the  court  upoa 
those  of  the  same  class. 

DEVISE  —  REMAINDERMEN  —  SALE  OF  PROPERTY- 
TITLE  OF  PURCHASER.— When  property,  which  is  devised  for 
life  with  a  general  remainder  over,  is  sold  under  an  order  of  court, 
all  the  remaindermen  living  being  before  the  court,  the  purchaser 
will  acquire  a  good  title  against  afterborn  children  of  the  life  ten- 
ant. 

Petition,  ex  parte,  for  the  sale  of  land  for  reinvestment. 
There  was  an  order  of  sale.  One  of  the  purchasers  refused  to 
complete  his  purchase  on  the  ground  that  he  did  not  buy  a  good 
title. 

Shepherd  &  Busbee,  for  the  appellees. 

No  counsel  contra. 

i«K»  FAIECLOTH,  C.  J.  N.  S.  Harp  devised  as  follows:  "All 
the  residue  of  my  estate,  real  and  personal  and  mixed,  I  give 
and  bequeath  to  my  wife,  Lucy  H.  Harp,  duiing  her  natural 
life,  and  then  in  remainder  to  my  daughter,  Elodia  Benton  Yan- 
cey, wife  of  Thomas  B.  Yancey,  during  her  natural  life,  and  theiv 
to  her  children."  Elodia  and  her  children,  some  of  whom  ar& 
minors  represented  by  their  next  friend,  ask  the  court  to  order 
a  sale  of  the  land,  and  that  the  proceeds  be  invested  under  the 
direction  of  the  court  for  their  benefit.  The  purchaser  of  ono 
lot  declines  to  pay  his  bid,  and  raises  the  question  whether  th& 
court  has  the  power  to  order  the  sale,  and  that  is  the  only  ques- 
tion. 

"We  are  not  considering  whether  Elodia  acquired  an  estate  in 
fee  or  for  life  only.  She  and  her  children  are  asking  for  a  sale. 
The  only  suggested  difficulty  is  that  by  possibility  she  may  have 
other  children,  whose  interest  cannot  now  be  sold.  We  think 
that  appellant's  contention  is  untenable.  ^^^  When  the  life 
tenant,  still  living,  has  no  child,  it  has  been  held  that  the  court 
has  no  power  to  order  a  sale  of  land,  where  it  is  limited  in  re- 
mainder to  persons  not  in  esse,  because  there  can  be  no  one  be- 
fore the  court  to  represent  their  interest:  Watson  v.  Watson,  5ft 
N.  C.  400;  Justice  v.  Guion,  76  K  C.  442. 


March,  1893.]  Yancey's  Case.  579 

So,  also,  if  the  devise  was  in  remainder  to  such  children  as 
should  be  living  at  the  death  of  the  life  tenant  the  court  could 
not  sell,  for  until  that  event  it  could  not  be  known  who  would 
take:  Miller,  Ex  parte,  90  N.  C.  625;  Williams  v.  Hassell,  74 
K  C.  434. 

But  when  all  the  remaindermen  living  are  before  the  court, 
they  represent  a  class,  and  when  the  gift  is  general  and  there  is 
no  element  of  survivorship  in  it,  it  is  otherwise,  and  by  repre- 
sentation those  who  may  afterward  be  born  are  concluded  by  the 
action  of  the  court  upon  those  of  the  same  class  then  before  it, 
and  the  purchaser  at  such  sale  will  acquire  a  good  title  against 
afterborn  children  of  the  same  life  tenant:  Irvin  y.  Clark,  98 
N.  C.  437. 

In  Williams  v.  Hassell,  74  N.  C.  434,  the  court  said:  "Sup- 
pose in  the  case  before  us  the  devise  had  been  to  the  first  takers 
for  life,  remainder  to  their  children;  that  woidd  take  in  all  the 
children,  as  well  those  bom  after  the  death  of  the  testator  as 
those  born  before,  and  in  such  case  it  may  be  that  the  born 
child  might  be  allowed  to  represent  the  class."  That  supposed 
case  is  just  what  we  now  have  before  us. 

The  investment  will  be  made  as  the  court  may  direct,  and  the 
cause  is  retained  for  further  direction. 

It  is  to  the  interest  of  our  people  that  the  title  to  property 
should  be  clogged  as  little  as  possible  with  'limitations,'* 
"trusts,"  et  cetera,  and  public  policy  requires  that  the  alienation 
of  lan-d  should  be  as  free  from  such  condition  as  any  article  of 
traffic. 
Affirmed. 


DEVISE-REMAINDERS— SALE  OP  PROPERTY.— An  order  for 
the  sale  of  real  estate  of  decedent  is  invalid,  if  persons  in  whom  a 
contingent  remainder  is  vested  by  the  will  of  the  decedent  are  not 
cited  to  appear,  and  given  an  opportunity  to  resist  the  granting  of 
such  order.  So  held  where  the  provisions  of  a  will  gave  the  use 
of  a  farm  to  the  testator's  son  for  life,  and  at  the  son's  death  to 
vest  in  his  children,  should  he  leave  any;  and  in  default  of  such 
children,  then  to  the  issue  of  the  testator's  brothers  and  sisters; 
and  at  the  time  of  the  proceedings  for  the  order  of  sale,  the  sou 
and  four  of  his  children  were  living,  as  well  as  a  number  of  chil- 
dren of  the  testator's  brothers  and  sisters,  who  were  not  cited  to 
appear:  Wilson  v.  White,  109  N.  Y.  59,  4  Am.  St  Kep.  420.  On  the 
sale  of  contingent  remainder  under  execution,  see  Haward  ". 
Peavey.  128  111.  430,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  120,  and  note.  See  the  note 
to  Snelling  t.  Lamar,  17  Am.  St  Rep.  84a 


580  Troxler  v.  Southern  Railway  Co.     [N.  Carolina, 


Tboxler  v.  Southern   Railway  Company. 

[124  North  Carolina,  18S.] 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— DUTY  OF  MASTER— SAFE 
APPLIANCES.— The  duty  to  furnish  proper  and  safe  appliances  is 
that  of  the  common  master,  and  injury  caused  by  their  absence 
cannot  be  attributed  to  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE  PER  SE— FAIL- 
URE TO  USE  SELF-COUPLING  DEVICES.— Failure  of  a  railroad 
company  to  equp  its  freight-cars  with  modern  self-coupling  devices 
is  negligence,  per  se. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  FAILURE  TO  USE  SELF- 
COUPLING  DEVICES— NEGLIGENCE  OF  EMPLOYE.— Where  a 
railroad  company  fails  to  equip  its  freight-cars  with  modern  self- 
coupling  devices,  and  an  employ^  is  injured  in  coupling  cars  by 
hand,  the  company  is  liable,  whether  such  employ^  was  negligent 
in  the  manner  of  making  the  coupling,  or  not. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— CONTINUING  NEGLIGENCE 
OF  MASTER— CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE  OF  SERVANT.— 
Where  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  is  a  continuing  negligence, 
there  can  be  no  contributory  negligence  which  will  discharge  the 
master's  liability. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— NEGLIGENCE  PER  SE— FAIL- 
URE TO  USE  SAFE  APPLIANCES  IN  GENERAL  USE.— When 
safer  appliances  have  been  invented,  tested,  and  have  come  into 
general  use,  it  is  negligence  per  se  for  the  master  to  expose  his 
servant  to  the  hazard  of  life  or  limb  from  antiquated  and  defective 
appliances  which  have  been  generally  discarded  by  the  intelligence 
and  humanity  of  other  employers. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  SAFE  APPLIANCES  —  DE- 
FENSE OF  POVERTY.— If  an  appliance  is  such  that  the  railroads 
should  have  it,  the  poverty  of  the  company  is  no  sufficient  excuse 
for  not  having  it. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  USB  SAFE  APPLI- 
ANCES IN  GKNERAL  USE.— The  employes  of  a  railroad  company 
and  the  traveling  public  alike  have  a  right  to  be  protected  against 
any  dangers  which  can  be  avoided  by  the  adoption  of  safety  appli- 
ances which  have  been  tested  by  experience  and  which  have  come 
into  general  use. 

Civil  action  to  recover  damages  for  personal  injuries,  alleged 
to  have  been  occasioned  by  the  defendant's  negligence.  The 
plaintiff  was  a  brakeman  on  the  defendant's  train,  and  by  direc- 
tion of  the  conductor  undertook  to  couple  two  cars,  which  were 
not  furnished  with  automatic  couplers.  Plaintiff's  hand  was 
injured. 

F.  H.  Busbee,  for  the  defendant. 

C.  M.  Steadman  and  D.  Schenck,  Jr.,  for  the  plaintiff. 

***  CLAEK,  J.  The  plaintiff  was  injured  in  attempting  to 
couple  cars  of  the  defendant  on  which  there  were  no  automatic 


March,  1899.]    Tboxleb  v.  Southern  Railway  Co  581 

car-couplers,  *®*  but  in  lieu  thereof  skeleton  draw-heads  of  un- 
equal height.  The  court  below  held  that  the  absence  of  auto- 
matic couplers,  in  general  use,  was  negligence,  per  se,  and  re- 
fused to  submit  an  issue  whether  the  injury  was  not  caused  by 
the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant,  and  refused  to  instruct  the 
jury,  as  prayed,  that  the  plaintiff  was  guilty  of  contributory 
negligence  if  he  could  by  proper  care  have  coupled  the  cars  by 
hand  without  accident. 

The  duty  to  furnish  proper  and  safe  appliances  is  that  of  the 
common  master,  and  injury  caused  by  their  absence  cannot  be 
attributed  to  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant:  Troxler  t. 
Southern  Ey.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  902;  Wright  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co., 
122  N.  C  959.  It  has  been  heretofore  held  in  Greenlee  \. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  977,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  734,  that  fail- 
ure of  a  railroad  company  to  equip  its  freight-cars  with  mod- 
ern self-coupling  devices  is  negligence,  per  se,  continuing  up  to 
the  time  of  an  injury  sustained  by  an  employe  in  coupling  cars 
by  hand,  and  renders  the  company  liable,  whether  such  employe 
was  negligent  in  the  manner  of  making  the  coupling,  or  not. 
The  same  ruling  had  been  previously  made  as  to  the  duty  of  fur- 
nishing automatic  car-couplers  on  passenger  trains  in  Mason  v. 
Richmond  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  482,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  814, 
decided  in  1892.  Where  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  is  a 
continuing  negligence  (as  the  failure  to  furnish  safe  appliances 
in  general  use,  when  the  use  of  such  appliances  would  have  pre- 
vented the  possibility  of  the  injury),  there  can  be  no  contribu- 
tory negligence  which  will  discharge  the  master's  liability. 
This  has  been  repeatedly  held:  Norton  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R. 
Co.,  122  N.  C.  911;  McLamb  v.  Wilmington  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  122 
N.  C.  873;  Cone  v.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.,  81  N.  Y.  206,  37  Am. 
Rep.  491.  The  failure  to  provide  the  necessary  appliances  is 
the  causa  causans.  The  defendant,  however,  frankly  asks  us 
to  reconsider  and  overrule  Greenlee's  case.  That  case  was  the 
expression  of  no  new  doctrine,  but  the  affirmation  of  one  ^^^  as 
old  as  the  law,  and  founded  on  the  soundest  principles  of  justice 
and  reason,  to  wit:  That  when  safer  appliances  have  been  in- 
vented, tested,  and  have  come  into  general  use,  it  is  negligence, 
per  se,  for  the  master  to  expose  his  servant  to  the  hazard  of  life 
or  limb  from  antiquated  and  defective  appliances  which  have 
been  generally  discarded  by  the  intelligence  and  humanity  of 
other  employers:  Witsell  v.  West  Asheville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  120  N. 
C.  557.    This  must  be  so,  if  masters  owe  any  duties  to  their  em- 


582  Tboxleb  v.  Southern  Railway  Co.     [N.  Carolina, 

ployes,  and  unless  economy  of  expenditures  on  the  part  of  the 
railroad  management  is  to  be  deemed  superior  to  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  lives  and  limbs  of  those  employed  in  their  operation. 

In  the  twelfth  annual  report  of  the  interstate  commerce  com- 
mission (1898),  published  by  authority  of  the  United  States 
government,  upon  returns  made  by  the  railroad  companies  them- 
selves, it  is  stated  (at  page  88) :  "Since  the  enactment  of  the  law 
in  1893  (requiring  automatic  couplers)  there  has  been  a  decreas- 
ing number  of  casualties.  There  were  1,034  fewer  employes 
killed  and  14,062  fewer  injured  during  the  year  ending  June  30, 
1897,  than  during  the  same  period  in  1893.  The  importance  of 
this  subject  will  be  realized  when  the  yearly  casualties  to  rail- 
way employes  are  compared  with  those  which  occurred  during 
the  recent  war.  In  the  Spanish-American  War  there  were  298 
killed  and  1,645  wounded.  In  1897  there  were  1,693  men  killed 
and  27,667  injured  from  all  causes  in  railway  service.  From 
coupling  and  uncoupling  cars  alone  219  less  were  killed  and 
4,994  less  were  injured  in  1897  than  in  1893,  when  the  law  was 
enacted.  The  number  of  such  employes  killed  has  been  reduced 
one-half,  and  the  number  of  injured  also  practically  reduced  one- 
half.  The  reduction  in  the  number  of  accidents  from  all  causes 
largely  exceeded  (by  nearly  three  to  one)  in  a  single  year  the 
entire  casualties  resulting  from  the  prosecution  of  the  late  war." 

103  Thus  in  four  years — from  1893  to  1897 — notwithstanding 
the  increase  of  thousands  of  miles  of  railways,  and  many  thou- 
sands of  employes,  and  the  further  fact  that  the  railroad  corpo- 
rations have  been  able  to  procure  from  the  interstate  commerce 
commission  an  extension  of  the  time  at  which  the  law  of  Con- 
gress, imposing  a  penalty  for  operating  any  cars  without  self- 
couplers,  will  come  into  force,  the  shadow  of  the  law  has  pro- 
cured so  general  an  attachment  of  these  self-couplers,  that  5,213 
fewer  employes  were  killed  and  wounded  in  coupling  and  un- 
coupling cars  in  1897  than  in  1893.  Can  it,  therefore,  be  seri- 
ously contended  that  the  absence  of  such  safety  appliances  is  not 
negligence  per  se,  rendering  the  railroad  company  liable  for 
damages?  As  these  appliances  have  been  patented,  and  more 
or  less  in  use  for  over  thirty  years,  it  should  not  have  required 
an  act  of  Congress  to  enforce  their  universal  adoption.  Failure 
to  adopt  them,  after  being  so  long  and  widely  known  and  used, 
was  negligence  in  the  defendant,  upon  the  principles  of  the 
common  law :  Witsell  v.  West  Asheville  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  120  N.  C. 
557.    The  act  of  Congress  imposing  a  penalty  for  failure  to  add 


March,  1899.]    Troxleb  v.  Southern  Railway  Co.  583 

the  appliances  after  January  1,  1898,  in  no  wise  affected  the 
right  of  any  employ^  to  recover  for  damages,  sustained  by  the 
negligence  of  any  railroad  company  to  attach  them.  The  action 
of  the  interstate  commerce  commission,  in  extending  the  date 
«t  which  such  act  should  come  into  force  (by  virtue  of  authority 
given  in  the  act)  could  not  set  aside  the  principle  of  law  that 
failure  to  adopt  such  appliances  was  negligence  per  se,  nor  have 
any  other  effect  than  to  postpone  the  date  at  which  the  United 
States  government  would  impose  the  prescribed  penalty  upon 
all  railroads  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  failing  to  equip  all 
their  cars  with  automatic  couplers,  a  penalty  which  is  imposed 
irrespective  whether  any  accidents  occur  from  such  failure  or 
not. 

i»4  rpjjg  indifference  of  railroad  companies  shown  in  not 
adopting  these  life  and  limb-saving  appliances  is  all  the  greater, 
fiince  their  cost  is  comparatively  small.  Indeed,  the  interstate 
<K)mmerce  commission,  in  the  above-cited  report  (page  89),  state 
that,  considering  the  less  expense  required  in  repairs,  they  are 
an  actual  saving.  They  say:  "Figures  submitted  by  one  of  the 
leading  railroad  companies  indicate  that  the  adoption  of  the  au- 
tomatic coupler  will  result  in  saving  a  very  large  sum  annually, 
in  comparison  with  the  expense  incurred  in  former  years,  in  ap- 
plying and  maintaining  the  link  and  pin  type ;  and  this  does  not 
take  into  account  the  reduced  cost  to  the  roads,  which  must  re- 
sult from  fewer  suits  for  damages  by  injured  employes.  And 
further,  that  there  being  too  much  slack  in  the  old  pin  and  link 
for  the  brake  to  act  economically  or  successfully,  the  automatic 
coupler  makes  the  requirements  of  railroad  operation  better,  aa 
well  as  minimizes  the  danger  to  employes." 

In  Witsell  v.  West  Asheville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  120  N.  C.  657,  562, 
it  is  said:  "If  an  appliance  is  such  that  the  railroads  should 
have  it,  the  poverty  of  the  company  is  no  sufficient  excuse  for 
not  having  it.'*  But  not  only,  as  above,  the  use  of  self-couplers 
would  be  an  actual  economy  to  the  defendant,  but  that  it  is 
amply  able  to  put  on  these  appliances,  if  it  were  not,  is  shown 
by  the  published  report  of  the  defendant  company  that  its  gross 
earnings  for  the  year  1895  (when  this  injury  was  inflicted)  were 
over  $17,000,000,  and  its  net  earnings,  over  and  above  all  ex- 
penses, were  more  than  $5,000,000  (Poor's  Railroad  Manual, 
1898,  792) — figures  which  for  the  year  just  past  have  risen  to 
over  $22,000,000  gross  earnings  and  over  $7,300,000  net  earn- 
ings. 


534  Tkoxler  v.  Southern  Railway  Co.     [N.  Carolina^ 

"With  such  an  array  as  above  of  the  terrible  cost  of  life  and 
limb  by  failure  to  use  appliances  to  avoid  coupling  and  un- 
coupling ^®^  cars  by  hand  (in  doing  which  the  plaintifE  was 
injured),  and  the  small  expense,  nay,  actual  economy,  of  adopt- 
ing them,  and  the  ample  means  the  defendant  possesses,  we  can- 
not reverse  our  ruling  in  Greenlee's  case,  that  it  is  negligence 
per  se  in  any  railroad  company  to  cause  one  of  its  employes  to 
risk  his  life  or  limb  in  making  couplings  which  can  be  made  au- 
tomatically without  risk. 

This  matter  of  requiring  these  great  corporations  to  protect 
the  traveling  public,  and  their  employes  as  well,  by  the  adop- 
tion of  all  safety  appliances  which  have  come  into  general  use, 
is  so  important  that  we  have  gone  into  the  subject  at  this 
length.  Ordinarily  owned  by  great  syndicates  out  of  the  state 
in  which  they  operate,  and  their  management  at  all  events  re- 
moved from  subjection  to  that  sound  public  opinion  which  is  so 
great  a  check  upon  the  conduct  of  individuals  and  of  govern- 
ment itself,  the  sole  protection  left  to  the  traveler  and  the  em- 
ploye alike  is  the  application  of  that  law  which  is  administered 
impartially,  and  which  can  lay  its  hand  fearlessly  upon  the  most 
powerful  conbination  and  protect  with  its  care  the  humblest 
individual  in  the  land. 

The  subject  is  one  of  transcendent  importance,  for  notwith- 
standing the  partial  adoption  of  these  appliances  and  consequent 
reduction  in  casualties,  the  twelfth  interstate  commerce  com- 
mission shows  (page  77"^  that  for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1897, 
on  the  railroads  engaged  in  interstate  commerce  (which  alone 
report  to  that  commission),  there  were  still  43,168  casualties,  of 
which  6,437  resulted  in  death.  Of  these  1,693  killed  and  27,667 
wounded  were  railroad  employes,  among  whom  314  were  killed 
and  6,283  wounded  in  coupling  or  uncoupling  cars.  In  our  own 
state,  the  report  of  the  North  Carolina  railroad  commission  for 
1898  (pages  250,  251)  shows  that  for  the  year  ending  June  30, 
1898,  the  railroads  reported  879  persons  killed  and  wounded  (of 
i»«  whom  99  were  killed)  and  of  these,  23  of  the  killed  and  599 
of  the  wounded  were  employes — total,  622.  As,  of  the  9,000 
employes  reported  in  this  state,  4,000  (according  to  the  usual 
ratio)  were  employes  engaged  in  the  actual  operation  of  the 
trains,  it  follows  that  in  this  state  one  such  employ^  in  every  6^ 
was  in  that  year  injured  or  killed.  In  view  of  such  mortality, 
rivaling  that  of  the  bloodiest  wars,  this  court  cannot  reverse  its 
declaration  heretofore,  which  is  sustained  by  every  sentiment  oi 


March,  1899  ]    Tboxleb  v.  Southern  Railway  Co.  585 

justice  and  humanity,  that  where  a  life  and  limh-saving  appli- 
ance, like  automatic  car-couplers,  has  come  into  general  use,  and 
its  partial  adoption  has  in  four  years,  notwithstanding  the  in- 
crease in  railroad  mileage  and  employes,  decreased  the  injuries 
and  deaths  from  coupling  cars  one-half,  that  the  failure  to  adopt 
and  use  it  is  negligence  per  se. 

Considering  the  economy  in  money  of  using  such  appliances, 
as  well  as  the  ample  revenues  of  the  defendant,  it  is  passing 
strange  that  it  (or  any  other  railroad  company)  should  have  de- 
layed till  now,  or  even  till  1895,  to  protect  the  lives  and  limbs 
of  their  employes  in  this  particular,  or  that  there  should  have 
been  need  of  an  act  of  Congress  or  the  verdict  of  a  jury  to  stimu- 
late considerations  of  humanity  toward  their  patrons  and  their 
employes. 

Counsel  for  defendant  read,  as  part  of  his  argument,  a  clip- 
ping from  a  newspaper,- and  repeats  in  his  brief,  that  a  noble 
English  lord,  who  was  a  railroad  manager  as  well  as  an  heredi- 
tary member  of  Parliament,  had  changed  his  party  affiliations 
because  the  one  to  which  he  had  belonged  had  advocated  the 
enforced  adoption  of  self -couplers  upon  English  railways.  That 
simply  shows  that  one  such  manager,  at  least,  possesses  a  lordly 
^disregard  for  the  thousands  of  deaths  and  injuries  of  employes 
yearly,  caused  by  the  lack  of  safety  appliances,  and  it  may  be 
there  are  others  who  entertain  sentiments  ^^"^  of  higher  alle- 
giance to  the  net  earnings  of  the  syndicates  that  employ  them 
than  to  those  great  principles  which  every  political  party  pro- 
fesses to  advocate,  as  being  for  the  best  interests  of  the  public. 
But  the  hostility  of  one  or  more  railway  managers  toward  the 
matter  cannot  affect  the  impartial  enforcement  of  the  sound 
legal  principle  that  employes  and  the  traveling  public  alike  have 
a  right  to  be  protected  against  any  -dangers  which  can  be 
avoided  by  the  adoption  of  safety  appliances  which  have  been 
tested  by  experience  and  which  have  come  into  general  use. 

In  the  present  case,  the  defendant  has  the  less  excuse  because 
there  was  uncontradicted  testimony  not  only  that  automatic  car- 
couplers  were  in  general  use  at  the  time  of  the  injurv  (March, 
1895),  but  that  the  skeleton  draw-heads,  in  attempting  to  make 
a  coupling  with  which  the  plaintiff  was  injured,  were  defective 
in  that  they  were  of  different  heights  from  the  ground,  and  evi- 
dence that  the  cars  could  not  have  been  coupled  with  a  stick  or 
in  any  other  manner,  except  by  hand. 


586  Bear  v.  Commissioners.  [N.  Carolina, 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— DUTY  OF  MASTER  TO  FURNISH 
SAFE  Af PLIANCES.— It  is  the  duty  of  the  master  to  the  servant 
to  furnish  sufficient,  properly  constructed,  and  safe  machinery,  or 
other  materials  or  appliances,  to  be  used  by  the  servant  in  the 
•course  of  his  employment  aud  necessary  for  the  service:  Meador  v. 
Lake  Shore  etc.  Ky.  Co.,  138  Ind.  2i)0,  46  Am,  St.  Rep.  384;  Nord 
Deutscher  etc.  Co.  v.  Ingebregsten,  57  N.  J.  L.  400,  51  Am.  St.  Rep. 
€04. 

RAILROAD  OOMPANIES-SELF-COUPLERS— NEGLIGENCE. 
The  rule  is  well  settled  in  North  Carolina  that  the  failure  of  a  rail- 
"svay  company  to  equip  its  freight-cars  with  self-coupling  devices 
is  negligence  per  se,  for  which  it  is  liable  in  damages  to  an  em- 
ploy 6  who  receives  an  injury  while  coupling  cars  by  hand,  whether 
he  is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence  or  not:  Greenlee  v.  South- 
ern Ry.  Co.,  122  N.  C.  977,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  734,  and  monographic 
note  thereto,  in  which  it  is  shown  that  the  North  Carolina  doctrine 
is  not  supported  by  the  weight  of  authority.  A  railroad  company 
need  not  furnish  the  best  machinery:  Mason  v.  Richmond  etc.  R.  R. 
■Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  482,  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  814.  Neither  is  a  railroad  com- 
pany required  to  adopt  every  appliance  which  even  a  majority  of 
the  well-regulated  roads  have  adopted:  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hall,  91  Ala.  112,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  863.  See  the  note  to  Chicago 
«tc.  E.  E.  Co.  V.  Swett,  92  Am.  Dec.  213. 


Bear  v.  Commissioners. 

[124  North  Carolina,  204. J 

ESTOPPEL-NECESSITY  TO  PLEAD.— Where  a  party  haa 
an  opportunity  to  plead  an  estoppel,  and  voluntarily  omits  to  do  so, 
but  goes  to  the  issue  on  the  facts,  he  thereby  waives  the  estoppel, 
and  the  jury  Is  at  liberty  to  find  according  to  the  facts  of  the  case. 

ESTOPPEL— PLEADING— DEMURRER.— Where  the  advan- 
tage might  have  been  taken  of  an  estoppel  by  means  of  a  demurrer, 
and  the  party  fails  to  so  take  advantage  of  it,  he  will  be  held  to 
have  waived  the  estoppel. 

MANDAMUS— NATURE.— ]\landamus  Is  In  the  nature,  both 
of  an  execution  and  of  a  civil  action. 

MANDAMUS— NATURE-CIVIL  ACTION.— Mandamus  Is  In 
the  nature  of  a  civil  action,  and  is  commenced  by  summons,  and 
the  pleadings  and  the  practice  are  the  same  as  are  prescribed  for 
the  conducting  of  civil  actions. 

SCHOOLS— SCHOOL  FUNDS— LIABILITY  OF  COUNTY.- - 
School  orders  issued  by  the  school  committee  upon  the  treasurer  of 
the  county  board  of  education,  under  the  North  Carolina  laws  In 
force  in  18S6,  were  paj^able  out  of  the  school  fund  only,  and  were 
not  a  valid  charge  upon  the  public  funds  of  the  county. 

MANDAMUS  TO  COMPEL  COUNTY  COMMISPTOVPrS 
TO  LEVY  TAX— CONSTITUTION.— Under  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision prohibiting  any  tax  from  being  levied  by  any  county,  city, 
or  town,  except  for  the  necessary  expenses  thereof,  uiiless  by  n  vote 
of  the  majority  of  the  qualilied  voters  therein,  before  mandamus 
can  be  issied  to  compel  the  board  of  commissioners  of  a  co-iit-  to 
4evy  a  tax  to  pay  a  judgment  against  the  commissioners,  the  plain- 


March,  1899.]  Bear  v.  Commissioners.  587 

tiff— Judgment  creditor— must  show  affirmatively  by  the  record  or 
other  competent  evidence  that  the  consideration  of  the  debt,  upon 
which  the  judgment  was  obtained,  was  of  such  a  character  as  to 
fall  under  the  head  of  ordinary  or  necessary  county  expenses. 

E.  K.  Bryan  and  Frank  McNeill,  for  the  defendants. 
J.  D.  Bellamy  and  Shepherd  &  Busbee,  for  the  plaintiff. 

20S  MONTGOMERY,  J.  This  case  is  before  us  on  a  peti- 
tion to  rehear,  the  first  opinion  having  been  filed  at  the  spring 
term,  1898,  and  published  in  Bear  v.  Board  of  Commrs.,  122  N. 
€.  434,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  711.  After  further  argument  and  a 
closer  investigation,  we  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  there 
was  error  in  the  former  opinion  in  its  reversal  of  the  judgment 
of  the  superior  court.  That  judgment  ought  to  have  been  af- 
firmed. 

The  plaintiff  in  his  complaint  alleged  that  the  defendants 
were  indebted  to  him  in  the  sum  of  ...  .  dollars  due  by  eight 
judgments  originally  had  in  a  court  of  a  justice  of  the  peace, 
and  afterward  docketed  by  transcript  in  the  office  of  the  clerk  of 
the  superior  court  of  Brunswick  county,  and  prayed  judgment 
that  the  defendants  be  compelled  to  levy  a  tax  to  pay  the  judg- 
ments and  costs.  The  defendants,  in  their  answer,  admitted 
that  the  judgments  were  procured  as  alleged,  but  averred  that 
they  were  not  valid  and  binding  against  the  defendants,  for  the 
reason  that  they  were  obtained  against  a  former  board  of  com- 
missioners on  school  claims  for  which  neither  the  defendants 
nor  their  predecessors  were  liable  in  law.  The  defendants 
further  aver  that  the  judgments  were  obtained  on  certain  school 
orders  issued  about  the  year  1886  by  the  school  committeemen 
of  certain  school  districts  of  Brunswick  county  upon  the  treas- 
urer of  the  county  board  of  education,  and  that  they  were  not 
«  valid  charge  against  the  defendants,  the  board  of  commission- 
ers, or  a  charge  upon  the  public  funds  of  the  county,  or  upon  any 
other  ^****  fund  except  those  expressly  set  apart  for  school  pur- 
poses. And  for  a  further  defense  the  defendants  aver  that  sec- 
tion 7,  article  7,  of  the  constitution  of  North  Carolina  prohibits 
any  tax  from  being  collected  or  levied  by  any  county,  city,  or 
town,  or  other  municipal  corporation,  except  for  the  necessary 
expenses  thereof,  unless  by  a  vote  of  the  majority  of  the  quali- 
fied voters  therein;  and  the  defendants  aver  that  the  considera- 
tion upon  which  the  judgments  were  had  was  not  for  the  neces- 
sary expenses  of  the  county  or  for  a  debt  contracted  in  the  man- 
ner provided  bj  the  constitution. 


688  Bear  v.  Commissioners.  [N.  Carolina, 

When  the  case  came  on  for  trial  a  jury  trial  was  waived,  and 
it  was  agreed  that  his  honor  who  presided  should  find  the  facts, 
and  the  case  was  heard  by  the  court  by  the  consent  of  counsel 
of  the  plaintiff  and  of  the  defendants.     "What  facts  could  have 
been  in  the  minds  of  the  counsel,  except  the  facts  connected 
with  the  consideration  of  the  claims  on  which  the  original  judg- 
ments were  procured,  and  those  connecting  the  judgments  of 
1894,  docketed  in  the  superior  court  by  transcript,  as  being  the 
same  judgments  which  were  originally  rendered  by  the  justice  of 
the  peace  in  1888?     No  other  facts  could  have  been  referred  to, 
for  they  were  raised  by  the  pleadings,  and  the  defendants  in 
their  answer  had  admitted  that  the  judgments  had  been  obtained 
by  the  plaintiff,  as  set  out  in  his  complaint.     The  plaintiff,  hav- 
ing failed  to  plead  his  judgments  in  estoppel  of  the  matter  set 
out  in  the  answer,  or  to  demur  to  the  answer,  waived  his  rights 
as  to  any  advantage  which  the  law  had  given  to  his  position,  and 
by  his  agreement  to  submit  the  facts  to  the  finding  of  the  court, 
went  to  the  hearing  on  the  merits  of  the  original  consideration 
upon  which  the  judgments  were  granted.    "Numerous  decisions 
in  this  country  and  England  hold  that  where  a  party  has  an  op- 
portunity to  plead  an  estoppel,  and  voluntarily  ^^"^  omits  to  do 
so,  but  goes  to  the  issue  on  the  facts,  he  thereby  waives  the  es- 
toppel, and  the  jury  is  at  liberty  to  find  according  to  the  facts 
of  the  case.    So,  where  the  advantage  might  have  been  taken  of 
an  estoppel  by  means  of  a  demurrer,  and  the  party  fails  to  so 
take  advantage  of  it,  he  will  be  held  to  have  waived  the  estop- 
pel": 8  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  13,  and  cases  there  cited.    If 
the  plaintiff  intended  to  avail  himself  of  the  full  benefit  and  ef- 
fect of  his  judgments,  it  was   incumbent   on  him  to  do  so,  by 
some  proper  pleading  because  of  the  nature  of  defendant's  an- 
swer, for,  though  mandamus  is  in  the  nature  of  an  execution, 
yet  it  is  in  the  nature  of  a  civil  action ;  it  is  commenced  by  sum- 
mons and  the  pleadings,  and  the  practices  are  the  same  as  are 
prescribed  for  the  conducting  of  civil  actions:  Code,  sec.  G23. 

His  honor  found  as  a  fact  upon  the  evidence,  none  of  which 
was  objected  to,  that  the  original  judgments  were  obtained  upon 
certain  school  orders  issued  during  the  year  1886,  and  that  the 
judgments  of  1894  in  the  superior  court  were  the  same  judg- 
ments which  were  obtained  before  the  justice  of  the  peace  in 
1888,  and  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  record  or  judgment  of 
1894  to  show  what  the  cause  of  action  was,  except  that  they  were 
brought  on  former  judgments.     Now,  upon  his  honor's  findings 


March,  1899.]         Beab  v.  Commissioners,  689 

of  fact,  the  legal  question  arises.  Were  school  orders  issued  in 
1886  a  debt  for  which  the  county  was  liable,  and  for  which  the 
board  of  commissioners  could  Jbe  made  to  provide  by  taxation  ? 
We  think  not. 

The  law  in  force  at  the  time  when  the  school  orders  upon 
which  the  plaintiff's  action  was  brought  were  issued,  was  the 
-code,  chapter  15,  volume  2,  as  amended  by  chapter  174  of  the 
acts  of  1885.  Section  2551  of  the  code  provides  that  the  county 
board  of  education  shall,  on  the  first  Monday  in  January  ^*^  of 
•each  year,  apportion  among  the  several  districts  all  school  funds, 
specifying  how  much  of  the  same  is  apportioned  to  each  race, 
and  give  notice  thereof  to  the  school  committees  of  the  several 
districts  of  the  county.  It  is  further  provided  in  the  same  sec- 
tion that  the  sums  thus  apportioned  to  the  several  districts  shall 
be  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  school  committees  thereof,  for 
the  payment  of  the  school  expenses  authorized  by  law.  In  sec- 
tion 2555  of  the  code  it  is  provided  that  "all  orders  upon  the 
treasurer  of  the  county  board  of  education  for  school  money  for 
the  payment  of  teachers,  duly  countersigned  by  the  county 
superintendent  of  public  instruction,  and  all  orders  for  the  pur- 
chase of  sites  for  schoolhouses,  and  for  the  costs  of  building,  re- 
pairing, and  furnishing  schoolhouses,  shall  be  signed  by  the 
school  committee  of  the  district  in  which  the  school  is  taught, 
or  in  which  the  site  or  schoolhouse  is  situated,  which  orders, 
duly  indorsed  by  the  person  to  whom  the  same  are  payable,  shall 
be  the  only  valid  vouchers  in  the  hands  of  the  treasurer  of  the 
■county  board  of  education,  to  be  paid  out  of  the  funds  appor- 
tioned to  the  district  in  which  the  schoolhouse  is  erected." 

The  county  treasurer  of  each  county  was  required  to  receive 
and  disburse  the  public  school  funds,  not  under  his  general 
bond,  but  under  a  separate  bond  conditioned  for  the  faithful 
performance  of  his  duties  as  treasurer  of  the  county  board  of 
education.  The  county  board  of  education  were  empowered,  if 
they  deemed  it  necessary,  to  require  the  treasurer  of  the  county 
board  of  education  to  strengthen  his  bond,  and  for  any  breach 
of  that  bond  action  was  to  be  brought,  not  by  the  county  com- 
missioners, but  by  the  county  board  of  education:  Code,  sec. 
2554. 

The  treasurer  of  the  county  board  of  education  was  required 
to  open  accounts  with  each  public  school  district,  and  report 
yearly  to  each  school  committee  the  amount  apportioned  *®®  to 
the  respective  districts  for  the  year,  and  to  the  county  board  of 


t90  Beak  d.  Commissioners.  [N.  Carolina, 

education  the  amoimts   received   froin  all   sources   for   public 
school  purposes. 

From  this  review  of  the  law  in  force  when  the  school  orders 
were  issued,  upon  which  the  plaintiff's  judgments  were  obtained^ 
it  appears  that  there  was  a  complete  separation  of  the  school 
funds  from  the  general  county  fund  upon  the  apportionment 
being  made,  and  from  that  time  all  control  of  the  same  by  the 
county  commissioners  ceased;  that  the  funds  were  taken  charge- 
of  by  the  treasurer  of  the  board  of  education  under  a  separate 
bond;  that  the  disbursements  were  made  by  that  officer  under 
orders  signed  by  the  school  committees;  that  the  accounts  of 
the  school  fund  were  kept  by  that  officer  and  the  several  school 
committees,  and  a  report,  yearly,  to  the  county  board  of  edu- 
cation, made  of  all  receipts  of  school  funds  by  him,  and  the 
amount  apportioned  to  each  district  was  the  fund  out  of  which 
school  orders  were  to  be  paid. 

The  county,  therefore,  through  the  board  of  commissioners, 
was  not  liable  for  the  debt  upon  which  those  orders  were  issued. 

If  the  amount  apportioned  to  the  district  or  districts  upon 
whose  committee  or  committees  the  orders  were  drawn  had  been  ' 
in  the  hands  of  the  treasurer  of  the  board  of  education,  and  he 
had  defaulted  in  their  payment,  then  the  law  required  action 
for  such  defalcation  to  be  instituted  against  that  officer  and  his 
bond.  If  there  never  had  been  in  the  treasurer's  hands  any 
funds  to  meet  those  orders,  because  they  were  improperly  issued, 
then  there  was  no  liability  on  either  the  county  or  the  treasurer. 

But  besides  the  view  of  this  case,  as  expressed  above,  we  are 
of  the  opinion  that  before  mandamus  can  be  issued  to  compel 
the  board  of  commissioners  of  a  county  to  levy  a  tax  ^***  to  pay 
a  judgment  against  the  commissioners,  the  plaintiff — judgment 
creditor — must  show  affirmatively  by  the  record  or  other  com- 
petent evidence  that  the  consideration  of  the  debt,  upon  which 
the  judgment  was  obtained,  was  of  such  a  character  as  to  fall 
under  the  head  of  ordinary  or  necessary  county  expenses.  Any 
other  view  of  the  law  would  enable  a  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners to  levy  a  tax  to  pay  a  debt  reduced  to  judgment  by  con- 
fession or  by  default,  which  debt,  under  section  7  of  article  7  of 
the  constitution,  the  county  would  be  prohibited  from  contract- 
ing, unless  the  question  was  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  qualified 
voters  of  the  county.  Such  a  course  would,  in  effect,  be  a  con- 
venient method,  whenever  the  county  commissioners  might 
choose  to  do  so,  of  destroying  a  most  salutary  provision  of  the 
constitution.     It  would  be  equivalent  to  holding  that,  by  a  rule 


March,  1899.]  Beab  v.  Commissioners.  691 

of  pleading,  a  plain  provision  of  the  constitution  can  he  ahol- 
ished.  No  technical  learning  based  on  the  rules  of  pleading  caa 
force  us  into  such  a  conclusion. 

The  prayer  of  the  petitioners  must,  therefore,  be  granted. 
The  case  must  be  reheard,  and  the  judgment  of  this  court  en- 
tered therein  at  the  spring  term,  1898,  must  be  set  aside,  and 
judgment  entered  at  this  term  affirming  the  judgment  of  the 
superior  court.     Prayer  of  the  petitioners  granted. 

FAIRCLOTH,  0.  J.,  dissented,  on  the  ground  that  the  Judg- 
ments, being  based  upon  school  claims,  were  a  necessary  expense, 
aud  that  mandamus  would  lie.  "We  must  consider  whether  the 
expense  of  the  public  common  county  school  system  Is  a  necessary 
expense.  What  is  a  necessary  expense  fs  a  question  for  the  court, 
whenever  the  question  arises.  It  is  necessary  for  the  good,  safety,. 
and  happiness  of  the  whole  people  that  certain  benefits  and  Im- 
provements shall  be  recognized  as  necessary  expenses.  The  public- 
school  system  tends  to  Improve  the  manners,  morals,  and  material 
condition  of  the  people  In  the  march  of  civilization.  This  court 
has  often  said  that  the  building  of  courthouses,  public  roads,  and 
bridges   are    necessary   expenses:  Vaughn   v.    Commissioners,    117 

N.  C.  434 Public  education  Is  a  cherished  object  of  our  con- 

Btltution  and  of  our  legislature  and  people.  It  Is  of  vital  importance- 
to  society  and  to  the  state.  Is  it  less  so  than  a  public  bridge  across 
a  stream  which  can  be  crossed  by  a  common  ferry  boat?"  The  dis- 
senting opinion  cites,  also,  the  North  Carolina  constitution,  article 
1,  section  27,  and  article  IX,  sections  2,  4,  and  15;  Lutterloh  v.  Com- 
missioners, 65  N.  C.  403. 


ESTOPPEL— NECESSITY  TO  PLEAD.— Estoppels  In  pals  must 
be  specially  pleaded  to  be  available  as  a  defense:  Coclirill  v. 
Hutchinson,  135  Mo.  67,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  564,  and  note.  An  estop- 
pel of  record,  to  be  effectual,  must  be  pleaded,  if  there  is  an  oppor- 
tunity to  plead  it:  Water  Comrars.  v.  Cramer,  61  N.  J.  L.  270,  68 
Am.  St.  Rep.  705.  One  who  has  an  opportunity  to  plead  an  estop- 
pel, but  does  not,  thereby  waives  it:  Niclium  v.  Burckhardt,  30  Or. 
4(>4.  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  822.  See  the  monographic  note  to  Tyler  v. 
Hall,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  344. 

MANDAMUS— NATURE.— Mandamus  is  regarded.  In  modera 
practice,  as  an  action  by  the  party  on  whose  relation  it  is  granted 
to  enforce  a  private  right  when  the  law  affords  no  other  adequate 
means  of  redress:  Arberry  t.  Beavers.  6  Tei.  457.  55  Am.  Dec.  791. 
See.  also.  Moody  v.  Fleming,  4  Ga.  115,  48  Am.  Dec.  210;  Swift  ▼. 
Richardson,  7  Houst.  338,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  127. 

MANDAMUS  TO  CXDMPEL  LEVY  OF  TAX.— See,  on  this  ques- 
tion. Coy  V.  City  Council,  17  Iowa,  1,  85  Am.  Dec.  639,  and  note 
thereto. 


^92  Kei«drick  v.  Life  Insurance  Co.    [N.  Carolina, 


Kbndeiok  V.  Life  Insurance  Company. 

[124  North  Caeolina,  815.] 

INSURANCE— POSSESSION  OF  POLICY.— Possession  of  an 
insurance  policy,  at  the  death  of  the  insured,  makes  out  a  prima 
facie  case. 

INSURANCE— PAYMENT  OF  PREMIUM— RECITALS  IN 
THE  POLICY— ESTOPPEL —The  acknowledgment  in  the  policy  of 
the  receipt  of  the  premium  estops  the  company  to  test  the  validity 
■of  the  poMcy  on  the  ground  of  nonpayment  of  the  premium. 

insurance— RECITALS  OF  PAYMENT  IN  THE  POLICY 
—WHEN  A  MERE  RECEIPT.— In  so  far  as  a  recital  in  an  Insur- 
-ance  policy  of  the  payment  of  premium  is  a  mere  receipt  for  money, 
it  is  only  prima  facie  like  other  receipts,  and  will  not  prevent  an 
action  to  recover  the  money  if  not  in  truth  paid. 

INSURANCE— RECITALS  OF  PAYMENT  IN  THE  POL- 
ICY—WHEN PART  OF  CONTRACT.— In  so  far  as  a  recital  in  an 
insurance  policy  of  the  payment  of  premium  is  a  part  of  the  con- 
tract of  insurance,  it  cannot  be  contradicted  by  parol  to  invalidate 
the  contract,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  in  procuring  the  delivery  of 
the  policy. 

DEEDS— RECITALS  IN  AS  TO  PAYMENT— EVIDENCE  TO 
CONTRADICT.— Although  it  is  always  competent  to  contradict  the 
recital  in  a  deed  as  to  the  amount  paid,  in  an  action  Involving  the 
recovery  of  the  purchase  money,  or  as  to  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages in  an  action  upon  the  covenants  in  the  deed,  it  is  not  com- 
petent to  contradict  the  acknowledgment  of  a  consideration  paid, 
in  order  to  affect  the  validity  of  the  deed  in  creating  or  passing  a 
title  to  the  estate  thereby  granted. 

INSURANCE— INSTRUCTIONS  TO  AGENTS— EVIDENCE 
AGAINST  THE  COMPANY.— The  instruction  to  agents  that  if  the 
premium  was  paid  more  than  thirty  days  after  due  there  must  be  a 
health  certificate  is  evidence  against  the  company  that  credit  or 
indulgence  of   payment  was  allowable. 

INSURANCE— INSTRUCTIONS  TO  AGENTS  NOT  BIND- 
ING ON  THE  INSURED.— The  instruction  to  agents  that  after 
thirty  days'  delay  in  the  payment  of  premium  a  health  certificate 
is  required  Is  not  binding  on  the  insured,  who  may  rely  upon  the 
provision  In  the  policy  itself  that  the  payment  must  be  made  "dur- 
ing life." 

INSURANCE— CONSTRUCTION  OF  POLICY.— The  uniform 
rule  of  construction  of  Insurance  policies  is,  that  if  reasonably  sus- 
ceptible of  two  constructions,  that  one  will  be  adopted  whlcli  is 
more  favorable  to  the  Insured. 

CONTRACTS— CONSTRUCTION  OF  PROMISES.— It  Is  a 
rule  of  law,  as  well  as  of  ethics,  that  where  the  language  of  a 
promisor  may  be  understood  in  more  senses  than  one,  it  Is  to  be 
Interpreted  in  the  sense  in  which  he  had  reason  to  suppose  it  was 
understood  by  the  promisee. 

CONTRACTS— CONSTRUCTION  OF.-If  It  be  left  In  doubt 
whether  given  words  were  used  in  an  enlarged  or  a  restricted  sense, 
•other  things  being  equal,  that  construction  should  be  adopted 
wBicli  Is  most  beneficial  to  the  promisee. 

TRIAI^REFUSAL  OF  -COURT  TO  SUBMIT  ISSUES.— 
Where  every  phase  of  a  defendant's  contention  could  be  and  waa 
presented  without  prejudice  under  the  issue  submitted  by  the 
court,  the  refusal  to  submit  other  issues,  though  asked,  is  not  error. 


April,  1899.]    Kendrick  v.  Life  Insurance  Ca  698 

Burwell,  Walker  &  Cansler,  for  the  defendant. 
Jones  &  Tillett,  for  the  plaintiff. 

'**  CLARK,  J.  John  F.  Kendrick  applied  for  insurance  on 
liis  life  in  the  defendant  company  for  the  henefit  of  his  wife, 
the  plaintiff,  and  on  the  15th  of  July,  1897,  the  defendant  issued 
its  policy  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  application,  which 
was  delivered  hy  its  agent  to  him,  a  few  days  thereafter.  He 
was  afterward  taken  ill  with  typhoid  fever  and  died  on  the  15th 
of  September,  1897.  The  policy  recited  the  payment  of  the 
premium,  though  in  fact  it  was  not  paid  until  a  few  hours  be- 
fore, and  in  fact,  on  the  same  day  on  which  the  insured  died,  the 
payment  being  then  made  for  him  by  a  friend  and  accepted  by 
the  local  agent  with  full  knowledge  of  Kendrick's  critical  con- 
dition. This  agent  had  theretofore  indulged  the  payment,  stat- 
ing that  it  would  be  sufficient  if  the  payment  was  made  during 
Kendrick's  life.  The  policy  contained  a  provision:  "This  pol- 
icy does  not  take  effect  until  the  first  premium  shall  have  been 
actually  **''  paid  during  the  lifetime  of  the  insured."  There 
was  in  the  instructions  of  the  company,  in  the  hands  of  its 
•agents,  a  further  provision,  that:  **When  a  premium  is  paid 
more  than  thirty  and  within  sixty  days  after  due,  a  certificate 
of  good  health,  signed  by  the  applicant,  will  be  required."  It 
was  not  shown  that  John  F.  Kendrick  had  notice  of  this  instruc- 
tion. 

These,  in  substance,  were  the  facts.  The  plaintiff,  to  whom 
the  policy  was  payable,  was  in  possession  of  the  policy,  and,  the 
death  of  the  insured  being  admitted,  this  made  out  a  prima  facie 
oase.  In  the  absence  of  evidence,  the  policy  is  presumed  to  have 
been  delivered  at  the  time  it  bears  date :  Meadows  v.  Cozart,  76 
N.  C.  450;  Lyerly  v.  Wheeler,  34  N.  C.  290.  The  authorities 
are  numerous  and  quite  uniform  that  the  acknowledgment  in 
the  policy  of  the  recipt  of  the  premium  estops  the  company  to 
test  the  validity  of  the  policy  on  the  ground  of  nonpayment  of 
the  premium.  In  so  far  as  it  is  a  mere  receipt  for  money,  it  is 
only  prima  facie  like  other  recipts,  and  will  not  prevent  an 
action  to  recover  the  money,  if  not  in  truth  paid;  but  in  so  far 
«s  it  is  a  part  of  the  contract  of  insurance,  it  cannot  be  contra- 
dicted by  parol  to  invalidate  the  contract,  in  the  absence  of 
fraud  in  procuring  the  delivery  of  the  policy.  The  rule  is  thus 
«tated  in  2  Biddell  on  Insurance,  section  1128:  "As  a  general 
rule,  it  has  been  held  in  the  United  States  that  while  such  a  re- 

Aic  St.  Rkp„  Vou  LXX.— 38 


594  Kea'DRIck  v.  Life  Insurance  Co.     [N.  Carolina^ 

ceipt  will  prevent  the  insurer  from  proving  the  premium  was 
unpaid  in  order  to  show  the  policy  was  void  from  its  inception^ 
it  may  be  contradicted  in  order  to  show,  on  a  suit  for  premium, 
that  no  payment  had  been  made/'  citing  numerous  cases  in  the 
note.  To  same  effect  the  law  is  summed  up  and  stated  in  1^ 
Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  1126;  Basch  v.  Humboldt  Ins.  Co.,  35 
N.  J.  L.  429,  in  a  very  clear  statement  by  Beasley,  C.  J.,  citing 
Provident  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fennell,  49  111.  180;  New  ^^^  York  Cent. 
Ins.  Co.  V.  National  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  20  Barb.  471.  Chancellor 
Kent  says  (3  Kent's  Commentaries,  260) :  "The  receipt  of  the 
premium  in  the  policy  is  conclusive  of  payment  and  binds  the 
insurer  unless  there  is  a  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  insured."  Ta 
like  purport.  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oilman,  112  Ind.  7;  Goit  v.  Na- 
tional etc.  Ins.  Co.,  25  Barb.  189, 192;  Southern  Life  Ins.  Co.  v, 
Booker,  9  Heisk.  606,  24  Am.  Eep.  344;  Illinois  Cent.  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Wolf,  37  111.  354,  356,  87  Am.  Dec.  251;  Teutonia  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Mueller,  77  111.  22,  24;  Phillips  on  Insurance,  sees.  514,, 
615;  Farnum  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  83  Cal.  246,  17  Am.  St. 
Rep.  240;  Michael  v.  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  10  La.  Ann.  737;  Con- 
solidated etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cashow,  41  Md.  60,  76.  In  striking 
analogy  is  the  same  rule  as  to  receipts  in  deeds.  In  3  Wash- 
burn on  Eeal  Property,  614,  the  fourth  rule  applying  to  re- 
ceipts in  deeds  is  as  follows:  "Although  it  is  always  compe- 
tent to  contradict  the  recital  in  the  deed  as  to  the  amount  paid,. 
in  an  action  involving  the  recovery  of  the  purchase  money,, 
or  as  to  the  measure  of  damages,  in  an  action  upon  the  cove- 
nants in  the  deed,  it  is  not  competent  to  contradict  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  a  consideration  paid,  in  order  to  affect  the 
validity  of  the  deed  in  creating  or  passing  a  title  to  the  estate 
thereby  granted.'*  This  is  quoted  and  approved  in  Barbee 
V.  Barbee,  108  N.  C.  584,  and  it  may  be  said,  in  passing,  that 
the  difficulty  in  reconciling  opinions  expressed  in  that  case 
was  due  to  the  failure  to  note  the  double  aspect  of  a  recital  in  a 
deed  of  payment  as  being  a  mere  receipt  for  money,  and  there- 
fore only  prima  facie,  in  an  action  to  recover  the  money,  and  as- 
being  sometimes  also  a  part  of  the  contract  and  therefore  not 
to  be  impeached,  except  for  fraud,  et  cetera,  when  the  validity 
or  effect  of  the  contract  depends  on  prepayment,  a  distinction 
which  is  clearly  pointed  out  by  Ashe,  J.,  in  Harper  t.  Dail,  9^ 
N.  C.  394,  citing  Wilson  v.  Derr,  69  N.  C.  137. 

The  above  proposition  being  true  even  when  the  policy  is^ 
made  payable  to  the  estate  of  the  insured,  a  fortiori  the  defend- 
ant ^*®  company  is  estopped  when  the  beneficiary  Ib  a  third 


April,  1899.]    Kbndrick  v.  Life  Insurance  Co.  695 

party:  Kline  y.  National  Ben.  Assn.,  Ill  Ind.  462,  60  Am.  Eep. 
706. 

Certainly,  it  is  not  the  defendant  who  can  except  because  the 
court  charged  the  jury:  "If,  when  the  policy  was  handed  to 
Kendrick  by  the  agent,  it  was  not  the  understanding  that  it 
should  then  take  effect  as  a  policy,  then  Kendrick  could  not,  by 
sending  this  amount  as  a  payment,  create  or  put  in  force  a  con- 
tract of  insurance,  although  the  agent  during  Kendrick's  sick- 
ness may  have  agreed  and  directed  that  he  should  do  so.  On 
the  other  hand,  although  defendant  may  show  that  as  a  fact  the 
recital  of  the  payment  of  premium  was  not  true,  yet  if  the  pol- 
icy was  delivered  to  operate  as  a  contract  of  insurance,  it  can- 
not contend  that  the  policy  was  invalid  because  the  premium 
was  not  paid"  (at  time  of  delivery).  If  it  be  conceded,  contrary 
to  authorities  above  recited,  that  the  proviso  in  the  policy,  that 
it  shall  not  be  effective  "unless  the  first  premium  shall  have 
been  actually  paid  during  the  lifetime  of  the  insured,"  removed 
the  estoppel  arising  from  the  acknowledgment  of  the  receipt 
of  the  money,  the  condition  was  complied  with  by  the  actual 
payment  of  the  money  in  the  lifetime  of  the  insured,  which  re- 
lated back  to  the  date  of  the  policy.  The  instruction  to  agents, 
as  recited  in  the  letter  of  the  general  agent,  that  if  the  premium 
was  paid  more  than  thirty  days  after  due  there  must  be  a  health 
certificate,  is  evidence  against  the  company  that  credit  or  indul- 
gence on  payment  was  allowable,  but  the  terms  that,  after  thirty 
days*  delay,  a  health  certificate  is  required  is  not  binding  on 
the  insured,  who  is  not  shown  to  have  had  knowledge  of  it,  and 
who  (even  if  he  had)  might  well  rely  upon  the  simple  provision 
in  the  policy  itself  that  the  payment  must  be  made  "during 
life"  and  the  assurance  of  the  agent  that  if  it  was  done  it  would 
be  sufficient:  Horton  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  122  K  C.  498,  65  Am. 
St.  Rep.  717;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Wilkinson,  13  Wall.  222. 

320  It  is  true  in  Whitley  v.  Piedmont  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  71  N.  C. 
480,  it  is  held  that  the  representation  of  good  health  con- 
tinues up  to  the  consummation  of  the  contract.  There,  the 
policy  was  not  delivered  till  more  than  a  month  after  the  death 
of  the  insured,  and  the  agent  was  ignorant  of  the  condition  of 
the  insured.  In  the  present  case,  the  contract  was  consum- 
mated by  the  unconditional  delivery  of  the  policy  acknowledg- 
ing receipt  of  payment,  and  if  that  acknowledgment  can  be 
varied  by  the  provision  that  the  policy  was  not  valid  unless 
the  premium  was  "actually  paid  during  life,"  this  condition 
was  complied  with.     There  was  no  suppression  of  information 


696  Kbndrick  v.  Life  Insurance  Co.    [N.  Carolina, 

or  fraud,  for  the  agent  knew  the  condition  of  the  insured  when 
he  received  the  premium.  The  authorities  cited  in  Whitley's 
case,  supra,  do  not  support  the  construction  sought  to  be  placed 
on  that  opinion  by  the  defendant.  It  would  be  contrary  to 
every  rule  of  construction  to  restrict  the  obligation  of  a  prom- 
isor beyond  the  plain  meanings  of  his  words.  On  the  contrary, 
the  uniform  rule  of  construction  of  insurance  policies  is  that  if 
reasonably  susceptible  of  two  constructions,  that  one  will  be 
adopted  which  is  more  favorable  to  the  insured:  National  Bank 
V.  Ins.  Co.,  95  U.  S.  673. 

In  Hoffman  v.  Aetna  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  33  N.  Y.  413,  88  Am.  Dec. 
337,  the  rule  is  laid  down  by  the  New  York  court  of  appeals  as 
follows:  "It  is  a  rule  of  law,  as  well  as  of  ethics,  that  where 
the  language  of  a  promisor  may  be  understood  in  more  senses 
than  one,  it  is  to  be  interpreted  in  the  sense  in  which  he  had 
reason  to  suppose  it  was  understood  by  the  promisee:  Potter 
V.  Ontario  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Hill,  147,  149;  Barlow  v.  Scott,  24 
N.  Y.  40.  It  is  also  a  familiar  rule  of  law  that  if  it  be  left 
in  doubt,  in  view  of  the  general  tenor  of  the  instrument  and 
the  relations  of  the  contracting  parties,  whether  given  words 
were  used  in  an  enlarged  or  a  restricted  sense,  other  things 
being  equal,  that  construction  should  be  adopted  which  is  most 
beneficial  tp  the  promisee:  Coke  on  Littleton,  183;  Bacon's  ^-* 
Law  Maxims,  Teg.  3;  Doe  v.  Dixon,  9  East,  16;  "Marvin  v. 
Stone,  2  Cow.  806.  This  rule  has  been  very  uniformly  applied 
to  conditions  and  provisos  in  policies  of  insurance  on  the  ground 
that,  though  they  are  inserted  for  the  benefit  of  the  under- 
writers, their  office  is  to  limit  the  force  of  the  principal  obliga- 
tion." 

In  Goodwin  v.  Provident  Assur.  Soc,  97  Iowa,  226,  59  Am. 
St.  Rep.  411,  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa  states  the  rule  as  fol- 
lows: "The  tenets  established  for  the  guidance  of  the  courts 
in  such  matters  are  well  understood,  and  no  one  is  better  estab- 
lished than  that  in  all  cases  the  policy  must  be  liberally  con- 
strued in  favor  of  the  assured,  so  as  not  to  defeat,  without  a 
clear  necessity,  his  claim  for  indemnity.  And  when  the  words 
used  may,  without  violence,  be  given  two  interpretations,  that 
which  will  sustain  the  claim  and  cover  the  loss  should  be 
adopted.'*  The  court  cites  a  large  number  of  authorities  to 
sustain  the  proposition,  and  indeed  the  authorities  seem  uni- 
form. 

Besides,  the  agent  of  the  company  put  the  same  construc- 
tion upon  the  policy  and  said  that  it  would  be  sufficient  if 


April,  1899.]    Kendrick  v.  Life  Insurance  Co.  697 

the  payment  was  made  "during  lifetime/'  and  if  this  had  mis- 
led the  insured  it  would  have  heen  fraud  for  the  company  to 
avail  itself  of  a  forfeiture  thus  procured:  McMaster  v.  New 
York  Life  Ins.  Co.,  78  Fed.  Kep.  36;  Continental  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Chamherlain,  132  U.  S.  304.  The  agent  directed  the  "check 
to  be  mailed,"  and  the  time  of  the  mailing  was  the  time  of  pay- 
ment (the  check  being  honored  on  presentation):  Whitley  v. 
Piedmont  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  71  N.  C.  480. 

Every  phase  of  the  defendant's  contention  could  be  and  was 
presented  without  prejudice  under  the  issue  submitted  by  the 
court,  aiid  therefore  the  refusal  to  submit  other  issues,  though 
asked,  is  not  error:  Pretzfelder  y.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  123  N.  C. 
164. 

Afiirmed, 

INSURANCE— RECITALS  OF  PAYMENT  IN  THE  POLICY- 
ESTOPPEL.— Where  an  insurance  policy  contains  a  formal  receipt 
of  the  premium,  Its  unconditional  delivery  is  conclusive  evidence 
of  payment  so  as  to  estop  the  company  from  denying  the  validity 
of  the  policy,  notwithstanding  the  declaration  in  it  that  it  shall 
not  be  binding  until  the  premium  is  actually  paid:  Farnum  v.  Phoe- 
nix Ins.  Co.,  83  Cal.  246,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  233;  Southern  Life  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Booker,  9  Heisk.  606,  24  Am.  Rep.  344;  Kline  v.  National 
Bon.  Assn.,  Ill  Ind.  462,  60  Am.  Rep.  708.  But  see  Sheldon  v. 
Atlantic  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  460.  84  Am.  Dec.  213. 

INSURANCE-POWERS  OF  AGENTS-INSTRUCTIONS  TO 
AGENTS.— Private  Instructions  to  an  agent  limiting  his  autoorlty 
cannot  bind  persons  having  no  knowledge  thereof:  Brown  v.  Frank- 
lin etc.  Ins.  Co.,  105  Mass.  565,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  534;  California 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Gracey,  15  Colo.  70,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  376.  An  insurance 
company  may  limit  the  power  of  Its  agent,  and  when  such  notice 
as  a  prudent  man  is  bound  to  regard  Is  brought  home  to  the  as- 
sured, limiting  the  power  of  such  agent,  he  relies  upon  any  act  In 
excess  of  such  limited  power  at  his  peril:  Weldert  v.  State  Ins. 
Co.,  19  Or.  261,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  809.  The  Insured  is  bound  by  limi- 
tations upon  the  power  of  the  agent  contained  in  his  policy:  Cleaver 
V.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.,  65  Mich.  527,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  908. 

INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION  OF  POLICY.— When  the  terms 
of  a  policy  permit  more  than  one  construction,  that  will  be  adopted 
which  will  support  its  validity  and  favor  the  insured:  Berliner  v. 
Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  121  Cal.  458,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  49;  Matthews  v. 
American  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  440,  61  Am.  St  Rep.  627;  Good- 
win v.  Provident  etc.  Assur.  Assn.,  97  Iowa,  226,  59  Am.  St.  Rep. 
411. 

CONTRACTS— CONSTRUCTION  OF.— If  a  written  contract  rea- 
sonably admits  of  two  constructions,  that  is  to  be  adopted  which 
is  least  favorable  to  the  party  whose  language  it  Is:  Amory  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Tex.  419,  59  Am.  St  Rep.  65.  If  the 
terms  of  an  Instrument  are  not  ambiguous,  the  testimony  of  the 
parties  as  to  how  they  understood  it  Is  inadmissible:  Pratt  v. 
Prouty,  104^  Iowa,  419,  65  Am.  St  Bep.  472. 


598  GoEEELL  V.  Watee  Supply  Co.     [N.  Carolina, 


GoEEELL  V.  Water  Supply  Company. 

[124  NoETH  Carolina,  328.] 

CONTRACrr  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PARTY— RIGHT 
OF  ACTION.— One  not  a  party  or  privy  to  a  contract,  but  who  Is 
a  beneficiary  tlaereof,  is  entitled  to  maintain  an  action  for  its 
breach. 

CONTRACT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PARTY— BENE- 
FICIARY ONE  OF  A  CLASS— AOTION.—One  not  a  party  to  a  con- 
tract, but  who  is  a  beneficiary  thereof,  is  entitled  to  maintain  an 
action  for  its  breach,  even  when  he  is  only  one  of  a  class  of  per- 
sons, if  the  class  is  sufficiently  designated. 

WATER  COMPANIES— BREACH  OF  CONTRACT— NATU- 
RAL AND  PROXIMATE  RESULT— DAMAGE  BY  FIRE  TO 
TAXPAYER.— Where  a  party  undertakes  to  furnish  water  in  such 
mode  and  quantity  that  it  may  be  used  to  extinguish  fires  in  the 
city  in  which  it  is  to  be  supplied,  damages  sustained  by  a  citizen 
and  taxpayer  by  the  destruction  of  buildings,  by  the  failure  to  so 
furnish  water,  is  a  natural  and  proximate  consequence  of  such 
breach  of  the  undertaking. 

CONTRACT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PARTY— RIGHT 
OF  ACTION  FOR  BREACH.— The  beneficiaries  of  a  contract,  who 
furnish  the  consideration  money  of  the  contract,  can  maintain  an 
action  for  damages  caused  by  its  breach. 

DECISIONS  OF  SISTER  STATES— WEIGHT  OF.— In  a  case 
of  first  impression  in  a  state,  the  decisions  in  other  states  have 
only  persuasive  authority,  and  the  consideration  to  which  the  rea- 
soning therein  is  entitled. 

King  &  Kimball,  for  the  defendant. 

Boyd  &  Brooks,  for  the  plaintifE. 

*^®  CLARK,  J.  This  cause  is  presented  npon  complaint 
and  demurrer.  The  complaint  avers  authority  conferred  upon 
Greensboro  by  its  charter  to  provide  water  supplies,  either  by 
erecting  waterworks  itself  or  by  contract,  and  that,  ^^®  in  pur- 
suance thereof,  the  city  contracted  with  the  Greensboro  Water 
Company  to  furnish  said  city  "with  pure  and  wholesome  water 
for  the  use  of  its  citizens  and  of  force  at  all  times  sufficient  to 
protect  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  against  loss  by  fire,'*  giving 
to  said  company  exclusive  rights  of  eminent  domain  over  its 
streets,  alleys,  sidewalks,  and  public  grounds  for  the  purpose 
of  laying  and  operating  water  mains,  pipes,  hydrants,  stands, 
€t  cetera;  that  subsequently  all  the  rights  and  property  of  said 
water  company  passed  by  sale  to  the  defendant,  who  at  the  same 
time  assumed  all  the  duties  and  obligations  imposed  by  the 
aforesaid  contract,  and  both  the  defendant  and  the  city  had 
acquiesced  in  the  same;  that  by  virtue  of  said  contract  it  was 
stipulated  and  agreed  inter  alia  that  the  water  company  should 


April,  1899.]      Gorrell  v.  Water  Supply  Co.  599 

^'supply  the  city  and  inhabitants  with  pure,  good,  and  whole- 
some water,  suitable  for  all  domestic,  sanitary,  and  fire  purposes, 
and  for  individual  use";  should  "erect  and  maintain  settling 
basins,  filtering  galleries,  reservoirs,  water  towers,  pump-houses 
«nd  other  appurtenances  and  attachments  necessary  or  expedi- 
ent for  the  proper  conducting  and  carrying  on  said  waterworks, 
so  as  to  afford  at  all  times  the  most  adequate  supply  for  all 
domestic  uses  and  the  greatest  protection  against  fire."  The 
remainder  of  the  complaint  is  as  follows: 

8.  That  it  was  also  stipulated  and  agreed  by  and  under  said 
contract  that  the  said  water  company  should  use  only  first-clasa 
machinery,  pipes,  hydrants,  valves,  pumps,  et  cetera,  in  connec- 
tion with  said  waterworks,  and  that  the  said  works  should  be 
complete  in  all  its  details  with  a  capacity  to  furnish  one  and 
«  half  million  gallons  of  water  every  twenty-four  hours  against 
a  pressure  of  two  hundred  feet  head.  And  should  erect  a  stor- 
age water  tank  whose  top  water  level  should  be  one  hundred  feet 
above  the  surface  of  the  ground  at  the  center  of  the  public  square 
and  to  be  of  a  capacity  of  one  hundred  thousand  ^**  gallons  of 
water,  and  that  the  same  shall  be  filled  by  the  said  water  com- 
pany to  its  top  every  day  an  hour  before  sundown.  And  for 
the  extinguishment  of  fire  in  said  city  the  company  shall  erect 
a  pump-house  and  put  therein  a  pumping  engine,  which  shall 
be  kept  ready  at  all  times  to  supply  the  needed  fire  pressure. 

9.  That  it  was  further  stipulated  and  agreed  by  and  under 
^5aid  contract  that  the  said  water  company  should  erect  and  put 
in  seventy-five  hydrants,  at  such  places  as  the  city  might  desig- 
nate, and  for  the  rents  of  which  said  city  of  Greensboro  was 
to  pay  them  annually  two  thousand  eight  hundred  and  seventy- 
five  dollars.  And  in  pursuance  of  such  agreement  and  compli- 
ance therewith  on  the  part  of  the  city,  the  water  company  did 
■erect,  and  their  successors,  the  Greensboro  Water  Supply  Com- 
pany, had  in  possession  and  use  at  the  times  hereinafter  men- 
tioned, two  hydrants — one  a  hundred  and  the  other  about  two 
hundred  feet  distant  from  plaintiff's  storehouses,  which  were 
•destroyed  by  fire  on  the  date  hereinafter  mentioned. 

10.  That  by  the  terms  of  said  contract  it  was  further  stipu- 
lated and  agreed  that  the  said  water  company  should  keep  a 
pressure  of  water  for  fire  purposes  sufficient  to  throw  six  streams 
-of  water  from  six  hydants,  to  a  vertical  height  of  one  hundred 
feet  in  still  air,  each  stream  being  taken  from  one  hydrant  and 
with  one  hundred  feet  of  hose  and  a  one-inch  ring  nozzle,  and 


600  GoEEELL  V.  Water  Supply  Co.     [N.  Carolina^ 

the  said  company  shall  constantly,  day  and  night,  except  from 
unavoidable  accidents,  keep  all  the  said  hydrants  supplied  with 
water  for  fire  service  and  shall  keep  them  in  good  order  for  said 
service. 

11.  That  said  contract  was  made  with  the  said  Greensboro 
Water  Company  and  extended  to  and  acquiesced  in  by  their 
successors,  the  defendant  Greensboro  Water  Supply  Company, 
for  the  use  and  benefit  of  all  its  property  owners  and  inhabi- 
tants— among  which  was  the  plaintiff,  who  was  a  ^"^^  property 
owner  in  said  city,  at  the  times  hereinafter  referred  to  and  for 
several  years  prior  thereto,  in  common  with  that  of  other  citi- 
zens of  said  city,  which  said  property  was  taxed  at  its  full  value 
to  raise  money  with  which  to  pay  said  hydrant  rents. 

12.  That  on  the  night  of  the day  of  June,  1897, 

a  fire  broke  out  in  a  building  some  thirty  feet  distant  from 
plaintiff's  storerooms  on  the  south  side  of  South  Elm  street  in 
said  city;  that  the  fire  alarm  was  at  once  turned  on,  and  in 
less  than  ten  minutes  thereafter  the  Greensboro  Fire  Company 
arrived  at  said  fire  with  their  hose,  fire  engine,  and  other  ap- 
purtenances necessary  for  the  ready  extinguishment  of  said  fire. 
That  the  said  fire  company  attached  its  hose,  which  were  in 
every  respect  adequate  and  sufficient  for  the  demands  of  the 
occasion,  as  plaintiff  is  advised  and  believed,  to  the  two  hydrants 
above  mentioned,  one  one  hundred  feet  from  said  storerooms 
and  the  other  about  two  hundred  feet  distant,  each  of  which 
said  hydrants  were  sufficiently  near  to  said  store  and  lot  to  have 
afforded  water  adequate  for  the  ready  extinguishment  of  said 
fire,  if  the  proper  pressure  had  been  on  same. 

13.  That  notwithstanding  the  promptness  of  the  fire  com- 
pany in  reaching  said  fire  and  the  perfect  sufficiency  of  its 
equipments  to  convey  the  water  to  same,  the  defendant,  as 
plaintiff  is  advised  and  believes,  persistently,  carelessly,  and 
negligently  refused  to  furnish  said  hydrants  above  described  and 
referred  to  with  a  sufficient  pressure  of  water  to  extinguish  said 
fire,  and  by  reason  of  such  tortious  and  negligent  conduct  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant  the  said  fire  spread  from  the  building 
in  which  it  originated  and  ignited  the  storeroom  of  the  plain- 
tiff. 

14.  That  after  the  fire  had  spread  to  and  caught  on  flames 
the  building  of  the  plaintiff,  the  said  fire  company,  as  plaintiff 
is  advised  and  believes,  was  still  present  with  its  hose,  ladders, 
buckets,  engine,  et  cetera,  ready  to  use  its  every  effort  to  *^* 


April,  1899.]      Goreell  v.  Watee  Supply  Co.  601 

extinguish  Bame,  and  while  the  said  fire  company  had  its  hose 
attached  to  said  hydrants  sufficiently  near,  with  the  proper 
pressure,  to  have  quickly  extinguished  same  and  saved  plain- 
tiff's property  from  burning,  the  defendant  persistently  refused, 
neglected,  and  omitted  to  have  the  fire  pressure  agreed  to  and 
required  by  its  contract,  and  only  furnished  pressure  sufficient 
to  throw  a  stream  ten  feet  from  the  end  of  said  regulation  hose, 
by  carelessly,  negligently,  and  wrongfully  failing  to  keep  any 
water  in  its  water  tank,  or  even  its  hydrants  and  pipes  full, 
and  not  having  its  pumping  engine  at  work;  by  reason  of  which 
negligent,  wrongful,  and  tortious  conduct  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant,  the  plaintiff's  property  was  totally  destroyed  by  fire, 
and  by  reason  of  such  loss  she  has  been  damaged  in  the  sum  of 
five  thousand  dollars. 

15.  That  the  said  fire  originated  in  an  adjacent  building  ta 
plaintiff's,  and  that  the  destruction  of  her  property  by  same 
was  not  occasioned  by  any  mistake,  carelessness,  or  negligence 
on  her  part,  but  solely  on  account  of  the  careless,  willful,  and 
wanton  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  to  furnish  the 
hydrants  above  referred  to  with  the  water  which  they  were  re- 
quired, and  had  obligated  themselves  to  do,  and  upon  their  doing 
of  which  plaintiff  confidently  relied. 

16.  That  as  plaintiff  is  advised  and  believes,  defendant's  fail- 
ure to  provide  sufficient  water  for  the  extinguishing  of  said  fire 
was  not  occasioned  by  any  unavoidable  accident  or  lack  of  water 
in  the  reservoir  from  which  they  originally  take  same,  but  was 
the  result  of  a  wanton,  careless,  and  willful  neglect  and  dis- 
regard for  their  duties  and  obligation  contracted  and  owed  to 
the  several  inhabitants  of  the  city  of  Greensboro,  including  the 
plaintiff. 

Wherefore  plaintiff  demands  judgment  against  the  said 
Greensboro  Water  Supply  Company  for  the  sum  of  five  thoti- 
Band  dollars  damages  and  the  cost  of  this  action.  And  for  such 
other  and  further  relief  as  the  court  may  deem  plaintiff  entitled 
to. 

^^^  The  demurrer  admits  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  to 
be  true.  Those  grounds  of  demurrer  which  allege  omission  of 
technical  or  formal  averments  in  the  complaint  we  deem  not 
well  taken,  and  to  require  no  discussion.  The  demurrer,  so 
far  as  it  relates  to  the  merits  of  the  case  is  substantially  that 
the  complaint  has  stated  no  cause  of  action:  1.  Because  the 
plaintiff,  though  a  citizen  and  taxpayer  of  Greensboro  (as  alleged 


€02  GoRRELL  V.  Water  Supply  Co.     [N.  Carolina, 

in  tlie  complaint),  is  neither  a  party  nor  privy  to  the  contract, 
the  breach  of  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  action;  2.  The 
failure  of  the  defendant  to  furnish  water  was  not  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  plaintiff's  loss. 

It  is  true  tlie  plaintiff  is  neither  a  party  nor  privy  to  the 
■contract,  but  it  is  impossible  to  read  the  same  without  seeing 
that,  in  warp  and  woof,  in  thread  and  filling,  the  object  is  the 
•comfort,  ease,  and  security  from  fire  of  the  people,  the  citizens 
of  Greensboro.  This  is  alleged  by  the  eleventh  paragraph  of 
the  complaint,  and  is  admitted  by  the  demurrer.  The  benefit 
to  the  nominal  contracting  party,  the  city  of  Greensboro,  as  a 
corporation,  is  small  in  comparison,  and,  taken  alone,  would 
never  have  justified  the  grants,  concessions,  privileges,  benefits, 
and  payments  made  to  the  water  company.  Upon  the  face  of 
the  contract,  the  principal  beneficiaries  of  the  contract  in  con- 
templation of  both  parties  thereto  were  the  water  company  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  individual  citizens  of  Greensboro  on  the 
other.  The  citizens  were  to  pay  the  taxes  to  fulfill  the  money 
consideration  named,  and  furnishing  the  individual  citizens 
with  adequate  supply  of  water  and  the  protection  of  their  prop- 
erty from  fire  was  the  largest  duty  assumed  by  the  company. 
One  not  a  party  or  privy  to  the  contract,  but  who  is  a  bene- 
ficiary thereof,  is  entitled  to  maintain  an  action  for  its  breach. 
This  has  been  sustained  by  many  decisions  elsewhere:  Ellis  v. 
Harrison,  ^^  104  Mo.  270;  Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20  N".  Y.  268; 
Simson  v.  Brown,  68  N.  Y.  355;  Yrooman  v.  Turner,  69  N.  Y. 
280,  25  Am.  Eep.  195;  Wright  v.  Terry,  23  Fla.  160;  Austin 
V.  Seligman,  18  Fed.  Hep.  519;  Burton  v.  Larkin,  36  Kan.  246, 
59  Am.  Rep.  641;  and  even  when  the  beneficiary  is  only  one 
of  a  class  of  persons,  if  the  class  is  sufficiently  designated: 
Johannes  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  66  Wis.  50,  57  Am.  Rep.  249.  It 
was  considered,  though  without  decision,  by  this  court  in  Haun 
V.  Burrell,  119  N.  C.  644,  548,  and  Sams  v.  Price,  119  N.  C. 
•572.  Especially  is  this  so  when  the  beneficiaries  are  the  citi- 
zens of  a  municipality  whose  votes  authorized  the  contract  and 
whose  taxes  discharge  the  financial  burdens  the  contract  entails. 
The  officials  who  execute  the  contract  are  technically  the  agents 
of  the  corporation,  but  the  corporation  itself  is  the  agent  of  the 
people,  who  are  thus  effectively  the  principals  of  the  contract. 
The  acceptance  of  the  contract  by  the  water  company  carries 
with  it  the  duty  of  supplying  all  persons  along  its  mains:  Griffin 
V.  Goldsboro  Water  Co.,  122  N.  C.  206;  Haugen  v.  Albina  Water 
Co.,  21  Or.  411. 


April,  1899.]      Gorrell  v.  Water  Supply  Co.  603 

In  Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah  Water  Supply  Co.  (1889), 
€9  Ky.  340,  25  Am.  St.  Eep.  536,  it  is  held:  "If  a  water  com- 
pany enter  into  a  contract  with  a  municipal  corporation 
whereby  the  former  agrees,  in  consideration  of  the  grant  of  a 
franchise  and  a  promise  to  pay  certain  specified  prices  for  the  use  ir 
of  hydrants,  to  construct  waterworks  of  a  specified  character,  > 
force,  and  capacity,  and  to  keep  a  supply  of  water  required  for 
domestic,  manufacturing,  and  fire  protection  purposes  for  all  the 
inhabitants  and  property  of  the  city,  a  taxpayer  of  the  city  may 
recover  of  the  water  company  when,  through  a  breach  of  its 
contract,  he  is  left  without  means  of  extinguishing  fire  and  his 
property  is  on  that  account  destroyed,"  and  it  is  therein  further 
held:  "Where  a  party  undertakes  to  furnish  water  in  such  mode 
and  quantity  that  it  may  be  used  to  extinguish  fires  in  the  city 
in  which  it  is  to  be  supplied,  damages  sustained  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  buildings  by  the  failure  to  so  ^^^  furnish  such  water  is  a 
natural  and  proximate  consequence  of  such  breach  of  the  under- 
taking." This  opinion  is  based  upon  sound  reason  and  is 
adopted  by  us.  It  is  conclusive  of  both  points  raised  as  to  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  by  the  demurrer.  Indeed,  it  could  not 
be  doubted  that  if  the  city  buildings  were  destroyed  by  fire 
through  failure  of  the  defendant  to  furnish  water  for  their  pro- 
tection as  provided  by  the  contract,  the  city  could  recover:  New 
Orleans  etc.  Co.  v.  Meridian  Waterworks,  72  Fed.  Rep.  227.  Be- 
sides, the  complaint,  in  paragraphs  13  and  14,  alleges  that  the 
•defendant's  failure  to  furnish  water  as  per  contract  was  the 
■direct  and  sole  cause  of  the  loss,  and  this  is  admitted  by  the 
demurrer.  This,  the  question  really  narrows  down  to  the  ques 
tion  whether  the  beneficiaries  of  a  contract,  who  furnish  the  con 
fiideration  money  of  the  contract,  can  maintain  an  action  fo 
■damages  caused  by  its  breach. 

The  case  of  Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah  Water  etc.  Co., 
89  Ky.  340,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  536,  is  exactly  in  point,  was  re- 
affirmed on  rehearing,  and  is  followed  by  Duncan  v.  Owensboro 
Water  Co.  (Ky.,  Dec.  10,  1889),  in  the  same  court,  making  three 
■decisions  altogether.  The  decisions,  however  (twelve  in  num^ 
ber),  in  other  states  where  the  question  has  been  presented,  aM 
the  other  way.  But  this  is  a  case  of  the  first  impression  in  thi  i 
state,  and  decisions  in  other  states  have  only  persuasive  author'' 
ity.  They  have  only  the  consideration  to  which  the  reasoning 
therein  is  entitled.  They  are  to  be  weighed,  not  counted.  We 
€hould  adopt  that  line  which  is  most  consonant  with  justice  and 
the  "reason  of  the  thing." 


604  GoRRELL  V.  Water  Supply  Co.     [N.  Carolina^ 

Did  tHe  people  of  Greensboro  have  just  cause  to  believe  that, 
by  virtue  of  that  contract,  they,  as  well  as  the  corporation,  were 
guaranteed  a  sufficient  quantity  of  water  to  protect  their  prop- 
erty from  fire,  and  did  the  water  company  understand  it  waa 
agreeing,  for  the  valuable  considerations  named,  to  furnish  a 
sufficient  quantity  of  water  to  protect  private  as  well  as  public 
property  from  fire?  The  intent  is  to  be  '^'^^  drawn  from  the  in- 
strument itself,  and  on  its  face  there  can  be  no  doubt  it  was  con- 
tracted that  the  water  supply  should  be  sufficient  to  protect 
private  as  well  as  public  property.  If  so,  it  follows  that  when, 
by  breach  of  that  contract,  private  property  is  destroyed,  the 
owner  thereof,  one  of  the  beneficiaries  contemplated  by  the  con- 
tract, is  the  party  in  interest,  and  he,  and  he  alone,  can  maintain 
an  action  for  his  loss. 

As  is  said  by  Judge  Freeman,  the  learned  annotator  of  the . 
American  State  Reports,  in  commenting  on  the  fact  (Britton  v. 
Green  Bay  etc.  W.  W.  Co.,  29  Am.  St.  Eep.  863)  that  the  major- 
ity of  decisions  so  far  rendered  were  adverse  to  the  position  taken 
in  the  Kentucky  case  above  cited  and  approved  by  us:  "As  none 
of  the  courts  have  fairly  faced  what  seems  to  be  the  logical  result 
of  these  decisions,  viz.,  that  the  injured  person  is  left  without 
any  remedy  at  all,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  subject  is  left 
in  an  extremely  unsatisfactory  position.  It  seems  to  be  uni- 
versally agreed,  and  on  the  soundest  reasoning,  that  the  city 
itself  is  not  liable  for  failing  to  protect  the  property  of  taxpayers 
from  fire,  unless  made  liable  by  express  statutory  provisions: 
Wright  V.  Augusta,  78  Ga.  241,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  256.  And  it 
seems  equally  clear  that  the  city  would  have  no  right  of  action 
in  such  case  in  behalf  of  the  taxpayer,  for  the  basis  of  all  the 
[adverse]  decisions  is  that  there  is  no  privity  of  contract  between 
the  taxpayers,  and  the  water  companies.  If  the  contract  is  not 
made  for  the  benefit  of  the  taxpayers  in  such  a  sense  that  they 
can  sue  upon  it,  it  can  hardly  be  maintained  that  the  same  con- 
tract is  made  for  one  of  those  taxpayers  in  such  a  sense  that  the 
city  can  recover  damages  in  his  name.  ...  If,  then,  neither  the 
taxpayer  himself  nor  the  city  on  his  behalf  can  sue  the  company, 
the  conclusion  seems  to  be  that  the  loss  by  fire  in  these  cases  is 
regarded  by  the  law  as  damage  for  which  there  is  no  redress." 
This  is  a  complete  reduction  ad  absurdum,  and  we  prefer  not 
to  ^^"^  concur  in  cases,  however  numerous — there  are  probably  a 
dozen  scattered  through  half  a  dozen  states — ^which  lead  to  such 
conclusion.    All  these  cases  (when  not  based  on  reference  to  the 


April,  1899,]      GoRUELL  v.  Water  Supply  Co.  606 

others)  rest  upon  the  narrow  technical  basis  that  a  citizen,  he- 
cause  not  a  privy  to  the  contract,  cannot  sue,  whereas  authorities 
are  numerous  that  a  beneficiary  of  a  contract,  though  not  a  party 
or  privy,  may  maintain  an  action  for  its  breach:  7  Am.  &  Eng. 
Ency.  of  Law,  2d  ed.,  105-108.  Here,  the  water  company  con- 
tracted with  the  city  to  furnish  certain  quantities  of  water  for 
the  protection  of  the  property  of  the  citizens  as  well  as  of  the 
city,  and  receive  full  consideration,  a  large  part  of  which  comes 
in  the  shape  of  taxation,  paid  annually  by  those  citizens.  On  a 
breach  of  the  contract,  whereby  the  property  of  a  citizen  is  des- 
troyed, he,  as  a  beneficiary  of  the  contract,  is  entitled  to  sue,  and 
under  our  code,  requiring  the  party  in  interest  to  be  plaintiff, 
he  is  the  only  one  who  can. 

Whether  there  was  a  breach  of  the  contract,  and  whether  it 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss,  regarded  as  matters  of  fact, 
will  be  determined  by  the  Jury,  if,  when  the  case  goes  back,  the 
defendant  shall  file  an  answer,  as  it  has  a  right  to  do  (Code,  sec. 
272)  raising  those  issues.  But  in  overruling  the  demurrer  to  the 
complaint  there  was  no  error.  As  was  said  by  the  supreme  court 
of  Kentucky,  when  affirming,  on  a  petition  to  rehear,  the  deci- 
sion in  the  Paducah  case,  supra:  "The  water  company  did  not 
covenant  to  prevent  occurrence  of  fires  nor  that  the  quantity 
of  water  agreed  to  be  furnished  would  be  a  certain  and  effectual 
protection  against  every  fire,  and  consequently  does  not  in  any 
sense  occupy  the  attitude  of  an  insurer;  but  it  did  undertake  to 
perform  the  plain  and  simple  duty  of  keeping  water  up  to  a 
designated  height  in  the  stand-pipe,  and  if  it  failed  or  refused  to 
comply  with  that  undertaking,  and  such  breach  was  the  '*^** 
proximate  cause  of  destruction  of  the  plaintiff's  property,  which 
involves  issues  of  fact  for  determination  by  a  jury,  there  exists 
no  reason  for  its  escape  from  answering  in  damages  that  would 
not  equally  avail  in  case  of  any  other  breach  of  contract.** 

Afl&rmed. 

Faircloth,  C.  J.,  and  Furches,  J.,  dissent. 


CONTRACT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PARTY-RIGHT  OP 
ACTION.— If  a  contract  has  been  made  between  two  parties  for  the 
benefit  of  a  third,  an  action  will  He  thereon  at  the  instance  and 
in  the  name  of  the  party  to  be  benefited,  although  the  contract 
was  made  without  his  knowledge,  and  without  any  consideration 
moving  from  him:  Brown  v.  Markland,  16  Utah,  360,  67  Am.  St. 
Rep.  629;  St.  Louis  v.  Von  Phul,  133  Mo.  661,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  695. 
and  note. 

WATER  COMPANIES— BREACH  OF  CONTRACT— NATURAL 
AND  PROXIMATE  RESULT.— Where  a  party  undertakes  to  fur- 


606  Balk  v.  Harris.  [N.  Carolina, 

nish  water  in  such  mode  and  quantity  that  it  may  be  used  to  ex- 
tinguish fires  in  the  city  in  which  it  is  to  be  supplied,  damages- 
sustained  by  the  destruction  of  buildings  by  the  failure  to  so  fur- 
nish such  water  is  a  natural  and  proximate  consequence  of  sucl> 
breach  of  the  undertaliing:  Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah  Water 
etc.  Co.,  89  Ky.  340,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  53(1. 

WATER  COMPANIES— CONTRACT  WITH  MUNICIPALITY- 
TAXPAYER'S  RIGHT  OF  AOTION.-If  a  contract  is  made  be- 
tween a  municipality  and  a  corporation  that  the  latter  will  furnish, 
water  for  the  extinguishment  of  fires  and  other  purposes,  a  pri- 
vate citizen  cannot  recover  of  such  corporation  for  damages  sus- 
tained by  him  for  the  breach  of  its  contract  with  the  city:  Fitch  v. 
Seymour  etc.  Co.,  139  Ind.  214,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  258;  Britton  v.  Greea 
Bay  etc.  W.  W.  Co.,  81  Wis.  48,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  856,  and  especially 
the  note  thereto;  Howsmon  v.  Trenton  etc.  Co.,  119  Mo.  304,  41  Am. 
St.  Rep.  654.  and  note.  Contra,  Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah. 
Water  etc.  Co.,  89  Ky.  340,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  536. 


Balk  v.  Harris. 

[124  NoBTH  Carolina,  467.] 

TAXATION— SITUS  OF  A  DEBT.— The  situs  of  a  debt  for 
purposes  of  taxation,  and  usually  for  all  purposes.  Is  with  the 
creditor. 

ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— SITUS  OF  DEBT.— In 
North  Carolina,  the  situs  of  a  debt  for  purposes  of  an  attachment 
Is  where  the  debtor  resides. 

ATTACHMENT— NONRESIDENT  GARNISHEE  —  JURIS- 
DICTION.—As  a  general  rule,  the  courts  of  a  state  cannot,  by  their 
service  of  process  upon  an  inhabitant  of  another  state  transiently 
within  their  jurisdiction,  charge  such  person  as  garnishee. 

ATTACHMENT  — WHEN  NONRESIDENT  MAY  BB 
CHARGED  AS  GARNISHEE— JURISDICTION.— The  courts  of  a 
state  can  charge  a  nonresident  debtor,  transiently  within  their 
jurisdiction,  as  garnishee,  if  he  has  in  his  possession  money  or 
property  of  the  defendant,  or  if  he  has  contracted  to  pay  money 
or  deliver  property  within  such  jurisdiction. 

ATTACHMENT  —  GARNISHMENT  —  JURISDICTION.  —  A 
court  entertaining  a  garnishment  must  have  some  jurisdiction  over 
the  thing  garnished,  and  where  the  garnishee  is  a  nonresident,  has 
in  his  hands  no  property  belonging  to  the  principal  debtor,  and 
owes  him  nothing  payable  within  that  state,  the  jurisdiction  is  de- 
feated. 

ATTACHMENT  —  GARNISHMENT  —  JURISDICTION  OF 
ACTION.— Since  an  attachment  is  in  efiect  a  proceeding  by  the 
principal  debtor  In  tbe  name  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  garnishee, 
tlie  action  must  be  brought  wiiere  the  garnishee  resides,  for  it  Is 
there  that  his  creditor  must  have  sued  him. 

Charles  F.  Warren  for  the  petitioner. 

John  H.  Small,  contra. 

*^^  CLAKK,  J.     This  is  a  petition  to  rehear  the  decision  re- 
ported in  Balk  t.  Harris,    122   N.  C.    64,     The   judgment   of 


April,  1899.]  Balk  v.  Harris.  007 

another  state  condemning  the  debt  due  by  Harris  to  Balk  can 
only  be  recognized  as  valid  here  when  that  court  acquired  juris- 
diction. It  was  not  founded  on  personal  services,  but  it  is  con- 
tended that  the  Maryland  court  acquired  jurisdiction  by  attach- 
ing the  debt  due  Balk  by  serving  notice  upon  Harris,  who  was 
transiently  in  the  city  of  Baltimore.  The  situs  of  the  debt  for 
purposes  of  taxation,  and  usually  for  all  purposes,  is  with  the- 
creditor.  But  there  are  many  states  whose  courts  hold  that  for 
the  purposes  of  attachment  the  situs  of  the  debt  is  at  the  resi- 
dence or  domicile  of  the  debtor.  The  conflicting  authorities 
are  summed  up  and  arrayed  in  the  notes  to  Hlinois  Cent.  K.  R. 
Co.  V.  Smith,  70  Miss.  344,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  651,  whose  accom- 
plished editor  sums  up  a  careful  review  of  the  authorities  as- 
follows:  "The  true  doctrine  seems  to  us  to  be  that  no  jurisdic- 
tion can  be  obtained  to  comdemn  a  debt  due  to  a  nonresident 
unlesF  jurisdiction  of  his  person  is  obtained,  that  is,  that  the 
situs  of  debt  for  the  purpose  of  garnishment  is  at  the  residence 
of  the  creditor.  To  hold  that  such  situs  is  with  the  debtor 
seems  against  reason  because  he  has  no  property  in  the  debt,  and 
because  it  allows  a  proceeding  to  condemn  one's  property  to  be 
prosecuted  without  notice  to  him,  or  representation  by  anyone 
who  cares  for  the  protection  of  his  interests.  Such  a  proceed- 
ing seems  unworthy  to  be  called  due  process  of  law."  There  is 
logic  and  force  in  these  views  if  it  were  an  open  question  with 
us,  but  North  Carolina  is  one  of  the  states  whose  courts  have 
held  that  for  purposes  of  an  attachment  the  situs  of  a  debt  is 
where  the  debtor  resides:  Cooper  v.  Adel  Security  Co.,  122  N.  C. 
463;  Winfree  v.  Bagley,  102  N.  C.  515. 

The  apparent  inconsistency  or  hardship  of  such  ruling  is 
much  lessened  by  the  uniform  holding  by  courts  of  that  "*** 
line  of  thought  that  the  attachment  of  the  debt  can  only  be 
made  where  the  debtor  resides,  and  can  have  no  validity  if  levied 
upon  him  when  only  passing  through  or  transiently  in  another 
slate.  It  is  thus  stated  in  8  American  and  English  Encyclopedia 
of  Law,  1129,  1130:  "Choses  in  action  upon  which  the  garnishee^ 
is  liable  are  not  to  be  considered  as  following  the  former  wherever 
he  may  be  transiently  found,  to  be  there  taken,  at  the  will  of  a 
third  person,  within  a  jurisdiction  where  neither  such  debtor  nor 
his  creditor  resides.  As  a  general  rule,  therefore,  the  courts  of 
a  state  cannot,  by  their  service  of  process  upon  an  inhabitant  of 
another  state  transiently  within  their  jurisdiction,  charge  such 
person  as  garnishee.  But  if,  when  so  served,  the  garnishee  have- 
in  his  possession,  within  the  state,  money  or  property  of  th» 


60S  Balk  v.  Harris.  [N.  Carolina, 

defendant,  or  has  contracted  to  pay  money  or  deliver  property 
within  such  jurisdiction,  he  may  he  charged."  This  is  sustained 
hy  uniform  decisions  (many  of  which  are  there  stated  in  the 
notes);  among  many  others,  Smith  v.  Eaton,  36  Me.  298,  58  Am. 
Dec.  746;  Lovejoy  v.  Albee,  33  Me.  415,  54  Am.  Dec.  630;  Saw- 
jer  V.  Thompson,  24  N.  H.  610;  Baxter  v.  Vincent,  6  Vt.  614; 
Ray  V.  Underwood,  3  Pick.  302;  Hart  v.  Anthony,  15  Pick.  445; 
•Cronin  v.  Foster,  13  R.  I.  196.  In  the  last  case  it  is  said:  "When 
a  person  transiently  in  another  state  is  sued  for  his  own  debt,  it 
is  a  different  case.  But  if  a  person  by  garnishment  is  compelled, 
in  order  to  satisfy  a  debt  not  his  own,  but  due  from  one  of  his 
-creditors,  to  pay  his  own  debt  in  a  mode  very  different  from  that 
in  which  he  would  otherwise  have  paid  it,  it  would  be  a  hard- 
ship." The  court,  proceeding,  admits  the  recognized  exceptions 
above  stated  that  the  foreign  court  could  acquire  jurisdiction  by 
^€ervice  upon  a  garnishee  transiently  within  the  state:  1.  When 
the  garnishee  has  personal  chattels  of  the  debtor  with  him 
^which  usually  could  be  attached  without  garnishment);  and  2. 
When  the  debt  due  by  '*''®  the  garnishee  is  contracted  to  be 
paid  within  the  state.  Among  other  cases  to  same  effect,  Wright 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  19  Neb.  175,  56  Am.  Rep.  747,  in 
which  it  is  said:  "The  rule  is  well  settled  that  garnishment 
•served  upon  a  nonresident  of  the  state,  but  temporarily  within 
it,  is  not  effectual  as  an  attachment";  citing  to  same  purpose 
<Treen  v.  Farmers*  etc.  Bank,  25  Conn.  452;  Casey  v.  Davis,  100 
Mass.  124;  Sawyer  v.  Thompson,  24  N.  H.  510;  Lawrence  v. 
Smith,  45  K  H.  533,  86  Am.  Dec.  183;  Nye  v.  Liscombe,  21 
Pick.  263;  Tingley  v.  Bateman,  10  Mass.  343;  Jones  v.  Winches- 
ter, 6  N.  H.  497;  Mathews  v.  Smith,  13  Neb.  190;  Danforth  v. 
Penny,  3  Met.  564;  Gold  v.  Housatonic  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Gray,  424. 
In  Bush  V.  Nance,  61  Miss.  237,  it  is  said  that  unless  the  debt  of 
the  nonresident  garnishee  was  payable  in  the  state  where  gar- 
nished, *Tie  was  not  subject  to  garnishment  in  that  state,  and 
the  writ  served  on  him  there  was  a  nullity,  and  this  seems  set- 
tled law  by  the  authorities.  The  reason  is,  that  the  court  enter- 
taining a  garnishment  must  have  some  jurisdiction  over  the 
thing  garnished,  and  where  the  garnishee  is  a  nonresident,  has 
in  his  hands  no  property  belonging  to  the  principal  debtor,  and 
owes  him  nothing  payable  within  that  state,  the  jurisdiction  is 
defeated.  Such  is  the  well-settled  law:  Drake  on  Attachment, 
-5th  ed.,  sees.  474,  475,  and  cases  there  cited."  This  is  sustained 
hj  reference  to  the  citation  from  Drake  on  Attachment,  and  also 


April,  1899.]  Balk  t;.  HARRia  609 

by  Waples  on  Attachment,  228.  There  are  many  other  cases  to 
same  effect,  among  them  Squair  v.  Shea,  26  Ohio  St.  645;  Mohile 
€tc.  II.  R.  Co.  V.  Barnhill,  91  Tenn.  395,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  889; 
Commercial  Nat.  Bank  v.  Chicago  etc.  R'y  Co.,  45  Wis.  172. 
The  defect  being  jurisdictional,  the  garnishee  cannot  waive  it 
^^because  it  is  not  with  him  a  personal  matter,  and  he  has  no 
right  to  prejudice  the  defendant:  Rindge  v.  Green,  52  Vt.  204; 
Waples  on  Attachment,  228;  Drake  on  Attachment,  sec.  476. 

*''*  Inasmuch  as  an  attachment  is  in  effect  a  proceeding  by 
the  principal  debtor  (the  defendant  in  the  action)  in  the  name 
of  the  plaintiff  against  the  garnishee,  it  is  thus  properly  held, 
«ven  in  those  courts  which  hold  that  the  situs  of  a  debt  for  this 
purpose  is  with  the  debtor  (garnishee),  that  the  action  must  be 
brought  where  he  "resides"  or  "has  his  domicile,"  since  it  ia 
there  that  his  creditor  must  have  sued  him.  One  or  two  cases 
•unguardedly  say  the  action  may  be  brought  "wherever  the  debtor 
^garnishee)  may  be  found,"  but  the  context  and  the  facts  in 
those  eases  show  that  they  mean  where  he  may  be  found  "resi- 
dent" or  "domiciled"  as  it  is  expressly  held  in  all  cases  where 
the  point  is  made.  As,  upon  the  uniform  authorities  above  cited 
and  others  not  necessary  to  cite,  the  Maryland  court  acquired  no 
jurisdiction  as  against  Balk  by  service  of  notice  upon  his  debtor, 
Harris,  who  had  no  tangible  property  of  Balk's  in  his  possession, 
and  was  not  resident  in  that  state,  we  reaffirm  our  former  deci- 
sion, but  after  the  benefit  of  the  able  and  exhaustive  argument 
upon  the  rehearing,  for  an  entirely  different  reason  from  that 
given  on  the  first  hearing. 

Petition  dismissed. 


ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— SITUS  OF  DEBT.— A  debt 
lias  no  situs  for  the  purpose  of  garnishment  in  a  state  of  which 
tlie  plaintiff,  flie  defendant,  and  the  garnishee  are  all  nonresidents, 
■although  the  latter  Is  a  foreign  corporation  which,  by  general  pro- 
visions of  a  state  statute,  is  subject  to  garnishment  in  such  state: 
Morawetz  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office,  96  Wis.  175,  65  Am.  St  Rep.  43.  It 
18  held  in  some  Jurisdictions  that  garnishment  proceedings  must 
l»e  instituted  in  the  state  where  the  debt  Is  payable,  or  the  property 
is  to  be  delivered,  and  a  garnishment  in  one  state  of  a  debt  due 
and  payable  in  another  is  void:  American  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hettler, 
S7  Neb.  849,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  522.  In  other  jurisdictions  it  is  held 
that  though  the  situs  of  intangible  personalty  may  be  at  the  domi- 
-cile  of  the  creditor  for  the  purpose  of  taxation  or  distribution,  yet 
for  the  purpose  of  collecting  a  debt  it  is  ambulatory,  accompanying 
the  person  of  the  debtor,  and  may  be  attached  wherever  he  may 
be  found:  Neuf elder  v.  German  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  6  Wash.  336,  30  Am. 
fit.  Rep.  166,  and  note;  Wyeth  etc.  Cb.  v.  Lang,  127  Mo.  242.  48  Am. 
fit  Rep.  626.     Under  such  holdings,  a  debtor  may    at    the    same 

AM.  ST.  K«p.,  Vol.  LXX  —39 


610  Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.      [N.  Carolina^ 

time  be  subject  to  garnishment  in  two  or  more  states:  Lancashire 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Corbetts,  165  111.  592,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  275,  and  note.  See 
the  monographic  note  to  National  Bank  v.  Furtick,  69  Am.  St.  Eep. 
113. 


Beoadpoot  v.   Fayetteville. 

[124  North  Carolina,  478.] 

MUNICIPAL,  CORPORATIONS-REPEAL  OF  CHARTER- 
EFFECT  ON  DEBTS.— Debts  due  from  a  municipal  corporation  are- 
not  extinguished  by  the  repeal  of  its  charter,  and  still  exist  not- 
withstanding that  repeal. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— WHEN  A  NEW  CORPO- 
RATION IS  THE  SUCCESSOR  OF  AN  OLD  ONE.— Where  the  old 
charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  has  been  repealed,  and  a  new- 
one,  creating  a  new  corporation,  has  been  granted,  the  new  cor- 
poration, embracing  the  same  territory,  the  same  inhabitants  and 
the  same  taxable  property,  is  considered  as  the  successor  of  the  old. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY  OP  NEW  COR- 
PORATION FOR  DEBTS  OF  OLD.— When  the  old  charter  of  a 
municipal  corporation  is  repealed  and  a  new  one  is  granted,  upon 
which  latter  are  bestowed  by  law  asil  the  benefits  and  property  of 
the  old,  the  burden  of  the  old  must  be  borne  by  the  new;  where  the 
benefits  are  taken,  the  burdens  are  assumed. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY  OF  SUCCES- 
SOR OF  OLD  CORPORATION— CONSIDERATION.— The  founda- 
tion on  which  the  liability  of  a  new  municipal  corporation  for  the- 
debts  of  the  old  rests,  is  that  the  new  corporation  embraces  the 
Bame  territory,  the  same  corporators,  the  same  taxable  property^ 
and  has  received  the  property  of  the  old  corporation  without  con- 
sideration; and  for  these  benefits  must,  in  return,  bear  the  bur- 
dens of  the  old  corporation. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 
—STATUTES  PROHIBITING  PAYMENT  OF  DEBTS  OF  OLD 
CORPORATION.— A  statute  expressly  prohibiting  a  municipal  cor- 
poration from  assuming  the  debts  of  its  predecessor,  or  from  pay- 
ing any  part  of  them,  is  unconstitutional. 

LEGISLATURE— POWER  TO  TAX— LIMITATION.—  The 
legislative  power  of  taxation  is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  it 
must  not  be  exercised  to  Impair  the  obligation  of  contracts. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— REMEDIES  OF  CRED- 
'ITORS— POWER  OF  LEGISLATURE.— The  remedies  of  a  creditor 
for  the  enforcement  of  his  debt  assumed  by  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, which  existed  when  the  contract  was  made,  must  be  left  unim- 
paired by  the  legislature;  or,  if  they  are  changed,  a  substantial 
equivalent  must  be  provided. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— BONDS-POWER  TO  TAX 
FOR  PAYMENT  OF.— Where  the  resource  for  the  payment  of  the 
bonds  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  the  power  of  taxation  existing 
when  the  bonds  were  issued,  any  law  which  withdraws  or  limits  the 
taxing  power  and  leaves  no  adequate  moans  for  the  payment  of  the 
boivis,  is  forbidden  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  i» 
noU  and  void. 


April,  1899.]       Beoadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.  611 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION  —  BONDS  —  PAYMENT  BY 
NEW  CORPORATION— STATUTE  PROHIBITING.— Where  a  mu- 
nicipal coi'poration  has  issued  bonds,  and  before  their  payment  its 
charter  has  been  repealed  and  a  new  corporation  formed,  a  statute 
which  prohibits  the  levying  of  taxes  for  the  payment  of  the  bonds 
by  the  new  corporation  is  invalid  and  cannot  be  regarded. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-MANDAMUS 
TO  COMPEL.— Where  statutes  have  been  passed,  abrogating  or  re- 
stricting the  power  of  taxation  delegated  to  a  municipality  upon  the 
faith  of  which  coutracls  were  made  with  her,  and  upon  the  continu- 
ance of  which  alone  they  can  be  enforced,  a  party  interested  may 
by  mandamus  compel  the  exercise  of  that  power  as  if  no  legrislaiion 
had  ever  been  attempted. 

BONDS-COUPONS  OR  INTEREST— NATURE.— Coupo'is 
attached  to  bonds,  being  for  interest  to  become  due  on  such  bonds, 
are  a  part  of  them  and  partake  of  their  nature. 

LIMITATIONS  OP  ACTIONS— COUPONS  ATTACHED  TO 
BONDS.— The  statute  of  limitations  which  applies  to  bonds  applies 
to  coupons  attached  thereto,  wnen  such  coupons  are  for  interest 
to  become  due  on  the  bonds. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— WHAT  WILL  STOP  RUN- 
NING OF  STATUTE.— The  general  rule  is,  that  when  the  statute  of 
limitations  once  begins  to  run  no  subsequent  happening  or  event 
can  obstruct  its  course. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— WHAT  WILL  STOP  RUN- 
NING OF  STATUTE.— The  statute  of  limitations  ceases  to  run 
against  a  claimant  whose  power  to  institute  his  suit  has  been  taken 
away  by  statute,  whether  such  exception  is  contained  in  the  act  of 
limitation  or  not. 

N.  W.  Eay  and  H.  McD.  Eobinson,  for  the  appellant; 

E.  P.  Buxton  and  J.  C.  and  S.  H.  MacEae,  for  the  plaintiff. 

*»3  MONTGOMEEY,  J.  Under  the  provisions  of  an  act  of 
the  general  assembly  of  the  session  of  1881,  the  charter  of  the 
town  of  Fayetteville  was  surrendered  and  repealed.  At  its  ses- 
sion in  1883  the  general  assembly  created  a  taxing  and  police 
district  out  of  the  territory  included  in  the  boundaries  of  the  old 
town  of  Fayetteville,  the  taxing  and  police  district  to  be  called 
Fayetteville.  Under  the  last-mentioned  act,  all  of  the  property 
of  the  former  town  of  Fayetteville  was  transferred  to  the  custody 
and  control  of  the  board  of  commissioners  appointed  by  the  gen- 
eral assembly.  The  public  buildings,  streets,  and  squares  and 
the  policing  of  the  same  were  placed  under  the  charge  of  those 
commissioners.  Taxes  were  levied  by  the  general  assembly  with 
a  specification  as  to  the  purposes  to  which  they  were  to  be  ap- 
plied. The  general  assembly,  at  its  session  of  1893,  incorporated 
the  inhabitants  within  the  old  territory  of  the  town  of  Fayette- 
ville under  the  name  of  the  city  of  Fayetteville. 

The  plaintiff  in  1880  and  1881,  being  the  owner  of  fifty-two 
coupons  cut  from  bonds  executed  by  the  town  of  Fayetteville, 


612  Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.       [N.  Carolina, 

presented  the  same  for  payment,  and,  upon  payment  being  re- 
fused, brought  two  actions  against  the  town  of  Fayetteville  to 
recover  the  amounts  due  on  the  coupons.  Judgments  were 
rendered  at  August  term,  1882,  of  Cumberland  superior  court  in 
the  two  actions  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  but  between  the  time  of 
action  begun  and  judgment  rendered  the  charter  of  the  then 
defendant,  the  town  of  Fayetteville,  was  surrendered  and  re- 
pealed. 

The  complaint  in  the  present  action  embraces  three  causes  of 
action.  The  first  is  founded  upon  the  judgments  procured  in 
1^82  by  the  plaintiff  against  the  town  of  Fayetteville;  the  *»'* 
second  upon  the  coupons  themselves,  upon  which  the  judgments 
were  procured,  and  the  third  upon  the  plaintiff's  alleged  right 
to  have  the  two  cases  against  the  town  of  Fayetteville,  which 
were  pending  in  the  superior  court  of  Cumberland  county,  at  its 
August  term,  1882,  reinstated  on  the  civil  issue  docket,  brought 
forward  and  consolidated  into  one  action,  and  judgment  rendered 
therein  for  the  amount  due  on  the  fifty-two  coupons  mentioned 
in  those  actions.  The  plaintiff's  allegations  are  that  the  judg- 
ments against  the  town  of  Fayetteville,  or  the  coupons,  if  the 
judgments  are  invalid,  are  still  due;  that  although  the  charter 
of  the  old  town  of  Fayetteville  was  repealed  and  surrendered 
under  the  act  of  1881,  yet  the  act  incorporating  the  city  of 
Fayetteville  rehabilitated  the  old  town  of  Fayetteville,  and  that 
the  city  is  the  successor  of  the  old  town,  and  therefore  liable  to 
the  plaintiff  for  the  amount  of  the  coupons. 

The  defendant  admits  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of  the  town  of 
Fayetteville,  that  the  coupons  have  never  been  paid,  that  the 
judgments  were  entered  against  the  town  of  Fayetteville  after  its 
charter  had  been  surrendered,  and  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
old  town  have  been  incorporated  by  the  act  of  1893  under  the 
name  of  the  city  of  Fayetteville.  The  defendant  avers,  how- 
ever, that  the  judgments  procured  by  the  plaintiff  against  the 
town  of  Fayetteville  were  void  and  denies  that  the  city  of  Fay- 
etteville is  the  successor  of  the  old  town  of  Fayetteville,  or  liable 
on  the  coupons  or  on  the  judgments. 

It  is  of  the  first  importance  then  to  consider  whether  the  city 
of  Fayetteville,  the  new  corporation,  chartered  by  the  act  of 
March,  1893,  is  so  far  the  successor  of  the  town  of  Fayetteville, 
the  old  corporation,  as  to  be  liable  for  its  debts.  If  this  ques- 
tion is  answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  statutes  of  limitation  set 
up  in  the  answer,  as  a  defense  to  the  action,  ^'"^  will  then  have 
to  be  discussed  and  decided.    This  court  at  one  time  adopted  the 


April,  1899.]       Bboadfoot  v.  Fayettevillb.  613 

old  common-law  rule,  that  upon  the  civil  death  of  a  corporation, 
the  grantors  of  its  real  estate  took  it  by  reversion,  and  the  debts 
due  to  and  from  it  were  extinguished:  Fox  v.  Horah,  36  N.  C. 
358,  36  Am.  Dec.  48.  This  rule  was  changed  by  the  court  in 
the  case  of  Wilson  v.  L^ary,  120  N.  C.  90,  58  Am.  St.  Rep. 
778,  and  that  of  Fox  v.  Horah,  36  N.  C.  358,  36  Am.  Dec.  48, 
was  overruled.  The  debt  then  due  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  town 
of  Fayetteville  was  not  extinguished  by  the  repeal  of  its  char- 
ter, and  still  exists,  notwithstanding  that  repeal:  Meriwether  v. 
Garrett,  103  U.  S.  472;  Wolff  v.  New  Orleans,  103  U.  S.  358; 
Mobile  V.  Watson,  116  IT.  S.  289;  O'Connor  v.  Memphis,  6  Lea, 
730. 

Apparently,  each  corporation  created  by  a  separate  charter  is 
a  distinct  entity,  and  from  this  it  may  be  argued  with  plausibil- 
ity that  no  two  successive  corporations  can  be  connected  unless 
they  are  connected  by  the  terms  of  the  act  which  created  them. 
But  that  view  must  be  often  only  apparently  true.  If,  in  the 
case  of  a  municipal  corporation,  the  old  charter  should  be  re- 
pealed and  a  new  one  granted,  and  the  new  one  should  include 
the  same  territory,  substantially  the  same  people,  and  the  great 
mass  of  the  taxable  property  of  the  old  corporation,  and  the 
property  of  the  old  corporation  used  for  public  purposes  be 
passed  over  to  the  possession  and  control  of  the  new  corpora- 
tion without  consideration  from  the  new  corporation,  it  would  be 
difficult  to  appreciate  how  the  property  and  the  benefits  of  the 
old  corporation  could  be  received  by  the  new  one  without  the 
shouldering  of  its  responsibility  by  the  new  one.  It  must  be  that 
the  creditors  of  a  defunct  municipal  corporation,  whose  money 
and  property  have  helped  to  build  up  and  improve  the  wealth 
and  influence  of  the  old  corporation  (although  they  must  sub- 
mit when  a  charter  is  absolutely  abolished,  and  while  the  old  ter- 
ritory and  people  remain  unincorporated)  have  the  right  in 
equity  to  have  a  new  corporation,  embracing  the  same  terri- 
tory and  *®®  the  same  inhabitants  and  the  same  taxable  prop- 
erty, considered  as  the  successor  of  the  old,  at  least  so  far  as  its 
liabilities  for  the  debts  of  the  old  corporation  are  concerned. 
When  the  old  charter  is  repealed  and  a  new  one  is  granted,  upon 
which  latter  are  bestowed  by  law  all  the  benefits  and  property  of 
the  old,  the  burden  of  the  old  must  be  borne  by  the  new;  where 
the  benefits  are  taken,  the  burdens  are  assumed. 

So  strong  has  this  view  been  impressed  upon  the  courts  that 
in  O'Conner  v.  Memphis,  6  Lea,  730,  the  court  said:  "But  in 
no  case  have  the  courts  ever  failed  to  declare  the  identity  or  sue- 


614  Broadfoot  v.  Fayettevillb.       [N.Carolina, 

cession  or  continuity  of  the  two  corporations  where  the  same 
corporators  and  the  same  corporate  property  have  passed  to  the 
new  corporation.  The  terms  of  the  charter  have  in  such  cases 
never  been  construed  otherwise." 

The  same  doctrine  was  laid  down  in  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beck- 
with,  100  U.  S.  514;  in  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266; 
in  Wolif  v.  New  Orleans,  103  U.  S.  358;  and  in  Mobile  v.  Wat- 
son, 116  U.  S.  289.  The  acts  of  the  legislature  repealing  the 
old  charters  of  the  cities  of  Memphis  and  Mobile,  and  incorpo- 
rating those  cities,  were  passed  on  the  same  day,  and  it  might 
be  inferred  that  these  acts  were  considered  as  one  and  the  same 
in  legislative  intent.  But  in  the  case  of  Amy  v.  Selma,  77  Ala. 
103,  cited,  indorsed  and  approved  with  high  commendation  by 
the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  in  Mobile  v.  Watson, 
116  U.  S.  289,  the  acts  were  not  simultaneously  passed.  The 
repealing  act  was  passed  in  December,  1882,  and  the  reincorpo- 
rating act  in  February,  1883.  In  that  case  the  supreme  court  of 
Alabama  held  that  the  act  repealing  the  charter  of  the  city  of 
Selma  was  without  effect  or  operation  upon  the  liabilities  of  the 
city  of  Selma;  that  the  act  of  February,  incorporating  the  in- 
habitants and  territory  formerly  embraced  within  the  limits  of 
the  city  of  Selma,  was  a  reorganization  under  the  corporate 
name  of  Selma,  of  the  same  corporators,  and  "^^"^  embraced  sub- 
stantially the  same  territory  as  the  city  of  Selma;  that  Selma 
was  the  successor  of  the  city  of  Selma,  and  liable  for  the  pay- 
ment of  its  debts. 

It  appears  also,  in  the  case  of  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S. 
266,  that  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of  Pensacola  was  under  one 
act  and  the  reincorporation  of  the  city  under  the  same  name 
was  under  a  different  law. 

In  the  case  before  us,  twelve  years  elapsed  between  the  repeal 
of  the  charter  of  the  town  of  Fayetteville  and  the  incorporation 
of  the  city  of  Fayetteville;  but  we  cannot  see  how  that  can  alter 
the  principle  involved  in  the  case.  The  foundation  on  which 
the  liability  of  the  new  corporation  rests  is  that  the  new  corpora- 
tion embraces  the  same  territory,  the  same  corporators,  the  same 
taxable  property,  and  has  received  the  property  of  the  old  corpo- 
ration without  consideration;  and  for  these  benefits  must,  in 
return,  bear  the  burdens  of  the  old  corporation.  The  liability 
in  such  a  case  commences  from  the  receiving  of  the  benefits, 
and  whether  those  benefits  were  received  one  or  ten  years,  or 
more,  from  the  repeal  of  the  old  charter,  makes  no  difference. 

But  it  is  argued  for  the  defendant  that   even  if   the  act  of 


April,  1899.]      Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.  615 

1893  did  have  the  effect  to  make  the  city  of  Fayetteville  the 
successor  of  the  old  town  of  Fayetteville,  yet  the  new  corpora- 
tion was  not  liable  for  the  debts  of  the  old  corporation,  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  expressly  prohibited  from  assuming  the 
debts  of  the  old  town  or  from  paying  any  part  of  them,  except 
such  as  were  provided  for  in  the  act  of  1883,  and  the  plaintifE 
claimed  no  benefit  under  that  act.  The  position  was  without 
^my  citation  of  authority  to  support  it,  and  to  us  it  did  not  seem 
to  be  sound  (and  the  authorities  so  far  as  they  have  been  exam- 
ined by  us  are  all  the  other  way).  If  the  law  was  as  is  contended 
for  by  the  defendant,  then  it  would  be  in  the  power  of  the  legis- 
lature to  destroy  the  claims  of  creditors  ****  against  municipal 
corporations  by  simply  repealing  their  charters  on  one  day,  and 
on  the  next  reincorporating  the  same  inhabitants  in  the  samo 
territory,  taking  care  to  insert  in  the  repealing  acts  a  provision 
to  the  effect  that  the  new  corporation  should  not  be  liable  for 
the  debts  of  the  old.  Such  legislation  would  be  contrary  to 
every  idea  of  justice  and  law,  and  obnoxious  to  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States,  and  to  that  of  our  own  state. 

In  Amy  v.  Selma,  77  Ala.  103,  it  appeared  that  the  act  incor- 
porating Selma  authorized  the  proper  officials  to  levy  taxes,  but 
declared  that  no  funds  derived  by  the  corporation  from  the  col- 
lection of  taxes  or  from  any  other  source  should  be  used  for  the 
payment  of  any  of  the  debts  of  the  city  of  Selma,  the  old  corpo- 
ration; and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  supreme  court  of  Alabama  in 
that  case  held  that  the  provision  was  inoperative  against  the 
debts  and  liabilities  of  the  city  of  Selma,  and  the  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States,  in  Mobile  v.  Watson,  116  U.  S.  289,  cited 
the  decision  with  marked  approval. 

But  the  defendant  further  contends  that  even  if  it  should  be 
held  by  this  court  that  the  debts  against  the  town  of  Fayette- 
ville were  not  extinguished  by  the  repeal  of  the  town  charter, 
and  that  they  are  valid  and  good  against  the  city  of  Fayette- 
ville, yet  the  officials  of  the  new  corporation  are  not  only  not 
authorized  to  levy  taxes  to  pay  those  debts,  but  are  prohibited 
from  doing  so  by  the  very  terms  of  the  act  of  incorporation, 
and  that  "the  power  of  taxation  is  legislative,  and  cannot  be 
exercised  otherwise  than  under  the  authority  of  the  legislature,** 
as  was  said  in  Merriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472.  That  ia 
a  good  proposition  of  law,  and  it  was  applicable  to  the  condition 
of  affairs  which  appeared  in  that  case,  as  well  as  from  the  view 
of  the  law  which  that  court  took  of  the  effect  of  the  repeal  of 
the  charter  of  Memphis,  and  the  one  creating  out  of  the  same 


616  Beoadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.      [N.  Carolina, 

territory  a  taxing  district.  That  court  held  '*®®  that  the  char- 
ter of  Memphis  was  absolutely  repealed,  and  treated  the  case  of 
Merriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472,  upon  that  view.  The 
effect  of  the  act  creating  the  taxing  district  was  not  directly 
before  the  court.  We  have  seen  that  the  supreme  court  of  Ten- 
nessee in  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  Dist.,  2  Lea,  425,  and  O'Connor  v. 
Memphis,  6  Lea,  730,  held  that  the  taxing  district  was  a  reor- 
ganization of  the  city  of  Memphis.  But  the  act  of  the  Tennes- 
see legislature,  creating  the  taxing  district  of  Shelby,  was  a  very 
different  act  from  the  act  of  the  North  Carolina  legislature- 
which  created  the  taxing  district  of  Fayetteville.  The  former 
conferred  on  the  officers  of  the  former  extensive  legislative  and 
judicial  powers,  and  provided  that  at  the  end  of  two  years  the 
district  should  be  governed  by  officers  of  its  own  choice.  No 
Buch  powers  were  conferred  on  the  officers  of  the  taxing  district 
of  Fayetteville.  But  that  the  power  of  taxation  which  is  vested 
in  the  legislature  is  such  a  power  as  the  defendant  contends  for 
cannot  be  maintained.  The  power  is  subject  to  the  qualification 
which  attends  all  state  legislation,  that  is,  that  it  must  not  be 
exercised  to  impair  the  obligation  of  contracts,  thereby  conflict- 
ing with  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  of  North 
Carolina.  There  is  no  doubt  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
repeal,  out  and  out,  a  municipal  charter,  and  there  is  no  doubt 
that  after  the  application  of  the  property  of  the  defunct  corpo- 
ration not  necessary  for  public  uses  (public  buildings,  streets, 
squares,  parks,  promenades,  wharves,  landing-places,  fire  engines, 
hose  and  hose-carriages,  engine-houses  and  engineering  instru- 
ments, being  property  necessary  for  public  uses,  as  is  held  in 
Merriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  TJ.  S.  472,  and  not  subject  to  the 
demands  of  creditors  of  the  corporation)  toward  the  payment  of 
any  remaining  indebtedness,  the  debt  cannot  be  enforced,  al- 
though it  is  not  extinguished.  But  as  long  as  the  charter  is  not 
repealed,  or  if  repealed  can  be  ^®  rehabilitated  so  as  to  become 
the  successor  of  the  old  and  liable  for  its  debts,  the  taxing  power 
in  the  hands  of  the  legislature  cannot  be  used  to  decrease  or  im- 
pair the  rights  of  the  creditor  in  the  enforcement  of  the  collec- 
tion of  the  debt.  In  reference  to  this  matter  it  was  said  in  the 
case  of  Wolff  v.  New  Orleans,  103  U.  S.  358:  "This  doctrine  has 
been  repeatedly  asserted  by  this  court  when  attempts  have  been 
made  to  limit  the  power  of  taxation  of  a  municipal  body,  upon 
the  faith  of  which  contracts  have  been  made,  and  by  means  of 
which  alone  they  could  be  performed.  So  long  as  the  corpora- 
tion continues  in  existence,  the  court  has  said  that  the  control 


April,  1899.]      Bboadfoot  v.  Faykttevillb.  617 

of  the  legislature  over  the  power  of  taxation,  delegated  to  it,  is 
restrained  to  cases  where  such  control  does  not  impair  the  obli- 
gation of  contracts  made  upon  a  pledge  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly given  that  the  power  shall  be  exercised  for  their 
fulfillment.  However  great  the  control  of  the  legislature  over 
the  corporation  while  it  is  in  existence,  it  must  be  exercised 
in  subordination  to  the  principle  which  secures  the  inviolability 
of  contracts."  The  same  doctrine  is  declared  in  Mobile  v.  Wat- 
son, 116  U.  S.  289  (and  many  cases  there  cited),  where  it  is  said: 
"But  when  (municipal  corporations)  empowered  to  take  stock  in 
or  otherwise  aid  a  railroad  company,  and  they  issue  their  bonds 
in  payment  of  the  stock  taken,  or  to  carry  out  any  other  author- 
ized contract  in  aid  of  the  railroad  company,  they  are  to  that 
extent  to  be  deemed  private  corporations,  and  their  obligations 
are  secured  by  all  the  guaranties  which  protect  the  engagements 
of  private  individuals.  Therefore,  the  remedies  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  such  obligations  assumed  by  a  municipal  corporation, 
which  existed  when  the  contract  was  made,  must  be  left  unim- 
paired by  the  legislature;  or,  if  they  are  changed,  a  substantial 
equivalent  must  be  provided.  Where  the  resource  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  bonds  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  the  power  of 
taxation  existing  when  the  bonds  were  issued  "***  any  law  which 
withdraws  or  limits  the  taxing  power  and  leaves  no  adequate 
means  for  the  payment  of  the  bonds  is  forbidden  by  the  consti- 
tution of  the  United  States,  and  is  null  and  void." 

Now,  to  apply  the  law  as  we  have  found  it  to  be  to  the  par- 
ticulars of  the  case  before  us:  Under  what  circumstances  did 
the  debt  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  town  of  Fayetteville  arise, 
and  what  were  the  means  provided  at  the  time  the  debt  was 
contracted  for  its  payment? '  The  Western  Eailroad  was  incor- 
porated by  the  general  assembly  of  North  Carolina,  at  its  session 
of  1852,  by  chapter  147.  By  an  act  passed  at  the  same  session 
(chapter  207),  the  town  of  Fayetteville  was  authorized  to  sub- 
scribe for  shares  of  stock  in  that  railroad  company,  the  shares 
of  stock  to  be  held  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the  town.  To 
meet  the  pa}Tnent  of  any  subscriptions  that  might  be  made,  the 
town  was  authorized  to  issue  and  sell  bonds  bearing  interest,  and, 
by  section  4,  to  levy  and  collect  taxes  for  the  payment  yearly 
of  the  interest,  and  to  create  a  sinking  fund  for  the  ultimate 
payment  of  the  debt,  and  to  invest  from  time  to  time,  in  profita- 
ble stock,  the  surplus  of  their  taxes  to  meet  the  maturity  of  the 
bonds.  An  election  was  held  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
act,  and  a  majority  of  the  qualified  voters  cast  their  ballots  for 


618  Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.       [N.  Carolina, 

■^'subscription/'  and  the  bonds  were  issued.  On  the  22d  of 
March,  1875,  the  general  assembly  of  that  year  passed  an  act 
{chapter  248),  in  which  the  town  of  Fayetteville  was  authorized 
to  fund  the  bonded  debt  of  the  town,  contracted  for  stock  of 
the  Western  Eailroad  Company  by  virtue  of  the  act  of  1853. 
The  debt  was  funded,  and  the  coupons  on  which  this  suit  was 
brought  are  clipped  from  the  bonds  issued  by  the  town  under 
the  funding  act  of  1875.  It  appears,  then,  from  the  above  state- 
ment of  the  facts,  that  the  bonds  were  originally  issued  by  the 
town  with  the  express  provision  in  the  act  which  authorized  ^'^^ 
their  issue  (1852)  that  the  town  authorities  were  to  levy  and 
collect  an  annual  tax  upon  the  property  and  polls  within  the 
town,  with  which  to  pay  the  interest  (coupons),  and  in  the  same 
way  to  raise  a  sinking  fund  to  pay  the  bonds  at  maturity.  The 
act  of  1875,  authorizing  the  town  to  fund  the  original  bonds, 
provided  for  the  payment  of  the  new  bonds  in  the  same  man- 
ner and  to  the  like  extent  as  were  the  old  bonds. 

It  follows,  then,  from  the  conclusion  at  which  we  have  arrived, 
aided  as  we  have  been  by  the  decisions  of  other  courts,  that  the 
act  of  1852  was  the  basis  of  a  contract  between  the  holders  of 
the  bonds  which  were  issued  to  buy  the  stock  of  the  Western 
Eailroad  Company,  and  the  town  of  Fayetteville,  by  which  the 
town  authorities  were  to  levy  a  tax  upon  the  property  and  polls 
of  the  town,  with  which  to  pay  the  coupons,  and  also  to  provide 
a  sinking  fund  with  which  to  pay  the  bonds  at  maturity;  that 
the  coupons  upon  which  this  suit  was  brought  were  clipped  from 
the  bonds  issued  under  the  act  of  1875,  under  which  the  old 
bonds  were  funded;  that  the  new  bonds  are  of  the  same  nature  as 
the  old  bonds  and  were  invested  with  the  same  security  for  their 
payment;  that  these  bonds  aro  still  in  force,  and  that  the  obliga- 
tion to  pay  the  same,  together  with  the  coupons  (the  interest), 
rests  upon  the  city  of  Fayetteville  as  the  legal  successor  of  the 
town  of  Fayetteville. 

The  provisions  in  the  act  of  1893  incorporating  the  city  of 
Fayetteville,  which  prohibit  the  levying  of  taxes  for  the  pay- 
ment of  the  bonds  by  the  new  corporation,  are  invalid  and  can- 
not be  regarded.  In  support  of  this  position  we  refer  to  the 
case  of  Mobile  v.  Watson,  ll'i  U.  S.  289:  "All  laws  passed  since 
the  making  of  th'e  contract  whose  purpose  or  effect  is  to  take 
from  the  city  of  Mobile,  or  its  successor,  the  power  to  levy  the 
tax  and  pay  the  bonds,  are  invalid  and  ineffectual,  and  will  be 
disregarded;  to  Wolf  v.  New  ('Means,  10^  U.  S.  358.  where  the 
*^^  court  said:  "The  courts,  therefore,  treating  as  invalid  and 


April,  1899.]       Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville.  619 

void  the  legislation  abrogating  or  restricting  the  power  of  taxa- 
tion delegated  to  the  municipality,  upon  the  faith  of  which  con- 
tracts were  made  with  her,  and  upon  the  continuance  of  which 
alone  they  can  be  enforced,  can  proceed,  and  by  mandamus  com- 
pel, at  the  instance  of  parties  interested,  the  exercise  of  that 
power  as  if  no  legislation  had  ever  been  attempted." 

The  conclusion  at  which  we  have  arrived  as  to  the  liability 
of  the  city  of  Fayetteville,  the  new  corporation,  for  the  debts  of 
the  town  of  Fayetteville,  the  old  corporation,  makes  it  neces- 
€ary  for  us  to  discuss  and  decide  the  question  of  the  statute  of 
limitations  set  up  by  the  defendant  in  the  answer  as  a  bar  to  the 
action.  The  coupons  being  for  interest,  to  become  due  on  the 
bonds,  are  a  part  of  the  bonds  and  partake  of  their  nature,  and 
the  statute  of  limitations,  therefore,  which  applies  to  the  bonds 
themselves  must  be  the  same  statute  which  is  applicable  to  the 
•coupons.  The  bonds  are  specialties,  and  so  are  the  coupons.  The 
ten  years  statute  begins  to  run  against  coupons  from  the  time  of 
their  maturity:  8  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  18;  Clark  v.  Iowa 
City,  20  Wall.  583;  Amy  v.  Dubuque,  98  U.  S.  470;  Koshkonong 
V.  Burton,  104  U.  S.  668.  The  coupons  in  this  case  became  due 
in  1881;  the  charter  of  the  town  of  Fayetteville  was  repealed  in 
October,  1881;  the  city  of  Fayetteville  was  incorporated  in 
March,  1893,  and  this  action  was  brought  in  1894.  If  the  time 
which  elapsed  between  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of  the  town  of 
Fayetteville  and  the  act  of  1893  which  incorporated  the  city  of 
Fayetteville,  and  during  which  time  the  territory  was  a  taxing 
district,  is  to  be  counted,  then  the  statute  of  limitations  (ten 
years)  will  be  a  bar  to  the  action;  if  that  time  is  not  to  be 
counted,  then  the  statute  will  not  be  a  bar  to  the  action. 
We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  time  should  not  be  counted. 
In  Lilly  v.  Taylor,  88  N.  C.  489,  it  was  held  that  as  a  re- 
sult of  ■****  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of  Fayetteville  (and 
that  too  after  the  court  had  taken  official  knowledge  of  the 
act  of  1883  creating  the  taxing  district),  the  creditors  of  the 
town  had  had  all  remedies  for  coercing  the  payment  of  their 
•debts  taken  from  them;  and  by  the  reference  of  the  court  to  the 
case  of  Merriwether  v.  Garrett,  102  U.  S.  472,  as  decisive  of  the 
case  before  them,  the  court  could  have  had  no  other  idea  than 
that  the  creation  of  the  taxing  district  did  not  in  any  way  or 
for  any  purpose  revive  the  old  corporation. 

But  the  defendant  insists  that  the  statute  of  limitations  be- 
gan to  run  against  the  coupons  in  1881  when  they  fell  due,  and 
that  more  than  ten  years  elapsed  between  that  time  and  the 


620  Broadfoot  v.  Fayiettevillb.      [N.  Carolina, 

time  when  this  action  was  begun;  and  that  when  the  statute 
once  begins  to  run  no  subsequent  happening  or  event  can  ob- 
Btruct  its  course.  That,  as  a  general  proposition  of  law,  is  true, 
and  we  have  numerous  decided  cases  in  our  own  reports  which 
lay  down  that  rule  in  the  clearest  language.  In  Hamilton  v. 
Shepperd,  7  N.  C.  115,  the  plaintiff  insisted  that  his  action  waa 
not  barred  because  there  was  fraud  in  the  conduct  of  the  defend- 
ant, but  the  court  said:  "But  it  [the  matter  on  which  the  plain- 
tiff relied  to  take  hi&  case  out  of  the  operation  of  the  statute] 
is  not  in  the  act,  nor  is  there  anything  like  it,  and  we  cannot  put 
it  there.  It  is  neither  in  its  letter  nor  spirit.'*  In  Vance  v. 
Granger,  1  N,  C.  804  (*'M)  the  court  said:  "The  act  of  limitation 
would  amount  to  a  general  and  positive  bar,  were  not  certain 
exceptions  contained  in  the  proviso;  we  cannot  add  to  these  oth- 
ers which  the  legislature  has  omitted.'*  But  we  are  satisfied 
that  when  these  decisions  were  made  the  court  had  in  mind  only 
cases  where  the  ability  to  bring  suit  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff, 
or  some  one  for  him,  had  not  been  taken  away  by  law — by  stat- 
ute— and  where  the  courts  were  open  for  the  hearing  of  all  mat- 
ters of  which  they  had  jurisdiction.  Statutes  of  limitation  are 
founded  on  the  idea  that  one  who  has  a  cause  of  action  will  un- 
dertake to  ■*'***  enforce  it  within  a  reasonable  time  if  the  courts 
are  open  to  him.  To  prevent  confusion  and  to  produce  certainty 
as  to  what  is  reasonable  time,  the  law  (the  statutes  of  limitation) 
has  fixed  the  periods  vsdthin  which  actions  must  be  brought. 
These  views  are  so  well  expressed  in  the  case  of  United  States  v. 
Wiley,  11  Wall.  508,  that  we  cannot  do  better  than  quote  a  part 
of  the  opinion  in  that  case:  "But  it  is  the  loss  of  the  ability  to 
sue,  rather  than  the  loss  of  the  right,  that  stops  the  running  of 
the  statute.  The  inability  may  arise  from  a  suspension  of  right, 
or  from  the  closing  of  the  courts;  but,  whatever  the  original 
cause,  the  proximate  and  operative  reason  is  that  the  claimant 
is  deprived  of  the  power  to  institute  his  suit.  Statutes  of  limita- 
tion are  indeed  statutes  of  repose.  They  are  enacted  upon  the 
presumption  that  one  having  a  well-founded  claim  will  not  de- 
lay enforcing  it  beyond  a  reasonable  time,  if  he  has  the  power  to 
sue.  Such  reasonable  time  is  therefore  defined  and  allowed. 
But  the  basis  of  the  presumption  is  gone  whenever  the  ability 
to  resort  to  the  courts  has  been  taken  away.  In  such  a  case  the 
creditor  has  not  the  time  within  which  to  bring  his  suit  that 
the  statute  contemplated  he  should  have.**  This  view  of  the 
law  is  strengthened  by  what  was  said  by  the  court  in  Hanger  v. 
Abbott,  6  Wall.  532:  "They  (the  statutes  of  limitation)  proceed 


Ainil,  1899.]       Broadfoot  v.  Fayettevillb.  621 

also  upon  tlie  presumption  that  claims  are  extinguished  when- 
€ver  they  are  not  litigated  in  the  proper  forum  within  the  pre- 
scribed period,  and  they  take  away  all  solid  ground  of  complaint 
because  they  rest  on  the  negligence  or  laches  of  the  party  him- 
self." These  cases  were  approved  in  Braun  v.  Sauerwein,  10 
Wall.  218,  where  it  was  said:  "Similar  decisions  (referring  to 
Hanger  v.  Abbott,  6  Wall.  532)  have  been  made  in  the  state 
-courts.  They  all  rest  on  the  ground  that  the  creditor  has  been 
■disabled  to  sue  by  a  superior  power,  without  any  default  of  hia 
■own,  and  therefore  that  none  of  the  reasons,  which  "*®®  induced 
the  enactments  of  the  statutes,  apply  to  his  case;  that  unless 
the  statutes  cease  to  run  during  the  continuance  of  the  super- 
vening disability,  he  is  deprived  of  a  portion  of  the  time  within 
which  the  law  contemplated  he  might  sue." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  consider  at  any  length  the  effect  of  the 
judgment  which  was  entered  up  against  the  town  of  Fayette- 
ville  after  the  charter  of  the  town  of  Fayetteville  had  been  re- 
pealed. For  the  purposes  of  this  case  we  will  treat  it  as  void, 
as  was  contended  by  the  defendant.  The  second  cause  of  action 
founded  on  the  coupons  is  good. 

In  conclusion,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  city  of  Fayette- 
ville, the  new  corporation,  is  the  successor  of  the  town  of  Fay- 
etteville, the  old  corporation;  that  the  debts  of  the  old  corpora- 
tion were  not  extinguished  by  the  repeal  of  its  charter;  that  the 
same  power  to  assess  and  collect  taxes  to  pay  the  plaintiff's  claim 
which  existed  at  the  time  that  the  bonds  were  issued  is  in  the 
new  corporation,  and  has  not  been  affected  by  the  provision  in 
the  act  incorporating  the  city  of  Fayetteville,  which  prohibits 
the  collection  of  taxes  for  the  payment  of  claims  like  those  of 
the  plaintiff;  that  the  statute  of  limitations  did  not  run  during 
the  time  when  the  territory  and  inhabitants  of  the  territory 
formerly  embraced  in  the  town  of  Fayetteville  was  a  taxing  dis- 
trict, and  therefore  is  not  a  bar  to  this  action;  and  that  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  a  peremptory  mandamus  requiring  the 
proper  authorities  of  the  city  of  Fayetteville  to  levy  and  collect 
taxes  upon  property  and  polls  within  the  city,  with  which  to  pay 
the  plaintiff's  claim. 

Affirmed. 


MU«S'ICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  — INDEBTEDNESS  — NEW 
CHARTER— COUNTIES.— Indebtedness  Incurred  by  an  Incorpo- 
rated town  Is  not  extinguished  by  the  change  of  the  town  into  a  city 
by  an  act  of  the  legislature:  Olney  v.  Harvey.  50  111.  453,  99  Am. 
Dec.  530,  and  note.    But  where  a  new  county  is  formed  out  of  the 


622  Broadfcot  v.  Fayetteville.       [N.  Carolina- 

territory  of  old  counties,  the  new  one  is  liable  for  no  debts  of  the 
old  ones,  unless  the  legislature  imposes  such  liability:  See  the  mono- 
graphic note  to  State  v.  Clevenger,  20  Am.  St,  Rep.  677. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— TAXATION— MANDAMUS.— 
The  levy  by  the  council  of  a  municipal  corporation  of  a  tax  for  the 
payment  of  just  debts,  at  a  rate  not  exceeding  the  maximum  limit 
of  its  power  of  taxation,  is  not  discretionary,  so  that  they  may 
refuse  to  levy  such  tax  for  the  payment  of  a  judgment  duly  ren- 
dered, upon  which  execution  has  been  issued  and  returned  nulla 
bona,  but  is  a  duty  the  discharge  of  which  may  be  enforced  by  man- 
damus: Coy  V.  City  Council,  17  Iowa,  1,  85  Am.  Dec.  539,  and  note. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— RESTRICTING  POWER  OP 
TAXATION.— The  obligations  of  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  be 
impaired  by  restricting  its  power  of  taxation  to  the  point  of  dis- 
abling it  from  performance  or  by  a  repeal  of  the  law  under  which 
the  obligation  was  to  be  enforced:  People  v.  Buffalo,  140  N.  Y.  300, 
S7  Am.  St.  Rep.  563. 

STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS— WHEN  DOBS  NOT  RUN.— The 
statute  of  limitations  barring  the  right  to  sue  does  not  run  during^ 
the  time  of  Civil  War,  where  the  courts  are  not  open  to  suitors: 
Caperton  v.  Martin,  4  W.  Va.  138,  6  A"m.  Rep.  270;  Coleman  v. 
Holmes,  44  Ala.  124,  4  Am.  Rep.  121;  Perkins  v.  Rogers,  35  Ind.  124, 
9  Am.  Rep.  639.  Contra,  McKinzie  v.  Hill,  51  Mo.  303,  11  Am.  Rep. 
450.  The  Inability  to  sue  will  not  prevent  the  running  of  prescript 
tlon:  Smith  v.  Stewart,  21  La.  Ann.  67^  99  Am.  Dec.  700. 


CASES 

IN  THB 

SUPBEME   COURT 

ov 

PENNSYLVANIA. 


Enyard  V,  Enyard. 

[190  Pennsylvania  State,  114.] 

DOWER— ESTATE  OF— NATURE.— The  statutory  dower  of 
a  widow  is  not  treated  as  a  lien  upon  laud,  but  as  an  interest  in  it. 
It  is  an  estate  given  by  the  intestate  laws. 

COTENANCY— RIGHTS  OF  WIDOW  OF  ONE  COTENANT 
—SECURING  ADVERSE  TITLE.— Where  one  of  two  cotenants 
dies,  the  dower  interest  of  his  widow  in  the  land  of  the  cotenancy 
brings  her  within  the  general  rule  that,  where  one  is  interested  with 
another  in  an  estate,  an  implied  obligation  arises  to  sustain  the 
common  interest,  and  she  cannot  acquire  and  set  up  an  adverse  title 
to  deprive  the  other  cotenant  of  his  interest  as  by  purchasing  the 
property  at  a  sheriff's  sale  had  under  proceedings  to  collect  arrears 
of  ground  rent. 

De  Forrest  Ballou,  for  the  appellant. 

Charles  Frances  Gummey,  Jr.,  for  the  appellee. 

116  PELL,  J.  The  plaintiff  and  his  uncle,  William  Enyard, 
owned  by  descent  the  real  estate  in  question.  William  Enyard 
died  in  April,  1897,  and  two  days  after  his  death  his  widow, 
Catharine  Enyard,  purchased  the  property  at  sherlS's  sale  had 
under  proceedings  to  collect  arrears  of  ground  rent.  The  ad- 
verse title  thus  acquired  she  sets  up  to  defeat  the  plaintiff  in 
ejectment.  It  is  conceded  that  where  one  is  interested  with 
another  in  an  estate,  an  implied  obligation  arises  to  sustain  the 
common  interest,  and  that  he  cannot  acquire  and  set  up  an  ad- 
verse title  to  deprive  the  other  of  his  interest,  but  it  is  claimed 
that  the  dower  interest  of  the  widow  is  not  such  an  interest  as 
to  prevent  her  from  setting  up  the  title  she  acquired  at  sheriff'^ 
sale.    The  general  rule  is  stated  in  notes  to  Keeeh  y.  Sanford,  1 

(68S) 


624  Enyard  v.  Enyaed.  [Penn. 

Lead.  Cas.  Eq.  62,  to  be:  "Whenever  one  person  is  placed  in 
€ueh  relation  to  another,  by  the  act  or  consent  of  that  other,  or 
the  act  of  a  third  person,  or  of  the  law,  that  he  becomes  inter- 
•ested  for  him,  or  interested  with  him,  in  any  subject  of  property 
or  business,  he  is  prohibited  from  acquiring  rights  in  that  sub- 
ject antagonistic  to  the  person  with  whose  interests  he  has  be- 
<5ome  associated.  If  one  comes  into  an  interest  by  the  permis- 
sion of  another,  or  accepts  an  interest  with  another  by  the  act  of 
■a  third  person,  or  of  the  law,  as  in  the  case  of  tenants  in  com- 
mon under  the  same  will  or  descent,  an  implied  obligation  arises 
to  sustain  the  common  interest  into  which  he  has  been  admitted; 
^nd  equity  vindicates  it  in  the  form  of  a  trust.'* 

The  statutory  dower  of  a  widow  is  not  treated  as  a  lien  upon 
land,  but  as  an  interest  in  it  It  is  an  estate  given  by  the  in- 
testate laws:  Schall's  Appeal,  40  Pa.  St.  170;  Helfrich  v.  Weaver, 
61  Pa.  St.  385.  In  the  opinion  in  McGowan  v.  Bailey,  179  Pa, 
St.  470,  it  was  said  by  our  brother  Dean  that  the  widow's  inter- 
•€st  in  real  estate  of  which  her  husband  died  seised,  of  which 
there  has  been  neither  appraisement  nor  partition,  is  a  freehold 
*^^''  estate  in  the  land.  In  Kunselman  v.  Stine,  183  Pa,  St.  1, 
it  was  held  that  the  widow's  interest  in  the  real  estate  of  her  hus- 
band is  such  an  estate  as  can  be  sold  only  by  a  writ  of  venditioni 
•exponas  in  the  manner  provided  by  the  act  of  January  24,  1849. 
In  Weaver  v.  Wible,  25  Pa.  St.  270,  64  Am.  Dec.  696,  a  widow 
who  came  into  possession  of  land  through  her  husband,  and  who 
had  a  possible  dower  interest,  was  denied  the  right  to  acquire 
title  to  the  land  to  the  prejudice  of  his  heirs  and  creditors.  The 
•defendant  in  this  case,  while  having  a  dower  interest  only,  came 
within  the  general  rule,  and  being  jointly  interested  with  the 
plaintiff  in  the  land  she  could  not  acquire  a  title  to  his  exclusion. 

The  verdict  and  judgment  thereon  establish  only  the  plain- 
tiff's title.  Any  right  the  defendant  may  have  to  contribution 
for  payments  properly  made  for  the  benefit  of  the  joint  estate 
<;an  be  adjusted  in  other  proceedings. 

The  judgment  is  affirmed. 


DOWER— ESTATE  OF-NATURE.— Dower,  until  the  death  of  the 
4iU8band,  is  merely  an  inchoate  Interest:  Moore  v.  Mayor,  8  N.  Y.  110, 
50  Am.  Dec.  "573.  Such  inchoate  right  is  a  mere  possibility,  and  not 
an  estate:  Magee  v.  Young,  40  Miss.  164,  90  Am.  Dec.  322.  The  In- 
choate right  of  dower  in  the  wife  Is,  however,  a  sufficient  estate  to 
-entitle  her  to  maintain  a  bill  In  equity  to  redeem  lands  from  a  mort- 
gfige  in  which  she  had  joined  with  her  husband:  Davis  v.  Wetherell, 
13  Allen,  60,  90  Am.  Dec.  177.  In  Porter  v.  Noyes,  2  Greenl.  22,  11 
Am.  Doc.  30,  it  was  held  tliat  the  Inchoate  right  of  dower  was  an 
existing  encumbrance  which  would  defeat  a  contract  to  convey  an 


Feb.  1899.]        Commonwealth  v.  Wirebacz.  625 

unencumbered  title.  And  as  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  the  principal 
-case,  It  has  been  held  that  the  right  of  dower  is  an  existing  lien 
or  encumbance  and  not  a  mere  possibility  or  contingency:  Ficklin 
v.  Rixey,  89  Va.  832,  37  Am.  St.  Kep.  891. 

COTENANCY  —  WHO  ARE  COTENANTS  —  SECURING  AD- 
VERSE TITLE.— A  person  regularly  deriving  title  from  one  coten- 
ant  will  be  regarded  as  a  tenant  in  common  of  the  property  with 
the  other  cotenants:  Dain  v.  Cowing,  22  Me.  347,  39  Am.  Dec.  585. 
See,  generally,  Metcalfe  v.  Miller,  96  Mich.  459,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  617. 
A  cotenant,  whether  in  or  out  of  possession  cannot  buy  and  hold  a 
tax  title  against  the  other  cotenants:  Cohea  t.  Hemingway,  71  Miss. 
22,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  449. 


Commonwealth  v,  Wibbbaok. 

[190  Pennsylvania  State,  138.] 

WITNESSES— EXPERTS— QUESTION  OF  SANITY— PENI- 
TENTIARY WARDEN.— Where  the  prisoner's  Insanity  Is  set  up  in 
■defense  of  a  prosecution  for  homicide,  and  expert  testimony  is  given 
In  support  of  such  plea,  .together  with  evidence  of  acts  and  declara- 
tions of  the  defendant  tending  to  show  insanity,  a  penitentiary 
warden  who,  through  a  long  period  of  service,  has  had  opportunity 
to  study  criminals,  is  competent  to  testify  that  very  many  prisoners 
feigned  insanity  and  delusions,  and  that  some  had  deceived  him  and 
physicians. 

HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE  AS  TO  INSANITY— OPINION  OF 
WITNESSES.— The  opinion  of  a  witness  as  to  the  Insanity  of  the 
<lefendant  in  a  prosecution  for  homicide  Is  inadmissible,  no  founda- 
tion therefor  having  been  laid.  But  It  Is  competent  for  witnesses 
who  have  stated  their  opportunities  for  observing  defendant  to  tes- 
tify whether  or  not  they  had  noticed  anything  In  his  conduct  or  con- 
versation indicating  Insanity. 

TRIAI^IMPANELING  JURY-EXAMINATION  ON  VOIR 
DIRE.— In  impaneling  a  jury  In  a  trial  for  homicide,  defendant's 
counsel  should  not  be  allowed,  in  the  examination  of  jurors  on  their 
voir  dire,  to  ask  them  whether  defendant's  failure  to  testify  in  his 
•own  behalf  would  prejudice  him  in  their  minds. 

APPEAL^EXAMINATION  OF  EXPERTS-HYPOTHETI- 
CAL QUESTIONS.— Whether  the  hypothesis  propounded  to  wit- 
nesses include  the  material  facts  necessary  to  the  formation  of  an 
opinion,  or  whether  facts  are  assumed  which  have  no  existence, 
rests  largely  in  the  knowledge  of  the  trial  judge,  and  his  rulings  will 
be  held  conclusive  on  appeal  unless  prejudicial  error  is  afflrmativeiy 
«hown. 

HOMICIDE— DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY.— Whether  the  Insan- 
Ity  be  general  or  partial.  In  order  that  it  may  excuse  homicide,  the 
degree  of  it  must  be  so  great  as  to  have  controlled  the  will  of  its 
subject  and  to  have  taken  from  him  the  freedom  of  moral  action. 

HOMICIDE— DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY.— MERE  MORAL 
OBX.IQUITY  OF  PERCEPTION  does  not  constitute  Insanity  excus- 
ing a  person  from  punishment  for  his  deliberate  act,  nor  does  a 
mere  perversion  of  the  moral  sense,  nor  does  an  individual  belief  as 
to  right  and  wrong,  however  sincere,  constitute  *  delusion,  or  a 
phase  of  insanity,  excusing  homicide. 

AM.  St.  Kkp..  Vou  LXX..—lti 


626        Commonwealth  v.   Wireback.      [Penn^ 

INSTRUCTIONS— REVIEW  ON  APPEAL.— In  determining 
whether  an  instruction  given  in  a  trial  for  homicide  was  erroneous- 
aud  prejudicial,  it  should  be  considered  not  only  with  what  precedes- 
and  follows  it,  but  in  view  of  the  idea  being  elucidated. 

HOMICIDE  —  DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY— SANITY  PRE- 
SUMED.—If  the  defendant  in  a  prosecution  for  homicide  was  sane 
shortly  before  and  shortly  after  the  act  of  murder,  the  presumption 
Is  of  sanity  at  the  time  of  the  act,  which  presumption  could  only  be 
rebutted  by  showing  some  special  frenzy  or  madness,  connected  with 
the  act,  which  at  the  instant  irresistibly  impelled  the  defendant  to- 
commit  it. 

HOMICIDE— DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY— REQUISITE  DE- 
GREE OF  PROOF.— If  one  accused  of  homicide  alleges  insanity  as  a 
defense,  he  must  establish  It  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence,  or  the 
presumption  of  insanity  which  the  law  raises  stands  unshalien.  The 
law  recognizes  no  middle  ground  of  doubt  of  sanity  reducing  murder 
otherwise  in  the  first  degree  to  murder  in  the  second  degree, 

John  M.  GrofE  and  C.  Eugene  Montgomery,  for  the  appellants 

John  A.  Coyle,  W.  U.  Hensel,  George  A.  Lane  and  W.  T^ 
Brown,  district  attorney,  for  the  appellee. 

*4i  DEAN,  J.  Wireback,  the  defendant,  was  convicted  of 
murder  of  the  first  degree  in  the  court  below,  and  sentenced  ta 
be  hanged;  hence  this  appeal . 

It  appears  from  the  evidence  that  he  was  forty-eight  years  of 
age;  was  a  manufacturer  and  vender  of  a  patent  medicine;  in 
conducting  his  business,  he  traveled  over  Lancaster  and  the  ad- 
joining counties;  his  place  of  business,  however,  was  in  Lancas- 
ter city,  where  he  made  his  home  with  his  family,  a  wife  and 
two  sons.  They  lived  in  a  dwelling-house,  the  property  of  D.  B. 
Landis,  a  reputable  and  prominent  resident  of  Lancaster.  On 
July  1,  1897,  Landis  leased  to  him  by  writing  the  house  until 
April  1,  1898,  with  the  privilege  of  an  extension  for  one  year 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term,  if  he,  Landis,  did  not  in  the 
meantime  sell  the  property.  Landis  did  sell,  about  the  last  of 
August,  1897,  and  Wireback  had  knowledge  of  the  fact,  and 
also  knew  he  must,  by  the  contract,  give  up  possession  on  April 
1st,  following.  He  continued,  however,  to  pay  his  monthly 
rental  promptly,  but,  notwithstanding  the  unmistakable  *** 
terms  of  his  contract,  frequently  complained  to  his  neighbors 
that  his  landlord,  Landis,  intended  to  wrong  him  by  dispossess- 
ing him,  when  he  had  a  right  to  another  year's  occupancy;  more 
than  once,  when  making  known  his  alleged  grievance,  he  used 
threatening  language,  such  as,  that  he  would  have  vengeance 
against  anyone  who  came  into  the  house,  and  that  his  principle 
was  "justice  or  death."  About  a  week  before  April  1st,  he  went 
to  a  store  outside  the  city  and  purchased  a  breach-loading  shot- 


Feb.  1899.]        Commonwealth  v.  Wireback.  627 

gun,  with  some  large  ammunition,  saying  that  he  "was  going  to 
have  a  fuss  the  let  of  April  with  a  man  about  house  rent."  He 
then  bought  cord  wood  and  had  it  hauled  to  the  house;  with  this 
and  other  materials  he  barred  the  cellar  door,  and  also,  by  like 
methods,  closed  the  other  entrances  on  the  first  floor  of  the 
house.  As  he  refused  to  move  on  April  1st,  Landis  instituted 
suit  for  possession  before  an  alderman  under  the  landlord  and 
tenant  act,  and,  having  obtained  judgment,  had  issued  thereon 
to  a  constable  the  usual  warrant  for  possession.  On  the  morning 
of  April  7th,  the  constable,  Graef,  another  constable,  Price,  D. 
B.  Landis  and  his  son,  with  three  other  men  employed  by  Landis, 
seven  in  all,  proceeded  to  the  house  to  dispossess  Wireback;  find- 
ing the  doors  barricaded,  they  broke  open  one  or  more  of  them, 
and  entered  to  the  first  floor,  Wireback  retreating  upstairs  to 
the  second;  in  that  position  there  was  a  parley  between  him  and 
the  officers;  they  asked  him  to  come  down;  he  refused,  declar- 
ing that  they  had  come  there  to  kill  him;  about  that  time  Wire- 
back  requested  to  see  D.  B.  Landis,  the  deceased,  who,  in  re- 
sponse, went  up  the  stairs,  and,  on  reaching  the  landing,  dis- 
covered that  Wireback  had  fled  to  the  garret;  he  went  to  the 
foot  of  the  garret  stairs,  and  Wireback,  who  was  behind  a  barri- 
cade at  the  top,  called  out  to  him,  "Mr.  Landis,  what  do  you 
intend  doing  for  me  and  my  family?"  Landis  commenced  to  re- 
ply, saying  "I  will — *'  or  "Well,  I  will — "  when  Wireback,  from 
behind  the  barricade,  fired  from  the  shotgun  the  charge  which 
struck  Landis  in  the  head  and  killed  him  instantly.  Wireback 
neither  fled  nor  resisted  arrest.  There  was  no  substantial  dis- 
pute as  to  the  facts  thus  narrated.  At  the  trial,  the  only  defense 
was  insanity.  The  evidence  tending  to  show  unsoundness  of 
mind  consisted  mainly  of  a  course  of  conduct  distinct  from  and 
at  variance  with  that  of  his  life  before  August,  1897,  when  he 
learned  of  *'*^  the  sale  of  the  house.  It  was  alleged,  and  the 
evidence  tended  to  show,  that  before  that  time  he  was  a  kind 
husband  and  had  led  an  orderly  life;  that  commencing  about 
that  date,  and  continuing  down  to  the  killing  of  Landis,  he  was 
at  times  morose,  was  abusive  toward  his  wife,  had  fits  of  jeal- 
ousy, and  showed  a  disposition  to  lewdness;  there  was  also  evi- 
dence that  he  suffered  from  bodily  disease,  either  real  or  imag- 
inary, and  had  resort  to  childish  and  absurd  methods  of  cure. 
Further,  there  was  evidence  of  insanity  in  near  collateral  rela- 
tives of  his  father  and  mother.  During  the  week  preceding  the 
homicide  he  slept  and  ate  but  little.  The  theory  of  defendant's 
counsel,  very  earnestly  argued  in  the  court  below  and  here,  is. 


628  Commonwealth  v.  Wireback.  [Penn. 

that  Wireback,  about  the  time  he  learned  that  he  must  give  up 
the  house,  was  diseased  in  body,  and  was  severely  pinched  in 
money  affairs;  the  consequence  was,  his  mind  became  disordered; 
that  this  condition  continued  down  to  the  time  the  attempt 
was  made  to  dispossess  him;  that  then  he  firmly  believed  the 
purpose  of  the  officers,  under  the  direction  of  Landis,  was  to  at- 
tack and  kill  him;  and  that,  acting  on  a  firm  conviction  that 
this  was  their  purpose,  he  resisted  by  opposing  force  to  force 
in  defense  of  his  life.  That,  although  this  was  a  delusion,  yet 
to  him  being  a  fact,  the  duty  of  defending  his  own  life  as  he 
did  was  to  him  imperative.  There  was  evidence  on  the  part  of 
members  of  his  famil}'',  and  three  medical  experts.  Doctors  Mills, 
Gerhart,  and  Diller,  tending  to  sustain  this  theory.  As  opposed 
to  it,  the  commonwealth  called  a  very  large  number  of  witnesses 
who  had  known  defendant  for  years,  and  down  to  the  date  of  the 
homicide  had  transacted  more  or  less  business  with  him,  ^et  had 
never  observed  any  indications  of  unsoundness  of  mind;  besides 
these,  the  keepers  of  the  prison,  who  had  every  opportunity  to 
observe  him  after  his  arrest,  for  more  than  four  months,  testified 
that  during  that  time  he  gave  no  evidence  of  insanity.  Physi- 
cians, one  of  them,  Dr.  Chapin,  an  eminent  specialist,  were  of 
the  opinion  that,  from  the  testimony  as  to  defendant's  conduct 
immediately  before  and  after  the  shooting,  he  could  not  have  had 
such  frenzy  or  delusion  at  the  moment  the  shot  was  fired,  as 
suggested  by  his  counsel.  The  court  submitted  the  somewhat 
conflicting  evidence  on  the  question  of  sanity  to  the  jury,  who, 
having  found  defendant  guilty  of  murder  of  the  first  degree,  he 
was  sentenced  accordingly,  and  we  now  have  this  appeal,  with 
fifty  assignments  of  error. 

144  rpj^g  |jj.g^  three  and  sixth  to  fifteenth,  inclusive,  allege  er- 
rors in  the  admission  and  rejection  of  evidence.  Michael  J. 
Cassidy,  warden  of  the  eastern  penitentiary,  being  called,  testi- 
fied that  for  thirty-eight  years  he  had  been  an  assistant  and  war- 
den of  that  institution,  and  during  that  time  had  observation 
of  several  thousand  criminals;  that,  as  a  necessity  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  duty,  he  had  studied,  from  the  conduct  of  the  pris- 
oners, real  and  feigned  insanity;  that  very  many  prisoners 
feigned  insanity  for  the  purpose  of  being  removed  to  city  hos- 
pitals, whence  they  could  more  easily  escape;  that  many  of  them 
feigned  delusions,  as  the  most  convenient  method  of  deception. 
And  some  had  successfully  deceived  him  and  physicians.  The 
defendant  objected  to  this  testimony,  as  incompetent,  because 
the  witness  was  not  a  physician,  nor  a  graduate  of  any  institu- 


Fe'-.  1899.]        Commonwealth  v.  Wireback.  629 

tion  of  learning,  and  therefore  not  an  expert  whose  opinion  was 
admissible.  To  sustain  the  objection  Commonwealth  v.  Farrell, 
187  Pa.  St.  408,  is  cited,  where  the  witness  testified  to  a  fact  de- 
pending largely  on  conclusions  derived  from  scientific  anatomi- 
cal investigations;  his  opinion,  derived  wholly  from  his  own  ob- 
servation of  corpses,  was  ruled  inadmissible,  because  of  the 
doubtfulness  and  sparseness  of  the  facts  on  which  it  was  based. 
But  Cassidy  was  not  called  as  a  scientific  expert  in  diseases  of 
the  mind,  but  to  establish  a  fact  observable  by  any  intelligent 
man  with  like  opportunity.  Tliat  for  thirty-eight  years  thou- 
sands of  prisoners  had  been  under  his  care,  and  that  many  of 
them  feigned  insanity  and  pretended  delusions,  he  knew,  be- 
cause, when  they  failed  to  accomplish  their  purpose  by  the  pre- 
tense, it  was  abandoned,  and  they  resumed  the  normal  conduct 
of  sane  men.  The  defendant,  when  charged  with  a  high  crime, 
committed  acts  and  made  declarations  which  tended  to  show 
aberration  of  the  mind  and  delusions.  The  commonwealth  an- 
swered, that  in  these  acts  and  declarations  the  accused  might  be 
merely  feigning  insanity  to  escape  punishment,  and  they  called 
one  abundantly  competent  to  testify  that  such  conduct  is  com- 
mon among  criminals,  and  that  at  times  it  will  deceive  even 
experts.  This  is  one  of  the  very  facts  on  which  scientific  eX' 
perts  base  their  deductions,  and  it  was  proper  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  jury  in  determining  the  value  of  defendant's  expert 
testimony  as  to  his  sanity. 

The  sixth  assignment  is  to  sustaining  the  objection  of  the 
*"*•*  commonwealth  to  the  opinion  of  Mrs.  Kate  L.  Shertzer,  a 
witness  called  by  defendant.  After  stating  that  she  was  a 
neighbor  of  Wireback,  and  had  seen  him  often;  that  he  was 
nervous  and  excited,  especially  on  April  1st;  that  he  said  he  was 
Avronged,  but  that  Landis  would  do  the  right  thing  by  him,  she 
was  asked:  "From  what  you  saw  of  him,  do  you  think  he  was  of 
sound  or  unsound  mind?"  This  was  objected  to,  because  the 
witness  had  stated  no  facts  warranting  an  opinion.  The  court 
properly  sustained  the  objection;  no  foundation  for  an  opinion 
was  laid;  every  act  and  declaration  of  the  defendant  testified 
to  by  her  was  rational.  If  her  opinion  was,  that  defendant  was 
insane,  it  necessarily  was  based  on  facts  other  than  those  stated. 

The  seventh  to  sixteenth  assignments  complain  that  the  court 
erred  in  overruling  objections  to  the  admissibility  of  the  opinion 
of  witnesses  called  by  the  commonwealth.  Nine  witnesses  were 
called,  who  testified  to  a  personal  acquaintance  with  defendant, 
to  having  seen  him,  and  to  having  transacted  business  with  him. 


630  CoMMoiswEALTH  V.  WiREBACK.  [Penn. 

some  a  short  time  before  the  homicide,  others  within  three  or 
six  months  of  it;  all  stated  their  opportunities  for  observation; 
then,  in  substance,  this  question  was  put  to  each:  "From  the 
conversation  you  had  with  the  prisoner  at  the  time  you  stated, 
and  from  your  observation  of  his  conduct,  manner,  and  appear- 
ance, did  you  or  did  you  not  discover  anything  that  would  lead 
you  to  beJieve  he  was  of  unsound  mind?"  Against  defendant's 
objection,  the  witness  was  permitted  to  answer.  In  this,  there 
was  no  error.  The  \^itnesses  were  not  asked  to  give  their  opin- 
ion affirmatively,  as  to  whether  the  defendant  was  of  sound 
mind,  for  they  had  stated  nothing  to  warrant  such  opinion;  but 
whether  they  had  noticed  anything  in  his  conduct  or  conversa- 
tion irrational  or  indicating  insanity  at  the  times  they  saw  and 
talked  with  him  was  clearly  competent.  The  defendant  alleged 
that  he  gave  evidence  of  insanity  for  a  period  of  eight  months 
before  the  homicide;  the  commonwealth  could  answer  it  in  no 
other  way  than  by  calling  those  who  had  seen  and  conversed 
with  him  during  the  same  time  to  testify  that  they  had  noticed 
nothing  indicating  unsoundness  of  mind.  The  defendant  might 
well  argue  that  this  negative,  when  compared  with  his  affirma- 
tive *^**  testimony,  was  the  weaker,  but  his  objection  to  its  ad- 
missibility is  not  well  founded. 

The  twenty-third  to  thirty-sixth  assignments  are  to  the  re- 
fusal of  the  court  to  permit  this  interrogatory  by  defendant's 
counsel  to  jurors  when  called  to  the  box:  ''Would  the  neglect 
or  refusal  of  defendant  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf  create  any 
presumption  against  him  in  your  mind?'*  The  question  was 
wholly  unwarranted;  it  reflected  on  the  integrity  of  the  juror. 
He  might  as  well  have  been  asked  whether,  if  sworn  as  a  juror, 
he  would  obey  the  law.  No  liberality  of  examination  of  jurors 
on  their  voir  dire,  accorded  to  those  ^accused  of  crime,  author- 
izes a  question  which,  in  its  insinuation,  must  be  an  insult  to 
an  honest  man.     The  court  properly  disallowed  it.  , 

The  forty-second  to  forty-eighth  assignments  inclusive  are 
to  rulings  on  hypothetical  questions  to  physicians  and  other  wit- 
nesses. "WTiether  the  hypothesis  propounded  to  the  witness  in- 
cluded the  material  facts  necessary  to  the  formation  of  an  opin- 
ion, or  whether  facts  are  assumed  which  have  no  existence,  rests 
largely  in  the  knowledge  of  the  trial  judge,  and  necessarily  must 
control  him  in  his  rulings.  The  evidence,  as  before  him,  is  sel- 
dom 80  clearly  before  us.  A  careful  inspection  of  the  evidence, 
the  hypothetical  questions,  and  the  rulings  connected  therewith. 


Feb.  1899.]        Commonwealth  v.  Wibeback.  631 

complained  of  in  these  assignments,  fails  to  convince  us  that  any 
error  was  committed  by  the  court. 

The  fourth,  thirty-seventh,  thirty-eighth,  thirty-ninth,  for- 
tieth, and  forty-first  assignments  all  complain  of  errors  of  law 
in  the  charge  and  answers  to  points.  There  is  probably  no  fea- 
ture of  criminal  law  which  has  been  so  frequently  the  subject 
of  judicial  consideration  and  opinion  as  that  of  insanity  as  an 
excuse  for  crime.  Text-writers  on  medical  jurisprudence  and 
courts  are,  on  some  phases  of  the  subject,  at  variance.  The 
•enunciation  of  the  law  in  our  own  state,  for  many  years  at  least, 
has  been  consistent.  While  conceding  the  existence  of  differ- 
ent types  of  insanity,  we  have  persistently  declined  to  refine  upon 
it  with  the  specialists,  and  measure  criminal  responsibility  ac- 
cording to  the  exact  degree  of  it.  Any  departure  from  the  con- 
■dition  of  a  well-balanced  mind  is  often  pronounced  insanity  by 
science.  It  has  even  been  argued  with  plausibility  by  theorists 
that  all  are  insane  on  one  or  more  subjects,  or  labor  under  some 
delusion  or  other.  But  these  speculations  and  ^^'^  refinements 
help  but  little  in  the  practical  administration  of  justice;  the 
moral  guilt  of  one  man,  by  reason  of  vicious  training  or  inferior- 
ity of  intellectual  power,  may  be  less  than  that  of  another,  but 
the  law  takes  no  note  of  this  in  fixing  responsibility  for  crii^e; 
nor  dare  it  do  so,  if  society  is  to  be  protected.  Therefore,  since 
<Dommonwealth  v.  Hosier,  4  Pa.  St.  264,  decided  more  than  a 
half -century  ago,  it  has  been  held  in  this  state  thus:  "The  law 
is  that,  whether  the  insanity  be  general  or  partial,  the  degree 
of  it  must  be  so  great  as  to  have  controlled  the  will  of  its  sub- 
ject, and  to  have  taken  from  him  the  freedom  of  moral  action.** 
Further  in  the  same  case,  it  is  said:  "A  man  may  be  mad  on  all 
subjects;  and  then,  though  he  may  have  glimmerings  of  reason^ 

he  is  not  a  responsible  agent.     This  is  general  insanity 

Partial  insanity  is  confined  to  a  particular  subject,  the  man 
being  sane  on  every  other.  In  that  species  of  madness,  it  ia 
plain  that  he  is  a  responsible  agent,  if  he  were  not  instigated  by 
his  madness  to  perpetrate  the  act.  He  continues  to  be  a  legiti- 
mate subject  of  punishment,  although  he  may  have  been  labor- 
ing under  a  moral  obliquity  of  perception,  as  much  as  if  he  were 
merely  laboring  under  an  obliquity  of  vision." 

In  Sayres  v.  Commonwealth,  88  Pa.  St.  299,  the  court  below 
charged  the  jury  thus:  "Ji  the  prisoner,  although  he  labors  un- 
der partial  insanity,  hallucination,  or  delusion,  did  understand 
the  nature  and  character  of  his  acts,  had  a  knowledge  that  it 
was  wrong  and  criminal,  and  mental  power  sufficient  to  appljj 


632  Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  [Penn* 

that  knowledge  to  his  own  case,  and  knew  if  he  did  the  act  hd 
would  do  wrong  and  would  receive  punishment;  if,  further,  he 
had  sufficient  power  of  memory  to  recollect  the  relation  in  which 
he  stood  to  others,  and  others  stood  to  him,  that  the  act  in 
question  was  contrary  to  the  plain  dictates  of  justice  and  right,. 
injurious  to  others,  and  a  violation  of  the  dictates  of  duty,  he- 
would  be  responsible."  This  court,  on  appeal,  approved  this  in- 
struction, saying,  "The  case  was  treated  with  marked  accuracy 
and  care  by  the  learned  judge  of  the  court  below." 

In  the  same  case,  the  court  instructed  the  jury  that  if  the 
prisoner  bona  fide  labored  under  a  fixed  belief  that  his  assailant 
was  attempting  to  take  his  life,  although  such  belief  was  a  de- 
lusion, and  he  killed  him  as  he  supposed  in  self-defense,  he  waa 
exempt  from  punishment. 

148  -^g  jja,Ve  very  many  reported  cases  involving  the  same 
question,  but  in  not  one  of  them  has  there  been  any  substan- 
tial variation  in  the  law  as  quoted  from  these  two  cases.  Read- 
ing carefully  the  charge,  including  the  answers  to  defendant's 
points,  we  think  it  was  a  correct  enunciation  of  the  law,  and 
entirely  fair  to  the  defendant.  It  was  not  pretended,  nor  could 
it  be  on  the  evidence,  that  the  killing  of  Landis  was  not  con- 
ceived by  defendant  weeks  before,  determined  on,  and  the  means 
of  accomplishing  it  provided  when  the  gun  and  ammunition 
were  bought;  then  deliberately  and  methodically  committed 
when  the  looked-for  opportunity  occurred.  His  preceding  con- 
duct and  preparation  for  the  act  evince  mental  soundness.  Con- 
cede that,  in  flagrant  disregard  of  the  terms  of  his  contract,  he 
termed  Landis  a  wrongdoer  in  attempting  to  dispossess  him;  this 
proves  nothing  that  warrants  an  inference  of  insanity.  Observa- 
tion teaches  that  men  of  crude  ideas  as  to  property  rights,  or 
of  vindictive  dispositions,  not  seldom  act  as  if  wronged,  when 
called  upon  to  pay  an  honest  debt  or  perform  an  honest  contract 
obligation.  He  may  have  wrought  himself  into  a  belief  that 
Landis  ought  not  to  retake  possession  of  his  property;  if  so,  it 
was  a  mere  perversion  of  the  moral  sense,  prompting  him  to  vio- 
late a  law  of  property  because  it  seriously  inconvenienced  him; 
then,  but  a  step  further  in  the  same  direction,  in  assumed  self- 
defense,  he  violated  the  law  protecting  the  person  of  Landis. 
The  whole  argument  of  appellant  rests  on  an  unsubstantial  foun- 
dation, to  wit,  that  the  individual  belief  of  Wireback,  as  to 
right  and  wrong,  if  sincere,  constituted  a  delusion,  or  a  phase 
of  insanity  which  as  to  him,  at  the  time,  excused  his  crime. 
The  same  sort  of  delusion  would  excuse  a  Mormon  elder  who  en- 


Feb,  1899.]        Commonwealth  t;.  Wireback.  63S 

tered  into  plural  marriage  contracts  in  this  state.  He  not  onlj 
believes  his  conduct  not  wrong,  but  that  it  is  divinely  enjoined. 
But  the  law  tolerates  no  mere  individual  opinion,  however  sin- 
cere, as  an  excuse  for  breaking  the  law;  itself  establishes  the 
rule  of  conduct  for  the  individual  in  his  relations  to  society,  en- 
joins what  it  deems  right  and  prohibits  what  it  deems  wrong, 
and  to  this  rule  he  must  conform  or  take  the  consequences.  The 
whole  evidence,  in  one  view  of  it,  tended  to  show  that  Wireback, 
with  full  knowledge  of  the  law,  set  up  his  own  standard  of  right 
and  wrong  with  reference  to  his  contract  with  Landis  and  their 
*****  respective  duties  under  it,  and  followed  that  standard  to  the 
end.  To  indiiterence  to  this  distinction,  the  rule  of  action  pre- 
scribed by  the  law,  and  a  rule  of  action  violative  of  it  prescribed 
by  Wireback  for  himself,  is  owing  the  burden  of  appellant's 
complaint  of  the  charge.  The  learned  judge  of  the  court  below, 
throughout,  had  it  fully  in  view,  and  so  declared  the  law  that 
the  jury  could  not  have  failed  to  understand  it.  Defendant's 
ninth  point  and  the  answer  thereto  really  lay  down  the  law  as 
his  counsel  requested,  thus: 

"9.  If  the  jury  believes  that  the  reason,  judgment,  and  un- 
derstanding of  the  defendant  were  overthrown  at  the  time  of 
the  shooting,  and  he  really  did  not  know  what  he  was  doing, 
the  verdict  must  be  not  guilty,  on  the  ground  of  insanity.  An- 
swer: This  point  is  affirmed,  provided  the  jury  are  satisfied  from 
a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  at  the  time  of  the 
commission  of  the  act  the  defendant  had  not,  by  reason  of  in- 
sanity, the  power  or  capacity  to  distinguish  between  right  and 
wrong  at  that  time,  in  reference  to  the  act  he  was  about  to  and 
actually  did  commit." 

This  point  and  answer,  in  connection  with  the  instruction  in 
the  general  charge:  "That  no  mere  moral  obliquity  of  percep- 
tion will  protect  a  person  from  punishment  for  his  deliberate 
act,"  presented  both  the  defendants  and  the  commonwealth's 
legal  contention  perspicuously.  The  complaint  that  the  court 
erred  in  saying  to  the  jury  that,  "an  individual  who  has  suffi- 
cient intelligence  to  know  that  loading  a  pistol  or  gun,  point- 
ing it  at  a  human  being  and  pulling  the  trigger,  are  acts  which 
may  or  will  cause  death  of  the  person  against  whom  they  are 
directed,  should  not  be  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity," 
is  error,  if  wrested  from  its  connection,  and  treated  as  an  iso- 
lated sentence.  But,  to  determine  whether  the  jury  could  have 
been  misled,  it  must  be  considered,  not  only  with  what  pre- 
cedes and  follows,  but  in  view  of  the  idea  then  being  elucidated. 


634  Commonwealth  v.  Wireback.  [Penn. 

Oounsel,  as  shown  by  their  written  point,  contended  that  if,  at 
the  time  of  the  shooting,  the  reason  of  defendant  was  overthrown, 
«o  that  he  did  not  know  what  he  was  doing,  he  should  be  found 
not  guilty,  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  and  this  irrespective  of  the 
soundness  of  mind  immediately  before  and  after  the  shooting.  If 
Wireback  was  sane  immediately  before  and  immediately  after  the 
shooting,  clearly  the  law  would  presume  him  ^°**  sane  when  he 
fired  the  shot,  and  this  presumption  could  only  be  rebutted  by 
his  showing  some  special  frenzy  or  madness,  connected  with  the 
act,  which  at  the  instant  irresistibly  impelled  him  to  commit 
it.  There  was  nothing  in  the  act  itself  or  the  method  of  it 
which  tended  to  rebut  the  presumption.  A  previously  prepared 
loaded  weapon  in  his  hands,  sheltering  himself  behind  the  bar- 
ricade at  the  head  of  the  stairs,  luring  Landis,  the  special  object 
of  his  animosity,  to  the  foot  of  them,  the  assured  aim  at  a 
vital  part  of  the  body,  all  indicated  intelligence  and  reasoning 
power;  certainly,  if  he  were  sane  immediately  before  and  imme- 
diately after  such  acts,  he  should  not,  from  any  inference  to  be 
drawn  from  them,  be  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity.  As 
«howing  conclusively  the  meaning,  the  court  below  immediately 
follows  this  remark  by  saying:  "The  doctrine  that  an  individual 
can  be  entirely  sane  immediately  before  and  immediately  after 
such  act  was  committed,  and  yet  insane  at  the  instant  if  was 
committed,  is  contrary,  as  writers  say,  to  every  principle  of  sound 

psychological  science Our  supreme  court    has  said  the 

law  presumes  sanity  if  no  insanity  be  shown,  and  if  the  person 
was  sane  shortly  before  and  shortly  afterward  the  presumption 
is  of  sanity  at  the  time  of  the  act.'*  The  meaning  is  further 
shown  by  the  instruction  immediately  preceding  the  sentence 
complained  of,  as  to  an  insane  delusion  that  the  of&cers  had 
come  to  kill  him,  and  that  self-defense  was  his  right  and  duty, 
thus:  'Ton  will  readily  perceive,  therefore,  that  a  delusion,  to 
Tender  a  person  irresponsible  for  an  act  which  would  otherwise 
be  criminal,  must  be  a  delusion  that  a  state  of  facts  exist  which, 
if  really  existing,  would  wholly  excuse  the  act  he  was  about  to 
commit."  The  court  thus  impressed  upon  the  jury  the  dis- 
tinction between  a  thoroughly  tenable  ground  of  defense,  a  bona 
fide  delusion  as  to  a  fact,  to  wit,  that  the  purpose  was  to  kill 
him,  and  an  untenable  ground,  with  nothing  in  the  evidence 
to  support  it,  to  wit,  from  the  act  of  shooting,  itself,  instanta- 
neous and  momentary  frenzy  which  prompted  the  act.  The 
court  did  not,  as  argued,  by  this  sentence  sweep  away  the  de- 
fense that  Wireback  fired  the  shot  under  the  delusion  that  he 


Feb.  1899.]        Commonwealth  v.  Wibeback.  635 

was  acting  in  defense  of  his  life  against  those  who  unlawfully 
€ought  it.  Defendant's  first  point,  which  raises  the  question, 
is  substantially  affirmed.  The  jury  was  told  that  if  defendant 
***  committed  the  act  under  any  delusion  which  controlled  his 
will  and  made  the  commission  of  the  act  a  duty  of  overruling 
necessity,  the  verdict  should  be  not  guilty  on  the  ground  of  in- 
sanity, but  the  court  unnecessarily  went  further  and  added,  if 
the  delusion  deprived  him  of  all  freedom  of  agency,  the  verdict 
should  be  not  guilty  on  the  ground  of  insanity.  This  addition 
was  not  suggested  by  any  evidence  that  we  have  discovered,  and 
left  open  to  the  jury  a  field  for  conjecture  that  certainly  was  not 
prejudicial  to  defendant. 

Defendant's  seventh  prayer  for  instruction  was  that:  "The 
jury  need  not  be  satisfied  of  the  insanity  of  the  defendant  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt,  and  must  render  a  verdict  of  not 
guilty  on  the  ground  of  insanity  if  they  have  a  reasonable 
-doubt."  To  which  the  court  answered:  "The  presumption  is 
that  at  the  time  of  committing  this  crime  Kalph  W.  Wireback 
was  sane,  and  the  burden  of  proof  of  insanity  being  upon  him, 
the  defendant,  he  must  satisfy  the  jury  by  a  fair  preponderance 
of  the  evidence  submitted  to  them  that,  at  the  time  he  com- 
mitted the  act,  he  was  insane  to  such  an  extent  that  insanity 
controlled  his  will,  and  made  the  commission  of  the  act  he  com- 
mitted appear  to  him  a  duty  of  overruling  necessity,  or  deprived 
him  of  all  freedom  of  agency.  If  he  fail  to  do  so — if  the  fair 
preponderance  of  the  testimony  does  not  so  satisfy  the  jury  of 
fiuch  insanity,  but  only  creates  a  doubt  of  his  sanity,  or  reason- 
able doubt  of  his  sanity — ^it  is  insufficient  to  justify  an  acquittal, 
and  the  jury  should  return  a  verdict  of  guilty  in  such  case." 

More  than  once  we  have  attempted  to  settle  the  question 
raised  by  the  assignment  of  error  to  the  answer  to  this  point. 
To  convict  of  murder  of  the  first  degree,  the  commonwealth 
must  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  the  unlawful  killing  and 
the  fully  formed  purpose  to  kill;  it  need  adduce  no  proof  what- 
ever of  the  sanity  of  the  prisoner;  the  law  presumes  that,  and 
the  presumption  is  conclusive,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to 
rebut  it.  If  the  accused  alleges  insanity,  he  must  establish  it 
by  fairly  preponderating  evidence,  or  the  presumption  of  sanity 
which  the  law  raises  stands  unshaken:  Coyle  v.  Commonwealth, 
100  Pa.  St.  578,  45  Am.  Eep.  397;  Commonwealth  v.  Gerade, 
145  Pa.  St.  289,  27  Am.  St.  Eep.  689;  Commonwealth  v.  Wood- 
ley,  166  Pa.  St.  463.  Either  the  jury  remained  convinced  of 
the  prisoner's  sanity,  by  the  legal  presumption  against  him,  OT 


636  Commonwealth  v.  Wireback.  [Penn. 

they  are  convinced  of  his  insanity  by  the  preponderance  of  evi- 
dence ^*^^  in  his  favor;  there  is  no  middle  ground  which  the 
law  recognizes;  nor  does  a  doubt  of  sanity  reduce  the  grade  of 
the  crime  to  murder  of  the  second  degree.  From  the  very 
nature  of  the  mental  disease,  there  can  be  no  grading  of  it  by 
degrees  so  as  to  accord  with  a  degree  in  crime.  To  say  that  a 
man  is  insane  to  an  extent  which  incapacitates  him  from  fully 
forming  an  intent  to  take  life,  yet  enables  him  to  fully  and 
maliciously  form  an  intent  to  do  great  bodily  harm  without  a 
purpose  to  take  life,  is  absurd,  for  the  one  involves  the  same 
test  of  responsibility  as  the  other — the  ability  to  distinguish 
between  right  and  wrong.  Either  the  offense  of  defendant  is 
wholly  excused,  because  the  jury  is  satisfied  by  the  preponder- 
ance of  evidence  of  his  irresponsibility,  or  he  is  guilty,  because 
the  evidence  fails  to  so  satisfy  them. 

"We  have  thus  gone  over,  very  carefully,  the  evidence  and 
assignments  of  error,  because  the  gravity  of  the  judgment 
against  defendant  seemed  to  demand  it.  We  are  convinced  he 
had  a  lawful  and  impartial  trial,  and  that  the  evidence  was 
amply  sufficient  to  warrant  the  verdict. 

As  to  the  objection  to  remarks  of  commonwealth's  counsel  to 
the  jury,  the  assignment  of  error  is  irregularly  preferred  here, 
and  we  do  not  discuss  it. 

The  judgment  is  affirmed,  and  it  is  ordered  that  the  record 
be  remitted  to  the  court  of  oyer  and  terminer  of  Lancaster 
county,  that  the  judgment  may  be  carried  into  execution  accord- 
ing to  law. 

WITNESSES-EXPERTS  —  OPINIONS— SANITY.— A  nonexpert 
witness  may  be  heard  upon  the  question  of  insanity,  but  his  compe- 
tency to  express  an  opinion  must  first  appear,  and  whether  he  is 
compotont  or  not  is  a  question  for  the  court:  Grand  Lodge  I.  O.  M. 
A.  V.  Wieting,  168  111.  408,  Gl  Am.  St.  Rep.  123,  and  note;  Pidcock  v. 
Potter,  C8  Pa.  St.  M2,  8  Am.  Rep.  181,  and  monographic  note  thereto. 
It  is  not  error  to  exclude  the  opinion  of  a  witness  as  to  whether  a 
person  acting  imnaturally  was  feigning  or  not,  where  no  prior  ac- 
quaintance between  such  person  and  the  witness  was  shown:  Bnos 
V.  St.  Paul  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  4  S.  Dak.  630,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  796. 

nOMICTDE— INSANITY  AS  A  DEFENSE— TEST.— Insanity  is 
not  available  as  a  defense  to  an  indictment  for  murder,  if  the  ac- 
cused, at  the  time  of  the  killing,  was  capable  of  distinguishing  be- 
tween right  and  wrong  with  respect  to  that  act,  and  was  conscious 
that  the  act  was  one  which  he  ought  not  to  have  done,  although  he 
might  have  been  imnelled  by  an  irresistible  impulse  to  do  it:  Genz 
V.  State,  no  N.  .T.  L.  48**.  59  Am.  St.  Ren.  (519.  and  note;  Evers  v.  State, 
31  Tex.  Crlm.  Rep.  318,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  811.  The  test  of  responsl- 
liility  for  criminal  acts,  where  unsoundness  of  mind  is  set  up  as  a  de- 
fense, is  the  capaeity  of  the  defendant  to  distinguish  between  right 
and  wrong  at  the  time  of  and  with  respect  to  the  act  which  is  the 


March,  1899.]  Swope  v.  Donnelly.  637 

subject  of  the  Inquiry:  Flanngan  v.  People,  52  N.  Y.  467,  11  Am.  Rep. 
731;  Cunningham  v.  State,  56  Miss.  269,  31  Am.  Rep.  360.  See  the 
extended  notes  to  Parsons  v.  State,  60  Am.  Rep.  212-2^,  and  State 
V.  Marler,  36  Am.  Dec.  402-411.  As  to  when  partial  insanity  Is  a  de- 
fense to  crime:  C^irter  v.  State,  12  Tex.  500,  62  Am.  Dec.  530;  State  v. 
Shippey,  10  Minn.  223,  88  Am.  Dec.  70;  when  it  is  not:  Common- 
wealth V.  Rogers,  7  Met.  500,  41  Am.  Dec.  458;  Freeman  v.  People, 
4  Denio,  9,  47  Am.  Dec.  216. 

HOMICIDE-DEFENSE  OP  INSANITY— MORAL  INSANITY. 
The  defense  of  moral  insanity  in  criminal  cases  is  so  peculiarly  liable 
to  abuse  that  the  utmost  care  and  circumspection  are  required  on 
the  part  of  the  court  in  presenting  to  the  jury  the  legal  principles 
relating  to  it:  Scott  v.  Commonwealth,  4  Met  227,  83  Am.  Dec.  461. 
In  South  Carolina,  moral  insanity  is  not  a  defense  against  a  charge 
of  crime:  State  v.  Levelle,  34  S.  C.  120.  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  799. 

TRIAL  — IMPANELING  JURY  —  EXAMINATION  ON  VOIR 
DIRE.— The  examination  of  Jurors  upon  their  voir  dire  Is  not  to  be 
confined  strictly  to  the  questions  formulated  in  the  statute,  but 
should  be  varied  and  elaborated  as  the  circumstances  seem  to  re- 
quire, so  as  to  obtain  a  fair  and  impartial  Jury:  Pinder  v.  State,  27 
Fla.  370,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  75,  and  note.  That  only  statutory  ques- 
tions should  be  asked,  see  Monday  v.  State,  32  Ga.  672,  79  Am.  Dec 
314. 


SwoPE  V,  Donnelly. 

[190  Pennsylvania  State,  417.] 

WILLS— DECLARATIONS  OP  TESTATOR  AS  EVIDENCE. 
Where  a  will  is  attaclied  on  the  gi'ound  of  forgery,  declarations  of 
the  testator  as  to  his  intentions  are  admissible  for  the  purpose  of 
corroboration,  but  such  evidence  Is  not  suflScient  either  to  establish 
the  execution  of  the  will  or  to  overcome  the  testimony  of  the  sub- 
ecrioing  witnesses. 

WILLS— DECLARATIONS  OP  TESTATOR— NOT  PROP- 
ERLY ADMISSIBLE.— Where  the  Issue  Is  whether  or  not  a  will 
purporting  to  have  been  executed  on  a  certain  day  Is  a  forgery, 
■declarations  of  the  testator  that  a  will  with  which  he  was  satisfied 
was  in  existence  two  months  before  that  day,  also  an  expression  of 
Infentlon  made  by  him  five  years  before  that  time,  are  irrelevant  and 
inadmissible. 

APPEAL-INSUFFICIENT  ASSIGNMENT  OF  ERROR.— 
An  assignment  of  error  alleging  error  in  the  admission  of  evidence 
will  not  be  considered,  where  it  fails  to  set  forth  the  evidence. 

A  paper  alleged  to  be  the  will  of  Mary  R.  Donnelly,  who  died 
on  December  25,  1893,  and  dated  December  10,  1893,  made 
Xellie  Swope  and  Monica  Doorley  the  residuary  legatees.  The 
decedent's  husband,  Patrick  F.  Donnelly,  attacked  the  paper  as 
a  forgery.  Four  witnesses  testified  to  the  execution  of  the 
paper.  Three  assignments  of  error  were  made  on  appeal  from 
judgment  for  plaintiffs.  Two  are  recited  in  the  opinion,  and 
the  third,  which  the  court  refused  to  consider,  was  in  allowing 


638  SwoPE  V.  Donnelly.  [Penn. 

plaintiffs  to  show  declarations  of  Mary  E.  Donnelly,  prior  to  the 
date  of  the  alleged  will,  as  to  her  intended  disposition  of  her 
property. 

C.  Cooper  Shapley,  for  the  appellant. 

Thomas  James  Meagher  and  Patrick  Duffy,  for  the  appellees. 

'*2**  FELL,  J.  On  the  questions  of  testamentary  capacity 
and  fraud  or  undue  influence  in  the  procurement  of  a  will,  the 
declarations  of  a  testator,  not  a  part  of  the  res  gestae,  hut  so 
connected  in  point  of  time  with  the  testamentary  act  as  to 
justify  an  inference  that  they  indicate  the  state  of  the  testator's 
mind  when  the  will  was  executed,  are  admissible  in  evidence. 
Such  declarations  may  he  direct  proof  on  the  question  of  testa- 
mentary capacity,  but  as  tending  to  establish  the  fact  of  undue 
influence  they  are  hearsay  merely,  and  without  force.  They  are, 
however,  admissible  on  that  question  as  tending  to  show  the  sus- 
ceptibility of  the  testator's  mind  to  the  influences  which  sur- 
rounded him:  Herster  v.  Herster,  122  Pa.  St.  239,  9  Am.  St. 
Eep.  95;  Wharton  on  Evidence,  sees.  1009-1012;  1  Redfield  on 
Wills,  *551. 

The  proposition  that  the  declarations  of  a  testator  as  to  his 
intentions  are  admissible  where  the  will  is  disputed  on  the 
ground  of  fraud,  circumvention,  or  forgery,  has  received  the 
general  assent  of  text-writers  on  the  subject;  but  the  cases  in 
which  such  declarations  have  been  admitted,  where  the  only 
question  was  that  of  forgery,  are  few.  The  trend  of  decision 
seems  to  be  very  decidedly  in  favor  of  their  admission  in  cor- 
roboration of  direct  proof  of  the  execution  of  the  will,  whether 
made  before  or  after  its  date.  In  Turner  v.  Hand,  3  Wall.  Jr. 
88,  proof  was  admitted  of  conversations  had  with  the  decedent,, 
both  before  and  after  the  date  of  the  alleged  will,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing,  among  other  things,  that  the  dispositions  of 
property  contained  in  the  paper  were  wholly  at  variance  with 
his  often  expressed  testamentary  intentions.  In  Tynan  v.  Pas- 
chal, 27  **i  Tex.  286,  84  Am.  Dec.  619,  declarations  of  the  tes- 
tator were  said  to  be  admissible  to  rebut  the  presumption  of 
cancellation  or  revocation  of  a  will  arising  from  its  loss  or  de- 
struction before  his  death,  and  as  tending  in  some  degree  to 
strengthen  other  proofs  of  its  execution.  The  relevancy  of 
such  declarations  was  recognized  in  Johnson  v.  Brown,  51  Tex. 
65,  in  a  contest  as  to  the  genuineness  of  a  will;  and  the  declara- 
tions of  a  testator,  made  both  before  and  after  its  date,  expres- 


March,  1899.]  Swope  v.  Donnelly.  639 

sive  of  ill-will  or  of  kindness  toward  the  beneficiaries,  were  ad- 
mitted. In  Hoppe  V.  Byers,  60  Md.  381,  a  very  carefully  con- 
sidered case  in  which  the  authorities  on  the  subject  are  reviewed,, 
it  was  held  that  after  the  introduction  of  direct  proof  of  the- 
genuineness  of  the  handwriting,  met  by  direct  proof  to  the  con- 
trary, declarations  of  the  deceased  corroborative  of  such  direct 
proofs  were  admissible  in  evidence.  A  like  ruling  was  made  ia 
Taylor  will  case,  10  Abb.  Pr.,  K  S.,  300. 

In  all  of  these  cases  it  was  said,  in  effect,  that  the  proof  of 
declarations  was  not  in  itself  sufficient  either  to  establish  the 
execution  of  the  will  or  to  overcome  the  testimony  of  the  sub- 
scribing witnesses,  and  that  it  was  admissible  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  corroboration.  In  the  opinion  in  Hoppe  v.  Byers,  60- 
Md.  381,  it  was  said:  "But  in  thus  sustaining  the  ruling  ex- 
cepted to,  it  must  be  distinctly  understood  that  we  hold  that 
such  declarations  would  not  be  admissible  if  they  stood  alone,, 
and  had  not  been  preceded  by  direct  proof  of  witnesses  to  the 
genuineness  of  the  handwriting.  They  are  not  to  be  taken  as 
direct  proof  to  establish  the  paper,  but  merely  as  corroborative- 
of  such  direct  proof,  or  as  a  circumstance  in  a  case  of  this  char- 
acter, where  such  direct  evidence  has  been  first  given,  proper 
for  the  consideration  of  the  jury."  At  the  best,  this  is  a  dan- 
gerous class  of  testimony,  and  its  admission  shoidd  be  carefully- 
guarded  and  its  effect  as  corroborative  only  should  be  clearly 
defined. 

In  this  case  the  deceased,  who  was  a  married  woman  without 
children,  died  on  December  25,  1893.  The  writing  offered  for 
probate  is  dated  December  10,  1893,  and  by  it  all  her  property 
is  given  to  her  sisters  and  nieces,  to  the  exclusion  of  her  hus- 
band. The  assignments  of  error  are  to  the  admission  of  declara- 
tions of  the  deceased  made  to  witnesses  before  the  execution 
of  the  writing  as  to  the  disposition  which  she  intended  to  make- 
'*^^  of  her  property.  There  was  not  the  slightest  limit  as  to- 
the  time  when  the  declarations  were  made,  and,  under  general 
offers,  the  witnesses  were  allowed  to  testify  to  conversations  had 
at  any  time  during  the  life  of  the  deceased.  This  led  to  the 
introduction  of  testimony  which  was  clearly  irrelevant.  One 
witness,  Emma  Witherspoon,  testified  to  a  conversation  with  the^ 
deceased  in  October  precdfling  her  death,  in  which  she  said  she 
had  executed  a  will,  and  then  had  it  with  her,  in  which  she 
had  provided  for  one  of  her  sisters,  and  that  she  wished  her 
husband  to  have  only  what  the  law  would  allow  him.  Another^ 
Mary  Muldoon,  testified  that  the  deceased  had  said  to  her  thai 


€40  SwoPE  V.  Donnelly.  [Penn. 

€he  wished  her  money  to  go  to  her  people,  and  that  she  would 
not  leave  a  dollar  to  her  husband  if  the  law  did  not  compel 
her  to  do  so;  and  that  on  one  occasion  she  had  gone  with  her 
to  see  a  lawyer  about  making  her  will.  This  was  about  five 
years  before  her  death.  The  writing  in  question,  if  genuine,  was 
prepared  by  the  deceased  in  the  house  of  her  sister  about  fifteen 
days  before  her  death.  Tlie  testimony  of  one  of  the  witnesses 
tended  to  show  that  there  had  been  a  prior  will,  that  of  the 
other  an  intention  to  make  a  will,  and  perhaps  that  of  both  a 
general  intent  that  her  husband  should  receive  only  such  share 
of  her  estate  as  the  law  would  give  him.  But  upon  the  real 
issue,  whether  a  will  had  been  executed  in  December,  1893,  this 
testimony  threw  a  very  uncertain  light,  and  it  was  altogether  too 
Tague  and  remote  to  be  considered  as  corroborative  of  the  testi- 
mony of  the  witnesses  to  the  execution  of  the  writing  offered  aa 
s.  will.  The  fact  that  a  will  with  which  the  deceased  was  satis- 
fied was  in  existence  in  October  could  not  be  corroborative  of 
testimony  that  another  will  had  been  executed  in  December,  and 
the  mere  expression  of  an  intention  to  make  a  will  five  years 
before  would  have  no  weight  whatever. 

In  justice  to  the  learned  trial  judge,  it  should  be  said  that 
many  of  the  questions  which  elicited  this  irrelevant  testimony 
were  not  objected  to  at  the  time,  and  he  may  have  considered 
them  as  having  been  asked  without  objection.  They  came,  how- 
•ever,  without  specific  objections,  under  the  general  rulings  on 
the  subject,  one  of  which  was  on  the  question,  "What  disposi- 
tion did  she*  tell  you  she  was  going  to  make  of  her  property?'* 
And  the  other  on  an  offer  to  prove  declarations  of  the  deceased 
made  at  any  time. 

*^''*  Leave  was  given  at  the  argument  to  amend  the  first  and 
second  assignments  by  adding  thereto  the  testimony  to  the  ad- 
mission of  which  exceptions  were  taken  at  the  trial.  The  third 
-assignment  is  not  in  compliance  with  the  rules  of  this  court,  and 
will  not  be  considered.  The  first  and  second  assignments  of 
error  are  sustained,  and  the  judgment  is  reversed  with  a  renire 
facias  de  novo. 


WILLS-DECLARATTONS  OF  TESTATOR  AS  EVlDBNCBl 
-Generally,  the  declarations  of  a  testator  are  not  competent  evidence 
to  Impeach  the  validity  of  a  will.  And  evidence  that  the  deceased 
had  in  his  lifetime  often  declared  his  Ignorance  of  the  existence  of 
a  will  executed  by  hhu  is  inadmissible:  See  the  note  to  Roberts  v. 
Trawlcli,  52  Am.  Dec.  108.  Declarations  of  the  ancestor,  under 
whom  both  parties  claim,  unaccompanied  by  any  act,  showing  what 
disposition  be  had  made  or  Intended  to  make  of  his  estate,  are  not 


March,  1899.]         Steinmeyeb  v.  Siebebt.  641 

evidence:  Chadwick  v,  Webber.  3  Greenl.  141,  14  Am.  Dec.  222.  A. 
testator's  declarations  are  admissible  only  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing the  state  of  his  mind:  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme  Soc,  8  Conn.  254, 
20  Am.  Dec.  100;  Waterman  v.  Whitney,  11  N.  Y.  157,  62  Am.  Dec. 
71,  and  note  thereto;  Reynolds  v.  Adams,  90  111.  134,  32  Am.  Rep.  15. 
APPEALr-ASSIGNMENT  OP  ERROR.— An  exception  to  the  ad- 
mission or  rejection  of  evidence  will  not  be  considered  by  an  appel- 
late court  when  the  record  does  not  state  what  the  evidence  was: 
Sanford  v.  Howard,  29  Ala.  684,  68  Am.  Dec.  101;  Harris  v.  Tyson, 
24  Pa.  St.  347,  64  Am.  Dec.  661;  Sewell  v.  Eaton,  6  Wis.  490,  70  Am. 
Dec.  471;  Burson  v.  Fire  Assn.,  136  Pa.  St.  267,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  919. 


Steinmeyeb  v.  Siebeet. 

(190  Pennsylvania  Stats,  47L] 

EQUITY— JURISDICTION— SPECIFIC  PERFORMANCE.— 
The  rule  that  equity  will  not  entertain  jurisdiction  to  decree  spe- 
cific performance  respecting  goods,  chattels,  stocks,  and  other  things 
of  a  merely  personal  nature,  is  limited  to  cases  where  compensa- 
tion in  damages  will  furnish  a  complete  remedy.  Where  the 
wrong  is  a  betrayal  of  confidence,  equity  will  decree  restitution, 
which  may  be  enforced  specifically  against  the  wrongdoer. 

APPEAL— FINDINGS  OF  JUDGE  SITTING  AS  CHANCEL- 
LOR.—Findings  of  fact  made  by  a  judge  sitting  as  chancellor  will 
not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  except  for  error  which  clearly  appears. 
An  apparent  preponderance  of  testimony  against  them  is  not  sufll- 
cient  to  lead  to  a  reversal,  where  there  Is  testimony  which  might 
warrant  them. 

Bill  in  equity  to  compel  the  restitution  of  stock  of  a  corpora- 
tion. The  stock  in  question  was  one  hundred  and  forty-seven 
shares  of  stock  in  the  Ewalt  Street  Bridge  Company,  alleged  by 
plaintiff  to  belong  to  his  testator,  Christian  Siebert,  but  which 
purported  to  have  been  transferred  to  the  defendant,  P.  W.  Sie- 
bert, a  son  of  the  testator,  before  the  latter's  death.  The  lower 
court,  sitting  as  a  court  of  chancery,  found  as  conclusions  of  fact 
that  the  defendant  stood  in  a  relation  of  great  confidence  and 
trust  to  his  father  as  his  confidential  agent,  and,  in  short,  that 
he  had  no  right  to  any  but  twelve  of  the  one  hundred  and  forty- 
fieven  shares  of  stock  mentioned  above.  In  pursuance  of  the 
findings,  a  decree  was  entered  directing  a  transfer  of  one  hun- 
<dred  and  thirty-five  shares  of  stock  to  the  executor,  and  direct- 
ing the  defendant  to  pay  over  to  the  executor  the  amount  of 
dividends  which  he  had  received  on  the  shares.  Appeal  from 
this  decree. 

J.  S.  Ferguson  and  E.  G.  Ferguson,  for  the  appellant. 
AM.  St.  Est.,  Vol.  LXX.-41 


642  Steinmeyer  v.  Siebeet.  [Penn» 

W.  B.  Eodgers  and  J.  R.  Sterrett,  for  the  appellees. 

474  j^ELL,  J.  The  contention  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  en- 
titled to  proceed  in  equity  because  he  had  an  adequate  remedy^ 
at  law  cannot  be  sustained.  No  contract  in  relation  to  the 
stock  of  the  Ewalt  Bridge  Company  is  set  up  by  the  bill,  but  it 
is  alleged  therein  that  the  defendant  Siebert  never  had  any  right 
to  or  interest  in  the  stock,  and  that  he  obtained  the  legal  title 
thereto  fraudulently  and  by  the  abuse  of  the  relation  of  trust 
and  confidence  in  which  he  stood  to  the  real  owner.  The 
prayers  of  the  bill  were  for  discovery,  an  account,  and  for  trans- 
fer of  the  stock.  The  rule  that  jurisdiction  in  equity  will  not 
be  entertained  to  decree  a  specific  performance  respecting  goods,, 
chattels,  stocks,  and  other  things  of  a  merely  personal  nature 
is  limited  to  cases  where  a  compensation  in  damages  will  fur- 
nish a  complete  remedy.  Where  the  wrong  is  a  betrayal  of  con- 
fidence, equity  will  decree  restitution,  which  may  be  enforced 
specifically  against  the  wrongdoer.  In  McGowin  v.  Remington,. 
12  Pa.  St.  56,  61  Am.  Dec.  584,  a  clerk  was  compelled  to  sur- 
render drafts,  maps,  plans,  et  cetera,  which  he  had  withheld 
from  his  employer;  in  Abbott  v.  Reeves,  49  Pa.  St.  494,  88  Am. 
Dec.  510,  persons  who  had  borrowed  stocks  and  bonds  from  an 
executor  were  required  to  make  restitution;  in  Pennsylvania  ^"^^ 
Co.  v.  Franklin  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  181  Pa.  St.  40,  the  defendant  was 
required  to  issue  new  certificates  of  stock  to  an  owner  whose 
certificates  had  been  transferred  under  forged  powers  of  attor- 
ney. In  the  case  last  cited,  it  was  said  by  our  brother  Dean 
that  on  the  ground  that  an  action  at  law  would  be  an  inade- 
quate remedy  "equitable  jurisdiction  in  suits  by  shareholder* 
against  the  corporation  has,  on  like  prayers,  been  frequently  sus- 
tained both  in  the  English  courts  and  our  own." 

The  established  rule  under  the  former  practice  was  that  the 
findings  of  a  master  on  conflicting  evidence,  approved  by  the 
court,  would  not  be  reversed  except  on  clear  evidence  of  mis- 
take: Stocker  v.  Hutter,  134  Pa.  St.  19;  Brotherton  v.  Reynolds, 
164  Pa.  St.  134.  The  same  rule  applies  to  the  findings  of  fact 
of  a  judge  sitting  as  a  chancellor  under  the  new  equity  rules; 
his  findings  are  not  conclusive  upon  us,  but  they  will  not  be 
disturbed  except  for  error  which  clearly  appears.  An  apparent 
preponderance  of  testimony  against  them  is  not  sufficient  to 
lead  to  a  reversal,  if  there  is  testimony  which,  if  believed,  will 
warrant  them.  The  credibility  of  witnesses,  and  in  a  large  de- 
gree the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  their  testimony,  which 


March,  1899.]         Steinmeyeb  v.  Siebebt.  643 

depends  upon  their  character,  intelligence,  and  knowledge  of 
the  subject,  can  be  determined  much  better  by  the  judge  who 
hears  them  than  by  us  on  appeal:  Stockett  v.  Ryan,  176  Pa.  St. 
71;  Commonwealth  v,  Stevens,  178  Pa.  St.  543;  Hancock  v.  Mel- 
loy,  187  Pa.  St.  371.  We  have  referred'  to  this  subject,  n.ot 
because  we  have  entertained  any  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of 
the  conclusions  reached  in  this  case,  but  in  order  that  it  may 
be  better  understood  by  the  profession,  as  many  cases  came  here 
on  appeal  in  which  the  real  question,  as  in  this,  is  one  of  fact 
to  be  determined  by  the  consideration  of  conflicting  evidence. 
The  findings  of  fact  of  the  learned  judge  are  stated  with  clear- 
ness and  precision,  and  we  have  no  hesitation  in  accepting  them 
as  abundantly  sustained  by  the  testimony. 

The  decree  is  afl&rmed  at  the  cost  of  the  appellant. 


EQUITY  JURISDICTION— SPECIFIC  PERFORMANCEJ-PER- 
SONAL  PROPERTY.— Specific  performance  of  a  contract  respect- 
ing personal  property  will  not  ordinarily  be  enforced  In  equity  un- 
less an  adequate  remedy  at  law  cannot  be  had:  Eckstein  v.  Down- 
ing, 64  N.  H.  248,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  404,  and  note;  Hissam  v.  Par- 
rlsli,  41  W.  Va.  686,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  892;  see  the  monographic  note 
to  Anderson  v.  Green,  23  Am.  Dec.  423.  Equity  will  decree  the 
specific  performance  of  a  contract  to  convey  personal  property,  If 
like  property  cannot  be  obtained  elsewhere,  or  if  loss  cannot  be 
adequately  compensated  by  damages  In  an  action  at  law:  Manton 
V.  Ray,  18  R.  I.  672,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  811,  and  note. 

APPEAI^FINDINGS  OP  JUDGE  SITTING  AS  CHANCEL- 
LOR.—An  appeal  may  be  taken  In  equity  cases  on  questions  of  fact 
as  well  as  of  law,  and  the  appellate  court  may  go  behind  the  find- 
ings, weigh  all  the  evidence,  and  decide  according  to  its  preponder- 
ance; but  the  findings  of  the  court  below  will  not  be  disturbed  when 
the  evidence  as  to  a  fact  is  so  evenly  balanced,  or  the  proof  of  it 
BO  unsatisfactory  as  to  cause  the  mind  to  hesitate  and  pause  as  to 
the  side  on  which  it  preponderates,  and  to  leave  It  In  grave  doubt: 
North  Point  Irr.  Co.  v.  Union  etc.  Canal  Co..  16  Utah,  246,  67  Am.  St. 
Rep.  607.  The  general  rxile  Is  that  findings  will  not  be  disturbed: 
Shults  V.  Shults,  159  111.  654,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  188;  Pollock  v.  Caro- 
lina etc.  Assn.,  51  S.  C.  420,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  G83;  Holker  t.  Hennes> 
sey,  141  Mo.  527,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  524. 


644  Equitable  Trust  Co.  v,  Garis.  [Penn. 

Equitable   Trust  Company  v.  Garis. 

[190  Pennsylvania  State,  514.] 

EQUITY— JURISDICTION— DISCOVERY  OF  LUNATIC'S 
PROPERTY.— The  committee  of  a  lunatic  is  the  proper  party  to 
maintain  a  bill  in  equity  against  the  lunatic's  husband  for  the  dis- 
covery and  delivery  of  possession  of  muniments  of  title,  negotiable 
securities,  and  personal  property,  belonging  to  the  lunatic's  estate 
and  in  the  possession  of  the  husband,  where  the  latter  denies  her 
title,  or  there  is  reason  to  apprehend  that  he  will  treat  such  prop- 
erty adversely  to  her  interest. 

CORPORATIONS— TRUST  COMPANY— PRESUMPTION  OP 
CAPACITY.— In  the  absence  of  specific  restriction  in  Its  charter,  a 
trust  company  having  general  power  to  "execute  trusts  of  every  de- 
scription" must  be  presumed  to  have  corporate  capacity  to  act  as 
committee  of  a  lunatic. 

INSANE  PERSONS— POWERS  OF  COMMITTEE— EFFECT 
OF  APPEAL  FROM  ORDER  OF  COMMITMENT.- An  appeal  from 
an  order  of  commitment  entered  in  lunacy  proceedings  does  not 
oust  or  suspend  the  committee  of  a  lunatic  from  its  functions,  nor 
relieve  it  of  the  duty  to  guard  the  lunatic's  property.  Such  com- 
mittee may  stiil  sue  in  equity  for  the  discovery  and  deliverance  of 
property  of  the  lunatic  held  by  an  unauthorized  person. 

EQUITY— DISCOVERY  OP  LUNATIC'S  PROPERTY- 
SCOPE  OF  PRELIMINARY  INJUNCTION.— Under  a  bill  in  equity 
brought  by  the  committee  of  a  lunatic  against  the  latter's  husband 
for  the  discovery  of  property  of  the  lunatic  kept  by  the  husband  in 
a  box  in  a  safe  deposit  company,  a  preliminary  injunction  should 
go  no  farther  than  is  necessary  for  the  protection  and  enforcement 
of  the  lunatic's  rights  to  property  in  such  box,  and  should  not  in- 
fringe upon  defendant's  right  to  take  therefrom  property  belong- 
ing to  him  and  not  claimed  by  the  committee. 

INSANE  PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION  OF  LUNATIC'S 
ESTATE— DISBURSEMENTS— NOTICE  TO  NEXT  OF  KIN.- 
Before  ordering  disbursements  from  a  lunatic's  estate  upon  peti- 
tion of  the  committee,  notice  should  be  given  to  the  next  of  kin,  or 
parties  standing  in  close  relation  to  the  lunatic. 

INSANE  PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION  OF  ESTATES  OF. 
It  is  the  duty  of  a  court  in  administering  the  estate  of  an  insane 
person  to  keep  expenses  within  reasonable  bounds,  to  sacrifice  the 
estate  only  when  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  make  it  neces- 
sary, and  to  see  to  it  that  the  future  comfort  of  the  lunatic  shall 
be  made  as  secure  as  possible. 

Samuel  M.  Roberts  and  Allen  H.  Gangewer,  for  the  appellant. 

Dwight  M.  Lowrey,  Alfred  R.  Haig,  Henry  C.  Thompson,  Jr., 
and  William  F.  Harrity,  for  the  appellee. 

648  MITCHELL,  J.  This  ease  has  been  unfortunately  con- 
ducted from  the  outset.  The  extravagance  of  the  appellant's 
contentions  has  led  to  efforts  to  put  a  summary  end  to  them  by 
irregular  proceedings  which  cannot  be  sustained.  For  this  rea- 
son a  commitment  for  contempt  was  reversed:  In  re  Garis,  185 
Pa.  St.  497. 


AprU,  1899.]      Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Gabis.  645 

Substantially,  it  is  a  contest  between  the  committee  of  a 
lunatic  wife  and  the  husband  for  certain  property  claimed  by 
both,  and,  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  now  before  us,  it  is  a  bill 
filed  by  the  committee  against  the  husband,  setting  forth  on 
information  and  belief  tliat  certain  muniments  of  title,  nego- 
tiable securities,  and  personal  property  belonging  to  the  luna- 
tic's estate  were  in  the  possession  of  the  husband,  and  that  part 
of  them  at  least  had  by  him  been  deposited  in  a  private  box  in 
the  Columbia  Avenue  Trust  Company.  The  latter  was  also 
made  a  formal  defendant.  The  bill  prayed  for  discovery,  deliv- 
ery of  the  said  property,  and  an  injunction  against  the  husband 
from  opening  the  said  box,  and  against  the  trust  company  from 
permitting  him  to  have  access  to  it. 

The  husband  filed  an  answer,  denying  the  essential  averments 
as  to  his  possession  of  the  property.  The  denial,  however,  was 
purely  formal,  and  as  to  matters  which,  if  true,  must  be  within 
his  personal  knowledge,  as,  for  example,  the  averments  of  the 
fourth,  seventh,  tenth,  eleventh,  and  twelfth  items  of  the  bill, 
^^  the  answer  was  clearly  evasive  and  insufficient.  The  appel- 
lant and  his  codefendant,  the  Columbia  Avenue  Trust  Com- 
pany, then  put  on  record  an  agreed  statement  of  facts,  setting 
forth  the  connection  of  the  company  with  the  matter,  and  the 
appellant  filed  a  cross-bill  against  the  Equitable  Trust  Com- 
pany denying  its  capacity  to  act  as  committee,  its  right  to  bring 
suit  against  the  husband  of  the  lunatic,  and  raising  questions 
of  law  upon  these  and  other  matters  appearing  in  the  bill.  The 
court  below,  upon  a  preliminary  hearing,  issued  an  injunction, 
which  is  the  main  subject  of  the  present  appeal.  Before  dis- 
cussing its  terms,  it  is  desirable  to  clear  away  some  of  the  pre- 
liminary questions  involved,  so  that  the  case  may  be  put  in  posi- 
tion to  proceed  regularly  to  final  determination. 

A  bill  in  equity  will  lie  in  appropriate  circumstances  for  dis- 
covery and  delivery  of  possession  of  deeds  and  other  muniments 
of  title,  certificates  of  stock,  negotiable  securities,  and  other 
personal  property  having  special  and  peculiar  value  which  is  not 
adequately  represented  by  market  price.  The  committee  of  a 
lunatic  is  the  proper  party  to  bring  and  maintain  such  bill  for 
the  lunatic's  property. 

Such  bill  may  be  maintained  by  the  committee  against  the 
husband  of  the  lunatic  where  he  denies  her  title,  or  there  is 
reason  to  apprehend  that  he  will  deal  with  the  property  in  any 
way  adversely  to  her  interest. 

In  the  absence  of  specific    restriction  in  its  charter,  which 


646  Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Garis.  [Penn. 

nowhere  appears,  the  Equitable  Trust  Company,  by  virtue  of  its 
general  powers  under  the  act  of  May  9,  1889  (Pub.  Laws,  159), 
to  "execute  trusts  of  every  description,"  must  be  presumed  to 
have  corporate  capacity  to  act  as  committee  of  the  lunatic. 

The  bill  could  be  filed,  notwithstanding  the  removal  of  the 
record  of  the  lunacy  proceedings  to  this  court  by  the  appeal 
from  the  order  of  commitment.  That  appeal  did  not  oust  or 
suspend  the  committee  from  its  functions,  or  its  duty  to  secure 
the  property  of  the  lunatic.  The  bill  was  filed  in  the  same 
court  and  of  the  same  term  and  number  as  the  lunacy  proceed- 
ings, but  that  was  a  mere  incident  arising  from  the  rules  of  the 
courts  of  Philadelphia  county  for  the  proper  and  convenient  dis- 
tribution of  their  business.  Except  for  those  rules  it  might 
have  been  filed  in  a  different  court  and  have  made  part  of  a 
different  record. 

650  rpj^g  |j-j|^  therefore,  was  properly  filed,  but  it  must  be 
sustained  in  the  regular  way,  and  the  defendant  cannot  be  de- 
prived of  property,  of  which  he  is  in  possession  under  claim 
of  title,  without  hearing  and  competent  evidence.  The  extrava- 
gance of  his  claims  cannot  bar  him  from  his  actual  rights.  In 
view,  however,  of  the  nature  of  the  property  in  controversy  and 
the  facility  with  which  the  purpose  charged,  to  remove  it  from 
the  jurisdiction,  might  be  carried  out,  the  court  was  authorized 
to  grant  a  preliminary  injunction  to  protect  the  lunatic's  in- 
terests, should  her  title  be  hereafter  established. 

This  brings  us  to  the  consideration  of  the  terms  of  the  injunc- 
tion. These  are  too  broad.  It  appears  by  the  agreed  state- 
ment of  facts  that  the  appellant  deposited  in  the  Columbia 
Avenue  Company  in  November,  1894,  a  tin  box,  containing 
valuables  not  named,  and  in  April,  1896,  rented  a  safe  in  the 
vaults  of  the  said  company,  and  deposited  therein  a  number  of 
things  also  not  specified.  These  acts  were  done  in  his  own  name, 
and  the  later  of  them  more  than  a  year  before  the  proceedings 
in  lunacy  began,  though  the  inquisition  found  that  the  lunacy 
had  extended  back  to  February,  1896,  thus  antedating  by  two 
months  the  renting  of  the  safe.  The  presumption  from  these 
facts  is,  that  part  at  least  of  the  property  on  deposit  in  the 
Columbia  Avenue  Company  is  the  appellant's  own,  and  though 
his  failure  to  say  so  in  explicit  terms,  and  to  specify  the  articles 
he  so  claims,  greatly  weakens  such  presumption,  yet  he  should 
not  be  deprived  of  the  property  without  a  full  opportunity  to 
defend  his  title. 

The  injunction  is  also  somewhat  carelessly  worded,  so  that  it 


April,  1899.]     Equitable  Teust  Co.  v.  Gabis»  647 

appears  to  be  inconsistent  in  requiring  the  "boxes  to  "be  opened 
by  the  Columbia  Avenue  Trust  Company,  without  the  presence 
of  the  appellant,  and  in  prohibiting  him  from  opening  them, 
while  at  the  same  time  requiring  him  to  make  a  detailed  in- 
ventory of  their  contents.  And  the  last  paragraph  is  clearly; 
•excessive,  in  requiring  appellant  to  produce  and  deliver  to  the 
■committee  the  bonds,  mortgages,  et  cetera,  including  his  own 
note  in  his  wife's  favor,  the  title  and  even  existence  of  which 
have  not  yet  been  established.  This  order  can  only  be  made 
on  final  hearing,  the  power  of  the  court  at  present  being  limited 
to  the  preservation  of  the  existing  status  of  the  property  until 
the  title  to  it  is  determined. 

'^^  In  the  present  position  of  the  case  the  committee,  plain- _ 
tiff,  is  entitled:  1.  To  discovery  and  inspection  of  the  contents 
of  the  box  and  safe  in  the  vaults  of  the  Columbia  Avenue  Trust 
Company,  to  be  made  in  the  presence  of  both  parties  or  their 
attorneys;  2.  To  the  immediate  delivery  of  such  of  the  contents 
of  said  box  and  safe  as  are  or  may  be  admitted  by  the  appellant 
to  be  the  property  of  the  lunatic;  3.  To  an  injunction  until  final 
hearing  or  until  further  order  of  the  court,  restraining  the  ap- 
pellant from  selling,  pledging,  assigning,  removing,  or  otherwise 
interfering  with  such  contents  of  the  said  box  and  safe,  as  may 
be  claimed  by  him,  but  also  claimed  by  the  committee  as  the 
property  of  the  lunatic;  with  leave,  however,  to  the  appellant 
to  apply  at  any  time  to  the  court  for  permission  to  resume  the 
possession  and  control  of  any  of  the  said  contents  upon  giving  se- 
curity that  the  same  or  the  value  thereof  shall  be  forthcoming 
to  abide  the  final  decree  in  the  case;  4.  The  appellant  to  be  at 
liberty,  in  the  presence  of  the  proper  attorneys  or  representa- 
tives of  the  Equitable  Trust  Company  and  the  Columbia  Avenue 
Trust  Company,  to  remove  such  contents  of  the  said  box  and 
€afe  as  are  not  claimed  by  the  committee  as  the  property  of  the 
lunatic;  and  after  such  removal  the  Columbia  Avenue  Trust 
Company  may  be  enjoined  from  permitting  the  appellant  to 
have  access  to  the  said  box  and  safe,  except  in  the  presence  of 
the  attorney  or  representative  of  the  said  committee.  The  in- 
junction having  been  thus  modified,  the  case  should  proceed 
promptly  to  a  final  hearing  and  decree. 

This  disposes  of  the  substantial  controversy  in  the  case,  in  its 
present  position.  But  the  third  assignment  of  error  requires 
notice  of  another  matter.  The  court  below,  on  petition  of  the 
committee  in  July,  1897,  ordered  payment  of  certain  expenses 
for  costs  of  inquisition,  board  of  the  lunatic,  et  cetera,  out  of 


€48  Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Gams.  [Penn^ 

the  lunatic's  estate,  and  tlie  application  of  the  income  there- 
after to  her  hoard  from  time  to  time.  When  the  case  was  here 
before,  185  Pa.  St.  497,  it  was  held  that  this  could  be  done  with- 
out notice  to  the  party  instituting  the  proceedings.  But  it  is 
better  practice  to  give  notice  to  the  next  of  kin,  or  parties  stand- 
ing in  close  relation  to  the  lunatic.  The  danger  of  not  doing 
BO  is  illustrated  ^^^  by  the  similar  but  more  extensive  order 
made  in  July,  1898,  whereby  the  committee  was  authorized,  not 
only  to  apply  the  balance  of  the  income,  but  "so  much  of  the 
principal  as  may  be  necessary  after  the  income  is  exhausted" 
to  the  support  of  the  lunatic.  This  was  a  highly  improvident 
order.  The  estate,  as  set  forth  in  the  petition  of  the  committee, 
amounted  in  1898  to  about  nine  thousand  four  hundred  dollars, 
yielding  an  income  of  six  hundred  and  fifty  dollars,  which  the 
expenses  of  maintenance  as  at  present  conducted  would  exceed 
by  about  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  dollars  annually.  The 
situation,  therefore,  was  one  of  annually  decreasing  principal 
and  increasing  deficit,  a  situation  calling  for  the  utmost  care 
and  discretion  in  administration.  This  discretion  should  not  be 
surrendered  by  the  court  to  any  other  tribunal,  and  especially 
not  to  the  committee  by  any  general  order.  The  principal  of 
the  estate  should  only  be  sacrificed  to  necessity,  and  such  neces- 
sity should  be  determined  in  each  specific  instance  by  the  court 
itself,  having  before  it  all  the  circumstances,  including  the 
nature  and  value  of  the  property,  the  age,  condition  of  health 
and  situation  in  life  of  the  lunatic,  the  effect  of  loss  of  accus- 
tomed comforts,  the  prospect  of  increasing  infirmities,  et  cetera. 
It  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  see  that  the  future  comfort  of  the 
unfortunate  shall  be  made  as  secure  as  the  circumstances  per- 
mit, and  for  that  purpose  to  keep  present  expenses  within  rea- 
sonable bounds.  As  said  by  this  court  in  Wier  v.  Myers,  34 
Pa.  St.  377,  "all  those  expenses  ought  to  be  carefully  supervised 
by  the  court,  and,  considering  the  helpless  condition  of  the  luna- 
tic, none  ought  to  be  allowed  except  such  as  are  manifestly  just 
and  moderate"  Especially  is  it  the  duty  of  the  court  to  see 
that  the  estate  is  protected  in  the  administration.  Commis- 
Bions,  fees,  and  charges  of  all  kinds  should  be  allowed  only  on 
the  most  moderate  scale  of  compensation. 

We  have  considered  this  case,  as  was  our  duty,  in  the  light  of 
the  appellant's  legal  rights.  But  we  are  not  impressed  with 
the  merits  of  his  contention.  Whatever  claim  or  title  he  has 
to  any  of  the  property  in  controversy  he  should  show  promptly 
and  clearly.    As  against  the  committee,  he  has  no  right  of  pos- 


April,  1899. J      Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Garis.  64^ 

session  of  any  of  his  wife's  property,  and,  in  the  language  of  the 
chief  justice  when  the  case  was  here  before,  if  he  has  any  such 
property  in  his  possession  he  ought  to  turn  it  over  to  the  com- 
mittee and  save  further  trouble. 

The  decree  is  reversed  and  the  record  is  remitted,  with  direc- 
tions ^^^  to  amend  the  order  of  July  18,  1898,  by  striking  out 
the  authorization  of  the  application  of  any  part  of  the  principal 
of  the  estate  to  the  support  of  the  lunatic  without  express  direc- 
tion of  the  court,  and  to  reform  the  order  and  injunction  of 
November  15,  1898,  in  accordance  with  this  opinion.  The  costs 
of  this  appeal  to  abide  the  final  result  of  the  case. 


INSANE  PERSONS— EQUITY  JURISDICTION— POWERS  OF 
COMMITTEE— SALE  OP  PROPERTY.— The  exclusive  care  and 
custody  of  the  estate  of  idiots,  lunatics,  and  habitual  drunljards,  as 
well  as  of  their  persons,  are  vested  by  statute  In  the  court  of  chan- 
cery: L'Anioreux  v.  Crosby,  2  Paige,  422,  22  Am.  Dec.  655.  Lunacy 
or  mental  unsoundness  does  not  give  a  court  of  chancery  jurisdiction 
over  the  incompetent  until  after  the  inquisition  of  a  jury  adjudging 
him  to  be  non  compos  mentis:  Hamilton  v.  Traber,  78  Md.  26,  44 
Am.  St.  Rep.  258.  It  has  been  held  that  a  court  of  equity  has  in- 
herent power  to  order  a  sale  of  a  lunatic's  real  estate:  Dodge  v. 
Cole,  97  111.  338,  37  Am.  Rep.  111.  But  this  broad  statement  seems 
to  have  some  qualification,  and  the  sale  of  the  property  of  a  lunatic 
can  be  authorized  by  a  court  of  chancery  only  when  applied  to  by  a 
regularly  constituted  guardian,  committee,  or  trustee,  charged  with 
the  duty  of  maintaining  such  lunatic  and  protecting  and  managing 
his  estate.  A  mere  stranger  to  the  lunatic's  estate,  though  akin  to 
him  by  blood,  cannot  by  his  petition  give  the  court  jurisdiction: 
Hamilton  v.  Traber,  78  Md.  26,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  258.  The  power  of 
the  committee  of  a  lunatic  to  deal  with"  his  estate  was  at  common 
law  restricted  to  the  preservation  of  the  estate  and  the  application 
of  the  rents  and  income  to  his  proper  support  and  maintenance,  to 
the  exclusion  even  of  creditors,  if  necessary:  Hamilton  v.  Traber, 
78  Md.  26,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  258.  See  generally  on  the  question  of  the 
expenditure  of  the  income  of  the  lunatic's  estate,  the  monographic 
note  to  Villard  v.  Robert,  49  Am.  Dec.  657;  Patton  v.  Thompson,  2 
Jones  Eq.  411,  67  Am.  Dec.  222;  Campbell's  case,  2  Bland,  209,  20 
Am,  Dec.  360. 

CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A  company  may  foster  Its  legiti- 
mate business,  whatever  it  is,  by  all  the  usual  means,  but  It  can  go 
no  further:  Northside  Ry.  Co.  v.  Worthington,  88  Tex.  602,  53  Am. 
St.  Rep.  778.  A  corporation,  unless  prohibited  by  Its  charter  or  by 
statute,  has  power  to  make  all  contracts  requisite  for  the  purpose 
for  which  it  was  created.  A  corporation  may  act  as  an  adminis- 
trator when  the  law  does  not  require  the  administrator  to  take  an 
oath,  or  to  do  any  other  act  which  a  corporation  is  Incompetent  to 
perform:  Deringer  v.  Derlnger,  5  Houst  416,  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  150. 


CASES 

INTHB 

SUPREME   COURT 

TENNESSEE. 


Clement  v.  Insurance  Company. 

[101  Tennkssbe,  22.] 

INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY.— Where  a  pol- 
icy of  life  insurance  provides  tliat  after  one  year  from  its  inception 
It  shall  be  incontestable  if  the  premiums  are  paid,  such  policy  can- 
not be  contested  by  the  insurer,  after  a  year  has  elapsed,  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  in  obtaining  the  policy,  and  it  malses  no  difiCerence 
whether  suit  is  brought  upon  the  policy  by  the  assured's  represen- 
tatives or  any  bona  tide  assignee  of  the  assured, 

INSURANCE  —  LIFE-INCONTESTABILITY— FRAUD  OP 
ASSIGNEE.— Where  a  policy  of  life  insurance  provides  that  It 
shall  be  incontestable  by  the  company  after  one  year  if  the.  premi- 
ums are  paid,  and  suit  Is  brought  thereon  by  a  transferee  of  the 
policy,  after  the  lapse  of  such  time,  the  premiums  being  paid,  the 
Insurer  may,  nevertheless,  defend  upon  the  ground  that  the  plain- 
tiflP  is  not  a  transferee  in  good  faith,  and  that  the  transfer  vras  a 
mere  evasion  of  the  rule  against  vragering  policies,  and  evidence  In 
support  of  such  defense  Is  admissible. 

INSURANCE— LIFE— PAYMENT  OF  PREMIUMS  TO 
AGENT— PROOF.— Where  a  policy  of  life  Insurance  provides  that 
premiums  thereon  may  be  paid  to  an  agent  producing  a  receipt 
therefor  signed  by  the  president  or  other  named  officers  of  the 
company,  the  payment  of  premiums  is  sufficiently  established  In  a 
suit  on  the  policy,  by  evidence  that  they  were  paid  to  one  held  out 
as  a  general  agent  of  the  company  who  delivered  a  receipt  signed 
by  the  president  when  the  payment  was  made. 

INSURANCE-LIFE  —  INSURABLE  INTEREST— WAGER- 
ING POLICY.— One  who  takes  out  a  policy  upon  the  life  of  another 
paying  the  premiums  therefor  himself  must  have  an  Insurable  In- 
terest In  the  life  of  that  other,  or  the  policy  will  be  a  mere  wager 
policy  upon  which  the  party  to  whom  It  was  Issued  cannot  recover. 

INSURANOE-LIFEJ-ASSIGNMENT— INSURABLE  INI  BR- 
EST.—While,  when  a  policy  of  life  insurance  has  once  been  Issued 
to  a  beneficiary  legally  entitled,  he  may  assign  or  transfer  it  to  an- 
other who  has  no  Insurable  interest,  the  transfer  or  assignment 
must  be  In  good  faith,  and  not  a  mere  colorable  evasion  of  the  pro- 

»660) 


April,  1898.]        Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  661 

Tlslon  In  regard  to  wagering  contracts  and  In  order  to  validate  or 
legalize  the  same. 

INSURANCE  —  LIFE  —  INCONTESTABLE  CLAUSE— WA- 
<JERING  TRANSFER.— An  Incontestable  clause  in  a  policy  of  life 
insurance  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  aid  a  transferee  thereof  who,  by 
means  of  an  unauthorized  and  illegal  transfer,  commenced  before, 
And  consummated  after,  the  policy  issued,  to  recover  thereon. 
Such  clause  does  not  preclude  inquiry  into  the  transfer  and  the 
right  of  the  transferee  to  take  under  the  policy,  and  if  the  transfer 
is  a  wagering  transfer  the  transferee  cannot  recover. 

Caldwell  &  Lowe,  for  the  appellant. 

Turley  &  Wright  and  Moore  &  Wells,  for  the  appellee. 

**  WILKES,  J.  This  is  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  insur- 
ance for  eight  thousand  dollars  upon  the  life  of  Mattie  Lee 
Wright.  The  policy  was  issued  on  October  11,  1893,  and  was 
payable  to  the  executors,  administrators,  and  assigns  of  the  in- 
fiured.  On  October  19,  1893,  it  was  assigned  to  R.  H.  Clement 
and  W.  B.  Kerr,  upon  consideration  that  they  pay  the  premiums 
as  they  should  accrue,  as  well  as  the  premiums  upon  a  policy 
of  two  thousand  dollars  issued  simultaneously  by  the  assured 
upon  his  life  for  the  benefit  of  his  wife,  and  the  further  consid- 
eration of  twenty-five  dollars  paid  to  the  assured  himself.  The 
assured  died  December  27,  1894,  or  one  year,  two  months,  and 
sixteen  days  after  the  policy  issued,  he  being  about  twenty-six 
years  of  age.  After  his  death,  W.  B.  Kerr  assigned  two  thou- 
sand two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  dollars  and  ten  cents  of  hia 
part  and  interest  in  the  policy  to  the  Jerome  Hill  Cotton  Com- 
pany, to  satisfy  an  attachment  which  had  been  levied  upon  it, 
and  afterward,  but  before  this  suit  was  instituted,  assigned  the 
remainder  of  his  interest  under  the  policy  to  his  two  sons,  the 
complainants,  W.  A.  and  E.  B.  Kerr. 

Upon  the  hearing  of  the  cause  in  the  court  below,  upon  a 
■voluminous  record  and  a  vast  volume  of  proof,  the  chancellor 
was  of  opinion  that  complainants  were  not  entitled  to  recover 
upon  the  policy,  nor  to  any  relief,  and  he  dismissed  the  bill  at 
*'  their  cost,  and  they  have  appealed  and  assigned  errors. 

The  learned  chancellor,  in  his  decree,  set  out  in  full  his  find- 
ing of  facts  and  conclusions  of  law  thereon.  We  are  satisfied, 
from  an  examination  of  the  entire  record  as  it  is  presented,  that 
the  chancellor  was,  in  the  main,  correct  in  finding  the  facts  as 
follows: 

When  the  policy  was  issued,  the  insured  was  not  a  fit  and 
€uitable  subject  for  insurance,  because  of  ill-health  and  bodily 
infirmities  of  a  serious  character,  which  was  well  known  to  him. 


652  Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  [Tenn. 

and  concealed  by  him  in  making  liis  application,  and  lie  pro- 
cured the  policy  by  fraudulent  misrepresentations  as  to  his 
physical  condition.  It  also  appears  that  prior  to  the  delivery 
of  the  policy,  and  doubtless  prior  to  the  application,  the  said 
E.  H.  Clement  and  W.  B.  Kerr  had  agreed  with  the  insured, 
that,  for  the  consideration  heretofore  stated,  he  would  transfer 
the  policy  for  eight  thousand  dollars  to  them,  and  the  policy 
was  procured  in  conformity  to,  and  in  pursuance  of,  such  agree- 
ment, said  Clement  and  Kerr  paying  the  cash  premium  to  the 
agent,  but  not  until  after  the  transfer  was  made  and  policy  de- 
livered to  them.  The  terms  of  the  transfer  recite  that  Clement 
and  Kerr  were  creditors  of  the  insured,  but  such  does  not  ap- 
pear to  be  the  fact  from  the  record,  except  so  far  as  that  rela- 
tion may  be  said  to  have  arisen  out  of  the  agreement  referred 
to,  nor  were  they  in  any  way  related  to  him,  nor  did  they  have 
any  insurable  interest  in  the  ^®  life  of  the  deceased,  but  had 
knowledge  of  his  physical  condition.  The  chancellor  was,  there- 
fore, of  opinion  that  the  transaction  was  a  gambling  or  wager- 
ing contract  upon  the  life  of  the  insured;  that  to  recognize  or 
enforce  it  would  be  contrary  to  sound  public  policy,  and  that 
the  subassignees  or  transferees  of  W.  B.  Kerr  could  stand  upon 
no  other  or  higher  ground  than  he  could. 

Unquestionably,  the  findings  of  the  chancellor  are  correct, 
and  his  conclusions  correct,  upon  the  record  as  presented  to  us, 
unless  they  are  controlled  and  neutralized  by  the  provisions  of 
the  policy  in  regard  to  the  right  of  the  company  to  contest  its 
liability  in  case  of  death.  The  provision  referred  to  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

'Incontestability. — After  this  policy  shall  have  been  in  force 
one  full  year,  if  it  shall  become  a  claim  by  death,  the  company 
will  not  contest  its  payment,  provided  the  conditions  of  the 
policy  as  to  payment  of  premiums  have  been  observed." 

The  rights  of  tlie  parties  are  thus  made  to  turn  upon  the 
force,  effect,  and  extent  of  this  provision  in  the  policy.  It  must 
be  apparent  from  the  outset  that  this  provision  was  intended 
to  have  some  material  effect,  and  was  not  inserted  as  a  matter 
of  form.  No  more  tempting  provision  to  an  applicant  could 
be  introduced  into  a  policy  of  life  insurance  than  this  one,  which 
guaranteed  to  the  applicant  that  his  policy  should  not  be  con- 
tested after  the  expiration  of  one  year,  provided  the  premiums 
were  paid. 

*'■  Premiums  upon  life  policies  are  often  paid  at  a  great  sacri- 
fice, and  one  of  the  most  disturbing  and  unsatisfactory  features 


April,  1898.]        Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  653 

of  the  insurance  contract  is  tlie  fact  that,  after  these  sacrifices 
and  payments  have  been  made  for  a  number  of  years,  and  the 
insured  has  died,  so  that  his  testimony  and  perhaps  that  of 
others  has  been  rendered  unavailable  by  the  lapse  of  time  and 
the  occurrence  of  death,  instead  of  receiving  the  promised  re- 
ward, the  beneficiary  will  be  met  with  a  contest  and  a  lawsuit 
to  determine  whether  the  insurance  ever  had  any  validity  or 
force.  Hence  it  has  become  an  almost  universal  practice  with 
insurance  companies  to  provide  against  any  contest  or  forfeiture 
of  their  policies  after  a  certain  length  of  time,  greater  in  some 
oases  and  less  in  others. 

The  provision  in  this  case  is  very  broad  in  its  terms.  There 
is  only  one  condition  upon  which  the  validity  of  the  policy  can 
be  questioned,  after  the  lapse  of  a  year,  and  that  is  the  nonpay- 
ment of  premiums.  The  meaning  of  the  provision  is,  that  if 
the  premiums  are  paid,  the  liability  shall  be  absolute  under  the 
policy,  and  that  no  question  shall  be  made  of  its  original  validity. 
No  reasonable  construction  can  be  placed  upon  such  provision 
other  than  that  the  company  reserves  to  itself  the  right  to  ascer- 
tain all  the  facts  and  matters  material  to  its  risk,  and  the 
validity  of  their  contract  for  one  year,  and  if,  within  that  time, 
it  does  not  ascertain  all  the  facts,  and  does  not  cancel  and 
rescind  the  ^"*  contract,  it  may  not  do  so  afterward  upon  any 
ground  then  in  existence. 

The  practical  and  intended  effect  of  the  stipulation  is  to  create 
a  short  statute  of  limitation  in  favor  of  the  insured,  within 
which  limited  period  the  insurer  must,  if  ever,  test  the  validity 
of  the  policy. 

It  has  been  held  that  an  agreement  limiting  the  time  within 
which  an  action  may  be  brought  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  by 
the  beneficiary  is  not  against  public  policy,  and  may  be  enforced, 
though  less  than  the  usual  time  imposed  by  law  has  been  fixed. 
If  this  be  so,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  a  similar  limitation  upon 
the  right  of  the  insurer  to  contest  should  be  against  public  pol- 
icy, and  why  it  should  not  be  enforced  by  the  courts. 

It  is  said,  however,  that  fraud  appearing  in  the  origin  of  the 
contract  must,  as  in  any  other  case,  render  it  null  and  void  from 
the  beginning.  It  is  true  that  fraud  vitiates  all  agreements  and 
undertakings  based  upon  it,  and  they  may  be  set  aside  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  party  defrauded.  So,  in  this  case,  fraud  in  obtain- 
ing the  policy  would  vitiate  it  at  the  option  and  upon  the  motion 
of  the  party  defrauded,  but,  under  the  provision  in  question,  the 
party  must,  within  the  year,  exercise  his  right  to  repudiate  and 


654  Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  [Tenn, 

rescind  it.  The  effect  of  this  agreement  not  to  contest  is  to  put 
the  company  in  the  attitude  of  being  unable  to  set  up  any  fraud 
or  false  swearing  in  obtaining  the  policy,  or  any  other  defense 
**  to  it,  save  the  one  excepted,  so  far  as  its  original  validity  is 
concerned.  Unless  the  language  be  thus  construed,  it  is  imprac- 
ticable to  put  any  reasonable  interpretation  on  it.  Unless  it  is 
the  object  and  purpose  of  the  provision  to  cut  off  all  defenses 
arising  out  of  the  false  statements  of  the  applicant  to  obtain  it,, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  what  practical  benefit  the  insured  is  to  derive 
from  it. 

It  has  been  well  said:  "The  effect  of  the  provision  is  to  pre- 
vent the  insurer  from  interposing  as  a  defense  the  falsity  of  the 
representations  of  the  insured,  which  is  a  fraud.  But  it  does  not 
prevent  abandonment,  rescission,  and  cancellation  of  the  con- 
tract for  such  fraud,  provided  the  action  for  that  purpose  is 
brought  within  a  year."  It  is  virtually  saying  to  the  insured 
that  "I  will  take  one  year  in  which  to  ascertain  whether  your 
representations  are  false  or  not,  and  whether  you  have  been 
guilty  of  any  fraud  in  obtaining  the  contract,  and  if  within  that 
period  I  cannot  or  do  not  detect  such  falsity  and  fraud,  I  will 
obligate  myself  to  make  no  further  inquiry  into  these  matters, 
and  to  make  no  defense  on  account  of  them.'* 

It  has  also  been  properly  said:  "Such  a  stipulation  ought  to  be 
an  incentive  to  the  insurer  to  exercise  vigilance  and  good  faith 
in  investigating  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  representations  upon 
which  the  policy  issued,  while  the  matter  is  fresh,  and  thus  it 
operates  fairly  between  the  parties.  The  witnesses  are  all  alive, 
and  the  exact  truth  can,  if  ever,  ^®  be  ascertained,  and  the  stipu- 
lation prevents  the  insurer  from  laying  by  and  receiving  the 
premiums  during  the  life  of  the  insured,  and  after  his  death, 
when  the  good  faith  and  the  truth  of  his  representations  cannot 
be  supported  by  his  own  oath  and  strengthened  by  his  own 
efforts  and  superior  knowledge,  contesting  the  policy  upon  the 
ground  that  the  insured's  representations  were  false.  It  is  true 
there  is  in  the  policy  a  stipulation  that  fraud  shall  vitiate  it,  but 
this  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  further  requirement  that  the 
insurer  must  set  up  the  fraud  during  the  time  limited":  "Wright 
V.  Mutual  Ben.  Assn.,  43  Hun,  61;  Wood  v.  Dwarris,  11  Ex.  493;^ 
Wright  V.  Mutual  Ben.  Assn.,  118  N.  Y.  237,  16  Am.  St.  Rep. 
749;  Kline  v.  National  Ben.  Assn.,  Ill  Ind.  462,  60  Am.  Eep. 
707. 

Fraud  is  always  required  to  be  set  up  promptly  when  discov- 
ered, or  it  may  be  treated  as  waived,  and  the  effect  of  this  stipu- 


April,  1898.]        Clement  v»  Insurance  Co.  655 

lation  is  that  the  insurer  must  exercise  due  diligence  to  dis- 
cover such  fraud  within  the  year,  and,  if  it  fails  to  do  so,  it  will 
treat  it  as  waived,  and  no  inquiry  will  be  made  or  allowed  into 
such  matters.  It  clearly  appears,  from  the  record  in  this  case, 
that  the  company  in  one  year  could  have  discovered  all  the  facta 
now  disclosed  in  the  proof  relating  to  this  question. 

Objection  was  made  by  the  complainant  to  any  testimony  re- 
lating to  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  representations  made  or  fraud 
practiced  by  the  assured,  ^*  or  the  transferees  in  obtaining  thi» 
policy,  but  such  objections  were  overruled,  and  much  testimony 
pro  and  con  was  taken  on  this  point,  and  this  is  now  assigned  as 
error.  We  are  of  opinion  this  would  be  error  if  the  present  suit 
was  being  prosecuted  by  the  assured's  representatives  or  any 
bona  fide  assignee  of  the  assured.  To  give  any  effect  to  the 
stipulation,  if  the  suit  were  in  the  interest  of  the  original  bene- 
ficiary or  his  bona  fide  assignee,  the  company  must  be  estopped 
from  inquiring  into  any  matter  involved  in  the  original  validity 
of  the  policy.  But  when  the  suit  is  brought  by  a  transferee,  and 
the  chancellor  was  of  opinion  that  such  transferee  did  not  hold 
in  good  faith,  and  that  the  transfer  was  but  a  mere  evasion  of  the 
rule  against  wagering  policies,  then  the  evidence  was  admissible 
on  the  question  of  fraud  or  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  trans- 
feree. 

It  is  said  by  the  defendant  company  there  is  no  sufficient 
proof  that  the  premium  due  one  year  after  the  policy  issued  was 
ever  paid  to  the  company. 

The  bill  alleges  that  the  premium  was  paid  promptly  when 
due,  and  a  receipt  is  filed  for  the  same  and  made  an  exhibit  to  the 
bill;  and  again  that  all  premiums  have  been  promptly  paid  on 
the  policy  when  due,  and  these  payments  were  made  under  the 
agreement  by  the  assignees,  E.  H.  Clement  and  W.  B.  Kerr. 

The  contest  is  not  that  the  premium  was  not  paid,  but  that 
there  is  no  evidence  that  such  payment  **  was  made  to  the  com- 
pany or  any  authorized  agent  of  the  company.  The  answer 
neither  admits  nor  denies  the  payment,  but  calls  for  strict  proof 
of  the  same  if  deemed  material.  The  alleged  receipt,  filed  with 
the  bill  as  an  exhibit,  is  in  the  words  and  figures  following: 


^56  Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  [Tenn. 

''New  York  Life  Insurance  Co., 
"346  &  348  Broadway,  New  York. 

"Eeeeived  $164,  being  the  annual  premium  due  October  11, 
1894,  upon  policy  No.  565,543. 

"JOHN  A.  McCALL, 

'Tresident. 

"Countersigned  by 

"WM.  H.  WOOD, 

"Cashier." 

On  the  back  of  this  receipt  there  is  printed  a  "Notice  to  Policy 
Holders,"  and  one  clause  of  the  notice  is  as  follows:  '^AU  pre- 
miums are  due  and  payable  at  the  home  office  of  the  company 
sinless  otherwise  agreed  in  writing,  but  any  premium  may  be 
.paid  to  an  agent  producing  a  receipt  therefor  signed  by  the  presi- 
dent, vice-president,  second  vice-president,  actuary,  or  secretary, 
-and  countersigned  by  such  agent."  A  similar  provision  is  found 
in  the  policy  itself.  William  H.  Wood  was  not  examined,  but 
it  was  attempted  to  be  shown  that  he  stated  that  he  was  the  gen- 
-€ral  agent  of  the  company  at  Memphis,  where  it  had  a  branch 
office;  that  he  was  authorized  to  receive  premiums  and  give  re- 
4;eipts;  and  that  he  did  receive  the  premium  as  stated,  and  exe- 
cuted the  receipt. .  This  evidence  was  objected  to  ^^  on  the 
ground  that  agency  cannot  be  proven  by  the  statements  of  the 
party  assuming  to  act  as  such.  The  objection  was  overruled 
hy  the  chancellor,  and  to  his  ruling  exception  was  taken.  It  is 
now  assigned  as  error  by  the  company  that  the  chancellor  im- 
properly admitted  this  testimony,  and  the  same  should  have 
been  excluded.  We  think  there  is  ample  evidence  that  Wood 
was  held  out  and  recognized  as  the  general  agent  of  the  com- 
pany, and  that  he  had  in  his  possession  the  receipt  of  the  com- 
pany signed  by  its  president,  John  A.  McCall,  and  delivered  this 
when  the  payment  was  made. 

In  regard  to  the  point  made  that  the  assignees,  R.  H.  Clements 
and  W.  B.  Kerr,  had  no  insurable  interest  in  the  life  of  the  de- 
-ceased,  and  the  transaction  as  to  them  was  invalid  and  void,  it  is 
necessary  to  repeat  that  the  policy  was  not  made  payable  to  them 
when  originally  issued,  but  to  the  executors,  administrators,  and 
assigns  of  the  insured.  Within  a  few  days  thereafter,  it  was 
regularly  assigned  to  said  Clements  and  Kerr.  The  manner  and 
form  prescribed  by  the  policy,  and  the  assignment  or  transfer 
was  made  known  to  and  recognized  by  the  company  by  receiving 
and  retaining  a  copy  of  the  transfer.  A  policy  for  ten  thousand 
•dollars  had  been  previously  procured  in  another  company,  pay- 


April,  1898.]        Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  657 

able  to  Clements  and  Kerr,  but  in  which  the  wife  was  to  have  a 
beneficial  interest  to  the  extent  of  two  thousand  dollars;  but  this 
policy  was  not  acceptable  to  Clements  and  Kerr,  and  they  de- 
■clined  to  receive  it,  and  the  application  ***  was  then  made  for 
the  present  policy,  payable  to  the  assured,  with  an  agreement 
that  he  would  transfer  it  to  Clements  and  Kerr.  The  insured, 
before  his  death,  executed  a  last  will  and  testament,  in  which  he 
recited  that  he  was  indebted  to  Clements  and  Kerr  prior  to  Oc- 
tober 1,  1893;  that  the  policy  had  been  issued  to  him  and  trans- 
ferred to  them  on  October  19,  1893,  and  the  transfer  accepted  by 
the  company  November  14,  1893;  and  in  his  last  will  he  directs 
that  the  proceeds  of  the  policy  be  paid  to  them  dn  the  event  of 
death. 

As  before  stated,  neither  Clements  nor  Kerr  were  related  in 
any  way  to  the  insured,  nor  were  they  creditors,  nor  did  they 
give  any  consideration  for  the  transfer,  except  the  twenty-five 
dollars  paid  the  insured,  and  undertaking  to  pay  the  premiums 
on  the  transferred  policy,  as  well  as  the  two-thousand-dollar 
policy  issued  at  the  same  time  with  the  policy  in  controversy 
upon  the  assured's  life  in  favor  of  his  wife,  and  they  had  knowl- 
edge of  the  assured's  physical  condition.  If  this  transfer  is  not 
authorized  by  the  policy  or  by  any  rule  of  law,  or  is  opposed  to 
any  sound  ground  of  public  policy,  we  cannot  see  that  such  in- 
firmity can  be  in  any  way  cured  by  the  provision  not  to  contest. 
That  provision  relates  to  the  issuance  of  the  policy  and  the  rep- 
resentations made  to  obtain  it,  and  not  to  any  subsequent  trans- 
fer, disposition,  or  assignment  of  the  policy.  As  to  these 
matters,  the  stipulation  has  no  reference  or  effect.  It  relates 
only  to  matters  arising  between  the  insurer  ^^  and  the  insured, 
and  not  to  matters  in  which  third  persons  are  concerned.  The 
only  provision  in  the  policy  as  to  assignments  is  the  following: 
"Any  assignment  of  this  policy  must  be  made  in  duplicate,  and 
both  copies  must  be  sent  to  the  home  office,  one  of  them  to  be 
retained  by  the  company.  The  company  has  no  responsibility 
for  the  validity  of  any  assignment." 

There  is  nothing  in  the  policy  as  to  who  may  be  beneficiaries, 
nor  as  to  whom  assignments  and  transfers  may  be  made,  but  it  is 
clearly  indicated  that  transfers  and  assignments  may  be  made  at 
the  risk  of  the  parties.  "We  are,  therefore,  relegated  to  the  gen- 
eral law  of  insurance  to  determine  whether  such  transfer  and 
assignment  can  be  sustained.  "We  think  there  can  be  no  ques- 
tion but  that  the  consideration  for  the  transfer  is  sufficient  as  to 
amount  and  value,  if  it  can  be  sustained  on  other  grounds,  and 

AM.  ST.  Rep.,  Vol.  LXX.— 12 


658  Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  [Tenn-. 

the  only  question  is,  whether  such  transfer  to  one  or  more  third 
persons,  having  no  insurable  interest,  can  be  sustained  under  the 
rules  of  law  and  upon  grounds  of  sound  public  policy.  While 
the  authorities  are  in  hopeless  conflict,  the  weight  of  authority 
is  that  one  who  takes  out  a  policy  upon  the  life  of  another,  pay- 
ing the  premiums  therefor  himself,  must  have  an  insurable  in- 
terest in  the  life  of  that  other,  or  the  policy  will  be  a  mere  wager 
policy,  upon  which  the  party  to  whom  it  was  issued  cannot 
recover:  See  authorities  collated  in  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law^ 
2d  ed.,  929. 

^®  But  the  weight  of  authority  is  that  when  the  insured  con- 
tracts directly  With  the  insurer,  paying  the  premiums  himself, 
he  may  designate  as  beneficiary  one  who  has  no  insurable  interest 
in  his  life:  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  2d  ed.,  959. 

So,  also,  the  weight  of  authority  is  that  when  a  policy  has  once 
been  issued  to  a  beneficiary  legally  entitled,  he  may  assign  it  to 
another  who  has  no  insurable  interest,  either  by  a  transfer  in  his 
lifetime  or  by  a  last  will  and  testament:  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of 
Law,  2d.  ed.,  1025. 

But  while  this  is  true,  the  transfer  and  assignment  must  be 
made  in  good  faith,  and  not  as  a  mere  colorable  evasion  of  the 
provision  in  regard  to  wagering  contracts  and  in  order  to  validate 
or  legalize  the  same:  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  2d  ed.,  1025,. 
and  notes;  Mutual  Protection  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hamilton,  5  Sneed,  269;. 
Nye  V.  Grand  Lodge,  9  Ind.  App.  131;  Eittler  v.  Smith,  70  Md. 
261;  Fairchild  v.  North  Eastern  Mut.  Life  Assn.,  51  Vt.  613  j 
Bursinger  v.  "Watertown  Bank,  67  Wis.  75,  58  Am.  Rep.  848; 
Heinlein  v.  Imperial  Life  Ins.  Co.,  101  Mich.  250,  45  Am.  St. 
Rep.  409,  25  L.  R.  A.  627,  note;  Carpenter  v.  United  States  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  9,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  880;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Hart- 
ford Life  Ins.  Co.,  56  Conn.  116,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  288;  Olmstead 
V.  Keyes,  85  N.  Y.  593;  Clark  v.  Allen,  11  R.  I.  439,  23  Am.  Rep. 
496. 

We  think  the  facts  in  this  case  show  that,  while  this  policy  was 
taken  out  by  the  assured,  payable  to  his  executors,  et  cetera,  it 
was  done  under  a  pre-existing  agreement  with  Clement  and  Kerr 
that  they  would  pay  the  premiums  and  the  other  considerations- 
named,  and  have  the  benefit  of  the  policy,  ^"^  and  the  assign- 
ment to  them  was  in  furtherance  of  this  agreement,  and  it  was^ 
therefore  a  wagering  policy.  But  it  is  said  that  if  this  be  true, 
still  the  complainants  can  take  under  the  will  of  the  assured. 
It  is  doubtless  true  that  anyone  by  will  may  bequeath  the  pro- 
ceeds of  a  life  policy,  payable  to  himself  or  his  executors  or  ad- 


April,  1898.]        Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  659 

ministrators,to  whom  he  pleases,  and  the  fact  that  the  legatee  has 
no  insurable  interest  will  not  defeat  his  right  to  receive  under 
the  will.  But  the  parties  complainant  do  not  sue  or  seek  to  re- 
cover in  this  case  as  legatees  or  under  the  will  of  the  insured. 
On  the  contrary,  they  expressly  state,  when  asked  the  question, 
in  making  proof  of  death,  under  what  title  they  claim,  that  they 
claim  under  the  transfer  and  assignment.  The  provision  in  the 
will  appears  clearly  to  be  an  afterthought,  an  act  to  strengthen, 
consummate,  and  support  the  transfer,  and  was  in  furtherance  of 
the  original  fraudulent  contrivance  and  agreement  to  vest  an  in- 
terest in  complainants.  While  we  think  the  party  procuring  a 
policy  is  entitled  to  rely  upon  a  provision  against  contest,  and 
may  transfer  this  right  to  anyone,  whether  having  an  insurable 
interest  or  not,  provided  he  takes  in  good  faith,  we  can  see  no 
reason  for  extending  the  benefit  to  one  who,  by  fraud  commenced 
before  and  consummated  after  the  policy  issues  (by  means  of  an 
unauthorized  and  illegal  transfer),  seeks  to  reap  the  same  benefit. 
This  would  be  to  allow  an  easy  evasion  of  the  rule  against  the 
validity  of  wagering  contracts:  Heinlein  ^*  v.  Imperial  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  101  Mich.  250,  45  Am.  St.  Eep.  409,  25  L.  R.  A.  628,  note. 

It  is  argued,  however,  that  the  clause  agreeing  not  to  contest 
must  have  the  effect  to  preclude  any  inquiry  into  the  transfer 
and  also  the  right  of  the  transferee  to  take  under  the  policy.  We 
are  of  opinion,  however,  that  the  clause  does  not  go  to  this  ex- 
tent and  cannot  have  this  effect.  It  is  intended  to  cut  off 
inquiry  into  the  truth  of  the  statements  made  by  the  assured  in 
the  application,  and  other  matters  going  to  the  original  validity 
of  the  policy,  but  not  to  any  subsequent  disposition  of  the  policy, 
and  the  company  expressly  disclaims  any  responsibility  for  the 
validity  of  any  assignment.  Tliere  is  nothing  in  this  holding 
inconsistent  with  the  ruling  in  the  case  of  Wright  v.  Mutual 
Ben.  Assn.  of  America,  118  N.  Y.  237,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  749. 

In  that  case,  Houghton,  the  original  beneficiary,  was  a  creditor 
of  Wright,  and  had,  therefore,  an  insurable  interest  in  his  life, 
and  the  policy  was  not,  therefore,  a  wagering  policy.  After  the 
death  he  assigned  and  transferred  his  interest  in  the  policy  to  the 
widow  of  the  insured,  and  the  suit  was  brought  in  her  name. 
The  court  held  that  she  might  recover  the  entire  amount  of  the 
policy  and  adjust  the  rights  of  Houghton  out  of  the  proceeds, 
and  make  such  other  payments  as  equity  demanded  out  of  the 
proceeds.  But  there  was  no  evidence  of  any  fraud,  either  in  the 
original  issuance  of  the  policy  or  in  **  its  subsequent  transfer, 
and  the  whole  matter  appears  to  have  been  done  in  the  utmost 


660  Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.  [Tenn. 

good  faith  and  with   no   purpose   of   carrying  out  a  wagering 
policy. 

While  the  court  is  disposed  to  give  to  the  assured,  and  parties 
taking  under  him  in  good  faith,  the  full  benefit  and  advantage 
of  the  noncontestable  clause,  by  shutting  off  inquiries  into  the 
truth  or  falsity  of  the  statements  made  in  the  application,  and 
this  because  of  the  contract  between  the  parties,  it  can  see  no 
reason  why  the  like  advantage  and  benefit  should  be  extended  to 
one  who  has  no  insurable  interest  in  the  assured,  who  does  not 
take  or  claim  in  good  faith,  and  whose  entire  connection  with 
the  matter  is  shown  to  have  been  for  a  speculative  and  fraudu- 
lent purpose,  and  no  sound  public  policy  can  be  subserved  by  so 
holding,  but,  on  the  contrary,  such  holding  would  sanction 
wagering  insurance  contracts,  to  the  great  detriment  of  the  pub- 
lic morals  and  public  good.  We  are,  therefore,  of  opinion  the 
decree  of  the  chancellor  is  correct  in  its  results,  and  it  is  affirmed, 
and  the  bill  dismissed  at  complainant's  cost. 

INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY.— A  stipulation  In  a 
certificate  of  life  insurance  "tliat  no  question  as  to  tlie  validity  of 
the  application  or  certificate  of  membersliip  shall  be  raised,  unless 
such  question  be  raised  within  the  first  two  years  after  the  date  of 
such  certificate  or  membership  and  during  the  life  of  the  member 
therein  named,"  is  valid,  and  excludes  both  the  defense  of  fraud 
and  the  defense  that  the  beneficiary  had  iJo  insurable  interest  in  the 
life  of  the  insured:  Wright  v.  Mutual  etc.  Assn.,  118  N.  Y.  237,  10 
Am.  St.  Rep.  749.  That  the  insui-ance  company  is  liable  under  a 
clause  of  incontestability  when  the  insured  commits  suicide,  even 
though  the  application  stipulates  that  the  insurer  shall  not  assume 
liability  for  the  death  of  the  Insured  by  his  own  hand,  see  Goodwin 
V.  Provident  etc.  Assn.,  97  Iowa,  226,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  411;  Mareck 
V.  Mutual  etc.  Assn.,  62  Minn.  39,  54  Am,  St.  Rep.  613. 

INSURANCE-LIFE  —WAGERING  POLICY— ASSIGNMENT.— 
A  policy  of  Insurance  on  the  life  of  another,  taljen  by  one  who  had 
an  insurable  interest  in  it,  for  the  purpose  of  assigning  It  to  a  third 
person  who  had  no  such  insurable  interest,  is  void  as  a  wagering 
policy  in  the  hands  of  the  assignee:  Keystone  etc.  Ben.  Assn.  v.  Nor- 
ris,  115  Pa.  St.  446,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  572.  See  generally,  on  the  val- 
idity of  assignment  of  life  insurance  to  one  who  has  no  insurable 
interest,  the  extended  notes  to  Equitable  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hazlewood, 
16  Am.  St.  Rep.  906;  Currier  v.  Continental  Life  Ins.  Co.,  52  Am. 
Rep.  143;  Bursinger  y.  Bank.  58  Am.  Rep.  852. 


May,  1898.]  Tubcott  v.  Railroad.  661 


TuRCOTT  V.  Railroad. 

[101  TENNE88EIC,  102.] 

LIMITATIONS  OP  ACTIONS— ABSENCE  FROM  STATE- 
CORPORATIONS.— A  statute  providing  for  the  suspension  of  the 
running  of  the  statute  of  limitations  during  the  absence  of  a  'per- 
son" from  the  state  applies  to  a  corporation,  and  requires  such  ab- 
sence as  will  prevent  service  of  process. 

CORPORATIONS.— THE  RESIDENCE  OP  A  CORPORA- 
TION is  in  the  state  of  its  creation. 

LIMITATIONS  OP  ACTIONS  —  ABSENCE  PROM  THE 
STATE— FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS.— A  foreign  corporation,  do- 
ing business  within  a  state,  and  having  there  agents  upon  whom 
process  may  be  served,  is  not  absent  from  the  state  within  the  mean- 
ing of  a  statute  suspending  the  running  of  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions in  favor  of  a  person  out  of  the  state,  though  it  has  failed  to 
file  and  register  its  charter  as  required  of  foreign  corporations  do- 
ing business  within  the  state  before  giving  them  the  rights  of  do- 
mestic corporations. 

CORPOIL1TIONS-POREIGN— PILING  OP  CHARTER- 
CONSTRUCTION  OP  STATUTE.— The  purpose  of  a  statute  requir- 
ing foreign  corporations  doing  business  within  the  state  to  file  and 
register  their  charters.  Is  to  enable  them  to  do  business,  own  or 
acquire  property,  and  be  enable  to  sue,  but  not  to  exempt  them 
from  suit  If  they  disregard  the  statute  or  to  estop  them  from  mak- 
ing defense  if  so  sued. 

Carroll,  Chalmers  &  McKellar,  for  the  appellant. 

Fentress  &  Cooper,  for  the  appellee. 

103  "WILKES,  J.  This  is  an  action  for  damages  for  personal 
injuries  inflicted  in  the  shops  of  the  defendant  company  at 
Vickshurg,  Mississippi.  The  action  was  brought  at  Memphis, 
Tennessee,  May  25,  1895,  about  one  and  one-half  years  after  the 
injury  was  suffered.  Demurrers  were  filed,  and  the  declaration 
was  amended.  To  the  declaration,  as  amended,  pleas  of  not 
guilty,  contributory  negligence,  and  the  Tennessee  statute  of 
limitation  of  one  year  for  injuries  to  persons  were  filed.  The 
latter  plea  states  in  detail  that  the  defendant  company  had  been 
operating  its  road  through  the  state  of  Mississippi  into  and  in 
the  state  of  Tennessee  for  fourteen  years;  that  it  had  an  oflBce 
and  agents  in  the  city  of  Memphis,  and  on  these  agents  service 
at  any  time  could  have  ^**  been  had,  and  that  at  no  time  had 
there  been  any  impediment  or  hindrance  to  the  bringing  of  this, 
or  any  other  suit  against  it,  or  to  the  service  of  legal  process 
upon  it. 

To  this  plea  there  was  a  replication,  in  substance  that  the  de- 
fendant is  a  foreign  corporation,  organized  and  existing  under 
the  laws  of  Mississippi,  and  that,  at  the  time  of  the  accrual  of 


662  TuRcoTT  V,  Railroad.  [Tenn. 

this  cause  of  action,  it  had  no  corporate  or  legal  existence  in  Ten- 
nessee, because  it  had  not  complied  with  the  requirements  of  the 
acts  of  1891,  chapter  122,  as  to  the  filing  and  registration  of  its 
charter,  and,  not  having  so  complied  until  after  the  bringing  of 
this  suit,  it  cannot  plead  the  statute  of  limitations  of  one  year 
in  bar  of  the  suit.  There  was  a  demurrer  to  this  replication, 
and  the  demurrer  was  sustained. 

The  exact  questions  presented  are  whether  foreign  corpora- 
tions can  plead  and  rely  upon  this  Tennessee  statute  of  limita- 
tion when  they  have  offices  and  agents  in  the  state  subject  to 
continuous  service  of  process,  and  whether  the  failure  to  file  and 
register  its  charter  will  deprive  it  of  that  right,  if  otherwise  it 
would  be  held  to  have  it. 

Under  the  statutes  of  Tennessee  (Shannon's  Comp.  Stats., 
4469),  it  is  provided,  among  other  things,  that  actions  for  in- 
juries to  the  person  must  be  commenced  within  one  year  after 
the  cause  of  action  accrues,  or  be  barred. 

Section  4455  of  Shannon's  Compiled  Statutes  provides:  "If, 
at  any  time,  any  cause  of  action  shall  accrue  against  any  person 
who  shall  be  out  of  this  state,  the  action  *****  may  be  commenced 
within  the  time  limited  therefor,  after  such  person  shall  have 
come  into  the  state;  and  after  any  cause  of  action  shall  have 
accrued,  if  the  person  against  whom  it  has  accrued  shall  be  ab- 
sent from,  or  reside  out  of  the  state,  the  time  of  his  absence  or 
residence  out  of  the  state  shall  not  be  taken  as  any  part  of  the 
time  limited  for  the  commencement  of  the  action." 

The  word  "person"  includes  a  "corporation":  Shannon's 
Comp.  Stats.,  sec.  62.  The  exception  made  in  this  statute  does 
not  apply  to  a  natural  person  unless  his  absence  from  the  state 
is  such  as  to  prevent  service  of  process:  Taylor  v.  McGill,  6  Lea, 
294,  301. 

The  statutes  relating  to  service  of  process  upon  corporations 
are  as  follows: 

"Service  of  process  on  the  president,  or  other  head  of  a  cor- 
poration, or,  in  his  absence,  on  the  cashier,  treasurer  or  secretary, 
or,  in  the  absence  of  such  officers,  on  any  director  of  such  corpo- 
ration shall  be  sufficient" :  Shannon's  Comp.  Stats.,  sec.  4539. 

"If  neither  the  president,  cashier,  or  secretary  resides  within 
the  state,  service  on  the  chief  agent  of  the  corporation  residing 
at  the  time  in  the  county  where  the  action  is  brought,  shall  be 
deemed  sufficient":  Shannon's  Comp.  Stats.,  sec.  4540. 

No  question  is  made  but  that  there  was  ample  opportunity  to 
obtain  service  of  process  at  any  time  on  the  defendant  through 


May,  1S98.]  Turcott  v.  Railroad,  663 

its  officers  and  agents,  nor  that  foreign  corporations  are  liable  to 
service  under  these  sections:  Telephone  Co.  v.  Turner,  88  Term. 
266. 

*®®  But  the  contention  is,  that  a  foreign  corporation  is  out 
of  the  state,  and  resides  out  of  the  state,  and  so  falls  within  the 
exception  before  stated,  and  that,  while  process  may  be  made 
upon  it,  still  it  is  optional  with  a  party  aggrieved  whether  and 
when  he  will  commence  his  suit,  and  the  bar  of  the  statute  con- 
not  be  set  up  if  the  suit  is  not  brought  within  one  year,  and  that 
it  does  not  come  within  the  state  in  legal  contemplation,  till  it 
files  and  registers  its  charter.  It  appears  that  there  is  some  con- 
flict of  decision  upon  the  first  question.  The  reason  of  the  rule 
of  law  is,  that  no  person  who  is  not  and  has  not  been  subject  to 
service  of  process  within  the  year,  shall  avail  himself  of  its  ex- 
emption: Taylor  v.  McGill,  6  Lea,  294.  Unquestionably ,  the 
residence  of  a  corporation  is  the  state  of  its  creation:  Young  y. 
South  Tredegar  Iron  Co.,  85  Tenn.  189,  4  Am.  St.  Rep.  753. 
And  if  we  should  give  the  statute  a  strict,  literal  construction, 
it  might  be  held  that  a  foreign  corporation  was  not  entitled  to 
the  benefit  of  the  limitation.  Still  the  courts  will  not  permit 
the  literalism  of  the  statute  to  thwart  its  obvious  purpose,  in- 
tent, and  meaning.  A  thing  may  be  within  the  letter  of  the 
statute,  yet  not  within  its  operation  if  not  so  intended:  Taylor 
V.  McGill,  6  Lea,  294. 

We  think  the  true  rule  is  laid  down  in  Murfree  on  Foreign 
•Corporations,  and  that  the  rule  as  thus  laid  down  is  based  on 
sound  reason  and  principle.  In  speaking  of  such  foreign  corpo- 
ration pleading  the  ^^^  statute  of  limitations,  it  is  said  (Mur- 
free on  Foreign  Corporations,  sec.  248):  "As  to  the  question 
whether  a  foreign  corporation,  when  sued,  can  plead  the  bar  of 
the  statute  in  defense,  it  may  be  said  that  the  great  weight  of 
Authority  is  in  favor  of  the  conclusion  suggested  above;  that  the 
true  test  of  the  running  of  the  statute  is  the  liability  of  the  party 
invoking  its  bar  to  the  service  of  process  during  the  whole  of  the 
period  prescribed;  that  if  the  operations  of  the  company  within 
the  jurisdiction  were  such  as  to  render  it  liable  to  suit,  then  it 
may  plead  the  statute.  The  principles  upon  which  this  doctrine 
rests  have  nowhere  been  more  effectively  expressed  than  in  the 
decision  of  the  Illinois  appellate  court,  in  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Sloan,  1  111.  App.  364.  Said  Pleasants,  J.,  who  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  after  referring  to  a  number  of  cases  holding 
that  a  corporation  must  be  considered  an  inhabitant  of  the  state 
lay  which  it  is  created:  *We  should  have  no  hesitation  in  approY- 


664  TuRCOTT  V.  Railroad.  [Tenn^ 

ing  these  applications  of  the  doctrine  if  there  were  no  other  ele- 
ment in  the  cases  bearing  on  the  question  than  the  origin  and 
nature  of  the  corporation.  For  it  is  true  that  a  positive  law  can 
never,  of  its  own  force,  and  ordinarily  does  not  otherwise,  operate 
beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  power  by  which  it  is  en- 
acted; and,  hence,  unless  It  is  otherwise  enabled,  a  corporation 
must  indeed  dwell  in  the  place  of  its  creation,  and  cannot 
migrate  into  another  sovereignty.  But  the  law  of  one  state 
may  have  operation  for  certain  purposes  in  another  by  the 
comity  }^^  or  permission  of  the  latter,  and  we  see  no  insuper- 
able difficulty  in  the  way  of  such  migration,  provided  the  former 
does  not  positively  forbid  and  the  latter  does  positively  consent. 
It  is  conceded  that,  with  such  consent,  they  lawfidly  may,  as 
they  often  actually  do,  remove  their  officers,  agents,  offices,  and 
effects  into  another  sovereignty,  and  there  exercise  their  func- 
tions and  franchises.  In  such  a  case,  where  is  the  corporation? 
If  it  be  said  that  it  still  dwells  in  the  place  of  its  creation,  and  is- 
acting  elsewhere  only  by  agents,  the  answer  is  no  more  by  agents 
elsewhere  than  in  the  place  of  its  creation.  It  can  do  nothing 
an3rwhere,  nor  manifest  its  presence  or  being  at  all,  except 
through  its  agents,  its  property,  or  its  operation.  Where  these 
are,  then,  it  seems  most  accordant  with  substantial  fact  and  rea- 
son to  say,  there  is  the  corporation.  Where  these  are  not,  we 
know  of  no  means  by  which  process  can  be  served  upon  it;  and 
if  there  be  none,  that  fact  would  seem  to  be  conclusive  upon  the 
question  of  residence  for  the  time  being,  at  least  for  purposes  of 
judicial  jurisdiction.' " 

In  Montana,  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that  a  foreign  company 
had  subjected  itself  to  a  penalty  by  failing  to  file  its  charter  or 
act  of  incorporation  as  required  by  the  statute,  though  such  fail- 
ure did  not  disqualify  it  from  being  sued,  did  not  thereby  lose 
the  right  to  plead  the  statute:  See  King  v.  National  etc.  Co.,  4 
Mont.  1. 

In  support  of  the  text,  the  author  cites  the  following  *<*®  au- 
thorities: Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  McKenzie,  2  Brock,  393.  Compare 
Clarke  v.  Bank  of  Mississippi,  10  Ark.  516,  52  Am.  Dec.  248; 
Holy  Trinity  Church  v.  United  States,  143  U.  S.  457;  Huss  v. 
Central  R.  R.  etc.  Co.,  66  Ala.  472;  Lawrence  v.  Ballon,  50  Cal. 
258;  Express  Co.  v.  Ware,  20  Wall.  543;  Hall  v.  Vermont  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,|28  Vt.  401;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Sloan,  1  111.  App. 
364;  King  v.  National  etc.  Co.,  4  Mont.  1;  Connecticut  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duerson,  28  Gratt.  630;  Wall  v.  Chicago  R.  R. 
Co.,  69  Iowa,  498;  McCabe  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  4  McCrary,. 


May,  1898.]  Turcott  v.  Railroad.  665 

492, 13  Fed.  Rep.  827.  See,  also,  Winney  v.  Sandwich  Mfg.  Co., 
(Iowa,  Dec.  17,  1891),  50  K  W.  Rep.  565;  Koons  v.  Chicago  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  23  Iowa,  493.  Compare  Abell  v.  Penn.  Mut.  Ins.  Co., 
18  W.  Va.  400;  North  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Akers,  4  Kan.  *453, 
96  Am.  Dec.  183;  Waterman  v.  Sprague  Mfg.  Co.,  55  Conn.  654; 
New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Estill,  147  U.  S.  608. 

We  are  aware  that  New  York,  Nevada,  Kansas,  and  possibly 
other  states,  do  not  follow  this  rule.  It  is  said  that  such  hold- 
ing raises  a  discrimination  against  individuals  and  in  favor  of 
corporations.  The  argument  is,  that  individuals  cannot  claim 
the  exemption  when  they  are  out  of  the  state  or  are  nonresidents, 
and  it  would  be  inequitable  to  allow  corporations  out  of  the  state 
or  nonresidents  to  claim  it.  But  this  apparent  difference  arises 
out  of  the  fact  that  individuals  out  of  the  state  or  residing  out 
****  of  it,  cannot  be  reached  by  process  against  a  resident  agent, 
while  a  corporation  can;  so  that  in  the  one  case  suit  cannot  be 
brought  and  in  the  other  it  may.  Absence  from  the  state,  and 
residence  out  of  the  state,  in  the  sense  of  the  statute,  means 
Buch  absence  and  such  nonresidence  as  renders  it  impracticable 
at  all  times  to  obtain  service  of  process,  so  that,  while  a  corpora- 
tion's technical  legal  residence  may  be  where  it  was  created,  its 
residence  and  status,  for  purposes  of  suit,  will  be  where  it  can, 
through  its  officers  and  agents,  be  reached  with  process.  While 
a  corporation  may  reside  beyond  the  state,  and  be  out  of  the 
state,  still  it  may,  through  its  officers  and  agents,  subject  itself 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  state.  It  may  sue  and 
be  sued  in  a  jurisdiction  foreign  to  its  technical  residence. 

Nor  do  we  think  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  act  of  1891, 
chapter  122,  will  preclude  this  foreign  corporation  from  setting 
up  the  statute.  • 

It  would  not  be  a  proper  construction  of  that  statute  to  hold 
that  a  corporation  actually  doing  business  in  the  state  without 
complying  with  the  statute  could  not  be  sued  for  a  tort  commit- 
ted, and,  having  been  impleaded  upon  the  ground  of  tort,  it  can- 
not be  that  the  failure  to  comply  with  that  statute  must  pre- 
clude it  from  making  any  defense,  for  it  logically  follows  that 
if  it  cannot  make  this  defense  because  of  its  failure,  it  can 
make  no  other. 

The  scope  and  purpose  of  that  act  was  to  require  corporations 
to  file  and  register  their  charters,  **^  in  order  that  they  might 
do  business,  own  or  acquire  property,  and  be  enabled  to  sue,  but 
it  was  never  intended  to  exempt  them  from  suit  if  they  disre- 
garded the  statute,  nor  to  estop  them  from  making  defense  if  so 


666  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn. 

sued;  otherwise  their  property  might  he  taken  from  them,  and 
they  estopped  to  defend.  This  company  was  in  the  state  own- 
ing property  and  doing  business  before  the  act  was  passed,  and 
while  this  did  not  exempt  it  from  a  compliance  with  the  act,  m 
order  that  it  might  have  all  the  rights  of  a  domestic  corporation, 
at  the  same  time  it  was  not  the  purpose  nor  the  proper  con- 
struction of  that  act  that  its  property  should  he  taken  from  it, 
or  its  right  to  defend  actions  brought  against  it  should  be  cut 
off  by  its  failure  to  comply  with  it. 

Let  the  judgment  be  affirmed  with  costs. 


LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— ABSENCE  FROM  STATE- 
CORPORATIONS.— A  foreign  corporation  is  a  "person"  within  the 
meaning  of  tJie  exceptions  in  the  statute  of  limitations  as  to  per- 
sons absent  from  the  state:  North  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Akeis,  4 
Kan.  453,  96  Am.  Dec.  183;  monographic  note  to  Moore  v.  Arm- 
strong, 36  Am.  Dec.  73.  Contra,  Clarlie  v.  Bank  of  Mississippi,  10 
Ark.  516,  52  Am.  Dec.  248,  but  see  the  note  thereto. 

CORPORATIONS— RESIDENCE.— A  corporation  can  have  but 
■one  legal  residence,  and  that  must  be  within  the  state  or  sovereignty 
creating  it:  Ireland  v.  Globe  Milling  etc.  Co.,  19  R.  1.  180,  61  Am. 
St.  Rep.  756,  and  note;  Duke  v.  Taylor,  37  Fla.  64,  53  Am.  St.  Rep. 
232. 

CORPORATIONS— FOREIGN  —  FILING  OF  CHARTER.— The 
"failure  of  a  foreign  corporation  engaged  in  business  in  the  state  to 
<?omply  with  its  law  by  filing  a  copy  of  its  articles  of  incorpora- 
tion and  the  certificate  of  the  appointment  of  an  agent  authorized 
to  accept  service  of  process  cannot  be  taken  advantage  of  by  the 
■corporation.  In  such  case,  valid  service  of  process  may  be  made 
upon  its  managing  agent:  Foster  v.  Betcher  Lumber  Co.,  5  S.  Dak. 
67,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  869. 


Beqwn  V.  Eleotrio  Eailway  Company. 

[101  Tennessee  252.] 

NEGLIGENCE— ACTION  FOR  DEATH  OF  HUSBAND— 
RI2LEASE  BY  HUSBAND.— A  settlement  and  adjustment  of  a  claim 
for  personal  injuries  made  by  a  deceased  husband  in  his  lifetime 
bars  an  action  by  his  widow  for  his  death  resulting  from  such  in- 
juries. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISK.— Dan- 
ger  from  a  bank  or  wall  of  earth  falling  is  one  open  to  common  ob- 
servation, and  a  servant  engaged  In  excavating  a  ditch  who,  know- 
ing that  he  is  exposed  to  such  danger,  continues  to  work,  assumes 
the  risks  and  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for  injuries  sustained. 

Case  &  Case,  for  the  appellant. 

Brown  &  Spurlock,  for  the  appellee. 


Sept.  1898.]         Bbown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  667 

**^  WILKES,  J.  This  is  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  re- 
eulting  in  the  death  of  plaintiff's  husband,  Andrew  Brown. 
Defendant  introduced  no  evidence,  hut  demurred  to  that  of 
plaintiff,  which  was  sustained  by  the  trial  judge  and  the  suit  dis- 
missed, and  the  plaintiff  has  appealed  and  assigned  errors. 

The  defendant,  as  one  of  his  pleas,  stated  that  the  matter  of 
damages  arising  out  of  this  accident  was  compromised  and  set- 
tled with  the  deceased  in  his  lifetime. 

There  was  a  replication  to  this  plea,  among  other  things,  to 
the  effect  that  this  settlement  was  before  the  husband  died,  and 
before  the  plaintiff's  right  of  action  accrued,  and  was  no  bar  to 
it.  The  court  on  motion,  struck  out  this  part  of  the  replication, 
and  this  is  assigned  as  error.  There  was  no  testimony  on  this 
feature  of  the  case,  and,  under  the  shape  it  has  assumed,  it  is  not 
material  to  be  considered.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  it  was 
not  error  to  strike  out  the  replication,  since  if  there  had  been  a 
settlement  and  adjustment  made  by  the  deceased  in  his  lifetime 
of  his  claim  for  damages,  it  would  bar  any  subsequent  action  by 
the  widow.  Of  course,  the  good  faith  and  binding  effect  of  such 
settlement  could  be  put  in  issue  as  was  done,  but  that  also  be- 
comes immaterial  under  the  demurrer,  which  raises  and  relies 
solely  upon  the  theory  that  there  was  no  cause  of  action  to  any- 
one arising  out  of  the  accident. 

The  facts  as  disclosed  by  plaintiff's  proof  are  **^  that  her  hus- 
band was  an  illiterate  negro,  an  ordinary  laborer,  but  there  is  no 
proof  that  he  was  weak-minded  or  imbecile.  He  was  employed 
with  another  to  dig  and  uncover  an  escape  pipe  at  or  near  the 
defendant's  power-house,  in  an  alley  between  the  power-house 
and  a  frame  house  on  the  east  of  it.  This  alley  was  some  ten 
feet  wide.  The  ditch  started  in  at  a  depth  of  three  or  four  feet 
at  the  north,  and  deepened  to  seven  feet  or  more  at  the  edge  of 
Seventh  street.  Beneath  the  surface  the  dirt  to  be  excavated 
was  loose  for  some  distance  and  then  there  was  clay,  and  it  was 
thrown  out,  as  excavated,  on  the  east  side  of  the  ditch,  next  to 
the  power  building.  There  was  a  ledge  of  about  three  feet  on 
which  the  dirt  was  banked  up.  There  were  no  stays  across  or 
along  the  ditch,  and  no  protection  from  its  falling  in  or  caving 
in. 

It  did  fall  in  on  Andrew  Brown,  while  he  was  excavating  at  a 
a  place  where  it  was  about  six  feet  deep,  and  crushed  him  so  that 
he  died.  An  expert  engineer,  Fritzwater,  had  charge  of  the 
work,  and  Brown  was  working  under  his  directions  and  obeying 


668  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn.. 

his  orders.  After  the  accident  defendant  took  precautions  to 
avoid  further  caving.     The  pipes  were  rusted. 

It  is  insisted  that  this  is  not  a  case  where  the  employe  has  full 
knowledge  of  the  danger  and  assumes  the  risk;  that  he  was  an 
ignorant  negro,  and  could  not  be  presumed  to  know  his  danger 
from  the  character  of  the  soil,  which  was  filled  in  with  cinders 
^^'^  and  debris,  nor  that* the  banking  of  the  dirt  upon  the  narrow 
ledge  woidd  cause  it  to  cave  in;  and  that  all  these  facts  and  the 
danger  consequent  on  them  were  well  known  to  the  engineer  and 
not  communicated  to  the  employe;  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
employer  to  furnish  a  safe  place  to  work  in;  that  the  work  was 
done  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  the  engineer  who  was 
present;  that  stays  and  supports  for  the  excavation  should  have 
been  provided  and  used;  and  that  the  evidence  should  have  gone 
to  the  jury,  especially  iu  view  of  the  ignorance  of  the  deceased, 
as  to  whether  he  knew  of  the  danger.  The  right  of  recovery  is 
resisted  on  the  idea  that  the  danger,  if  any,  was  patent;  that  it 
could  be  appreciated  and  known  by  the  weakest  intelligence,  and 
that  the  deceased,  when  he  undertook  the  work,  assumed  the 
risks  incident  to  it. 

If  the  plaintiff  in  this  case  was  aware  of  the  danger  attending 
his  work,  or  it  was  so  obvious  and  apparent  that  a  man  of  ordin- 
ary intelligence  would  have  seen  it,  then  he  must  be  held  to  have 
taken  its  risks  and  hazards,  and  would  not  be  entitled  to  recover: 
Bailey's  Personal  Injuries,  sees.  501,  502a,  796,  796a. 

The  witnesses  state  that  the  loose  character  of  the  soil  and  the 
banks  was  apparent,  and  the  danger  of  their  caving  in  must  have 
been  obvious  to  the  most  ordinary  intelligence  and  to  a  common 
laborer.  The  witness,  McCabe,  says  that  it  could  be  seen  as  you 
went  down  into  the  ground  that  it  was  ^"^  made  earth,  and  any 
man  of  ordinary  sense  could  see  the  kind  of  soil  it  was;  that  it 
was  priacipally  filled  in  with  cinders,  which  was  loose  stuff,  and 
the  person  who  was  digging  could  tell  this  better  than  anyone 
else.  The  witness,  Gass,  states  substantially  to  the  same  effect, 
and  says  that  any  man  of  ordinary  sense  could  tell  whether  he 
was  digging  through  cinders  or  clay.  It  clearly  appears,  there- 
fore, that  the  deceased  knew  the  danger  to  which  he  was  exposed, 
and  continued  to  work,  and  in  such  cases  he  must  be  held  to  have 
assumed  the  risks,  and  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for  injuries  sus- 
tained. 

Danger  from  a  bank  or  wall  of  earth  falling  is  one  open  to 
common  observation,  and  is  a  risk  assumed  by  anyone  walking 
thereon:  Olson  v.  McMullen,  34  Minn.  95;  Pederson  v.  Eush- 


Sept.  1898.]         Beown  t;.  Elkctric  Ry.  Co.  669 

ford,  41  Minn.  290;  Swanson  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  68 
Minn.  184;  Loughlin  v.  State,  105  N.  Y.  159;  Del  Sejnore  v. 
Hallinan,  153  N.  Y.  274;  Evans  v.  Council  Bluffs,  65  Iowa,  238; 
Kranz  v.  Long  Island  Ry.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  5;  Hughes  v.  Maiden 
€tc.  Gas  Light  Co.,  1G8  Mass.  396. 

Let  the  judgment  of  the  court  below  be  affirmed  with  costs. 


NEGLIGENCE-ACrriON  FOR  DEATH-RELEASE.— If  a  stat- 
ute makes  the  killing  of  a  passenger  of  a  railway  corporation 
through  gross  negligence  punishable  by  a  penalty  payable  to  a 
widow  and  children  or  next  of  kin,  such  passenger  cannot  release 
the  corporation  from  liability,  and  therefore  his  agreement  to  do  so 
cannot  bar  an  action  brought  for  his  death  by  an  administrator  for 
the  benefit  of  the  persons  entitled  to  the  penalty:  Doyle  v.  Fltch- 
burg  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  66,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  335.  A  sued  B  for 
assault  and  battery,  and  the  suit  was  settled  and  dismissed.  A  died 
a  few  days  afterward  from  the  effects  of  the  assault.  Held,  that 
A's  widow  was  not  barred  of  her  action  against  B,  under  the  stat- 
ute, for  damages  for  the  killing:  Donahue  v.  Drexler,  82  Ky.  157, 
56  Am.  Rep.  886. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISKS.— If  de- 
fects complained  of  are  as  open  and  obvious  to  the  servant  as  they 
are  to  the  master,  the  servant  cannot  recover  for  an  Injury  aris- 
ing therefrom:  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stutts,  105  Ala.  368,  53 
Am.  St.  Rep.  127;  Borden  v.  Daisy  etc.  Co.,  98  Wis.  407,  67  Am.  St. 
Hep.  816,  and  note.  When  a  servant  does  not  assume  obvious 
risks:  Maitland  v.  Gilbert  Paper  Co.,  97  Wis.  476,  65  Am.  St  Rep. 
137,  and  note. 

Of  Actions  for  the  Death  of  a  Human  Being:.* 
The  proper  limits  of  a  note  of  this  character  are  quite  inadequate 
to  the  treatment  of  all  the  questions  which  have  arisen  In  actions 
brought  to  recover  damages  for  the  death  of  another.  The  single 
matter  of  the  measure  and  elements  of  damages  In  such  actions  Is 
in  Itself  a  large  subject,  and,  as  It  Is  discussed  in  a  monographic 
note  to  Louisville  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Goodykoontz,  12  Am.  St  Rep.  375- 
383,  we  shall  not  consider  it  herein.  We  shall  also  exclude  from 
our  discussion  cases  arising  under  civil  damages  acts  passed  In 
many  states,  giving  to  persons  suffering  through  the  intoxication 
of  others,  an  action  for  damages  against  persons  furnishing  liquor 
to  those  through  whose  Intoxication  the  suffering  resulted.  Our 
subject  might  easily  be  allowed  to  lap  over  the  law  of  negligence 
as  well  as  that  of  master  and  servant,  but  we  shall  endeavor  to 
avoid  such  a  result  by  omitting  unnecessary  excursions  Into  related 
legal  domains  and  by  confining  our  attention  to  the  mere  right  of  ac- 
tion for  the  death  of  another,  and  to  matters  of  practice  and  pro- 
ceedings In  the  enforcement  of  such  right. 

The  Right  of  Action  is  Statutory.— Actio  personalis  moritur  cum 
persona  is  an  Important  maxim  of  the  common  law.    Under  It  the 

•BKFKEKNCB  to  MONOOftAPHIC  NOTES. 

Action  for  wrongful  act  causing^  death  in  another  state:  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  85S-855. 
Elements  and  measure  of  damages  in  actions  for  death:  12  Am.  8t.  Rep.  S76-S8S. 
Actions  for  injuries  resulting  in  death:  4»  Am.  Dec.  632-641;  37  Am.  Rep.  716-719. 


670  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn, 

right  of  recovery  for  injury  resulting  in  deatli  abates  witli  tho- 
death  of  the  person  injured.  It  must  be  regarded  as  a  propositiort 
no  longer  open  to  question,  though  sometimes  criticised  and,  less 
frequently,  dissented  from,  that  at  common  law  no  right  of  civil 
action  for  death  was  recognized  or  existed,  and  that  such  right  of 
action,  as  it  is  known  today,  rests  purely  in  statutory  enactments: 
Kahl  V.  Memphis  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  95  Ala.  337;  Kramer  v.  Market 
Street  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Cal.  434;  Kelly  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  16  CaL 
455;  Hindry  v.  Holt,  24  Colo.  464,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  235;  Connecticut 
Ins.  Co.  V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Conn.  265,  65  Am.  Dec.  571; 
Western  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  v.  Strong,  52  Ga.  461;  Shields  v.  Yonge,  15 
Ga.  349,  60  Am.  Dec.  698;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Schroeder,  18  IlL 
App.  328;  Long  v.  Morrison,  14  Ind.  595,  77  Am.  Dec.  72;  Jackson 
V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  140  Ind.  241,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  192;  Conner^ 
V.  Burlington  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Iowa,  490,  60  Am.  Rep.  814;  Dwyer 
V.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  84  Iowa,  479,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  322;  Eureka 
V.  Merrifield,  53  Kan.  794;  Winnegar  v.  Central  Passenger  Ry.  Co., 
85  Ky.  547;  Hubgh  v.  New  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  6  La.  Ann.  495,  54 
Am.  Dec.  565;  Hermann  v.  New  Orleans  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  11  La.  Ann. 
5;  Van  Amburg  v.  Vicksburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  La.  Ann.  650,  55 
Am.  Rep.  517;  State  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.,  58  Me.  176,  4  Am.  Rep. 
258:  Carey  v.  Berkshire  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Cush.  475,  48  Am.  Dec.  616; 
Richardson  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass.  85;  Hyatt  v. 
Adams,  16  Mich.  180;  Amos  v.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63  Miss.  509; 
State  v.  Manchester  etc.  R.  R.,  52  N.  H.  528;  Corliss  v.  Worcester 
etc.  R.  R.  63  N.  H.  404;  Grosso  v.  Delaware  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  50  N. 
J.  L.  317;  Myers  v.  Holborn,  58  N.  J.  L.  193,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  606; 
Whitford  v.  Panama  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  465;  Lucas  v.  New  lork 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Barb.  245;  Woodard  v.  Michigan  Southern  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio  St.  121;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  55 
Pa.  St.  499;  Usher  v.  West  Jersey  R.  R.  Co.,  126  Pa.  St  206,  12 
Am.  St.  Rep.  863;  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beall,  91  Tex.  310,  66  Am.  St. 
Rep.  892;  Edgar  v.  Castello,  14  S.  C.  20,  37  Am.  Rep.  714;  Thomas  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  Utah,  232;  Needham  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.» 
88  Vt.  294;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Brame,  95  U.  S.  754;  Armstrong  v» 
Beadle,  5  Saw.  484;  Sullivan  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  McCrary^ 
801,  2  Fed.  Rep.  447. 

Perhaps  the  only  well-considered  American  dissent  from  thi» 
proposition  is  the  opinion  delivered  by  Dillon,  O.  J.,  In  Sullivan  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  Dill.  334,  in  which  that  learned  jurist  de- 
nies the  binding  authority  of  Lord  Ellenborough's  statement  ia 
Baker  v.  Bolton,  1  Camp.  493,  that  "In  a  civil  court,  the  death  of  a 
human  being  cannot  be  complained  of  as  an  Injury."  Judge  Dillon 
points  out  that,  since  Baker  v.  Bolton,  1  Camp.  493,  was  determined 
in  1808,  the  decision  therein  Is  not  binding  upon  the  courts  of  this 
country  as  part  of  the  common  law.  Considering  the  matter  thus. 
Judge  Dillon  dissented  from  the  proposition  to  which  we  have  just 
cited  authorities,  so  far  as  It  applied  to  the  case  In  band.  But  hi» 
decision  has  since  been  reversed  and  robbed  of  its  claim  to  authority 


Sept.  1898.]         Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  671 

by  later  federal  decisions  cited  above.  In  Holmes  v.  O.  &  C.  Ry. 
Co.,  5  Fed.  Rep.  75,  Deady,  D.  J.  said:  "It  Is  admitted  that  it  came^ 
to  be  the  rule  at  common  law  that  an  action  will  not  lie  to  recover 
damages  for  the  death  of  a  human  being.  The  maxim,  actio  per- 
sonalis moritur  cum  persona,  was  held  to  apply.  It  is  also  admitted 
that  the  weight  of  authority  in  this  country  is  with  the  Englisl> 
rule.  But  It  Is  not  admitted  that  the  rule  is  founded  in  reason  or  1^ 
consonant  with  Justice":  See  The  Garland,  5  Fed.  Rep.  924.  So  la 
Van  Amburg  v.  Vlclcsburg  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3T  La.  Ann.  650,  55  Am. 
Rep.  517,  the  common-law  rule  is  adverted  to  in  this  wise:  "Legis- 
lation and  jurisprudence  have  combined  to  perpetuate  the  extra- 
ordinary doctrine  that  the  life  of  a  free  man  cannot  be  made  the- 
subject  of  valuation,  and  under  the  domination  of  that  dogmatic 
utterance,  made  earlier  than  the  Roman  Digest,  reproduced  therein^ 
and  echoed  by  the  courts  of  all  countries  from  then  till  now,  tho- 
singular  spectacle  has  been  witnessed  of  courts  sanctioning  dam- 
ages for  short-lived  pains,  and  refusing  them  for  a  life-long  sorrow 
and  the  pecuniary  losses  consequent  upon  the  death  of  one  from, 
whom  was  derived  support,  comfort,  and  even  the  necessary  stays- 
of  life.  Legislation  has  at  last  come  to  the  relief  of  future  suf- 
ferers." So  in  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beall,  91  Tex.  blO,  66  Am.  St.  Rep. 
892,  the  court  considers  itself  bound  by  the  rule  stated  In  the 
preceding  paragraph,  though  "none  of  the  reasons  assigned  therefor- 
seem  entirely  satisfactory,"  and  "the  reason  for  the  original  adop- 
tion of  the  rule  ....  is  involved  in  doubt  and  obscurity.^'  And  In 
Maney  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  49  111.  App.  105,  the  rule  Is  criticised 
as  allowing  "a  glaring  absurdity  in  allowing  a  husband  and  father,  if 
injured,  but  not  killed,  a  right  of  action  for  the  recovery  of  damages- 
thus  sustained,  and  denying  to  his  widow  and  children  any  compen- 
sation for  damages  inflicted  upon  them  should  the  Injury  be  greater 
and  result  in  his  death." 

That  there  is  justice  in  some  of  these  criticisms  cannot  be  denied. 
In  considering  any  proposition  of  law,  the  reasons  upon  which  it 
is  based  cannot  be  overlooked.  But  it  Is  of  greater  importance  to- 
lawyers  to  know  what  the  law  Is  than  to  know  why  It  Is  what  It 
Is.  That  a  proposition  of  law,  though  firmly  established  by  au- 
thority, is  not  based  upon  reason,  Is  a  matter  worthy  of  knowledge, 
because  prophetic  of  the  disappearance  of  the  proposition  from  the 
body  of  the  law,  but  should  not  lead  one  Into  mistake  as  to  what 
the  law  is.  Various  reasons  have  been  suggested  for  the  common- 
law  rule  aside  from  the  maxim  that  personal  injuries  die  with  the- 
person.  It  has  been  said  that  by  death  the  civil  injury  merges  in 
the  felony,  but  It  Is  manifest  that  In  the  bulk  of  instances  of 
death  from  injuries  no  felony  is  constituted.  In  Hyatt  v.  Adams, 
16  Mich.  180,  the  court,  per  Christiancy,  J.,  enters  into  a  lengthy 
discussion  of  the  reason  of  the  rule  in  question,  reaching  the  con- 
clusion "that  the  reason  of  the  rule  Is  to  be  found  In  that  natural 
and  almost  universal  repugnance  among  enlightened  nations  to  set- 
ting a  price  upon  human  life,  or  any  attempt  to  estimate  Its  value- 
by  a  pecuniary  standard,  a  repugnance  which  seems  to  have  beeik 


€72  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn. 

strong  and  prevalent  among  nations  in  proportion  as  they  have 
been  or  become  more  enlightened  and  refined,  and  especially  so 
where  the  Christian  religion  has  exercised  its  most  beneflcient  in- 
fluence and  where  human  life  has  been  held  most  sacred."  The 
statutes  passed  quite  generally  in  America  are  looked  upon  by  the 
able  justice  as  necessary  concessions  to  the  needs  created  by 
modern  developments  in  modes  of  travel  and  business— concessions 
not  unmixed  with  some  incidental  evils.  "And  it  will  be  fortunate 
in  the  future,"  he  concludes,  "if  it  shall  be  found  that  habituating 
the  public  mind  to  the  idea  of  pecuniary  compensation  for  human 
life  has  not  tended  to  wealien  its  safeguards,  and  to  render  it  less 
sacred  in  popular  estimation."  For  our  own  part  we  see  little 
menace  in  this,  certainly  much  less  than  we  should  see  in  a  state 
of  the  law  which  encouraged  negligent  destruction  of  human  life 
by  providing  no  remedy  therefor  except  where  a  felony  was  con- 
stituted. 

Statutory  Enactment  and  Construction.— Both  In  England  and 
throughout  the  United  States,  statutes  have  been  enacted  abrogat- 
ing the  common-law  rule  which  refused  to  allow  the  maintenance 
of  an  action  against  one  who  by  wrongful  act,  neglect,  or  default, 
caused  the  death  of  another.  The  English  statute  (9  &  10  Vict., 
c.  93)  was  passed  in  184G,  and,  being  the  earliest  of  this  class  of 
statutes,  has  served  as  a  model  for  subsequent  legislation  directed  . 
toward  the  same  end.  It  is  commonly  referred  to  as  Lord  Camp- 
bell's act.  These  statutes,  being  in  abrogation  of  the  common  law, 
are  strictly  construed.  The  slightest  variation  in  verbiage  between 
two  statutes  may  be  of  great  importance  in  its  effect  upon  the 
decisions  thereunder.  So  it  is  well  settled  that  only  those  persons 
named  in  the  statute  as  proper  parties  plaintiff  may  sue:  Wilson  v. 
Bumstead,  12  Neb.  1;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Oyster,  Nebraska, 
Feb.,  1899.  The  cases  which  adhere  to  this  almost  elementary  rule 
-derive  their  especial  interest  from  their  construction  of  various 
words  and  phrases.  Where  a  statute  designates  the  parties  who 
itoay  sue,  and  provides  that  the  "heir  or  heirs"  of  the  deceased  may 
sue,  If  there  is  no  husband  or  wife,  or  if  he  or  she  fails  to  sue  within 
one  year  after  the  death,  the  words  quoted  mean  "child  or  child- 
ren," and  do  not  include  all  those  entitled  to  share  In  the  estate 
of  a  person  dying  Intestate.  The  right  of  action  Is,  therefore, 
limited  to  lineal  descendents:  Hindry  v.  Holt,  24  Colo.  464,  65  Am. 
St.  Rep.  235;  Jordan  v.  Cincinnati  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Ky.  40.  And 
in  construing  the  word  "heir"  to  mean  "child  or  children,"  It  Is  held 
to  Include  adult  as  well  as  minor  children:  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Malla,  Kentucky  Ct.  of  App.,  Feb.  1899.  In  a  similar  statute, 
"heirs"  is  held  to  be  restricted  to  the  widow  and  children  of  de- 
ceased, and  does  not  Include  parents  or  collateral  relatives:  Noble 
V.  Seattle,  19  Wash.  133.  On  the  other  hand,  the  words  "heirs  at 
law,"  as  used  In  the  Arkansas  statute,  are  held  to  be  used  In  con- 
tradistinction to  devisees  and  to  Include  all  those  entitled  to  share 
In  the  distribution,  under  the  Arkansas  statutes,  of  the  personal 


Sept.  1898.]         Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  673 

estate  of  persons  dying  Intestate:  St.  Louis  etc.  Ey.  C5o.  t.  Need- 
ham,  10  U.  S.  App.  339,  52  Fed.  Rep.  371. 

Where  a  statute  limits  the  right  of  action  to  lineal  descendants 
of  the  deceased,  his  niece  cannot  sue:  Hindry  v.  Holt,  24  Colo.  464, 
«5  Am.  St.  Hep.  235.  Under  a  statute  providing  for  an  action  by  the 
■widow  or  next  of  liin  of  deceased,  a  widower  is  not  enabled  to  sue 
for  the  death  of  his  wife,  as  he  is  not  included  In  "the  next  of 
kin":  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  McGill,  57  Fed.  Rep.  699;  Dickins 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  158;  Drake  v.  Gilmore,  52  N.  Y.  389. 
The  words  "next  of  kin"  are  limited  in  legal  meaning,  as  in  com- 
mon use,  to  blood  relations,  and  do  not  include  a  husband  or  a 
wife  unless  accompanied  by  other  words  clearly  manifesting  a 
purpose  to  extend  their  signification:  Haraden  v.  Larrabee,  113 
Mass.  430.  Though  in  Ohio  it  was  held  that  "next  of  kin"  used  in  a 
statute  allowing  an  action  for  death  included  the  widower  of  a  de- 
ceased woman:  Steel  v.  Kurtz,  28  Ohio  St.  191.  A  statute  allow- 
ing a  wife  to  sue  for  the  death  of  her  husband  does  not  authorize 
the  latter  to  sue  for  the  death  of  the  former:  Grosso  v.  Delaware 
etc.  R.  R,  Co.,  50  N.  J.  L.  317;  Georgia  R.  R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Wynn,  42 
<5a.  331.  If  a  right  of  action  is  given  to  the  mother  for  the  death 
of  a  minor  child,  the  father  cannot  sue:  Frazier  v.  Georgia  R.  R. 
etc.  Co.,  96  Ga.  785.  Where  the  right  of  action  is  given  to  the 
widow  by  statute,  the  personal  representative  cannot  sue:  Litch- 
field Coal  Co.  V.  Taylor,  81  111.  590;  and,  conversely,  the  widow 
cannot  sue  under  a  statute  giving  a  right  of  action  to  the  personal 
representatives  of  the  deceased:  Weidner  v.  Rankin,  26  Ohio  St. 
522;  Holston  v.  Coal  etc.  Co.,  95  Tenn.  521;  Usher  v.  West  Jersey 
R.  R.  Co.,  126  Pa.  St.  206,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  863.  SimUarly,  under 
a  statute  providlug  that  actions  for  the  widow  and  next  of  kin  may 
in  all  cases  be  brought  by  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  de- 
ceased, except  that  where  there  is  a  widow  only  she  may  sue  in 
her  own  name,  the  father  of  a  deceased  minor  cannot  sue  in  his 
own  name  as  next  of  kin:  Goodwin  v.  Nickerson,  17  R.  I.  478.  See, 
also,  Fitzhenry  v.  Consolidated  Traction  Co.,  N,  J.  Sup.  Ct.,  Feb., 
1899;  Lovell  v.  De  Bardelaben  Coal  etc.  Co.,  90  Ala.  13;  Eureka  v. 
Merrifield,  53  Kan.  794;  ScheflSer  v.  Minneapolis  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  32 
Minn.  125.  The  words  "personal  representatives"  mean  the  ad- 
ministrator or  executor  of  the  deceased,  and  not  the  heir  or  next 
of  kin:  Kramer  v.  Market  Street  R.  R.  Co.,  25  Cal.  434;  and  such 
words  do  not  Include  parent  or  child,  or  husband  or  wife.  Illinois 
-Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  70  Miss.  471;  Railroad  v.  Johnson,  97 
Tenn.  667.  Where  the  right  of  action  Is  given  the  distributees  of  a 
deceased  person,  his  personal  representatives  cannot  sue:  HuJbert 
V.  Topeka,  34  Fed.  Rep.  510. 

Under  a  statute  authorizing  a  child  to  recover  for  the  homicide 
of  a  parent,  it  has  no  right  of  action  for  the  homicide  of  Its  step- 
father: Marshall  v.  Macon  Sash  etc.  Co.,  103  Ga.  725,  68  Am.  St. 
Rep.  140.  Conversely,  a  stepfather  cannot  sue  for  the  death  of  a 
etepchlld:  Hennessey  v.  Bavarian  Brewing  Co.,  145  Mo.  104,  68  Am. 
AM,  St.  Uep.,  Vol.  LXX.-43 


674  Beown  V,  Electkic  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn» 

St.  Rep.  554.  A  statute  giving  to  parents  the  right  to  recover  for 
the  -wrongful  death  of  a  minor  child  does  not  include  a  man  who 
marries  the  mother  of  a  bastard  child:  Thornburg  v.  American 
Strawboard  Co.,  141  Ind.  443,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  334;  nor  can  th* 
father  or  mother  of  au  illegitimate  child  recover  for  its  death:  Mc- 
Donald V.  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144  Ind.  459,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.. 
185;  Marshall  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Fed.  Rep.  269.  The  wont 
"child,"  used  in  a  statute  giving  an  action  to  a  father  for  the  death 
of  his  child,  is  not  equivalent  to  the  word  "minor,"  but  is  limited 
to  such  as  occupy  the  position  of  child  to  a  parent  and  are  depen- 
dent upon  the  parent  for  support.  It  does  not  include  a  minor  who 
is  the  head  of  a  family:  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Vining,  27  Ind. 
513,  92  Am.  Dec.  269.  "Minor  and  unmarried,"  used  in  a  statute,. 
cannot  be  read  "minor  or  unmarried"  so  as  to  allow-  parents  to  re- 
cover for  the  death  of  an  adult  unmarried  son:  Isaac  v.  Denver  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  12  Daly,  340.  A  statute  giving  an  action  for  the  death 
of  a  "person"  does  not  enable  a  recovery  for  the  death  of  a  child 
whose  birth  was  hastened  by  an  accident  to  its  mother,  and  whicb" 
survived  only  a  few  minutes:  Dietrich  v.  Northampton,  138  Mass. 
14,  52  Am.  Rep.  242;  Hawkins  v.  Front  Street  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  Z 
Wash.  592,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  72.  "Widow  or  children,  husband  or 
father,"  does  not  include  a  mother  so  as  to  enable  her  to  sue  for 
the  death  of  her  minor  child:  Amos  v.  Mobile  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  63 
Miss.  509.  It  has  been  held  in  Texas  that  a  stepfather  may  repre- 
sent his  wife's  min»r  children  as  nest  friend  in  a  suit  for  damages 
for  causing  the  death  of  their  father:  International  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Kuehn,  70  Tex.  582. 

Statutes  quite  generally  aim  to  give  dependent  children  a  right 
of  action  for  the  death  of  a  parent.  "Minor  heirs"  cannot  include 
children  of  age:  Huberwald  v.  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  50  La.  Ann.  477. 
Where  a  statute  gave  an  action  for  the  benefit  of  "children"  of  a 
person  killed  through  the  wrongful  act,  neglect,  or  default  of 
another,  a  child  born  after  his  father's  death  is  entitled  to  have 
an  action  brought  for  his  benefit:  Nelson  v.  Galveston  etc.  Ry.  Co.,. 
78  Tex.  621,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  81.  Such  a  child  is  entitled  to  partici- 
pate In  the  benefit  of  a  judgment  recovered  for  the  negligent  kill- 
ing of  its  parent:  Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  82  Tex.  657,  27 
Am.  St.  Rep.  629.  Whether  or  not  an  adult  child  may  recover  for 
the  death  of  his  parent  depends  in  each  case  upon  the  wording  and- 
theory  of  the  statute  upon  which  recovery  is  sought  to  be  based. 
Where  the  aim  of  the  statute  is  to  afford  a  remedy  only  to  those 
children  who  are  dependent  upon  their  parent  for  support,  an 
adult  child  cannot  recover:  Mott  v.  Central  R.  R.,  70  Ga.  680,  48 
Am.  Rep.  595;  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  78  Tex.  536.  In 
Maryland,  it  was  held  that  since  the  statute  made  no  reference  to 
the  age  or  condition  of  the  parties  sought  to  be  benefited,  adult 
children  might  sue  for  the  death  of  a  parent:  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  State,  60  Md.  449.  And  the  mere  fact  that  children  are  adult 
and  self-supporting  does  not,  in  a  number  of  states,  necessarily 
preclude  a  recovery  by  them  for  pecuniary  loss  consequent  upoa 


Sept.  1898.]         Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  675 

a  parent's  death:  Lock  wood  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y. 
523;  Schnats  v.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  G02;  Tuteur 
V.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  505.  Minor  children  may  recover 
for  the  homicide  of  their  mother  under  the  Georgia  statute  au- 
thorizing a  recovery  by  "a  widow,  or,  if  no  widow,  a  child  or 
children  ....  for  the  homicide  of  a  husband  or  parent":  Atlanta 
etc.  R,  R.  Co.  V.  Venable,  G5  Ga.  55;  but  they  have  no  such  right 
of  action  where  their  father  is  alive:  Scott  v.  Central  Railroad,  77 
Ga.  450.  Brothers  and  sisters  of  a  deceased  person  are  not  entitled 
to  sue  under  a  statute  authorizing  an  action  for  the  benefit  of 
"husband  or  widow,  or  lineal  descendents  or  ancestors":  Brown  v. 
Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  Wisconsin,  Dec,  1898. 

Plaintiff  Must  'Bring  Himself  Within  Statute.— M.uch  of  the  matter 
included  in  the  division  of  our  note  just  finished  might  have  been 
omitted  had  we  been  content  to  rest  upon  a  mere  statement  of  the 
rule  that  only  the  persons  named  in  the  statute  may  bring  an  action 
for  the  death  of  another    But  a  rule  so  general  and  absolute  in  its 
terms  cannot  be  understood  from  a  bare  statement  of  it,  so  we 
have  shown  at  Considerable  length  the  various  applications  of  the 
rule  which  our  courts  have  made.    The  particular  thing  evinced 
by  such  a  recital  is,  that  courts,  without  exception,  apply  a  rule 
of  strict  construction  to  statutes  giving  a  right  of  action  for  death. 
Another  proposition,  which  directly  results  from  this  rule  of  con- 
struction, and  which  Is  an  essential  corollary  to  the  rule  that  only 
the  persons  named  in  the  statute  may  sue,  is  that  one  seeking  to 
recover  under  a  statute  for  the  death  of  a  human  being  must  bring 
himself  clearly  within  the  terms  of  the  statute:  McDonald  v.  Pitts- 
burgh etc.  Ry.  Co.,  144  Ind.  459,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  185;  and  that  the 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  him  to  show  the  existence  in  fact  of  the 
relationship  to  the  deceased  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
action:  Deni  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.,  181  Pa.  St.  525,  59  Am. 
St.  Rep.  676.    Thus,  in  Arkansas  the  father,  if  living,  must  sue 
for  the  death  of  a  minor,  and  if  the  mother  sues,  she  must  show 
affirmatively  and  positively  that  the  father  is  dead.    A  bare  allega- 
tion that  she  is  a  widow  is  insufficient:  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Yocum,  34  Ark.  493.    Where  the  statute  gives  to  a  father  and 
mother  an  action  for  the  death  of  a  "minor  and  unmarried"  child, 
a  petition  failing  to  allege  that  the  deceased  was  unmarried  does 
not  state  a  cause  of  action:  Dulaney  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  21 
Mo.  App.  597.    Compare  Barker  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  91  Mo. 
86.    Generally,  where  the  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased 
person  are  authorized  to  sue  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow, 
children,  or  next  of  kin,  the  existence  of  such  beneficiaries  must 
be  alleged:  Holton  v.  Daly,  106  111.  131;  West  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mabie,  77  111.  App.  176;  Stewart  v.  Terre  Haute  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
103  Ind.  44;  Schwarz  v.  Judd,  28  Minn.  371;  Burlington  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Crockett,  17  Neb.  570;  Serensen  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed. 
Rep.  407.    But  such  an  allegation  has  been  considered  unnecessary 
because  "a  collateral  fact  of  this  character,  the  existence  of  which 
in  almost  all  cases  is  common  knowledge,  will  be  presumed:  Colum- 


676  Beown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn. 

bus  etc.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Bradford,  86  Ala.  574;  and,  by  another  court, 
on  the  ground  that  there  is  a  presumption  that  every  Intestate 
leaves  next  of  kin,  and  the  party  who  wishes  to  negative  the  pre- 
sumption must  aver  and  prove  it:  Warner  v.  Western  etc.  li.  R. 
Co.,  94  N.  C.  250.  Wiiere  the  personal  representative  is  given  a 
right  to  sue  only  for  the  benefit  of  certain  designated  beneficiaries, 
the  existence  of  such  beneficiaries  will  scarcely  be  presumed.  The 
presumption  in  favor  of  the  existence  of  next  of  liin  or  heirs  can- 
not be  reasonably  stretched  to  cover  such  a  case.  Where  the  right 
of  recovery  Is  regarded  as  surviving  the  deceased  and  as  becom- 
ing part  of  the  assets  of  his  estate,  such  right  may  be  enforced 
by  the  personal  representative  for  the  benefit  of  the  estate;  Stewart 
V.  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  83  Ala.  493;  and  it  would  seem  that 
in  such  a  case  the  presumption  of  the  existence  of  persons  entitled 
to  share  in  the  estate  as  distributees  would  render  a  direct  allega- 
tion of  that  fact  unnecessary.  This  raises  another  matter  relative 
to  the  theory  of  statutes  giving  actions  for  the  death  of  human 
beings. 

Two  Classes  of  Statutes.— These  statutes  are  divisible  Into:  1.  Those 
which  provide  merely  for  the  survival  in  favor  of  the  estate  or 
designated  beneficiaries  of  the  action  which  the  deceased  would 
have  had  in  his  own  favor  had  he  survived  his  injuries:  and  2.  Those 
which  create  an  entirely  new  cause  of  action  distinct  from  any 
that  deceased  might  have  had  had  he  survived.  The  distinction 
between  these  two  classes  would  be  of  greater  importance  to  us 
were  we  to  take  up  the  matter  of  measure  and  elements  of  dam- 
ages, but  it  has  a  limited  influence  upon  our  subject  as  we  have 
defined  it.  We  have  already  mentioned  its  pertinency  to  the  mat- 
ter of  necessary  allegations  in  petitions  for  relief  under  the  statutes. 
If  the  statute  merely  provides  for  the  survival  of  a  right  of  action. 
It  becomes  necessary  to  determine  that  the  deceased,  at  the  mo- 
ment of  his  death,  had  a  right  ojC  action  based  upon  his  injuries 
and  8ufi"erings  therefrom.  If  his  death  was  instantaneous,  no  period 
of  suffering  Intervening  between  his  injury  and  his  death.  It  is 
plain  that  under  such  a  statute  no  action  would  survive.  It  would 
be  paradoxical  to  say  that  a  deceased  person  had  a  right  of  action 
for  his  own  death.  It  would  be  difficult.  In  case  of  instantaneous 
death  to  determine  at  what  point  deceased's  cause  of  action  ac- 
crued, and  also  as  to  what  Is  meant  by  the  survival  of  such  an 
action.  But  the  theory  of  this  class  of  statutes  Is  not  that  they 
provide  for  the  survival  of  a  cause  of  action,  but,  instead,  that 
they  create  a  new  cause  of  action  which  was  unknown  to  the  com- 
mon law.  This  is  the  general  rule,  although  there  are  exceptions 
to  it:  Schwarz  v.  Judd,  28  Minn.  371;  Munro  v.  Pacific  Coast  Dredg- 
ing etc.  Co.,  84  Cal.  515,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  248;  Brown  v.  Chicago 
etc  Ry.  Co.,  Wisconsin,  Dec,  1898.  See  citations  under  "The  right 
of  action  is  statutory,"  supra.  Under  such  statutes  the  plaintiff 
is  not  regarded  as  representing  the  right  of  action  which  deceased 
would  have  had,  but  as  suing  in  his  own  behalf  for  damages  suf- 
fered through  the  death  of  the  deceased:  Morgan  y.  Southern  Tac 


Sept.  1898.]         Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  677 

Co.,  95  Cal.  510,  29  Am.  St  Rep.  143;  Pennsylvania  R.  R,  Co.  v. 
Vandever,  36  Pa.  St.  298;  Atchison  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  26  Kan. 
443;  Donaldson  v.  Mississippi  etc.  R,  R.  Co.,  18  Iowa,  280,  87  Am. 
Dec.  391;  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miller,  2  Colo.  460;  Hyatt  v.  Adams, 
16  Mich.  180;  Legg  v.  Britton,  64  Vt.  652.  Though  where  the  aim 
of  the  statute  is  to  simply  transmit  to  survivors  the  right  of  action 
which  deceased  would  have  had  had  he  lived,  the  plaintiff  stands 
In  the  stead  of  the  deceased:  Hennessey  v.  Bavarian  Brewing  Co., 
145  Mo.  104,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  554.  In  Kansas,  the  statute  permits 
actions  for  injury  to  the  person  to  survive  only  when  d^ath  does 
not  result  from  the  injury,  but  occurs  from  other  causes.  Where, 
however,  death  results  from  the  injury,  a  right  of  action  is  created 
for  the  benefit  of  the  widow^  and  children,  or  next  of  kin:  Martin 
V.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  58  Kan.  475. 

Instantaneous  Death.— There  can  be  no  doubt  that  at  common  law 
no  action  existed  for  the  instantaneous  death  of  a  human  being. 
Where,  however,  deceased  had  an  interval  of  conscious  suffering, 
it  has  been  held  that  his  right  of  action  survives  for  the  benefit 
of  his  estate:  Clare  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  172  Mass.  211; 
Wlnuogar  v.  Central  Passenger  Ry.  Co.,  85  Ky.  547.  Compare 
Kelley  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  16  Colo.  455.  Where  Injuries  to  a 
child  resulted  in  death,  but  not  Instantaneously,  it  was  held  that 
at  common  law  the  surviving  mother  might  sue  for  the  loss  of 
the  child's  services  and  expenses  incurred  for  medical  attention, 
care,  and  nursing:  Natchez  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cook,  63  Miss.  38; 
.Tackson  v.  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ry.  Co.^  140  Ind.  241,  49  Am.  St  Rep. 
192.  Since  the  general  theory  of  American  statutes  on  this  subject 
is,  as  we  have  said,  that  the  action  thereby  newly  created  is  en- 
tirely distinct  from  any  action  which  the  deceased  might  have  had 
had  he  lived.  It  logically  follows  that  the  newly  created  action  is 
not  barred  by  the  fact  that  the  death  of  the  deceased  was  instan- 
taneous: Connors  v.  Burlington  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  71  Iowa,  490,  60  Am. 
Rep.  814;  Worden  v.  Humeston  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  72  Iowa,  201;  Givens 
V.  Kentucky  Cent.  Ry.  Co.,  89  Ky.  231;  Daly  v.  New  Jersey  Steel 
etc.  Co.,  155  Mass.  1;  Reed  v.  Northeastern  R.  R.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  42; 
Nashville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Prince,  2  Heisk.  580,  announcing  a  dif- 
ferent rule  from  that  adhered  to  in  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Burke,  6  Cold.  45;  International  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kindred,  57  Tex. 
491.  We  find  it  declared  that  to  entitle  an  administrator  to  sue 
under  the  Vermont  statute  it  is  not  necessary  that  death  should 
have  resulted  instantly  from  the  injury  complained  of:  Boyden  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  70  Vt.  125;  and  that  the  remedies  provided  by 
the  Maine  statute  are  limited  to  cases  where  the  injured  person  dies 
immediately:  Sawyer  v.  Perry,  88  Me.  42.  Where  a  statute  was 
designed  to  cause  to  survive  to  the  personal  representative  any 
right  of  personal  action  which  the  deceased  might  have  commenced 
or  prosecuted  if  living,  it  was  logically  held  that  an  administrator 
could  not  sue  for  injuries  causing  the  death  of  his  intestate  If  the 
death  was  Instantaneous:  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pendergrass,  69 
Miss.  425;  McVey  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R,  R.  Co.,  73  Miss.  487;  Beldlng 


678  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn. 

V.  Black  Hills  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  3  S.  Dak.  369.    Compare  Dlmmey  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  27  W.  Va.  32;  55  Am.  Rep.  292. 

Proper  and  Necessary  Parties— Joinder. — We  have  already  said  that 
actions  for  death  can  be  maintained  only  by  the  persons  named  in 
statutes  as  beneficiaries,  and  that,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  a 
recovery,  a  plaintiff  must  bring  himself  within  the  statute  under 
which  he  sues.  The  discussion  of  these  propositions  is  in  point  to 
the  question.  Who  are  proper  parties?  In  Indiana,  a  father  cannot 
maintain  an  action  as  Administrator  of  his  deceased  minor  son, 
unless  there  has  been  an  emancipation  of  the  infant:  Berry  v.  Louis- 
ville etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  128  Ind.  484;  though  under  the  Indiana  statutes 
the  father  has  a  right  to  recover  for  the  injury  or  death  of  his 
child:  Baltimore  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bradford,  20  Ind.  App.  348,  67  Am. 
St.  Rep.  252.  It  is  indispensable  that  the  plaintiff  sue  in  the  proper 
capacity.  Under  the  Illinois  statute,  a  father  may  sue  as  adminis- 
trator for  the  death  of  his  minor  child:  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111. 
349,  68  Am.  Dec.  553.  The  question  as  to  who  are  necessary  and 
proper  parties  depends  entirely  upon  the  particular  statute  under 
which  suit  is  brought.  The  statutes  of  the  different  states,  though 
modelled  from  Lord  Campbell's  Act,  vary  sufficiently  in  their 
terms  to  render  it  almost  impossible  anywhere  in  our  subject  to 
indulge  in  the  statement  of  general  propositions.  It  becomes,  then, 
the  first  duty  of  the  practitioner  to  consult  the  statute  upon  which 
he  relies,  for  the  rule  of  law  that  remedial  statutes,  though  in 
abrogation  of  the  common  law,  must  be  liberally  construed  to 
accomplish  the  end  desired,  has  not  been  much  observed  in  the 
interpretation  of  statutes  giving  an  action  for  the  death  of  a  human 
being.  On  one  hand  it  is  held  that  where  a  right  of  action  is  given 
to  the  heirs  at  law  of  a  deceased  person  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow 
and  next  of  kin,  all  the  heirs  at  law  are  indispensable  parties  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  action:  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Needham,52  Fed. 
Rep.  371,  10  U.  S.  App.  339.  On  another  hand  a  widow  Is  allowed  to 
bring  suit  for  herself,  and  also  for  the  use  of  her  husband's  parents 
without  their  knowledge  or  consent:  San  Antonio  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ren- 
ken,  15  Tex.  Civ.  App.  229.  Compare  East  Line  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cul- 
berson, 68  Tex.  664.  Under  the  Pennsylvania  statute,  the  widow  in 
such  case  has  the  sole  right  of  action:  Lehigh  Iron  Co.  v.  Rupp,  100 
Pa.  St.  95.  In  Tennessee,  children  are  unnecessary  parties  to  a  suit 
brought  by  the  widow  or  administrator:  Collins  v.  Bast  Tennessee 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Heisk.  841.  Generally,  where  an  action  is  given 
to  the  father  and  mother,  as  parents,  for  the  death  Of  a  minor  child. 
It  Is  not  necessary  that  they  be  joined  as  parties  plaintiff.  Either 
may  sue  alone:  Pierce  v.  Conners,  20  Colo.  178,  46  Am.  St.  Rep. 
279;  but  there  Is  no  impropriety  In  their  suing  jointly:  Texas  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Hall,  83  Tex.  675.  A  married  woman  deserted  by  her 
husband  may  maintain  an  acflon  In  her  own  name  for  the  death  of 
a  minor  child  of  herself*  and  husband:  Kerr  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  R., 
169  Pa.  St.  95.  Where  a  statute  provides  that  the  "action  shall 
be  for  the  sole  and  exclusive  benefit  of  the  surviving  husband,  wife, 
children,    and   parents"    of    deceased,    grandchildren    are    neither 


Sept  1898.]        Bbown  v.  Electeic  Ry.  Co.  679 

necessary  nor  proper  parties  to  the  suit;  Dallas  Rapid  Transit  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Elliott,  7  Tex.  OIv.  App.  216.    Where  a  widow  sues  for  the 
death  of  her  husband,  there  Is  no  misjoinder  of  parties  plaintiff  If 
Bhe  sues  Individually  and  as  guardian  of  a  minor  child,  the  Issue 
of  her  marriage  with  deceased:  Helm  v.  O'Rourke,  46  La.  Ann.  178. 
Dependency  and  Expectation  of  Benefits. —  In  Georgia,  a  mother  or 
father  cannot  recover  under  the  statute  for  the  death  of  a  child, 
unless  It  be  shown  that  such  mother  or  father  was  dependent  upon 
such  child  for  support,  and  that  such  deceased  child  contributed 
to  the  support  or  maintenance  of  the  mother  or  father:  Clay  ▼. 
Central  R.  R.  etc.  Co.,  84  Ga.  345.    It  Is  sufficient  that  a  mother 
was  partially  dependent  upon  a  deceased  son,  though  her  husband 
also  contributed  to  her  support:  Daniels  v.  Savannah  etc.  Ry.  Co., 
86  Ga.  236;   Richmond  etc.   R.   R.   Co.  v.  Johnston,  89  Ga.  560; 
as  where   all   of  a   family   reside   together   and   labor  for  their 
mutual  support,   the  proceeds  of  the  labor  of  the  minor  child 
going  Into  the  common  stock:  Augusta  Ry.  Co.  Y.  Glover,  92  Ga. 
132;  Atlanta  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gravitt,  93  Ga.  369,  44  Am.  St  Rep. 
146.    Where,  however,  a  son,  while  serving  a  term  In  the  peniten- 
tiary, was  unlawfully  killed,  but  at  the  time  of  his  death  was  not 
actually  contributing  to  his  father's  support,  the  latter  could  not 
recover  for  the  homicide:  Smith  v.  Hatcher,  102  Ga.  158.    Where 
the  deceased  for  years  prior  to  his  death  had  voluntarily  cared 
for  and  supported  his  aged  mother,  a  minor  sister,  and  a  minor 
niece,  all  of  whom  were  without  property  or  means  of  support,  such 
support  In  the  past  gave  them  a  reasonable  expectancy  of  Its  con- 
tinuance In  the  future;  and,  when  coupled  with  the  disabling  ad- 
vanced age  of  the  mother,  and  the  disabling  minority  of  the  others, 
and  their  want  of  property  means,  conferred  upon  them  the  right 
to  recover  under  the  statute  as  "dependents  for  support":  Duval 
v.  Hunt,  34  Fla.  85.    It  is  not  necessary  that  deceased  should  have 
been  legally  bound  to  support  the  plaintiff,  provided  there  was  a 
reasonable  expectation  of  support  or  benefit:  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Branyan,  10  Ind.  App.  570;  Daly  v.  New  Jersey  Steel  etc  Co., 
155  Mass.  1;  Winnt  v.  International  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  74  Tex.  32; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Barron,  6  Wall.  90;  Boyden  v.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co., 
70  Vt  125.     Under  the  Colorado  statute,  it  need  not  appear  that 
plaintiff  was  dependent  upon  the  person  killed  for  support:  Brennan 
V.  Molly  Gibson  etc  Milling  Co.,  44  Fed.  Rep.  795.    See,  also,  How- 
ard V.  Delaware  etc.  Canal  Co.,  40  Fed.  Rep.  195.    Where  an  action 
Is  given  next  of  kin  for  pecuniary  damages  resulting  from  the 
death  of  their  relative,  a  reasonable  expectation  9  benefit  from 
deceased  had  he  lived  will  support  an  action:  Grotenkemper  v.  Har- 
ris, 25  Ohio  St  510;  Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  55  Pa.  St 
499.    The  mere  receiving  of  occasional  assistance  does  not  show  de- 
pendency for  support  upon  the  wages  of  deceased,  under  the  Mas- 
sachusetts statute:  Hodnett  v.  Boston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  86L 
Compare  Houlihan  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  R.  Co.,  164  Mass.  555; 
^hnatz  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.,  160  Pa.  St  602.    Under  a  statute 


680  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn^ 

allowing  an  action  by  a  child  for  the  death  of  its  parent,  the  word 
"child"  includes  only  those  occupying  the  position  of  child  to  a 
parent  and  dependent  upon  the  parent  for  support.  It  does  not 
Include  a  minor  who  is  the  head  of  a  family:  Pittsburgh  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Vining,  27  Ind.  513,  92  Am.  Dec.  269.  Nor  can  parents  sue 
for  the  death  of  a  child,  free  by  age  or  emancipation,  who  contrib- 
uted in  no  way  to  their  support:  Lehigh  Iron  Co.  v.  Rupp,  100  Pa.. 
St  95. 

Nature  of  Injury.— An  injury  to  a  person  resulting  in  his  death 
cannot  give  to  beneficiaries  under  a  statute  allowing  an  action  for 
such  injury  any  better  basis  for  a  recovery  than  deceased  himself 
would  have  had  had  he  survived.  It  is  generally  held  under  stat- 
utes modeled  from  Lord  Campbell's  act  that  no  actions  may  be  had 
thereunder  for  injuries  resulting  in  death,  unless  the  injury  be  of 
such  a  nature  that  deceased  himself,  had  he  lived,  might  have  sued 
therefor:  Spiva  v.  Osage  Coal  etc.  Co.,  88  Mo.  68;  Quincy  Coal  etc. 
Co.  V.  Hood,  77  111.  68;  Texas  etc.  R.  R,  Co.  v.  Berry,  67  Tex.  238. 
The  applications  of  this  rule  are  various.  Thus,  it  may  be  stated 
that,  in  such  an  action  brought  by  a  beneficiary  under  the  statute, 
all  the  defenses  which  would  have  availed  had  the  action  been 
brought  by  deceased  are  available  to  the  defendant:  Ohio  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Tindall,  13  Ind.  366,  74  Am.  Dec.  259.  These  defenses  In- 
clude matters  going  to  the  cause  of  the  Injury,  the  nature  of  de- 
fendant's negligence,  contributory  negligence  on  the  part  of  de- 
ceased, and  matters  of  defense  peculiar  to  the  law  of  master  and 
servant,  all  of  which  matters  fall  outside  the  scope  of  this  note. 
In  Sheffer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  105  U.  S.  249,  It  appeared  that  deceased 
had  been  injured  in  a  railway  collision,  and,  becoming  thereby  dis- 
ordered in  mind  and  body,  after  an  Interval  of  eight  months  com- 
mitted suicide.  His  representatives  sued  for  his  death,  but  ware 
denied  a  recovery,  the  court  relying  upon  the  doctrine  of  proximate 
cause.  In  Rhode  Island,  it  was  held  that  a  statute  giving  a  cause 
of  action  for  death  "inflicted  by  the  wrongful  act  of  another"  does 
not  embrace  the  case  of  mere  passive  neglect  or  omission  of  duty: 
Bradbury  v.  Furlong,  13  R.  I.  15,  43  Am.  Rep.  1;  and,  under  the 
same  statute,  that  no  action  would  lie  for  the  death  of  a  wife 
brought  about  by  detaining  her  from  her  husband  and  slandering 
him:  Neilson  v.  Brown,  13  R.  I.  651,  43  Am.  Rep.  58.  In  the  last 
case  cited,  the  court  concluded  thus:  "We  understand  that  statute 
to  give  a  right  of  action  in  those  cases  In  which,  at  common  law, 
an  action  might  have  been  maintained  for  the  Injury  from  which 
death  resulted;  but  death  could  result  from  no  Injury,  unless  an 
Injury  to  the  IB^eased  person,  and  for  such  Injury  only  the  deceased 
person  could  have  maintained  an  action.  It  follows,  therefore,  that 
no  action  can  be  maintained  under  this  statute,  except  In  cases 
where  the  deceased  person,  had  he  lived,  would  have  had  an  action. 
In  this  case,  the  count  alleges  that  the  wife  was  by  persuasion 
detained  from  her  husband,  and  tlanderous  and  false  statements 
regarding  him  and  her  marriage  were  made  to  her.  It  seems  clear 
that  for  these  acts  no  action  could  have  been  maintained  by  the 


Sept.  1898.]         Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  681 

wife  or  for  her  use,  and  therefore  the  present  action  must  faU."  See> 
also,  Vawter  v.  Hultz,  112  Mo.  633. 

State  Statutes  in  Federal  Courts— Marine  Tor**.— Actions  for  death 
based  upon  state  statutes,  are  often  brought  In  federal  courts,  gen- 
erally where  death  resulted  from  a  marine  tort.  It  was  formerly 
doubted  that  admiralty  courts  were  obliged  to  adhere  to  the  com- 
mon-law rule  denying  actions  for  death,  and  held  that  such  an  ac- 
tion might  be  brought  In  admiralty  in  the  absence  of  statute,  but 
this  doubt  has  been  removed  by  the  federal  supreme  court,  and 
statutory  authority  is  now  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  such 
an  action  in  admiralty,  as  in  other  courts.  A  statute  of  a  seaboard 
state  giving  an  action  for  wrongful  death  will  support  an  actiou 
for  wrongful  death  on  the  high  seas  within  three  miles  of  the  state 
shore,  brought  In  an  admiralty  court:  In  re  Humboldt  etc.  Assn., 
60  Fed.  Rep.  428,  where,  by  the  state's  constitution  and  laws,  her 
boundaries  extend  three  miles  beyond  the  seashore:  Humboldt  Lum- 
ber etc.  Assn.  V.  Christopherson,  73  Fed.  Rep.  239.  Such  a  statute 
will  support  an  action  in  rem  in  a  federal  court  of  admiralty  for 
death  resulting  from  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  steamboat  navi- 
gating a  river  of  the  state:  The  St  Nicholas,  49  Fed.  Rep.  671.  It 
was  held  in  that  case  that  it  was  unnecessary  for  the  state  statute 
to  create  a  lien  upon  a  vessel  for  the  liability  sought  to  be  en- 
forced: Compare  The  Willamette,  59  Fed.  Rep.  797;  Holmes  v.  O.  & 
C.  Ry.  Co.,  5  Fed.  Rep.  75.  Where  there  Is  no  such  lien  created, 
an  admiralty  court  may  enforce  the  liability  in  personam:  The  City 
of  Norwalk,  55  Fed.  Rep.  98;  but  the  liability  Is  not  enforceable 
by  a  libel  in  rem,  except  where  such  lien  is  created:  The  Corsair, 
145  U.  S.  335;  Welsh  v.  The  North  Cambria,  40  Fed.  Rep.  655;  The 
Wydale,  37  Fed.  Rep.  716;  The  Glendale,  81  Fed.  Rep.  633.  While 
a  state  statute  may  cover  the  case  of  death  occurring  through  negli- 
gence upon  navigable  waters  within  the  state's  Jurisdiction  (Sherlock 
V.  Ailing,  93  U.  S.  99),  it  cannot  embrace  the  case  of  death  on  the 
high  seas  beyond  the  territorial  limits  of  the  state:  Armstrong  v. 
Beadle,  5  Saw.  484.  Compare  McDonald  v.  Mallory,  77  N.  Y.  546,  33 
Am.  Rep.  664,  where  It  was  held  that  the  laws  of  the  state  to  which 
a  vessel  belongs  maybe  regarded  as  following  her  upon  the  high  seas 
until  she  comes  within  the  Jurisdiction  of  some  other  government, 
and  that  a  state  statute  giving  an  action  for  wrongful  death  covers 
the  case  of  a  death  from  negligence,  upon  the  high  seas,  on  a  vessel 
hailing  from,  and  registered  within,  the  state.  The  right  to  recover 
the  penal  sum  of  five  thousand  dollars  provided  by  the  Missouri 
statute  for  occasioning  death  by  negligence,  unsliillfulness  or  crimi- 
nal Intent,  cannot  be  enforced  in  a  federal  court  in  another  state, 
the  rule  applying  that  penal  statutes  are  only  enforceable  In  the 
sovereignty  of  their  creation:  Marshall  v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.,  46  Fed. 
Rep.  269. 

Bar  or  Abatement  of  Action— Matteis  Relating  TJiereto.— The  right  of 
action  which  one  spouse  is  given  for  the  death  of  the  other  Is  not 
affected  by  his  or  her  remarriage  subsequent  to  such  death:  Georgia 
B.  R.  etc.  Co.  V.  Garr,  57  Ga.  277,  24  Am.  Rep.  492;  International 


€82  Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn. 

etc.  E.  K.  Co.  V.  Kuehn,  70  Tex.  582;  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Younger, 
90  Tex.  387;  Davis  v.  Guarnieri,  45  Ohio  St.  470,  4  Am.  St.  Rep. 
648.  This  Is  upon  the  ground  that  "a  right  of  action  arises  at  th<> 
time  of  death  to  recover  just  w^hat  was  lost  by  it;  and  that  the 
loss  thus  occasioned  is  none  the  less,  even  though  the  injured  party 
thereafter  acquire,  through  his  ovp^n  skill  or  industry  or  the  charity 
-or  affection  of  others,  more  than  he  lost":  Railway  Co.  v.  Maddry, 
■57  Arl£.  306.  Where  two  persons  married  while  slaves,  and  con- 
tinued to  live  together  until  after  the  enactment  of  a  statute  con- 
firming slave  marriages  for  all  civil  purposes,  then  separated,  each 
marrying  another,  it  was  held  that  the  woman  still  remained  tho 
lav/ful  wife  of  the  first  husband  and  could  recover  for  his  wrongful 
^death:  Thomas  v.  East  Tennessee  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  63  Fed.  Rep.  420. 
Nor  is  a  widow's  action  for  her  husband's  death  barred  by  the  feet 
that  she  married  him  after  he  had  received  the  injury  which  re- 
sulted in  his  death:  Gross  v.  Electric  Traction  Co.,  180  Pa.  St.  99. 
In  Texas,  it  is  held  that  a  wife  under  a  common-law  marriage, 
and  the  issue  thereunder,  are  entitled  to  recover  for  the  death  of 
the  husband  and  father:  Galveston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cody,  Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  Feb.,  1899.  The  remarriage  of  a  woman,  and  the  assumption 
by  the  husband  of  the  duties  of  stepfather  toward  her  child,  do 
not  affect  her  right  to  sue  for  the  wrongful  death  of  such  child: 
Hennessey  v.  Bavarian  Brewing  Co.,  145  Mo.  104,  58  Am.  St.  Rep. 
654.  A  wife,  though  living  in  separation  from  her  husband,  is  not 
prevented  from  maintaining  an  action  for  his  death:  Dallas  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Spielcer,  61  Tex.  427,  48  Am.  Rep.  297.  This  is  true  although 
the  separation  was  for  the  twelve  years  preceding  his  death,  during 
which  time  he  contributed  nothing  to  the  support  of  his  family: 
Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chambers,  81  Md.  371. 

Bar  or  Abatement  of  Action— Former  Recovery.— The  usual  aim  of 
statutes  creating  a  right  of  recovery  for  wrongful  death  is  to  allow 
only  one  action  for  an  injury  resulting  in  death.  This,  however. 
Is  not  always  true,  as  we  shall  see,  but  when  it  is  plain  from  the 
language  and  intendment  of  the  statute  that  only  one  action  Is  al- 
lowed, a  suit  by  one  of  the  beneficiaries  named  in  the  statute  Is 
a  bar  to  any  subsequent  action  by  other  beneficiaries:  Munro  v. 
Pacific  Coast  Dredging  Co.,  84  Cal.  515,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  248;  Lu- 
brano  v.  Atlantic  Mills,  19  R.  I.  129;  Hartigan  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co., 
86  Cal.  142;  Beard  v.  Skeldon,  113  111.  584;  Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Le  Gierse,  51  Tex.  189;  Paschal  v.  Owen,  77  Tex.  583;  St.  Louis 
«tc.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Needham,  10  U.  S.  App.  339,  52  Fed.  Rep.  371;  Ewell 
T.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Fed.  Rep.  57;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
McElwain,  98  Ky.  700,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  385;  Legg  v.  Britton,  64  Vt. 
•652.  In  placing  such  construction  upon  the  Arkansas  statute,  San- 
born, O.  .T.,  in  St.  Louis  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Needham,  10  U.  S.  App.  339, 
52  Fed.  Rep.  371,  said:  "It  gives  'an  action,'  a  single  action,  not 
several  actions  for  the  wrongful  killing.  It  provides  that  every 
such  action  must  be  brought  In  the  name  of  the  personal  repre- 
sentatives, If  there  are  such;  otherwise,  by  the  helrs-at-law. 
It  will  not   be  gravely  Insisted   that   the  personal   representatives 


Sept.  1898.]         Beown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  683 

could  maintain  more  than  a  single  action,  or  that,  where  there 
are  several  administrators,  one  of  them  could  maintain  the  ac- 
tion without  joining  all;  and  It  Is  equally  clear  that  when  the 
action  is  brought  by  the  heirs  there  must  be  but  a  single  action, 
and  all  the  heirs  must  be  made  parties  to  It,  so  that  the  entire 
controversy  may  be  determined  and  the  entire  amount  recovered 
and  distributed  In  the  single  action  given  by  the  statute.  The 
simplicity  and  effectiveness  of  such  an  action,  the  Inconvenience 
and  Injustice  to  the  plaintiffs  and  defendants  alike  resulting 
from  any  other  practice;  the  rule  of  distribution  of  the  amount 
recovered,  based,  not  upon  the  Injury  to  each  person  entitled 
to  receive  a  share,  but  upon  the  statute  of  descents;  the  settled 
rule  of  law  as  to  parties  jointly  Interested  In  a  cause  of  action, 
and  the  plain  reading  of  the  statute,  compel  the  conclusion  that 
«uch  was  the  intention  of  the  legislature."  Where,  under  such  a 
statute,  two  actions  are  begun,  one  by  the  personal  representative, 
the  other  by  the  widow,  the  defendant  may  elect  which  he  will 
defend,  and  plead  the  pendency  of  either  In  bar  of  the  other:  Hen- 
derson V.  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  K.  Co.,  86  Ky.  389.  Under  these  stat- 
utes, a  common-law  recovery  for  suffering  of  the  deceased  inter- 
vening between  his  injury  and  his  death  bars  the  statutory  action 
by  beneficiaries:  Conner  v.  Paul,  12  Bush,  144.  For  contrary  hold- 
ings, see  Clare  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  172  Mass.  211;  Nelson 
V.  Galveston  etc.  R,  R.  Co.,  78  Tex.  621,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  81;  Bowea 
V.  Boston,  155  Mass.  344;  Hedrick  v.  Ilwaco  R.  R.  etc.  Co.,  4  Wash. 
400.  Where  plaintiff's  Intestate  was  killed,  and  his  horses  and 
wagon  destroyed.  In  a  collision  with  defendant's  train,  a  suit  by 
the  administrator  to  recover  for  the  death  of  his  intestate  Is  not 
barred  by  a  former  recovery  by  the  same  plaintiff  of  the  value  of 
the  horses  and  wagon:  Peake  v.  Baltimore  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  Fed. 
Rep.  495.  But  a  widow's  right  of  action  Is  barred  by  a  recovery 
of  judgment  had  by  her  husband  for  his  Injuries:  Legg  v.  Britton, 
€4  Vt.  652.    See,  also,  Hecht  v.  Ohio  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  132  Ind.  507. 

Bar  or  Abatement  of  Action— Compromise  or  Release.— Vn^ev  purely 
survival  statutes,  or  those  preserving  for  the  benefit  of  designated 
beneficiaries  only  the  right  of  action  which  deceased  would  have 
had  had  he  lived,  a  release  or  compromise  for  value  executed  by 
the  deceased  before  his  death  Is  a  good  defense  to  an  action  brought 
by  the  beneficiaries  under  the  statute  after  his  death:  Hill  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  R.  Co.,  178  Pa.  St.  223,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  754;  Price  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  33  S.  C.  556,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  700;  Brown  v.  Electric 
Ry.  Co.,  101  Tenn.  252;  ante,  p.  666.  Only  a  minority  of  our  various 
statutes,  however,  belong  to  the  class  known  as  survival  statutes.. 
Where  a  statute  creates  a  new  cause  of  action,  distinct  from  that 
which  deceased  might  have  had,  a  cause  of  action,  not  alone  for 
injuries,  but  for  death,  and  vests  It  In  designated  beneficiaries, 
aiming  to  compensate  them  for  loss  through  the  fact  of  deceased's 
death,  a  release  or  compromise  by  deceased  before  his  death  cannot 
logically  bar  an  action  by  the  beneficiaries  for  the  death  of  the 
deceased:  Hurst  v.  Detroit  City  Ry.,  84  Mich.  539;  Illinois  Cent.  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Cozby,  69  111.  App.  256;  Maney  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  R. 


684  Bbown  r.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn» 

Co.,  49  111.  App.  l(^;  Pittsburgh  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hosea,  152  Ind. 
412.  Where  a  statute  makes  the  killing  of  a  passenger  of  a  railway 
corporation  through  gross  negligence  punishable  by  a  penalty  pay- 
able to  the  widow  and  children  or  next  of  kin,  such  passenger  can- 
not release  the  corporation  from  liability,  and  therefore  his  agree- 
ment to  do  so  cannot  bar  an  action  brought  for  his  death  by  an 
administrator  for  the  benefit  of  the  persons  entitled  to  the  penalty: 
Doyle  V.  Fitchburg  R.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  66,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  335. 
As  has  been  said  above,  it  Is  commonly  held  that  no  action  for 
death  can  be  maintained,  except  where  deceased  himself  could  have 
sued  had  he  survived.  When  the  right  of  action  given  by  statute, 
while  not  simply  that  which  deceased  would  have  had,  depends 
upon  the  right  of  deceased  to  have  sued,  it  is  sometimes  held  that 
a  release  or  compromise  by  deceased  before  his  death,  if  sufficient 
to  have  barred  his  own  right  of  action,  bars,  also,  that  of  the  statu- 
tory beneficiaries:  Sykora  v.  Case  etc.  Machine  Co.,  59  Minn.  130; 
Price  V.  Railroad  Co.,  33  S.  C.  556,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  700. 

It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  combat  the  logic  which  leads  to  such 
a  conclusion.  The  rule,  however,  that  no  action  for  wrongful  death 
is  maintainable,  except  where  deceased  himself  could  have  sued 
had  he  survived,  applies  to,  as  indeed  it  grew  out  of,  matters  per- 
taining to  the  nature  and  cause  of  the  injury  which  resulted  in 
death.  Was  the  negligence  or  wrongful  act  of  defendant  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  injury?  If  not,  deceased  could  not  have  recovered 
against  him,  nor  can  his  successors  under  the  statute.  Did  de- 
ceased's contributory  negligence  cause  the  injury?  If  so,  any  action 
for  such  injury  Is  similarly  barred.  If  the  relation  of  master  and 
servant  subsisted  between  deceased  and  defendant,  was  the  Injury 
resultant  from  the  act  or  neglect  of  a  fellow-servant,  or  was  it, 
for  any  reason  arising  out  of  the  rules  of  master  and  servant,  such 
an  injury  as  gave  rise  to  no  liability  on  the  part  of  the  defendant? 
If  this  Is  answered  affirmatively,  and  in  the  two  cases  mentioned 
before,  no  cause  of  action  ever  arose  which  was  susceptible  of  re- 
lease or  compromise.  Where,  however,  a  cause  of  action  does  arise, 
and  the  Injured  person  has  a  period  of  suffering  and  expense,  there 
seems  no  reason  that  he  should  not  be  able,  while  living,  to  make 
an  adjustment  of  his  claim  with  defendant  which  would  bar  a 
recovery  by  his  beneficiaries  after  his  death  upon  the  same  claim. 
But  the  action  given  under  other  than  survival  statutes  Is  entirely 
distinct  from  the  action  which  deceased  had  at  the  moment  prior 
to  his  death.  It  Is  an  action  for  damages  arising  from  the  mere 
fact  of  death,  not  damages  to  the  deceased,  but  damages  to  his 
•  successors  under  the  statute.  Therefore,  we  cannot  comprehend 
the  reasoning  which  enables  an  Injured  person  to  release  a  cause 
of  action  which  has  not  accrued,  and  cannot  accrue  until  his  death, 
and  which  then  accrues  to  third  persons.  It  would  be  necessary 
to  support  such  a  conclusion  that  we  admit  that  a  person  has  a 
right  of  action  for  his  own  death.  A  greater  degree  of  absurdity 
would  not  be  attained  in  the  enactment  of  a  statute  making  siilcide 
punishable  as  murder  In  the  first  degree. 


Sept.  1898.]         Beown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  685 

Where  a  right  of  action  for  death  Is  vested  In  the  personal  repre- 
«entatlves  of  the  deceased  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  or  children 
and  next  of  kin,  the  personal  representative  may  bind  the  bene- 
ficiaries by  a  release  or  compromise  of  the  claim  out  of  court: 
Parker  v.  Providence  etc.  Steamboat  Co.,  17  R.  I.  376,  33  Am.  St 
Rep.  8G9;  Hartigan  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  86  Cal.  142.  An  admin- 
istrator's suit  for  Injuries  resulting  In  his  intestate's  death,  brought 
on  behalf  of  the  widow  and  children,  cannot  be  compromised  by  the 
widow  alone,  without  the  consent  of  the  administrator  or  the  con- 
currence of  the  other  beneficiaries:  Railroad-  Co.  v.  AcufP,  92  Tenn. 
26;  Yelton  v.  Evans  ville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  134  Ind.  414;  Do  well  v. 
Burlington  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  62  Iowa,  629.  Compare  South  etc.  R.  R. 
<^o.  V.  Sullivan,  59  Ala.  272.  Where  the  administrator,  after  insti- 
tuting the  suit,  resigned,  and  the  suit  is  continued  in  the  name  of 
the  widow  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  herself  and  child,  she  may 
settle  the  suit  as  she  sees  fit,  without  the  consent  of  the  child'.^ 
guardian:  Stephens  v.  Nashville  etc.  Ry.,  10  Lea,  448.  A  widow 
may  compromise  and  settle  the  action  given  to  her  and  the  hus- 
band'^ next  of  kin  for  the  husband's  death,  either  before  or  after 
she  has  Instituted  suit,  and  the  other  beneficiaries  will  be  bound: 
Holder  v.  Railroad,  92  Tenn.  141,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  77;  Natchez  Cot- 
ton Mills  Co.  V.  Mull  ins,  67  Miss.  672.  But  a  contrary  rule  is  main- 
tained In  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson,  163  U.  S.  369;  Houston 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bradley,  45  Tex.  171;  Galveston  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Olerse.  51  Tex.  189.  Where  a  railroad  employs  entered  into  a  con- 
tract with  the  relief  department  of  the  company  to  the  effect  that 
the  acceptance  of  benefits  from  such  department  for  Injury  or  death 
€hould  operate  as  a  release  of  all  claims  against  the  railroad  com- 
pany arising  from  such  Injury  or  death,  the  acceptance  of  benefits 
from  the  relief  department  by  his  widow,  who  was  the  sole  bene- 
ficiary named  in  the  contract,  will  not  bar  a  recovery  for  the  wrong- 
ful death  of  the  decedent  for  the  use  of  his  child:  Pittsburgh  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Moore,  152  Ind.  345;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wymore, 
40  Neb.  645.  The  true  rule  would  appear  from  all  the  authorities 
to  be  that  one  of  the  beneficiaries  cannot,  by  release,  compromise, 
or  settlement,  prejudice  the  other  beneficiaries,  or  conclude  them, 
unless  the  sole  right  of  action  is  vested  In  him. 

Bar  or  Abatement  of  Action— Death^Miscellaneotis.— Where  a  parent, 
entitled  to  bring  an  action  of  tort  for  the  homicide  of  a  son,  dies 
without  having  Instituted  suit,  the  right  of  action  does  not  survive 
to  the  administrator  of  such  parent:  Frazler  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  etc. 
Co.,  101  Ga.  77.  Similarly,  an  action  by  a  husband  for  the  death 
of  his  wife  abates  on  the  death  of  the  husband:  Harvey  v.  Balti- 
more etc.  R.  R,  Co.,  70  Md.  319.  Where  a  father,  having  brought 
suit  for  the  death  of  his  son,  died  while  the  action  was  pending 
nnd  before  judgment,  it  was  held  that  his  right  of  action  did  not 
survive  to  his  heirs:  Chlvers  v.  Rogers,  50  La.  Ann.  57;  Huberwald 
V.  Orleans  R.  R.  Co.,  50  La.  Ann.  477.  The  Texas  statutory  action 
for  Injuries  resulting  in  death  does  not  survive  against  the  estate 
of  the  wrongdoer,  where  no  action  was  commenced  against  him  in 


686  BaowN  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.  [Tenn. 

his  lifetime:  Jolinson  v.  Farmer,  89  Tex.  610.  This  Is  In  accordance 
with  the  maxim,  actio  personalis  moritur  cum  persona:  Hegerich  v. 
Keddie,  99  N.  Y.  258,  52  Am.  Rep.  25;  Noe  v.  Smiley,  125  Pa.  St.  136; 
Russell  V.  Sunbury,  37  Ohio  St.  372,  41  Am.  Rep.  523;  Hamilton  v. 
Jones,  125  Ind.  .176;  Green  v.  Thompson,  26  Minn.  500.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  of  the  correctness  of  these  decisions.  Of  course,  it  is  by  th»> 
abrogation  of  the  maxim  quoted  that  actions  for  death  are  maintain- 
able, speaking  broadly,  but  such  abrogation  is  only  with  especial 
reference  to  the  allowance  of  such  actions.  Having  been  created, 
such  an  action  is  merely  a  personal  one,  subject  to  the  usual  rule  of 
abatement  by  death  of  one  or  both  the  parties  to  it.  In  a  number 
of  states,  the  survival  of  this  class  of  actions  for  the  benefit  of 
successors  of  the  plaintifC  against  the  successors  of  the  defend- 
ant is  provided  for  by  statute,  but  in  the  absence  of  such  en- 
actment the  usual  rules  as  to  abatement  apply:  Pennsylvania 
Co.  V.  Davis,  4  Ind.  App.  51;  Johnson  v.  Farmer,  89  Tex.^ 
610.  Where  a  person  is  killed  through  the  wrongful  act  or 
neglect  of  another,  and  leaves  none  of  the  beneficiaries  named  in 
the  statute,  the  statutory  action  for  his  death  does  not  arile.  It 
cannot  be  enforced  by  creditors  of  the  deceased:  Railway  Co.  v. 
Lilly,  90  Tenn.  563.  The  Arkansas  statute  relating  to  married 
women,  providing  that  their  earnings  shall  be  their  sole  and  sep- 
arate property,  does  not  divest  a  husband  of  the  right  to  his  wife's 
services,  nor,  where  her  death  has  been  caused  by  negligence,  pre- 
clude him  from  recovering  for  the  loss  of  such  services:  St.  Louis 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Henson,  58  Fed.  Rep.  531. 

Statute  of  Limitations.— AX  common  law  the  rule  was  that  no  lia- 
bility for  murder  arose  unless  deceased  died  within  a  year  and  a  day 
from  the  time  of  his  Injury.  This  limitation,  however,  does  not  apply 
to  actions  for  death:  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clarke,  152  U.  S. 
230;  Schlichting  v.  Wintgen,  25  Hun,  626.  In  perhaps  every  state 
there  Is  a  special  statutory  limitation  as  to  the  time  within  which 
an  action  for  death  must  be  brought.  It  would  not  be  worth  while 
here  to  collate  these  various  provisions,  as  a  practitioner  will  be 
able  to  examine  the  statute  of  his  own  state.  SuflBce  It  to  say  that 
the  period  fixed  by  statute  is  absolute,  and  that  no  delay  beyond 
such  period  will  be  allowed  to  be  explained:  Taylor  v.  Cranberry 
Iron  etc.  Co.,  04  N.  C.  525;  George  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.  51  Wis. 
603.  The  minority  of  the  plaintiffs  does  not  prevent  the  running 
of  the  statute:  Bledsoe  v.  Stokes,  1  Baxt.  312;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Sanders,  86  Ky.  259;  Foster  v.  Yazoo  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  72  Miss. 
886;  though  it  Is  not  probable  that  the  statute  would  be  held  to  run 
against  a  minor,  except  where  there  Is  some  one  in  existence  au- 
thorized to  sue  for  his  benefit.  An  administrator's  right  of  action 
for  the  death  of  a  minor  begins  to  run  from  the  time  of  death: 
Murphy  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  80  Iowa,  26.  It  was  held  that 
where  a  posthumous  child  Is  entitled  to  recover  damages  for  the 
death  of  Its  father,  the  statute  of  limitations  does  not  begin  to  run 
against  him  from  the  time  when  the  cause  of  action  accrued,  merely 
because  his  mother  was  capable  of  commencing  suit  at  that  time: 


Oct.  1898.]  Gann  v.  Railroad.  687 

Nelson  v.  Galveston  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  78  Tex.  621,  22  Am.  St,  Rep.  81. 
The  time  at  which  the  statute  of  limitations  begins  to  run  will 
depend  generally  upon  the  wording  of  the  particular  statute  under 
which  suit  is  brought  The  general  and  reasonable  rule  is,  that  It 
runs  from  the  time  of  the  death  and  not  from  that  of  the  injury: 
Hanna  v.  Je£fersonville  R.  R.  Co.,  32  Ind.  113;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Clarke,  152  U.  S.  230;  Nestelle  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co., 
66  Fed.  Rep.  261.  Compare  Fowlkes  v.  Nashville  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
9  Heisk.  829;  Rugland  v.  Anderson,  30  Minn.  386.  A  declaration  ia 
an  action  under  the  statute  for  causing  the  death  of  a  person  is  suf- 
ficient after  verdict,  where  it  alleges  the  time  of  death,  but  does  not 
allege  specifically  that  the  action  is  not  barred:  Hill  v.  New  Haven,, 
87  Vt  601.  88  Am.  Dec.  613. 


Gann  v.  Railroad. 

[101  Tennessee,  880.] 

APPEALr-IMMATERIAL  ERROR.— On  appeal,  the  conrt 
will  not  review  the  action  of  the  lower  court  in  admitting  evidence 
as  part  of  the  res  gestae,  where  the  admission  or  rejection  of  such 
evidence  would  not  aflfect  the  case  or  change  the  result. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS— 
FELLOW-SERVANTS.— While  a  section  foreman  and  his  subordi- 
nates generally  occupy  the  position  of  vice-principal  and  servants 
as  to  each  other,  yet  such  foreman  may  become  the  fellow-servant 
of  his  8ut)ordinates  during  the  performance  of  work  properly  that 
of  a  fellow-servant,  as  by  handling  the  brake  on  a  hand-car  used 
by  the  section  gang.  While  engaged  in  such  work  the  principal  is 
not  liable  for  injui^es  resulting  to  a  meml}er  of  the  section  gang 
from  the  foreman's  negligence. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS- 
SAFE  APPLIANCES— NEGLIGENCE  OF  SECTION  FOREMAN. 
In  the  matter  of  providing  safe  appliances  for  the  use  of  his  sub- 
ordinates, a  section  foreman  bears  to  such  subordinates  the  rela- 
tion of  a  vice-principal,  and  for  his  negligence  In  this  regard  the 
company  is  liable. 

RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS— AS- 
SUMPTION OF  RISKS.— A  section  hand  who  continues  to  use  a 
hand-car,  the  brake  on  which  he  knows  to  be  dangerously  defec- 
tive, assumes  the  risk  arising  from  such  defect  and  cannot  recover 
for  injuries  resulting  therefrom. 

W.  T.  Murray  and  B.  F.  Tatiim,  for  the  appellant. 

W.  D.  Spears,  for  the  appellee. 

*»i  WILKES,  J.  This  is  an  action  for  personal  injuriea^ 
tried  by  the  conrt  and  jury,  and  resulting  in  a  verdict  and  judg- 
ment for  plaintiff  for  twelve  hundred  and  fifty  dollars.  The  de- 
fendant railroad  has  appealed  and  assigned  errors. 


688  Gann  v.  Railroad.  [Tenn. 

The  first  error  assigned  is  to  the  admission  of  certain  state- 
ments  made  by  Cox,  immediately  after  the  accident  occurred,  as 
to  the  cause  of  it,  and  how  it  happened.  It  is  insisted  they  were 
not  part  of  the  res  gestae,  and  were,  therefore,  inadmissible.  We 
need  not  pass  upon  this  assignment,  as  the  statements  made  by 
<^ox  would  not  change  the  result  of  the  case  or  place  it  in  any 
■different  light  than  if  they  had  been  rejected. 

It  is  next  insisted  that  the  negligence  which  caused  the  acci- 
-dent  in  this  case  was  the  personal  negligence  of  Cox,  and  not 
official  negligence,  and  that  the  court  not  only  failed  to  make 
the  proper  distinction  between  the  two  classes  of  cases,  but  re- 
fused to  charge  a  request  which  would  have  pointed  out  the  dif- 
ference. 

It  appears  that  Cox  was  a  section  boss  and  Gann  was  a  sec- 
tion hand  under  him;  that  Cox  had  authority  and  control  over 
Gann;  that  he  was  subject  to  his  orders;  that  Cox  had  the  right 
to  employ  and  discharge  at  will,  and  had  complete  control  of  the 
section  and  hands  upon  it. 

^^^  It  appears  that  Cox  one  evening  ordered  the  section  hands 
to  get  on  a  hand-car,  to  go  to  a  point  on  the  road  known  as 
*'Eamsey's  Bottom,"  to  measure  up  a  lot  of  old  iron.  Cox,  as 
-was  his  custom,  took  a  position  at  the  brake,  for  the  purpose  of 
holding  it  and  guiding  the  movements  of  the  car.  Gann  and 
the  other  hands,  under  direction  of  Cox,  operated  the  propelling 
lever  which  drove  the  car.  The  accident  occurred  on  a  steep 
down  grade,  and  the  car  was  running  at  about  fifteen  miles  an 
hour.  The  brake  was  a  peculiar  one,  and  appears  to  have  been 
-of  Cox's  own  invention.  The  main  insistence  is,  that  Cox  neg- 
ligently applied,  or  failed  to  apply,  this  brake  in  such  manner  as 
to  suddenly  check  the  car.  It  appears. that  it  acted  upon  a  prin- 
ciple the  reverse  of  the  ordinary  brake,  and  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  hold  it  off,  or  it  would  apply  itself  automatically  and  im- 
mediately stop  the  car  unless  held  off.  The  sudden  checking 
of  the  car,  in  consequence  of  Cox  letting  the  brake  loose,  forced 
the  lever  down  on  plaintiff's  knee,  and  drove  the  leg  bone  down 
into  the  ankle,  permanently  injuring  the  plaintiff.  He  fell  from 
the  car,  and  it  was  at  once  stopped,  and  Cox  went  back  to  where 
he  was  lying,  and,  according  to  the  proof  of  two  witnesses 
(though  contradicted  by  Cox  himself),  stated  that  he  did  not  go 
to  do  it,  that  his  coat  was  about  to  get  caught  in  the  wheel,  and 
he  reached  back  for  it  with  his  left  hand,  and  that  threw  him 
around  so  that  the  brake  handle  came  out  from  under  his  right 
•***  arm,  and  the  brake  went  on.    This  is  the  statement  to  which 


Oct.  1898.]  Gann  t;.  Railroad.  689 

objection  was  made.  There  is  nothing  in  it  prejudicial  to  the 
defendant  in  this  case  upon  its  theory. 

It  is  insisted  that  Cox,  in  operating  this  brake,  was  a  fellow- 
servant  with  Gann  and  the  other  hands,  not  filling  the  place  of 
the  master,  but,  for  the  time  being,  in  the  work  and  doing  the 
service  of  a  servant. 

The  court  qharged  the  jury,  in  substance,  that  under  the  facta 
us  thus  staled  Cox  and  Gann  were  not  fellow-servants,  and  the 
defendant  would  be  liable  for  Cox's  negligence.  He  was  re- 
quested to  charge,  in  substance,  the  reverse  of  this  proposition, 
and  declined. 

It  has  been  held  in  this  state  that  a  section  boss  and  his  sub- 
ordinates occupy  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  as  to  each 
other.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  a  man  may  occupy  the  posi- 
tion of  a  master  or  vice-principal  in  some  respects  and  in  the  do- 
ing of  some  acts,  and  that  of  a  fellow-servant  in  other  respects 
and  in  doing  other  acts.  If  a  superior  undertakes  to  do  the  work 
of  a  fellow-servant,  and  puts  himself  in  the  place  to  do  the  work 
of  a  fellow-servant,  he  becomes  one  as  to  that  particular  work, 
and  his  negligence  in  such  case  is  that  of  a  fellow-servant,  and 
not  that  of  a  vice-principal.  An  individual  may  act  in  a  dual 
•capacity,  not,  it  is  true,  at  the  same  moment  and  in  the  same 
act,  but  he  may,  while  generally  acting  as  vice-principal  and 
•*®**  standing  in  the  place  of  a  mastef,  lay  aside  that  character 
and  authority,  and  occupy,  for  the  time  being,  the  place  and  do 
the  work  of  a  fellow-servant,  and  while  thus  engaged  in  the  par- 
ticular act  he  is,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  a  fellow-servant,  and  the 
principal  is  not  responsible  for  his  negligence. 

This  distinction  is  clearly  pointed  out  in  the  case  of  Railroad 
•Co.  V.  Bolton,  99  Tenn.  277,  and  cases  there  cited.  See,  also, 
Allen  V.  Goodwin,  92  Tenn.  385. 

The  distinction  is  plainly  and  forcibly  stated  in  Stockmeyer  v. 
Reed,  55  Fed.  Rep.  259,  as  follows:  "The  question  is  not  one  of 
rank.  If  the  superintendent  was  acting  at  the  time  in  the  capac- 
ity of  a  fellow-servant,  and  his  negligence  caused  the  injury,  the 
master  is  not  liable.  Notwithstanding  his  superior  power,  such 
superintendent  is  still  a  servant,  and,  in  respect  to  such  acts  and 
work  as  properly  belongs  to  a  servant  to  do,  he  is,  while  perform- 
ing them,  discharging  the  duties  of  a  servant":  See  the  same 
case  on  appeal,  Reed  v.  Stockmeyer,  74  Fed.  Rep.  186.  The  same 
distinction  is  held  in  Arkansas:  Railway  Co.  v.  Torry,  58  Ark. 
217,  and  cases  there  cited.     So,  likewise,  in  Indiana:  NaU  v, 

AM.  8r.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.-44 


690  Gann  v.  Railroad.  [Tenn^ 

Louisville  etc.  E.  R.  Co.,  129  Ind.  264;  Taylor  v.  Evansville  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  121  Ind.  124,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  372.  New  York,  Penn^ 
Bylvania,  Michigan,  and  other  states  hold  the  same  doctrine:. 
Hankins  v.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  416,  40  Am.  St. 
Rep.  616;  Ross  v.  Walker,  139  Pa.  St.  42,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  160;. 
Harrison  v.  Detroit  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  79  Mich.  385  409^  19  j^^^  g^^ 
Rep.  180.  And  the  same  doctrine  is  held  in  North  Dakota,  Min- 
nesota, Georgia,  Oregon,  Virginia,  Vermont,  Kansas,  California,. 
Massachusetts,  "West  Virginia,  Illinois,  South  Carolina,  Rhode 
Island,  and  other  states.  The  states  of  Ohio  and  Missouri  maj 
be  said  not  to  recognize  the  distinction  clearly  and  fully.  And 
Texas,  under  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  that  state,  defining  the- 
relation,  seems  to  be  undecided,  if  not  antagonistic  to  the  view:. 
Texas  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Reed,  88  Tex.  439;  Sweeney  v.  Gulf  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  84  Tex.  433,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  71.  See  the  subject  elabo- 
rately discussed  in  volume  47  of  the  Central  Law  Journal,  of 
August  12,  1898,  page  130  et  seq.  See,  also,  Bailey's  Personal 
Injuries,  sees.  1834,  1972,  2154,  2176,  2535. 

The  court  was  asked  to  charge  that  if  plaintiff  was  one  of  a 
gang  ot  laborers  at  work  on  the  defendant  road,  and  if  the  gang 
was  under  Cox,  as  foreman,  and  if  Cox  had  charge  of  the  brake, 
and  the  injury  was  brought  about  through  the  negligence  of  Cox 
in  letting  the  brake  loose  and  suddenly  stopping  the  car,  or 
throwing  it  on  and  suddenly  stopping  the  car,  the  negligence 
would  be  the  personal  negligence  of  Cox,  as  distinguished  from 
his  official  negligence,  and  defendant  would  not  be  liable;  that 
in  order  to  charge  the  defendant,  Cox  must  so  far  stand  in  the 
place  of  the  master  as  to  be  charged  in  the  particular  matter 
with  a  duty  toward  the  defendant,  which,  under  the  law,  tha 
master  ^®^  owed  to  him,  and  his  negligence  in  such  case  could 
not  be  such  an  obligation.  This  was  refused,  and  was,  we  think, 
error.  We  think  the  case  is  almost  identical  with  that  of  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Bolton,  99  Tenn.  276,  and  with  that  of  Northern  Pac. 
R,  R.  Co.  V.  Peterson,  162  U.  S.  346.  See,  also.  Northern  Pac. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Charless,  162  U.  S.  359;  Martin  v.  Atchison  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  166  U.  S.  403. 

There  is  a  conflict  in  the  evidence  as  to  whether  this  brake^ 
was  in  good  and  safe  condition,  and  this  is  material,  because,, 
even  if  Cox  was  doing  the  work  of  a  fellow-servant  in  handling^ 
the  brake,  and  for  his  negligence  in  so  doing  the  company  would 
not  be  liable,  still,  if  he  failed  to  provide  safe  and  proper  appli- 
ances, he  would,  in  that  matter,  be  doing  the  work  of  his  prin- 


Oct.  1898.]  Gann  v.  Railroad.  G91 

cipal,  and  for  his  negligence  in  not  providing  safe  appliances  the 
company  would  be  responsible,  as  was  held  in  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Northington,  91  Tenn.  56. 

The  proof  tends  to  show  that  the  brake  was  somewhat  worn, 
so  that  it  did  not  work  as  it  would  if  in  perfect  condition,  and 
that,  in  consequence  of  this  wearing,  Cox  was  required  to  hold  it 
oflF  with  his  hands  all  the  time,  otherwise  it  would  automatically 
close  upon  the  wheels,  and  immediately  stop  the  car.  The  court 
charged  the  jury  that  "if  the  brake  was  not  the  kind  ordinarily 
used  in  the  management  of  hand-cars,  and  was  not  reasonably 
safe,  and  the  plaintiff  knew  its  condition,  and  continued  in  the 
employment  of  defendant  knowing  just  what  this  brake  was — 
that  it  was  defective  and  not  reasonably  safe — he  could  not  re- 
cover." 

^■^  Tbe  proof  leaves  no  doubt  but  that  Gann  knew  the  condi- 
tion of  the  brake,  whether  it  was  safe  or  defective,  so  that  we 
cannot  affirm  the  judgment  upon  the  ground  that  the  brake  was 
defective,  or  was  so  found  by  the  jury.  If  they  did  so  find,  they 
must  also  have  found  that  plaintiff  had  full  knowledge  of  its 
condition. 

It  is  urged  upon  us  that  this  view  of  the  law  is  inconsistent 
with  the  holding  of  this  court  in  Railroad  Co.  v.  Northington, 
91  Tenn.  56,  et  sequitur.  We  do  not  so  regard  it.  In  the  North- 
in  gton  case  the  section  boss  was  recognized  as  the  superior,  as 
he  is  in  this  case.  His  negligence  in  the  Northington  case  was 
that  of  a  vice-principal,  and  was  official.  In  this  case  it  was 
that  of  a  fellow-servant,  and  was  personal.  In  the  Northington 
case  the  section  boss  caused  the  gang  to  push  before  them  a  truck 
or  push-car,  containing  two  dumpbeds  or  boxes,  in  moving  from 
one  place  to  another.  Instead  of  furnishing  these  dumpbeds 
with  proper  appliances  to  fasten  them  together,  and  thus  to 
make  it  safe  to  push  them  over  the  track,  there  was  no  way  to 
fasten  them.  To  remedy  this  omission,  the  foreman  stood  upon 
the  boxes,  with  a  foot  in  each,  thus  attempting  to  supply  the 
place  of  proper  fastenings  and  couplings,  which  it  was  his  official 
duty  to  provide.  In  addition,  he  was  directing  the  movements  of 
the  car,  and  saw  that  the  dumpbox  was  slipping,  but  calculated 
that  it  would  not  strike  the  platform,  and  took  the  risk  of  its 
^®®  doing  80,  without  giving  any  warning  to  the  crew.  He  was 
negligent,  therefore,  in  not  providing,  in  the  first  instance,  safe 
and  proper  appliances,  and,  next,  in  requiring  the  car  to  be  run 
on  after  he  saw  the  risk  and  danger,  and  without  notifying  the 


Gann  v.  Railroad.  [Tenn, 

crew  of  such  danger.  There  was  no  evidence  in  that  case  that 
the  foreman  was  in  the  habit  of  thus  substituting  his  feet  for  a 
coupling  appliance  to  hold  the  cars  together,  or  that  the  crew 
was  aware  of  such  practice,  in  which  event  they  might  be  held  to 
have  assumed  the  risk  if  they  did  not  object  (as  was  charged  in 
the  present  case).  He  was  also  negligent,  while  guiding  and 
directing  the  movements  of  the  car,  in  not  stopping  when  he 
saw  the  danger,  and  in  not  notifying  his  crew  of  such  danger, 
and  in  both  these  negligent  acts  he  was  clearly  in  the  line  of  his 
official  duty  as  vice-principal.  But,  in  the  case  at  bar,  if  the 
brake  was  defective,  it  had  been  so  for  some  time,  and  the  fact 
was  well  known  to  plaintiff.  The  section  boss  was  giving  no 
directions  and  was  not  controlling  the  movements  of  the  crew, 
but  was  manipulating  the  brake  personally,  which  was  a  servant's 
place,  and  the  accident  was  due  to  the  unintentional,  negligent 
act  of  the  foreman  thus  engaged,  in  allowing  the  brake  to  es- 
cape his  control. 

We  are  of  opinion  there  is  error  in  the  judgment  of  the  court 
below,  and  it  is  reversed  and  cause  remanded  for  a  new  trial.  Ap- 
pellee will  pay  costs  of  appeal. 

In  Electric  Railway  Co.  v.  Lawson,  101  Tenn.  406,  questions 
similar  to  those  decided  in  the  principal  case  were  presented.  The 
action  was  for  the  death  of  plaintiff's  decedent,  who  was  a  section 
hand,  which  death  resulted  from  an  attempt  on  his  part,  In  obedi- 
ence to  an  order  of  the  section  foreman,  to  board  a  moving  car. 
wnereby  he  was  thrown  under  the  car  and  killed.  The  relation 
between  the  section  foreman  and  decedent  was  in  -issue.  The  court 
held  that  there  was  no  immediate  order  or  sudden  emergency  shown 
such  as  would  justify  an  attempt  to  obey  an  order  of  a  superior 
in  a  hazardous  matter.  As  to  the  remaining  matters— the  relation 
between  the  foreman  and  deceased,  and  the  question  of  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  former— the  court  adhered  to  the  rule  established  in 
Tennessee  that  a  section  boss  or  track  foreman  is  a  vice-principal. 
As  to  whether  the  foreman's  negligence  in  failing  to  stop  the  car 
in  his  charge  in  order  to  allow  deceased  to  get  on,  was  personal  or 
official,  it  was  held  to  be  official.  It  was  his  duty  "to  control  the 
cars  ....  and  it  was  also  his  duty  to  order  the  men  on  and  off 
the  cars.  What  he  did  or  omitted  to  do,  therefore,  If  negligent,  was 
the  master's  negligence.  He  was  running  by  there  without  stop- 
ping before  or  after  deceased  caught  the  car,  having  given  orders 
to  board  them  while  in  motion.  The  jury  had  the  right  to  find 
this  was  negligence  and  that  It  was  official." 

APPEAL.— HARMLESS  ERROR  in  the  admission  of  evidence  Is 
no  ground  for  a  reversal  of  the  judgment:  liockford  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Blake,  173  111.  354,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  122.  A  judgment  will  not  be 
reversed  for  the  reception  of  Improper  evidence  If  the  same  result 
must  have  been  reached  had  such  evidence  been  excluded:  Park- 
hurst  V.  Berdell,  110  N.  Y.  386,  0  Am.  St.  Rep.  384.  Where  evidence 
could  not  produce  prejudice,  there  can  be  no  reversal:  Empire  Mill 
Co.  v.  Lovell,  77  Iowa,  100,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  272. 


Nov.  1898.]  Weeks  v.  McNulty.  693 

RAILROADS  —  SECTION  FOREMAN— VICE-PRINCIPAL.— A 
railway  section  foreman,  havfng  power  to  control,  employ,  and  dis- 
charge tlie  men  under  li!m,  is  a  vice-principal,  and  not  a  fellow- 
servant  with  them,  and  the  railway  company  is  liable  for  his  neg- 
ligent act  in  throwing  baclc  an  open  switch,  whereby  one  of  the 
men  under  his  control  Is  injured:  Sweeney  v.  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  C5o.,  84 
Tex.  433,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  71;  Sullivan  v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
107  Mo.  66,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  388,  and  note;  Bloyd  v.  St.  Louis  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  58  Arlf.  66,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  85,  and  note.  Contra,  Span- 
cake  V.  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  148  Pa.  St.  184,  33  Am.  St  Rep. 
821;  Ell  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  N.  Dak.  336,  26  Am.  St.  Rep. 
621,  and  note;  Schroeder  v.  Flint  etc.  R.  B.  Co.,  103  "Mich.  213,  50 
Am.  St.  Rep.  354. 

RAILROADS— INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS-ASSUMPTION  OF 
RISKS.— If  a  car  belonging  to  a  connecting  carrier  is  equipped  w^h 
double  buffers,  that  fact  is  open,  apparent,  and  obvious.  An  ex- 
perienced brakeman  who  attempts  to  make  a  coupling  with  such 
car  assumes  the  risks  attendant  thereon:  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Curtis,  51  Neb.  442,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  456;  Louisville  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Stutts,  105  Ala.  368,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  127.  Mere  knowledge  of 
a  railroad  employ^  that  an  appliance  owned  by  the  company  is 
defective,  and  that  risk  is  incurred  in  Its  use,  does  not,  as  matter  of 
law,  defeat  the  employS's  action  when  the  danger  Is  not  such  as 
to  threaten  Immediate  Injury,  or  when  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  the  appliance  may  be  safely  used  by  the  exercise  of  care  and 
caution:  Swadley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  118  Mo.  268,  40  Am. 
St.  Rep.  366;  Soeder  v.  St  I^uls  etc  Ry.  Co.,  100  Mo.  673,  18  Ana. 
St  Rep.  724. 


Weeks   v.  MoNultt. 

[101  Tennessee,  495.] 

INNKEEPERS— LIABILITY— GENERAL  RULE.— The  gen- 
eral rule  of  law  governing  the  Jiablllty  of  an  Innkeeper  Is,  that  he 
is  not  an  Insurer  of  the  person  of  his  guest  against  Injury,  but  his 
obligation  Is  merely  to  exercise  reasonable  care  that  his  guests  may 
not  be  injured  by  anything  happening  through  the  innkeeper's  negli- 
gence. 

INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE— INJURY.  TO  GUEST  BY 
FIRE.— No  presumption  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  an  Innkeeper 
arises  where  a  guest  loses  his  life  In  a  fire  originating  in,  and  de- 
stroying the  premises.  To  make  the  Innkeeper  liable  in  such  a 
case  It  must  be  shown  that  his  negligence  was  the  proximate  cause 
of  the  fire  and  the  consequent  Injuries. 

APPEAL— REFUSAL  TO  PERMIT  ANSWER  TO  QUES- 
TIONS.—The  refusal  of  the  trial  court  to  permit  answers  to  perti- 
nent questions  affords  no  cause  for  reversal,  unless  the  record 
shows  affirmatively  that  the  answers  would  have  been  competent 
and  material  evidence. 

INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE  IN  FAILING  TO  PROVIDE 
FIRE-ESCAPES  —  MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCE— EVIDENCE,— In 
an  action  against  an  Innkeeper,  based  upon  his  negligence  In  falling 
to  provide  his  premises  with  fire-escapes,  as  required  by  city  ordi- 
nance, resulting  In  the  death  of  plaintiff's  decedent.  It  Is  not  error  to 
exclude  the  violated  ordinance  from  evidence  where  no  causal  con- 


694  Weeks  v.  McNulty,  [Tenn. 

nectlon  between  the  violation  of  the  ordinance  and  the  injuries  com- 
plained of  is  shown. 

EVIDENCE-ADMlfeSIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST— TESTI- 
MONY IN  SIMILAR  CASE.— Where,  in  the  course  of  a  trial  in  an 
action  for  negligence,  plaintiff  is  permitted  to  read  to  the  jury  por- 
tions of  cross-examination  of  the  defendant,  in  a  former  trial  in- 
volving identical  questions,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  admissions 
by  defendant  against  his  interest,  defendant  should  be  allowed  to 
read  the  entire  examination  in  chief  to  the  jury. 

APPEAL-INSTRUCTIONS— FAILURE  OP  DEFENDANT 
TO  TESTIFY.— It  is  not  error  in  an  action  for  negligence  to  in- 
struct the  jury  that  no  prejudicial  inference  could  be  drawn  against 
defendants  from  their  failure  to  testify,  where  it  does  not  appear 
that  such  defendants  had  facts  peculiarly  within  their  knowledge 
^d  not  fully  known  to  other  witnesses. 

Templeton  &  Gates,  for  the  appellant. 

Fowler,  Mynatt  &  Fowler,  and  Washburn,  Pickle  &  Turner, 
for  the  appellee. 

•*»«  McAIJSTEE,  J.  Plaintiff  brings  this  suit  to  recover 
damages  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  Arthur  E.  Weeks,  which 
is  alleged  to  have  been  occasioned  *^''  by  the  negligence  of  the 
defendants.  The  grounds  of  liability  alleged  in  the  declaration 
are:  1.  That  the  defendants,  at  the  date  aforesaid,  were  proprie- 
tors of  Hotel  Knox,  a  public  inn  in  the  city  of  Knoxville,  and 
had  negligently  permitted  said  hotel  to  be  in  an  unsafe  and  dan- 
gerous condition;  and  2.  That  defendants  had  not  employed  a 
sufficient  complement  of  servants  for  the  protection  of  the  hotel 
and  guests;  and  3.  That  the  servants  employed  were  incompe- 
tent, whereby  said  hotel  was,  on  April  9,  1897,  destroyed  by  fire, 
and  plaintiff's  intestate,  Arthur  E.  Weeks,  who  was  a  guest  there- 
in, lost  his  life.  The  more  specific  grounds  of  negligence  are 
stated  in  the  second  count  of  the  declaration,  viz:  That  defend- 
ants had  failed  to  provide  fire-escapes,  as  ordered  by  an  ordinance 
of  the  city  of  Knoxville,  or  other  reasonable  means  of  escape 
from  said  building;  that  defendants  failed  to  arouse  deceased  or 
give  him  proper  warning  of  said  fire,  and  that  this  failure  was 
due  to  defendant's  omission  in  not  employing  a  responsible 
watchman.  It  is  further  alleged  that  the  fire  was  caused,  and 
said  hotel  destroyed,  by  the  negligence  of  defendant  in  allowing 
the  cellar  of  his  storehouse,  which  was  situated  next  door  to  said 
hotel,  to  be  filled  with  inflammable  material.  Defendants 
pleaded  not  guilty.  The  case  was  tried  by  a  special  jury,  to 
whom  a  large  volume  of  testimony  was  submitted.  The  trial  re- 
sulted in  a  verdict  and  judgment  for  defendants.  Plaintiff  ap- 
pealed, and  has  assigned  errors. 


Nov.  1898.]  Weeks  v.  McNulty.  696 

498  rpjj^g  £g^g|,g  necessary  to  be  stated  are  that  tHe  defendant, 
Frank  McNulty,  was  the  owner  and  proprietor  of  a  public  inn 
in  the  city  of  Knoxville,  known  as  Hotel  Knox.  Plaintiff's  in- 
testate, Arthur  Weeks,  was  a  traveling  man,  representing  the 
Rochester  Stamping  Works  and  the  Robinson  Cutlery  Company, 
■of  Rochester,  New  York.  On  the  evening  of  April  7,  1897,  said 
Weeks  reached  the  city  of  Knoxville,  registered  at  the  Hotel 
Knox,  and  was  assigned  to  room  49,  on  the  third  floor.  About 
3  o'clock  in  the  morning  following  Hotel  Knox  was  destroyed 
by  fire,  and  said  Weeks  perished  in  the  flames.  The  fire  was  first 
-discovered  by  the  night  watchman  of  the  hotel,  who'  immediately 
gave  the  alarm,  ascended  the  stairway  leading  to  the  second  and 
third  floors,  knocked  upon  the  doors,  and  made  every  effort  to 
arouse  the  guests.  It  is  in  proof  that  the  guests  were  all 
aroused  and  escaped,  excepting  deceased  and  one  other.  It  is 
in  evidence  that  one  of  the  guests,  as  he  passed  out,  heard  some 
one  in  room  49  pounding  at  the  door,  and  noticed  that  he  had 
kicked  out  one  of  the  panels.  If  this  evidence  is  to  be  credited, 
it  tends  to  show  that  deceased  heard  the  alarm,  but  had,  unfor- 
tunately, fastened  himself  in,  or,  in  the  excitement,  had  lost  all 
command  of  his  faculties.  It  is  also  shown  that  parties  occupy- 
ing rooms  on  the  same  floor  with  deceased,  immediately  contigu- 
ous, and  across  the  hall  in  opposite  and  diagonal  directions,  all 
received  the  alarm  and  succeeded  in  making  ■*®®  their  escape. 
The  building  was  provided  with  a  front  and  rear  stairway,  but 
had  no  flre  escapes.  South  of  the  Hotel  Knox,  and  immediately 
adjoining,  was  the  banking  house  of  the  Third  National  Bank, 
which  being  only  one  story  in  height,  several  of  the  guests  leaped 
upon  its  roof  from  the  burning  hotel  building.  This  mode  of 
escape  was  accessible  to  deceased,  since  his  window  overlooked 
the  roof;  but  it  is  not  shown  he  had  knowledge  of  it. 

The  general  rule  of  law  governing  the  liability  of  an  inn- 
keeper is,  that  he  is  not  an  insurer  of  the  person  of  his  guest 
against  injury,  but  his  obligation  is  merely  to  exercise  reasonable 
care  that  his  guests  may  not  be  injured  by  anything  happening 
through  the  innkeeper's  negligence:  11  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of 
Law,  32. 

"There  is  no  natural  presumption,"  said  this  court,  "that  a 
fire,  the  origin  of  which  is  unknown,  was  the  result  of  the  want 
of  care  of  the  owner  or  occupant  of  the  premises.  The  ancient 
rule  of  the  common  law,  which  presumed  negligence  in  such 
cases,  was  pronounced  in  the  reported  cases  to  be  harsh  and  un- 


696  Weeks  v.  McNulty.  [Tenn. 

reasonable,  and  was  by  the  statute,  6  Anne,  chapter  31,  abro- 
gated. The  courts  of  this  country,  whether  regarding  the  stat- 
ute of  Anne  as  in  force  or  not,  have  unanimously  held  that  neg- 
ligence or  misconduct  was  the  gist  of  the  action  against  one  upon 
whose  premises  a  fire  had  originated,  and  that  such  negligence 
would  not  be  presumed  from  mere  proof  of  the  loss  by  fire  com- 
municated ^^**  from  the  premises  of  another":  Eailway  Co.  v. 
Manchester  Mills,  88  Tenn.  659.  It  must  be  shown  that  the 
negligence  of  the  innkeeper  in  this  case  was  the  proximate  cause 
of  the  fire  and  the  consequent  injuries:  Deming  v.  Merchants' 
Cotton  Press  Co.,  90  Tenn.  353;  Eailroad  Co.  v.  Kelly,  91  Tenn. 
699,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  902;  Postal  Tel.  Co.  v.  Zopfi,  93  Tenn.  374, 

We  understand  these  principles  were  substantially  charged  by 
the  circuit  judge,  and  the  issues  of  fact  have  been  resolved  by 
the  jury  in  favor  of  the  defendants.  We  find  material  evidence 
in  the  record  to  sustain  these  findings,  and,  under  the  rule,  the- 
verdict  cannot  be  disturbed  on  this  assignment. 

The  third  assignment  is,  that  the  court  erred  in  excluding 
testimony  showing  that  defendant,  McNulty,  had  stored  in  the 
rear  of  the  grocery  store,  on  the  ground  floor  and  near  the  ele- 
vator shaft,  oils  and  other  combustible  materials.  Counsel  is  in 
error  in  his  statement  of  the  action  of  the  court.  The  grocery 
store,  it  appears,  adjoins  the  hotel,  and  is  situated  just  north  of 
it.  It  was  owned  by  McNulty,  the  proprietor  of  Hotel  Knox. 
The  object  of  this  inquiry  was  to  show  that  defendant  had  been 
guilty  of  negligence  in  storing  oils  and  other  inflammable  sub- 
stances on  the  ground  floor  of  the  grocery  store,  near  the  elevator 
shaft.  This  testimony  was  excepted  to  by  defendant,  on  the 
ground  that  no  such  negligence  was  alleged  in  the  declaration. 
The  negligence  alleged  was  that  defendants  had  permitted  the 
hotel  to  be  in  an  unsafe  and  dangerous  ^^^  condition,  and  that 
they  had  filled  the  cellar  with  inflammable  materials,  but  there 
was  no  allegation  of  negligence  in  storing  oils  and  other  com- 
bustible materials  in  the  grocery  store,  on  the  floor  above  the 
basement.  Moreover,  it  seems  defendant  was  permitted  to  prove 
that  coal  oil  was  kept  in  the  grocery  store,but,  when  the  question 
was  asked,  how  near  the  coal  oil  was  kept  to  the  elevator  shaft, 
an  objection  was  interposed  by  defendants'  counsel,  which  was 
sustained  by  the  court.  If  it  be  conceded  that  the  action  of 
the  court  in  sustaining  the  objection  was  erroneous,  it  is  not 
shown  in  the  bill  of  exceptions  what  the  witness  would  have  an- 
swered.   It  has  been  frequently  held  by  this  court  that  the  re- 


Nov.  1898.]  Weeks  v.  McNulty.  697 

fusal  of  the  trial  court  to  permit  answers  to  pertinent  questions 
affords  no  cause  for  reversal,  unless  the  record  shows  affirma- 
tively that  the  answers  would  have  been  competent  and  material 
evidence:  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Barnes,  95  Tenn.  271;  Holmark  v. 
Molin,  5  Cold.  484;  State  v.  Turner,  6  Baxt.  203. 

The  fourth  assignment  is,  that  the  court  erred  in  excluding 
the  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Knoxville,  requiring  the  owners  and 
keepers  of  hotels  to  erect  fire-escapes  thereon.  The  objection 
offered  to  this  testimony  was  that  the  ordinance  in  question  con- 
templated that  notice  to  erect  fire  escapes  must  be  given  to  the 
owner  of  the  property  by  the  board  of  public  works,  and  that 
no  such  notice  was  given  to  the  owner  and  proprietor  of  Hotel 
Knox.  The  declaration,  as  already  observed,  alleged  that  de- 
fendant *****  had  failed  to  provide  fire-escapes  for  Hotel  Knox, 
as  ordered  by  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Knoxville.  The  insist- 
ence of  counsel  for  defendant  is  that  this  ordinance  contains  no 
absolute  requirement  for  the  construction  of  fire-escapes,  but 
only  provides  that  the  same  may  be  required  by  the  board  of  pub- 
lic works,  if,  in  their  judgment,  they  are  deemed  necessary.  It 
is  further  insisted  that,  under  the  ordinance,  the  supervision, 
control,  and  direction  of  everything  pertaining  to  fire  escapes, 
including  the  number,  locality,  strength,  capacity,  and  mode  of 
structure,  is  committed  to  the  board  of  public  works,  and  that 
no  plans  or  directions  were  ever  furnished  defendants  by  said 
board.  It  is  insisted,  however,  that  failure  to  comply  with  even 
an  absolute  requirement  of  a  municipal  ordinance  in  the  erec- 
tion of  fire-escapes  will  not  render  the  delinquent  party  liable  to 
a  civil  action  for  damages  resulting  from  such  neglect,  especially 
where  the  ordinance  provides  a  penalty,  and  does  not  provide  in 
its  face  for  the  civil  liability.  It  is  conceded  that  a  civil  action 
will  lie  for  an  act  done  in  violation  of  a  prohibitory  state  law 
(Queen  v.  Dayton  Coal  etc.  Co.,  95  Tenn.  458,  49  Am.  St.  Rep. 
935),  but  it  is  insisted  a  different  rule  prevails  when  the  act  is 
done  in  violation  of  a  city  ordinance.  This  precise  question  was 
left  open  and  undecided  by  this  court  in  Schmalzried  v.  White, 
97  Tenn.  45. 

It  was  held  in  Osborne  v.  McMasters,  40  Minn.  103,  12  Am. 
St.  Rep.  698,  where  a  statute  or  municipal  ordinance  ^^^  im- 
poses upon  any  person  a  specific  duty  for  the  protection  or  bene- 
fit of  others,  if  he  neglects  to  perform  that  duty  he  is  liable  to 
those  for  whose  benefit  or  protection  it  was  imposed  for  any  in- 
juries of  the  character  which  the  statute  or  ordinance  was  de- 


698  Weeks  v.  McNulty.  [Tenn. 

€igned  to  prevent,  and  which  were  proximately  produced  by  suchi 
neglect. 

In  Bott  V.  Pratt,  33  Minn.  323,  53  Am.  Eep.  47,  it  was  held 
that  where  a  city  ordinance,  in  pursuance  of  the  charter,  makes 
it  unlawful  to  leave  a  team  standing  unfastened  or  unguarded 
in  a  street,  anyone  injured  by  a  violation  thereof  may  maintain 
«,n  action  against  the  wrongdoer. 

In  Salisbury  v.  Herchenroder,  106  Mass.  458,  8  Am.  Rep.  354, 
it  appeared  that  defendant  had  suspended  a  sign  over  a  street 
in  Boston,  in  violation  of  a  public  ordinance  of  the  city.  Dur- 
ing an  extraordinary  gale,  the  sign  was  blown  down,  and  a  bolt, 
part  of  the  fastenings,  was  hurled  against  plaintiff's  window, 
■causing  damage,  for  which  action  was  brought.  Held  that  de- 
fendant was  liable,  notwithstanding  due  care  was  exercised  in 
constructing  and  fastening  the  sign.  The  reason  was,  that  the 
defendant  had  placed  and  kept  the  sign  there  illegally,  and  this 
illegal  act  contributed  to  plaintiff's  injury. 

In  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  328,  the 
action  was  to  recover  damages  for  personal  injuries  alleged  to 
have  been  sustained  by  the  plaintiff,  a  boy  eight  or  nine  years 
old,  who  ^^^  lost  his  arm  by  being  run  over  by  one  of  the  de- 
fendant's cars.  The  particular  negligence  charged  in  the  declar- 
ation was  the  omission  of  the  railroad  company  to  build  a  fence 
on  the  west  line  of  its  right  of  way,  as  required  by  an  ordinance 
of  the  city  of  Chicago.  The  court  held  that  an  ordinance  passed 
in  pursuance  of  legislative  authority  has  the  force  of  law  within 
the  limits  of  the  city,  and,  although  in  case  of  injury  to  persons 
by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  company  to  erect  such  fence,  such 
•default  is  not  conclusive  of  liability,  irrespective  of  contribu- 
tory negligence  by  plaintiff,  yet  an  action  will  lie  for  the  per- 
«onal  injury,  and  this  breach  of  duty  will  be  evidence  of  negli- 
gence. ''The  duty,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Matthews,  "is  due,  not  to 
the  city  as  a  municipal  body,  but  to  the  public,  considered  as 
comprised  of  individual  persons,  and  each  person  specially  in- 
jured by  the  breach  of  the  obligation  is  entitled  to  his  individual 
compensation,  and  to  an  action  for  its  recovery."  "The  nature 
of  the  duty,"  said  Justice  Cooley,  in  Taylor  v.  Lake  Shore  etc. 
Ey.  Co.,  45  Mich.  74,  40  Am.  Rep.  457,  "and  the  benefits  to  be 
accomplished  through  its  performance,  must  generally  determine 
■whether  it  is  a  duty  to  the  public  in  part  or  exclusively,  or 
whether  individuals  may  claim  that  it  is  a  duty  imposed  wholly 
or  in  part  for  their  especial  benefit." 


Kov.  1898.]  Weeks  t;.  McNulty.  699 

We  are  aware  there  is  a  line  of  cases  whicli  hold  that  when 
the  duties  enjoined  by  ordinance  are  due  to  the  municipality,  or 
to  the  public  at  large,  and  ''**  not  as  composed  of  individuals, 
the  rule  is  different,  and  an  action  will  not  lie  for  a  breach  of  the 
■ordinance.  In  many  cases  of  the  latter  class  it  was  held  that 
the  owners  of  land  abutting  on  streets  were  liable  to  the  city 
alone  for  the  breach  of  ordinances  requiring  such  owners  to  keep 
sidewalks  clear  of  snow  and  ice,  and  in  good  repair,  and  that  they 
were  not  liable  in  damages  to  persons  injured  by  their  neglect 
to  perform  the  duties  enjoined  by  such  ordinances.  These  cases, 
it  is  said,  proceed  upon  the  ground  that  it  is  the  sole  duty  of 
the  city  to  keep  the  streets  in  good  repair  and  clear  of  snow  and 
ice:  See  Flynn  v.  Canton  Co.  40  Md.  312,  17  Am.  Eep.  603; 
Heeney  v.  Sprague,  11  E.  I.  456,  23  Am.  Eep.  602;  Vandyke  v. 
Cincinnati,  1  Disn.  532;  Philadelphia  etc.  R.  E.  Co.  v.  Ervin,  89 
Pa.  St.  71,  33  Am.  Eep.  726. 

An  ordinance  which  a  municipal  corporation  is  authorized  to 
make  is  as  binding  on  all  persons  within  the  corporate  limits  as 
any  statute  or  other  law  of  the  state,  and  all  persons  interested 
are  bound  to  take  notice  of  its  existence:  Bott  v.  Pratt,  33  Minn. 
328,  53  Am.  Eep.  51;  Heland  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen,  407,  81  Am. 
Dec.  670;  Vandine's  Case,  6  Pick.  187,  17  Am.  Dec.  351;  Gil- 
more  V.  Holt,  4  Pick.  257;  Johnson  v.  Simonton,  43  Cal.  242-249. 

The  duty  to  erect  fire-escapes  required  by  this  ordinance  is  not 
due  simply  to  the  municipality,  or  public  at  large,  but  was  a 
regulation  designed  for  *****  the  peculiar  benefit  and  protection 
of  individuals.  It  is  well  settled  that  when  a  statute  commands 
■or  prohibits  a  thing  for  the  benefit  of  a  person,  he  shall  have  a 
remedy  upon  the  same  statute  for  the  thing  enacted  for  his  bene- 
fit, or  for  a  wrong  done  him  contrary  to  its  terms:  Queen  v.  Day- 
ton Coal  etc.  Co.,  95  Tenn.  463,  49  Am.  St.  Eep.  935;  Pauley 
V.  Steam  Gauge  etc.  Co.,  131  N.  Y.  90;  Willy  v.  Mulledy,  78 
N.  Y.  314,  34  Am.  Eep.  536. 

We  do  not,  however,  decide  the  effect  of  the  breach  of  an  or- 
dinance in  fixing  civil  liability,  nor  do  we  adjudicate  the  proper 
•construction  of  the  ordinance  offered  in  evidence,  sinie  neither 
■question  is  necessarily  involved  in  this  case,  for  the  following 
reason,  namely:  There  is  no  proof  in  the  record  even  tending 
to  show  that  the  deceased  lost  his  life  in  consequence  of  the  fail- 
ure to  construct  fire-escapes,  as  provided  by  the  city  ordinance. 
The  principle  is  recognized  in  all  the  cases  that  a  liability  can- 
not be  predicated  alone  upon  the  breach  of  an  ordinance,  but  it 


700  Weeks  v,  McNulty.  [Teniu 

mnst  affirmatively  appear  that  the  injury  sustained  resulted 
proximately  from  said  breach. 

In  Queen  v.  Dayton  Coal  etc.  Co.,  95  Tenn.  458,  49  Am.  St. 
Eep.  935,  we  said:  "So,  we  think,  the  employment  of  the  minor, 
in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the  statute  in  question,  was  an 
act  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  defendant,  and  a  causal  connec- 
tion between  the  employment  and  the  injuries  sustained  by  the 

boy  being  shown,  there  is  liability The  breach  of  the 

statute  is  actionable  negligence,  whenever  it  is  shown  ^^"^  that 
the  injuries  were  sustained  in  consequence  of  the  employment. 
In  other  words,  it  is  not  enough  that  negligence  exists,  or  that 
the  ordinance  was  violated,  unless  it  proximately  caused  the  in- 
jury: Deming  v.  Cotton  Press  Co.,  90  Tenn.  353;  Eailroad  Co. 
V.  Kelly,  91  Tenn.  699,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  902;  Postal  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Zopfi,  93  Tenn.  374. 

After  a  very  attentive  reading  of  the  record  in  this  cause,  we 
have  failed  to  discover  any  causal  connection  between  the  death 
of  plaintiff's  intestate  and  the  failure  of  defendant  in  error  to 
erect  fire-escapes,  as  required  by  the  ordinance.  It  is  not  shown 
that  deceased  was  at  a  window  or  in  any  position  where  a  fire- 
escape  would  have  afforded  him  any  benefit  whatever. 

There  is  evidence  tending  to  show  that  deceased  had  locked 
himself  in  his  room  and  was  heard  beating  on  his  door,  trying 
to  make  his  escape.  It  is  shown  that  one  of  the  windows  of  his 
room  overlooked  the  Third  National  Bank  building,  and  that 
deceased  could,  with  entire  safety  to  himself,  have  escaped  by 
leaping  to  the  roof  of  that  building,  as  many  others  similarly 
situated  successfully  did  escape.  As  already  stated,  it  is  not 
shown  that  deceased  knew  of  this  avenue  of  escape,  and  we  can- 
not perceive  how  he  would  have  been  benefited  by  fire-escapes, 
under  the  circumstances  surrounding  him.  We  are,  therefore, 
of  opinion  that,  if  the  contention  of  counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error 
in  respect  of  the  proper  construction  of  this  ordinance  were  cor- 
rect, and  that  *^****  its  breach  would  constitute  actionable  negli- 
gence, these  questions  are  mere  abstractions  in  this  case,  since 
no  causal  connection  between  the  violation  of  the  ordinance  and 
the  injuries  sustained  by  the  plaintiff  is  shown. 

The  fifth  assignment  is,  that  the  court  erred  in  permitting  de- 
fendants to  read  as  evidence  the  stenographer's  report  of  the 
examination  in  chief  of  defendant,  John  R.  Northington,  given 
on  the  trial  of  the  case  of  H.  L.  Crowder  against  these  defend- 
ants in  the  circuit  court  of  Knox  county.    It  appears  that  the 


Nov.  1898.]  Weeks  r.  McNulty,  701 

case  of  Crowder  against  these  defendants  had  been  tried  only  a 
few  days  prior  to  this  case,  and  on  that  trial  John  R.  Northing- 
ton  was  examined  as  a  witness.  The  questions  at  issue  in  the 
Crowder  case  were  identical  with  those  involved  in  the  present 
case.  The  plaintiff's  counsel  in  the  present  trial  read  a  large 
portion  of  Northington's  cross-examination  given  on  the  former 
trial,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  admissions  by  Northington 
against  his  interest.  Counsel  for  defendants  then  insisted  the 
statements  of  Northington  could  not  be  well  understood  unless 
the  whole  of  it  was  read,  and  thereupon  offered  to  read  the  re- 
mainder of  his  evidence.  The  court  ruled  that  defendant's  coun- 
sel had  the  right  to  introduce  the  whole  of  the  statement  where 
any  part  of  it  is  offered  by  the  other  side,  and  thereupon  defend- 
ant read  the  whole  of  Northington's  examination  in  chief,  and 
plaintiff  read  the  whole  cross-examination,  including  the  portion 
**^  her  counsel  had  previously  read.  "We  think,  after  reading 
the  testimony  of  Northington,  that  the  cross-examination  read 
by  plaintiff's  counsel  could  not  be  fully  understood  without  read- 
ing the  examination  in  chief.  Says  Mr.  "Wood,  in  his  work  on 
Practice  and  Evidence,  section  160:  "An  important  rule  relat- 
ing to  the  admissions  of  a  party  is  that  the  whole  statement  con- 
taining the  admission  must  be  taken  together,  whether  the  ad- 
mission is  verbal  or  written;  for,  although  some  part  of  it  may 
contain  matter  favorable  to  the  party,  and  the  object  is  only 
to  ascertain  what  he  has  conceded  against  himself,  and  what 
may  therefore  be  presumed  to  be  proven,  yet,  unless  the  whole  is 
received  and  considered,  the  true  meaning  and  import  of  the 
part  which  is  good  evidence  against  him  cannot  be  ascertained.'* 
Of  course,  it  is  not  admissible,  under  this  rule,  to  read  matters 
wholly  disconnected  and  apart  from  the  matter  which  constitutes 
the  admission,  but  the  whole  admission,  and  anything  bearing 
upon  it  and  explanatory  of  it,  is  competent  and  relevant.  More- 
over, it  is  a  conclusive  answer  to  this  assignment  that  plaintiff 
in  error  did  not  stand  on  the  exception  made,  but  read  the  whole 
of  the  cross-examination. 

The  seventh  assignment  is,  that  the  court  erred  in  charging 
the  jury  that  no  prejudicial  inference  could  be  drawn  against 
defendants  in  this  case  from  the  mere  fact  that  they  did  not 
offer  themselves  as  witnesses  and  testify  in  this  case.  The  gen- 
eral rule  undoubtedly  is,  that  the  failure  of  a  party  to  be  ^^^ 
examined,  as  to  matters  necessarily  within  his  personal  knowl- 
edge, affords  a  presumption  against  him,  where  the  proof  is  not 


702  Weeks  v.  McNulty.  .    [Tenn. 

clear,  and  the  case  he  seeks  to  make  could  be  proven  by  him  if 
true:  Dunlap  v.  Haynes,  4  Heisk.  476. 

It  is  shown  by  witness,  Hacker,  that  defendant,  McNulty,  waa 
examined  at  the  coroner's  inquest,  and  stated  that  he  did  not  get 
to  the  hotel  until  after  the  fire,  and,  hence,  knew  nothing  about 
the  matter.  It  is  not  shown  there  were  any  facts  connected  with 
the  case  peculiarly  within  his  knowledge,  and  which  were  not 
known  so  fully  to  any  other  witness.  The  condition  of  the  prem- 
ises, including  the  elevator  shaft,  as  well  as  the  character  and 
habits  of  John  Davis,  the  colored  night  watchman,  were  fully 
proved  Dy  other  witnesses.  In  respect  of  M.  L.  Eqss'  testimony, 
this  witness  was  introduced  by  plaintiff,  and  does  not  state  any- 
thing calling  for  a  denial  from  defendant. 

Numerous  assignments  are  made,  all  of  which  have  been  care- 
fully considered,  but  we  find  in  them  no  reversible  error. 

Affirmed. 


INNKEEPERS— LIABILITY.— An  innkeeper  Is  bound  to  see  that 
one  who  enters  his  inn  is  protected,  not  only  from  the  assaults  or 
Insults  of  those  in  his  employ,  but  of  the  drunken  and  vicious  men 
whom  he  may  choose  to  harbor:  Rommel  v.  Schambacher,  120  Pa. 
St.  579,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  732,  and  note  discussing  the  question.  If  a 
guest  is  beaten  in  an  inn,  the  innkeeper  shall  not  answer  for  It: 
monographic  note  to  Clute  v.  Wiggins,  7  Am.  Dec.  452.  Liability 
of  innkeeper  where  guest  contracts  disease:  Gilbert  v.  Hoffman,  66- 
Iowa,  205,  55  Am.  Rep.  263;  Sheffer  v.  Willoughby,  163  111.  518, 
54  Am.  St.  Rep.  483. 

EVIDENCE  — ADMISSIONS  AT  A  PREVIOUS  TRIAL.— Ad 
admission  made  at  the  first  trial,  if  reduced  to  writing,  or  Incorpo- 
rated Into  a  record  of  the  case,  will  be  binding  at  another  trial 
of  the  case:  Holley  v.  Young,  68  Me.  215,  28  Am.  Rep.  40.  The  rule 
as  applied  to  notes  of  testimony  taken  by  counsel  on  a  former  trial: 
Philadelphia  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Spearen,  47  Pa.  St.  300,  86  Am.  Dec. 
544.  As  applied  to  minutes  of  testimony  taken  by  the  judge,  see 
Fitzpatrick  v.  FItzpatrick,  6  R.  I.  64,  75  Am.  Dec.  681. 

INSTRUCTIONS  — DEFENDANT  NOT  TAKING  WITNESS 
STAND.— In  a  criminal  case,  It  is  proper  to  Instruct  a  jury  that  un- 
favorable Inferences  are  not  to  be  predicated  upon  the  fact  that 
the  defendant  did  not  take  the  witness  stand:  People  v.  Seamen^ 
107  Mich.  348,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  826. 


Dec.  1898.]  Austin  v.  Statb.  70ft 


Austin  v.  Statb. 

[101  TSNNESSKE,  563.] 

EVIDENCE  —  JUDICIAL  NOTICE  —  DELETERIOUS  NA^ 
TURE  OP  CIGARETTES.— A  court  may  take  judicial  notice  that 
cigarettes  possess  no  virtue,  are  inherently  bad,  and  wholly  noxlous- 
and  deleterious  to  health. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— REGULATION  BY  STATES— 
CIGARETTES.— Cigarettes  are  not  legitimate  articles  of  commerce,. 
and,  in  the  absence  of  congressional  regulation  to  the  cojitrary,  a 
state  statute  may  prohibit  the  importation  and  sale  of  cigarettes 
within  the  state.  Such  a  statute  is  not  in  contravention  of  that 
clause  of  the  federal  constitution  which  inhibits  state  regulation 
of  interstate  commerce. 

POLICE  POWER— REGULATION  BY  STATES  OP  INTER- 
STATE COMMERCE.— Every  state  has  the  right  under  its  re- 
served police  power  to  prohibit  the  importation  and  sale  of  all  ar- 
ticles inherently  unworthy  of  commerce  and  unfit  for  the  use  of 
its  people,  and,  in  the  absence  of  congressional  action  to  the  con- 
trary, the  determination  by  a  state  legislature  that  an  article  of 
doubtful  commercial  quality  Is  not  a  legitimate  article  of  commerce, 
is  conclusive. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— STATE  REGULATION— SI- 
LENCE OF  CONGRESS.— The  rule  that  the  silence  of  congress  in 
relation  to  articles  confessedly  suited  for  commerce  Is  to  be  talven 
as  legally  equivalent  to  its  declaration  that  the  transportation  of' 
those  articles  into  the  states  shall  be  free  and  unrestricted,  has  no 
application  to  articles  of  doubtful  commercial  quality. 

STATUTES— PKESUMPTION  OP  CONSTITUTIONALITY. — 
All  intendments  are  in  favor  of  the  constitutionality  of  every  stat- 
ute passed  with  requisite  form  and  ceremony. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— STATE  REGULATION- CON- 
STITUTIONALITY—BURDEN  OP  PROOF.— The  burden  is  upon. 
a  person  who  assails  a  state's  restrictive  or  prohibitory  statute  as 
an  unwarranted  interference  with  interstate  commerce,  to  show 
that  the  particular  article  involved  Is  a  legitimate  subject  of  com- 
merce. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  —  LEGITIMATE  COMMODI- 
TIES—CONGRESSIONAL TAXATION  OP  CIGARETTES.— Con- 
gress, by  Imposing  a  revenue  tax  upon  cigarettes,  does  not  recog- 
nize them  as  proper  commercial  commodities. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— ORIGINAL  PACKAGE— DEFI- 
NITION.—An  original  package,  as  applied  to  interstate  or  Inter- 
national commerce,  is  a  package,  bundle,  or  aggregation  of  goods, 
put  up  in  whatever  form,  covering,  or  receptable  for  transporta- 
tion, and  as  a  unit  transported  from  one  state  or  nation  to  another. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— ORIGINAL  PACKAGE— BAS- 
KET CONTAINING  CIGARETTE  PACKAGES.— Where  a  num- 
ber of  packages  of  cigarettes  containing  ten  cigarettes  each  are 
shipped  from  one  state  to  another  in  a  basket,  the  basket  Is  an 
original  package  within  the  Interstate  commerce  act  The  presence- 
or  absence  of  covering  to  the  basket  Is  immaterial  to  the  question 
whether  or  not  the  basket  is  an  original  package,  and  It  Is  of  no- 
Importance  that  the  basket  is  owned  by  the  transporting  carrier. 

POLICE  POWER  —  MANUFACTURE  AND  SALE  OP- 
CIGARETTES.- A  state  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  cigarettes 
manufactured  within  the  state,  is  valid  as  an  internal  police  regu- 
lation. 


704  Austin  v.  State.  [Tenn. 

Welker  &  Parker,  for  the  appellant. 
Attorney  General  Pickle,  for  the  appellee. 

^^*  CALDWELL,  J.  W.  B.  Austin  prosecutes  this  appeal  in 
•error  from  the  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  of  Monroe  coimty, 
wherehy  he  was  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine  of  fifty  dollars  and  costs 
-of  suit,  for  unlawfully  selling  cigarettes.  He  admits  the  sale, 
■but  denies  that  it  was  unlawful. 

^^^  Austin,  who  was  a  citizen  and  merchant  of  Monroe 
county,  Tennessee,  purchased  from  the  American  Tobacco  Com- 
pany, a  New  J  ersey  corporation,  at  its  factory  in  Durham,  North 
Carolina,  a  lot  of  cigarettes,  in  packages  of  ten  cigarettes  each, 
which  it  shipped  thence,  by  express,  to  him  at  his  place  of  busi- 
ness in  this  state;  and  there  he  sold  one  of  these  packages,  with- 
out breaking,  to  W.  Gr.  Brown,  an  adult  citizen  of  the  same 
county. 

The  statute  under  which  the  conviction  was  had  uncondition- 
ally prohibits  all  sales  of  cigarettes,  whether  manufactured  in 
this  state  or  elsewhere.  It  provides  "that  it  shall  be  a  misde- 
meanor for  any  person,  firm,  or  corporation  to  sell,  offer  to  sell, 
or  to  bring  into  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  selling,  giving  away, 
>or  otherwise  disposing  of,  any  cigarettes,  cigarette  paper,  or  sub- 
stitute for  the  same;  and  a  violation  of  any  of  the  provisions  of 
this  act  shall  be  a  misdemeanor,  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  less 
<than  fifty  dollars":  Acts  1897,  c.  30,  sec.  1. 

Austin  concedes  that  his  sale  to  Brown  was  clearly  within  the 
prohibition  of  this  act,  yet  he  says  it  was  lawful,  nevertheless. 
The  substance  of  his  contention  is,  that  his  sale  was  of  an  im- 
ported commercial  article,  in  the  original  package,  and  that  the 
statutory  prohibition,  as  applied  to  such  a  sale,  is  obnoxious  to 
the  commerce  clause  of  the  federal  constitution,  and,  therefore, 
null  and  void. 

In  considering  this  contention,  we  raise  two  vital  inquiries: 
Whether  or  not  cigarettes  are  legitimate  ****  articles  of  com- 
merce, and  whether  or  not  the  sale  shown  in  this  case  was  of  an 
•original  package  in  the  true  commercial  sense. 

1.  Are  cigarettes  legitimate  articles  of  commerce?  We  think 
•they  are  not,  because  wholly  noxious  and  deleterious  to  health. 
Their  use  is  always  harmful;  never  beneficial.  They  possess  no 
virtue,  but  are  inherently  bad,  and  bad  only.  They  find  no  true 
commendation  for  merit  or  usefulness  in  any  sphere.  On  the 
^contrary,  they  are  widely  condemned  as  pernicious  altogether. 


Dec.  1898.]  Austin  v.  State.  705 

Beyond  question,  their  every  tendency  is  toward  the  impairment 
of  physical  health  and  mental  vigor.  There  is  no  proof  in  the 
record  as  to  the  character  of  cigarettes,  yet  their  character  is 
80  well  and  so  generally  known  to  be  that  stated  above,  that 
the  courts  are  authorized  to  take  judicial  cognizance  of  the 
fact.  No  particular  proof  is  required  in  regard  to  those  facts 
which,  by  human  observation  and  experience,  have  become  well 
and  generally  known  to  be  true:  Schollenberger  v.  Pennsylva- 
nia, 171  U.  S.  1;  1  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  sec.  6;  1  Wharton  on 
Evidence,  sec.  282;  1  Jones  on  Evidence,  sees.  129,  134;  Lan- 
fear  v.  Mestier,  18  La.  Ann.  497,  89  Am.  Dec.  658,  and  note 
693;  State  v.  Goyette,  11  K.  I.  592;  Watson  v.  State,  55  Ala.  158; 
nor  is  it  essential  that  they  shall  have  been  formally  recorded  in 
written  history  or  science  to  entitle  courts  to  take  judicial  notice 
of  them:  Boullemet  v.  State,  28  Ala.  83,  12  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency. 
of  Law,  199. 

It  is  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  organization  of  '^''  the  vol- 
unteer army  in  the  United  States  during  the  present  year  that 
large  numbers  of  men,  otherwise  capable,  had  rendered  them- 
selves unfit  for  service  by  the  use  of  cigarettes,  and  that,  among 
the  applicants  who  were  addicted  to  the  use  of  cigarettes,  more 
were  rejected  by  examining  physicians  on  account  of  disabilities 
thus  caused  than  for  any  other,  and,  perhaps,  every  other  reason. 
It  is  also  a  part  of  the  unwritten  history  of  the  legislation  in 
question  that  it  was  based  upon  and  brought  to  passage  by  the 
firm  conviction  in  the  minds  of  legislators  and  of  the  public 
that  cigarettes  are  wholly  noxious  and  deleterious.  The  enact- 
ment was  made  upon  this  idea,  and  alone  for  the  protection 
of  the  people  of  the  state  from  an  unmitigated  evil.  Such  being 
the  nature  of  cigarettes,  they  cannot  be  legitimate  articles  of 
commerce,  and,  consequently,  are  not  within  the  provision  of 
the  federal  constitution  (U.  S.  Const.,  art.  1,  sec.  8,  cl.  3)  in  re- 
lation to  the  regulation  by  Congress  of  conmierce  with  foreign 
nations,  and  among  the  several  states,  and  with  the  Indian 
tribes.  Only  those  things  which  are  in  fact  commodities  in  some 
true  sense,  and,  as  such,  are  proper  things  for  importation  and 
use,  can  be  legitimate  articles  of  commerce  and  within  the  scope 
of  the  constitutional  provision  invoked  by  the  defendant  in  this 
case.  Kegulation  of  traffic  in  things  not  suited  for  commerce 
was  not  by  that  provision  delegated  to  Congress.  Every  state 
has  the  right,  under  its  reserved  police  power,  to  prohibit  the 
importation  **®  and  sale  of  all  articles  inherently  unworthy  of 

AM.  8t.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— 46 


706  Austin  v.  State.  [Tenn. 

commerce  and  unfit  for  the  use  of  its  people.    Indeed,  an  active 
duty  rests  upon  the  legislative  branch  of  the  state  government  to 
enact  appropriate  laws  for  the  protection  of  the  public  against 
the  hurtful  influence  of  such  articles,  and,  in  the  discharge  of 
that  important  duty,  the  members  of  the  legislature  must  be  al- 
lowed to  act  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  their  own  best 
judgment.    This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  state  legisla- 
ture may  override  congressional  legislation  on  the  subject,  or 
that  the  state  has  the  paramount  right  to  determine  what  is 
and  what  is  not  a  legitimate  article  of  interstate  or  international 
commerce.     The  reverse  is  true.     Congress  has  the  superior 
right  in  the  determination  of  that  question,  and  its  decision, 
when  made,  is  controlling.     But,  if  the  question  arises  in  the 
state  in  advance  of  congressional  action,  as  in  the  present  in- 
stance, the  state  legislature  may  and  should  act  according  to  its 
own  deliberate  view  of  the  matter,  and  its  action,  when  taken, 
is  and  should  be  conclusive  until  Congress  shall  have  given  some 
adverse  expression  on  the  same  subject.     We  are  mindful  of  the 
rule  that  the  silence  of  Congress  in  relation  to  articles  confess- 
edly suited  for  commerce  is  to  be  taken  as  legally  equivalent  to 
its  declaration  that  the  transportation  of  those  articles  into  the 
states  shall   be  free  and   unrestricted:  Mobile  v.  Kimball,  103 
V.  S.  691;  Eobbins  v.  Shelby  Taxing  Dist.,  120  U.  S.  492;  Leisy 
V.  Hardin,  135  U.  S.  100;  State  v.  Scott,  98  ^^  Tenn.  260;  but 
congressional  nonaction   upon  the  antecedent  question  as  to 
whether  or  not  other  articles  are  suited  for  commerce,  is  not 
tantamount  to  an  affirmation  by  that   body  that   they  are  so 
Articles  of  the  former  class  are  already  within  the  domain  of 
congressional  regulation,  while  those  of  the  latter  class  are  as 
yet  beyond  that  domain  and  within  the  control  of  the  states, 
and,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  must  remain  so,  unless  and 
until  affirmatively  determined  by  higher  authority  to  be  worthy 
of  commerce,  and  thereby  transferred  to  the  other  class.     The 
right  of  a  state  to  protect  its  people,  in  their  comfort,  health, 
and  safety,  against  the  importation  and  sale  of  noncommercial 
articles  has  long  been  recognized,  and  never  questioned,  by  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States:  License  Cases,  5  How.  504; 
Bowman  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  125  U.  S.  465;  Hannibal  etc. 
R.  E.  Co.  v.  Husen,  95  U.  S.  465;  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  135  U.  S. 
100;  Plumley  v.  Massachusetts,  155  IJ.  S.  461;  Collins  v.  New 
Hampshire,  171  U.  S.  30;  Schollenberger  v.  Pennsylvania,  171 
U.  S.  1. 


Dec.  1898.]  Austin  v.  State,  707 

In  the  license  cases  Mr.  Justice  Catron  observed  that  what 
belongs  to  commerce  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States,  and  that  what  does  not  belong  to  commerce  is  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  state,  and  by  the  state  may  be  excluded  from 
introduction:  License  Cases,  5  How.  600. 

The  statute  of  Pennsylvania  impeached  in  Schollenberger  v. 
Pennsylvania,  171  U.  S.  1,  was  adjudged  violation  '^'^^  of  the 
commerce  clause  of  the  federal  constitution,  because  it  prohib- 
ited the  importation  and  sale  of  pure  oleomargarine.  In  the 
course  of  his  opinion  in  that  case,  Mr.  Justice  Peckham  attached 
controlling  importance  to  the  fact  that  pure  oleomargarine,  as 
contradistinguished  from  that  which  was  adulterated,  was  a 
wholesome  article  of  food,  and  had  been  recognized  by  Congress 
as  a  commodity  suitable  for  commerce;  and,  in  recognition  of 
the  state's  right  to  exclude  the  adulterated  article,  said:  "The 
bad  article  may  be  prohibited,  but  not  the  pure  and  healthy 
one." 

In  Plumley  v.  Massachusetts,  155  U.  S.  467,  it  was  said,  in 
effect,  by  the  court,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Harlan,  that 
deceptive  discoloration  or  adulteration  of  imported  oleomar- 
garine removed  it  from  the  domain  of  congressional  regulation, 
and  subjected  it  to  unconditional  exclusion  by  state  law. 

The  New  Hampshire  enactment  involved  in  Collins  v.  New 
Hampshire,  171  U.  S.  30,  provided  for  the  exclusion  of  all  oleo- 
margarine not  of  a  pink  color.  It  was  held  to  be  invalid,  for 
the  reason  that  it  virtually  excluded  pure  oleomargarine,  which 
was  never  naturally  pink  in  color,  and  which  was  a  proper  and 
well-recognized  commercial  commodity. 

The  case  of  Leisy  v.  Hardin,  135  U.  S.  100,  is  the  one  most 
urged  upon  our  attention  by  counsel  for  Austin.  That  case, 
however,  like  all  the  others,  recognized  the  right  of  the  state, 
under  its  police  power,  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  noncom- 
mercial **''*  articles  among  its  people.  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Fuller 
distinctly  places  the  court's  decision  upon  the  ground  that  the 
commodities  whose  importation  and  sale  were  so  greatly  re- 
stricted by  the  Iowa  statute  there  examined,  had  been  "recog- 
nized by  the  usages  of  the  commercial  world,  the  laws  of  Con- 
gress, and  the  decisions  of  courts"  as  proper  articles  of  commerce, 
and  were,  therefore,  subject,  in  the  first  instance,  to  con- 
gressional regulation  only.  In  the  conclusion  of  the  opinion  he 
said:  ''Whatever  our  individual  views  may  be  as  to  the  dele- 
terious or  dangerous  qualities  of  particular  articles,  we  cannot 


708  Austin  v.  State.  [Tennw 

hold  that  any  articles  which  Congress  recognizes  as  suhjects  of 
interstate  commerce  are  not  such,  or  that  whatever  are  thus 
recognized  can  be  controlled  by  state  laws  amounting  to  regula- 
tion, while  they  retain  that  character;  although,  at  the  sam& 
time,  if  directly  dangerous  in  themselves,  the  state  may  take 
appropriate  measures  to  guard  against  injury  before  it  obtains 
complete  jurisdiction  over  them." 

That  case,  then,  as  the  others  that  declare  state  restrictions 
and  prohibitions  unauthorized  and  invalid,  is  distinguishable 
from  the  present  one  in  the  fundamental  and  ever-controlling 
fact  that  the  articles  there  in  question  were  commercial  com- 
modities in  some  true  sense,  and  as  such  appropriately  recog- 
nized, while  those  here  in  question  are  not  so.  Moreover,  besides 
the  conclusive  recognition  received  by  those  articles,  they  stand 
upon  a  higher  plane  in  respect  of  inherent  merit  than  cigarettes, 
for  they  are  confessedly  •*^'''^  beneficial  in  some  instances  and  for 
some  purposes,  while  cigarettes  have  no  redeeming  qualities. 
The  Iowa  statute,  upon  its  face,  distinctly  acknowledged  that 
the  restricted  articles  possessed  some  virtue,  by  allowing  im- 
portations and  sales  of  them  for  certain  purposes  and  under  cer- 
tain restrictions.  In  no  instance  has  a  state's  right  of  author- 
ity and  control  been,  denied  when  the  commodity  restricted  or 
prohibited  was  not  first  found  to  be  a  proper  subject  of  com- 
merce, and  therefore  within  the  jurisdiction  of  Congress  and 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state.  The  existence  of  that 
fundamental  fact  has  always  been  the  decisive  criterion,  and  the 
burden  of  showing  it  is  upon  the  complaining  party. 

All  intendments  are  in  favor  of  the  constitutionality  of  every 
statute  passed  with  requisite  form  and  ceremony:  Cooley's  Con- 
stitutional Limitations,  6th  ed.,  218;  Black's  Constitutional  Law, 
sec.  28;  Sutherland  on  Statutory  Construction,  sec.  332;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Harris,  99  Tenn.  703;  hence,  the  burden  is  upon 
the  person  who  assails  a  state's  restrictive  or  prohibitory  statute, 
BO  passed,  as  an  unwarranted  interference  with  interstate  or  in- 
ternational commerce,  to  show  that  the  particular  article 
involved  is  a  legitimate  subject  of  commerce.  If  that  fact  be 
not  made  to  appear  in  some  appropriate  way,  his  assaUment  must 
be  unsuccessful. 

Mr.  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  in  Brown  v.  Maryland,  12  "Wheat. 
436,  wherein  a  state  statute  was  challenged  for  repugnance  to 
the  commerce  clause  of  the  federal  constitution,  remarked:  "It 
•"^^  has  been  truly  said  that  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  every 


Deo.  1898.]  Austin  v.  State.  709 

» 

kgislative  act,  and  that  the  whole  burden  of  proof  lies  on  him 
who  denies  its  constitutionality." 

The  same  rule  was  announced  and  emphasized  by  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Waite  in  this  language:  "Every  possible  presumption  is 
in  favor  of  the  validity  of  a  statute,  and  this  continues  until  the 
contrary  is  shown  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  One  branch  of 
the  government  cannot  encroach  on  the  domain  of  another  with- ' 
out  danger.  The  safety  of  our  institutions  depends  in  no  small 
degree  on  a  strict  observance  of  this  salutary  rule":  Sinking 
Fund  Cases,  99  F.  S.  718. 

If  there  were  only  a  doubt,  then,  that  cigarettes  are  legiti- 
mate articles  of  commerce,  that  doubt  would  be  resolved  against 
the  defendant  and  this  act  would  be  sustained.  But,  as  already 
stated,  they  are  clearly  not  so,  as  the  court  may  judicially  know 
(SchoUenberger  v.  Pennsylvania,  171  U.  S.  1),  and  the  passage 
of  the  act  is  a  legislative  determination  to  that  effect,  which 
must  be  treated  as  conclusive  of  the  question,  in  the  absence  of 
congressional  expression  to  the  contrary.  Congress  has  laid  a 
tax  on  cigarettes,  prescribing  the  forms  in  which  they  may  be 
put  up  and  the  manner  in  which  they  shall  be  stamped:  U.  S. 
Eev.  Stats.,  sec.  3392.  This  was  done,  however,  for  purposes  of 
revenue  only,  and,  without  more,  was  not  a  recognition  of  them 
as  legitimate  articles  of  commerce.  '^^'*  It  was  no  expression  on 
the  subject  of  commerce  one  way  or  the  other.  Indeed,  all  in- 
ternal revenue  legislation  is  referable  to  a  different  provision 
of  the  fundamental  law  (IT.  S.  Const.,  art.  1,  sec.  8,  cl.  1),  and 
should  be  construed  as  relating  to  questions  of  revenue  only, 
nnless  obviously  intended  to  include  some  additional  subject, 
which  is  not  true  in  this  instance.  The  fact  that  Congress  has 
declared  by  general  statute  (U.  S.  Rev.  Stats.,  sec.  3243)  that 
the  payment  of  any  tax  imposed  by  the  internal  revenue  laws 
for  the  carrying  on  of  any  trade  or  business  shall  not  authorize 
the  pursuit  of  that  trade  or  business  in  any  state  forbidding  the 
same,  nor  prohibit  state  taxation  thereon,  indicates  unmistakably 
that  Congress  does  not  intend  by  the  imposition  of  such  special 
tax  to  reach,  determine,  or  in  any  way  affect  questions  apper- 
taining to  interstate  or  international  commerce.  The  imposi- 
tion of  the  tax  is  aside  from  all  these  questions.  The  statement 
herein  that  the  taxation  of  cigarettes  is  not  a  recognition  of 
them  as  proper  commercial  commodities,  is  sustained  by  the  rea- 
soning and  decision  in  the  case  of  Plumley  v.  Pennsylvania,  155 
U.  S.  461. 


710  Austin  v.  State.  [Tenn, 

2.  Was  the  sale  shown  to  have  been  made  in  this  case  a  sale 
of  an  original  package,  in  the  true  commercial  sense?  We 
think  not.  It  may  he  truly  said  to  have  been  an  original  pack- 
age for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  because  put  up  by  the  manu- 
facturer, in  the  first  instance,  in  one  of  the  forms  **''''  prescribed 
by  the  internal  revenue  statute  (U.  S.  Eev.  Stats.,  sec.  3392); 
yet  it  was  not  an  original  commercial  package,  because  not  sold 
and  transported  apart  from  other  like  articles,  but  in  the  same 
general  receptacle  with  them.  Speaking  generally,  we  would 
say  that  an  original  package,  as  applied  to  interstate  and  inter- 
national commerce,  is  a  package,  bundle,  or  aggregation  of  goods, 
put  up,  in  whatever  form,  covering,  or  receptacle,  for  transporta- 
tion and  as  a  unit  transported  from  one  state  or  nation  to  an- 
other. 

In  Guckheimer  v.  Sellers,  81  Fed,  Eep.  997,  the  court  said: 
"An  original  package,  within  the  meaning  of  the  law  of  inter- 
state commerce,  is  the  package  delivered  by  the  importer  to  the 
carrier  at  the  initial  point  of  shipment,  in  the  exact  condition 
in  which  shipped.  In  the  case  of  liquors  in  bottles,  if  the  bot- 
tles are  shipped  singly,  each  is  an  original  package;  but,  if  a 
number  are  fastened  together  and  marked,  or  are  packed  in  a 
box,  barrel,  crate,  or  other  receptacle,  such  bundle,  box,  barrel^ 
crate,  or  other  receptacle  constitutes  the  original  package." 

The  supreme  court  of  Iowa  considered  this  question  in  Mc- 
Gregor V.  Cone,  104  Iowa,  465,  65  Am.  St.  Eep.  522;  and,  upon 
the  authority  of  numerous  cited  cases,  ruled,  as  correctly  stated 
in  the  headnote,  as  follows:  "1.  An  original  package  is  that 
package  which  is  delivered  by  the  importer  to  the  carrier  at  the 
initial  point  of  shipment,  in  the  exact  condition  in  which  it  was 
shipped;  2.  The  determination  of  the  *"^®  internal  revenue  de- 
partment that  a  package  is  a  proper  and  original  package  for 
purposes  of  taxation,  does  not  show  that  it  is  an  original  pack- 
age of  commerce;  3.  A  pine  box,  in  which  are  packed  for  com- 
mercial shipment  packages  of  cigarettes,  each  of  which  contains  • 
ten  cigarettes  and  is  sealed  with  an  internal  revenue  stamp,  with- 
out any  other  packing  or  inclosure  around  or  about  them  except 
the  box  itself,  is  the  original  package  of  commerce;  and,  when 
that  is  opened,  the  packages  of  cigarettes  are  subject  to  the  police 
power  of  the  state,  as  a  part  of  the  common  mass  of  property 
therein." 

The  material  facts  of  the  present  case  are,  that  the  defend- 
ant purchased  from  the  American  Tobacco  Company,  at  its  fac- 


Dec.  1898.]  Austin  v.  State.  711 

tory  in  Durham,  North  Carolina,  a  lot  of  cigarettes,  manufac- 
tured by  that  company  at  that  factory,  and  there,  by  it,  put  into 
pasteboard  boxes,  in  quantities  of  ten  cigarettes  to  each  box; 
that  each  of  these  boxes,  known  as  packages,  was  separately 
stamped  and  labeled,  as  prescribed  by  the  United  States  revenue 
statute;  that,  after  defendant's  purchase,  the  American  Tobacco 
Company  piled  upon  the  floor  of  its  warehouse  in  Durham, 
North  Carolina,  the  number  of  boxes  or  packages  sold,  and, 
having  done  so,  notified  the  Southern  Express  Company  to  come 
and  get  them;  and  said  company,  by  its  agent,  took  them  from 
the  floor  and  placed  them  in  an  open  basket,  already  and  pre- 
viously in  the  possession  of  the  Southern  Express  Company,  and, 
in  that  basket,  had  them  transported  by  express  to  the  defend- 
ant's ^"^"^  town  in  Tennessee,  and  there  an  agent  of  the  same 
express  company  took  the  basket  to  the  defendant's  place  of 
business,  and  lifted  from  it,  on  to  the  counter  of  the  defendant, 
the  lot  of  detached  boxes  or  packages  of  cigarettes,  and  there- 
upon took  a  receipt,  and  departed  with  the  empty  basket. 
Thereafter  the  defendant  sold  one  of  these  boxes  or  packages, 
without  breaking  it,  and  for  that  sale  he  stands  convicted. 

Under  these  facts,  it  is  entirely  manifest  to  our  minds  that 
the  basket,  with  its  contents,  made  one  original  package  in  the 
true  commercial  sense,  each  box  or  package  of  cigarettes  being  a 
constituent  part  thereof,  and  that  the  original  commercial  pack- 
age was  broken,  and  each  box  or  package  of  cigarettes  assumed 
a  separate  identity  before  the  law  when  the  basket  was  relieved 
of  its  contents.  This  is  true,  though  the  basket  was  open  all 
the  while,  and  was  filled  and  emptied  by  the  agent  of  the  ex- 
press company.  A  box,  crate,  barrel,  or  basket,  filled  with  goods 
for  shipment,  and  actually  transported  from  a  citizen  of  one 
state  to  a  citizen  of  another  state,  it  is  no  less  a  receptacle  of  the 
goods  in  a  legal  sense,  and  such  receptacle  is  no  less  an  original 
commercial  package  because  open  and  not  covered.  The  pres- 
ence or  absence  of  a  covering  to  a  receptacle  so  used  is  of  no 
consequence  in  determining  what  is  and  what  is  not  an  original 
package. 

In  South  Dakota  v.  Chapman,  1  S.  Dak.  414,  and  also  in  Eion 
V.  Alabama,  91  Ala.  3,  it  ^"^^  appeared  that  whisky,  in  bottles 
separately  wrapped,  had  been  packed  and  shipped  in  uncovered 
boxes,  furnished  by  the  shippers,  and  the  court  held,  in  each  case, 
that  the  open  boxes,  and  not  the  separate  bottles,  were  the  origi- 
nal commercial  packages.     The  ownership  of  the  basket  used  in. 


712  Austin  v.  State.  [Tenn. 

the  shipment  involved  in  this  case — ^whether  in  the  shipper  or  the 
carrier — ^is  not  disclosed.  If  the  defendant  predicated  anjrthing 
of  ownership  in  the  carrier,  the  burden  was  upon  him  to  show 
that  ownership.  To  avail  himself  of  the  protection  afforded  hy 
the  federal  law  in  relation  to  the  sale  of  original  packages,  he 
must  prove  every  fact  essential  to  show  that  his  sale  was  of 
such  a  package:  Keith  v.  Alabama,  91  Ala.  2.  But  we  regard 
the  question  of  such  ownership  as  wholly  immaterial,  for,  in 
taking  the  basket  to  the  factory  of  the  shipper  and  there  put- 
ting the  cigarettes  in  it,  the  express  company's  agent  was  act- 
ing for  the  seller,  and  the  legal  effect  of  his  action  was  the  same 
as  if  the  basket  had  been  procured  and  filled  by  the  shipper 
alone.  It  is  perfectly  obvious,  moreover,  that  this  plan  of  ship- 
ment was  resorted  to  as  a  mere  device  for  the  purpose  of  evading 
the  state  law  against  the  sale  of  cigarettes.  Prior  to  the  pas- 
sage of  this  law,  as  is  well  known,  no  such  scheme  was  adopted 
in  the  transportation  of  such  articles,  and  the  carrier  was  not 
called  upon  to  play  so  unusual  a  part  in  such  a  matter. 

Our  conclusion  upon  the  whole  case  is:  1.  That  ^''^  cigarettes 
are  not  legitimate  articles  of  commerce,  and,  consequently,  that 
their  importation  and  sale  are  not  within  the  scope  of  the  com- 
merce clause  of  the  federal  constitution,  but  are  subject  to  state 
control  and  prohibition;  and,  2.  That  if  they  were  legitimate 
articles  of  commerce  the  sale  for  which  the  defendant  stands 
convicted  was  not  of  an  original  commercial  package,  and  hence 
was  not  protected  by  that  clause  of  the  federal  constitution. 

Since  cigarettes  are  not  legitimate  articles  of  commerce  and 
as  such  within  the  domain  of  congressional  regulation,  the  stat- 
ute here  called  in  question  is  valid  as  a  whole — that  part  which 
prohibits  the  importation  and  sale  of  cigarettes  manufactured 
out  of  the  state,  as  well  as  that  part  prohibiting  the  sale  of 
those  manufactured  in  the  state — and  the  defendant's  conviction 
is  sustainable  under  the  statute  generally,  or  under  the  former 
part,  without  reference  to  the  question  of  original  package.  But 
if  they  were  legitimate  articles  of  commerce,  and  the  former 
part  of  the  statute,  therefore,  invalid,  the  latter  part  would 
remain  valid,  nevertheless  (State  v.  Scott,  98  Tenn.  254),  as  an 
internal  police  regulation  (Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128  U.  S.  1;  Mugler 
V.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  623;  Plumley  v.  Massachusetts,  155  U.  S. 
461);  and  the  defendant's  conviction  would  be  sustainable  there- 
under, because  his  sale  to  Brown  was  not  of  an  original  com- 
mercial package^  but  only  of  a  part  thereof  after  it  had  been 


Dec.  1898.]  Austin  v.  State.  713 

broken  and  its  contents  thereby  made  subject  to  the  laws  •*** 
of  the  state,  like  other  local  property  of  the  same  class:  Leisy 
V.  Hardin,  135  U.  S.  100;  SchoUenberger  v.  Pennsylvania,  171 
U.  S.  1. 

We  are  aware  that  Judge  Lurton,  for  whose  opinion  we  have 
great  respect,  ruled  otherwise  in  the  case  of  Sawrie  v.  State,  82 
Fed.  Rep.  G15,  upon  a  record  very  similar  to  this  one,  yet  we 
believe  our  conclusion  entirely  sound. 

Affirm. 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— REGULATION  BY  STATE— LEGI- 
TIMATE COMMODITIES.— A  state  has  no  right  to  Interfere  with, 
or  to  attempt  to  regulate,  interstate  commerce  in  an  article  on  the 
ground  that  it  Is  deleterious  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  state,  so 
long  as  it  Is  recognized  in  the  commercial  world,  by  the  laws  of 
congress,  and  by  the  decisions  of  the  courts  as  a  commodity  in 
which  a  right  of  traflSc  exists:  McGregor  v.  Cone,  104  Iowa,  465, 
65  Am.  St.  Rep.  522.  The  rule  In  the  principal  case  that  cigarettes 
are  not  legitimate  articles  of  commerce  is  denied  in  McGregor  v. 
Cone,  104  Iowa,  465,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  522,  where  It  was  held  that 
cigarettes  are  a  recognized  commercial  commodity.  Hence,  a  state 
statute  which  prohibits  the  sale  of  cigarettes  within  the  state  by 
all  persons,  except  jobbers,  who  do  an  interstate  business  with 
customers  outside  of  the  state,  is  in  contravention  of  section  8,  ar- 
ticle 1,  of  the  federal  constitution,  conferring  upon  congress  the 
exclusive  right  to  regulate  commerce  among  the  several  states,  and 
Is  void,  so  far  as  it  amounts  to  such  a  regulation:  See,  also,  State  v. 
Goetze,  43  W.  Va.  495,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  871. 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE-ORIGINAL  PACKAGES.— The  mle 
stated  in  the  principal  case  as  to  what  constitutes  an  original  pack- 
age is  sustained  by  McGregor  v.  Gone,  104  Iowa,  465,  05  Am.  St. 
Rep.  522;  Haley  v.  State,  42  Neb.  556,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  718;  State  v. 
Parsons,  124  Mo.  436,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  457,  and  note;  monographic 
note  to  People  v.  Wemple,  27  Am.  St.  Rep.  553.  But  In  State  v. 
Goetze,  43  W.  Va.  495,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  871.  it  was  held  that  if 
cigarettes  are  put  up  in  paper  boxes,  at  a  factory  for  the  manu- 
facture of  cigarettes,  each  box  containing  ten  cigarettes,  and  are 
shipped,  for  sale.  In  a  large  wooden  box,  which,  for  convenience  of 
shipment,  contains  a  number  of  the  smaller  paper  boxes,  each 
paper  box  must  be  regarded  as  an  original  package,  where  it  has  a 
proper  label,  giving  the  name  of  the  cigarettes,  the  caution  notice, 
the  number  of  the  factory,  the  number  of  the  revenue  district,  et 
cetera. 

STATUTES.— ALL  PRESUMPTIONS  ARE  SOLVED  IN  favor  ol 
the  constitutionality  of  a  statute.  It  devolves  upon  one  who  as- 
sails it  to  point  out  certainly  and  clearly  wherein  it  is  unconstitu- 
tional: Mauldin  v.  Greenville,  42  S.  C.  293,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  723. 


714  GoNCE  V.  McCJoY.  [Tenn. 


GONOB  V,  MoCoY. 

[101  T£NNE88£E,  687.] 

EXECUTION— SALES-GAVEAT  EMPTOR.— In  execution- 
and  Judicial  sales  of  land,  except  in  special  cases,  there  is  no  war- 
ranty of  title  or  quality,  but  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor  applies,  and 
the  purchaser  gets  virtually  nothing  but  the  quit-claim  title  of  the 
debtor  defendant. 

EXECUTION— SALES— JUDGMENT  CREDITOR  AS  PUR- 
CHASER—DEFECT OF  TITLE.— A  judgment  creditor  who  bid* 
the  amount  of  his  judgment  on  land  and  thus  satisfies  it  is  not  en- 
titled to  have  the  satisfaction  vacated  and  the  judgment  reinstated 
because  he  only  obtained  a  life  estate  in  the  land,  when  he  believed 
he  was  getting  a  fee  simple  estate,  and  bought  under  that  belief.  If 
he  obtains  any  beneficial  interest  by  his  purchase,  he  is  not  entitled 
to  such  relief. 

ESTATES— ESTIMATE  OF  VALUE— LIFE  ESTATE.— The 
value  of  a  life  estate  should  be  estimated,  not  in  the  light  of  its  ac- 
tual duration  as  subsequently  developed,  or  the  rents  received  in 
that  time,  but  at  its  value  at  the  time  of  purchase,  estimated  ac- 
cording to  the  rules  usually  adopted  in  estimating  the  value  of  life 
estates. 

Estill  &  Tumey,  J.  T.  Matthews  and  Banks  &  Embry,  for  the 
appellant. 

Lynch  &  Lynch,  for  the  appellee. 

»8«  WILKES,  J.  This  bill  is  filed  to  set  aside  the  satisfac- 
tion of  a  judgment  and  have  it  restored  to  vitality  and  force, 
and  to  have  the  judgment  thus  restored  declared  a  lien  upon 
land  and  the  land  sold  to  satisfy  the  same.  The  chancellor  dis- 
missed the  bill,  refusing  any  relief,  and  the  complainant  ap- 
pealed. The  court  of  chancery  appeals  reversed  the  chancellor, 
and  decreed  that  the  satisfaction  be  set  aside;  that  a  lien  be  de- 
clared for  the  reinstated  judgment;  that  it  be  collected  out  of 
certain  lands  and  out  of  a  certain  judgment  obtained  by  de- 
fendant, McCoy,  against  Sells,  the  vendor  of  the  land  to  him. 
The  case  was  also  remanded  for  an  account  of  rents  received 
by  complainants  and  for  the  execution  of  the  decree.  Both  par- 
ties have  appealed  to  this  ^*^^  court — the  complainant  from  sa 
much  of  the  decree  as  holds  him  for  rents,  and  the  defendants 
from  the  remainder  of  the  decree,  setting  aside  the  satisfaction 
and  declaring  a  lien  and  decreeing  a  collection. 

The  facts  found  by  the  court  of  chancery  appeals,  so  far  as 
they  need  be  stated,  are  that  McCoy  purchased  from  P.  G.  Sells 
a  tract  of  land  which  belonged  originally  to  one  Eice,  at  the 
price  of  two  thousand  four  hundred  dollars,  of  which  twelve 


Dec.  1898.]  Gonck  v.  McCoy.  715- 

hundred  dollars  was  paid  in  cash,  and  for  the  balance  three 
notes  were  given,  each  for  four  hundred  dollars.  One  of  these- 
notes  was  paid,  and  complainant  bought  the  other  two  for  six 
hundred  and  sixty-six  dollars,  and  claims  to  be  an  innocent 
holder  of  them.  They  were  secured  by  a  lien  on  the  land.  The 
land,  by  proper  proceeding  was  sold  to  satisfy  the  judgment 
obtained  on  these  notes,  amounting  to  one  thousand  and  fiftj 
dollars,  and  was  bought  by  complainant,  at  his  debt  and  costs,, 
and  the  judgment  was  thus  satisfied.  It  appears,  however,  that 
Eice,  the  original  owner  of  the  land,  before  he  conveyed  it  to 
Sells,  had  made  a  conveyance  of  it  to  Nancy  McCoy,  reserving 
a  life  estate  in  himself.  One  of  the  conditions  of  the  convey- 
ance to  Nancy  McCoy  was  that  she  should  live  with  Eice  and 
family  until  his  death.  She  failed  to  do  this,  but  left  the 
state,  and  Eice  thereupon  filed  a  bill  to  vacate  the  deed,  alleging 
that  it  had  never  been  delivered  and  had  never  taken  effect. 
Such  proceedings  were  had  that  this  deed  was  set  aside,  and  Eice 
thereupon  sold  to  William  Sells,  and  he  to  P.  0.  Sells,  and  he 
to  A.  J.  McCoy,  as  before  '^^^  stated.  After  the  vendor's  lien 
had  been  enforced  by  Gonce,  the  holder  of  the  notes,  against  A. 
J.  McCoy,  and  after  the  death  of  Eice,  Nancy  McCoy  having 
also  died,  her  heirs  filed  a  petition  setting  up  the  original  deed 
to  their. mother,  and  claiming  the  land  under  it,  alleging  that 
when  Eice's  proceedings  were  had  against  Nancy  McCoy,  to 
vacate  her  deed,  she  was  dead,  and  the  proceeding  therefore  a 
nullity.  The  result  of  this  suit  was  that  the  heirs  of  Nancy 
McCoy  recovered  the  land  from  Gonce,  the  purchaser  and  holder 
of  the  notes;  and  Gonce  thus  lost  the  benefit  of  his  purchase, 
except  as  to  the  life  estate  of  Eice.  He  had  possession,  however, 
of  the  land,  under  his  purchase,  from  November  5,  1892,  to  May 
5,  1893,  the  date  when  Eice  died,  and  until  that  date  his  pur- 
chase was  good  in  any  event,  as  he  held  the  life  estate  of  Eice, 
and  was  entitled  to  hold  it,  even  as  against  the  heirs  of  Nancy 
McCoy.  This  bill  was  then  filed  by  Gonce,  the  purchaser  of  the 
land  and  holder  of  the  notes,  to  set  aside  the  satisfaction  of  his 
judgment,  on  the  ground  that,  by  his  purchase,  he  had  not  ob- 
tained a  fee  simple  title  to  the  land  bought.  We  consider  this^ 
question  primarily,  inasmuch  as,  if  the  judgment  is  not  set  aside, 
the  question  of  its  lien  and  enforcement  need  not  be  considered.. 
The  court  of  chancery  appeals  find  that  when  complainant 
bought  the  notes  sued  on  he  was  assured  by  both  McCoy,  the 
maker,  and  Sells,  the  indorser^  that  the  title  to  the  land  for 


716  GoNCE  V.  McCoy.  [Tenn. 

which  they  ^^^  were  given  was  good,  and  he  believed  he  was  get- 
ting a  good  title  in  fee  simple  to  the  land  by  his  purchase.  It 
appears  that  neither  party  had  actual  notice  of  the  particular 
defect  in  title  which  caused  the  loss,  and,  hence,  there  was  no 
fraud,  though  there  is  some  evidence  of  a  supposed  defect  aris- 
ing from  a  different  source  known  to  both  parties. 

Gonce,  as  before  stated,  obtained  by  his  purchase  the  life 
estate  of  Rice,  but  did  not  get  the  fee  simple.  He  went  into 
possession  in  November,  1892.  Rice  died  in  May,  1893.  In 
this  interval,  Goiice  had  received  the  rents  and  profits  of  the 
land,  and  was  required  by  the  court  of  chancery  appeals  to 
account  for  the  same  as  a  credit  upon  his  judgments  when  rein- 
stated and  as  a  condition  to  their  reinstatement.  Upon  this 
feature  of  the  case  the  question  is  narrowed  down  to  this:  Is  the 
creditor,  who  has  bid  his  judgments  on  land,  and  thus  satisfied 
them,  entitled  to  have  this  satisfaction  vacated  and  the  judg- 
ments reinstated  because  he  only  obtained  a  life  estate  in  the 
land,  when  he  believed  he  was  getting  a  fee  simple  estate  and 
bought  under  that  belief?  Unquestionably,  if  there  be  a  total 
failure  of  title  and  the  purchaser  get  nothing  by  his  purchase, 
such  a  result  would  follow. 

The  provision  of  the  code  (Shannon's  Comp.  Stats.,  sec.  4719), 
is,  in  substance,  that  the  satisfaction  may  be  set  aside  by  scire 
facias  if  no  title  is  obtained  to  the  property  bought  to  satisfy 
the  judgment. 

But  the  question  in  this  case  is.  Does  such  remedy,  ^^^  or  a 
remedy  in  chancery,  exist  when  the  purchaser  obtains  a  valid 
title  to  the  property,  but  not  the  one  which  he  understood  he 
was  getting — in  other  words,  when  the  title  acquired  is  good  so 
far  as  it  goes,  but  does  not  confer  the  quantum  of  estate  which 
the  purchaser  expects  under  his  purchase?  It  is  well  settled 
that  in  sales  of  land  under  decree  and  under  execution,  except 
in  special  cases,  there  is  no  warranty  of  title  or  quality,  but  the 
rule  of  caveat  emptor  applies,  and  the  purchaser  gets  virtually 
nothing  but  the  quitclaim  title  of  the  debtor  defendant.  In 
this  case  it  appears  that  the  complainant,  as  purchaser,  was  aware 
that  the  title  to  this  land  was  questionable,  and  bought  with 
this  knowledge,  but  he  did  not  know  of  the  particular  defect 
which  afterward  occasioned  his  loss,  but  his  knowledge  was  of 
other  supposed  defects  which  were  not  real.  He  bought  a  prop- 
erty under  these  circumstances  which  originally  cost  two  thou- 
sand four  hundred  dollars,  and  paid  for  it  in  notes  which  cost 


Dec.  1898.]  Gonce  v.  McCoy.  717 

him  six  hundred  and  Bixty-sir  dollars,  and  wliile  he  had  no 
notice,  as  stated,  of  the  defect  in  title  which  finally  caused  the 
loss,  he  did  know  that  the  title  was  heing  questioned  on  other 
grounds,  and  hought  at  the  risk  of  this  and  over  the  protest  of 
the  defendant,  McCoy,  who  was  trjdng  to  prevent  an  enforce- 
ment of  the  vendor's  lien  and  a  sale  of  the  land  by  setting  up 
a  defective  title.  We  think  that  the  fact  that  the  complainant, 
as  purchaser,  got  only  a  life  estate,  when  he  expected  to  get  a  fee 
simple  estate,  cannot  entitle  him  to  have  the  satisfaction  ''^^  of 
his  judgments  bid  on  the  property  set  aside.  It  is  true  the  life 
estate  proved  to  be  of  short  duration,  and  hence  brought  but 
little  return  to  the  purchaser.  But  this  cannot  matter.  It 
might  have  continued  for  a  long  number  of  years  and  been  al- 
most as  valuable  as  the  fee,  so  there  was  neither  entire  failure 
of  title  nor  of  consideration.  To  hold  that,  because  he  thought 
or  expected  to  get  a  fee,  he  is  entitled  to  relief  because  he  only 
got  a  life  estate,  would  be  proceeding  upon  the  idea  that  the 
sale  carries  with  it  a  warranty  of  title,  not  only  as  to  validity  of 
title,  but  as  to  quantum  of  estate. 

He  is  not  entitled  to  such  relief  if  he  obtains  any  '^beneficial 
interest"  by  his  purchase,  and  the  courts  cannot  measure  the 
benefit  or  value  of  the  interest  acquired  if  it  is  substantial: 
Hayes  v.  Cartwright,  6  Lea,  145.  It  should  be  stated  that 
Gonce,  the  purchaser,  does  not  offer  to  refund  what  he  really 
obtained  by  his  purchase,  but  he  objects  to  refunding  or  account- 
ing for  anything  he  has  received,  and  appeals  from  so  much  of 
the  decree  of  the  court  of  chancery  appeals  as  requires  him  to 
give  credit  for  the  rents  received;  in  other  words,  he  insists  he 
has  a  right  to  have  his  judgments  restored  and  reinstated  and 
still  to  hold  on  to  all  he  has  received  from  a  sale  under  these 
judgments.  In  his  bill  he  does  not  offer  to  return  what  he 
received,  and  while  he  acquired  Kice's  life  estate  under  his  pur- 
chase, he  refuses  to  account  for  what  he  received  '^^^  out  of  hia 
purchase  of  it.  This  he  cannot  do;  Hill  v.  Harriman,  95  Tenn. 
305.  But  if  complainant  is  entitled  to  have  the  satisfaction  set 
aside  at  all,  it  would  be  more  proper  to  do  so  on  condition  that 
he  account  for  the  value  of  the  life  estate  he  obtained  and  not 
merely  the  rents  during  the  time  he  occupied  it.  And  the  value 
of  that  life  estate  would  be  estimated,  not  in  the  light  of  the 
actual  duration  of  the  life  estate  as  subsequently  developed  or 
the  rents  received  during  that  time,  but  at  its  value  at  the  time 
of  purchase,  estimated  according  to  the  rules  usually  adopted  in 


718  GoNCE  t>.  McCoy.  [Tenn. 

■estimating  the  value  of  life  estates.  To  illustrate:  If  this  life 
estate  of  Kice  had  contiimed  for  ten,  twenty,  or  fifty  years,  and 
■complainant  had  all  the  while  been  enjoying  the  use  of  the  prop- 
-erty  under  his  purchase,  it  would  hardly  he  insisted  he  would 
he  entitled  to  have  the  satisfaction  set  aside  on  the  ground  that 
he  had  not  obtained  the  fee.  The  value  of  the  estate  acquired 
hy  complainant  at  his  purchase  must  be  estimated  at  the  date  of 
the  purchase  and  its  probable  value  at  that  time,  and  not  by 
its  actual  return  as  subsequently  developed. 

"We  are  of  opinion  that  the  court  of  chancery  appeals  is  in. 
€rror  in  holding  that  the  complainant  is  entitled  to  have  the 
€atisf action  of  the  judgment  in  this  case  set  aside  and  the  judg- 
ments restored  to  force  and  vitality,  but  that  he  is  bound  by  his 
purchase  and  the  benefits  received  thereunder,  and  it  is  not 
necessary  to  consider  the  other  question. 

605  fpjjg  decree  of  the  court  of  chancery  appeals  is  reversed 
and  the  decree  of  the  chancellor  afiirmed,  and  the  bill  is  dis- 
missed, and  complainants  will  pay  all  costs  in  this  court  and 
the  court  below. 


EXECUTION— SALES— CAVEAT  EMPTOR— .There  Is  no  war- 
ranty of  title  by  a  sheriff  at  an  execution  sale.  The  purchaser  takes 
just  what  title  the  defendant  in  the  execution  has,  and  buys  at  his 
peril.  The  rule  of  caveat  emptor  applies  to  him:  Greer  v.  Winter- 
smith,  85  Ky.  516,  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  613,  and  note.  In  sales  of  land 
under  execution,  the  rule  caveat  emptor  applies,  and,  on  failure  of 
title,  the  purchaser  has  no  relief  from  the  payment  of  his  bid  ex- 
cept by  resort  to  equity:  Stearns  v.  Edson,  63  Vt.  259,  25  Am,  St. 
Rep,  758;  Lewark  v.  Carter,  117  Ind.  206,  10  Am.  St.  Rep.  40,  and 
note*.  See  the  extended  note  to  McGhee  v.  Ellis,  14  Am.  Dec.  131, 
where  the  entire  question  is  discussed.  See,  also,  Henderson  t. 
Overton,  2  Yerg.  394,  24  Am.  Dec.  492. 


CASES 

nr  THB 

COURT  OP  CRIMINAL  APPEALS 

or 

TEXAS. 


Jones  v.  State. 

[88  Texas  Cbiuinal  Rkfobts,  87.] 

WITNESSES  —  COMPETENCY  —  WIFE  IN  CRIMINAL 
OASB.— A  wife  can  be  a  witness  for  her  husband,  but  not  against 
him,  and  the  state  in  a  criminal  case  has  the  right  to  cross-examine 
her  pertaining  to  the  facts  sworn  to  by  her  on  direct  examination. 
When  the  state  leaves  the  matter  elicited  in  the  examination  in 
chief,  and  attempts  to  prove  independent  material  facts  by  her,  it 
makes  her  its  witness  and  a  witness  against  her  husband  against 
his  objection.  This  cannot  be  legitimately  done.  To  permit  It  Is  re- 
versible error. 

WITNESSES  —  CROSS-EXAMINATION  —  MAKING  ONE 
PARTY'S  OWN  WITNESS.— When  the  matter  elicited  from  a  wit- 
ness in  his  examination  In  chief  is  departed  from,  or  when  the  facts 
sought  to  be  established  on  cross-examination  are  not  pertinent  or 
germane  to  those  elicited  in  the  examination  in  chief,  the  witness 
becomes  the  witness  of  the  party  attempting  to  prove  such  matter. 

HOMICIDE— WIFE  OF  THE  ACCUSED  AS  A  WITNESS- 
EVIDENCE  TO  SUPPORT  HER.— If  the  defense  to  murder  is  in- 
sulting words  and  conduct  by  the  deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the 
accused  which  she  communicated  to  him,  and  to  which  she  has 
testified.  It  is  error  to  exclude  the  testimony  of  witnesses  to  estab- 
lish the  fact  that,  before  the  homicide,  she  had  stated  to  them  the 
facts  as  testified  to  by  her.  Such  testimony  Is  admissible  to  sup- 
port her,  and  to  show  that  her  husband  believed  her  statements 
and  committed  the  homicide  In  consequence  thereof,  when  the  the- 
ory and  evidence  on  behalf  of  the  prosecution  is  to  the  effect  that 
her  testimony  was  prompted  by  an  improper  motive  and  was  re- 
cently fabricated  solely  to  aid  In  the  defense  of  the  husband. 

MURDER— INSULTING  CONDUCT  TOWARD  WIFE— EVI- 
DENCE.—If  the  defense  to  murder  Is  Insulting  conduct  by  the  de- 
ceased toward  the  wife  of  the  accused,  he  may  prove,  as  original 
evidence,  that  prior  to  the  homicide  his  wife  communicated  a  state- 
ment of  the  Insulting  conduct  toward  her  to  the  witness,  who  in 
turn  communicated  It  to  the  husband. 

HOMICIDE  — MURDER  — EVIDENCE  OF  REPUTATION 
OF  DECEASED.- If  the  defense  to  murder  is  insulting  conduct  of 
the  deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the  accused,  which  she  has  com- 

(71»> 


720  Jones  v.  State.  [Texaa, 

municated  to  him,  the  bad  general  reputation  of  the  deceased,  as 
well  as  his  general  reputation  as  a  man  of  unchaste  and  lecherous 
habits  toward  women,  is  admissible  in  evidence  upon  the  issue  a» 
to  whether  the  accused  believed  the  information  received  from  his 
wife  and  acted  thereon. 

HOMICIDD-EVIDBNCE— STATEMENTS  OF  DECEASED 
—HEARSAY.— If  the  defense  to  murder  is  insulting  conduct  by  the 
deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the  accused,  the  testimony  of  a  wit- 
ness, that,  subsequently  to  the  alleged  insulting  conduct,  he  saw  a 
woman  in  the  office  of  the  deceased,  and  that  the  latter  informed 
him  that  she  was  the  wife  of  the  accused,  is  hearsay  and  inadmis- 
sible. 

HOMICIDE  — WIFE  AS  WITNESS  — CROSS-EXAMINA- 
TION.—If,  upon  the  trial  of  a  husband  on  a  criminal  charge,  hia 
wife  as  a  witness,  on  direct  examination,  should  swear  to  facts  in- 
jurious to  him,  he  cannot  complain,  but  her  cross-examination  must 
be  confined  to  tlie  matter  elicited  upon  the  examination  in  chief. 
Everything  which  is  legitimate  for  the  purpose  of  testing  her  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts  sworn  to,  her  bias  or  prejudice,  or  any  matter 
that  legitimately  goes  to  discredit  her,  is  admissible  on  cross-ex- 
amination, but  if  the  prosecution  leaves  the  matter  testified  to  on 
the  examination  in  chief  and  proposes  to  prove  independent  crim- 
inative facts  against  the  accused,  this  is  not  cross-examination,  and 
the  wife  then  becomes  a  witness  for  the  prosecution.  Her  exami- 
nation must  then  stop,  because  she  cannot  become  a  witness  against 
her  husband. 

HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE— RES  GESTAE.— If  the  defense  to 
murder  is  insulting  conduct  by  the  deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the 
accused,  and  she  has  testified  as  to  such  conduct  and  to  communi- 
cating it  to  her  husband,  and  that  he  and  deceased  were  friendly 
until  she  made  such  communication,  the  prosecution  cannot  prove 
by  her,  as  part  of  the  res  gestae,  on  cross-examination,  matters  re- 
lating to  the  disposition  of  her  property,  deceased's  connection  there- 
with, or  the  squandering  of  her  property  by  her  husband. 

WITNESSES— IMPEACHMENT.— If  a  witness  is  attacked  by 
showing  that  he  has  testified  corruptly,  or  has  recently  fabricated 
his  testimony,  he  can  be  supported  by  proof  that  that  he  had  at  a 
prior  time  made  the  same  statements,  before  any  motive  could  have 
existed. 

E.  B.  Seay,  J.  C.  Muse,  S.  H.  Eussell,  and  Miller  &  Williams, 
for  the  appellant. 

M.  Trice,  assistant  attorney  general,  for  the  state. 

®®  DAVIDSON,  J.  Appellant  was  convicted  of  murder  in 
the  second  degree  and  given  twenty  years  in  the  penitentiary; 
hence  this  appeal. 

The  record  contains  something  over  three  hundred  pages  of 
tjrpewritten  matter,  a  great  deal  of  which  is  absolutely  unneces- 
sary to  a  proper  understandng  of  the  points  in  the  case  neces- 
sary to  be  reviewed  by  this  court.  We  have  repeatedly  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that  care  should  be  taken  by  the  lower 
courts  in  preparing  a  record  for  this  court,  so  that  the  points 
in  the  case  may  be  clearly  presented,  without  unnecessary  pro- 


June,  1897.]  Jones  i;.  Statk.  721 

lixity  or  confusion.  To  make  a  record  in  the  lower  court  con- 
taining a  great  deal  of  useless  matter  is  an  idle  consumption  of 
time,  tending  to  produce  confusion,  requiring  great  labor  in  the 
preparart;ion  of  such  a  record,  and  is  a  draft  upon  the  time  of 
this  court  in  reading,  analyzing,  and  dissecting  the  same  so  as 
to  ascertain  what  essential  matter  the  record  contains.  And  we 
egain  call  attention  to  this  practice. 

After  a  painstaking  and  exhaustive  perusal  of  the  voluminous 
record,  it  occurs  to  us  that  the  only  questions  that  require  a 
discussion  and  reviewal  by  this  court,  necessary  to  a  proper  dis- 
position of  this  case,  are  as  follows:  1.  The  action  of  the  court 
in  permitting  a  cross-examination  of  Mrs.  Jones  upon  matters, 
as  insisted  upon  by  appellant,  not  drawn  out  from  her  on  the 
€xamination  in  chief,  and  not  pertinent  to  such  examination; 
•2.  The  action  of  the  court  in  refusing  to  permit  the  appellant 
to  prove  by  the  witness  Kendall  what  defendant  and  his  wife 
may  have  told  him  with  reference  to  the  alleged  insults  of  de- 
ceased toward  her;  3.  The  general  reputation  of  deceased  with 
reference  to  his  being  a  man  of  chaste  and  virtuous  habits  and 
conduct  toward  women,  or  otherwise;  4.  The  admission  of  the 
testimony  of  S.  Q.  Kichardson,  as  to  seeing  a  woman  in  the  office 
of  Veal  during  the  year  1885,  and  that  Veal  told  witness  that  it 
was  Mrs.  Jones,  et  cetera. 

In  order  to  a  proper  understanding  of  these  questions,  we 
will  summarize  the  case  sufficiently  to  show  their  bearing.  The 
evidence  on  the  part  of  the  state  tended  to  show  an  unprovoked 
murder.  The  killing  occurred  in  the  city  of  Dallas  during  the 
fall  of  1892,  while  the  Dallas  Fair  was  in  progress.  On  the 
morning  of  the  homicide,  Veal,  the  deceased,  and  several  others, 
were  in  a  room  in  the  third  story  of  the  Gaston  building  on 
Commerce  street,  preparing  some  data  or  program  in  connection 
with  the  Confederate  Eeunion  to  take  place  at  the  Fair,  Veal 
was  busy  at  the  time,  writing.  Defendant  came  upstairs,  walked 
into  the  room,  drew  his  pistol,  placed  it  in  close  proximity  to 
the  head  of  deceased,  and  fired  upon  and  killed  him.  The  de- 
fense set  up  by  appellant  went  merely  to  the  degree  of  the  homi- 
cide; that  is,  he  claimed  that  he  killed  deceased  because  of  the 
insulting  words  and  conduct  toward  his  wife,  after  their  mar- 
riage, which  was  intensified  by  an  alleged  rape  upon  ®®  her  by 
the  deceased  prior  to  their  marriage;  and  that  he  killed  deceased 
on  their  first  meeting  after  being  informed  thereof.  The  de- 
fendant having  been  previously  acquitted  of  murder  in  the  first 
AM.  ar.  RKP..  Vol.  lxx.— 16 


722  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas, 

degree,  the  only  issue  presented  on  this  trial  was  whether  or 
not  he  was  guilty  of  murder  in  the  second  degree  or  of  man- 
slaughter. 

1.  Appellant  introduced  his  wife  as  a  witness,  who  testified 
as  to  the  alleged  rape,  which  she  testified  was  committed  upon, 
her  in  the  year  1871,  prior  to  her  marriage  with  the  defendant, 
which  occurred  in  March,  1874.  In  that  connection  she  stated 
that  she  was  living  with  a  Mrs.  Cockrell,  in  Dallas.  That  she 
occupied  a  room  upstairs,  with  her  infant  child,  by  a  former 
marriage.  That  Veal  came  and  stayed  all  night  at  Mrs.  Cock- 
rell's,  he  being  then  a  minister  of  the  gospel  in  the  Methodist 
Church,  and  was  assigned  a  room  upstairs,  in  which  he  slept. 
That  some  time  during  the  night  she  was  aroused  from  slumber, 
and  saw  standing  by  her  bed  a  man.  She  raised  up  and  told 
him  to  go  away.  "He  kept  standing  there,  and  when  I  said 
that,  he  put  his  hand  out  to  mine,  and  put  his  hand  over  my 
mouth,  and  he  says,  *Hush,  they'll  hear  you.'  I  was  almost 
paralyzed  with  fright,  but  I  seemed  to  realize  what  his  object 
was,  and  threw  myself  backward,  and  threw  my  arms  around 
my  baby,  but  he  pulled  me  away  and  ravished  me.  1  was  not 
conscious  at  the  time  I  was  outraged.  When  consciousness  re- 
turned to  me.  Veal  had  gone."  She  further  testified  that  "about 
a  year  after  her  marriage  with  defendant,  while  she  was  living 
on  Eoss  avenue,  in  Dallas,  one  day  some  one  knocked  at  the 
door  and  the  servant  came  and  opened  it,  and  Captain  Veal,  the 
deceased,  came  in.  That  Veal,  instead  of  going  into  the  parlor, 
came  into  the  room  where  she  was  sitting.  That  she  got  up, 
and  he  came  toward  her,  with  his  arms  out,  just  like  he  was 
going  to  take  her  in  his  arms;  that  she  stepped  back  and  said: 
*You  forget  yourself.  Captain  Veal,  You  forget  that  I  have  a 
husband  to  protect  me  now.'  *'  She  told  him  to  go  away,  and 
turned  and  left  the  room.  "A  number  of  years  after  that,  while 
I  was  living  in  East  Dallas,  near  the  ice  factory,  and  after  I  had 
moved  in  from  Mesquite,  my  little  girl  came  and  said,  'There  is 
a  gentleman  at  the  door.'  I  looked,  and  saw  Captain  Veal  stand- 
ing in  the  front  door.  I  said:  'What  do  you  mean.  Captain  Veal, 
by  coming  to  my  house?  You  know  I  do  not  want  to  see  you. 
It  makes  me  miserable  to  see  you;  and  I  don't  want  to  see  you,*^ 
And  he  said,  *I  was  taking  a  walk,  and  thought  I  would  stop 
in  and  see  you  a  few  minutes.*  And  I  told  him  he  was  not 
welcome,  and  did  not  want  him  to  come  near  me.  He  only 
stayed  a  few  minutes,  and  then  left.     These  were  the  only  two> 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  723 

occasions  I  ever  saw  Veal  after  I  was  married  to  Dr.  Jones." 
She  testified  that  in  the  fall  of  1891,  for  the  first  time,  she  men- 
tioned Veal's  conduct  toward  her,  both  before  and  since  her 
marriage  with  the  defendant.  That  when  she  told  her  husband 
of  these  matters  he  became  greatly  excited,  and  acted  like  a 
crazy  man.  He  wanted  to  go  immediately  to  Fort  Worth  (where 
Veal  then  lived),  but  she  begged  him  not  to,  and  to  let  Veal 
alone.  That  repeatedly  thereafter  the  subject  was  mentioned, 
the  defendant  bringing  it  up,  and  on  such  occasions  *^®  he  would 
act  like  a  crazy  man.  This  is  the  condensed  testimony  of  Mrs. 
Jones  introduced  by  the  defendant.  Over  the  objections  of  the 
defendant,  the  state  proved  by  Mrs.  Jones  that  she  had  conveyed 
certain  property  to  her  son,  James  Bullington,  at  the  instance 
of  Mrs.  Cockrell  and  Mitch  Gray,  upon  the  eve  of  her  marriage 
to  the  defendant;  that  this  angered  the  defendant,  and  he  also 
became  angry  at  Mitch  Gray  and  Mrs.  Cockrell  because  of  this 
matter;  that  the  defendant  forbade  his  wife  visiting  Mrs.  Cockrell 
for  nearly  twenty  years  on  account  thereof;  the  squandering  of 
the  witness'  property  by  the  defendant;  the  effort  of  the  witness, 
Mrs.  Jones,  and  the  defendant  to  have  the  disabilities  of  min- 
ority of  James  Bullington  removed,  in  order  to  have  him  recon- 
vey  the  property  to  witness;  and  also  interrogated  the  defend- 
ant's wife  as  to  advice  given  by  the  deceased  to  her  in  reference 
to  her  property, and  that  deceased  transacted  business  for  witness 
and  defendant.  These  matters  were  all  brought  out  upon  what 
is  termed  a  cross-examination  of  the  witness.  Mrs.  Jones  had 
testified  to  no  facts  to  which  these  matters  related  or  were  ger- 
mane; not  one.  When  the  state  left  the*  matter  elicited  upon 
examination  in  chief,  and  attempted  to  prove  these  things  by 
Mrs.  Jones,  it  made  her  its  witness,  and  would  have  had  the 
right  to  introduce  her  as  a  witness,  and  prove  these  facts,  if  ap- 
pellant had  never  placed  her  upon  the  stand,  if  such  facts  could 
be  proved  by  her,  as  was  done  in  this  instance.  The  wife  can  be 
a  witness  for  the  husband,  but  not  against  him.  He  is  permitted 
to  prove  by  her  any  fact  that  he  desires.  The  state  had  the 
right  to  cross-examine  her  pertaining  to  the  facts  sworn  to  by 
her  on  direct  examination.  This  would  be  a  cross-examination. 
But  when  the  state  leaves  the  matter  elicited  in  the  examination 
in  chief,  and  attempts  to  prove  independent  facts  by  her,  it 
makes  her  its  witness,  and  a  witness  against  her  husband,  over 
his  objections.  This  cannot  be  done.  This  is  no  new  doctrine 
in  this  state,  but  is  settled  by  a  number  of  cases:  See  Creamer 


724  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas, 

V.  State,  34  Tex.  173;  Greenwood  v.  State,  35  Tex.  587;  Hamp- 
ton V.  State,  45  Tex.  154;  Washington  v.  State,  17  Tex.  Crim. 
App.  197;  Johnson  v.  State,  28  Tex.  Crim.  App.  17;  Bluman  v. 
State,  33  Tex.  Crim.  Kep.  43;  Hoover  v.  State,  35  Tex.  Crim. 
Eep.  342.  The  rule  adopted  by  the  courts  in  our  state  is  illus- 
trated by  the  right  to  cross-examine  a  witness.  The  cross-exam- 
ination of  an  ordinary  witness  can  only  be  conducted  as  to  such 
matters  as  are  pertinent  to  the  matters  brought  out  in  the  ex- 
amination in  chief;  and  in  most  jurisdictions  in  our  country, 
where  a  party  seeks  on  cross-examination  to  bring  out  matters 
not  germane  or  pertinent  to  the  examination  in  chief,  if  they  are 
legitimate  in  evidence  as  competent  testimony  for  the  party 
seeking  to  bring  them  out  on  cross-examination,  he  will  not  be 
permitted  to  do  so  in  the  cross-examination  of  such  witness,  but 
when  he  comes  to  present  his  case  he  can  introduce  the  witness 
on  his  own  behalf.  See  the  rule  stated  in  1  Greenleaf  on  Evi- 
dence, section  445,  and  authorities  there  cited.  This  practice 
renders  patent  the  fact  that  the  witness,  so  far  as  the  matters 
which  do  not  pertain  to  the  examination  in  chief  are  concerned, 
is  the  witness  of  the  party  introducing  them.  Now,  in  some 
jurisdictions  ^^^  the  party  is  not  required  to  stand  the  witness 
aside  until  he  introduces  his  evidence,  but  may  prove  any  per- 
tinent fact  by  the  witness  introduced  by  the  other  party;  but  in 
doing  so,  if  he  departs  from  the  matter  elicited  in  chief,  he 
makes  the  witness  his  own  witness.  So,  applying  either  rule, 
the  conclusion  is  inevitable  that  when  the  matter  elicited  in 
chief  is  departed  from,  or  when  the  facts  sought  to  be  established 
upon  a  cross-examinaflon,  so  called,  are  not  pertinent  or  germane 
to  that  elicited  in  chief,  the  witness  becomes  the  witness  of  the 
party  attempting  to  prove  such  matter.  Apply  that  rule  to  this 
case:  The  facts  proved  by  Mrs.  Jones,  over  the  objection  of  the 
defendant,  as  above  stated,  had  no  relation  whatever — were  not 
pertinent  or  germane — to  any  fact  elicited  on  her  examination  in 
chief.  In  a  case  it  may  be  important  as  to  when  the  defendant 
married.  He  introduces  his  wife,  and  proves  the  date  of  the  mar- 
riage. If  the  rule  be  otherwise  than"  that  stated  by  us,  the  state 
would  be  permitted  to  prove  by  the  wife  all  manner  and  every 
description  of  criminative  facts  against  the  husbaAd.  We  are  of 
opinion  that  the  state  had  a  right  to  prove  by  Mrs.  Jones,  because 
it  was  pertinent  to  her  examination  in  chief,  that  she  visited  the 
deceased  after  the  commission  of  the  alleged  rape  and  the  other 
insulting  conduct.     Any  fact  or  circumstance  which  tended  to 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  725 

ehow  a  friendly  relation  between  Veal  and  Mrs.  Jones  after 
the  insulting  conduct  above  mentioned  occurred  is  admissible, 
because  pertinent  to  her  examination  in  chief;  but  nothing  else, 
according  to  this  record,  was  permissible  to  be  shown  by  the 
state  on  cross-examination.  Now,  while  the  court  might  have 
violated  this  rule  in  permitting  the  state  to  prove  facts  not 
germane  to  the  examination  in  chief,  yet,  unless  the  facts  are  of 
such  a  character  as  to  have  a  material  bearing  upon  the  issues 
involved,  we  would  not  reverse  this  judgment  upon  this  ground. 
The  question,  therefore,  is  the  materiality  of  these  facts;  their 
bearing,  et  cetera,  when  viewed  with  reference  to  the  theories  of 
both  parties.  The  record  develops  the  fact  that  the  theory  of 
the  state  was  that  Jones  killed  the  deceased  because  he  was  try- 
ing to  protect  Mrs.  Jones,  and  especially  her  son,  James  Bulling- 
ton,  from  the  avarice  of  Jones,  the  defendant;  that  Veal  was  the 
protector  of  Mrs.  Jones  and  her  son,  and  that  he  was  a  serious 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  Jones  in  his  (Jones')  desire  to  obtain  the 
possession  and  control  of  the  property  which  belonged  to  Bul- 
lington,  having  been  transferred  to  him  just  before  the  marriage 
of  the  mother  with  the  defendant;  his  object  was  to  get  a  deed 
from  young  Bui  ling  ton  to  his  wife  for  the  property  and  real 
estate,  and  finally  to  have  the  control  and  management,  and 
perhaps  the  absolute  fee  to  the  property,  in  himself,  and  that 
the  deceased  was  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  defendant  to  perfect 
his  plans.  The  theory  of  the  defendant  was,  that  owing  to  the 
insults,  outrages,  and  conduct  of  Veal  toward  his  wife,  he  killed 
him,  and  that  he  was,  therefore,  guilty  of  nothing  greater  than 
manslaughter.  These  were  the  opposing  theories.  The  battle 
was  fought  upon  these  lines;  the  state  marshalling  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  in  support  of  its  theory,  and  the  defendant 
all  that  supported  his  theory.  Now,  the  state  is  permitted,  over 
the  objections  ^^'^  of  the  defendant,  to  lay  the  very  foundation 
upon  which  this  theory  rests  by  the  testimony  of  Mrs.  Jones, 
which  was  not  germane  to  anything  elicited  by  the  defendant. 
We  think  the  testimony  was  very  important  when  we  look  to  the 
issues  between  the  parties,  and,  not  being  pertinent  or  germane 
to  her  examination  in  chief,  but  being  original  testimony,  she 
being  the  wife  of  the  appellant,  its  admission,  over  the  objection 
of  appellant,  was  improper. 

2.  On  the  trial  of  the  case,  appellant  introduced  one  T.  G.  T. 
Kendall,  and  proposed  to  prove  by  him  that  immediately  after 
the  communication  made  by  the  wife  of  appellant  to  him  in  the 


726  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas, 

fall  of  1891  (about  a  year  prior  to  the  homicide)  in  regard  to 
Veal's  conduct  toward  her,  that  defendant,  being  in  great  dis- 
tress of  mind,  sougnt  his  friend,  said  Kendall,  to  advise  with 
him  relative  to  the  communication  so  made  by  his  wife;  that 
defendant  was  then  in  an  excited  and  distressed  condition  of 
mind,  and  then  and  there  told  Kendall  of  said  communication 
so  made  to  him  by  his  wife,  to  wit,  that  Veal  had  raped  her  in 
1872,  prior  to  her  marriage  with  defendant,  and  after  her  mar- 
riage with  defendant,  in  1874  or  1875,  and  again  in  1885,  Veal 
had  visited  her  with  lecherous  and  carnal  propositions,  and  that 
in  said  first  visit  Veal  had  sought  to  embrace  his  (defendant's) 
wife;  defendant  stating  then  and  there  to  said  Kendall  that  his 
(defendant's)  wife  had  commimicated  such  facts  to  him  a  few 
days  prior  thereto.  Defendant  further  offered  to  prove  that  he 
expressed  to  Kendall  his  unqualified  belief  in  the  truth  of  the 
statement  so  made  to  him  by  his  wife;  that  said  Kendall  then 
stated  to  defendant  that  he  did  not  believe  it,  that  he  had  known 
defendant's  wife  since  she  was  a  child,  and  that  he  would  not 
believe  that  Veal  or  any  other  man  had  raped  or  insulted  her, 
unless  he  heard  it  from  her  own  lips;  and  said  Kendall  refused 
to  talk  with  defendant,  and  left  him.  He  also  offered  to  prove 
by  Kendall  that  shortly  thereafter  he  saw  Mrs.  Jones  (wife  of 
appellant),  and  that  she  told  him  of  the  circumstance  of  Veal 
having  raped  her  before  her  marriage  with  appellant,  and  of  his 
subsequent  visits  to  her  as  stated  above.  A  few  hours  after  this, 
Kendall  again  met  defendant,  and  told  him:  "I  have  been  to 
your  house.  I  have  seen  and  talked  with  your  wife,  and  she  haa 
told  me  that  what  you  stated  to  me  in  regard  to  Veal's  conduct 
toward  her  was  true."  And  said  witness,  in  that  connection, 
stated  to  appellant:  "Every  word  your  wife  has  stated  to  me  and 
to  you  is  true.  Veal  did  everything  she  says  he  did.  I  know 
your  wife  to  be  incapable  of  telling  a  lie.  A  purer,  better 
woman  never  lived,  and  I  believe  every  word  she  says  about  it." 
Appellant  also  offered  to  prove  by  Kendall  that  repeatedly  after 
said  communications  appellant  talked  with  him  about  said 
matters  up  to  within  a  few  days  of  the  homicide,  and  on  all 
such  occasions  he  was  greatly  excited,  and  appeared  to  be  in  a 
distressed  condition  of  mind,  and  on  such  occasions  was  never 
calm,  and  always  avowed  his  belief  in  the  truth  of  said  commu- 
nications made  to  him  by  his  wife.  Appellant  also  proposed  to 
prove  by  his  wife  that  she  made  the  statement  to  Kendall  as 
above  stated;  and  it  was  also  proposed  to  prove  by  her  that  she 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  727 

told  Mrs.  Cockrell  these  same  matters.  All  of  **'  this  testi- 
mony was  objected  to  by  the  state,  and  excluded  by  the  court, 
to  which  defendant  execpted.  Appellant  insists  that  said  testi- 
mony was  admissible  as  tending  to  show  that  his  defense  set  up 
in  this  case  was  not  fabricated,  and  as  tending  to  rebut  the  con- 
tention of  the  state  that  said  matters  were  manufactured  after 
the  homicide.  He  also  urges  that  said  testimony  was  admissible 
as  tending  to  establish  both  the  truth  of  the  facts  communicated 
to  defendant  by  his  wife,  and  the  defendant's  belief  in  the  truth 
of  said  communication;  and  also  showed  a  communication  to 
defendant  by  Kendall  of  the  same  facts  communicated  to  the 
defendant  by  his  wife,  and  that  defendant's  wife,  long  anterior 
to  the  homicide,  had  communicated  said  rape  and  subsequent 
insults  by  Veal  to  another  than  the  defendant. 

The  statement  of  acts  presents  but  one  issue,  and  that  is, 
whether  appellant  was  guilty  of  murder  in  killing  W.  G.  Veal, 
or  whether  he  was  gulity  of  manslaughter.  If  the  jury  believed 
the  testimony  of  Mrs.  Jones  and  appellant,  the  theory  of  appel- 
lant that  it  was  nothing  greater  than  manslaughter  is  clearly 
presented.  If  the  jury  did  not  believe  the  testimony  of  appel- 
lant and  Mrs.  Jones,  then  manslaughter,  so  far  as  the  jury  is 
concerned,  is  not  in  the  case.  The  state's  theory  is,  that  the 
killing  was  not  prompted  by  a  passion  aroused  by  this  miscon- 
duct of  Veal  toward  Mrs.  Jones  (wife  of  appellant),  and  that  her 
testimony  was  manufactured  to  aid  her  husband  in  his  defense. 
Every  particle  of  testimony  introduced  by  the  state  is  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  case  in  opposition  to  the  truth  of  the  tes- 
timony of  Mrs.  Jones  and  defendant.  Now,  the  rule  of  law  is, 
that  where  the  opposing  case  is  that  the  witness  testified  under 
corrupt  motives,  or  where  the  impeaching  evidence  goes  to 
charge  the  witness  with  a  recent  fabrication  of  his  testimony, 
the  party  introducing  the  witness  can  prove  that  before  the 
motive  existed  (the  motive  in  this  case  being  to  save  the  life  or 
liberty  of  her  husband),  the  witness  made  the  same  statement  aa 
that  sworn  to.  To  state  the  proposition  in  another  form:  if  the 
opposing  case  is  to  the  effect  that  the  witness  had  a  corrupt 
motive  in  swearing  to  certain  facts,  or  that  the  witness  recently 
fabricated  the  testimony  for  a  purpose  (in  this  case  the  motive 
being  to  prevent  the  conviction  of  appellant,  and  that,  therefore, 
this  testimony  was  manufactured .  after  the  death  of  Veal),  the 
party  introducing  the  witness  (being  the  appellant  in  this  case) 
can  show  that  before  the  deceased  (Veal)  was  killed  the  witnesa 


728  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas^ 

(Mrs.  Jones)  told  the  same  story  which  she  swears  to  upon  the- 
trial.  By  such  proof,  the  charge  that  it  was  fabricated,  or 
prompted  by  an  improper  motive,  is  completely  met  and  des- 
troyed, if  believed  by  the  jury.  The  authorities  are  divided  as^ 
to  whether  a  witness  can  be  supported  because  the  adversary 
has  shown  that  he  made  conflicting  statements  about  the  fact. 
We  hold  that  this  can  be  done.  This,  however,  is  a  doubtful 
question  when  tested  by  the  authorities.  All  the  authorities 
agree,  where  the  attack  is  made  that  the  witness  is  prompted  by 
improper  motives,or  has  recently  fabricated  the  story,  that  under 
either  of  these  contingencies  the  party  introducing  his  witness 
can  prove  his  witness  stated  the  same  facts  prior  to  ****  the 
time  when  the  motive  could  have  existed,  or  prior  to  the  occa- 
sion or  circumstances  prompting  the  manufacturing  of  the  testi- 
mony. We  have  repeatedly  written  upon  this  subject,  laying 
down  substantially  the  same  rules  that  we  here  state,  and  we 
deem  it  unnecessary  to  even  cite  the  cases.  In  support  of  this 
last  proposition  we  cite  1  Wharton  on  Evidence,  2d  ed.,  art.  570. 
We  also  call  attention  to  the  long  list  of  cases  cited  by  Mr. 
Wharton  in  note  2  to  this  article.  Apply  these  principles  to  this 
case:  When  the  testimony  in  the  case  had  been  concluded,  there 
was  no  evidence  before  the  jury  that  Mrs.  Jones  or  appellant 
had  ever  alluded  to  the  outrages  committed  upon  Mrs.  Jones. 
The  inference  was  cogent,  indeed,  that  it  was  fabricated  to  save 
the  life  or  liberty  of  the  appellant.  When  the  testimony  of  Mrs. 
Jones  is  scrutinized,  it  is  placed  in  a  very  doubtful  attitude.  It 
would  have  been  perfectly  natural  and  reasonable  for  the  jury  to 
have  inferred  that  she  had  manufactured  her  testimony  because 
she  wanted  to  save  her  husband.  But  suppose,  in  addition  to 
her  testimony  (it  being  of  a  doubtful  character  standing  alone), 
the  evidence  of  Kendall  had  been  received,  would  any  man  have 
entertained  the  same  doubts  about  its  truth  as  if  her  testimony 
had  been  without  support?  Law  should  be  common  sense,  and 
there  is  no  man  but- what  would  have  much  more  readily  believed 
her  testimony  if  they  had  known  that  she  told  the  same  story 
before  the  death  of  Veal  as  that  which  she  swears  to  on  the  trial. 
We  are  of  opinion  that  this  testimony  was  admissible  for  the 
purpose  of  supporting  Mrs.  Jones,  and  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing that  Jones  believed  her  statements.  Again,  in  another  view, 
this  testimony  was  admissible  as  independent  evidence,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  the  insulting  conduct  of  Veal  toward 
Mrs.  Jones  had  been  communicated  to  Jones  prior  to  the  homi- 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  729 

cide.  It  is  true  that  Mrs.  Jones  swore  directly  that  she  com- 
municated the  insulting  conduct  of  Veal  to  her  hushand,  but  the 
defendant  was  not  circumscribed  by  making  such  proof  by  his 
wife.  As  original  testimony,  it  was  entirely  competent  for  the 
defendant  to  have  introduced  Kendall  to  show  that  Mrs.  Jonea 
communicated  the  conduct  of  Veal  to  him,  and  that  he  in  turn 
told  it  to  the  defendant  prior  to  the  homicide. 

3.  The  next  question  presented  is,  whether  or  not  appellant 
had  the  right  to  prove  the  general  reputation  of  deceased  with 
reference  to  his  being  a  man  of  chaste  and  virtuous  habits  and 
conduct  toward  women  or  otherwise.  Appellant  attempted  to 
do  this  by  a  number  of  witnesses,  and  on  objection  by  the  state  it 
was  excluded  by  the  court.  We  are  of  opinion  that  specific  acta 
of  lewdness  (which  appellant  also  claims  were  excluded)  were  not 
admissible.  The  general  principle  applicable  to  such  specific 
acts  is  that  it  would  involve  too  many  issues,  and  the  court  can- 
not turn  aside  to  try  a  vast  number  of  collateral  matters.  But 
the  rule  is  different  as  to  general  reputation.  "We  are  of  opinion 
that  proof  of  deceased's  general  reputation  being  bad  in  this  par- 
ticular was  not  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  he 
was  guilty  of  the  insulting  conduct  toward  Mrs.  Jones,  but  we 
are  of  the  opinion  that  his  general  ***'  reputation  was  admissi- 
ble for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether  Jones  believed  the 
story  told  him  by  his  wife.  We  have  no  doubt  of  the  correctness 
of  this  proposition.  In  addition  to  this,  appellant  had  a  right 
to  prove  that  his  general  reputation  was  bad,  and  that  he  was 
informed  of  such  reputation.  This  evidence  is  admissible,  as 
before  stated,  to  show  that  he  not  only  believed  what  his  wife 
had  told  him,  but  added  greater  probability  to  the  presumption 
that  he  acted  on  this  belief. 

4.  The  next  question  presented  is  as  to  the  action  of  the 
court  in  admitting  the  testimony  of  S.  Q.  Eichardson  as  to  see- 
ing a  woman  in  the  oflBce  of  Veal  during  the  year  1885,  and  that 
Veal  told  witness  that  it  was  Mrs.  Jones.  The  object  of  this  tes- 
timony on  the  part  of  the  state  was  doubtless  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  friendly  relation  existing  between  Mrs.  Jones  and 
Veal,  and  so  to  discredit  her  story  with  reference  to  Veal's  in- 
sults toward  her.  Now,  if  this  testimony  had  identified  the 
Mrs.  Jones  seen  in  Veal's  ofilce  by  Eichardson  as  the  wife  of  ap- 
pellant, or  if  it  had  a  tendency  to  so  identify  her,  it  would  have 
been  admissible.  But,  in  our  opinion,  there  was  no  circum- 
stance connected  with  this  matter  that  aufl&ciently  identifies  her 


730  Jones  v.  State,  [Texas, 

as  being  tte  wife  of  appellant,  and  so  the  testimony  should  have 
been  excluded.  Again,  what  Veal  said  about  it  was  clearly  hear- 
say evidence,  in  the  absence  of  any  testimony  tending  to  iden- 
tify Mrs.  Jones  there  mentioned  as  the  wife  of  the  appellant. 
This  testimony,  as  presented,  is  purely  hearsay.  If,  in  fact,  Mrs. 
Jones  •  visited  Veal,  as  attempted  to  be  shown  by  Eichardson, 
this  would  have  been  a  very  strong  circumstance  with  the  jury, 
tending  to  negative  or  disprove  everything  that  she  had  said 
about  the  insulting  conduct  of  the  deceased.  The  conclusion 
would  have  been  very  strong,  indeed,  that  she  had  manufactured 
this  story  for  the  purpose  of  saving  the  life  and  liberty  of  her 
husband.  Now,  the  rule  is  that  no  conclusion  can  rise  higher 
than  the  facts  from  which  it  is  made.  When  a  conclusion  is 
eought  to  be  made,  the  fact  upon  which  it  is  based  must  be 
clearly  proved.  Vague  suspicions,  leading  to  hurtful  conclu- 
sions, are  not  permitted  in  law.  See  Burrill  on  Circumstantial 
Evidence,  126.  This  is  the  second  appeal  of  this  case,  appellant 
having  previously  been  convicted  of  murder  in  the  first  degree, 
but  the  case  was  reversed,  because  it  was  not  properly  tried: 
Jones  V.  State,  33  Tex.  Crim.  Eep.  492,  47  Am.  St.  Eep.  46. 
The  questions  discussed  in  this  opinion  are  upon  the  admission 
and  exclusion  of  evidence,  which,  in  our  opinion,  go  to  the  merits 
of  the  case.  The  errors  are  not  mere  irregularities,  but  are  in 
regard  to  the  admission  and  exclusion  of  evidence  upon  vital 
questions,  and  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  tell  what  influence  the 
excluded  testimony  might  have  had  upon  the  jury,  or  what  in- 
fluence the  admitted  testimony  may  have  wrought  upon  their 
minds.  The  rules  with  regard  to  said  testimony,  it  occurs  to  us, 
are  obvious.  They  are  found  in  the  text-books  on  evidence,  and 
have  been  followed  by  this  court  in  a  number  of  decisions.  We 
cannot  afford  to  set  a  bad  precedent  by  their  violations,  nor  are 
we  inclined  to  do  so.  In  the  discharge  of  our  duty,  the  rules 
of  evidence  must  be  observed  in  all  cases.  This  is  for  the  com- 
mon benefit  of  all,  in  order  that  all  may  alike  be  protected  by 
the  rules  of  law.  Because,  in  our  *****  opinion,  these  rules  were 
not  adhered  to  and  enforced  in  the  court  below,  the  judgment  is 
reversed,  and  the  cause  remanded. 

After  the  above  opinion  was  handed  down,  a  motion  for  re- 
hearing and  brief  in  behalf  of  the  state  was  filed  by  Hon.  Mann 
Trice,  assistant  attorney  general: 

***^  DAVIDSON,  J.  We  have  carefully  considered  the  mo- 
tion for  rehearing  presented  by  the  assistant  attorney  general. 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  731 

At  a  former  day  of  this  term  this  court  reversed  the  judgment 
of  the  lower  court  on  four  errors  committed.  We  will  go  over 
the  grounds  again,  and  re-examine  the  record. 

1.  The  first  error  is  in  relation  to  the  court's  permitting  the 
state  to  prove  by  Mrs.  Jones,  wife  of  appellant,  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances not  germane  to  anything  she  had  sworn  on  her  tes- 
timony in  chief.  "We  held,  and  still  hold,  that  this  cannot  be 
done.  The  law  will  not  permit  the  husband  or  wife  to  be  a  wit- 
ness against  each  other.  If  the  husband  is  upon  trial,  and  his 
wife  is  a  witness,  and  she  should  swear  to  facts  injurious  to  him, 
in  answer  to  questions  propounded,  he  could  not  complain,  but, 
where  she  swears  to  certain  facts  and  circumstances,  the  cross- 
examination  must  be  confined  to  the  matter  elicited  in  chief.  Of 
course,  everything  which  is  legitimate  for  the  purpose  of  testing 
her  knowledge  of  the  fact  sworn  to,  her  bias,  her  prejudice,  in 
fact  any  matter  that  goes  legitimately  to  discredit  her,  is  admissi- 
ble on  cross-examination.  However,  where  the  state  leaves  the 
matter  testified  to  in  chief,  and  proposes  to  prove  independent 
criminative  facts  against  the  accused,  this  would  not  be  a  cross- 
examination  of  the  witness.  When  the  matter  is  departed  from, 
the  witness  ceases  to  be  a  witness  for  her  husband,  and  becomes 
a  witness  for  the  state.  This  is  absolutely  demonstrated  by  the 
overwhelming  weight  of  the  authority.  Mr.  Wharton,  in  his 
work  on  Evidence,  section  529,  says:  "Although,  in  England, 
counsel,  in  cross-examination,  are  permitted  to  ask  questions 
bearing  on  the  whole  case,  so  as  to  bring  out  matters  of  inde- 
pendent defense,  in  this  country,  in  most  jurisdictions,  cross- 
examinations,  with  greater  propriety,  are  confined  to  the  subject 
of  the  examination  in  chief,  and  that  of  the  credit  of  the  witness. 
If  a  matter  of  defense  is  to  be  proved,  this  must  be  reserved 
until  the  cross-examining  party  has  opened  his  case,  when  he  is 
at  liberty  to  call  the  witness  to  prove  such  defense.'*  In  support 
of  this  proposition,  Mr.  Wharton  cites  not  less  than  fifty  cases, 
from  the  states  of  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
Michigan,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Iowa,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota,  Kan- 
sas, Nevada,  Georgia,  California,  Arkansas,  Nebraska,  and  a 
number  of  others.  The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  holds 
that,  where  the  matter  sworn  to  in  chief  is  departed  from  on  so- 
called  cross-examination,  the  witness  becomes  the  witness  of  the 
party  who  elicits  this  matter.  To  illustrate  the  proposition: 
The  defendant  ^*'*  introduces  a  witness  to  prove  certain  facts. 
Ihe  state  cross-examines  as  to  these  facts,  and  then  proves  in- 


732  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas, 

dependent  facts  by  the  witness — facts  which  are  not  germane 
to  the  examination  in  chief.  So  far  as  these  facts  are  concerned, 
the  witness  becomes  the  witness  of  the  defendant.  Now,  let  us 
illustrate  the  question  before  us:  An  accused  party  is  upon  trial 
for  murder.  It  becomes  relevant  and  important  to  know  when 
he  and  his  wife  were  married,  or  when  a  certain  child  of  theirs 
was  born,  or  whether  he  was  at  home  at  a  particular  hour  of  a 
certain  night,  et  cetera.  He  introduces  his  wife,  and  she  swears 
to  the  date  of  the  marriage,  to  the  birth  of  the  child,  and  that 
her  husband  on  that  particular  night  was  at  home.  The  state 
can  cross-examine  her  thoroughly  as  to  the  marriage,  where  it 
occurred,  who  attended,  who  were  the  bridesmaids,  grooms,  and 
how  old  the  parties  were,  et  cetera,  and  then  institute  an  in- 
quiry as  to  her  prejudice,  contradictory  statements,  if  there  are 
such,  and  every  matter  which  is  proper  to  test  her  means  of 
knowledge  and  credibility.  So,  with  reference  to  the  birth  of 
the  child,  and  the  supposed  alibi.  This  testimony  is  elicited 
from  the  wife,  to  wit,  the  marriage,  birth  of  the  child,  and  proof 
of  the  alibi.  After  having  cross-examined  the  witness  pertain- 
ing to  these  matters,  the  state  proposed  to  prove  by  the  defend- 
ant's wife  that  he  had  a  motive  to  kill  the  deceased;  that  he  had 
threatened  to  kill  deceased;  that  he  had  arms  suitable  for  that 
purpose,  corresponding  with  those  used  at  the  homicide,  et  cet- 
era. These  matters  are  not  relevant  at  all  to  the  marriage,  the 
birth  of  the  child,  or  the  alibi;  and,  when  the  state  proves  these 
facts  by  the  wife,  she  then  becomes  the  witness  of  the  state,  and 
is  emphatically  forced  to  testify  against  her  husband.  We  can- 
not give  a  clearer  illustration  of  this  question  than  that  above. 
In  line  with  the  cases  referred  to  above  will  be  found  the  case 
of  People  V.  Briggs,  60  How.  Pr.  17.  In  that  case,  Osbom,  P.  J., 
illustrates  a  provision  of  the  New  York  statute  which  provides 
that  the  husband  and  wife  shall  not  testify  against  each  other, 
and  which  might  have  been  inserted  for  a  certain  purpose,  to  wit, 
he  says:  "For  instance,  a  wife  might  be  called  as  a  witness  on 
behalf  of  the  husband,  to  prove  some  one  isolated  fact.  It  may 
be  that  the  legislature,  by  saying  that  she  should  not  be  com- 
pelled to  testify  or  give  evidence  against  him,  intended  to  pre- 
vent, upon  cross-examination,  an  inquiry  into  any  other  matters 
not  inquired  into  upon  the  direct  examination,  and  which  might 
be  very  damaging  to  the  husband,  and  so  vice  versa."  We  deem 
deem  it  unnecessary  to  add  additional  authorities  upon  this  sub- 
ject.   In  Texas  and  other  states  the  witness  is  not  required  to 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  733 

etand  aside  until  the  opposing  party  introduces  his  evidence. 
The  adverse  party  can  cross-examine  the  witness  thoroughly 
pertaining  to  the  matters  elicited  in  chief,  and  will  not  be  re- 
quired to  wait  until  he  presents  his  testimony  in  order  to  prove 
facts  relevant  to  the  main  issue,  by  the  witness.  He  can  prove 
any  competent  fact  by  the  witness  on  what  is  called  cross-exam- 
ination, but  this  rule  does  not  affect  the  question  at  all.  Sup- 
pose, upon  the  so-called  cross-examination,  the  matter  elicited  in 
chief  is  completely  departed  from,  and  new  matter  is  sought  to 
be  established  by  the  witness,  which  is  relevant  to  the  main  ^^"^ 
issue,  would  the  party  be  permitted  to  lead  the  witness  in  regard 
to  this  matter?  Would  he  not  still,  though  he  could  elicit  the 
matter,  be  held  to  examine  him  just  as  if  he  had  introduced  him? 
Certainly.  By  way  of  illustration:  The  plaintiff  introduces  a 
witness,  and  proves  a  relevant  fact.  The  adverse  party  can 
cross-examine  him  thoroughly  as  to  this  fact.  After  doing  so, 
if  he  leaves  this  matter,  and  proposes  to  prove  important  relevant 
facts  by  the  witness  introduced  by  the  plaintiff,  he  is  not  bound 
to  require  him  to  stand  aside,  but  can  do  so.  Should  he  propose 
to  prove  the  facts  by  leading  questions,  and  the  plaintiff  objects, 
not  to  his  right  to  prove  the  facts,  but  leading  the  witness,  this 
tests  the  question  as  to  whose  witness  he  is  as  to  this  matter. 
Evidently,  he  is  then  the  witness  of  the  defendant. 

The  assistant  attorney  general  insists  that  anything  pertaining 
to  the  res  gestae  can  be  proved  by  the  wife.  In  his  motion  for 
rehearing  he  says:  "I  concede  that  the  general  rule  is  as  stated 
by  the  court,  that  the  cross-examination  of  the  wife  should  be 
confined  to  the  matters  drawn  out  on  the  examination  in  chief, 
or  be  germane  thereto;  but  there  are  well  established  exceptions 
to  this  general  rule,  which  is  universal  and  binding — ^that  is, 
the  right  of  cross-examination  extends  to  all  matters  connected 
with  the  res  gestae,  and  as  to  credit."  Res  gestae  of  what? 
Ees  gestae  of  what  she  said  in  chief?  If  so,  we  do  not  object. 
Does  he  mean  the  res  gestae  of  the  homicide?  If  so,  we  certainly 
cannot  concede  any  such  proposition.  Mrs.  Jones  did  not  say 
one  word  about  the  homicide.  She  was  not  a  witness  to  the 
homicide,  and  knew  nothing  of  the  facts  attending  the  homicide. 
If  res  gestae  can  be  established  by  the  wife  or  husband,  upon 
cross-examination,  then  the  assistant  attorney  general's  excep- 
tion should  be  the  rule,  instead  of  that  stated  by  him  to  be  the 
rule,  for  we  have  never  yet  been  able  to  place  any  limit  to  what 
is  called  res  gestae  of  a  homicide.     Our  understanding  of  this 


734  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas, 

rule,  as  explained  by  Mr.  Stephens  in  his  work  on  Evidence,  is 
that  the  homicide  has  its  res  gestae,  or  attending  circumstances; 
that  any  relevant  fact  to  the  main  fact  is  its  res  gestae,  until  you 
extend  it  into  a  field  in  which  the  fact  has  no  probative  force. 
It  would  be  a  novel  case  in  which  a  relevant  fact  would  not  be 
res  gestae  of  the  main  fact,  or  which  would  not  have  its  own  rea 
gestae.  Now,  we  concede  that  anything  that  is  res  gestae  to 
what  was  said  is  admissible.  Mrs.  Jones  testified  as  to  the  rape 
by  Veal,  and  his  subsequent  insulting  conduct  toward  her,  and 
that  Veal  and  appellant  had  been  friendly  before  she  communi- 
cated these  facts  to  appellant.  The  state  proved  by  her,  over 
the  objections  of  appellant,  all  that  matter  pertaining  to  the 
effort  to  have  the  disabilities  of  her  son  removed,  so  that  he 
could  make  a  deed  to  her,  et  cetera.  We  most  seriously  would 
ask  if  this  matter  was  res  gestae  to  the  rape  or  subsequent  in- 
sulting conduct?  Was  it  calculated  to  explain,  modify,  or  to 
affect  in  any  manner  her  testimony  in  regard  to  Veal's  conduct? 
How  and  in  what  manner  did  it  bear  on  the  fact  that  Veal  and 
Jones  had  been  friendly  r*  If  this  evidence  be  a  part  of  the  res 
gestae  of  the  efforts  to  remove  the  disabilities  of  the  minor  son, 
^^®  then  could  there  be  any  relevant  fact  which  would  not  have 
been  res' gestae?  And  instead  of  confining  the  cross-examina- 
tion, so  called,  to  the  matters  elicited  in  chief,  we  would  never 
find  a  case  that  did  not  have  res  gestae  enough  to  admit  any- 
thing they  proposed  to  prove.  Would  not  this  idea  of  the  as- 
sistant attorney  general's  theory  of  res  gestae  be  a  most  remark- 
ablt,  novel  application  of  this  doctrine?  We  confess  that,  out- 
side of  this  motion  for  rehearing,  we  have  never  found  such  an 
extension  of  the  doctrine.  To  condense:  It  means  that  the  wife 
can  be  made  a  witness  against  her  husband  in  the  face  of  the 
prohibition  of  the  statute  in  regard  to  any  matter  relevant  to 
the  case,  whether  it  be  germane  to  what  she  hrd  sworn  in  chief  or 
not. 

It  is  contended,  however,  by  the  assistant  attorney  general, 
that  in  fact  the  wife  was  not  compelled  to  testify  to  any  fact 
which  was  not  germane  to  her  testimony  in  chief;  that  there  was 
merely  an  effort  to  make  her  testify  to  such  facts.  A  very  slight 
investigation  of  this  record  will  demonstrate  that  several  very 
important  facts  were  sworn  to  by  her,  over  the  objection  of  ap- 
pellant. For  instance,  we  refer  to  bill  of  exceptions  number  3, 
which  was  approved  by  the  trial  judge.  The  bill  was  reserved  to 
the  action  of  the  court  permitting  the  state  to  elicit  from  Mrs. 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  731^ 

Jones  a  great  deal  of  testimony  with  reference  to  the  transfer  by 
herself  of  a  large  amount  of  property  to  her  infant  son,  the  day 
before  her  marriage  with  the  defendant,  and  thus  laying  the 
foundation  of  the  theory  of  the  state  in  proving  a  motive  for  the 
killing  other  than  that  assigned  by  the  appellant.  The  import- 
ance of  this  testimony  must  be  conceded,  for  the  state  relied 
upon  these  matters  as  a  motive  for  the  killing,  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  the  testimony,  relied  upon  by  the  appellant,  re- 
garding the  insulting  conduct  of  Veal  toward  appellant's  wife  as 
the  cause  for  the  killing.  Mrs.  Jones  had  not  testified  for  the- 
defendant  in  regard  to  this  property  transaction,  and  it  was 
brought  out  from  her  by  the  state,  over  appellant's  objection.  If 
appellant  killed  Veal  on  account  of  his  supposed  connection  with 
the  transfer  of  the  property,  it  might  be  considered  by  the  jury 
as  an  answer  to  Mrs.  Jones'  evidence  in  regard  to  the  insulting 
conduct,  and  tend  to  phow  that  her  testimony  in  regard  to  such 
insulting  conduct  was  a  fabrication.  Then  the  antagonism; 
between  the  two  theories  was  potent  and  sharp,  the  defendant 
relying  upon  what  his  wife  and  Kendall  had  told  him  with  refer- 
ence to  the  insulting  conduct  of  Veal  toward  his  wife,  and  the- 
state  relying  upon  the  fact  that  the  motive  operating  upon 
Jones'  mind  at  the  killing  grew  out  of  the  property  transaction. 

2.  The  assistant  attorney  general  contends  that  this  court 
erred  in  reversing  the  judgment  because  the  trial  court  refused 
to  permit  Mrs.  Jones  to  be  corroborated  Dy  the  statement  of  the 
witness  Kendall,  in  reference  to  the  alleged  rape  and  insulting 
conduct.  He  says:  "It  is  never  admissible  to  sustain  a  witness 
by  proof  of  general  good  character  or  otherwise,  until  the  repu- 
tation of  the  witness  is  assailed  for  truth  and  veracity,  or  im- 
peached by  showing  contradictory  statements.  These  are  con- 
ditions precedent  to  offering  testimony  to  corroborate  or  sus- 
tain a  *^®  witness."  The  original  opinion  in  this  case  does  not 
insinuate  that  the  state  had  proved  that  Mrs.  Jones  had  made 
contradictory  statements  about  any  matter.  In  that  opinion  wa 
never  discussed  the  question  as  to  whether  the  witness  could  be 
supported  when  thus  attacked,  to  wit,  by  proof  of  contradictory 
statements.  But,  since  our  attention  has  been  called  to  this 
subject,  we  will  go  further,  and  discuss  the  question  as  to 
whether  a  party  can  support  his  witness  when  thus  attacked. 
We  deemed  it  unnecessary  to  discuss  this  in  our  former  opin- 
ion. Now,  then,  was  there  an  effort  made  to  show  that  Mrs. 
Jones  had  made  contradictory  statements  about  this   matter? 


786  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas, 

There  was  not,  "but  there  was  an  efEort  made,  and  it  is  claimed 
that  it  was  successful,  to  show  that  her  conduct  gave  the  lie  to 
the  tale  she  told;  that  after  this  rape  hy  Yeal,  et  cetera,  she  vis- 
ited Yeal;  that  business  relations  existed  between  them,  et  cet- 
■era.  There  is  no  difference  in  the  character  of  the  attack.  If 
the  state  had  proved  that  she  had  made  contradictory  statements 
in  regard  to  the  matter  testified  to  by  her,  every  decision  in  this 
state  is  to  the  effect  that  she  could  have  been  supported  by  proof 
that  she  made  the  same  statement  to  others  as  that  sworn  to  on 
the  trial.  Acts  speak  as  loud,  and  demonstrate  the  condition  of 
the  mind  as  effectually,  as  words.  For  what  purpose  was  the 
evidence  introduced,  tending  to  show  that  she  was  on  friendly 
terms  with  Veal,  if  it  was  not  to  establish  the  fact  that  what 
she  had  said  about  the  insulting  conduct  was  false?  There 
could  have  been  no  other  purpose.  In  fact,  the  evidence  would 
not  have  been  relevant  for  any  other  purpose  in  this  case.  This 
attack  was  as  effectual,  if  not  more  so,  than  to  have  proved  that 
she  did  make  a  contradictory  statement.  Being  thus  attacked, 
under  all  the  authorities  in  this  state,  the  wife  could  have  been 
supported. 

The  assistant  attorney  general  cites  us  to  Mr.  Wharton  and 
authorities  which  deny  the  correctness  of  a  proposition  that  a 
witness  can  be  supported  when  thus  attacked.  We  have  written 
a  number  of  opinions  in  which  we  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  Mr.  Wharton  and  a  great  many  cases  question  or  deny  the 
•correctness  of  the  proposition.  We  have  not  invented  this  rule 
for  this  case,  but  have  applied  it  to  every  case  in  which  the  ques- 
tion has  arisen.  The  original  opinion  was  based  upon  this  propo- 
sition, found  in  Mr.  Wharton's  work  on  Evidence,  section  570, 
and  the  same  section  relied  on  by  the  assistant  attorney  general, 
and  the  rule  is  not  questioned  by  any  authority,  to  wit:  "On  the 
other  hand,  where  the  opposing  case  is  that  the  witness  testified 
under  corrupt  motives,  or  where  the  impeaching  evidence  goes 
to  charge  the  witness  with  a  recent  fabrication  of  his  testimony, 
it  is  but  proper  that  such  evidence  should  be  rebutted.  It  has 
•consequently  been  ruled  that  statements  made  by  a  witness  cor- 
roborating his  evidence  upon  the  trial,  such  statements  being 
uttered  soon  after  the  transaction  in  litigation,  and  at  a  time 
vhen  the  witness  could  not  have  been  subject  to  any  disturbing 
influences,  are  competent  when  proof  has  been  offered  to  im- 
peach him,  by  showing  that  he  had  recently  fabricated  the'  nar- 
rative, or  that  he  testified  corruptly."    In  support  of  this  propo- 


June,  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  737 

ation,  Mr.  Wharton  cites  a  *^®  great  number  of  authorities, 
<;ommon  law  as  well  as  from  the  different  states  of  this  Union. 
And  in  the  note  to  said  text  we  find  this:  "Russell  (3  Russell 
on  Crimes,  593)  holds  *that  the  better  opinion  seems  to  be  that 
such  evidence  is  not  admissible,  except  in  cases  where  the  coun- 
sel on  the  other  side  impute  a  design  to  misrepresent,  from  some 
motive  of  interest  or  relationship.* "  And  this  note  is  supported 
by  a  great  number  of  authorities,  all  of  which  are  English  cases, 
including  as  well  Phillips,  Starkie,  and  Hawkins.  These  ex- 
cerpts from  Mr.  Wharton  will  be  found  in  the  very  same  section 
quoted  and  relied  upon  by  the  assistant  attorney  general.  If 
we  had  based  our  ruling  upon  the  fact  that  Mrs.  Jones  was 
supported,  because  proof  had  been  made  tending  to  show 
that  she  had  made  contradictory  statements,  the  excerpt  from 
Mr.  Wharton  contained  in  the  motion  of  the  assistant  attor- 
ney general  would  have  had  some  explanation.  But,  as  be- 
fore stated,  the  appellate  courts  of  this  state  have  held,  in 
an  unbroken  line  of  decisions,  that  where  a  witness  is  attacked 
by  showing  contradictory  statements,  the  witness  can  be  sup- 
ported. We  are  not  called  upon  to  go  back  on  that  rule,  for,  as 
above  stated,  the  opinion  is  not  upon  that  subject.  Now,  will 
any  one  deny  but  what  the  state's  case — the  opposing  case — 
most  powerfully  suggests  that  Mrs.  Jones  had  fabricated  her  tes- 
timony to  save  her  husband's  life?  There  was  the  motive,  the 
cause  assigned,  and  no  doubt  argued  with  great  force  and  effect 
before  the  jury.  To  meet  this,  appellant  had  the  right  to  show 
that  his  wife  did  not  fabricate  this  testimony  to  save  her  hus- 
band; that  she  told  the  same  story  before  the  killing  of  Veal. 
For  the  first  time  in  this  state,  so  far  as  we  know,  the  motion  for 
rehearing  in  this  case  questions  the  rule,  where,  when  a  witness 
is  attacked  by  showing  that  he  testified  corruptly,  or  had  re- 
■cently  fabricated  his  testimony  for  a  purpose,  he  could  be  sup- 
ported by  proof  that  he  (witness)  made  the  same  statemencs  be- 
fore the  motive  could  have  existed,  and  that  it  was  not  fabri- 
<»ted,  because  he  had  told  the  same  story  before.  In  this  case 
the  motive  on  the  part  of  Mrs.  Jones  was  to  save  the  life  of  her 
husband,  if  her  testimony  was  false.  This  was  the  opposing  case 
of  the  state  on  the  trial. 

3.  We  have  no  doubt  of  the  correctness  of  our  views  in  re- 
gard to  proof  of  the  general  reputation  of  Veal  as  being  a  man 
«f  unchaste  and  lecherous  habits,  as  applied  to  the  facts  of  this 
case.    By  analogy,  we  could  adduce  any  number  of  cases;  for  in- 

AM.  St.  Rbp..  \  ol.  LXX.—  47 


738  Jones  v.  State.  [Texaa^ 

stance,  the  case  of  Horbach  v.  State,  43  Tex.  243.  In  that  case 
Judge  Roberts  properly  held  that  the  general  reputation  of 
Thomas  was  admissible  as  a  dangerous  and  violent  man  when 
drinking.  That  testimony  was  not  for  the  purpose  of  excusing 
Horbach  for  killing  Thomas,  but  for  the  purpose  of  determin- 
ing the  light  in  which  Horbach  had  a  right  to  view  the  acts  and 
conduct  of  the  deceased,  in  connection  with  his  bad  character. 
The  same  principle  is  applicable  here.  Did  Jones  believe  what 
his  wife  told  him?  He  had  a  right  to  look  to  the  general  reputa- 
tion of  Veal  upon  that  subject;  and  the  jury  had  a  right  to  know 
the  general  reputation  of  Veal,  in  order  to  determine  whether 
or  not  Jones  believed  the  story  told  him  by  his  wife. 

***  4.  The  assistant  attorney  general  contends  that  the  court 
i  erred  in  holding  that  the  testimony  of  S.  Q.  Eichardson  waa 
inadmissible,  and  insists  that,  as  other  witnesses  testified  that 
Mrs.  Jones  and  Veal  met  on  friendly  terms,  therefore  the  testi- 
mony of  said  Eichardson  was  admissible.  Now,  Eichardson  doea 
not  swear  that  the  Mrs.  Jones  who  testified  in  this  case,  and  th& 
wife  of  the  appellant,  was  the  woman  that  he  saw  in  Veal's  office^ 
He  swears  that  Veal  said  that  a  certain  woman  who  visited  his 
office  was  Mrs.  Dr.  Jones.  Suppose  Veal  had  said  that  it  waa 
Mrs.  Dr.  Jones,  the  wife  of  Dr.  E.  H.  Jones,  this  appellant; 
would  it  be  contended  that  this  would  have  been  admissible? 
Would  it  not  be  hearsay  testimony?  If  Eichardson  knew  that 
Mrs.  Jones,  the  wife  of  appellant,  was  the  lady  who  visited  Veal, 
and  of  whom  he  was  testifying,  there  would  be  no  necessity  of 
stating  what  Veal  said  about  it.  If  Eichardson  knew  this  wit- 
ness to  be  the  lady,  and  that  she  and  Veal  conversed,  all  that 
was  said  would  have  been  admissible,  because  Eichardson  him- 
self would  have  identified  Mrs.  Jones  as  the  wife  of  appellant. 
However,  he  knew  nothing  of  this  himself.  The  state  simply 
proved  by  him  that  a  woman  visited  the  office  of  Veal,  and  that 
Veal  said  her  name  was  Mrs.  Dr.  Jones.  As  we  have  said.  Veal 
might  have  told  Eichardson  that  she  was  Mrs.  Dr.  Jones,  the- 
wife  of  Dr.  E.  H.  Jones,  this  appellant;  yet,  unless  Eichardson 
knew  that  she  was  the  witness,  Mrs.  Dr.  Jones,  all  that  Veal  said 
would  have  been  hearsay. 

We  have  gone  over  the  motion  made  for  a  new  trial  made  by 
the  assistant  attorney  general,  as  well  as  the  transcript  herein, 
and  our  views  have  not  been  shaken  in  the  least,  but  confirmed. 
The  motion  for  rehearing  filed  by  the  state  is  overruled,  and,  in 
accordance  with  the  original  opinion,  the  judgment  of  the  lower 
court  is  reversed,  and  the  cause  remanded. 


June,  1897.J  Jones  v.  State.  t39 

IN  THE  SUBSEQUENT  CASE  of  Galnes  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Crlm. 
Rep.  202-220,  it  was  again  decided,  on  the  autliority  of  the  prin- 
cipal case,  that  if  the  wife  of  the  accused  is  a  witness  for  him  on 
his  trial  for  murder,  her  cross-examination  must  be  limited  strictly 
to  such  facts  as  are  pertinent  and  germane  to  matters  brought  out 
on  her  examination  in  chief,  and  it  is  reversible  error  to  permit  her 
to  be  cross-examined  against  objection,  as  to  important  collateral 
matters  Injurious  to  the  accused,  or  to  permit  her,  after  such  Illegal 
cross-examination,  to  be  impeached  by  proof  of  her  contradictory 
statements  as  to  such  matters,  and  it  Is  beyond  the  power  of  the 
court  to  cure  the  error  and  to  so  limit  and  control  such  evidence 
In  the  charge  to  the  jury  as  to  deprive  it  of  its  injurious  effect. 

WITNESSES-COMPETENCY  OP  WIPE  IN  CRIMINAL  CASE. 
Under  a  statute  providing  that  "husband  and  wife  may  be  wit- 
nesses for  each  other  in  all  criminal  cases,  but  they  shall  not  be 
required  to  testify  against  each  other,  as  witnesses  for  the  prosecu- 
tion," neither  is  a  competent  voluntary  witness  against  the  other: 
Byrd  v.  State,  57  Miss.  243,  34  Am.  Rep.  440,  and  note.  Extended 
note  to  State  v.  Boyd,  27  Am.  Dec.  377.  See  the  note  to  Hitchcock 
V.  Moore,  14  Am.  St.  Rep.  481;  Crawford  v.  State,  98  Wis.  623,  67 
Am.  St.  Rep.  829,  and  note. 

WITNESSES.-CROSS-EXAMINATION  must  be  confined  to  the 
matters  about  which  the  direct  testimony  was  given:  State  v. 
Eifert,  102  Iowa,  188,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  433,  and  note. 

WITNESSES  —  CROSS-EXAMINATION— MAKING  ONE  PAR- 
TY'S OWN  WITNESS.— The  defendant  has  no  right  to  cross-ex- 
amine the  plaintiff's  witness  as  to  matters  of  defense  which  have 
no  dependence  upon  or  necessary  connection  with  his  direct  testi- 
mony, but  the  defendant  must  make  the  witness  his  own  witness 
as  to  such  testimony:  Mitchell  v.  Welch,  17  Pa.  St.  339.  55  Am.  Dec. 
557,  and  note.  But  cross-examination  as  to  new  matter,  when  it  Is 
part  of  the  res  gestae,  is  allowable:  Bank  v.  Fordyce,  9  Pa.  St  275; 
49  Am.  Dec.  561. 

WITNESSES— IMPEACHMENT.— If  It  Is  charged,  either  directly 
or  by  Implication,  that  the  testimony  of  the  witness  is  a  recent 
fabrication,  Inconsistent  with  his  previous  declarations  or  conduct, 
and  having  its  origin  in  some  event  powerfully  affecting  his  In- 
terests, or  in  some  change  in  his  situation  with  reference  to  the 
transaction  or  to  the  parties,  It  is  admissible  to  rebut  the  Imputation 
by  proving  declarations  prior  to  such  event  or  change,  agreeing 
with  what  he  now  swears  to  be  the  truth:  See  the  extended  note 
to  Johnson  v.  I'attersou,  11  Am.  Dec.  759. 

HOMICIDE— INSULTING  LANGUAGE  TO  WIPE  AS  A  DB- 
PENSE.— The  general  rule  is  that  words,  however  aggravating,  are 
not  considered  sufficient  provocation  to  extenuate  the  killing  of  a 
person,  so  as  to  render  it  manslaughter:  Commonwealth  v.  York,  9 
Met.  93,  43  Am.  Dec.  373;  Commonwealth  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  295, 
52  Am.  Dec.  711.  But  in  Texas,  by  statute.  It  Is  provided  that  In- 
sulting words  toward  a  female  relation  should  be  adequate  cause 
to  reduce  a  homicide  from  murder  to  manslaughter:  Hudson  v. 
State,  6  Tex.  App.  565,  32  Am.  Rep.  593. 


740  Ex  PARTE  Newman.  [Texas, 


Ex  PARTE  Newman. 

[38  Texas  Cmminal  Kepoets,  165.  J 

BAIL  IN  CAPITAL  CASE— BURDEN  OP  PROOF.— On  an 
application  by  habeas  corpus  for  bail  in  a  capital  case,  the  burden 
to  establish  the  fact  that  the  proof  is  evident  is  upon  the  state  and 
not  upon  the  relator  to  prove  the  contrary. 

BAIL-ACCUSED,  WHEN  ENTITLED  TO.— Unless  the  case 
Is  a  capital  one  and  the  proof  is  evident  of  this  fact,  and  unless  the 
proof  is  evident  that  the  prisoner  is  guilty  of  a  capital  crime,  he 
is  entitled  to  bail,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  prosecution  to 
Bhow  that  he  Is  not  so  entitled. 

AN  INDICTMENT  FURNISHES  NO  PROOF  that  an  accused 
is  guilty  of  a  capital  crime,  much  less  that  he  is  guilty  of  a  capital 
crime  of  which  the  proof  is  evident. 

HABEAS  CORPUS— BURDEN  OP  PROOF.— Although  the 
statute  gives  the  relator  the  right  to  open  and  close  the  argument 
in  a  habeas  corpus  proceeding,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow,  nor 
follow  at  all,  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him. 

W.  Kelso,  J.  M.  Goggin  and  H.  C.  Carter,  for  the  relator. 

M.  Trice,  assistant  attorney  general,  for  the  state. 

1^  HUET,  P.  J.  Appellant  was  charged  by  indictment  with 
robbery  by  the  use  of  firearms.  The  indictment  charges  a  capi- 
tal offense.  Upon  the  trial  below,  relator  introduced  one  wit- 
ness, Lewis,  the  prosecutor  and  alleged  injured  person.  This 
witness  failed  to  identify  the  relator  as  one  of  the  parties  en- 
gaged in  the  robbery.  The  names  of  a  number  of  witnesses  were 
on  the  back  of  the  indictment.  These  witnesses  were  not  used 
by  the  relator.  The  testimony  of  this  witness  shows  that  other 
parties  were  engaged  in  the  robbery,  but  that  he  did  not  know 
who  they  were.  The  court  below  refused  bail,  holding  evidently 
that  the  burden  was  upon  the  applicant  to  establish  the  fact 
that  the  proof  was  not  evident  that  he  was  one  of  the  parties 
engaged  in  the  robbery,  which  is  conceded  to  be  a  capital  of- 
fense. In  this  view  of  the  question,  the  court  below  is  sup- 
ported by  the  opinion  of  Judge  Willson  in  Ex  parte  Smith,  23 
Tex.  Crim.  App.  100.  The  question  is  therefore  presented 
whether  or  not  the  rule  laid  down  in  that  case  is  correct.  If 
the  burden  is  upon  the  defendant  to  show  that  the  proof  is  evi- 
dent that  it  was  not  a  capital  offense,  or  that  he  was  not  a  par- 
ticipant therein,  then,  in  this  case,  the  relator  has  not  discharged 
the  burden.  If,  however,  the  burden  is  upon  the  state,  the  re- 
lator is  entitled  to  bail.  Now,  the  question  is.  Upon  whom  is 
the  burden  in  such  a  case?  The  constitution  provides  *®®  that 
all  prisoners  shall  be  bailable  by  sufficient  sureties,  except  for 


June,  1897.]  Ex  parte  Newman.  741 

capital  offenses  when  the  proof  is  evident.  "We  hold  that  the 
general  rule  is  in  favor  of  bail,  but  that  there  is  an  exception 
to  this  general  rule,  and  that  the  party  relying  upon  the  excep- 
tion must  prove  it.  The  exception  is  in  favpr  of  the  state.  Un- 
less the  case  be  a  capital  one,  and  the  proof  is  evident  of  this 
fact,  and  unless  the  proof  is  evident  that  the  prisoner  is  guilty 
of  a  capital  crime,  he  is  entitled  to  bail.  He  stands  upon  the 
constitution  of  this  state,  which  grants  bail  to  all  prisoners  with 
sufficient  sureties;  and,  as  before  stated,  the  party  relying  upon 
the  exception  must  prove  it.  We  are  also  of  opinion  that  the  in- 
dictment furnishes  no  proof  that  he  is  guilty  of  a  capital  crime, 
much  less  that  he  is  guilty  of  a  capital  crime  in  which  the  proof 
is  evident.  Let  us  concede  for  the  argument  that  the  legislature 
could  shift  the  burden  of  proof,  and  could  make  an  indict- 
ment a  prima  facie  case  of  proof  evident.  This  has  not  been 
done  by  the  legislature,  and  we  must  pass  upon  the  constitutional 
provision  as  it  stands.  Through  great  caution,  it  is  provided  in 
the  section  of  the  constitution  that  this  provision  shall  not  be 
so  construed  as  to  prevent  bail  after  indictment  found  upon  the 
examination  of  the  evidence  in  such  manner  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  law.  The  legislature  has  never  prescribed  how  the 
examination  shall  be  conducted.  Hence,  it  remains  just  as  if 
that  provision  was  not  inserted,  and  will  remain  so  until  the 
legislature  acts  upon  the  subject.  A  great  many  states  hold, 
under  constitutions  substantially  similar  to  ours,  that,  after  in- 
dictment found,  the  person  is  not  entitled  to  bail,  and  go  to  the 
extent  of  holding  that  inquiry  cannot  be  made  into  the  subject 
after  indictment  is  found.  Now,  this  provision  of  the  constitu- 
tion provides  that  it  shall  not  be  so  construed  as  to  prevent  bail 
after  indictment  found.  It  may  be  contended,  because  the  act 
of  the  legislature  gives  the  relator  the  right  to  open  and  con- 
elude  the  argument  in  a  habeas  corpus  case,  that  it  therefore 
follows  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him.  But  such  we  do 
not  construe  to  be  the  meaning  of  article  199  of  the  Code  of 
Criminal  Procedure  of  1895.  The  general  rule  is,  that  the  party 
having  the  burden  of  proof  has  the  opening  and  conclusion. 
This  statute  appears  to  us  simply  to  guarantee  to  an  applicant 
in  a  habeas  corpus  proceeding  an  additional  advantage,  as  an 
exception  to  the  general  rule;  for,  if  the  burden  was  upon  him, 
he  had  this  right,  independent  of  the  statute.  The  construction 
contended  for  would  require,  in  a  case  like  this,  that  the  appli- 
cant go  into  the  enemy's  camp,  and  examine  the  adversary's  wit- 


742  Ex  PARTE  Newman.  [Texas, 

nesses  as  his  own.  He  would  not  be  authorized  to  cross-examine 
them,  nor  to  impeach  them.  Such  a  construction  environs  an 
applicant  for  bail  in  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  with  difficulties 
which  we  do  not  believe  the  constitution  authorizes;  and  cer- 
tainly a  statute  that  would  impose  this  burden  ought  to  be  clear 
and  unambiguous,  and  not  be  left  to  implication  or  inference 
merely.  Entertaining  these  views,  the  case  of  Ex  parte  Smith, 
33  Tex.  Crim.  App.  100,  and  others  following  that  authority,  are 
hereby  overruled,  and  the  rule  as  to  the  burden  of  proof  above 
indicated  is  now  established  as  the  mode  of  procedure  ^^"^  in 
this  state.  We  are  not  to  be  understood  as  overruling  all  of  the 
rules  stated  in  the  Smith  case,  but  only  that  which  pertains  to 
the  burden  of  proof. 

The  judgment  is  reversed,  and  the  relator  is  granted  bail  in 
the  sum  of  three  thousand  dollars. 


BAIL  IN  CAPITAL  CASE.— All  persons  have  a  constitutional 
right  to  bail  by  sufficient  sureties,  except  for  capital  offenses,  when 
the  proof  is  evident  or  the  presumption  great:  Ex  parte  Goans,  99 
Mo.  193,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  571. 

BAIL  OF  ONE  CHARGED  WITH  MURDER.— A  prisoner  may 
be  admitted  to  bail  on  habeas  corpus,  if  charged  with  murder  by 
a  coroner's  Inquest,  but  not  after  the  finding  of  an  indictment  of 
a  grand  jury,  because  in  the  former  case  the  court  may  looli  into 
the  depositions,  and  in  the  latter  the  evidence  Is  secret:  People  v. 
McLeod,  1  Hill,  377,  25  Wend.  483,  37  Am.  Dec.  328. 

BAII^INDICTMENT  AS  PROOF  OF  GUILT.— The  guilt  of  a 
prisoner  while  on  trial,  cannot  be  presumed  from  the  fact  that  an 
indictment  has  been  found  against  him;  but  between  the  time  of 
the  indictment  and  the  trial,  so  far  as  the  intermediate  proceedings 
are  concerned,  it  furnishes  the  strongest  possible  evidence  of  guilt: 
Hight  V.  United  States,  Morris,  407,  43  Am.  Dec.  111.  An  Indict- 
ment for  a  capital  offense  furnishes  of  Itself  presumption  of  guilt 
too  great  to  entitle  a  defendant  to  bail  as  a  matter  of  right  under 
the  California  constitution,  or  as  a  matter  of  discretion  under  the 
state  legislation  In  that  regard:  People  v.  Tinder,  19  Cal.  539,  81 
Am.  Dec.  77;  Ex  parte  Goans,  99  Mo.  193,  17  Am.  St.  Rep.  571. 
Bail  may  sometimes  be  allowed  In  capital  cases  after  Indictment, 
though  no  special  or  extraordinary  circumstances  exist:  People  ▼. 
Tinder,  19  Cal.  539,  81  Am.  Dec.  77,  and  monographic  note  thereto. 


Nov.  1897.]  Ex  PABTB  Bbown.  7tf 


Ex  PARTE  Brown. 

[88  Tbxas  Ckiuimal  Kepobtb,  293.] 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— TITLE  OF  ACT.— An  act  known 
as  the  "cold  storage  act,'*  and  entitled,  "an  act  to  define  and  prevent 
cold  storage  In  a  local  option  county,  precinct,  city,  town,  or  sub- 
division of  a  county,  and  to  affix  a  penalty  for  running,  keeping,  or 
maintaining  them  in  such  county,  city,  or  town,  or  subdivision,  suffi- 
ciently embraces  the  subject-matter  of  the  act,  and  is  not  within 
&  constitutional  provision  invalidating  laws  where  the  substance  of 
the  act  Is  not  embraced  in  the  title. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— POLICE  REGULATIONS.— The 
state  may  Interfere  under  Its  police  power  to  prohibit  the  keeping 
of  property  injurious  to  the  lives,  health,  and  comfort  of  all  per- 
sons, but  it  is  not  authorized,  under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation, 
to  invade  the  fundamental  privileges  and .  interfere  with  the  full 
enjoyment  by  the  citizen  of  his  recognized  property  rights,  and  if  a 
statute  purporting  to  have  been  enacted  to  protect  the  public  health, 
the  public  morals,  or  the  public  safety  has  no  real  or  substantial  re- 
lation to  those  subjects,  it  Is  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  so  adjudge. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— POLICE  POWER  — KEEPING 
INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.— The  keeping  of  liquors  in  his  posses- 
sion by  a  person  whether  for  himself  or  another,  unless  he  does  so 
for  the  illegal  sale  thereof,  or  for  some  other  improper  purpose, 
cannot  injure  or  affect  the  health,  morals,  or  safety  of  the  public. 
Hence  a  statute  prohibiting  such  keeping  in  possession  is  not  a 
legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power,  but  it  is  an  abridgment 
of  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizen,  without  any  legal 
justification,  and  therefore  void. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  — LOCAL  OPTION.— A  constitu- 
tional provision  giving  the  legislature  authority  to  enact  laws  with 
regard  to  the  adoption  of  local  option  by  the  people  is  exclusive  of 
any  other  method  to  be  pursued  by  the  legislature  for  dealing  with 
the  question,  especially  so  far  as  the  same  territory  is  concerned 
Where  local  option  has  been  adopted. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  —  POLICE  POWER  —  INTOXI- 
CATING LIQUORS.— An  attempt  by  the  legislature  to  make  the 
keeping  of  liquor  by  one  citizen  for  another  In  a  local  option  terri- 
tory, whether  in  a  house,  tent,  or  anywhere  else,  and  whether  for 
«.  consideration  or  without,  a  crime,  or  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  legislature  to  make  It  criminal  for  a  person  who  may  be  the 
owner  or  proprietor  of  any  'building.  In  local  option  territory,  to 
solicit  or  take  and  order  for  another  person  for  Intoxicating  liquors, 
to  be  sent  or  delivered  to  the  proprietor  or  owner  of  such  house  for 
the  person  giving  such  order.  Is  without  authority  of  law,  as  viola- 
tive of  the  citizen's  fundamental  right  to  use  his  own  property  as 
he  pleases,  not  Injuring  another  person,  and  it  is  not  competent  for 
the  legislature,  under  its  power  of  police  regulation,  to  Impair  the 
legal  ownership  and  holding  of  one's  property,  either  by  hImseU 
or  by  another  person. 

W.  W.  Nelms,  for  the  relator. 

M.  Trice,  assistant  attorney  general,  for  tHe  state. 

8<>*  HENDERSON,  J.  Appellant  was  charged  by  infonnation 
in  the  county  court  of  Wiliamson  county  with  violating  what  is 


744  Ex  PARTE  Brown.  [Texas^ 

known  as  the  "cold  storage  act."  He  was  arrested  under  said 
information,  and  sued  out  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  before  the 
county  judge,  who,  after  bearing  the  case,  remanded  the  appli- 
cant to  the  custody  of  the  sheriff  to  answer  said  information; 
and  from  said  order  defendant  prosecutes  this  appeal. 

The  contention  of  appellant  is,  that  the  act  of  the  twenty-fifth 
legislature,  page  128,  entitled,  "An  act  to  define  and  prevent 
cold  storage  in  a  local  option  county,  precinct,  city,  town,  or  sub- 
division of  a  county,  and  to  aflSx  a  penalty  for  running,  keeping, 
or  maintaining  them  in  such  county,  city,  or  town,  or  subdivi- 
sion," is  unconstitutional  and  void.  We  understand  the  grounds 
of  his  contention  to  be  that  said  act  is  void:  1.  Because  the  cap- 
tion of  said  act  is  not  in  accordance  with  section  35  of  article  3 
of  the  constitution;  2.  Because  the  act  itself  is  an  invasion  of 
the  rights  of  private  property,  not  authorized  by  the  constitu- 
tion; 3.  That  said  act  is  violative  of  section  20  of  article  16  of 
our  state  constitution  (said  section  known  as  the  "local  option 
clause"). 

Without  quoting  in  extenso  the  act  in  question,  we  will  con- 
dense the  provisions  of  said  act.  In  section  1  an  attempt  is 
made  to  define  what  a  cold  storage  is.  It  provides:  1.  That  any 
building,  et  cetera,  in  any  local  option  district,  which  may  be 
kept  or  maintained  for  the  purpose  of  storing,  cooling,  or  keep- 
ing intoxicating  liquors,  et  cetera,  for  others,  is  a  cold  storage; 
2.  Or  any  building,  et  cetera,  in  any  local  option  district,  which 
shall  be  used  or  kept  to  store  or  keep  for  any  other  person  than 
the  owner  any  intoxicating  liquors,  et  cetera,  is  a  cold  storage;  3. 
Or  any  such  building,  et  cetera,  in  any  local  option  district, 
where  the  agent,  owner,  et  cetera,  may  solicit  or  take  any  orders 
from  others  for  intoxicating  liquors,  to  be  sent  or  delivered  to 
such  owner,  et  cetera,  for  the  person  giving  such  order,  shall 
constitute  a  cold  storage.  The  second  section  of  said  act  pro- 
vides, substantially:  1.  That  any  owner,  agent,  et  cetera,  wha 
shall  keep,  et  cetera,  any  cold  storage  house,  or  be  interested  in 
keeping  the  same,  in  any  local  option  district,  shall  be  guilty  of 
a  misdemeanor,  et  cetera;  2.  Any  person  who  shall  solicit  or  take 
orders  for  any  intoxicating  liquors  to  be  sent  or  shipped  to  ^^^ 
any  person  who  may  keep,  et  cetera,  or  be  interested  in  the  keep- 
ing, et  cetera,  of  any  cold  storage  in  any  local  option  district, 
shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  fined  not  less  than  one  hun- 
dred dollars  nor  more  than  five  hundred  dollars,  and,  in  addi- 
tion thereto,  shall  be  imprisoned  in  the  county  jail  not  less  than 


No7.  1897.]  Ex  PARTE  Brown.  74& 

twenty-five  nor  more  than  one  hundred  days.  Section  3  pro- 
vides, if  any  owner,  et  cetera,  of  any  cold  storage,  where  local 
option  is  in  force,  shall  solicit  or  take  any  order  for  intoxicating 
liquors  to  he  shipped  or  sent  into  any  snch  local  option  district, 
and  such  intoxicating  liquors  shall  he  shipped  or  sent  therein 
hy  reason  of  such  order,  that  the  same  shall  constitute  a  sale  in 
such  local  option  district. 

The  information  against  appellant  charges  that,  in  a  local  op- 
tion district,  **he  was  the  owner  and  proprietor  and  the  agent 
and  employe  of  the  owner  and  proprietor  of  a  cold  storage,  and 
was  interested  in  the  keeping,  maintaining,  and  managing  a  cold 
storage  within  said  justice  precinct,  and  that  he  did  then  and 
there  solicit  and  take  orders  for  intoxicating  liquors  to  he 
shipped  to  a  person  who  then  and  there  kept,  maintained,  and 
managed  a  cold  storage,  and  to  he  shipped  to  the  agent  and  em- 
ploy6  of  a  cold  storage,  and  in  the  care  of  the  proprietor,  agent, 
and  employ^  of  a  cold  storage," 

We  are  not  inclined  to  regard  said  act  as  violative  of  section 
35  of  article  3  of  the  constitution,  as,  in  our  opinion,  the  title 
sufficiently  emhraces  the  subject  matter  of  the  act.  The  effect 
of  the  act,  however,  is  to  make  criminal  the  act  of  any  person 
who  may  keep  or  maintain  a  nouse  in  a  local  option  district  for 
the  storage,  keeping,  or  cooling  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  others, 
or  the  owner,  proprietor,  et  cetera,  of  any  building,  et  cetera, 
which  shall  be  used  to  store  such  intoxicating  liquors  for  others 
than  the  owner,  for  it  makes  criminal  the  act  of  any  person  who, 
as  owner,  proprietor,  et  cetera,  may  solicit  orders  from  others  for 
intoxicating  liquors  to  be  sent  or  delivered  to  such  owner,  et 
cetera;  that  is,  it  proposes  to  make  criminal  the  act  of  keeping 
or  storing  any  intoxicating  liquors  for  others  than  the  owner  of 
such  building,  in  any  house,  building,  et  cetera,  in  any  district 
where  local  option  is  in  force. 

If  we  had  no  provision  of  the  constitution  on  the  subject  of 
local  option,  we  believe  that  this  act  would  be  unconstitutional, 
as  an  invasion  of  the  fundamental  right  of  a  citizen  to  the  free 
use  and  exercise  of  property,  and  that  the  legislature  would  not 
be  authorized,  under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation,  to  so  inter- 
fere with  the  enjoyment  on  the  part  of  the  citizen  of  his  prop- 
erty rights.  Intoxicating  liquors  are  regarded  as  property,  both 
in  the  state  and  nation,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  refer  to  acts 
of  legislation  or  decisions  of  the  courts  in  which  intoxicating 
liquors  are  so  regarded.    Furthermore,  we  have  a  distinct  con- 


746  Ex  PARTE  Brown.  [Texas, 

fititutional  provision  on  the  subject  of  tlie  power  of  the  legisla- 
ture in  regard  to  the  liquor  traffic.  That  constitutional  provi- 
€ion  is  as  follows:  "The  legislature  shall,  at  its  first  session,  en- 
act a  law  whereby  the  qualified  voters  of  any  county,  justice  pre- 
cinct, town,  city,  or  such  subdivision  of  a  county  as  may  be  des- 
ignated by  the  commissioners'  court  of  such  county,  may,  by  a 
majority  vote,  determine  from  time  to  time  whether  the  sale  of 
intoxicating  ^^^  liquors  shall  be  prohibited  within  the  pre- 
scribed limits";  Const.,  art.  16,  sec.  20.  It  occurs  to  us  that 
this  expression  of  the  will  of  the  people  on  the  subject  is  exclu- 
sive of  any  other  method  to  be  pursued  by  the  legislature.  What- 
ever may  be  said  as  to  the  power  of  the  legislatures  of  other 
states,  with  no  express  provisions  of  their  constitutions  on  this 
subject,  to  legislate  in  regard  to  the  liquor  traffic  under  the  gen- 
eral police  power,  the  same  does  not  apply  with  us.  We  have 
an  express  provision  on  the  subject,  and  that  provision  was  in- 
tended to  prescribe  a  method  of  dealing  with  the  question,  and 
to  exclude  any  other  rule  or  method,  at  least  so  far  as  local  op- 
tion territory  is  concerned:  See  HoUey  v.  State,  14  Tex.  Grim. 
App.  505;  Stallworth  v.  State,  16  Tex.  Grim.  App.  345;  Steele  v. 
State,  19  Tex.  Grim.  App.  425;  Ninenger  v.  State,  25  Tex.  Grim. 
App.  449. 

In  State  v.  Oilman,  33  W.  Va.  146,  almost  the  identical  ques- 
tion here  presented  came  before  that  court;  and  the  views  of 
the  learned  judge  who  delivered  the  opinion  are  so  well  expressed 
that  we  give  them  in  full:  "Has  the  legislature  of  this  state  the 
constitutional  power  to  make  such  an  act  a  crime?  The  four- 
teenth amendment  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  de- 
clares: *No  state  shall  make  or  enforce  any  law  which  shall 
abridge  the  privileges  or  immunities  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States';  and  the  same  amendment  makes  all  persons  bom  or 
naturalized  in  the  United  States  citizens  thereof.  It  is  conceded 
that  the  'privileges  and  immunities'  here  protected  are  such  only 
as  are  in  their  nature  fundamental — such  as  belong  of  right  to 
the  citizens  of  all  free  governments,  and  which  have  at  all  times 
been  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of  the  several  states  of  the  Union, 
from  the  time  of  their  becoming  free,  independent,  and  sovereign. 
What  these  fundamental  rights  are  it  is  not  easy  to  enumerate, 
the  courts  preferring  not  to  describe  and  define  them  in  a  gen- 
eral classification,  but  to  decide  each  case  as  it  may  arise.  The 
following,  however,  have  been  held  to  be  embraced  among  them; 
Trotection  by  the  government;  the  enjoyment  of  life  and  lib- 


Nov.  1897.]  Ex  PABTB  Brown.  741 

erty,  with  the  right  to  acquire  and  possess  properly  of  every 
kind,  and  to  pursue  and  obtain  happiness  and  safety,  subject  to 
such  restraints  as  the  government  may  justly  prescribe  for  the 
general  good  of  the  whole':  Washington,  J.,  in  Corfield  v.  Cory- 
ell, 4  Wash.  C.  C.  380,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  3230;  Connor  v.  Elliott,  18 
How.  591;  In  re  Parrott,  6  Saw.  349,  1  Fed.  Kep.  481;  6  Meyers 
Fed.  Dec,  sec.  1000;  Butchers'  Union  Slaughter-House  Co.  v. 
Crescent  City  Livestock  Landing  Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  746.  These  are 
inalienable  and  indefeasible  rights,  which  no  man,  or  set  of  men, 
by  even  the  largest  majority,  can  take  from  the  citizen.  They 
are  absolute  and  inherent  in  the  people,  and  all  free  govern- 
ments must  recognize  and  respect  them.  Therefore,  it  is  incum- 
bent upon  the  courts  to  give  to  the  constitutional  provisions 
which  guarantee  them  a  liberal  construction,  and  to  hold  in- 
operative and  void  all  statutes  which  attempt  to  destroy  or  in- 
terfere with  them:  Cooley's  Constitutional  Limitations  (35),  44. 
It  can  hardly  be  questioned  that  the  right  to  possess  property 
is  one  of  these  rights,  and  that  that  right  embraces  the  ^^^ 
privilege  of  a  citizen  to  keep  in  his  possession  property  for  an- 
other. It  is  not  denied  that  the  keeping  of  property  which 
is  injurious  to  the  lives,  health,  or  comfort  of  all  persons  may  be 
prohibited  under  the  police  power.  The  maxim,  *Sic  utere  tuo 
ut  alienum  non  laedas,'  being  of  universal  application,  it  must, 
of  course,  be  within  the  range  of  legislative  action  to  define  the 
mode  and  manner  in  which  everyone  may  so  use  his  own  as  not 
to  injure  others.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  every  statute  en- 
acted ostensibly  for  the  promotion  of  these  ends  is  to  be  ac- 
cepted as  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power  of  the  state; 
and  much  less  is  such  the  case  when  the  statute  is  merely  claimed 
by  its  defenders  to  be  intended  for  that  purpose.  The  court,  in 
its  opinion  in  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123  U.  S.  661,  says:  'The  courts 
are  not  bound  by  mere  forms,  nor  are  they  to  be  misled  by  mere 
pretenses.  They  are  at  liberty — indeed,  are  under  a  solemn 
duty — to  look  at  the  substance  of  things,  whenever  they  enter 
upon  the  inquiry  whether  the  legislature  has  transcended  the 
limits  of  its  authority.  If,  therefore,  a  statute  purporting  to 
have  been  enacted  to  protect  the  public  health,  the  public  mor- 
als, or  the  public  safety  has  no  real  or  substantial  relation  to 
those  objects,  or  is  a  palpable  invasion  of  rights  secured  by  the 
fundamental  law,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  so  adjudge,  and 
thereby  give  effect  to  the  constitution':  Mugler  v.  Kansas,  123 
U.  S.  661.    The  keeping  of  liquors  in  his  possession  by  a  per- 


748  Ex  PARTE  Brown.  [Texas, 

Bon,  whether  for  himself  or  for  another,  unless  he  does  so  for 
the  illegal  sale  of  it,  or  for  some  other  improper  purpose,  can 
by  no  possibility  injure  or  affect  the  health,  morals,  or  safety  of 
the  public;  and  therefore  the  statute  prohibiting  such  keep- 
ing in  possession  is  not  a  legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power. 
It  is  an  abridgment  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the 
citizen,  without  any  legal  justification,  and  therefore  void.  But 
it  seems  to  me  the  said  provision  of  the  statute  is  in  violation 
of  that  provision  of  our  state  constitution,  which  declares  that 
'laws  may  be  passed  regulating  or  prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors  within  the  limits  of  this  state':  Const.,  art.  6, 
FCC.  46.  While  it  is  admitted  to  be  a  well-settled  principle  that 
the  legislature  has  the  same  unlimited  power  in  regard  to  legis- 
lation which  resides  in  the  British  parliament,  except  where  it  is 
restrained  either  by  the  state  or  federal  constitutions,  still  it  is 
equally  true  that  these  constitutional  limitations  are  not  con- 
fined to  express  inhibitions,  for  there  are  but  few  positive  re- 
straints upon  the  legislative  power  contained  in  the  constitution. 
The  third  article,  or  ^bill  of  rights'  lays  down  the  ancient  limita- 
tions which  have  always  been  considered  essential  in  a  constitu- 
tional government,  whether  monarchial  or  popular;  and  there 
are  scattered  through  the  instrument  some  other  express  provi- 
sions in  restraint  of  legislative  authority.  But  the  affirmative 
prescriptions  and  general  arrangements  of  the  constitution  are 
far  more  fruitful  of  restraints  upon  the  legislative  power.  Every 
positive  direction  contains  an  implication  against  everything 
contrary  to  it,  or  which  would  frustrate  or  disappoint  the  pur- 
pose of  that  provision.  The  frame  of  the  government,  the  grant 
of  legislative  power  itself,  the  organization  of  the  executive  au- 
thority, and  the  erection  of  the  principal  courts  of  justice,  ****^ 
create  implied  limitations  upon  the  law-making  authority,  as 
strong  as  though  a  negative  was  expressed  in  each  instance: 
Cooley's  Constitutional  Limitations,  87;  People  v.  Draper,  15 
N.  Y,  543,  If  the  people  had  not  made  the  provision  above 
quoted  a  part  of  the  constitution,  the  legislature  would,  so  far 
as  that  instrument  is  concerned,  have  had  plenary  and  unre- 
stricted authority  to  deal  with  liquors  in  any  manner  it  chose  to 
do.  But  the  people,  by  declaring  that  'laws  may  be  passed 
regulating  or  prohibiting  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,'  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  we  have  announced,  imposed  a  restraint 
upon  this  plenary  power.  By  granting  an  express  authority  to 
the  legislature  to  regulate  or  prohibit  the  sale,  there  is  an  im- 


Nov.  1897.]  Ex  PAETB  Bbown.  749 

plied  inhibition  to  the  exercise  of  any  authority  in  respect  to 
that  subject  which  is  not  embraced  in  the  grant.  This  rule  is 
simply  an  application  of  the  old  maxim,  'Expressio  unius  est 
exclusio  alterius/  which  Lord  Bacon  concisely  explains  by  say- 
ing: 'As  exception  strengthens  the  force  of  a  law  in  cases  not 
excepted,  so  enumeration  weakens  it  in  cases  not  enumerated.' 
The  express  power  here  given  to  regulate  or  prohibit  the  sale 
of  liquors,  unless  it  was  intended  to  limit  the  legislative  author- 
ity, would  render  this  provision  of  the  constitution  wholly  nuga- 
tory and  useless,  because,  as  we  have  seen,  without  this  provision 
the  legislature  would  have  had  plenary  power  over  the  whole 
subject.  It  could  not  only  have  legislated  in  respect  to  the  pro- 
hibition and  sale  of  liquors,  but  in  all  other  respects.  It  seems 
to  me,  therefore,  that  the  purpose  and  effect  of  this  constitu- 
tional provision  was  and  is  to  restrict  and  limit  the  legislative 
authority  to  the  powers  expressly  granted  therein — that  is,  to 
the  power  to  regulate  or  prohibit  the  sale  of  liquors;  and  con- 
sequently a  legislative  act  not  within  the  legitimate  scope  of 
this  express  grant,  unless  it  is  a  fair  and  reasonable  exercise  of 
the  police  power,  must  be  held  unconstitutional  and  void." 

We  entirely  concur  with  the  principles  enunciated  in  the  fore- 
going opinion,  and  their  application  to  the  question  in  this  case 
is  obvious;  and  we  accordingly  hold  the  attempt  of  the  legisla- 
ture to  make  the  keeping  of  liquor  by  one  citizen  for  another, 
in  a  local  option  territory,  whether  in  a  house,  tent,  or  any- 
where else,  and  whether  for  a  consideration  or  without  a  con- 
sideration, a  crime,  or  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  legislature 
to  make  it  criminal  for  a  person  who  may  be  the  owner  or  pro- 
prietor of  any  building,  et  cetera,  in  a  local  option  territory, 
to  solicit  or  take  an  order  from  another  person  for  intoxicating 
liquors,  to  be  sent  or  delivered  to  the  proprietor  or  owner  of 
such  house  for  the  person  giving  such  order,  to  be  without 
authority  of  law,  as  violative  of  the  citizen's  fundamental  right 
to  use  his  own  property  as  he  pleases,  not  injuring  another  per- 
son; and  that  it  is  not  competent  for  the  legislature,  under  its 
power  of  police  regulation,  to  impair  the  legal  ownership  and 
holding  of  one's  property,  either  by  himself  or  by  another  per- 
son. 

We  further  hold  that  the  act  in  question,  applicable  alone  to 
local  option  territory,  is  violative  of  the  express  provisions  of 
our  constitution  on  the  subject.  If  this  law  could  be  enforced 
in  such  local  option  territory,  '^^^  then  a  minister  or  any  mem- 
ber of  any  of  the  various  churches  who  should  hold  or  keep 


750  Ex  PARTE  Brown.  [Texas, 

wine  at  his  residence  or  any  house  under  his  control,  for  the 
purpose  of  being  used  by  the  members  of  his  church  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  Lord's  Supper,  would  be  guilty  of  keeping  a 
cold  storage,  for  he  would  come  under  the  terms  of  the  law 
which  inhibits  the  keeping  of  intoxicating  liquors  for  others. 
This  illustration  will  serve  to  show  the  futility  of  legislation  to 
hamper  or  prevent  the  use  or  ownership  of  one's  property  for 
a  purpose  that  is  not  inhibited  by  the  constitutional  provision 
on  the  subject.  That  provision  inhibits  the  sale  only  and  was 
evidently  intended  by  the  people  to  mark  the  limitation  of  power 
of  the  legislature  on  that  subject.  The  people,  in  saying  that 
a  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors  might  be  prohibited,  deny  to  the 
legislature  the  power  to  otherwise  interfere  with  its  use;  and 
the  cold  storage  act  was  an  attempted  interference  with  the  use 
of  intoxicating  liquors  in  local  option  territory,  not  authorized 
or  warranted  by  the  constitution,  and  we  accordingly  hold  it 
illegal  and  void,  and  it  is  therefore  ordered  that  the  relator  be 
discharged. 

Hurt,  presiding  judge,  absent. 


STATUTES— TITLE  OF  ACT— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— An  act 
Is  unconstitutional  and  void  if  its  title  is  not  broad  enough  to  in- 
clude the  subject  matter  of  the  legislation:  State  v.  Tibbets,  52 
Neb.  228,  G6  Am.  St.  Rep.  492.  See  the  monographic  note  to  Bobel 
V.  People,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  70. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— POLICE  POWER.— The  legislature 
cannot,  under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation,  arbitrarily  invade 
private  property  or  personal  rights,  but  it  must  appear  to  the  court, 
when  such  regulation  is  called  in  question,  that  there  is  a  clear  and 
real  connection  between  the  assumed  purpose  of  the  law  and  its 
actual  provisions:  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  47  Neb.  549,  53 
Am.  St.  Rep.  557.  The  courts  can  say  whether  the  police  power 
has  been  properly  exercised  by  the  legislature:  People  v.  Warden, 
157  N.  Y.  116,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  763;  Colon  v.  LIsk,  153  N.  Y.  188, 
60  Am.  St.  Rep.  609. 

INTOXICATING  LIQUORS— LOCAL  OPTION.— One  Indicted  for 
selling  Intoxicating  liquor  in  violation  of  a  local  option  law  in 
force  In  a  certain  county,  by  furnishing  to  others  and  forwarding 
to  wholesalers  in  another  county  blank  orders  for  liquor,  directing 
It  to  be  shipped  in  the  care  of  the  defendant,  who  received  and  de- 
livered the  liquor  to  the  persons  thus  ordering  It,  who  pay  him 
therefore,  is  not  guilty  if  the  liquor  is  shipped  to  him  as  the  agent  of 
those  who  order  It,  or  at  their  request:  State  v.  WIngfield,  115  Mo. 
428.  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  406. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— LOCAL  OPTION.— Wherever  a  local 
option  law  has  been  adopted  In  accordance  with  a  constitutional 
provision,  and  been  put  In  force.  It  operates  to  repeal  all  laws  and 
parts  of  laws  In  conflict  with  It,  within  the  limits  of  the  locality  in 
which  It  has  been  adopted;  and  a  general  law  imposing  an  occupa- 
tion tax  on  retail  liquor  dealers  is  not  In  force  in  localities  where 
the  local  option  law  has  been  adopted:  Extended  note  to  Common- 
wealth V.  Kimball.  35  Am.  Dec.  338. 


Nov.  1897.]  Jones  v.  Statk.  761 


Jones  v.  State. 

[88  Texas  Cbihinai.  Refobtb,  864.j 

LIBBL.-RECOGNIZANCE  ON  APPEAL  which  recites  that 
the  defendant  "stands  charged  with  the  offense  of  libel,"  Is  suffi- 
cient. 

LIBEL  OF  A  CLASS.— It  Is  a  violation  of  the  Texas  statute 
to  libel  any  sect,  company,  or  class  of  persons  without  naming  any 
person  in  particular  who  may  belong  to  such  class. 

LIBEL  OF  A  CLASS.— A  publication  charging  the  street-car 
conductors  of  a  certain  city  with  being  pimps,  and  that  they  would 
sell  the  virtue  of  their  sisters  for  a  drink,  is  libelous  per  se. 

W.  H.  Smith,  for  the  appellant. 

M.  Trice,  assistant  attorney-general,  for  the  state. 

see  DAVIDSON,  J.  Appellant  was  convicted  of  libel.  The 
assistant  attorney  general  moves  to  dismiss  the  appeal,  because 
the  recognizance  fails  to  recite  an  offense  known  to  the  law. 
Said  recognizance  recites  that  the  defendant  "stands  charged 
with  the  offense  of  libel."  This  is  the  only  recitation  in  said 
obligation  of  the  offense.  None  of  the  constitutent  element* 
are  set  out  or  attempted  to  be  set  out.  We  think  that  the  recog- 
nizance is  sufficient.  Libel  is  defined  to  be  an  offense  by  the 
statutes,  and  is  an  offense  eo  nomine,  as  theft,  murder,  slander,^ 
et  cetera.     The  motion  to  dismiss  the  appeal  is  overruled. 

Appellant  filed  his  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  because  the- 
indictment  is  fatally  defective,  in  that  the  published  statement 
alleged  to  be  libelous  fails  to  convey  the  idea  that  the  persons 
referred  to  had  been  guilty  of  a  penal  offense,  or  that  they  had 
been  guilty  of  some  act  or  omission  which,  though  not  penal, 
was  disgraceful  to  them  as  members  of  society,  the  natural  eon- 
sequence  of  which  was  to  bring  them  into  contempt  among^ 
honorable  persons;  or  that  they  had  some  moral  vice,  or  physi- 
cal or  mental  defect  or  disease,  which  rendered  them  unfit  for 
intercourse  with  respectable  society,  and  such  as  would  cause 
them  to  be  generally  avoided;  or  that  they  were  notoriously  of 
bad  or  infamous  character.  His  second  contention  is,  that  the 
printed  and  published  matter  could  be  held  to  refer  to  but  one 
person,  to  wit,  the  conductor  causing  the  injury  to  a  colored 
woman  on  East  Avenue  L  car,  and  the  indictment  fails  to  desig- 
nate by  name  who  that  conductor  was;  and  he  generally  urges 
that  the  published  matter  is  not  libelous.  Omitting  the  for- 
mal parts  of  the  indictment,  it  charges  that  "defendant  and 
W.  H.  Noble,  on  the  14th  of  November,  1896,  in  the  county  of 


752  Jones  17.  State.  [Texas, 

Galveston,  in  the  state  of  Texas,  with  force  and  arms,  then  and 
there,  with  intent  to  injure  A.  S.  Spurgeon"  and  others,  setting 
them  out  by  name,  "did  unlawfully  and  maliciously  make,  write, 
print,  publish,  sell,  and  circulate  a  malicious  statement  of  and 
concerning  the  said  A.  S.  Spurgeon"  and  others  mentioned,  "and 
-affecting  the  reputation  of  the  said  A.  S,  Spurgeon"  and  others 
mentioned,  "who  were  then  and  there  conductors  employed  by 
the  Galveston  City  Eailroad  Company,  on  the  various  lines  in 
the  city  of  Galveston,  Texas,  which  malicious  statement  was  of 
the  tenor  following,  to  wit:  'Irish  Snides.    It  is  really  disgust- 
ing, to  say  the  least,  for  one  to  take  notice  and  see  how  the 
Irish  snides  employed  by  the  street-car  company  (meaning  the 
Galveston  City  Eailroad  Company)  as  conductors  on  the  various 
lines  of  this  city  (meaning  the  city  of  Galveston)  discriminate. 
With  a  few  exceptions,  these  cowboys,  escaped  lunatics,  and 
imported  lords  have  a  way  of  their  own,  and  discriminate  with 
■a  vim.     These  whelps  seem  to  forget  that  they  are  public  ser- 
vants, and  treat  our  ^^'^  best  colored  ladies  with  a  contempt 
that  could  only  be  found  in  a  Yale  chump.     Some  few  nights 
ago,  a  colored  lady,  while  dismounting  from  an  East  L  car,  was 
thrown  to  the  ground  by  the  mangy  ape  that  poses  as  conductor 
ringing  the  bell  before  she  was  off  the  step.     And  the  lousy 
little  puppy,  that  scarcely  speaks  English,  said  to  a  white  gentle- 
man, that  spoke  of  the  danger  of  such  proceedings,  that  she  was 
«  'she  coon.'     Has  it  come  to  this?     Such  pimps  (meaning  one 
who  provides  the  means  and  opportunities  for  libidinous  gratifi- 
-cation;  that  is  to  say,  a  procurer  for  the  lusts  of  others)  as  this, 
men  so  low  that  they  would  willingly  sell  the  virtue  of  their 
€ister  for  a  drink,  the  descendants  of  Oscar  Wilde  (meaning  that 
they  commit  the  crime  of  sodomy),  greasy  curs,  foul-smelling 
•scavengers,  are  imported  to  this  country  to  insult  and  humiliate 
the  people  that  help  to  make  these  enterprises — that  build  up 
and  support  these  public  affairs.     We  coons!     Some  of  the  best 
families  of  America  have  raised  coons.     I  expect  that  foreign 
whelp  is  a  coon,  but  the  woman  in  question  is  a  colored  lady. 
Perhaps  I  am  a  coon,  but  I  would  not  give  one  drop  of  my 
■'cooney'  blood  for  a  barrel  of  the  'blud'  of  such  ^bludy*  Irish 
finides.  It's  time  that  the  car  company  should  right  these  wrongs, 
and  employ  only  respectable,  intelligent  men,  that  will  do  jus- 
tice to  all  alike.     We  pay  a  nickel,  and  we  demand  a  nickel's 
worth.     There  is  too  many  intelligent  men  in  this  country  to 
import  such  beastly  bastards  to  insult  the  people  here.'"     It 
will  be  seen  by  this  indictment  that  all  of  the  parties  named  in 


Nov.  1897.]  Jones  v.  State.  768 

the  alleged  libelous  matter  are  alleged  to  Tie  conductors  of  tha 
Oalveston  City  Eailroad  Company. 

Taking  appellant's  grounds  of  his  motion  out  of  the  order 
in  which  he  places  them,  we  notice  that  ground  of  said  motion 
first  which  alleges  the  indictment  is  insufficient,  because  it  only 
refers  to  one  conductor  causing  the  injury  to  a  colored  woman, 
€t  cetera,  and  fails  to  designate  by  name  that  conductor.  By 
reference  to  the  libelous  matter  published,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  first  sentence  in  said  publication  refers  to  the  conductors 
on  the  various  street-cars  of  this  city  (meaning  the  city  of  Gal- 
veston) as  a  class.  The  libelous  matter  makes  no  exception 
among  the  conductors,  but  includes  all  of  them.  This  has  been 
held  sufficient,  without  designating  the  names;  and  we  hold  this 
to  be  sufficient  designation  of  every  conductor  in  the  service  of 
said  railroad  company  at  the  time  of  said  publication.  It 
therefore  would  be  a  violation  of  our  statute  to  libel  any  sect, 
•company,  or  class  of  men  without  naming  any  person  in  par- 
ticular who  may  belong  to  said  class:  See  13  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency. 
of  Law,  499,  and  notes;  2  McClain's  Criminal  Law,  sec.  1044. 

In  reply  to  appellant's  contention  that  the  indictment  fails 
to  charge  said  conductors,  either  directly  or  by  innuendo,  with 
an  offense  against  the  laws,  or  with  some  act  or  omission  which, 
though  not  a  penal  offense,  is  disgraceful  to  said  conductors  as 
members  of  society,  or  the  natural  consequence  of  which  is  to 
bring  them  into  contempt  among  honorable  persons,  or  that 
they  have  some  moral  vice  or  physical  or  mental  defect  or  disease 
which  renders  them  unfit  for  mtercourse  with  respectable 
€ociety,  and  such  as  would  cause  them  to  be  generally  avoided, 
or  that  ^'^  they  are  of  notoriously  bad  or  infamous  character, 
we  have  this  to  say:  That  the  first  allegation  in  the  indictment, 
to  wit,  that  one  of  these  conductors  caused  a  colored  lady  to  be 
thrown  to  the  ground  while  dismounting  from  a  street-car,  im- 
puted an  assault  to  one  of  said  conductors  belonging  to  the  class 
charged  in  the  indictment,  but  does  not  name  him.  But  con- 
■cede  that  we  should  be  in  error  as  to  the  effect  of  this  allega- 
tion; unquestionably  the  charge  that  said  conductors  were  pimps, 
with  the  innuendo  following  the  same,  is  such  a  charge  as  im- 
puted some  act,  which,  though  not  a  penal  offense,  was  disgrace- 
ful to  said  conductors  as  members  of  society,  and  the  natural 
•consequence  of  which  was  to  bring  them  into  contempt  among 
honorable  persons.  So  of  that  portion  of  said  publication  which 
charged  that  said  conductors  were  so  low  that  they  would  will- 

AM.  St.  Rep..  Vou  LXX.— 18 


754  Jones  v.  State.  [Texas^ 

ingly  sell  the  virtue  of  their  sister  for  a  drink.  These  charges 
attributed  to  said  conductors  that  they  were  of  notoriously  bad 
or  infamous  character;  and,  as  the  prosecution  in  this  case  was 
under  all  of  said  allegations,  if  the  proof  sustained  anyone,  it 
was  sufficient.  It  will  be  further  noticed  by  reference  to  the 
allegations  in  the  indictment  that  there  are  innuendo  averments 
contained  therein  sufficiently  explanatory  of  said  statements  in 
said  publication.  But,  if  there  had  not  been,  we  hold  that  they 
were  sufficient  in  and  of  themselves  to  constitute  libel  without 
innuendoes.  The  statements  in  the  publication  were  so  plain 
and  unmistakable  in  their  meaning  that  no  intelligent  person 
could  fail  to  understand  and  comprehend  what  was  intended 
by  them:  More  v.  Bennett,  48  N.  Y.  472;  2  McClain's  Criminal 
Law,  sec.  1043,  and  authorities  cited  in  note  2. 

In  regard  to  the  remaining  question,  that  the  publication  i» 
not  libelous,  under  the  views  herein  expressed,  it  will  be  seen 
that  such  contention  is  without  merit.  "We  think  the  indict- 
ment is  sufficient,  and  the  judgment  is  affirmed. 


Libel  or  Slander  of  a  Class  or  Number  of  Persons. 

In  order  to  maintain  an  action  for  libel  or  slander,  the  detama- 
tory  words  must  refer  to  some  ascertained  or  ascertainable  person, 
and  such  person  must  be  the  plaintiff.  If  the  words  used  do  not, 
In  fact,  contain  any  reflection  on  any  particular  Individual,  no  aver- 
ment or  innuendo  can  malie  them  defamatory:  Harvey  v.  CoflSn,  5 
Blackf.  566;  Petsch  v.  Dispatch  Printing  Co.,  40  Minn.  291;  Miller 
V.  Maxwell,  16  Wend.  9;  Brashear  v.  Shepherd,  Sneed.  (Ky.)  249; 
Baldwin  v.  Hildreth,  14  Gray,  221.  Thus  In  an  action  for  libel  by 
a  grand  jury's  report,  where  the  only  evidence  to  show  that  plain- 
tiff was  one  of  the  majority  of  the  board  therein  referred  to  Is  an 
Indictment  brought  In  by  the  grand  jury  at  the  same  time  against 
the  plaintiff  and  other  members  of  the  board  of  police  commis- 
sioners, charging  them  and  other  persons  with  having  combined  to. 
obstruct  the  laws  and  to  remove  a  chief  of  police,  is  not  sufl3cient 
to  show  that  he  was  the  person  Intended  by  the  grand  jury's  re- 
port, which  alleges  corruption  on  the  part  of  a  majority  of  such 
board,  but  in  which  the  removal  of  the  chief  of  police  was  but  In- 
cidentally  mentioned:  Caruth  v.  Ralcheson,  96  Mo.  186. 

If  an  article  In  a  newspaper  Is  libelous  In  reflecting  on  a  class  of 
persons,  one  of  that  class.  In  order  to  maintain  an  action,  must 
Bhow  that  he  Is  specially  Included  In  such  class.  "If  a  man  wrote 
that  all  lawyers  were  thieves,  no  particular  lawyer  could  sue  him, 
unless  there  Is  something  to  point  to  the  particular  Individual"; 
Eastwood  V.  Holmes,  1  Post.  &  F.  347. 

Though  the  words  used  may  at  first  appear  to  apply  only  to  » 
class,  and  not  to  be  specially  defamatory  of  any  particular  indi- 
vidual or  member  of  such  class,  yet  an  action  may  be  maintained 


Nov.  1897.]        Jones  v.   State.  765 

by  any  person  of  that  class  who  can  satisfy  the  court  that  the  words 
used  refer  especially  to  himself,  but  the  words  must  be  capable  of 
bearing  such  special  application,  and  there  must  be  an  averment 
that  the  words  were  spoken  of  the  plaintiff  and  he  must  also  aver 
extraneous  facts,  if  any,  showing  that  he  was  the  person  specially 
referred  to.  "The  principle  is  undoubtedly  correct  that  where  libel- 
ous or  slanderous  matter  is  published  against  a  class  or  aggregate 
body  of  persons,  an  individual  member,  not  specially  mentioned  or 
Included  or  designated,  cannot  maintain  an  action,  for  this,  among 
other  reasons,  that  the  body  may  act  very  corruptly  or  disgrace- 
fully, yet  the  individual  may  have  been  In  the  minority  and  may 
have  opposed  the  measures  alluded  to.  But  where  many  indi- 
viduals are  severally  Included  In  the  same  attack,  whether  by  the 
language  of  the  satirist  or  the  pencil  of  the  caricaturist,  the  plain- 
tiff is  not  the  less  entitled  to  redress,  because  others  are  injured  by 
the  same  act.  Then  the  question  is,  whether,  on  the  whole,  the 
declaration  does  aver  with  sufficient  certainty,  that  the  plaintiff  is 
individually  held  up  to  contempt":  Ellis  v.  Kimball,  16  Pick.  132- 
135.  If  a  declaration  alleges  that  the  defendant  published  of  and 
concerning  the  plaintiff  and  of  a  certain  court  martial  of  which  he 
was  a  member,  a  defamatory  libel  and  caricature,  consisting  of  a 
certain  picture  and  representation  of  such  court  martial,  and  of  the 
plaintiff.  In  which  he  is  pointed  out  as  a  member  thereof  by  position 
and  certain  grotesque  resemblances,  and  is  represented  and  ex- 
hibited In  an  awkward  and  ludicrous  light,  posture,  and  position, 
It  avers  with  sufficient  certainty  that  plaintiff  was  specially  libelled 
and  also  sets  forth  the  libel  with  sufficient  certainty:  Ellis  v.  Kim- 
ball, 16  Pick.  132. 

It  Is  a  libel  to  write  of  a  Roman  Catholic  nunnery  that  it  Is  a 
brothel  of  prostitution,  for  this  is  an  aspersion  on  the  character  of 
the  nuns  In  general,  though  none  are  singled  out  by  name,  and  any 
nun  belonging  to  that  particular  nunnery  could  maintain  an  action 
therefor:  Gathercole's  case.  2  Lew.  O.  C.  237.  An  article  published 
in  a  newspaper  calling  policemen  hogs  and  blood-sucking  police 
officers,  who  Insist  on  sitting  on  juries  to  the  neglect  of  their  duties 
and  to  cheat  honorable  citizens  out  of  their  jury  fees,  and  adding 
that  this  has  no  reference  to  the  chief  of  police,  because  he  is  be- 
neath notice,  is  an  actionable  libel  as  to  him  and  to  either  of  such 
policemen:  Smith  v.  Utley,  92  Wis.  133.  A  charge  by  one  made  to 
a  father  that  "your  children  are  thieves,  and  I  can  prove  It"  is  suffi- 
ciently d'efinlte  to  enable  either  of  such  children  to  maintain  an 
action  for  slander:  Gidney  v.  Blake,  11  Johns.  54;  and  to  constitute 
a  criminal  libel  it  Is  not  necessary  that  the  alleged  libelous  article 
reflect  upon  the  conduct  of  any  particular  person,  and  if  It  Is  di- 
rected against  a  family  It  is  libelous:  State  v.  Brady,  44  Kan.  43o, 
21  Am.  St.  Rep.  296.  It  has  been  held  In  New  York,  erroneously, 
no  doubt,  that  a  civil  action  for  libel  does  not  lie  by  an  officer  of  a 
regiment,  for  a  publication  reflecting  upon  the  officers  of  the  regi- 
ment generally,  without  averring  special  damage:  Sumner  v.  Buel, 
12  Johns.  475.    This  case  was  questioned  in  Ryckman  v.  Delaven, 


756  Jones  v.   State.  [Texas, 

25  Wend.  186,  where  it  was  held  that  an  action  of  libel  may  be 
maintained  by  an  individual  for  an  injury  to  his  business  resulting 
from  a  libelous  publication,  although  it  aft'ects  the  business  of  others 
engaged  in  the  same  calling,  unless  it  is  manifest  from  the  face  of 
the  publication  that  the  charges  made  were  intended  against  a  class 
of  society,  a  particular  profession,  or  order  or  body  of  men,  and 
cannot  by  possibility  import  a  personal  application  tending  to  pri- 
vate injury.  This  case  intimates,  however,  that  if  the  libel  is 
against  a  class  without  special  damage  to  any  one  of  such  class,  the 
proceeding  must  be  by  criminal  libel,  and  not  by  private  suit.  Mr. 
Chancellor  Walworth,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said: 
"There  are  many  cases  in  the  books  where  the  writers  and  pub- 
lishers of  defamatory  charges  reflecting  upon  the  conduct  of  particu- 
lar classes,  or  bodies  of  individuals,  have  been  proceeded  against 
by  indictment  or  information,  although  no  particular  one  was  named 
or  designated  therein  to  whom  the  charge  had  a  personal  applica- 
tion. AJl  those  cases,  however,  whether  the  libel  is  upon  an  or- 
ganized body  of  men,  as  a  legislature,  a  court  of  justice,  a  church, 
or  a  company  of  soldiers,  or  upon  a  particular  class  of  individuals, 
proceed  upon  the  ground  that  the  charge  is  a  misdemeanor,  al- 
though it  has  no  personal  application  to  the  individual  or  the  body 
or  class  libeled,  because  it  tends  to  excite  the  angry  passions  of 
the  community,  either  in  favor  or  against  the  body  or  class  in  ref- 
erence to  the  conduct  of  which  the  charge  is  made,  or  because  it 
tends  to  impair  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  their  government 
or  in  the  administration  of  the  laws" :  Ryckman  v.  Delaven,  25 
Wend.  196;  following  White  v.  Delaven,  17  Wend.  49,  wherein  it 
was  held  that  an  action  for  libel  does  not  lie  for  a  publication  al- 
leged to  affect  the  individual  character  of  persons  and  the  trade 
and  business  carried  on  by  them,  if  on  its  face  it  does  not  point 
at  the  individuals  named  otherwise  than  that  they  pursue  a  particu- 
lar trade  or  business  in  a  certain  section  of  the  city.  A  publica- 
tion affecting  a  class  of  persons  does  not  entitle  an  Individual  of 
that  class  to  sustain  an  action  for  the  publication.  We  apprehend 
that  the  true  rule  is  that,  although  the  libelous  publication  is  di- 
rected against  a  particular  class  of  persons  or  a  group,  yet  any  one 
of  that  class  or  group  may  maintain  an  action  upon  showing  that 
the  words  apply  especially  to  him.  "Even  where  the  words  may  at 
first  sight  appear  only  to  apply  to  the  subordinate  engineers  as  a 
class,  and  not  to  be  specially  defamatory  of  any  particular  one 
of  them,  still,  if  the  plaintiff  can  satisfy  the  jury  that  they  refer 
especially  to  him,  he  is  authorized  to  maintain  the  action:  Hardy 
V.  Williamson,  86  Ga.  551,  22  Am,  St.  Rep.  479. 

If  several  are  included  in  the  same  libel,  they  may  each  maintain 
a  separate  action  for  the  injury:  Smart  v.  Blanchard,  42  N.  H.  137. 
Thus,  where  a  suit  was  pending  against  the  plaintiff  and  sixteen 
others,  and,  In  a  discourse  concerning  the  suit,  the  defendant  said, 
"These  defendants  helped  to  murder  H.  F.,"  and  it  was  held  that 
each  of  the  seventeen  defendants  was  entitled  to  maintain  his  sepa- 
rate action  for  slander:  Foxcroft  v.  I^acy,  Hob.  89.    The  publication 


Nov.  1897.]  Payne  v.  State.  757 

of  a  statement  that  persons  employed  In  a  certain  department  "havo 
been  dismissed  for  alleged  thefts  of  leather  belonging  to  the  depart- 
ment, and  that  the  rascals  ought  to  feel  thankful  for  getting  oCC 
without  more  severe  punishment,"  is  libelous  as  to  each  of  the 
persons  so  discharged:  Dwyer  v.  Fireman's  Journal  Co.,  11  Daly, 
24S;  Ryer  v.  Fireman's  Journal  Co.,  11  Daly,  2ol. 

The  words,  "Those  people  upstairs  keep  a  whore  house,"  are 
actionable  per  se,  and  where  the  complaint  alleges  that  such  words 
were  spoken  concerning  the  plaintiff,  such  allegation  is  sufficient 
to  connect  the  plaintifC  with  the  words  "the  people  upstairs,"  and 
will  admit  proof  that  plaintiff  was  one  of  the  people  referred  to:  Cook 
V.  Rief,  20  Jones  &  S.  302,  52  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  302.  If  words  amount- 
ing to  a  libel  against  a  group  of  persons,  as  the  "city  hall  ring," 
leave  it  uncertain  as  to  the  application  thereof  to  the  plaintiff,  such 
application,  may  be  shown  by  proof  of  extrinsic  facts  which  need 
not  be  alleged  in  the  complaint:  Petsch  v.  Dispatch  Printing  Co., 
4ff  Minn,  291.  To  the  same  effect,  Thibault  v.  Sessions,  101  Mich. 
279.  A  publication,  if  false,  of  a  list  of  persons  who,  though  able, 
will  not  pay  their  debts,  is  libelous,  and  an  action  therefor  may  be 
maintained  by  anyone  of  the  persons  named:  Nettles  v.  Somervell, 
6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  627.  An  article  is  libelous  per  se  which,  being 
published  in  a  newspaper,  of  certain  persons,  including  the  plain- 
tiff, charges  that,  with  contracted  fanatacism,  alleged  ladies  have 
perambulated  the  streets  to  prevent  such  newspaper  from  being 
purchased;  that  these  ladies  brazenly  lowered  themselves  to  a  level 
which  they  would  blush,  if  they  possessed  modesty,  to  see  described 
in  type;  that  the  time  used  by  them  could  be  more  profitably  em- 
ployed in  scrubbing  their  filthy  kitchens;  that  women  like  them 
have  little  Christianity  except  that  which  they  flaunt  on  dress  pa- 
rade; that  they  are  usually  indifferently  good  mothers,  wives  and 
daughters,  and  are  intermeddlers  who  accomplish  nothing,  and 
neglect  the  duties  God  has  created  for  them:  Street  y.  Johnson. 
80  Wis.  455,  27  Am.  St  Rep.  42. 


Payne  v.  State. 

[88  TsxAS  Cbimikai.  Reports,  494.] 

RAPE— FRAUD  IN  PERSONATING  HUSBAND—  INDICT- 
MENT.—An  indictment  which  charges  a  rape  by  fraud  in  person- 
ating the  husband  must  allege  that  the  injured  female  is  a  married 
woman,  and  not  the  wife  of  the  defendant;  and  while  it  is  not 
necessary  to  allege  the  name  of  the  husband,  it  is  the  better  prac- 
tice to  do  so. 

RAPE— FRAUD  IN  PERSONATING  HUSBAND.— In  order 
to  constitute  the  crime  of  rape  by  fraud  In  personating  the  hus- 
band the  defendant  must  resort  to  some  device  or  stratagem,  some 
artifice  or  trick,  intending  to  deceive  the  prosecutrix  and  make  her 
believe  that  he  is  her  husband,  and  the  effect  of  such  stratagem 


758  Payne  v.  State.  [Texas, 

must  also  be  to  deceive  and  Impose  on  her  and  make  her  believe 
that  he  Is  her  husband  at  the  time  the  act  is  committed,  and  by 
this  means  gain  her  consent  to  the  copulation. 

RAPE— BY  FORCE— PERSONATING  HUSBAND.— If  a  man 
begins  the  act  of  copulation  with  a  married  woman  while  she  is 
asleep,  and  upon  awakening  she  makes  no  resistance,  believing  him 
to  be  her  husband,  the  crime  may  be  rape  by  force,  but  not  by 
fraud. 

J.  E.  Thomas,  for  the  appellant. 

M.  Trice,  assistant  attorney  general,  for  the  state. 

496  HENDEESON,  J.  Appellant  was  convicted  of  rape,  and 
his  punishment  assessed  at  confinement  in  the  penitentiary  for 
a  term  of  five  years;  hence  this  appeal.  The  charging  part  of 
the  indictment  is  as  follows:  "That  defendant  did  then  and 
there  hy  force,  threats,  and  fraud,  and  without  the  consent -of 
the  said  Jessie  Winn,  ravish  and  have  carnal  knowledge  of  the 
said  Jessie  Winn,  the  said  Jessie  Winn  not  being  then  and  there 
the  wife  of  the  said  Bunyon  Payne,"  et  cetera. 

The  evidence  showed  that  on  the  night  of  the  alleged  offense 
there  was  a  party  at  the  house  of  one  H.  B.  Payne,  the  father 
of  the  appellant.  The  party  broke  up  some  time  after  midnight, 
and  the  prosecutrix,  Mrs.  Jessie  Winn,  and  her  husband,  stayed 
overnight  at  said  house.  A  bed  was  made  down  for  them  in 
the  main  room  of  the  house,  and  in  the  same  room,  on  the  other 
side  from  the  bed  of  the  prosecutrix  and  her  husband,  Dan 
Loftin  and  his  two  brothers,  and  the  defendant  and  his  two 
brothers,  slept  on  pallets.  In  the  kitchen,  adjoining  this  room, 
Mrs.  McGary  and  her  husband  slept.  Some  time  in  the  night, 
just  about  daylight,  Mrs.  Jessie  Winn  awoke,  and  found  de- 
fendant on  top  of  her.  She  did  not  then  know  who  he  was. 
He  had  her  clothes  up.  She  tried  to  get  him  to  get  off,  but  he 
would  not  do  so.  He  had  intercourse  with  her.  Had  already 
commenced  intercourse  with  her  when  she  waked  up.  At  the 
time  she  thought  it  was  her  husband,  and  called  him  "George." 
That  she  did  not  do  anything  but  talk  to  him,  and  try  to  get 
him  to  get  off.  That  at  the  time  she  was  unwell  with  her 
menses,  but  he  did  not  get  off  until  he  got  through.  While  he 
was  in  the  act,  and  when  she  first  waked  up,  she  put  her  arms 
around  his  neck  and  kissed  him,  and  said,  "George,  what  do  you 
mean?'*  That  when  he  got  off  of  her  he  crawled  from  the 
bed  of  the  prosecutrix  to  his  pallet  on  his  hands  and  knees,  and 
she  then  knew  **''  it  was  not  her  husband,  but  recognized 
him  as  Bunyon  Payne.     She  immediately  aroused  her  husband. 


Deo.  1897.]  Payne  v.  State.  769 

And  told  him  what  defendant  had  done.  There  was  also  other 
testimony  in  the  case;  and,  among  other  witnesses,  Mrs.  G.  Gt. 
McGary  testified  to  seeing  defendant  sitting  at  the  head  of  her 
bed  during  the  night,  sometime  before  the  alleged  rape,  after 
she  had  retired. 

Appellant's  first  bill  of  exceptions  is  with  regard  to  the  admis- 
45ion  of  evidence  that  the  prosecutrix  was  a  married  woman,  and 
the  wife  of  G,  W.  "Winn.  This  was  objected  to,  on  the  ground 
that  the  indictment  did  not  allege  that  the  injured  female  was 
B,  married  woman.  This  brings  in  question  the  validity  of  the 
indictment  in  this  case.  The  conviction  was  no  doubt  procured 
und»?r  the  allegation  of  fraud,  which,  by  our  statute,  is  defined 
to  mean  "the  use  of  some  stratagem,  by  which  the  woman  i8 
induced  to  believe  the  offender  is  her  husband;  or  in  administer- 
ing, without  her  knowledge  or  consent,  some  substance  pro- 
ducing unnatural  sexual  desire,  or  such  stupor  as  prevents  or 
weakens  resistance,  and  committing  the  offense  while  she  is  un- 
der the  influence  of  such  substance":  See  Pen.  Code,  1895,  art. 
636.  We  have  examined  the  authorities  as  to  the  form  of  an 
indictment  where  the  rape  was  committed  by  a  false  personation 
of  the  husband,  but  we  have  been  unable  to  find  a  case  where 
the  question  of  the  indictment  has  been  treated.  In  England, 
AS  in  this  country,  it  appears  that  rape  is  a  statutory  offense,  and 
we  understand  that,  under  an  ordinary  indictment  in  England 
for  rape  by  force  and  without  the  consent  of  the  alleged  injured 
female,  the  proof  can  be  made  for  rape  by  procuring  the  inter- 
course by  a  false  personation  of  the  husband  of  the  female:  See 
Eegina  v.  Young,  38  L.  T.,  N.  S.,  540;  Wharton's  Criminal  Law, 
see.  561,  and  notes.  In  this  state  the  statute  above  quoted  was 
evidently  passed  to  cover  this  character  of  offense;  that  is,  where 
the  alleged  rape  was  committed  by  fraud.  And  in  Franklin  v. 
State,  34  Tex.  Crim.  Eep.  203,  we  held  that  the  indictment  for 
an  attempt  to  commit  a  rape  need  not  set  out  the  particular 
kind  of  fraud,  whether  by  personating  the  husband  or  adminis- 
tering some  substance  to  the  female;  and  that  the  general  charge 
of  an  attempt  to  rape  by  fraud  is  sufficient,  and  furnishes  tne 
basis  for  proof  of  either  means  stated  m  the  statute.  We  also 
held  in  that  case  that,  where  the  indictment  alleged  that  the 
injured  female  was  a  married  woman,  this  would  authorize  proof 
of  the  name  of  her  husband,  though  his  name  was  not  set  out 
in  the  indictment.  This  is  as  far  as  we  feel  authorized  to  go. 
We  hold  that  an  indictment,  as  in  this  case,  which  charges  a 


760  Payne  v.  State.  [Texas^ 

rape  by  fraud  in  personating  the  husband,  in  order  to  be  suffi- 
cient, must  allege  that  the  injured  female  is  a  married  woman, 
and  not  the  wife  of  the  defendant.  While  it  is  not  necessary  to 
allege  the  name  of  the  husband,  still  this  allegation  would  be 
the  better  practice,  and  it  would  be  no  means  vitiate  the  indict- 
ment. The  allegations  of  the  indictment  being  defective  in 
this  respect,  we  hold  it  insufficient  to  sustain  a  conviction  for 
rape  by  fraud  in  personating  the  husband. 

498  rjij^g  question  is  also  presented  to  us  whether  or  not  the 
facts  of  this  case  show  such  false  personation  of  the  husband  as 
to  constitute  a  rape;  that  is,  it  is  insisted  that  the  intercourse 
was  accomplished  without  any  stratagem  or  deception  on  the 
part  of  the  appellant  to  induce  the  prosecutrix  to  believe  that 
he  was  her  husband.  It  is  a  feature  of  our  constitution,  and  a 
cardinal  principle  in  all  our  criminal  law,  that  no  one  can  be 
punished  unless  under  a  written  law  of  this  state  in  which  the 
offense  has  been  defined.  Now,  the  definition  above  quoted  from 
the  statutes,  where  the  prosecution  is  based  on  fraud,  makes  it 
essential  that  the  defendant  use  some  stratagem  by  which  the 
woman  is  induced  to  believe  that  the  offender  is  her  husband. 
A  "stratagem"  is  defined  to  be  "any  artifice;  a  trick  by  which 
some  advantage  is  intended  to  be  obtained":  See  Century  Dic- 
tionary. Now,  according  to  our  statute,  it  becomes  absolutely 
necessary,  in  order  to  constitute  this  offense,  that  the  defendant 
resort  to  some  device  or  stratagem,  some  artifice  or  tric^,  intend- 
ing to  deceive  the  prosecutrix,  and  make  her  believe  that  he  is 
her  husband:  and  not  only  so,  but  the  effect  of  his  stratagem 
must  be  to  deceive  and  impose  on  her,  and  make  her  believe 
that  he  is  her  husband  at  the  time  the  act  was  committed,  and 
by  this  means  gain  her  consent  to  the  copulation.  Applying 
this  rule  to  the  facts  as  they  appear  in  the  record,  we  find  that 
the  prosecutrix  testifies  that,  when  she  first  awoke,  the  defend- 
ant had  already  penetrated  her  person,  and  was  then  in  the  act 
of  copulating  with  her.  She  being  asleep  at  the  time,  it  was 
impossible,  no  matter  what  his  acts  may  have  been  in  the  prem' 
ises,  that  they  should  have  operated  upon  her  mind  so  as  to 
induce  her  to  consent  under  the  belief  that  he  was  her  husband. 
And,  moreover,  the  record  fails  to  disclose  that  he  used  any 
stratagem;  his  only  action  being  to  go  to  her  bed,  get  on  top  of 
her,  and  begin  the  act  of  copulation  while  she  was  asleep.  What 
was  done  after  the  act  of  copulation  began,  even  if  it  could  be 
conceded  that  he  then  resorted  to  some  stratagem  to  continue 


Dec.  1897.]  Payne  v.  State.  761 

the  operation,  would  not  constitute  this  offense;  but  the  record 
fails  to  disclose,  even  during  the  continuance  of  the  act,  that 
he  resorted  to  any  artifice  or  trick  to  induce  her  to  believe  that 
he  was  her  husband.  In  Mooney  v.  State,  29  Tex.  Crim.  App. 
257,  this  court  held  that  the  act  of  copulation  by  a  defendant 
with  the  wife  of  another  person,  while  she  was  asleep,  she  being 
incapable  of  consenting^  at  the  time,  was  rape  by  force;  and  this 
is  in  accord  with  a  number  of  authorities.  But  this  was  not 
rape  by  fraud:  See  Kegina  v.  Young,  38  L.  T.,  N.  S.,  540,  and 
Wharton's  Criminal  Law,  sec.  561,  and  notes.  In  Ledbetter  v. 
State,  33  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  400,  the  conviction  in  that  case  for 
rape  by  falsely  personating  her  husband  was  upheld  on  the 
ground  that  the  evidence  was  sufficient  to  show  that  the  ap- 
pellant by  his  language,  as  well  as  conduct,  induced  the  injured 
female  to  believe  that  he  was  her  husband.  In  that  case  the  evi- 
dence showed  that  she  was  awake  at  the  time,  and  consented 
to  the  act,  under  the  belief  that  appellant  was  her  husband. 
But,  as  stated  above,  such  is  not  the  testimony  in  this  case;  and, 
in  our  opinion,  tne  evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  authorize  a  con- 
viction of  rape  by  frazil.  The  court  in  his  charge  submitted 
rape  by  fraud  *^^  alone.  As  to  the  testimony  of  Mrs.  McGary, 
we  are  inclined  to  believe  that  same  was  not  admissible,  but, 
as  limited  by  the  court,  perhaps  it  was  not  calculated  to  injure 
the  appellant  so  as  to  authorize  a  reversal  of  the  case. 

For  the  error  di&cussed  the  judgment  is  reversed  and  the  cause 
remanded. 


RAPEJ-FRAUD  IN  PERSONATING  HUSBAND.-Cohabltatlon 
procured  by  means  of  the  fraudulent  personation  of  a  female's  hus- 
band does  not  amount  to  the  crime  of  rape;  there  Is  neither  actual 
nor  constructive  force:  Lewis  v.  State,  30  Ala.  54,  68  Am.  Dec.  113. 
See,  however,  as  holdlnj?  that  consent  obtained  by  fraud  Is  no  con- 
sent, and  does  not  deprive  the  offense  of  the  character  of  rape,  the 
note  to  State  v.  Murphy,  41  Am.  Dec.  84. 

RAPE.— AN  INDICTMENT  for  rape  need  not  allege  that  the 
woman  ravished  was  not  the  wife  of  the  defendant:  Commonwealth 
▼.  Fogerty,  8  Gray,  489,  69  Am.  Dec  264. 


DoRSBY  V,  Statb.  [Texas, 


Dorset  v.  State. 

[38  Texas  Criminal  Kepoets,  527.] 

FOODS— ADULTERATION  OF.— An  Inaictment  charging  the 
manufacture  and  offer  for  sale  of  an  adulterated  article  of  food 
must  allege  the  article  with  which  it  is  adulterated,  under  a  statute 
which  makes  any  article  of  food  criminally  adulterated  "if  any  sub- 
stance or  substances  has  or  have  been  mixed  with  it  so  as  to  reduce 
or  lower  or  injuriously  affect  its  quality  or  strength,  or  if  any  in- 
ferior or  cheaper  substance  or  substances  have  been  substituted 
wholly  or  in  part  for  the  article." 

FOODS— ADULTERATION  OF— POWER  TO  PROHIBIT.— 
Under  the  police  power  of  the  state,  the  legislature  may  legally  pass 
an  act  stating  in  distinct  terms,  as  to  any  article  of  food  or  drink, 
that  if  any  person  shall  adulterate  such  article,  naming  it,  with 
any  other  substance,  without  labeling  it,  he  shall  be  guilty  of  an 
offense;  but  it  is  not  competent  to  make  criminal  the  mixing  or 
mingling  of  articles  of  food  which  are  wholesome  and  nutritious 
and  absolutely  prohibit  the  sale  thereof. 

FOODS— ADULTERATION  OF— POWER  TO  REGULATE.— 
A  statute  providing  that,  if  certain  named  wholesome  and  nutritious 
articles  of  food  are  mixed  or  intermingled,  the  product  must  be  la- 
beled, showing  the  component  elements  thereof,  and  punishing  a 
failure  to  so  label,  is  valid,  but  a  statute  which  embraces  all  arti- 
cles of  food  or  drink,  without  naming  any,  and  makes  the  mixture 
of  any  articles  of  food,  however  nutritious,  without  labeling  the 
product,  an  offense,  is  too  general  in  its  terms  and  cannot  be  en- 
forced. 

Martin  &  Flanary  and  G.  A.  McCall,  for  the  appellant. 

W.  "W.  Walling,  and  M.  Trice,  assistant  attorney  general,  for 
the  state. 

«30  HENDEESON",  J.  Appellant  was  convicted  of  know- 
ingly and  fraudulently  adulterating  an  article  of  food,  and  his 
punishment  assessed  at  a  fine  of  one  hundred  dollars;  hence  this 
appeal. 

As  appellant  made  a  motion  to  quash  the  information,  and 
assigns  the  refusal  of  the  court  to  quash  the  same  as  error,  we 
will  set  out  the  charging  part  of  the  information,  to  wit:  "That 
H.  B.  Dorsey  did  then  and  there  knowingly  and  fraudulently 
manufacture,  offer  for  sale,  and  sell  a  certain  article  of  food,  to 
wit,  flour,  which  was  then  and  there  known  hy  him,  the  said 
H.  B.  Dorsey,  to  be  adulterated,  contrary,"  et  cetera.  There  are 
two  statutes  pertaining  to  this  subject,  under  either  of  which 
the  indictment  may  have  been  drawn.  Tlie  first  is  article  427 
of  the  Penal  Code  of  '^^^  3895,  which  provides:  "If  any  person 
shall  fraudulently  adulterate,  for  the  purpose  of  sale,  any  sub- 
stance intended  for  food,  ....  with  any  substance  injurioua 


Jan.  1898.]  Dorsey  t;.  State.  768 

to  health,  he  shall  he  punished  hy  a  fine  not  less  than  fifty  dol- 
lars nor  more  than  five  hundred  dollars."  Article  430  provides: 
**No  person  shall  within  this  state  manufacture,  offer  for  sale, 
or  sell  any  article  of  food,  which  is  by  him  known  to  be  adul- 
terated within  the  meaning  of  this  law**;  and  the  punishment 
assessed  is  a  fine  not  exceeding  one  hundred  dollars.  Article 
432  of  the  Penal  Code  undertakes  to  more  specifically  define 
the  meaning  of  the  term  "adulteration,"  and  in  what  it  con- 
sists. As  to  foods  or  drinks,  the  following  are  the  provisions 
necessary  to  be  quoted,  so  far  as  applicable  to  this  case:  "1.  If 
any  substance  or  substances  has  or  have  been  mixed  with  it  so 
as  to  reduce  or  lower  or  injuriously  affect  its  quality  or  strength; 
2.  If  any  inferior  or  cheaper  substance  or  substances  have  been 
substituted  wholly  or  in  part  for  the  article";  "6.  If  it  be  col- 
ored or  coated  or  polished  or  powdered,  whereby  damage  is 
concealed,  or  it  is  made  to  appear  better  than  it  really  is,  or  of 
greater  value."  Appended  to  this  article  is  the  following: 
''Provided,  that  the  state  health  officer  may,  with  the  approval 
of  the  governor,  from  time  to  time  declare  certain  articles  or 
preparations  to  be  exempt  from  the  provisions  of  this  law;  and 
provided,  further,  that  the  provision  of  this  act  shall  not  apply 
to  mixtures  or  compounds  recognized  as  ordinary  articles  of  food, 
provided  the  same  are  not  injurious  to  health,  and  that  the 
articles  are  distinctly  labeled  as  a  mixture,  stating  the  com- 
ponents of  the  mixture."  The  proof  in  this  case  shows  (which 
was  admitted  by  appellant)  that  the  adulteration  was  of  flour; 
that  is,  flour  and  meal  were  mixed  or  mingled  together  by  a 
bolting  process  which  was  in  operation  in  defendant's  flouring 
mill.  The  mixture  or  compound  contained  ninety  per  cent  of 
flour  and  ten  per  cent  of  com  meal. 

The  contention  of  the  defendant  as  to  the  indictment  is  that 
it  should  have  stated  how  the  adulteration  was  made;  that  is, 
the  contention  is,  that  it  was  necessary  to  prove  an  admixture 
or  adulteration  of  the  flour,  and  to  show  how  the  same  was  adul- 
terated, by  evidence,  and  that  the  indictment  should  have  con- 
tained the  allegations,  so  as  to  put  appellant  on  notice  of  what 
he  was  charged  to  answer.  For  instance,  in  this  case  it  is  in- 
sisted that  the  indictment  should  have  alleged  that  the  flour  was 
adulterated  with  a  certain  portion  of  com  m'eal,  and  that  said 
meal  was  a  substance  such  as  to  reduce  or  lower  or  injuriously 
affect  the  quality  of  the  flour,  or  that  said  flour  was  adulterated 
with  meal,  which  was  an  inferior  or  cheaper  substance  than  the 


764  DoRSEY  V.  State.  [Texas, 

flour  with  which  it  was  mixed.  It  occurs  to  us  that  this  con- 
tention is  sound.  There  are  a  number  of  articles  or  substances 
which  might  be  intermingled  with  flour  so  as  to  reduce  or  lower 
or  injuriously  affect  its  quality  or  strength,  or  which  are  of  an 
inferior  or  cheaper  character;  and  under  our  system  of  criminal 
pleading  the  appellant  should  have  been  charged  with  the  par- 
ticular substance  with  which  the  article  in  question  was  adulter- 
ated, so  that  he  might  be  prepared  to  meet  the  state's  case. 

*^^  We  take  it  that  the  indictment  in  question  was  brought 
under  article  430,  and  not  under  article  427,  inasmuch  as  there 
is  no  allegation,  nor  does  the  proof  indicate,  that  the  meal  shown 
to  have  been  mixed  with  the  flour  was  injurious  to  health.  In 
fact,  the  contrary  appears.  It  further  appears  from  the  evi- 
dence in  the  case  that  both  compounds  which  are  claimed  to 
constitute  the  adulteration  are  recognized  as  ordinary  articles 
of  food,  and  not  injurious  to  health.  In  such  case,  under  the 
provisions  of  the  law,  if  such  articles  are  mixed  together,  and 
are  distinctly  labeled  as  a  mixture,  the  person  manufacturing 
such  article  is  not  indictable.  It  would,  therefore,  seem  to  fol- 
low that  the  indictment,  to  be  good  under  this  article,  should 
negative  the  fact  that  such  substances  or  articles  of  food,  when 
combined  so  as  to  produce  a  wholesome  article  of  food,  were 
properly  labeled.  Of  course,  it  is  competent,  under  the  police 
power  of  the  state,  for  the  legisuature  to  pass  an  act  stating  in 
distinct  terms,  as  to  any  article  of  food  or  drink,  that  if  any 
person,  et  cetera,  shall  adulterate  such  article  (naming  it)  with 
any  other  substance,  without  labeling  same,  such  person  shall 
be  guilty  of  an  offense.  We  understand  this  to  be  a  rule  laid 
down  by  the  authorities.  Some  of  the  legislation  is  based  on  the 
adulteration  of  articles  of  food  or  drink  which  are  unwholesome 
or  injurious,  and  this  appears  to  be  provided  against  in  article 
427  of  our  statute.  Other  legislation  is  aimed  at  the  prevention 
of  frauds  on  the  public,  to  prevent  palming  off  on  them  an 
article  of  food  other  or  different  from  that  which  they  are  led 
to  believe  they  are  purchasing;  and  as  to  the  latter,  the  authori- 
ties appear  to  hold  that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  pro- 
hibit the  mixture  or  compound  altogether,  though  it  may  not  be 
injurious  or  unwholesome:  See  Powell  v. Commonwealth,  114  Pa. 
St.  265,  60  Am.  Rep.  350,  and  authorities  there  cited;  Waterbury 
V.  Newton,  50  N.  J.  L.  534;  Palmer  v.  State,  39  Ohio  St.  236,  48 
Am.  Pep.  429.  We  would  not  be  understood  as  indorsing  the  doc- 
trine laid  down  in  the  above  authorities.     The  courts  have  gone 


Jnn.  1898.]  Dorsey  v.  Statb.  765 

to  great  length  in  upholding  legislation  under  the  police  power. 
In  some  decisions  it  has  been  so  magnified  as  to  be  regarded  as 
almost  omnipotent.  We  do  not  agree  to  the  doctrine  that  un- 
der this  power,  or  any  other,  the  legislature  can  make  criminal 
the  mixture  or  mingling  of  articles  of  food  which  are  whole- 
some and  nutritious,  and  prohibit  the  sale  thereof.  "We  can  add 
nothing  to  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Judge  Gordon  in  the  case 
of  Powell  V.  Commonwealth,  114  Pa.  St.  265,  60  Am.  Eep.  350. 
We  do  agree  to  this  proposition,  that  the  legislature,  when  such 
articles  (namely,  articles  of  wholesome  and  nutritious  food)  are 
mixed  and  intermingled,  can  require  that  the  product  be  labeled, 
showing  the  component  elements  thereof,  and  punish  a  failure 
to  so  label.  We  further  hold  that  the  present  act  of  the  legis- 
lature on  the  subject  is  too  general  in  its  terms.  It  simply  em- 
braces all  articles  of  food  or  drink,  without  naming  any,  and 
makes  the  mixture  of  any  articles  of  food,  however  nutritious, 
without  labeling  the  product,  an  offense.  A  great  many  articles 
of  food  are  mixed  and  combined  together,  and  such  combina- 
tions are  not  only  harmless,  but  are  healthy,  as  articles  of  food; 
and  to  require  all  such  articles  to  be  labeled,  '^^^  so  as  to  show 
the  constituent  elements  composing  the  same,  it  occurs  to  us, 
is  extremely  onerous  legislation.  We  hold  that  an  act  on  this 
subject,  to  be  enforced,  should  name  the  particular  article  of 
food,  the  adulteration  of  which  is  prohibited  by  the  legislature, 
and  which  is  required  to  be  labeled.  In  all  the  cases  on  the 
subject  which  have  come  to  our  notice,  the  legislature  appears 
to  have  directed  the  law  to  some  particular  article  of  food  or 
drink.  For  instance,  in  the  Powell  case,  supra,  the  act  was  for 
the  purpose  of  prohibiting  the  manufacture  of  oleomargarine. 
Now,  as  bearing  on  the  subject  before  us,  we  hold  that  it  would 
be  entirely  competent  for  the  legislature,  by  an  act,  to  prohibit 
the  sale,  et  cetera,  of  flour  mixed  with  meal,  or  any  other  whole- 
some article,  without  properly  labeling  the  product  of  such  com- 
bination. They  have  not  done  this.  The  prosecution  is  at- 
tempted to  be  maintained  under  the  general  act  to  prohibit  the 
intermixing  of  all  foods.  We  do  not  believe  that  it  was  com- 
petent for  the  legislature  to  do  this. 

The  judgment  is  reversed,  and  the  prosecution  ordered  dis- 
missed. 


POLICE  POWER— ADULTERATION  OF  FOODS.— No  man  has 
a  constitutional  right  to  keep  secret  the  composition  of  substances 
which  he  sells  to  the  public  as  articles  of  food.    Therefore,  a  statute 


766  DoESEY  V.  State.  [Texas. 

requiring  the  seller  of  "lard  substitutes"  to  give  notice  of  that  fact 
to  the  purchaser,  by  labeling  the  article  with  a  quantitative  analysis 
of  its  ingredients,  does  not  deprive  the  seller  of  his  property  with- 
out due  process  of  law,  but  is  a  valid  exercise  of  the  police  power: 
State  V.  Aslesen,  50  Minn.  5,  36  Am.  St  Rep.  620.  A  statute  prohib- 
iting and  maliing  criminal  the  sale  of  oleomargarine  unless  it  has 
been  colored  pinli  is  constitutional,  though  applicable  to  that  manu- 
factured without,  as  well  as  within,  the  state.  Such  a  statute  has 
for  its  object  the  prevention  of  fraud  on  the  public,  and  is  there- 
fore within  the  police  power  of  the  state:  State  v.  Myers,  42  W. 
Va.  822,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  887;  State  v.  Campbell,  64  N.  H.  402,  10 
Am.  St.  Rep.  419,  and  note;  monographic  note  to  Butler  t.  Chambers. 
1  Am.  St  Rep.  644. 


CASES 

HT  THB 

SUPEEME   COUET 

UTAH. 


Murphy  v.  Motlb. 

[17  Utah,  113.] 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY  AFTER  DEATH 
OF  HUSBAND.— Whether  a  divorced  wife  and  minor  children,  or 
any  of  them,  are  entitled  to  have  the  payment  of  alimony  or  money 
for  their  support  continue  after  the  death  of  the  divorced  husband 
depends  on  the  nature  and  terms  of  the  decree  of  divorce. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY  AFTER  DEATH 
OF  HUSBAND.— A  decree  in  a  divorce  suit  granting  an  absolute 
divorce  and  providing  that  the  mother  shall  have  the  care  and  cus- 
tody of  the  minor  children,  and  the  father  shall  pay  a  certain  sum 
monthly  toward  their  support  during  their  minority,  is  not  dis- 
charged nor  annulled  by  the  death  of  the  father.  Its  performance 
may  be  enforced  thereafter  out  of  his  estate. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY— SECURITY.— If 
there  Is  danger  that  a  divorced  husband  may  dispose  of  his  property 
by  conveyance  or  squander  it,  so  that  nothing  will  remain  upon 
which  the  decree  of  divorce  providing  for  alimony  or  the  support 
of  minor  children  can  operate,  the  court  may  require  him  to  fur- 
nish security  for  its  performance. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE-ALIMONY— SECURITY— EN- 
FORCEMENT OF  LIEN.— If  a  court,  in  granting  an  absolute  di- 
vorce, decrees  that  a  husband  shall  pay  a  certain  sum  per  month 
toward  the  support  of  his  minor  children,  and  makes  such  obliga- 
tion a  lien  upon  part  of  his  property,  it  may  foreclose  the  lien  upou 
failure  of  payment,  and  its  power  to  do  this  is  not  affected  by  the 
death  of  the  father;  and  if  the  proceeds  are  insuflQcient  to  satisfy 
the  claim,  it  may  enforce  payment  of  the  balance  out  of  the  estate. 

J.  H.  and  0.  H.  Moyle,  for  the  appellant. 

Ferguson  &  Cannon,  for  the  respondent. 

**«  BAETCH,  J.    This  action  was  institnted  hy  the  plaintifT 
against  the  defendant,  as  executor  of  the  last  will  and  testament 

(767) 


768  Murphy  v.  Moyle.  [Utah, 

of  Jesse  J.  Murphy,  deceased,  and  involves  the  sum  of  four 
hundred  and  forty-seven  dollars,  claimed  by  virtue  of  a  decree, 
and  subsequent  modification  thereof,  made  by  the  district  court 
of  the  late  territory  of  Utah,  in  an  action  for  divorce  brought 
by  defendant's  testate  against  the  plaintiff.  In  that  case,  the 
-defendant  (plaintiff  herein)  filed  a  cross-complaint,  and  a  decree 
was  granted  in  her  favor  on  her  cross-complaint,  by  which  the 
bonds  of  matrimony  existing  between  the  parties  were  dissolved, 
and  a  certain  sum  of  money  decreed  to  be  paid  monthly  by  the 
defendant  therein  to  the  plaintiff,  for  the  support  of  their  two 
minor  children  during  their  minoritj^  and  until  they  would  be 
of  age.  To  secure  the  payment  of  such  sum,  it  was  decreed  to 
be  a  lien  on  certain  property  of  the  plaintiff  in  that  suit.  The 
*'^''  decree  was  afterward  so  modified  as  to  require  payment  of 
but  one-half  of  the  original  sum,  and  this  was  to  be  for  the 
support  of  the  child  in  whose  behalf  this  suit  was  brought. 
Since  the  death  of  the  testate,  payment  has  been  refused  by 
the  executor,  who  also  refused  to  allow  the  claim  above  men- 
tioned. At  the  trial  of  this  cause,  the  court  rendered  judgment 
in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  directing  that  the  "defendant,  as  execu- 
tor of  the  last  will  and  testament  of  Jesse  J.  Murphy,  deceased, 
pay  to  the  clerk  of  the  court,  for  the  use  of  the  plaintiff,  the 
€um  of  four  hundred  and  forty-seven  dollars,  to  be  paid  by  said 
<;lerk  to  the  plaintiff  in  the  following  manner:  The  sum  of  two 
hundred  and  sixteen  dollars  to  be  paid  as  soon  as  received  by 
«aid  clerk;  the  sum  of  six  dollars  per  month  on  the  first  day 
of  April,  1897;  the  sum  of  six  dollars  per  month  on  each  suc- 
<5eeding  month  thereafter  until  May  15,  1900,  for  the  care,  sup- 
port, and  education  of  Clara  Murphy,  the  minor  daughter  of  the 
■deceased,  to  be  paid  to  plaintiff  while  said  minor  is  under  age, 
-and  in  the  care  and  custody  of  plaintiff" — and  further  decreed 
that  the  plaintiff  had  a  lien  on  the  property  described  in  the 
-decree,  made  in  the  divorce  proceedings,  and  ordered  the  same 
to  be  sold  to  satisfy  the  lien,  and  the  proceeds  to  be  turned  over 
to  the  clerk  of  the  court,  and  that,  if  the  proceeds  were  insuffi- 
■cient  to  pay  the  amount,  the  executor  should  pay  the  deficiency. 
Judgment  was  also  given  for  costs. 

The  material  question  to  be  determined  is  whether,  under 
the  decree  made  in  the  proceedings  for  divorce,  as  afterward 
modified,  and  under  the  law,  the  court  was  authorized  to  mako 
the  decree  in  controversy  herein.  Counsel  for  the  appellant 
contend  that  the  piyment  of  the  money  for  the  support  of  the 


June,  1898.]  Murphy  v.  Moyle.  769 

minor  child  could  not  be  enforced  after  the  death  of  the  tes- 
tate. The  rule  which  counsel  would  here  invoke  was  doubt- 
less applicable  at  ***  common  law  to  a  divorce  a  mensa  et  thoro, 
which  did  not  finally  terminate  the  marriage  relation,  but  merely 
effected  a  separation,  without  disturbing  the  marital  rights  and 
obligations;  but  it  does  not  necessarily  apply  to  a  decree  of 
divorce  granted  under  the  statutes  of  this  state,  which  has  the 
same  effect  upon  the  marriage  relations  and  marital  rights 
and  obligations  as  a  divorce  a  vinculo  matrimonii  at  common 
law.  In  such  case,whether  or  not  the  divorced  wife  and  minor 
children,  or  any  of  them,  are  entitled  to  have  the  payment  of 
Alimony  or  money  for  their  support  continue  after  the  death  of 
the  deceased  depends  on  the  nature  and  terms  of  the  decree 
allowing  the  same.  In  the  case  at  bar,  the  original  decree  of 
•divorce,  after  declaring  the  bonds  of  matrimony  existing  between 
the  parties  dissolved,  and  awarding  the  care,  custody,  and  con- 
trol of  their  minor  children  (who  are  therein  mentioned  as 
Priscilla  Ellen  Murphy  and  Clara  Jane  Murphy)  to  the  defend- 
ant, the  plaintiff  herein,  respecting  the  matter  of  support  for 
them,  provides  as  follows:  "It  is  further  ordered,  adjudged,  and 
-decreed  by  the  court  that  the  defendant  have  and  receive  from 
the  plaintilT  the  sum  of  twelve  dollars  per  month  permanent 
alimony  and  support  for  her  said  minor  children,  the  said 
amount  to  be  paid  to  her  by  the  plaintiff  on  the  first  day  of  each 
and  every  month  during  the  minority  of  said  children,  and  until 
they  become  of  age,  and  that,  as  security  for  the  payment  there- 
of, the  defendant  have  a  lien"  upon  certain  premises  and  prop- 
erty described  in  the  decree.  It  will  be  noticed  that  by  this 
decree  the  plaintiff  was  required  to  pay  the  sum  of  twelve  dol- 
lars per  month  alimony  and  support  for  their  two  minor  chil- 
dren during  their  minority,  and  there  is  no  other  limitation 
than  their  minority,  and  that  a  specific  lien  was  placed  on  cer- 
tain property  to  secure  the  payment  of  such  sum.  The  *^** 
■divorce  granted  was  absolute,  and  severed  all  marital  relations; 
and  the  children  during  their  minority  had  no  other  recourse 
against  their  father  or  his  estate  for  support  than  that  provided 
in  the  decree,  unless  by  the  order  of  the  court.  Afterward,  this 
•decree  in  respect  to  the  support  of  the  minor  children  was  modi- 
fied as  follows:  "It  is  therefore  hereby  ordered,  adjudged,  and 
decreed  that  said  former  decree  entered  in  this  case,  June  24, 
1890,  be  and  the  same  shall  be,  and  is,  modified  as  follows: 
That  said  defendant  shall  have  the  care  and  custody  of  the  said 

AM.  St.  Kxf-  Vol.  LXX.— 19 


770  MuKPHY  V.  MoYLB.  [Utah, 

minor  child  Clara  Murphy,  and  the  said  plaintiff  shall  pay  to 
the  said  defendant,  for  the  support  and  maintenance  of  said 
Clara  Murphy,  the  sum  of  six  dollars  each  month.  And  it  i» 
further  ordered  that  said  decree  entered  June  24,  1890,  is  hereby 
further  modified  so  that  the  lien  provided  for  on  said  three- 
quarters  of  lot  24  in  hlock  4,  and  the  portion  of  lot  3,  in  said 
Ogden  City  survey,  county  of  Weber,  territory  of  Utah,  is- 
hereby  set  aside  and  dissolved  so  far  as  modified,  and  shall  stand 
for  naught;  and  said  lien  is  retained  and  continued  as  follows: 
Defendant  shall  still  have  a  lien  on  the  following  portion  of  said 
lot,  and  that  only  to  secure  the  payment  of  said  six  dollars  per 
month  for  the  support  of  said  minor  child."  The  property 
to  be  affected  by  the  lien,  and  which  is  in  this  action  ordered 
to  be  sold,  is  then  described.  This  modified  decree  simply 
cuts  off  the  support  to  one  of  the  children,  and  it  does  not  ma- 
terially afl'ect  the  force  of  the  former  decree  as  to  the  other. 
It  does  not  in  express  terms  require  payment  during  minority, 
but  the  former  decree  does;  and  it  will  be  noticed  that  the 
original  decree  is  set  aside  and  held  for  naught  only  "so  far  as 
modified."  Therefore,  construing  the  two  decrees  together,  it 
becomes  apparent  that  the  intention  was  to  provide  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  child  mentioned  in  the  modified  decree  during 
minority;  and  this  ^**  is  the  manifest  intention  indicated  by 
the  modified  decree.  Were,  then,  these  decrees,  and  especially 
the  provisions  thereof  respecting  the  children,  made  in  pursu- 
ance of  law? 

Section  2606  of  the  Comp.  Laws  of  Utah  of  1888,  so  far  a» 
material  here,  reads:  "When  a  divorce  is  decreed,  the  court  shall 
make  such  order  in  relation  to  the  children  and  property  of  the 
parties,  and  the  maintenance  of  the  wife,  and  such  portion  of 
the  children  as  may  be  awarded  to  her,  as  may  be  just  and 
equitable;  ....  provided,  further,  that  when  it  shall  appear 
to  the  court  at  a  future  time  that  it  would  be  for  the  interest 
of  the  parties  concerned  that  a  change  should  be  effected  in 
regard  to  the  formal  disposal  of  children  or  distribution  of  prop- 
erty, the  court  shall  have  power  to  make  such  change  as  will  be 
conducive  to  the  best  interest  of  all  parties  concerned."  This 
statute  is  broad  and  comprehensive.  Under  it  the  court  has 
power  to  make  such  a  decree  as  the  circumstances  may  warrant, 
and,  doubtless,  if  there  is  danger  of  the  father  squandering  the 
estate,  or  if,  from  hostility  or  other  cause,  he  is  likely  to  refuse 
maintenance  to  his  wife,  or  support  to  his  children  awarded  to 


June,  1898.]  Murphy  v.  Moylb.  771 

her,  and  thus  leave  the  children  to  he  supported  hy  the  mother 
without  aid  from  the  estate,  the  court  may  make  such  order 
respecting  the  property  and  the  support  and  maintenance  of 
the  wife  and  children  as  is  just  and  equitable,  and  such  order 
or  decree  may  be  made  to  continue  in  force  after  his  decease; 
and  the  court  may  afterward,  if  occasion  shall  require  it,  make 
such  change  in  any  decree  as  "will  be  conducive  to  the  best 
interest  of  all  parties  concerned/'  The  court  may  also  properly 
require  the  husband  to  furnish  security  where  there  is  danger 
that  he  will  dispose  of  his  property  by  conveyance  or  squander  it, 
so  that  nothing  will  remain  upon  which  the  decree  can  operate. 
Testing,  ^^^  therefore,  the  original  and  modified  decrees  by  the 
terms  of  the  statute,  it  is  evident  that  they  were  both  authorized, 
and  created  an  obligation  to  pay  and  a  lien  on  the  property  des- 
cribed in  the  modified  decree  as  security  for  payment  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  terms  of  the  decrees,  which  obligation  and 
lien  continued  in  force  after  the  death  of  the  deceased,  and 
bound  his  estate.  Such  lien  was  subject  to  foreclosure  for  fail- 
ure to  make  payment  of  the  sum  stipulated  at  any  time  during 
the  minority  of  the  child.  It  could  be  foreclosed  the  same  as 
any  other  lien  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  payment.  In 
O'Hagan  v.  O'Hagan,  4  Iowa,  509,  with  reference  to  a  decree 
of  divorce  fixing  a  certain  allowance  as  alimony  to  the  wife  for 
life,  it  was  said:  "This  decree  has  the  same  force  and  validity 
as  any  other  judgment,  and  may  be  collected  in  the  same  man- 
ner. It  is  a  fixed,  ascertained,  and  subsisting  debt  against  him, 
and,  upon  his  death,  against  his  estate. 

Nor  was  it  improper,  under  the  terms  of  the  original  and 
modified  decrees,  for  the  court  in  this  case  to  decree  the  prop- 
erty to  be  sold,  and  the  proceeds  applied  to  the  payment  of  a 
sum,  equal  in  amount  to  that  which  was  ordered  to  be  paid  dur- 
ing the  minority  of  the  child,  and  have  the  same  paid  to  the 
clerk  of  the  court,  to  be  paid  by  him  to  the  plaintiff  as  it  be- 
comes due.  The  court  had  the  right  to  enforce  the  former  de- 
crees, and  foreclose  the  lien  upon  failure  of  payment,  and  its 
power  to  do  so  was  not  affected  by  the  death  of  the  testate,  and, 
if  the  proceeds  shall  be  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  claim,  it  may 
enforce  payment  of  the  balance  out  of  the  estate:  Miller  v.  Miller, 
64  Me.  484;  Storey  v.  Storey,  125  111.  608,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  417; 
Carson  v.  Murray,  3  Paige,  483;  Burr  v.  Burr,  7  Hill,  207; 
Stratton  v.  Stratton,  77  Me.  373,  52  Am.  Rep.  779.  The  cases 
cited  by  appellant  do  not  appear  to  be  in  point  under  our  *^ 


772  MuBPHY  V.   MoYLB.  [Utah, 

statute  and  the  decree  of  divorce  herein  considered,  and  there- 
fore we  do  not  deem  it  important  to  review  them. 

We  cannot  sanction  appellant's  contention.  It  is  unsound, 
as  heing  at  variance  not  only  with  the  decrees  of  the  court  and 
the  law,  but  also  with  justice,  for  it  is  the  solemn  duty  of  every 
husband  and  father  to  support  his  wife  during  life,  and  his 
children  during  their  minority,  suitably  to  their  station  in  life, 
and,  if  he  fail  to  do  so,  every  principle  of  justice  demands  that 
they  be  thus  supported  out  of  his  estate.  This  is,  doubtless, 
what  the  court  endeavored  to  do  in  this  case,  as  is  apparent  from 
an  examination  of  the  several  decrees.  We  are  of  the  opinion 
that  the  decree  in  the  case  at  bar  is  valid,  and,  as  there  is  no 
reversible  error  in  the  record,  the  judgment  must  be  affirmed. 
It  is  60  ordered. 

Zane,  C.  J.,  concurs. 

Miner,  J.,  dissents. 


MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  —  ALIMONY  AFER  DEATH  OP 
HUSBAND.— Where  alimony  is  decreed  in  terms  for  the  natural 
life  of  the  wife,  it  subsists  even  after  the  defendant's  death:  Strat- 
ton  V.  Stratton,  77  Me.  373,  52  Am.  Rep.  779.  A  consent  decree, 
which  provides  for  payment  of  alimony  to  a  divorced  wife  "so  Ion.? 
as  she  may  remain  sole  and  unmarried,"  is  binding  upon  the  hus- 
band during  his  lifetime,  and  upon  his  estate  after  his  decease,  so 
long  as  the  wife  remains  unmarried:  Storey  v.  Storey,  125  111.  60S, 

8  Am.  St.  Rep.  417.  The  right  to  alimony  ceases  on  the  death  of 
the  husband,  and  cannot  afterward  be  availably  asserted,  unless 
It  has  been  before  ascertained  and  fixed  by  decree:  Gaines  v.  Gaines, 

9  B.  Mon.  2^,  48  Am.  Dec.  425.  In  an  earlier  case  in  Kentucky, 
however.  It  was  held  that  the  right  to  alimony  continues  only  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  husband,  or  during  the  separation  of  the  wife 
from  him;  and  it  is,  therefore,  erroneous  to  decree  it  to  her  for  the 
term  of  her  life:  Lockridge  v.  Lockrldge,  3  Dana,  28,  28  Am. 
Dec.  52. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  —  ALIMONY  —  LIEN.  —  Alimony 
awarded  in  a  divorce  case  may  be  decreed  to  be  a  lien  upon  the  real 
estate  of  the  defendant,  but  not  upon  his  personal  property:  John- 
Bon  v.  Johnson,  22  Colo.  20,  55  Am.  St  Rep.  112,  and  note.  See, 
also,  Gaston  v.  Gaston,  114  Cal.  542,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  86. 


July,  1898.]     SiNQEB  V.  Salt  Lake  Coppee  Mfq.  Co.  773 


Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Copper  Manufacturing  Co. 

[17  Utah,  143.] 

CORPORATIONS— MEETINGS— PRESUMPTIONS  AS  TO 
REGULARITY.— If  meetings  of  a  legally  constituted  board  of  di- 
rectors have  been  held,  and  business  within  the  scope  of  and  pur- 
suant to  the  purposes  for  which  the  corporation  was  organized  has 
been  transacted,  the  presumption  is,  that  such  meetings  were  regu- 
larly called,  convened,  and  held  for  the  transaction  of  such  business, 
and  the  onus  probandi  is  upon  him  who  maintains  the  contrary  to 
allege  and  prove  that  they  were  not  so  called  and  held. 

CORPORATIONS— MEETINGS— PRESUMPTION  AS  TO 
REGULARITY.— If  it  appears  that  a  special  meeting  of  the  directors 
of  a  corporation  was  held  and  that  a  quorum  was  present,  it  must 
be  presumed  that  due  notice  of  the  meeting  was  given  and  that 
all  steps  necessary  to  constitute  it  a  regular  and  valid  meeting  were 
taken. 

CORPORATIONS— TRUST  DEED— EXECUTION  OF.— If  a 
committee  is  authorized  by  the  board  of  directors  of  a  corporation 
to  procure  a  loan  for  it  and  the  oflBcers  who  execute  a  trust  deed 
to  secure  such  loan  are  expressly  authorized  to  do  so  by  the  board 
of  directors  and  the  by-laws  of  the  corporation,  the  validity  of  the 
deed  cannot  be  assailed  on  the  ground  that  it  is  not  signed  by  the 
president  and  secretary  of  the  corporation. 

CORPORATIONS— TRUST  DEED— DIRECTOR  DEALING 
WITH  CORPORATION.— If,  in  the  execution  of  a  trust  deed  by 
a  corporation,  there  is  an  entire  absence  of  want  of  good  faith, 
fraud  and  collusion  and  the  corporation  is  a  going  concern,  a  stock- 
holder or  director  is  not  prohibited  from  dealing  with  It.  In  such 
case  the  mere  fact  that  a  director  furnished  a  portion  of  the  money 
does  not  vitiate  the  trust  deed  given  to  secure  the  loan.  Contracts 
made  by  a  corporation  with  its  officers  are  not  void  per  se,  but  will 
be  carefully  scrutinized  in  equity  and  set  aside,  if  not  made  In  the 
utmost  good  faith. 

CORPORATIONS  —  MEEITNGS  —  NOTICE.— As  a  general 
rule,  notice  must  be  given  in  some  way  to  all  directors  of  the  meet- 
ings of  the  board,  where  the  by-laws  and  rules  of  the  corporation 
do  not  provide  the  time  and  place  of  meeting,  in  order  to  render 
them  valid.  To  this  rule  there  are  exceptions,  as  where  such  an 
emergency  exists  as  justifies  Immediate  action  on  the  part  of  the 
board,  and  the  giving  of  notice  to  all  the  members  is  not  practicable, 
or  where  a  director  secretes  himself  In  order  to  prevent  a  meeting, 
or  Is  beyond  the  reach  of  notice. 

CORPORATIONS  —  MEETINGS  —  WANT  OP  NOTICE.- A 
meeting  of  the  directors  of  a  corporation  held  without  notice  to  ab- 
sent directors,  or  the  existence  of  such  an  emergency  as  excuses 
notice  to  them,  renders  the  business  transacted  at  such  meeting 
void. 

CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— TRUST  DEED.— The  in- 
solvency of  a  corporation  at  the  time  a  trust  deed  Is  authorized  and 
executed  by  It  does  not  alone  render  the  Instrument  void. 

T.  Pierce,  for  the  appellanta. 

Shepard  &  Sanford,  Williams,  Van  Colt  &  Sutherland,  G.  A. 
Smith,  Marshall  &  Eoyle,  J.  W.  Barton,  Dickson,  Ellis  &  Ellia, 
C.  F.  Loofbourow,  and  A.  F.  Sanford,  for  the  respondents. 


774  Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Copper  Mfg.  Co.         [Utah, 

****  BAETCH,  J.  The  first  assignment  of  error  which  we 
will  consider  is  the  one  respecting  the  holding  of  the  court,  that 
the  first  trust  deed,  or  that  executed  June  1, 1894,  is  valid.  The 
appellants  insist  that  it  is  void,  and  appear  to  base  their  con- 
tention upon  the  grounds  that  the  meetings  of  the  board  at 
which  it  was  authorized  and  executed  were  not  legally  called,  that 
the  deed  was  not  signed  by  the  president  and  secretary,  and  that 
one  of  the  beneficiaries  was  a  director  of  the  corporation,  and 
participated  in  the  meeting  at  Denver  when  the  trust  deed  was 
executed.  Under  section  493  of  1  Mills'  Annotated  Statutes 
of  Colorado,  by  virtue  of  which  the  Salt  Lake  City  Copper 
Manufacturing  Company  was  incorporated,  and  under  the  ar- 
ticles of  incorporation  and  by-laws,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
board  of  directors  had  the  right  to  hold  meetings  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  state  of  Colorado;  and  the  question,  therefore,  as 
to  the  first  point  of  contention,  is  whether  the  meetings  at  New 
York  and  Denver  were  lawfully  convened.  A  careful  examina- 
tion of  the  record  reveals  nothing  to  show  that  either  one  of 
these  meetings  was  convened  without  notice  to  all  the  directors. 
On  the  contrary,  from  the  minutes  of  the  New  York  meeting  it 
is  clear  that  the  board  met  on  call  of  the  president  at  New  York 
on  May  23,  1894.  Whether  this  call  was  made  by  previous  order 
of  the  board,  as  provided  in  the  articles  of  incorporation,  or 
whether  all  the  members  were  actually  notified  of  the  meeting, 
does  not  appear  from  the  minutes.  Nor  is  there  any  extrinsic 
evidence  to  show  that  the  directors  were  not  properly  notified. 
It  does  appear  that  ^'"*  four  of  the  five  members  of  the  board 
were  present,  and  participated  in  the  meeting.  So,  of  the  Den- 
ver meeting,  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  it  was  not  a  legally 
called  meeting,  of  which  all  the  directors  had  due  and  legal 
notice.  The  minutes  of  both  meetings  show  the  business  which 
was  transacted,  and  that  a  quorum  was  present.  Under  such 
circumstances,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence  to  show  that 
the  meetings  were  not  lawfully  convened,  the  court  would  not 
be  justified  in  holding  that  these  meetings  were  unlawful. 
Where  meetings  of  a  legally  constituted  board  of  directors  have 
been  held,  and  business  within  the  scope  of  and  pursuant  to  the 
purposes  for  which  the  corporation  was  organized  was  transacted, 
the  presumption  is,  that  such  meetings  were  regularly  called  and 
held  for  the  transaction  of  such  business,  and  the  onus  probandi 
is  upon  him  who  maintains  the  contrary  to  allege  and  prove 
that  they  were  not  so  called  and  held.     "This  presumption  in- 


July,  1898.]    Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Coppeb  Mfg.  Co.  775 

eludes  the  presumption  that  the  meeting  of  a  hoard  of  directors 
at  which  a  given  resolution  was  passed  was  regularly  convened. 
Thus,  where  the  validity  of  an  act  done  at  a  special  meeting  of 
the  board  of  directors  of  a  corporation  is  drawn  in  question  on 
the  ground  that  some  of  the  directors  were  not  notified  to  at- 
tend the  meeting,  the  burden  is  on  the  party  attacking  the 
regularity  of  the  proceedings  to  show  that  the  directors  in  ques- 
tion were  not  in  fact  notified.  If  it  appear  that  a  meeting  waa 
held,  and  that  a  quorum  was  present,  it  will  be  presumed,  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that  due  notice  was  given, 
and  that  all  steps  necessary  to  constitute  it  a  regular  and  valid 
meeting  were  taken":  3  Thompson  on  Corporations,  sec.  3297; 
see,  also,  sec,  3926;  1  Cook  on  Stock  and  Stockholders,  sec.  600; 
1  Morawetz  on  Private  Corporations,  sec.  532;  Wells  v.  Kodgers, 
€0  Mich.  525;  Leavitt  v.  Oxford  etc.  Min.  Co.,  3  Utah,  265;  Cho- 
teau  Ins.  Co.  v.  Holmes,  68  Mo.  601,  30  Am.  Eep.  807;  ^'^^  Har- 
din V.  Iowa  Ey.  etc.  Co.,  78  Iowa,  726.  And  notice  need  not  be  af- 
firmatively shown  by  the  record:  3  Thompson  on  Corporations, 
eec.  3934;  Sargent  v.  Webster,  13  Met.  497,  46  Am.  Dec.  743; 
Wells  V.  Rodgers,  60  Mich.  525. 

If,  therefore,  the  appellants  wished  to  attack  the  validity  of 
either  or  both  of  the  meetings  in  question,  it  was  incumbent 
upon  them,  by  proper  averment  in  their  answer,  to  raise  the 
issue  that  the  meeting  or  meetings  were  irregularly  and  illegally 
convened,  because  of  want  of  notice  or  otherwise,  and  then  to 
establish  the  fact  by  proof  at  the  trial.  The  question  of  the  le- 
gality of  those  meetings  was  one  of  grave  importance  to  the 
plaintiif,  because  upon  it  depended  the  validity  of  the  first  trust 
deed,  through  which  he  and  others  claimed  priority  of  payment 
over  the  appellants.  This  is  especially  so,  owing  to  the  insolv- 
ency of  the  common  debtor.  The  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  be  in- 
formed by  their  answer  as  to  the  true  nature  of  the  defense  which 
his  adversaries  intended  to  make,  so  that  he  could  prepare  to 
meet  it.  "The  very  object  and  design  of  all  pleading  by  the 
plaintiff,  and  of  all  pleading  of  new  matter  by  the  defendant, 
is  that  the  adverse  party  may  be  informed  of  the  leal  cause  of 
action  or  defense  relied  upon  by  the  pleader,  and  may  thus  have 
an  opportunity  of  meeting  and  defeating  it,  if  possible,  at  the 
trial.  Unless  the  petition  or  complaint,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  answer,  on  the  other,  fully  and  fairly  accomplishes  this  pur- 
pose, the  pleading  would  be  a  useless  ceremony,  productive  only 
of  delay,  and  the  parties  might   better  be   permitted   to  state 


776  Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Copper  Mfg.  Co.         [Utah^ 

their  demands  orally  before  the  court  at  the  time  of  the  trial. 
The  requirement,  therefore,  that  the  cause  of  action  or  the  af- 
firmative defense  must  be  stated  as  it  actually  is,  and  that  the 
proofs  must  establish  it  as  stated,  is  involved  in  the  very  theory 
of  pleading":  Pomeroy's  Eemedies  and  Eemedial  Eights,  sec. 
554;  15''  Walton  v.  Minturn,  1  Cal.  363;  Green  v.  Palmer,  15 
Cal.  412,  76  Am.  Dec.  492;  Campbell  v.  Jones,  38  Cal.  507. 
There  appear  to  be  no  allegations  in  the  answers  of  the  appel- 
lants that  no  notice  of  those  meetings  was  given  to  the  directors,, 
nor  that  they  were  otherwise  unlawfully  held.  They  having 
failed  to  raise  such  an  issue  by  the  pleadings,  and  to  establish 
the  same  by  competent  evidence,  the  presumption,  "Omnia  rite 
acta,"  must  be  held  to  apply,  and  the  meetings  be  regarded  aa 
in  all  respects  regular  and  valid. 

There  is  no  foundation  for  the  contention  that  the  first  trust 
deed  was  not  properly  executed.  A  committee  was  authorized 
to  procure  the  loan,  and  the  officers  who  executed  the  trust  deed 
were  expressly  authorized  by  the  board,  and  by  virtue  of  the  by- 
laws were  proper  officers,  to  execute  the  deed.  Nor  can  the  fact 
that  the  plaintiff,  who  was  a  director  and  interested  in  the  loan, 
participated  in  the  meeting  at  Denver  when  the  trust  deed  was 
executed  and  delivered,  avail  the  appellants,  under  the  facts  and 
circumstances  disclosed.  The  board  of  directors  of  the  corpora^ 
tion  consisted  of  five  members,  three  of  whom  constituted  a 
quorum,  and  at  the  meeting  held  in  New  York  there  were  pres- 
ent four  directors,  and  it  is  true  that  plaintiff  was  one  of  them, 
but  there  was  a  quorum  present  without  him.  At  that  meeting, 
by  unanimous  action,  the  board  authorized  a  committee  to  nego- 
tiate a  loan  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  empowered 
the  proper  officers  to  execute  the  necessary  papers  therefor,  in- 
cluding a  trust  deed,  on  the  property  of  the  company.  At  that 
time  the  corporation  was  solvent — a  going  concern — and  pur- 
suing the  objects  of  its  creation.  The  loan  was  ordered  to  be 
negotiated  for  the  purpose  of  paying  its  bills  and  overdrafts  at 
a  bank,  and  to  complete  and  put  into  operation  its  electrolytical 
plant  and  copper  refinery.  The  committee,  it  appears,  found  it 
difficult  to  procure  the  *®®  entire  sum  from  disinterested  parties, 
and  hence  negotiated  with  the  plaintiff  and  three  others,  who 
furnished  the  money;  and  at  the  meeting  held  in  Denver  the 
loan  which  had  thus  been  previously  authorized  was  perfected, 
by  the  proper  officers  executing  and  delivering  the  notes  and 
trust  deed.     There  seems  to  be  nothing  in  the  transaction  which 


July,  1898.]    Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Coopeb  Mfg.  Co.  777 

is  tainted  witH  fraud  or  collusion.  It  has  the  appearance  of  a 
fair  business  dealing,  made,  not  for  the  purpose  of  hindering 
or  delaying  creditors  in  the  collection  of  their  claims,  or  secur- 
ing an  advantage  over  creditors,  or  defrauding  them,  but  for  the 
purpose  of  discharging  honest  obligations,  and  continuing  the 
business  of  the  corporation.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
mere  fact  that  a  director  furnished  a  portion  of  the  money  bor- 
rowed does  not  have  the  effect  of  vitiating  the  trust  deed  given 
to  secure  the  loan.  Nor  would  this  trust  deed  be  void,  under 
the  circumstances  surrounding  its  execution,  even  if  it  were  con- 
ceded that  the  plaintiff,  being  the  director  who  furnished  a  por- 
tion of  the  money,  improperly  voted,  as  one  of  the  quorum,  at 
the  Denver  meeting  where  the  same  loan  was  again  authorized, 
because  an  examination  of  the  minutes  of  the  New  York  meet- 
ing shows  that  the  power  then  and  there  conferred  upon  the 
committee  to  negotiate  the  loan  was  full  and  complete,  and 
hence  there  was  no  necessity  for  any  further  authorization  at 
the  subsequent  meeting.  The  mere  doing  of  an  unnecessary 
thing,  at  the  Denver  meeting,  cannot  have  the  effect  of  render- 
ing void  what  was  lawfully  done  at  the  New  York  meeting.  At 
the  time  of  the  transaction  neither  the  good  faith  of  the  plain- 
tiff nor  of  the  other  beneficiaries  was  questioned  by  the  com- 
pany or  any  stockholder  or  creditors,  and  months  thereafter  the 
claims  of  these  beneficiaries,  including  that  of  the  plaintiff,  were 
recognized  in  the  very  trust  deed  under  which  the  appellants 
claim;  *^®  and  this  with  the  knowledge  of  the  appellants. 
Where,  as  in  the  execution  of  the  trust  deed  here  under  consid- 
eration, there  is  an  entire  absence  of  a  want  of  good  faith,  fraud, 
and  collusion,  and  the  corporation  is  yet  a  going  concern,  no 
sound  principle  of  law  prohibits  a  stockholder  or  director  from 
dealing  with  the  corporation.  A  corporation  is  an  artificial  en- 
tity, and  one  of  the  principal  objects  of  its  creation  is  to  con- 
tract with  individuals  in  due  course  of  business.  This  it  may 
do  with  its  directors  and  stockholders  as  well  as  with  others; 
and,  under  the  weight  of  American  authority,  at  least,  contracts 
made  by  the  corporation  with  its  officers  are  not  void  per  se, 
but  at  most  voidable  merely,  at  the  election  of  the  corporation 
or  its  representatives,  within  a  reasonable  time.  Neither  the 
corporation  nor  a  stockholder  is  complaining  here.  It  is  quite 
true  that  since  the  will  of  snch  an  officer  goes  to  make  up  or 
forms  a  part  of  the  will  of  the  legal  entity,  and  the  officer  is 
therefore,  in  some  sense,  on  both  sides  of  the  contract — is  deal- 


778  Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Coppeb  Mfg.  Co.         [Utah, 

ing  with  a  creature  of  which  he  forms  a  part — his  contract  with 
the  corporation  will  be  very  carefully  and  closely  scrutinized  in 
equity,  and  will  be  set  aside  if  not  made  in  the  utmost  good 
faith.  This  doctrine  was  recognized  by  this  court  in  Mercantile 
€o.  V.  Mt.  Pleasant  Equitable  Co-operative  Inst.,  12  Utah,  213, 
where  it  was  said:  "So,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  legislation,  a 
mortgage  executed  by  a  corporation  under  embarrassed  circum- 
stances, to  enable  it  to  continue  its  business,  will  be  sustained 
if  the  whole  transaction  be  in  good  faith;  and  a  corporation  may 
also,  in  like  manner,  obligate  itself  to  a  stockholder  or  director. 
But  in  such  last  cases  a  court  of  equity  will  very  closely  scru- 
tinize the  transactions,  and,  in  case  of  a  contest  between  a  gen- 
eral creditor  and  a  director  or  other  managing  officer,  will  require 
of  the  latter  very  strict  proof  of  good  faith,  and  that  *®^  the 
mortgage  or  other  encumbrance  was  not  executed  in  expectancy 
«f  insolvency,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  an  advantage  over 
other  creditors;  and  such  transactions  may  be  set  aside  on  slight 
grounds." 

In  Twin-Lick  Oil  Co.  v.  Marbury,  91  TJ.  S.  587,  Mr.  Justice 
Miller,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said:  "While  it  is 
true  that  the  defendant,  as  a  director  of  the  corporation,  was 
bound  by  all  those  rules  of  conscientious  fairness  which  courts 
of  equity  have  imposed  as  the  guides  for  dealing  in  such  cases, 
it  cannot  be  maintained  that  any  rule  forbids  one  director  among 
several  from  loaning  money  to  the  corporation,  when  the  money 
is  needed,  and  the  transaction  is  open  and  otherwise  free  from 
blame.  No  adjudged  case  has  gone  so  far  as  this.  Such  a  doc- 
trine, while  it  would  afford  little  protection  to  the  corporation 
against  actual  fraud  or  oppression,  would  deprive  it  of  the  aid  of 
those  most  interested  in  giving  aid  judiciously,  and  best  quali- 
fied to  judge  of  the  necessity  of  that  aid,  and  of  the  extent  to 
which  it  may  safely  be  given":  3  Thompson  on  Corporations, 
sees.  4059,  4061;  Harts  v.  Brown,  77  111.  226;  Saltmarsh  v. 
Spaulding,  147  Mass.  224;  Smith  v.  Skeary,  47  Conn.  47;  Pneu- 
matic Gas  Co.  V.  Berry,  113  U.  S.  322;  Beach  v.  Miller,  130 
111.  162,  17  Am.  St.  liep.  291;  Leavenworth  Co.  Commrs.  v. 
Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  134  U.  S.  688.  Upon  the  foregoing  con- 
siderations, we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  trust  deed  executed 
June  1,  1894,  is  valid. 

This  brings  us  to  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  trust 
deed  executed  to  A.  Hanauer,  trustee,  on  September  24,  1894. 
The  appellants  maintain  that  this  trust  deed  is  valid,  while  the 


July,  1898.]    Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Copper  Mfg.  Co.  779 

respondents  insist  that  it  is  void,  because:  1.  No  notice  to 
directors  was  given  of  the  meeting  at  which  it  was  authorized; 
2.  The  company  at  the  time  of  its  authorization  and  execution 
was  insolvent;  and  3.  For  actual  fraud.  The  main  controversy 
on  ^^^  this  branch  of  the  case  is  respecting  the  legality  of  the 
meeting  held  on  September  24,  1894,  and  the  motives  which 
prompted  the  execution  of  the  trust  deed  of  that  date.  On  the 
question  of  notice  to  directors  of  the  meetings  of  the  board, 
article  2  of  the  by-laws  of  the  corporation,  in  conformity  with 
section  493  of  1  Mills'  Annotated  Statutes  of  Colorado  provides 
**The  board  of  directors  shall  hold  meetings,  when  called  by  the 
secretary,  upon  request  of  the  president  or  any  three  directors, 
upon  timely  notice  thereof."  Under  this  provision  of  this  by- 
law, the  directors  were  required  to  hold  meetings,  and  were  to 
have  timely  notice;  that  is,  every  director  was  entitled  to  have 
notice  in  some  way  of  each  and  every  meeting  of  the  board. 
In  general,  the  directors  had  no  authority  to  act,  except  when 
lawfully  convened  upon  notice  to  all  of  them.  This  is  a  rule 
common  to  all  corporations,  and  prescribes  the  mode  for  con- 
vening the  agents  to  transact  corporate  business.  A  corpora- 
tion, being  but  an  artificial  entity,  has  but  one  will,  and  this 
will  is  collected  by  the  sense  of  a  majority  of  the  directors.  Its 
will  so  collected,  directs  and  controls  the  corporate  acts.  It  is 
therefore  important  that  every  director  should  have  an  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  on  all  matters  affecting  the  corporation,  bo 
that,  through  the  sense  of  all,  its  best  interests  may  be  subserved. 
Every  director  is  entitled  to  the  reasoning,  judgment,  and  advice 
of  every  other  director,  and  cannot  be  deprived  therefrom 
through  failure  to  give  notice.  So  the  stockholders  are  entitled 
to  have  the  corporate  business  conducted  in  view  of  the  experi- 
ence and  wisdom  of  all  the  directors,  and  of  this  right  they  can- 
not be  deprived  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  a  quorum.  It  is  true 
it  is  not  imperative  for  every  director  to  be  present  at  every 
meeting,  but  he  should,  if  possible,  have  notice,  and  an  oppor- 
tunity ****  to  be  present;  for  where  matters  to  be  acted  upon  call 
for  deliberation  and  judgment,  all  interests  and  parties  to  be 
affected  should  have  the  benefit  of  the  wisdom  and  counsel  of 
all  those  intrusted  with  the  decision.  Although  all  may  not 
concur,  still  the  arguments  and  information  of  each  may  modify 
and  affect  the  conclusion  which  otherwise  might  be  reached. 
If  notice  were  not  required,  it  would  doubtless  frequently  hap- 
pen that  the  director,  whose  judgment  because  of  his  superior 


780  Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Coppek  Mfg.  Co.         [Utah, 

knowledge,  power  of  perception,  and  experience  in  the  corporate 
affairs,  would  carry  the  greatest  weight  in  the  deliberations, 
would,  through  lack  of  notice,  he  absent,  and  the  other  directors 
deprived  of  the  benefit  of  his  arguments.  There  are  other  rea- 
Bons  why  personal  notice  must  be  given  to  the  directors  of  all 
meetings  of  the  board  for  which  the  time  and  place  of  holding 
the  same  are  not  stated  in  the  by-laws  or  rules  of  the  corpora- 
tion. If  the  law  were  otherwise,  the  interests  and  rights  of  the 
minority  would  be  subject  to  great  abuse,  and  even  those  of  the 
majority  would  not  be  safe;  for,  where  the  minority  would  con- 
stitute a  majority  of  a  quorum,  they  might  give  notice  to  a 
bare  quorum,  and  at  a  meeting  so  called  change  the  entire  policy 
of  the  majority,  and  transact  business  which  would  destroy  the 
best  interests  of  the  corporation.  This  sequence  was  clearly 
stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Brewer  in  Paola  etc.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Anderson 
Co.  Commrs.,  16  Kan.  309,  where  he  says  that,  if  the  rule  as  to 
notice  were  otherwise,  then,  in  a  'Tsody  composed  of  twelve 
members,  a  quorum  of  seven  could  act,  and  a  majority  of  that 
quorum — four — could  bind  the  body.  An  unscrupulous  minor- 
ity of  four,  by  withholding  notice  to  five,  might  thus  bind  both 
the  body  and  the  corporation.**  While,  however,  the  general 
rule  is  that  every  director,  ^^^  under  such  by-laws  as  the  one 
in  question  herein,  must  have  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of 
every  meeting  of  the  board,  still  there  may  be  exceptions,  as 
where  such  an  emergency  exists  as  justifies  immediate  action  on 
the  part  of  the  board,  and  the  giving  of  notice  to  all  the  mem- 
bers is  not  practicable,  or  where  a  director  should  secrete  him- 
self in  order  to  prevent  a  meeting,  or  is  beyond  the  reach  of 
notice;  and  there  may  be  other  instances  where  the  giving  of 
notice  to  every  director  would  not  be  practicable,  and  a  lack  of 
notice  would  be  excusable.  In  such  cases,  the  rule  cannot  be 
permitted  to  be  used  as  a  weapon  to  prevent  the  transaction  of 
corporate  business,  and  thereby  defeat  the  end  and  object  for 
which  the  corporation  was  created.  The  general  rule  that  notice 
must  be  given  in  some  way  to  all  directors  of  meetings  of  the 
board,  where  the  by-laws  and  rules  of  the  corporation  do  not 
provide  the  time  and  place  of  meeting,  in  order  to  render  them 
valid,  is  well  settled.  In  Simon  v.  Sevier  Assn.,  54  Ark.  58, 
it  was  said:  "No  director  is  required  to  attend  a  meeting  of 
directors  held  without  authority.  Every  one  of  them  is  entitled 
to  vote  and  be  heard  in  all  the  proceedings  of  the  board.  The 
shareholders  in  the  corporation  are  entitled  to  the  influence  and 


July,  1898.]     Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  &jppeb  Mra.  Co.  781 

advice  of  every  director  in  the  management  of  their  affairs. 
Hence,  in  order  to  accomplish  the  object  for  which  each  director 
was  elected,  a  mere  majority  of  the  directors  cannot  constitute 
a  majority  of  the  board  for  the  transaction  of  business  unless 
they  meet  according  to,  and  by  authority  of,  the  by-laws  or  rules 
of  the  corporation,  or  are  called  together  upon  due  and  legal 
notice  given  to  all  of  them.  Assembled  in  any  other  manner, 
they  cannot  act  as  a  board,  but  as  individuals,  and  such  acts  are 
not  the  acts  of  the  corporation":  5  Thompson  on  Corporations, 
sec.  6176;  1  Morawetz  on  Private  Corporations,  sec.  532;  1  Beach 
on  Private  Corporations,  sec.  279;  Bank  of  Little  Eock  v.  Mc- 
Carthy, i«*  55  Ark.  473,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  60;  Stow  v.  Wyse,  7 
Conn.  214,  18  Am.  Dec.  99;  Farwell  v.  Houghton  Copper  "Works, 
8  Fed.  Rep.  66;  Doernbecher  v.  Columbia  City  Lumber  Co.,  21 
Or.  573,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  766;  Wiggin  v.  First  Baptist  Church,  8 
Met.  301;  Harding  v.  Vandewater,  40  Cal.  77;  Doyle  v.  Mizner, 
42  Mich.  332. 

Appellants  cited  the  cases  of  Edgerly  v.  Emerson,  23  N.  H. 
555,  55  Am.  Dec.  207,  and  Bank  v.  Flour  Co.,  41  Ohio  St.  552, 
which  hold  that,  if  a  quorum  of  directors  meet  ani  unite  in  any 
determination,  the  company  is  bound  thereby,  though  the  absent 
creditors  had  no  notice;  but  these  cases  are  evidently  opposed 
to  the  great  weight  of  authority,  and  we  therefore  decline  to 
follow  them.  In  the  case  at  bar,  it  is  shown  that  all  the  di- 
rectors of  the  corporation  were  summoned  to  Salt  Lake  City 
to  attend  a  meeting  to  be  held  on  September  20,  1894,  for  the 
purpose  of  transacting  the  business  and  straightening  up  the 
affairs  of  the  corporation.  It  was  found  that  the  one  hundred 
thousand  dollars  borrowed  previously,  on  June  1st,  had  been 
expended,  but  the  company's  plant  had  not  been  completed  as 
had  been  anticipated.  The  corporation  was  fifty  thousand  dol- 
lars in  debt,  and  money  was  needed  to  pay  for  labor,  machinery, 
et  cetera;  and,  it  would  seem,  certain  persons  were  to  advance 
the  money.  On  September  20th,  pursuant  to  call,  the  directors 
held  a  meeting,  all  being  present,  and,  upon  transacting  the 
corporate  business,  adjourned.  At  that  meeting  Saks  was  au- 
thorized to  borrow  ten  thousand  dollars  for  the  use  of  the  cor- 
poration, of  which,  it  appears,  the  plaintiff  paid  two  thousand 
five  hundred  dollars,  and,  after  guarantying,  with  two  others, 
the  payment  of  the  fifty  thousand  dollars  debt,  on  September 
21,  1894,  started  for  Chicago,  and  afterward  went  to  New  York 
city.    Directors  Green  and  Mears  resigned,  and    their   places 


782  Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Copper  Mfg.  Co.         [Utah, 

were  filled  by  others.  On  September  24,  1894,  David  May, 
Andrew  Saks,  and  J.  E.  Shoenberg,  being  a  quorum  of  the  di- 
rectors, held  a  special  meeting,  as  shown  by  the  evidence,  with- 
out any  *®^  notice  whatever  to  the  absent  members,  or  the  exist- 
ence of  such  an  emergency  as  would  excuse  notice,  and  at  such 
meeting  the  trust  deed  here  under  consideration  was  authorized, 
and  then  executed.  The  directors  holding  this  meeting  knew 
where  the  plaintiff  was  going,  but  nevertheless  failed  to  notify 
him  of  the  meeting,  which  was  held  but  three  days  after  his 
departure,  and  but  four  days  after  the  regularly  convened  meet- 
ing. In  the  trust  deed,  Saks  and  May  preferred  themselves, 
for  the  sum  of  fifty  thousand  dollars,  over  the  creditors  secured 
by  the  trust  deed  of  June  1,  1894,  which  was  unrecorded;  and 
yet  there  appears  to  be  nothing  to  show  that  the  corporation 
owed  them  anything.  At  the  same  meeting  these  directors  also 
transferred  to  the  trustee  in  the  trust  deed  ninety-nine  thousand 
nine  hundred  and  ninety-seven  shares  of  the  capital  stock  of  the 
Utah  Mining  Company,  as  further  security.  All  the  parties  to 
the  trust  deed  of  September  24,  1894,  and  the  directors  who 
authorized  its  execution,  knew  at  that  time  of  the  unrecorded 
trust  deed,  and  were  aware  of  its  terms  and  conditions.  Further 
record  reference  respecting  the  meeting  and  trust  deed  here 
under  consideration  would  seem  useless  and  unimportant,  be- 
cause the  inevitable  conclusion  to  which  reflection  upon  the 
facts  and  circumstances  shown  by  the  record  leads  is  that  the 
meeting  of  September  24,  1894,  falls  within  the  rule  above  con- 
sidered, and  therefore,  for  lack  of  notice  to  the  absent  directors, 
was  unlawfully  convened;  that  all  the  acts  done  by  the  directors 
at  that  meeting  were  without  force  or  effect;  that  the  trust  deed 
and  transfer  of  the  mining  stock  of  that  date  are,  ab  initio, 
null  and  void. 

As  to  the  second  proposition  of  respondents,  the  fact  that  the 
corporation  was  insolvent  when  the  trust  deed  was  authorized 
and  excuted,  alone,  would  not  per  se  render  that  instrument 
void. 

Having  reached  the  conclusion  stated  above,  it  becomes  *^** 
unnecessary  to  discuss  the  question  of  fraud.  It  suffices  to  say, 
in  relation  thereto,  that  the  transaction  which  culminated  in 
the  execution  of  the  second  trust  deed  and  transfer  of  the  stock 
was,  under  the  doctrine  of  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Mt.  Pleasant  Equi- 
table Co-operative  Inst.,  12  Utah,  213,  also  fraudulent.  Nor  is 
it  necessary  to  discuss  any  of  the  other  questions  presented  in 
the  record.     The  decree  entered  by  the  learned  court  appears  to 


July,  1898.]     Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  Copper  Mfg.  Co.  785 

dispose  of  the  various  claims  against  the  corporation  in  a  lawful 
manner,  and  upon  careful  consideration  we  are  not  inclined  to 
disturb  that  decree.     The  judgment  is  affirmed. 

Zane,  C.  J.,  and  Miner,  J.,  concur. 


CORPORATIONS  — MEETINGS  OF  DIRECTORS —NOTICE.— 
It  Is  indispensable  to  a  legal  meeting  of  the  directors  of  a  corpora- 
tion for  the  transaction  of  business  that  all  the  directors  have 
notice,  either  actual  or  constructive,  of  the  time  and  place  of  the 
meeting,  unless  they  are  all  actually  present  thereat.  The  transac- 
tions of  any  meeting  not  so  held  are  void,  and  evidence  of  such 
transactions  are  iDadmissfble  upon  a  direct  attack:  Doernbecher  v. 
Columbia  City  etc.  Co.,  21  Or.  573,  28  Am.  St.  Rep.  706.  Notice  ta 
all  the  directors  of  a  corporation  of  a  business  meeting  thereof  is 
generally  necessary  to  its  validity,  and  can  only  be  dispensed  with 
when  it  is  Impracticable  to  give  such  notice  to  the  minority  in  a 
case  of  emergency,  and  when  the  act  done  in  the  absence  of  one 
or  more  of  them  not  served  with  notice  clearly  appears  to  be  rea- 
sonably necessary  as  well  as  proper  to  the  welfare  of  the  corpora- 
tion: Bank  v.  McCarthy,  55  Ark.  473,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  60,  and  note. 
A  quorum  of  the  directors  of  a  corporation  having  attended  a  spe- 
cial meeting,  it  will  be  presumed  prima  facie  that  all  of  the  di- 
rectors were  duly  notified  to  attend:  Chouteau  Ins.  Co.  v.  Holmes. 
G8  Mo,  601,  30  Am.  Rep.  807.  On  the  entire  question  of  the  validity 
of  corporate  acts  done  or  authorized  at  a  meeting  not  properly 
called,  see  the  extended  note  to  Stow  v.  Wyse,  18  Am.  Dec.  102. 
As  holding  that  notice  to  all  the  directors  is  not  necessary,  see 
Sargent  v.  Webster,  13  Met.  497,  46  Am.  Dec.  743;  Edgerly  v.  Emer- 
son, 23  N.  H.  555.  55  Am.  Dec.  207. 

CORPORATIONS  —  DIRECTORS  DEALING  WITH.— Di lectors 
of  a  corporation  may  loan  It  money  or  Indorse  for  It,  and  have  the 
same  right  to  collect  the  debt  or  secure  themselves  as  Is  accorded 
to  other  creditors  of  the  corporation:  Schufeldt  v.  Smith,  131  Mo. 
280,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  028;  Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  156  111. 
624,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  245.  A  director  or  oflScer  of  a  solvent  corpora- 
tion Is  a  trustee  and  agent  of  It  and  of  Its  stockholders  only  and  so 
far  as  Its  creditors  are  concerned.  He  may  deal  with  It,  loan  it 
money,  and  take  security  therefor,  in  like  manner  as  a  stranger. 
In  such  case  the  subsequent  Insolvency  of  the  corporation  will  not 
affect  such  officer's  right  to  recover  his  loan  or  enforce  his  security: 
Mullanphy  Sav.  Bank  v.  Schott,  135  111.  655,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  401, 
and  note.  As  favoring  a  more  strict  rule,  see  O'Connor  etc.  Co.  v. 
Coosa  etc.  Co.,  95  Ala.  614,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  251.  See,  also,  th» 
monographic  note  to  Beach  y.  Miller,  17  Am.  St  Rep.  298-308. 


784  Morrison  v.  Willard.  [Utah, 


Morrison  v.  Willard. 

[17  Utah,  306.] 

MECHANIC'S  LIENS  — NOTICE  — SUFFICIENCY  OF.— A 
notice  of  mechanic's  lien  wtiich  fails  to  show  that  the  material  was 
furnished  for  the  construction  of  the  building  in  question,  or  that 
-any  portion  of  the  material  was  used  in  the  construction,  or  pur- 
chased for  the  purpose  of  constructing  the  building  referred  to  in 
the  notice  of  lien,  and  which  also  fails  to  show  the  terms,  time 
given,  and  conditions  of  the  contract,  and  which  contains  no  state- 
ment, except  inferentially,  as  to  what  the  contract  was,  how  much 
lumber  was  purchased,  what  price  was  agreed  to  be  paid  for  it, 
"Whether  it  was  purchased  or  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  construct- 
ing the  building  in  question,  or  whether  it  was  ever  used  therein, 
Is  InsufBcient  and  void. 

MECHANIC'S  LIENS  — NOTICE  — ESSENTIALS  OP.  —  A 
notice  of  mechanic's  lien  must  contain  and  set  out,  as  far  as  the 
<;laimant  is  able  to  ascertain  and  disclose  it,  the  contract  between 
the  owner  and  contractor,  so  that  the  price,  terms,  and  conditions 
of  the  contract  may  be  known  as  affecting  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  subcontractor  and  others  interested.  Otherwise,  the  notice 
Is  insufficient  and  void. 

MECHANIC'S  LIENS.— ESSENTIAL  AVERMENTS  OMIT- 
TED from  the  notice  of  a  mechanic's  lien  cannot,  in  an  action  to 
foreclose  the  lien,  be  supplied  by  averments  in  the  complaint  or  by 
•extrinsic  evidence. 

J.  M.  Bowman,  for  the  appellant. 

King,  Burton  &  King,  for  the  respondent. 

*®''  MINEK,  J.  Plaintiff  commenced  this  action  to  fore- 
close a  mechanic's  lien  upon  property  owned  by  defendant  Clay- 
ton, arising  upon  its  contract  in  furnishing  material  to  Willard 
&  Stewart,  as  subcontractors  on  a  contract  by  them  to  build  a 
house  for  defendant  Clayton,  and  to  secure  a  judgment  against 
Willard  and  Clayton.  The  notice  claiming  a  lien,  as  filed  and 
set  forth  in  the  complaint,  so  far  as  material,  reads  as  follows: 
■''To  Whom  it  May  Concern: 

"Notice  is  hereby  given  that  Morrison,  Merrill  &  Co.,  a  cor- 
poration duly  organized  under  the  laws  of  Utah,  intends  to  claim 
and  hold  a  lien  on  the  following  described  premises,  to  wit, 
....  said  described  premises  being  the  property  of  B.  J.  Clay- 
ton, who  contracted  with  H.  W.  Willard  and  E.  Stewart,  doing 
business  as  Willard  &  Stewart,  to  erect  said  Clayton  a  residence 
on  above-described  premises.  The  claimants,  Morrison,  Merrill 
&  Co.,  as  subcontractors  in  the  first  degree,  having  furnished 
Willard  and  Stewart  lumber  and  building  material  to  the  amount 
of  $775.68,  on  which  there  is  a  credit  of  $301.64,  leaving  still 
•due  and  unpaid  $474.04,  for  which  amount  said  lien  is  claimed. 


June,  1898.]  Morrison  v.  Willabd.  786 

together  with  interest  at  eight  per  cent  per  annum  from  Sep- 
tember 10,  1896,  said  Willard  and  Stewart  having  bought  said 
material  and  agreed  to  pay  for  the  same  in  cash/* 

^^^  Defendant  Clayton  filed  a  demurrer  to  the  complaint  on 
the  ground  that  it  did  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute 
&  cause  of  action.  The  demurrer  was  sustained  as  to  defendant 
Clayton.  Plaintiff  declined  to  amend,  and  the  complaint  was 
dismissed  as  to  Clayton.  Thereupon  the  plaintiff  appeals  to 
this  court. 

The  question  in  the  case  arises  upon  the  sufficiency  of  the 
notice  under  the  statute.  The  Eevised  Statutes,  section  1386, 
provides  that  "every  original  contractor  within  sixty  days  after 
the  completion  of  his  contract,  and  every  person  save  the  original 
contractor  claiming  the  benefit  of  this  chapter,  must,  within 
forty  days  after  furnishing  the  last  material  or  performing  the 
last  labor  for  any  building,  improvement,  or  structure,  or  for 
any  alteration,  addition  to  or  repair  of,  or  performance  of  any 
labor  in,  or  furnishing  any  materials  for,  any  mining  claim,  file 
for  record  with  the  county  recorder  of  the  county  in  which  the 
property  or  some  part  thereof  is  situated,  a  claim  in  writing 
containing  a  notice  of  intention  to  hold  and  claim  a  lien,  and  a 
statement  of  his  demand,  after  deducting  all  just  credits  and 
offsets,  with  the  name  of  the  owner  if  known,  and  also  the  name 
of  the  person  by  whom  he  was  employed  or  to  whom  he  fur- 
nished the  material,  with  a  statement  of  the  terms,  time  given, 
and  conditions  of  his  contract,  specifying  the  time  when  the 
first  and  last  labor  was  performed,  or  the  first  and  last  material 
furnished,  and  also  a  description  of  the  property  to  be  charged 
with  the  lien,  sufficient  for  identification,  which  claim  must  be 
verified  by  the  oath  of  himself  or  some  other  person."  The 
evident  purpose  and  object  of  the  statute  was  to  inform  the 
owner  or  others  interested  as  to  the  extent  and  nature  of  a 
lienor's  claim,  in  order  to  facilitate  investigation,  and  determine 
the  relative  rank  and  merits  of  the  lien  filed.  The  rights  of 
subcontractors  and  materialmen  can  be  ascertained  by  ****  refer- 
ence to  the  lien  as  filed,  and  necessarily  rest  upon  proof  of  con- 
tracts between  the  parties,  such  as  accord  with  the  terms  and 
conditions  set  forth  in  the  claim  of  lien  filed.  In  order  to  entitle 
a  person  to  a  lien  upon  the  property  of  another  for  materials 
furnished  or  labor  performed,  such  claimant  must  substantially 
comply  with  all  of  the  requirements  of  the  statute  in  the  state- 
ment of  his  claim  for  a  lien,  and  in  all  essential  particolars  such 

▲H.  ST.  Rbp.,  Vol.  LXX.-60 


786  MOERISON  V.   WiLLARD.  [Utah^ 

statement  must  be  true.  Whatever  rights  such  lienor  has  he 
chtains  by  virtue  of  the  statute,  and  a  full,  substantial  compli- 
ance with  its  provisions  must  be  observed,  or  his  rights  there- 
under will  fail.  The  lien  is  brought  into  operation  by  virtue  of 
the  statute.  The  contract  for  the  construction  of  the  building 
is  entered  into  with  a  view  of  or  with  reference  to  the  statute. 
The  lien  is  a  mere  incidental  accompaniment,  as  a  means  of 
enforcing  payment,  or  a  mere  remedy  given  by  statute  which 
secures  a  performance  provided  for,  but  which  does  not  exist, 
notwithstanding  the  justice  of  the  claim,  unless  the  claimant 
brings  himself  within  the  requirements  of  the  statute,  and  shows 
a  substantial  compliance  with  its  essential  provisions:  Hooper 
V.  Flood,  54  Cal.  222;  Goss  v.  Sterlitz,  54  Cal.  640;  Wagner  v. 
Hansen,  103  Cal.  104;  Phillips  on  Mechanics'  Liens,  sec.  9.  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  was  the  lien  as  filed  a  substantial  com- 
pliance with  the  essential  requirements  of  the  statute?  The 
statute  requires  the  name  of  the  owner,  if  known,  to  be  stated 
in  the  notice.  Tlie  notice  recites  that,  "said  described  premises- 
being  the  property  of  B.  J.  Clayton."  We  are  of  the  opinion 
that  this  recital  is  in  substantial  compliance  with  the  statute. 

Again,  it  does  not  appear  from  the  notice  that  the  material 
was  furnished  for  the  construction  of  the  building  in  question, 
or  that  any  portion  of  the  material  was  used  in  the  construc- 
tion or  purchase  for  the  purpose  of  ^^**  constructing  the  build- 
ing referred  to  in  the  notice  of  lien.  In  order  to  comply  with 
the  terms  of  the  statute,  it  should  appear  that  the  material 
was  furnished  for  the  building  in  question,  or  was  used  in  its 
construction.  The  statute  authorizes  the  lien  when  it  appears 
that  materials  were  furnished  for  any  building,  improvement, 
or  structure,  et  cetera.  Under  such  a  statute,  when  the  lienor 
seeks  to  obtain  a  lien  upon  the  real  property  of  the  owner,  and 
obtains  a  right  thereto,  it  is  reasonable  to  require  the  lienor  ta 
show  that  the  material  was  furnished  for  the  construction  of 
the  building  upon  which  he  seeks  to  obtain  his  lien:  Fathman 
etc.  Mill  Co.  T.  Eitter,  33  Mo.  App.  404;  Boisot  on  Mechanics* 
Liens,  sec.  308. 

The  statute  also  requires  that  the  notice  shall  contain  a  state- 
ment of  the  "terms,  time  given,  and  conditions"  of  the  contract. 
This  requirement  of  the  statute  was  not  substantially  complied 
with.  Except  inferentially,  the  notice  contains  no  statement 
as  to  what  the  contract  was,  how  much  lumber  was  purchased 
or  fumiflhed,  what  price  was  agreed  to  be  paid  for  the  lumber^ 


June,  1898.]  Morrison  v,  Willard.  787 

whether  the  lumber  was  purchased  or  delivered  for  the  purpose 
of  constructing  the  building  in  question,  and  whether  it  was  ever 
used  in  the  building  in  question.  The  nature  of  the  contract 
and  the  time  in  which  it  was  to  be  performed,  whether  the  price 
as  charged  was  the  price  agreed  to  be  paid,  what  the  contract  was 
between  the  owner  and  the  contractor,  and  whether  the  credit 
allowed  was  a  just  credit  or  otherwise,  does  not  sufficiently  ap- 
pear. All  these  questions  were  largely  left  to  conjecture  and 
uncertainty:  Hooper  v.  Flood,  54  Cal.  221;  Boisot  on  Mechanics' 
Liens,  401;  Gates  v.  Brown,  1  Wash.  470;  Wagner  v.  Hansen, 
103  Cal.  104. 

The  Eevised  Statutes,  section  1373  (Sess.  Laws  1894,  p.  44), 
provides  that  "in  case  of  a  contract  between  an  owner  and  a 
contractor,  the  lien  shall  extend  to  the  entire  contract  price, 
and  such  ^**  contract  shall  operate  as  a  lien  in  favor  of  all  per- 
sons except  the  contractor  to  the  extent  of  the  whole  contract 
price,  and,  after  all  such  liens  are  satisfied,  then  as  a  lien  for 
any  balance  of  the  contract  price  in  favor  of  the  contractor." 
Under  this  statute,  no  lien  of  the  subcontractor  can  extend  be- 
yond the  contract  price  between  the  owner  and  the  contractor. 
The  extent  of  the  rights  of  the  subcontractor  under  his  lien  will 
depend  upon  the  original  contract  between  the  owner  and  the 
contractor.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  the  notice  of  lien 
should  contain  and  set  out,  so  far  as  claimant  is  able  to  ascertain 
and  disclose  it,  the  contract  between  the  owner  and  the  con- 
tractor, so  that  the  price,  terms,  and  conditions  of  the  contract 
may  be  known  as  affecting  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  sub- 
contractor and  others  interested;  Boisot  on  Mechanics'  Liens, 
sec.  402;  Gates  v.  Brown,  1  Wash.  470.  These  essential  aver- 
ments, having  been  omitted  in  the  notice  of  lien,  cannot  be  sup- 
plied by  averments  in  the  complaint,  or  by  extrinsic  evidence: 
Bertheolet  v.  Parker,  43  Wis.  551;  Malter  v.  Falcon  Min.  Co.,  18 
Kev.  209;  Wagner  v.  Hansen,  103  Cal.  104. 

We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  demurrer  was  properly  sus- 
tained.    We  find  no  error  in  the  record.    The  judgment  of  the 

district  court  is  affirmed,  with  costs. 

« 

Zane,  C.  J.,  and  Bartch,  J.,  concur. 


MECHANIC'S  LIEN-NOTICE— ESSENTIATyS.— A  mechan- 
ic's lien  notice  is  sufficient  If  It  describes  the  premises  and  sUites 
the  amount  due,  to  whom  and  from  whom,  and  for  what  It  is  due: 
Coburn  v.  Stephens,  137  lud.  GS3,  45  Am.  St  Rep.  218,  and  note; 
Getty  V.  Ames,  30  Or.  573.  60  Am.  St  Rep.  835,  and  note;  Odd 
Fellows'  Hall  v.  Masser,  24  Pa.  St  507,  64  Am.  Dec.  675,  and  note. 


788  Staines  v.  Burton.  [Utah, 

A  notice  of  a  claim  for  a  mechanic's  lien  required  to  be  made  and 
filed  for  record  cannot  be  amended  or  reformed.  The  notice  of  the 
claim  must  be  perfect  when  filed:  Madera  Flume  etc.  Co.  v.  Kendall, 
120  Cal.  182,  6G  Am.  St.  Rep.  177,  and  note;  Fernandez  v.  Burleson, 
110  Cal.  164,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  75,  and  note.  But  it  seems  that  a  mere 
imperfect  description  of  the  property  in  the  lien  notice  may  be  aided 
by  extrinsic  evidence  where  there  are  proper  allegations  in  the 
pleadings,  upon  the  principle  that  that  is  certain  which  can  be  made 
certain:  Coburn  v.  Stephens,  137  Ind,  683,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  218. 


Staines  v.  Burton. 

[17  Utah,  331.] 

WILLS  —  CHARITABLE  TRUST  —  DESIGNATION  OP 
TRUSTEE.— If  a  testator,  after  providing  for  certain  beneficiaries 
in  his  will,  declares  therein  that  "after  the  death  of  each  one  I  de- 
sire that  my  executors  shall  malie  over  to  the  presiding  bishop  of 
the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints  the  half  of  my  es- 
tate from  which  that  wife's  income  was  derived.  The  presiding 
bishop  shall  receive  it  in  trust  and  expend  the  annual  income  ac- 
cording to  his  discretion,  for  the  benefits  of  the  members  of  the 
Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints,"  the  will  clearly 
designates  such  presiding  bishop  as  trustee  and  suflaciently  do- 
scribes  the  beneficiaries  under  the  will. 

WILLS— CHARITABLE  TRUSTS.— A  bequest  by  will  to  the 
presiding  bishop  of  a  certain  church,  in  trust,  to  expend  the  annual 
Income,  according  to  his  discretion,  for  the  benefit  of  the  members 
of  such  church,  "whether  it  be  for  public  schools,  parlis,  watering 
cities,  acclimatizing  foreign  plants,  or  anything  else  whereby  the 
members  may  be  benefited,  creates  a  charitable  use  or  trust,  and  is 
not  within  the  rule  against  perpetuities. 

WILLS-CHARITABLE  TRUSTS— CONSTRUCTION.— If  a 
charitable  Intent  appears  on  the  face  of  a  will,  but  the  terms  used 
are  broad  enough  to  allow  the  fund  being  applied  either  In  a  lawful 
or  unlawful  manner,  the  gift  must  be  supported,  and  its  application 
restrained  within  the  bounds  of  the  law. 

Shepard  &  Tanford,  for  the  appellant. 

L.  G.  Young  and  F.  S.  Eichards,  for  the  respondents. 

***  ZANE,  C.  J.  It  appears  from  this  record  that  William 
Carter  Staines,  late  of  Salt  Lake  City,  made  his  will  on  March 
1,  1873,  devising  certain  real  estate  to  his  two  wives,  Lilias  and 
Priscilla,  and  in  which  he  disposed  of  his  remaining  estate  as 
follows:  "My  will  is  that  my  executors  ^^  shall  sell  it,  and 
invest  the  proceeds  as  they  think  best,  to  be  safe,  and  to  yield 
the  most  income.  This  income  I  wish  to  have  divided  as  it 
accrues,  quarterly  or  semiannually,  between  the  above-named 
Lilias  and  Priscilla,  one-half  to  each  as  long  as  she  lives.     After 


July,  1898.]  Staines  v.  Burton.  789 

the  death  of  each  one,  I  desire  that  my  executors  shall  make 
over  to  the  presiding  hishop  of  the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ 
of  Latter-Day  Saints  the  half  of  my  estate  from  which  that 
wife's  income  was  derived.  The  presiding  bishop  shall  receive 
it  in  trust,  to  expend  the  annual  interest  or  income,  accord- 
ing to  his  discretion,  for  the  benefit  of  the  members  of  the 
Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints,  whether  it  be  for 
schools,  parks,  watering  cities,  planting  forests,  acclimatizing 
foreign  plants,  or  anything  else  whereby  the  members  may  be 
benefited."  He  made  a  codicil  to  the  will  on  January  20,  1881, 
devising  certain  other  lands  to  the  appellant,  his  only  child, 
to  be  held  and  used  in  case  he  should  die  without  issue,  and 
prior  to  testator's  wives,  Lilias  and  Priscilla,  "the  same  to  de- 
scend to  and  be  used  and  disbursed  as  stated  in  the  last  clause 
of  my  said  last  will  and  testament";  and  he  departed  this  life  on 
the  second  day  of  August,  1881.  The  property  subject  to  the 
last  clause  of.  his  will  is  now  estimated  to  be  of  the  value  of 
$42,526. 

Appellant's  counsel  insist  that  it  is  uncertain  from  testator's 
language  who  should  hold  the  residue  of  the  estate  as  distin- 
guished from  the  income  from  it — whether  the  body  known  as 
the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints  or  its  presiding 
bishop.  The  language  clearly  says  the  presiding  bishop  is  to  re- 
ceive it  in  trust,  and  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  he  shall  hold  it 
in  trust. 

Counsel  also  insist  that  it  is  uncertain  for  whose  benefit  the 
property  must  be  held  after  the  death  of  his  wives — whether  for 
the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  ^^*  Saints  or  its  mem- 
bers. As  to  the  beneficiaries,  there  appears  to  be  no  room  for 
a  reasonable  doubt.  The  language  of  the  clause  is:  "The  pre- 
siding bishop  shall  receive  it  in  trust,  to  expend  the  annual  inter- 
est or  income  according  to  his  discretion,  for  the  benefit  of  the 
members  of  the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints, 
whether  it  be  for  schools,  parks,  watering  cities,  planting  for- 
ests, acclimatizing  foreign  plants,  or  anything  else  whereby  the 
members  may  be  benefited."  The  expenditures  are  not  required 
to  be  made  for  church  purposes.  The  benefits  contemplated  are 
temporal,  not  spiritual;  they  do  not  relate  to  good  faith  or  wor- 
ship. Besides,  the  expenditures  are  required  to  be  made  for  the 
benefit  of  the  members  of  the  church.  The  class  of  persons  to 
be  benefited  is  distinguished  and  identified  by  church  member- 
ship. 


790  Staines  v.  Burton.  [Utah, 

It  is  further  urged  that  the  clause  creates  a  perpetuity,  and 
that  it  is  therefore  void.  The  estate  subject  to  the  clause  is  cer- 
tainly taken  out  of  commerce  for  a  longer  period  than  a  life  in 
being  and  twenty-one  years  beyond.  It  is  unalienable  for  all 
time,  and  must  be  held  void  if  subject  to  the  rule  of  law  for- 
bidding perpetuities.  However,  that  rule  does  not  apply  to 
grants,  devises,  or  bequests  to  charitable  uses. 

It  is  claimed  the  testator  devoted  the  property  in  question  to 
charity.  This  brings  us  to  the  question.  Are  the  uses  expressed 
in  the  will  charitable?  The  income  provided  was  to  be  ex- 
pended for  the  benefit  of  the  members  of  the  church.  They 
were  to  be  benefited  by  devoting  it  to  schools,  parks,  watering 
cities,  planting  forests,  and  to  acclimatizing  foreign  plants,  or 
in  aid  of  other  enterprises  to  benefit  the  same  class  of  persons. 
By  the  general  expression,  "anything  else  whereby  the  members 
may  be  benefited,"  we  are  authorized  to  assume  the  testator 
^^"^  meant  enterprises  similar  to  those  mentioned  in  the  same 
connection,  and,  if  those  were  charitable,  we  may  infer  he  in- 
tended charitable  objects  by  his  general  expression.  At  the 
time  the  testator  made  his  will  a  very  large  majority  of  the 
people  of  the  territory  were  Latter-Day  Saints.  In  fact,  there 
were  comparatively  few  that  were  not  so  recognized.  In  dedi- 
cating a  portion  of  his  estate  to  their  benefit,  he  devoted  to  the 
good  of  a  class  that  included  almost  the  entire  public.  He  se- 
lected the  enterprises  and  objects  which  he  intended  to  encour- 
age and  aid  from  the  standpoint  of  an  early  settler  in  an  arid 
region.  He  was  a  resident  of  a  city  with  but  few  schools,  and 
without  parks,  and  for  whose  people  there  was  an  increasing  de- 
mand for.  water.  He  was  in  a  new  country  without  forests,  and 
to  which  comparatively  few  foreign  plants  had  been  introduced. 
He  had  provided  for  his  wives  and  his  only  child,  and  wanted  to 
devote  the  remainder  of  his  estate  to  the  benefit  of  the  people  of 
his  own  faith.  The  enterprises  he  wished  to  foster  and  aid  by 
his  bounty  were  the  ones  upon  which  the  advancement,  pros- 
perity, and  the  welfare  of  the  people  largely  depended.  He  gave 
without  ostentation,  and  from  motives  free  from  the  taint  of 
selfish  or  private  considerations.  The  objects  upon  which  the 
testator  directed  the  income  from  the  estate  in  question  to  be 
expended  were  undoubtedly  charitable  in  a  legal  sense:  Jackson 
V.  Phillips,  14  Allen,  529;  1  Beach  on  Trusts,  sec.  371;  Eussell 
V.  Allen,  107  U.  S.  163;  Anderson's  Law  Dictionary,  term  "Char- 
ity." 


July,  1898.]  Staines  v.  Burton.  791 

In  Jackson  v.  Phillips,  14  Allen,  539,  the  court  said:  'It  is 
well  settled  that  any  purpose  is  charitable  in  the  legal  sense  of 
the  word  which  is  within  the  principle  and  reason  of  the  statute 
[43  Elizabeth,  c.  4],  although  not  expressly  named  in  it,"  and 
the  illustrations  give  are:  "Gifts  for  the  promotion  ^®  of  sci- 
ence, learning,  and  useful  knowledge,  though  by  different  donors 
and  in  different  ways  from  those  enumerated  under  the  second 
class;  and  gifts  for  bringing  water  into  a  town,  for  building  a 
town  house,  or  otherwise  improving  a  town  or  city,  though  not 
alluded  to  in  the  third  class,  have  been  held  to  be  charitable." 
And  later  in  the  same  opinion  the  court  uses  the  following  lan- 
guage: "A  precise  and  complete  definition  of  a  legal  charity  is 
hardly  to  be  found  in  the  books.  The  one  most  commonly  used 
in  modern  cases,  originating  in  the  judgment  of  Sir  William 
Grant,  confirmed  by  that  of  Lord  Eldon  in  Morice  v.  Bishop  of 
Durham,  9  Ves.  405,  10  Ves.  541,  that  those  purposes  are  con- 
sidered charitable  which  are  enumerated  in  statute  of  43  Eliza- 
beth, or  which  by  analogies  are  deemed  within  its  spirit  and  in- 
tendment, leaves  something  to  be  desired  in  point  of  certainty, 
and  suggests  no  principle.  Mr.  Binney,  in  his  great  argument 
in  the  Girard  will  case,  41  defined  a  charitable  or  pious  gift 
to  be  'whatever  is  given  for  the  love  of  God,  or  for  the  love 
of  your  neighbor,  in  the  catholic  and  universal  sense — ^given 
from  these  motives  and  to  these  ends — free  from  the  stain  or 
taint  of  every  consideration  that  is  personal,  private,  or  selfish.* 
And  this  definition  has  been  approved  by  the  supreme  court  of 
Pennsylvania:  Price  v.  Maxwell,  28  Pa.  St.  35.  A  more  concise 
and  practical  rule  is  that  of  Lord  Camden,  adopted  by  Chancellor 
Kent,  by  Lord  Lyndhurst,  and  by  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States:  *A  gift  to  a  general  public  use,  which  extends 
to  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich.' "  Except  in  a  few  states,  the 
statute  of  43  Elizabeth,  chapter  4,  is  admitted  to  be  the  princi- 
pal test  of  what  are  in  law  charitable  uses;  and  many  purposes 
not  named  in  it  have  been  held  to  be  charitable  when  withia 
the  reason  and  spirit  of  the  statute.  The  testator  named  in  the 
clause  quoted  ^^'^  schools,  parks,  a  water  supply  to  cities,  plant- 
ing forests,  acclimatizing  foreign  plants,  and  any  other  similar 
enterprise,  as  objects  to  which  his  trustee  was  authorized  to  de- 
vote the  income  from  the  estate  mentioned.  The  terms  of  the 
trust  did  not  require  the  trustee  to  aid  all  of  them.  He  might 
devote  all  of  the  income  to  schools  or  parks,  or  to  either  or  any 
ot  them,  if,  in  his  judgment,  by  so  doing,  the  members  of  the 


792  Staines  v.  Burton.  [Utah, 

church  would  he  henefited  most.  He  did  not  name  any  unlawful 
object,  or  any  purpose  forbidden  by  the  law  agi^inst  perpetuities; 
and,  if  the  trustee  were  to  attempt  to  expend  the  fund  for  any 
unlawful  purpose,  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  chancery  ju- 
risdiction, would  be  authorized  to  limit  such  expenditures  to 
charitable  and  lawful  purposes:  United  States  v.  Late  Corpora- 
tion etc.,  8  Utah,  343;  Jackson  v.  Phillips,  14  Allen,  539;  Mor- 
mon Church  V.  United  States,  136  U.  S.  1;  1  Beach  on  Trusts,, 
sec.  324.  In  United  States  v.  Late  Corporation  etc.,  8  Utah, 
342,  the  court  said:  "When  the  dedication  is  broad  enough  to 
allow  the  trustee  to  apply  the  fund  to  unlawful  as  well  as  lawful 
purposes,  the  court  will  limit  the  application  to  the  lawful  ones. 
When  the  terms  of  the  gift  authorize  the  trustee  to  devote  the 
fund  to  either  of  two  objects — one  lawful  and  the  other  illegal 
— its  application  will  be  confined  to  the  legal  purpose,  and  the 
unlawful  one  will  be  rejected."  In  the  case  of  Jackson  v.  Phil- 
lips, 14  Allen,  539,  the  court  said:  "When  a  charitable  intent 
appears  on  the  face  of  the  will,  but  the  terms  used^re  broad 
enough  to  allow  of  the  fund  being  applied  either  in  a  lawful  or 
an  unlawful  manner,  the  gift  will  be  supported,  and  its  applica- 
tion restrained  within  the  bounds  of  the  law.  The  most  fre- 
quent illustrations^  of  this  in  the  English  courts  have  arisen  un- 
der the  statute  of  9  George  II,  chapter  36  (commonly  called  the 
^statute  of  mortmain'),  prohibiting  ^'^^  devises  of  land,  or  be- 
quests of  money  to  be  laid  out  in  land,  to  charitable  uses.  In 
the  leading  case  Lord  Hardwicke  held  that  a  direction  of  execu- 
tors to  'settle  and  secure,  by  purchase  of  land  of  inheritance  or 
otherwise,  as  they  shall  be  advised,  out  of  my  personal  estate,* 
two  annuities,  to  be  paid  yearly  forever  for  charitable  objects, 
was  valid,  because  it  left  the  option  to  the  executor  to  make  the 
investment  in  personal  property,  which  was  not  prohibited  by 
the  statute;  and  said,  'This  bequest  is  not  void,  and  there  is  no 
authority  to  construe  it  to  be  void,  if  by  law  it  can  possibly  be 
made  good,'  or  (according  to  another,  and  perhaps  more  accu- 
rate, report)  'no  authority  to  construe  it  to  be  void  by  law  if  it 
can  possibly  be  made  good.'"  A  definition  of  a  legal  charity 
applicable  to  all  cases  can  hardly  be  found.  And  when  a  chari- 
table intent  appears  on  the  face  of  the  will,  and  the  terms  used 
are  broad  enough  to  allow  the  fund  to  be  used  for  charitable  ob- 
jects, and  for  those  within  the  rule  of  law  forbidding  perpetui- 
ties— for  lawful  and  unlawful  purposes — the  decisions  are  con- 
flicthig  as  to  whether  the  gift  will  be  good  as  to  the  lawful  pur- 
pose, and  its  application  restrained  to  that.    Some  of  the  cases^ 


July,  1898.]  Staines  v.  Bubton.  795 

apparently  in  conflict  may  be  reconciled,  while  others  cannot. 
We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  views  we  have  expressed  are  sup- 
ported by  the  weight  of  authority  and  by  reason.  The  decree  of 
the  court  below  is  affirmed. 

Bartch  and  Miner,  JJ.,  concur. 


CHARITABLE  TRUSTS— DESIGNATION  OP  TRUSTEE  ANI> 
BENEFICIARIES.— A  gift  for  a  specific  charitable  purpose  will 
not  fall  for  want  of  a  trustee:  Sears  v.  Chapman,  158  Mass.  4tlO,  35 
Am.  St.  Rep.  502.  Gifts  and  trusts  for  public  charitable  uses  are 
favorably  and  liberally  construed,  and  In  such  cases  it  Is  not  nec- 
essary that  the  trustee  be  known  or  capable  of  taking,  nor  that 
the  beneficiary  or  objects  of  the  charity  be  certain  and  definite: 
Raley  v.  Umatilla  County,  15  Or.  172,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  142.  All 
charities  are  not  public,  however,  and  when  the  right  to  share  In 
the  benefits  of  a  charity  depends  on  the  fact  of  voluntary  associa- 
tion with  some  particular  society,  while  all  not  members  of  such 
society  are  excluded,  the  charity  Is  not  purely  public  in  its  nature: 
Philadelphia  v.  Masonic  Home,  160  Pa.  St.  572,  40  Am.  St.  Rep. 
736.  The  general  rule  Is,  that  in  charitable  trusts  there  must  be 
certainty  respecting  both  the  beneficiaries  of  the  trust  and  the 
nature  of  the  benefit  they  are  to  receive  under  it:  See  the  mono- 
graphic note  to  Fifield  v.  Van  Wyck,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  756.  Accord- 
ingly, It  has  been  held  that  a  bequest  of  property  to  be  used  by 
a  Roman  Catholic  Bishop  of  the  diocese  of  G.,  for  the  benefit  and 
behoof  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  Is  void  for  uncertainty: 
McHugh  V.  McCole,  97  Wis.  166,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  106.  As  to  what 
purposes  are  charitable  In  their  nature,  so  that  a  gift  to  them  will 
constitute  a  valid  trust,  see  the  monographic  note  to  Hoeffer  v. 
Clogan,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  256-269;  Dye  v.  Beaver  Creek  Church,  4S 
S.  C.  444,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  724,  and  note;  Mannix  v.  Purcell,  46 
Ohio  St.  102;  15  Am.  St  Rep.  562. 

CHARITABLE  TRUSTS.— THE  RULE  AGAINST  PERPETUI- 
TIES does  not  apply  to  gifts  for  charitable  uses:  Mills  v.  Davison, 
64  N.  J.  Eq.  ^9,  55  Am.  St  Rep.  594,  and  note. 

CHARITABLE  TRUSTS— CONSTRUCTION.— If  two  modes  of 
construction  are  fairly  open,  one  of  which  turns  a  charitable  be- 
quest In  a  will  Into  an  Illegal  perpetuity,  while  the  other  makes  it 
valid  and  operative,  the  latter  construction  must  be  adopted:  Wood- 
ruff V.  Marsh,  63  Conn.  125.  38  Am.  St  Rep.  346. 


794  In  be  Cheistensen.  [Utah, 


In  ee  Christensbn. 

[17  Utah,  412.] 

INSANITY  —  OPINIONS  OF  NONEXPERTS.— Intimate  ac- 
<lTiaIntances  of  a  person  whose  sanity  is  tlie  subject  of  investiga- 
tion and  wlio  liave  been  close  observers  of  his  conduct,  though  not 
competent  as  experts,  when  they  can  instance  acts  indicating  men- 
tal derangement,  are  competent  to  give  their  opinions  as  to  the 
sanity  or  insanity  of  such  person. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW.— THE  TEERITORIAL  LAW  of 
Utah  so  far  as  it  purported  to  confer  general  common-law  and  chan- 
cery jurisdiction  on  probate  courts  is  void. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— WANT  OF  JURISDICTION. 
A  decree  of  divorce  granted  without  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter or  of  the  person,  without  cause  stated  and  without  proof,  is 
Absolutely  void. 

JUDGMENTS— WHEN  VOID— COLLATERAL  ATTACK.— 
A  judgment  pronounced  by  a  tribunal  having  no  authority  to  de- 
termine the  matter  in  issue  is  necessarily  and  incurably  void,  and 
may  be  shown  to  be  so  in  any  collateral  or  other  proceeding  in 
which  it  is  drawn  in  question. 

JUDGMENTS— VOID  CANNOT  BE  VALIDATED.— A  judg- 
ment or  decree  which  is  absolutely  void  cannot  be  validated  or  con- 
firmed by  subsequent  legislation. 

JUDGMENTS— JURISDICTION.— If  a  statute  purporting  to 
confer  jurisdiction  is  void,  no  intendment  of  law  or  presumption 
of  fact  can  be  made  in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction. 

JUDGMENTS— WHEN  MAY  BE  VALIDATED.— If  a  court 
has  jurisuiction  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of  the  person, 
and  some   essential  step  is   omitted  which  the    legislature  has  the  • 
right  to    dispense   with,  it  may    validate  the   judgment  or  decree, 
notwithstanding  the  omission  or  irregularity. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE.— PROCEEDINGS  FOR  DI- 
VORCE ARE  JUDICIAL  IN  THEIR  NATURE,  and  should  be  had 
in  courts  of  justice  under  constitutions  conferring  judicial  power 
on  those  tribunals.  A  divorce  cannot  be  granted  lawfully  except 
for  sufficient  cause,  upon  proof  and  with  notice  to,  or  the  appear- 
ance of,  the  party  comulained  of. 

JUDGMENTS.— ESTOPPEL  CANNOT  BE  BASED  on  a  void 
Judgment  or  decree. 

JUDGMENTS  AS  ESTOPPEL.— If  the  court  has  jurisdiction 
of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of  the  parties,  and  the  decree 
or  judgment  may  be  reversed  or  set  aside  for  error  or  irregularity, 
and  the  defendant  waives  his  right  to  have  this  done  by  executing 
or  accepting  It,  he  is  estopped  from  denying  Its  binding  effect,  but, 
if  such  judgment  is  void  for  any  reason,  he  is  not  estopped. 

Moyle,  Zane  &  Costigan  and  W.  D.  Livingston,  for  the  appel- 
lant. 

Eeid  &  Cherry,  Rawlins,  Thurman,  Hurd  &  Wedgwood,  for 
the  respondent. 

■****  ZANE,  C.  J.     It  appears  from  the  record  in  this  case  that 
Herman  J.  Christensen,  late  of  the  city  of  Manti,  in  the  county 


June,  1898.]  In  be  Christensen.  795 

of  Sanpete,  in  the  state  of  Utah,  died  intestate  on  June  26, 1897, 
the  owner  of  real  and  personal  property  valued  at  seventy-seven 
thousand  five  hundred  and  seventy-one  dollars  and  ninety-six 
cents;  that  three  children  by  Hannah  Christensen,  his  first  wife, 
and  two  children  by  his  last  alleged  lawful  wife,  Petrea  Sorenson 
Christensen,  from  whom  he  was  divorced  after  their  birth,  sur- 
vived him;  that  after  Luther  T.  Tuttle  had  been  appointed  ad- 
ministrator of  the  intestate's  estate,  and  had  filed  an  inventory 
thereof  in  the  probate  court  of  said  county,  Hannah  Christensen, 
by  her  guardian,  Tlieodore  E.  Christensen,  filed  her  petition,  as 
the  intestate's  widow,  for  an  allowance  from  his  estate.  It  also 
**°  appears  that  the  administrator  of  the  intestate  answered 
the  petition  admitting  the  marriage,  but  alleging  a  divorce  on 
December  5,  1854,  by  a  decree  of  the  probate  court  of  Sanpete 
county,  and  that  petitioner  afterward  intermarried  with  John 
Hathaway,  and  that  she  was  therefore  estopped  from  claiming 
she  was  the  widow  of  the  decedent.  It  further  appears  that  the 
district  court,  sitting  for  the  disposition  of  probate  business, 
after  hearing  the  evidence  offered  by  both  sides,  without  mak- 
ing findings,  entered  an  order  denying  the  prayer  of  the  peti- 
tioner. From  this  order  the  petitioner,  by  her  guardian,  has  ap- 
pealed to  this  court. 

These  alleged  facts  present  for  our  decision  the  question.  Was 
petitioner  the  lawful  wife  of  the  intestate  at  the  time  of  his 
death,  and  as  his  widow  is  she  entitled  to  an  interest  in  his 
estate?  The  determination  of  that  question  requires  us  to  de- 
cide upon  the  validity  of  the  alleged  decree;  and,  if  we  shall  find 
the  decree  to  be  void,  to  decide  whether  her  conduct  estops  her 
from  obtaining  the  rights  of  a  widow.  An  issue  as  to  petition- 
er's sanity  was  also  raised  on  the  trial.  Insanity,  if  found,  would 
appear  to  he  more  pertinent  to  the  question  of  estoppel,  but 
we  think  it  should  have  a  bearing  upon  the  decision  of  the  other 
question.  Therefore  we  will  first  consider  the  evidence  upon 
that  issue. 

It  appears  from  the  evidence  in  the  record  that  the  petitioner 
and  the  intestate  were  married  in  the  kingdom  of  Denmark 
about  1843;  that  three  sons  were  born  to  them  there;  that  a 
daughter  was  born  to  them  upon  the  plains. 

Mrs.  Snow,  an  old  resident  of  Manti,  who  knew  them  in  Cop- 
enhagen, and  emigrated  to  Utah  in  the  same  company,  testified, 
in  substance,  that  Hannah  Christensen  had  great  trouble  because 
her  husband,  after  they  reached  this  country,  always  wanted  to 


796  In  be  Christensen.  [Utah, 

get  rid  of  her,  *^®  and  take  the  children  from  her,  and  was  al« 
ways  looking  after  other  women;  that  he  took  up  with  a  girl 
by  the  name  of  Elizabeth  while  crossing  the  plains,  whom  he 
married  at  Springville,  Utah,  on  the  way  to  Manti.  Witness 
knew  the  petitioner  was  left  behind  at  Salt  Lake  City;  that  she 
followed  out  to  the  Jordan  river,  and  her  husband  took  her  back; 
that  she  knew  them  afterward  in  Manti;  that  her  troubles  ap- 
peared to  unhinge  her  mind;  that  she  had  a  great  deal  of  trouble, 
and  had  queer  ways;  that  there  always  appeared  to  be  some- 
thing on  her  mind  vexing  her,  caused  by  her  husband's  actions; 
that  petitioner's  peculiar  actions  indicated  her  mind  was  af- 
fected; that  her  mental  condition  has  appeared  better  since  the 
death  of  her  husband. 

Elsie  C.  Dungar  also  testified,  in  substance,  that  she  came 
across  the  plains  in  the  same  company  with  Herman  J,  Christen- 
sen and  Hannah,  his  wife.  Their  first  stop  was  at  Salt  Lake 
City.  Eemembered  the  time  when  Herman  tried  to  get  rid  of 
his  wife.  He  put  her  away.  She  wanted  to  come  with  him  and 
the  children.  When  the  company  left,  she  went  out  in  the  night 
to  the  camp.  They  had  three  little  boys,  and  a  little  baby,  Sarah, 
born  on  the  plains.  The  petitioner  followed  out  to  the  camp, 
and  her  husband  and  another  man  took  her  back  to  Salt  Lake 
City,  because  he  did  not  want  to  take  her  with  him.  He  took 
the  boys,  and  left  the  baby  with  her  mother.  He  had  a  woman 
with  him,  who  was  the  first  one  he  married  afterward.  The  peti- 
tioner afterward  followed  her  husband.  She  was  troubled  after 
she  reached  Manti,  because  her  husband  had  put  her  away,  and 
she  was  flighty — wrong  in  her  mind.  She  could  work  a  little. 
She  had  no  place  to  go  to.  She  remained  in  Manti  many  years, 
and  lived  at  witness'  home  part  of  the  time.  After  her  sons 
*'^''  grew  up,  they  built  her  a  small  house.  Afterward  she  was 
moved  to  Gunnison,  a  neighboring  town,  for  a  time.  She  trav- 
eled around  the  streets  night  and  day.  She  came  to  witness* 
house  many  times,  and  would  sleep  there.  She  was  running 
around  like  an  irresponsible  person.    She  had  no  home  there. 

Theodore  Christensen  testified,  in  substance,  that  he  was  the 
second  son  of  the  petitioner  and  intestate.  The  eldest  son  was 
dead.  Witness  was  born  in  the  kingdom  of  Denmark  in  1845, 
and  came  with  his  parents  to  Utah  in  1853,  and  remembered  the 
trouble  when  his  mother  was  left  behind,  and  the  children  were 
brought  to  Manti.  Eemembered  her  following  out  to  the  camp 
when  they  left  Salt  Lake,  and  how  she  hung  on  to  the  wagon, 
and  tried  to  come  with  the   children.     Eemembered   all  that. 


June,  1898.]  I»  ke  Christensen.  797 

**At  that  time,  after  the  trouble  began,  my  mother's  mind  failed 
her.  It  became  very  weak.  She  appeared  to  be  losing  her  reason. 
Witness  noticed  the  change,  even  as  a  boy.  His  mother  fol- 
lowed them  to  Manti,  a  few  months  after  she  was  left  behind. 
WTien  she  got  there  she  was  not  allowed  to  see  her  children.  She 
came  to  tlie  house  and  to  the  windows,  and  was  screaming  and 
crying,  and  we  children  wanted  to  get  out  to  her,  and  were 
not  allowed  to.  Quilts  were  put  up  to  the  windows,  and  some 
woman  came,  and  said,  Tor  God's  sake,  let  her  see  her  chil- 
dren.' After  that  she  would  come  every  little  while  to  see  us, 
but  was  not  allowed  to  stay.  She  appeared  to  be  out  of  her 
right  mind.  Eecently  her  mental  condition  has  improved."  The 
children  on  the  streets  called  her  "Crazy  Hannah"  (witness  ob- 
jected to  that).  At  times  she  would  talk  rationally,  and  at 
other  times  she  appeared  crazy.  Witness'  father  brought  an- 
other woman  with  him  to  Manti.  Did  not  know  why  his  mother 
was  left  behind  '^^^  and  deserted.  When  witness  grew  up,  he 
built  a  little  house  for  her,  and  his  mother  and  Sarah  lived  there 
until  she  moved  to  Gunnison.  "We  boys  took  care  of  her  after 
we  grew  up.    She  has  wandered  around  a  good  deal." 

Titus  Christensen,  the  third  son,  testified,  in  substance,  that 
he  was  two  years  old  when  his  father  and  mother  reached  Salt 
Lake  City,  and  can  remember  as  far  back  as  1860.  Witness  re- 
membered that  he  liked  to  go  and  see  his  mother,  but  his  father 
would  object.  That  his  mother  talked  about  his  father  a  great 
deal,  and  appeared  to  be  confused  and  bothered.  After  witness 
got  old  enough,  he  thought  she  was  deranged.  She  said  wild 
things.  She  treated  witness  well,  but  she  would  talk  to  herself 
about  reformation.  Was  troubled  about  the  way  father  was 
doing.  After  witness  grew  up,  people  told  them  they  ought  to 
have  a  guardian  appointed  for  her. 

Witness  Luke  testified,  in  substance,  that  he  had  known  the 
petitioner  since  1854.  That  his  wife  had  employed  her  to  wash 
for  her.  Sometimes  she  would  talk  reasonably,  and  at  other 
times  her  mind  appeared  to  be  unbalanced.  That  was  his  de- 
liberate judgment.  When  the  name  of  her  husband  was  men- 
tioned, or  her  children  were  spoken  of,  she  would  fall  all  to 
pieces.  She  would  say  Herman  was  a  villain.  Had  robbed  her 
of  her  children.  Witness  would  try  to  pacify  her,  but  it  did  no 
good.  Some  people  called  her  "Crazy  Hannah."  She  was  treated 
like  a  crazy  person. 

Sarah  Martin  testified,  in  substance,  that  she  was  the  daughter 
of  petitioner  and  intestate,  and  was  born  on  the  plains.    Could 


798  In  be  Chbistensen.  [Utah, 

rememter  living  with  her  mother  as  a  child.  She  made  pictures 
on  the  walls,  and  said  that  was  witness'  father.  Sometimes  she 
would  say  the  devil  was  after  him  with  big  sticks.  She  would 
run  out  at  all  hours  of  the  night  screaming,  and  witness  would 
lie  in  bed,  '*^®  when  a  little  girl,  also  screaming.  "Her  mental 
condition  has  "continued  the  same  until  the  present,  except  of 
late  years  she  was  been  more  calm,  but  she  still  makes  the  pic- 
tures on  the  walls,  and  thinks  they  are  trying  to  murder  her.'* 
Whenever  she  would  talk  about  witness'  father,  she  would  go 
into  a  frenzy.  "Witness  and  her  mother  lived  for  a  while  in  an 
old  cellar.  Her  mother  broke  pictures  once;  and  set  the  house 
on  fire  at  another  time,  and  partially  burned  it.  She  said  some- 
thing bothered  her;  that  she  could  hear  it  all  the  time,  but  she 
could  not  tell  what.  It  was  reported  that  Hathaway  was  a  de- 
serter from  Johnson's  army,  and  drifted  to  Manti,  and  her 
mother  was  a  poor  demented  woman  running  around,  and  that 
he  took  advantage  of  her. 

In  substance,  such  was  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  who 
knew  the  petitioner  longest  and  most  intimately.  Other  wit- 
nesses, who  saw  petitioner  occasionally,  and  whose  acquaintance 
was  not  so  intimate,  did  not  think  she  was  insane.  Some  of 
them,  however,  who  had  talked  with  her,  testified  that,  when 
her  husband's  name  would  be  mentioned,  she  would  become  agi- 
tated and  greatly  excited. 

The  opinions  of  witnesses  not  competent  as  experts,  and  not  in- 
timately acquainted  with  persons  whose  sanity  is  the  subject  of 
investigation,  unless  they  have  closely  observed  their  appearance 
and  expressions,  are  worth  but  little;  while  the  opinions  of  inti- 
mate acquaintances  who  have  been  close  observers  of  their  con- 
duct, though  not  competent  as  experts,  when  they  can  instance 
acts  indicating  mental  derangement,  are  often  more  reliable  and 
more  valuable  than  professional  experts,  who  have  not  had  the 
benefit  of  such  intimate  acquaintance.  It  must  be  conceded  that 
the  treatment  of  this  woman,  and  the  wrongs  and  hardships  she 
endured  were  well  calculated  to  agitate  *^®  her  feelings,  and 
arouse  her  emotional  nature,  becloud  her  reason,  and  to  impair 
and  unsettle  her  mental  balance  and  equilibrium.  One  witness, 
who  had  known  her  in  Denmark;  after  speaking  of  her  troubles 
on  the  plains,  at  Salt  Lake,  and  Manti,  said,  in  her  judgment, 
"They  unhinged  her  mind."  Another  said,  "Her  mind  became 
unbalanced."  Another  said  that  "she  talked  queer — not  like 
others  in  similar  trouble;  that  she  was  flighty,  and  her  mind  was 
wrong."    Another  said  she  was  regarded  as  crazy;  that  she  was 


June,  1898.]  In  re  Christensen.  79^ 

called  "Crazy  Hannah."  Her  daughter  said  she  would  get  out 
of  bed  at  night,  and  go  screaming  into  the  street;  that  she  cov- 
ered the  walls  of  her  house  with  pictures,  and  called  some  of 
them  devils  with  big  sticks  after  her  husband;  that  she  broke 
pictures  on  one  occasion,  and  set  her  house  on  fire  on  another, 
saying  they  bothered  her;  that  she  was  tired  of  living  there;. 
that  she  could  hear  them  all  the  time,  but  she  did  not  know  what. 

Such  are  some  of  her  acts  and  expressions,  detailed  by  those 
who  knew  her  best.  It  would  appear  that  her  feelings  and  her 
emotional  nature  were  subject  to  uncontrollable  excitement  and 
agitation,  and  that  her  mind  was  haunted  with  delusions,  and 
that,  therefore,  it  was  not  in  its  normal  condition.  There  is  no 
evidence  tending  to  prove  that  her  mind  was  unsound  before 
her  husband  deserted  her  and  took  another  wife,  and  forcibly 
separated  her  from  her  children.  After  she  had  been  put  awuy 
by  her  husband  (as  one  witness  expressed),  and  she  was  left  be- 
hind, and  had  attempted  to  follow  and  hold  on  to  the  wagon  in 
which  her  children  were,  and  after  she  had  been  in  the  night 
forcibly  brought  back  to  Salt  Lake  by  her  husband  and  another 
man,  and  after  she  had  followed  her  husband  and  children  more 
than  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles,  to  Manti,  and  was  denied  ad- 
mission to  the  house  where  her  children  were,  or  the  privilege  of 
seeing  them,  she  became  incapable  *^*  of  controlling  her  feel- 
ings and  emotions  and  of  exercising  her  reason.  Her  mental 
equilibrium  and  balance  was  overthrown,  and  a  cloud  passed 
over  her  mind,  her  life  was  blasted,  and  she  was  left  a  mere 
wreck.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  case  of  this  much 
wronged  and  abused  woman  appeals  strongly  for  remedial  jus- 
tice, and  that  she  should  be  given  a  portion  of  her  husband's 
estate  during  the  remainder  of  her  days,  if  the  rules  of  law  wiE 
permit. 

The  decree  on  which  the  administrator  relies  to  show  the  peti- 
tioner was  not  the  intestate's  wife,  at  the  time  of  his  death,  is  as- 
follows:  "December  5,  1854.  Probata  court  of  Sanpete  county, 
in  session,  by  a  special  call  by  his  honor,  George  Peacock,  i» 
place  of  the  regular  term  of  the  following  Monday,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  business.  The  court  then  proceeded  to  investigate  the 
charge  contained  in  the  petition  presented  by  Hammond  J. 
Christensen  v.  Hanne  Christensen  for  divorce.  Polance  Kof- 
fert  was  sworn  as  interpreter  to  interpret  the  Danish  language. 
The  court  heard  the  testimony,  and  decided  that  Hammond  J. 
Christensen  be  divorced,  and  that  he  have  control  of  three  chil- 
dren, namely,  Julius  H.  Christensen,  Theodore    Edward,  and 


600  In  ee  Christensen.  [Utah, 

"Titus  I.  E.  Christensen,  and  Hanne  Christensen  to  have  F.  C. 
Christensen,  aged  18  months,  until  otherwise  directed  by  the 
-court,  and  the  said  Hammond  J.  Christensen  to  pay  all  costs  of 
«mt,  which  is  ten  dollars.  Court  adjourned.  George  Peacock, 
Probate  Judge."  To  its  admission  in  evidence  the  petitioner,  by 
his  counsel,  objected  on  numerous  grounds,  and  exceptions  were 
taken  to  its  admission.  The  decree  recites  that  the  court  was  in 
special  session  by  a  special  call  of  the  judge,  in  place  of  the 
regular  term, .in  convene  on  the  following  Monday.  By  what  au- 
thority such  special  session  was  called  and  held  does  not  ap- 
pear from  the  record.  *^-  The  decree  also  recites  that  the  court 
proceeded  to  investigate  the  charge  contained  in  the  petition 
presented  by  Hammond  J.  Christensen  against  Hanne  Christen- 
sen for  divorce.  It  appears  from  the  transcript  that  petitioner's 
husband  was  named  Herman  J.  Christensen,  while  the  name  in 
the  decree  is  Hammond  J.  Christensen.  It  is  not  stated  what  the 
charge  in  the  petition  was,  or  what  the  petition  contained,  and 
there  were  no  findings  made  by  the  court,  and  it  does  not  ap- 
pear otherwise  that  there  was  any  petition  filed.  It  is  recited 
that  the  court  heard  the  testimony,  and  decided  that  Hammond 
-J.  Christensen  be  divorced  (from  whom  it  is  not  mentioned),  and 
that  he  should  have  control  of  three  children,  naming  them, 
and  that  Hanne  Christensen  should  have  F.  C.  Christensen,  aged 
18  months,  until  otherwise  ordered. 

Counsel  for  the  petitioner  insist  that  the  foregoing  decree  ia 
absolutely  void  for  several  reasons:  First,  because  the  probate . 
-court,  who  assumed  to  render  it,  did  not  have  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject  matter  of  the  suit.  An  act  of  the  territorial  legislature 
in  force  March  6,  1852,  under  which  the  probate  court  assumed 
jurisdiction  to  enter  the  decree,  expressly  provided  that  probate 
courts  should  have  jurisdiction  in  all  cases  of  divorce.  But  that 
legislature  possessed  only  such  authority  to  confer  jurisdiction 
on  those  courts  as  the  act  of  congress  known  as  the  "organic 
act"  conferred  upon  it.  While  that  act  conferred  common-law 
and  chancery  jurisdiction  upon  the  supreme  and  district  courts, 
respectively,  it  gave  to  the  probate  court  only  such  jurisdiction 
as  its  name  indicated — such  as  that  court  had  theretofore  exer- 
<;ised  in  England  and  in  the  United  States.  It  did  not  give  it 
general  jurisdiction  in  chancery  or  at  law,  nor  did  it  authorize 
the  legislature  of  the  territory  to  do  so.  Divorce  causes  belong 
to  chancery  jurisdiction.  In  Ferris  v.  Higley,  20  **^  Wall.  375, 
the  supreme  court, of  the  United  States  held  that  the  territorial 
law  now  in  question,  so  far  as  it  purported  to  confer  general 


June,  1898.]  In  re  Christensen.  801 

■common-law  and  cliancery  jurisdiction  on  the  probate  courts, 
was  absolutely  void:  Perea  v.  Barela,  6  N.  Mex.  239;  Perea  v. 
Barela,  5  N.  Mex.  458;  Cast  v.  Cast,  1  Utah,  112;  Higbee  v.  Hig- 
bee,  4  Utah,  19.  The  authority  of  the  court  to  try  a  cause  and 
render  judgment  must  be  determined  from  the  facts  alleged  as 
the  cause  of  action  and  the  law  conferring  and  limiting  its  pow- 
•ers.  If  the  only  law  purporting  to  confer  jurisdiction  on  the 
court  to  try  the  case  is  void,  then  all  acts  of  the  court  are  with- 
out authority,  and  also  void.  In  such  a  case,  no  intendment  of 
law  or  presumption  of  fact  can  be  made  in  favor  of  its  jurisdic- 
tion, whether  it  be  as  to  the  subject  matter  or  the  person,  or  as 
to  averment  or  proof.  Therefore,  we  must  hold  the  decree  ad- 
mitted in  evidence  absolutely  void:  1.  Because  the  court  had  no 
jurisdiction  to  try  a  divorce  case;  2.  Because  there  was  no  proof 
of  service  of  notice  on  the  defendant;  3.  Because  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that  any  cause  for  a  divorce,  such  as  the  law  required,  was 
stated;  and  4.  Because  it  does  not  appear  that  any  proof  was 
made  on  which  to  grant  the  decree.  It  is  true  that  one  witness 
testified  that  Hannah  Christensen  was  present,  and  said  she  did 
not  want  to  be  divorced.  That  could  only  be  regarded  as  an  ob- 
jection to  the  divorce,  not  as  an  entry  of  appearance,  even  if  she 
had  been  competent  to  enter  her  appearance:  Freeman  on  Judg- 
ments, 4th  ed.,  sees.  130,  123;  Galpin  v.  Page,  18  Wall.  351.  "A 
judgment  pronounced  by  a  tribunal  having  no  authority  to  de- 
termine the  matter  in  issue  is  necessarily  and  incurably  void, 
and  may  be  shown  to  be  so  in  any  collateral  or  other  proceeding 
in  which  it  is  drawn  in  question'*:  1  Freeman  on  Judgments, 
eec.  120;  Browne's  Jurisprudence  of  Insanity,  sec.  1. 

*^*  Counsel  for  the  intestate's  estate  rely  on  the  following 
provision  of  section  3  of  an  act  of  Congress  in  force  June  23, 
1874,  as  follows:  "All  judgments  and  decrees  heretofore  ren- 
dered by  the  probate  courts  which  have  been  executed,  and  the 
time  to  appeal  from  which  has  by  the  existing  laws  of  said  ter- 
ritory expired,  are  hereby  validated  and  confirmed."  A  preced- 
ing clause  of  the  same  section  expressly  provides  that  "probate 
courts,  in  their  respective  counties,  shall  have  jurisdiction  in 
the  settlement  of  estates  of  decedents  and  in  matters  of  guard- 
ianship and  other  like  matters;  but  otherwise  they  shall  have  no 
civil,  chancery,  or  criminal  jurisdiction  whatever;  they  shall  have 
jurisdiction  of  suits  of  divorce  for  statutory  causes  concurrently 
with  the  district  courts."  In  addition  to  the  territorial  stat- 
ute of  March  6,  1852,  intended  to  confer  jurisdiction  upon  the 

AM.  St.  Rbf..  Vol.  LXX.— 51 


802  In  re  Cheistensen.  [Utah^ 

probate  courts  of  the  territory  to  grant  divorces,  the  same  leg- 
islature passed  an  act  in  force  January  19,  1855,  section  29,  de- 
claring: "The  several  probate  courts  in  their  respective  counties 
have  power  to  exercise  original  jurisdiction,  both  civil  and  crim- 
inal as  well  in  chancery  as  at  common  law,  ....  and  they  shall 
be  governed  in  all  respects  by  the  same  general  rules  and  regula- 
tions as  regards  practice  as  the  district  courts."    Under  this  pro- 
vision the  probate  courts  for  nine  years  had  assumed  jurisdic- 
tion to  try  causes  and  render  judgments  in  criminal  and  civil 
cases  both  at  law  and  in  equity.     During  this  time  men  have 
been  tried  in  those  courts  in  the  various  counties,  and  convicted 
of  various  crimes,  and  sentenced  to  imprisonment  or  fined,  and 
had  served  terms  of  imprisonment;  others  had  paid  their  fines. 
Judgment  had  also  been  rendered  against  parties  for  sums  vary- 
ing in  amounts,  which  had  been  paid,  and  determining  prop- 
erty rights  that  had  been  executed.     Doubtless  Congress  pre- 
sumed the  parties  had  been  served  with  process,  or  had  *^*  ap- 
peared, and  had  received  justice;  that  in  some  cases  sentences 
had  been  made  upon  pleas  of  guilty;  that  some  of  the  judgments 
and  decrees  in  civil  cases  had  been  by  agreement  or  confession; 
that  many  had  been  paid,  and  possession  of  property,  personal 
or  real,  had  been  given  under  others;  and  in  that  way  the  judg- 
ments or  decrees  had  been  executed,  and  justice  had  been  done. 
It  does  not  appear  from  the  language  of  the  curative  provision 
that  Congress  understood  that  the  judgments  and  decrees  re- 
ferred to  were  absolutely  void.     Judgments  and  decrees  that 
had  been  executed,  and  from  which  the  time  for  appeal  had 
expired,  were  intended.     No  appeal   can   be  necessary  from  a 
judgment  that  is  entirely  and  absolutely  void.    Such  judgments 
and  decrees  are  of  no  effect,  and  parties  endeavoring  to  execute 
them  may  be  treated  as  trespassers.     As  we  have  seen,  "a  judg- 
ment pronounced  by  a  tribunal  having  no  authority  to  deter- 
mine the  matter  in  issue  is  necessarily  and  incurably  void,  and 
may  be  shown  to  be  so  in  any  collateral  or  other  proceeding  in 
which  it  is  drawn  in  question."     Again,  the  same  author  says: 
"A  void  judgment  is,  in  legal  effect,  no  judgment.     From  it 
no  rights  can  be  obtained.     Being  worthless  in  itself,  all  pro- 
ceedings founded  upon  it  are  equally  worthless.     It  neither 
binds  nor  bars  anyone.     All  acts  performed  under  it,  and  all 
claims  flowing  out  of  it,  are  void.     The  parties  attempting  to 
enforce  it  may  be  responsible  as  trespassers.     The  purchaser  at  a 
sale  by  virtue  of  its  authority  finds  himself  without  title  and 
without  redress":  Freeman  on  Judgments,  sees.  117,  120. 


June,  1898.]  In  be  Christensen.  803 

At  the  time  the  curative  provision  in  question  was  enacted  by 
Congress,  the  cases  of  Cast  v.  Cast,  1  Utah,  113,  and  Ferris  v. 
Higley,  20  Wall.  375,  declaring  the  probate  courts  of  Utah  had 
not  common-law  or  chancery  jurisdiction,  and  that  so  much  of 
the  act  of  the  territorial  legislature  as  purported  ■***  to  give 
them  jurisdiction  in  divorce  cases  and  general  jurisdiction  in 
criminal  and  civil  cases  were  absolutely  void,  had  not  been  ren- 
dered. "We  are,  therefore,  not  disposed  to  hold  that  Congress 
intended  to  make  a  decree  like  the  one  admitted  in  evidence  and 
relied  upon  in  this  case  valid — a  decree  rendered  without  juris- 
diction to  grant  a  divorce,  and  without  jurisdiction  of  the  per- 
son of  the  defendant,  and  in  which  it  did  not  appear  that  a 
petition  was  filed  stating  any  cause  for  divorce,  as  the  law  re- 
quired, and  in  which  it  did  not  appear  that  any  proof  was  made 
of  a  cause  for  divorce,  as  required  by  law;  and  if  the  national 
legislature  had,  by  the  provision  in  question,  intended  to  vali- 
date such  a  decree,  absolutely  void  beyond  all  question,  the 
provision  would  have  been  as  void  as  the  decree.  The  United 
States  is  based  on  the  will  of  the  people,  possesses  only  such 
powers  as  they  have  expressly  conferred  upon  it,  and  such  as 
are  necessary  to  the  use  of  such  as  are  expressed,  and  no  more. 
And  the  legislative  branch  of  those  delegated  powers  Congress 
possesses.  It  does  not  possess  absolute  power.  It  has  no  more 
power  to  make  a  valid  decree  out  of  a  void  one  than  it  has  to 
make  such  a  decree  out  of  a  sheet  of  blank  paper.  It  cannot 
make  black  white,  or  white  black,  or  something  out  of  nothing. 
Undoubtedly,  the  law-making  department  of  the  government 
may  validate  judgments  and  decrees  voidable  on  account  of 
errors  or  irregularities  merely.  If  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of  the  person,  and  some 
essential  step  is  omitted  which  the  legislature  had  the  right  to 
dispense  with,  it  may  validate  the  judgment  or  decree,  notwith- 
standing the  omission  or  irregularity.  The  legislature  prescribes 
the  methods  and  mode  of  procedure,  and  the  rules  under  which 
judicial  power  shall  be  exercised,  and  in  doing  so  may  dispense 
with  such  formalities  as  are  not  ^^"^  essential  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court.  Whatever  it  may  have  dispensed  with  by  law 
before  action  brought  it  may  dispense  with  by  statute  afterward. 
It  cannot,  however,  dispense  with  jurisdiction  of  the  subject 
matter  of  the  smt,  or  of  the  parties,  nor  with  a  complaint, 
declaration,  petition,  or  claim.  There  must  be  some  right,  duty, 
or  claim  specified.  There  must  be  a  subject  matter  stated,  and 
a  must  be  such  a  one  as  the  court  has  the  right  to  take  juris- 


804  In  be  Christensen.  [Utah, 

diction  of,  and,  if  the  judgment  or  decree  is  to  be  hased  upon 
facts,  they  must  be  first  ascertained  and  found  to  exist.  These 
requirements  are  essential  to  remedial  justice,  and  appear  to  be 
axiomatic. 

Judge  Cooley  says:  *^e  have  elsewhere  referred  to  a  number  of 
cases  where  statutes  have  been  held  unobjectionable  which  vali- 
dated legal  proceedings,  notwithstanding  irregularities  apparent 
in -them.  These  statutes  may  as  properly  be  made  applicable  to 
judicial  as  to  ministerial  proceedings;  and  although,  when  they 
refer  to  such  proceedings,  they  may  at  first  seem  like  an  inter- 
ference with  judicial  authority,  yet  if  they  are  only  in  aid  of 
judicial  proceedings,  and  tend  to  their  support  by  precluding 
parties  from  taking  advantage  of  errors  which  do  not  affect  their 
substantial  rights,  they  cannot  be  obnoxious  to  the  charge  of 
usurping  judicial  power.  The  legislature  does,  or  may,  prescribe 
the  rules  under  which  the  judicial  power  is  exercised  by  the 
courts;  and  in  doing  so  it  may  dispense  with  any  of  those  for- 
malities which  are  not  essential  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court; 
and  whatever  it  may  dispense  with  by  statute  anterior  to  the 
proceedings,  we  believe  it  may  also  dispense  with  by  statute  after 
the  proceedings  have  been  taken,  if  the  court  has  failed  to  observe 
any  of  those  formalities.  But  it  would  not  be  competent  for  the 
legislature  to  authorize  a  court  to  proceed  and  adjudicate  upon 
the  rights  of  parties,  without  giving  ^^s  them  an  opportunity 
to  be  heard  before  it;  and,  for  the  same  reason,  it  would  be 
incompetent  for  it,  by  retrospective  legislation,  to  make  valid 
any  proceedings  which  had  been  had  in  the  courts,  but  which 
were  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  over  the  parties.  Such  a 
legislative  enactment  would  be  doubly  objectionable:  1.  As  an 
exercise  of  judicial  power,  since,  the  proceedings  in  court  being 
void,  it  would  be  the  statute  alone  which  would  constitute  an 
adjudication  upon  the  rights  of  the  parties;  and  2.  Because,  in 
all  judicial  proceedings,  notice  to  parties  and  an  opportunity  to 
defend  are  essential — ^both  of  which  they  would  be  deprived  of 
in  such  a  case.  And  for  like  reasons  a  statute  validating  pro- 
ceedings had  before  an  intruder  into  a  judicial  office,  before 
whom  no  one  is  authorized  or  required  to  appear,  and  who  could 
have  jurisdiction  neither  of  the  parties  nor  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter, would  also  be  void." 

The  weight  of  authority  is  undoubtedly  against  the  proposi- 
tion that  the  law-making  power  may  validate  void  judgments  and 
decrees,  and  we  find  no  authority  for  the  validation  of  such  a 
decree  as  the  one  relied  upon  by  the  administrator.     Authority 


June,  1898.]  In  be  Christensen.  805 

is  against  it.  Some  of  the  cases,  however,  fail  to  distinguish  be- 
tween void  and  voidable  judgments.  Nor  do  we  think  it  can 
be  supported  on  principle:  McDaniel  v.  Correll,  19  111.  226,  68 
Am.  Dec.  587;  Kichards  v.  Eote,  68  Pa.  St.  248;  Roche  v. 
Waters,  72  Md.  264;  Nelson  v.  Kountree,  23  Wis.  367;  Yeatman 
V.  Day,  79  Ky.  186;  MaxweU  v.  Goetschius,  40  N.  J.  L.  383,  29 
Am.  Eep.  242. 

It  is  claimed,  however,  that  Congress  had  the  power  to  grant 
the  divorce  in  question,  and  could,  therefore,  validate  this  void 
decree  by  a  law  enacted  ten  years  after  it  was  framed.  Con- 
gress attempted  to  validate  judgments  in  criminal  and  civil  cases 
which  had  been  executed.  The  effect  of  the  curative  act  was 
(if  held  to  validate  the  decree  ^®  in  question)  to  divorce  the 
petitioner  from  her  late  husband,  and  make  the  divorce  take 
effect  ten  years  before  it  was  actually  granted.  But  Congress 
is  a  legislative  body.  It  is  not  vested  with  judicial  powers,  like 
the  British  parliament  and  many  of  the  states  of  this  Union 
during  their  early  history;  nor  has  Congress  ever  attempted  to 
exercise  such  judicial  power,  as  some  of  the  state  legislatures, 
after  their  constitutions  had  partitioned  the  powers  of  the  state 
government,  and  confined  their  functions  to  law-making,  have. 
Section  1,  article  1,  of  the  United  States  Constitution  declares 
that  "all  legislative  power  therein  granted  shall  be  vested  in  a 
Congress  of  the  United  States,  which  shall  consist  of  a  senate 
and  house  of  representatives."  And  section  1,  article  2,  declares 
that  "the  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  a  president  of  the 
United  States  of  America."  And  section  1  of  article  3  of  the 
same  instrument  declares  "the  judicial  power  of  the  United 
States  shall  be  vested  in  one  supreme  court,  and  in  such  inferior 
courts  as  the  Congress  may  from  time  to  time  ordain  and  estab- 
lish." All  the  legislative  power  delegated  to  the  national  gov- 
ernment is  vested  in  Congress,  except  so  far  as  the  president 
may  participate  therein,  in  the  approval  of  laws  or  by  his  veto; 
and  all  the  executive  power  is  vested  in  the  president,  except 
so  far  as  the  senate  may  give  effect  to  appointments  and  treaties 
by  its  advice  and  consent;  and  all  the  judicial  power  delegated 
to  the  national  government  is  vested  in  one  supreme  court,  and 
in  such  inferior  courts  as  Congress  may,  from  time  to  time, 
ordain  and  establish,  except  as  the  senate  may  use  such  power 
in  impeachment  trials,  and  in  such  investigations  as  it  may  make 
in  exercising  its  legislative  power,  and  in  requiring  witnesses  to 
appear  and  testify  therein.  It  is  plain  that  no  express  or  im- 
plied authority  to  try  divorce  or  other  causes  is  vested  in  Con- 


806  In  be  Christensen.  [Utah, 

gress,  but,  on  the  contrary,  all  ^^  judicial  power,  except  aa 
above  pointed  out,  is  vested  in  the  judicial  department  of  the 
government. 

There  are  decisions  to  the  effect  that  the  granting  of  a  di- 
vorce may  be  regarded  as  a  legislative  act,  and  that  the  legisla- 
ture may,  without  any  alleged  cause  for  divorce,  and  without 
any  notice  to  either  party  or  opportunity  to  be  heard,  and  with- 
out any  proof,  by  an  authoritative  order  or  fiat,  grant  divorces; 
and  there  is  a  second  class  of  cases  which  hold  that  divorce  is  a 
judicial  act  in  those  cases  upon  which  general  laws  confer  on 
the  courts  authority  to  grant  divorces  for  cause,  and  that  in 
such  cases  the  legislature  cannot  grant  divorces,  but  that  the 
legislature  may,  by  special  act,  grant  divorces  for  other  causes. 
A  third  class  of  cases,  however,  hold  that  marriage  secures  to 
the  respective  parties  legal  rights  which  cannot  be  dissolved 
except  for  sufficient  cause,  which  must  be  alleged,  and  that 
the  other  party  should  have  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard;  that  the  truth  can  only  be  ascertained  by  proof;  that  a 
decree  of  divorce  can  only  be  granted  on  such  proof;  and  that 
such  a  proceeding  is  necessarily  judicial;  and,  in  those  states 
whose  constitutions  vest  all  judicial  power  in  the  judicial  de- 
partment of  the  government,  decrees  of  divorce  can  only  be 
granted  by  courts  of  justice.  In  the  case  of  Higbee  v.  Higbee, 
4  Utah,  19,  it  appeared  that  Lyman  P.  Higbee,  an  attorney  at 
law,  residing  with  his  wife  in  Idaho,  sent  her  to  California  for 
her  health,  assuring  her  that  he  would  follow.  Soon  afterward 
he  was  elected  to  the  legislature  of  that  territory,  and  he  In- 
duced that  body  to  grant  him  a  divorce  from  his  wife  without 
notice  to  her,  without  her  knowledge,  without  assigning  cause 
for  divorce,  and  without  any  proof.  Afterward,  he  removed  to 
the  late  territory  of  Utah,  and  after  his  death  his  wife,  as  his 
widow,  was  denied  any  interest  in  his  estate  by  the  probate 
court;  but,  ■*^^  on  appeal  to  the  supreme  court  of  the  territory, 
the  legislative  divorce  of  Idaho  was  held  to  be  void,  and  his  wife 
was  held  to  be  his  widow,  and  entitled  to  a  share  of  his  estate. 
The  case  of  Maynard  v.  Hill,  125  U.  S.  190,  is  relied  upon  to 
establish  the  authority  of  Congress  to  grant  a  divorce  and  to 
validate  the  void  decree  in  evidence.  The  opinion  was  by  a 
divided  court.  It  held  a  divorce  granted  by  the  legislature  of 
the  territory  of  Oregon  valid.  In  that  opinion  the  court,  among 
other  things,  said:  "It  is  conceded  that  to  determine  the  pro- 
priety of  dissolving  the  marriage  relation  may  involve  investiga- 
tions of  a  judicial  nature,  which  can  properly  be  conducted  by 


June,  1898.]  In  be  Chribtenbkn.  807 

the  judicial  tribunal.  Yet  such  investigations  are  no  more  than, 
those  usually  made  when  a  change  of  the  law  is  designed.  They 
•do  not  render  the  enactment,  which  follows  the  information  ob- 
tained, void  as  a  judicial  act,  because  it  may  recite  the  cause  of 
of  its  passage.  Many  causes  may  arise,  physical,  moral,  and 
intellectual — such  as  the  contracting  by  one  of  the  parties  of  an 
incurable  disease,  like  leprosy,  or  confirmed  insanity,  or  hopeless 
idiocy,  or  a  conviction  of  a  felony — which  would  render  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  marriage  relation  intolerable  to  the  other  party, 
and  productive  of  no  possible  benefit  to  society.  When  the  ob- 
ject of  the  relation  has  been  thus  defeated,  and  no  jurisdiction 
is  vested  in  the  judicial  tribunals  to  grant  a  divorce,  it  is  not 
perceived  that  any  principle  should  prevent  the  legislature  from 
interfering,  and  putting  an  end  to  the  relation,  in  the  interest 
of  the  parties  as  well  as  of  society.  If  the  act  declaring  the 
divorce  should  attempt  to  interfere  with  rights  of  property 
vested  in  either  party,  a  different  question  woidd  be  presented." 

In  this  it  is  conceded  that  investigations  of  a  judicial  char- 
acter, to  determine  the  propriety  of  dissolving  the  marriage  rela- 
tion, may  be  involved,  and  that  a  decree  of  *^^  divorce  cannot 
be  granted  except  for  cause;  and  it  was  further  said,  when  the 
object  of  the  marriage  relation  has  been  defeated,  and  no  juris- 
diction is  vested  in  the  judicial  tribunals  to  grant  a  divorce,  that 
no  principle  was  perceived  that  should  prevent  the  legislature 
from  granting  a  divorce.  It  was  also  added  that,  if  the  act 
declaring  the  divorce  should  attempt  to  interfere  with  the  rights 
of  property  vested  in  either  party,  a  different  question  would 
be  presented.  Undoubtedly,  legislatures  should  pass  a  general 
Jaw  such  as  they  may  believe  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  society 
demands,  specifying  causes  for  divorces.  There  was  such  a  law 
in  force  in  the  territory  of  Utah  when  the  divorce  in  question 
was  attempted  to  be  granted,  and  when  the  validating  act  was 
passed,  and  the  district  courts  were  open,  with  undoubted  juris- 
diction. 

Inasmuch  as  the  welfare  of  society  and  the  happiness  of  the 
people  of  the  state  depend  so  largely  on  the  family  founded  on 
marriage,  and  the  public  has  an  interest  in  its  protection  and 
maintenance,  as  well  as  the  parties,  some  courts  have  gone  so 
far  as  to  hold  the  legislature  may  ignore  the  rights  of  the  par- 
ties, and  dissolve  the  relation,  without  inquiry,  and  without 
opportunity  to  the  parties  to  be  heard,  and  may  disregard  the 
rights  of  the  husband  or  wife  not  at  fault;  that  the  legislature  in 
that  way  may  break  up  the  family  and  set  the  wife  and  the  chil- 


808  In  re  Christensen.  [Utah^ 

dren  adrift  without  any  provision  for  support,  for  it  is  conceded 
that  the  legislature,  in  granting  the  divorce,  can-not  make  a 
decree  for  alimony,  or  as  to  custody  of  children,  or  as  to 
property.  In  effect,  it  is  held  by  such  cases  that  the  legislature 
may,  at  the  instance  of  the  delinquent,  or  one  at  fault,  without 
inquiry,  strike  in  the  dark,  and  break  up  the  family,  and  with- 
out warning  set  the  wife  and  children  adrift,  humiliated  and 
disgraced,  without  any  provision  for  their  support  or  mainte- 
nance. 

433  ipjjg  weight  of  authority  undoubtedly  is  to  the  effect  that 
a  divorce  should  not  be  granted  except  for  sufficient  cause;  that 
the  party  complained  of  should  have  an  opportunity  to  be  heard 
• — should  have  a  day  in  court;  that  the  decree  of  divorce  should  b& 
upon  proof;  and  that  such  a  proceeding  is  judicial  in  its  nature. 
Our  conclusion  is,  that  the  trial  of  divorce  causes  should  be  had 
in  courts  of  justice  under  constitutions  conferring  judicijil  power 
on  those  tribunals:  Higbee  v.  Higbee,  4  Utah,  19;  Ponder  v. 
Graham,  4  Fla.  23;  Bryson  v.  Brysoii,  44  Mo.  232;  State  v.  Fry, 
4  Mo.  *120  (81);  2  Kent's  Commentaries,  13th  ed.,  106;  Dart- 
mouth College  V.  Woodward  (Story,  J.),  4  Wheat.  694;  Cooley's 
Constitutional  Limitations,  6th  ed.,  132;  Greenough  v.  Green- 
ough,  11  Pa.  St.  489,  51  Am.  Dec.  567;  In  re  Handley's  Estate, 
15  Utah,  212,  62  Am.  St.  Eep.  926;  Maxwell  v.  Goetschius,  40 
N.  J.  L.  383,  29  Am.  Rep.  242.  When  the  people  of  Utah 
formed  a  state  government,  they  set  the  question  at  rest  for  the 
future  in  this  state,  by  forbidding  the  enactment  of  private  or 
special  laws  granting  divorces. 

Counsel  for  the  decedent's  estate  also  insist  that  the  petitioner 
is  estopped  from  claiming  any  interest  in  her  late  husband's 
estate,  because  of  her  misconduct,  after  the  void  decree,  in  con- 
tracting a  marriage  with  another  man,  or  by  acting  toward  him 
for  a  time  as  though  they  were  married.  An  estoppel  cannot  be 
based  on  a  void  decree  or  judgment.  If  the  decree  or  judgment 
is  simply  voidable,  a  different  rule  may  be  applied.  When  the 
court  has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of 
the  parties,  and  the  decree  or  judgment  may  be  reversed  or  set 
aside  for  error  or  irregularity,  if  the  defendant  waives  his  right 
to  do  so  by  executing  or  accepting  it,  he  will  be  estopped  from 
denying  its  binding  effect;  but,  when  such  judgment  is  void  for 
any  reason,  he  will  not  be  estopped.  The  void  decree  in  con- 
troversy was  obtained  '*^*  by  the  decedent  when  he  knew  he  waa 
not  entitled  to  it.  The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  about  a  year 
before  the  divorce  he  married  a  young  girl,  and,  in  view  of  that 


June,  1898.]  In  bb  Chbistensen.  80^ 

fact,  his  lawful  wife  had  a  complete  defense  to  a  divorce  at  hi& 
instance.  Besides,  he  had  deserted  and  abandoned  his  wife,  and 
had  taken  her  children  from  her  under  circumstances  so  cruel 
and  hard  as  to  overthrow  her  reason.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, there  is  no  legal  rule  or  equitable  principle  that  would 
have  permitted  the  decedent  during  his  lifetime  to  be  divorced 
from  her  because  of  her  imbecility  or  misconduct,  which  hia 
unkind  and  inhuman  treatment  brought  about.  Nor  can  his 
administrator  or  heirs  rely  upon  it  to  defeat  her  rights  as  his 
widow.  She  is  not  responsible  for  the  void  decree,  nor  does 
it  appear  that  she  consented  to  it.  In  her  forlorn,  wretched, 
and  pitiable  condition  she  did  say  that  she  did  not  want  a 
divorce,  and  it  appears  from  the  evidence  that  from  that  day 
she  has  been  incapable  of  forming  a  rational  conclusion  with 
respect  to  the  consequences  and  effects  of  her  ovm  actions. 
When  her  husband  was  the  subject  of  conversation,  her  feelings 
and  emotions  overwhelmed  her  reason. 

The  disastrous  consequences  suggested  that  may  follow  a  judg- 
ment of  this  court  holding  the  decree  of  divorce  in  question  of 
no  effect,  notwithstanding  the  curative  act  relied  upon,  are  not 
likely  to  follow.  Nearly  forty  years  have  elapsed  since  the  last 
of  such  decrees  or  judgments  were  rendered.  It  will,  in  all 
probability,  be  found  that  the  statute  of  limitations  and  the  dis- 
pensations of  time  have  shorn  such  decrees,  and  transactions  in 
con§equence  of  them,  of  the  consequences  feared  by  counsel,  if 
they  are  now  ascertained  to  have  been  void.  Owing  to  the 
peculiar  circumstances  of  this  case,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that 
the  petitioner's  right  to  an  estate  in  the  decedent's  *^^  estate  has 
survived,  notwithstanding  the  statute  of  limitations  and  the 
lapse  of  time;  and  that  this  aged  woman,  with  her  physical  and 
mental  infirmities,  is  entitled,  as  his  widow,  to  an  interest  in 
decedent's  estate,  and  to  whatever  comfort  it  may  afford  her 
during  the  remainder  of  her  days. 

The  order  appealed  from  is  reversed,  and  the  court  below  is 
directed  to  recognize  the  petitioner  as  the  lawful  widow  of  the 
decedent,  and  to  adjudicate  the  rights  of  the  respective  parties 
found  to  have  an  interest  in  his  estate,  and  to  make  payment  or 
distribution  thereof,  according  to  law, 

Bartch  and  Miner,  JJ.,  concur. 


INSANITY  —  OPINION  OF  NONEXPERT.— A  witness,  not  a 
physician,  may  give  his  opinion  as  to  a  person's  Insanity,  when  his 
opinion  is  accompanied  with  the  reasons  upon  which  It  Is  founded: 


810  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah, 

Maxwell  v.  Harrison,  8  Ga.  61,  52  Am.  Dec.  385,  and  note.  When 
A  nonexpert  may  not  testify:  Grand  Lodge  I.  O.  M.  A.  v.  Wieting, 
168  111.  408,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  123. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— JURISDICTION— FOREIGN  DI- 
VORCE.—A  divorce  entered  in  another  state  against  a  resident  of 
the  state  of  New  Yoric  in  a  suit  in  which  the  defendant  did  not  ap- 
pear, in  which  process  was  not  served  on  her  within  the  state 
wherein  the  decree  was  rendered,  is  void  as  against  her  in  New 
York:  Atherton  v.  Atherton,  155  N.  Y.  129,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  650; 
McCreery  v.  Davis,  44  S.  C.  195,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  794;  DeMeli  v. 
De  Meli,  120  N.  Y.  485,  17  Am,  St.  Rep.  652;  monographic  note  to 
Tolen  V.  Tolen,  21  Am.  Dec.  747. 

JUDGMENT— ESTOPPEL.— A  judgment  Is  conclusive  as  an  es- 
toppel, though  it  is  subject  to  be  opened  on  an  application  to  let 
in  a  defense,  so  long  as  it  stands  unopened:  Stevens  v.  Reynolds, 
143  Ind,  467,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  422.  A  judgment,  though  clearly 
■erroneous,  is  conclusive  as  an  estoppel:  People  v.  Holladay,  93  Cal. 
241,  27  Am,  St.  Rep.  186,  However,  nothing  but  a  valid  judgment 
will  operate  as  an  estoppel  upon  anyone:  Springer  v.  Shavender, 
118  N.  C.  33,  54  Am,  St.  Rep.  708.  See,  also,  Hodson  v.  Union  Pac. 
Ey.  Co.  14  Utah,  402,  60  Am,  St,  Rep.  902. 

JUDGMENTS— VOID— COLLATERAL  ATTACK.- A  judgment 
void  for  want  of  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  cannot  conclude 
any  person,  and  may  be  collaterally  attacked:  Springer  v.  Shaven- 
der, 118  N.  C.  33,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  708,  On  the  collateral  attack  of 
judgments  see  the  monographic  note  to  Morrill  v.  Morrill,  23  Am. 
St.  Rep.  104.  A  judgment  is  void  and  entirely  worthless,  and  no 
one  is  bound  to  obey  it,  if  the  court  pronouncing  it  had  not  juris- 
diction over  the  suliject  matter  of  the  action  or  of  the  persons  sought 
to  be  bound  by  it:  Savage  v.  Sternberg.  19  Wash.  679,  67  Am.  St. 
Rep.  751;  Staff Qrd  v.  Gallops,  123  N.  C.  19,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  815. 

JUDGMENTS— VALIDATING  JUDICIAL  PROCEEDINGS.— A 
retrospective  statute  curing  defects  in  legal  proceedings,  where 
they  are  in  their  nature  irregularities  only,  and  do  not  extend  to 
matters  of  jurisdiction,  is  not  void  on  constitutional  grounds  upless 
expressly  forbidden:  Note  to  State  v.  Torinus,  37  Am.  Rep.  397. 


Ceesoent  Mining  Company  v.  Silver  Kino  Min- 
ing Company. 

[17  Utah,  444.] 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATEI^-APPROPRIATION.— Percolating  water,  after  passing  In- 
to an  underground  artificial  tunnel,  and  not  naturally  flowing  from 
or  into  a  natural  stream  with  a  well-defined  channel,  banks,  and 
course.  Is  not  subject  to  appropriation  by  another  while  It  remains 
in  the  tunnel  upon  the  owner's  land;  but  if  the  water  Is  allowed 
to  flow  Into  an  artificial  lake  upon  public  land  It  is  then  subject 
to  appropriation.  The  appropriator  does  not,  however,  thereby  ac- 
quire an  easement  In  the  tunnel  nor  a  prescriptive  right  to  have  the 
water  flow  from  the  tunnel  Into  the  lake  uninterruptedly  and  con- 
tinuously, altliough  he  has  continually  used  the  water  of  the  lake 
for  a  long  period  of  years. 


Aug,  1898.]     Crescent  Mm.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     811 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATER.— The  owner  of  the  soil  Is  entitled  to  the  waters  percolat- 
ing through  It.  Such  water  is  not  subject  to  appropriation  until 
it  leaves  his  land. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATER —APPROPRIATION.— The  ordinary  rules  of  law  apply- 
ing to  the  appropriation  of  surface  streams  do  not  apply  to  perco- 
lating waters  and  subterranean  streams  with  undefined  and  un- 
known courses  and  banks. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATER.— If  water  percolates  through  and  under  the  surface  of  the 
€arth  upon  the  land  of  one  person  and  comes  to  the  surface  just 
before  It  empties  itself  upon  the  land  of  another,  the  owner  of  such 
land  has  no  right  to  demand  that  such  percolation  shall  continue. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATER.— A  PERSON  MAY  LAWFULLY  DIG  A  WELL  on  his 
own  land,  though  thereby  he  destroys  the  subterranean,  undefined, 
percolating  water  of  his  adjoining  neighbor's  spring,  and  no  action 
can  be  maintained  therefor. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATERS.— PRESCRIPTIVE  RIGHT  TO.— Whenever  percolating 
water  is  so  hidden  in  the  earth  that  its  course  is  not  discoverable 
from  the  surface,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  prescription  in 
favor  of  an  adjacent  proprietor  to  have  an  uninterrupted  flow  of 
such  stream  through  the  land  of  his  neighbor. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATER  which  has  been  gathered  in  artificial  tunnels  or  ditches 
and  allowed  to  flow  from  the  proprietor's  land  to  an  Inferior  pro- 
prietor, and  has  been  used  by  him  a  greater  period  of  time  than  that 
allowed  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  does  not  become  his  by  pre- 
scriptive title. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES— PERCOLATING 
WATER,  so  long  as  it  remains  in  an  artificial  tunnel  or  mining 
claim  of  the  proprietor  of  the  land,  is  not  open  to  appropriation  by 
another* 

TRESPASS  — INJUNCTION  AGAINST.— If  one  who  owns 
valuable  mining  property  and  a  water  supply  at  a  considerable  dis- 
tance therefrom  digs  a  trench  and  Inserts  a  pipe  line  therein  under 
the  surface  of  worthless,  uncultivated,  and  unused  land  of  another 
from  his  water  supply  to  his  mine,  covering  the  trench  with  the  ma- 
terial taken  out,  and  not  causing  the  landowner  any  damage  except 
nominal,  the  latter  is  not  entitled  to  an  injunction  restraining  the 
trespass,  when  it  appears  that  to  restrain  the  laying  of  the  pipe 
line  would  caupe  irreparable  damage  to  the  mine-owner  and  de- 
stroy a  large  Industry  without  any  benefit  to  the  landowner.  In 
such  case,  the  remedy  at  law  being  adequate  the  landowner  must  be 
required  to  resort  to  such  remedy  for  the  recovery  of  damages  at- 
tending the  trespass. 

INJUNCTIONS— WHEN  NOT  GRANTED.-If  the  facts  pre- 
sent  no  matter  requiring  equitable  relief,  and  the  granting  of  an  in- 
junction will  work  irreparable  injury  to  one  party  with  no  appre- 
ciable benefit  to  the  other,  and  the  remedy  at  law  Is  adequate  to 
<io  full  justice,  the  court  should  refuse  to  issue  an  Injunction  as 
not  within  Its  legitimate  Jurisdiction. 

Moyle,  Zane  &  Costigan  and  Marshall,  Eoyle  &  Hempstead, 
for  the  appellants. 


812  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah> 

Dickson,  Ellis  &  Ellis,  for  the  respondent. 

'*^*  MINEE,  J.  It  appears  from  the  findings  of  the  lower 
court  that  the  plaintiff  in  the  year  1886  constructed  a  dam 
across  the  outlet  of  what  is  called  "Thayne"  or  "Shadow"  lake, 
and  by  this  means  impounded  and  retained  the  waters  flowing 
into  said  lake,  and,  by  means  of  a  pipe  line  inserted  into  said 
lake,  took  from  the  unappropriated  waters  thereof  sufficient  to 
fill  its  said  pipe,  and  carried  the  same  to  the  Crescent  mine, 
for  use  in  carrying  on  the  mining  operations  of  the  plaintiff; 
that  one  of  the  principal  sources  of  supply  of  said  Shadow  lake 
or  reservoir  was  the  stream  of  water  flowing  from  the  Thayne  or 
Jeanette  tunnel,  situated  in  and  excavated  upon  the  Thayne  and 
Jeanette  mining  claims,  the  property  of  the  defendant,  and  its 
grantors  and  predecessors  in  interest,  which  said  stream  of  water 
was,  at  the  date  of  the  diversion  by  the  plaintiff,  as  aforesaid, 
of  the  waters  of  said  Shadow  lake,  running  from  said  tunnel 
into  said  lake;  that  said  Thayne  or  Jeanette  tunnel  was  run  upon 
and  excavated  upon  mining  claims  and  mining  property  owned 
by  said  defendant,  and  its  grantors  and  predecessors  in  interest, 
prior  to  the  year  1883,  and  prior  to  the  diversion  and  use  of  said 
waters  of  said  lake,  and  its  natural  sources  of  supply,  by  said 
plaintiff,  which  said  mining  claims  and  mining  property  were 
duly  patented  by  the  United  States  to  the  grantors  and  predeces- 
sors in  interest  of  defendant  '**®  prior  to  the  running  and  ex- 
cavation of  said  tunnel,  and  prior  to  the  appropriation  of  any  of 
the  waters  of  said  lake,  and  its  natural  sources  of  supply;  that  all 
the  water  issuing  from  said  tunnel  was  developed  by  said  de- 
fendant, and  its  grantors  and  predecessors  in  interest,  by  the 
running  and  excavation  of  said  tunnel,  and  that  said  water  was 
first  encountered  in  said  tunnel  at  about  seven  hundred  feet  from 
its  mouth,  and  was  and  is  percolating  water,  issuing  from  the 
rocks  in  said  patented  mining  claims,  and  said  water  is  not  from 
any  subterranean  stream,  having  any  defined  course,  bed,  or 
banks,  and  that  the  waters  of  said  tunnel  were  not  open  to 
appropriation  by  said  plaintiff  or  other  person,  excepting  said 
defendant,  and  were  subject  to  the  control  and  ownership  of 
said  defendant,  and  said  tunnel  was  an  artificial  watercourse, 
and  was  not  a  natural  source  of  supply  of  said  lake.  The  court 
further  found  that  the  mining  claims  of  plaintiff  over  and  across 
which  the  pipe  line  of  the  defendant  was  laid  unlawfully,  and  a 
trench  dug  in  and  upon  said  claims  unlawfully,  were  and  are  bar- 
ren, rocky,  uncultivated,  and  unused  mining  claims,  and  are 


Aug.  1898.]     Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silveb  King  Min.  Co.     813 

situated  upon  a  barren,  rocky,  and  worthless  hillside,  and  that 
the  digging  of  said  trench  and  the  laying  of  said  pipe  line  did 
not  damage  said  mining  claim  of  plaintiff,  or  either  of  them,  in 
any  manner  whatever,  except  nominally;  that  in  the  digging  of 
said  trench,  and  in  the  laying  of  said  pipe  line,  said  defendant 
did  not  removft  any  earth  or  material  from  said  mining  claims, 
and  did  not  in  any  way  disturb  said  mining  claims  except  to 
dig  said  trench,  and  lay  said  pipe  line  therein,  and  then  cover 
the  same  with  the  earth  and  material  taken  in  digging  said 
trench. 

The  first  question  for  determination  is.  Did  the  lower  court 
err  in  its  conclusions  of  law  and  decree  rendered  in  this  action, 
wherein  it  found  and  decreed  that  the  respondent  ^^  was  the 
owner,  and  entitled  to  the  exclusive  use  and  enjoyment,  of  all 
the  water  issuing  and  flowing  out  of  the  Jeanette  or  Thayne 
tunnel,  mentioned  and  described  in  the  complaint  and  findings, 
60  long  as  said  water  is  in  said  tunnel,  and  upon  the  mining 
claims  of  the  defendant,  and  is  entitled  to  divert  said  water  of 
said  tunnel  to  such  uses  as  it  may  deem  fit;  provided,  such  diver- 
sion be  made  upon  the  mining  claims  of  defendant,  and  before 
the  waters  of  said  tunnel  reach  the  said  reservoir  or  lake  known 
as  "Shadow  lake,"  from  which  lake  appellant  appropriated  and 
carried  away  said  waters  through  its  pipe  line  to  its  mine.  The 
plaintiff  contends  that,  under  such  a  state  of  facts,  the  court 
should  have  decreed  it  the  right  to  have  the  water  percolating 
into  and  issuing  from  the  Thayne  or  Jeanette  tunnel,  and  wholly 
located  upon  the  patented  land  of  the  defendant,  flow  unin- 
terruptedly into  Shadow  lake,  located  upon  the  land  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  that  it  was  entitled  to  all  of  such  waters  by  virtue 
of  its  alleged  appropriation  of  the  waters  of  said  lake  so  formed; 
and  that,  because  said  plaintiff  has  used  said  waters  of  Shadow 
lake  for  more  than  seven  years,  it  has  a  prescriptive  right  to  have 
the  same  flow  from  said  tunnel  uninterruptedly  and  continuously 
into  said  lake. 

It  is  not  contended  that  the  plaintiff  at  any  time  entered  upon 
the  land  of  the  defendant,  or  upon  said  tunnel,  or  appropriated 
the  waters  thereof,  except  after  the  waters  had  been  allowed  to 
flow  into  the  so-called  "Shadow  lake";  nor  is  it  claimed  that  the 
plaintiff  at  any  time  interfered  with  defendant's  possession  or 
use  of  said  water  while  it  was  still  in  the  tunnel  or  in  the  min- 
ing claim  of  the  defendant.  Under  such  circumstances,  could 
the  plaintiff  acquire,  as  ajrainst  the  defendant,  any  right  in  such 
water  while  it  remained  in  the  tunnel  or  in  the  mining  claim  of 


814  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah, 

the  defendant,  from  '^^  which  said  waters  percolated  into  said 
tunnel.  The  waters  issuing  from  the  artificial  tunnel  into  the 
lake  are  found  to  be  underground,  percolating  waters  from  the 
mining  claim  of  the  defendant,  and  not  waters  naturally  flowing 
in  a  stream  with  a  well-defined  channel,  banks,  and  course.  Un- 
der such  a  state  of  facts,  the  law  seems  to  be  well  settled  that 
water  percolating  through  the  soil  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  dis- 
tinguished from  the  soil  itself.  The  owner  of  the  soil  is  entitled 
to  the  waters  percolating  through  it,  and  such  water  is  not  sub- 
ject to  appropriation.  The  ordinary  rules  of  law  applying  to 
the  appropriation  of  surface  streams  do  not  apply  to  percolating 
water  and  subterranean  streams,  with  undefined  and  unknown 
courses  and  banks.  When  water  percolates  through  and  under 
the  surface  of  the  earth  upon  land  belonging  to  one  person,  and 
comes  to  the  surface  just  before  it  empties  itself  upon  the  land 
of  another,  the  owner  of  such  land  has  no  right  to  demand  that 
such  percolation  shall  continue.  It  is  held  that  a  person  may 
lawfully  dig  a  well  on  his  own  land,  though  thereby  he  destroys 
the  subterranean,  undefined,  percolating  water  of  his  neighbor's 
spring,  and  no  action  will  lie  therefor:  Hosier  v.  Caldwell,  7  Nev. 
363;  Eoath  v.  Driscoll,  20  Conn.  533,  52  Am.  Dec.  352. 

In  the  case  of  Acton  v.  Blundell,  12  Mees.  &  W.  324,  it  is  said: 
"In  the  case  of  the  running  stream,  the  owner  of  the  soil  merely 
transmits  the  water  over  its  surface.  He  receives  as  much  from 
his  higher  neighbor  as  he  sends  down  to  his  neighbor  below. 
He  is  neither  better  nor  worse.  The  level  of  the  water  remains 
the  same.  But  if  the  man  who  sinks  the  well  on  his  own  land  can 
acquire  by  that  act  an  absolute  and  indefeasible  right  to  the 
water  that  collects  in  it,  he  has  the  power  of  preventing  his 
neighbor  from  making  any  use  of  the  springs  in  his  own  soil 
which  shall  interfere  with  the  enjoyment  of  the  *°^  well.  He 
has  the  power,  still  further,  of  debarring  the  owner  of  the  land 
in  which  the  spring  is  first  found,  or  through  which  it  is  trans- 
mitted, from  draining  his  land  for  the  proper  cultivation  of  the 
soil;  and  thus,  by  an  act  which  is  voluntary  on  his  part,  and 
which  may  be  entirely  unsuspected  by  his  neighbor,  he  may  im- 
pose on  such  neighbor  the  necessity  of  bearing  a  heavy  ex- 
pense, if  the  latter  has  erected  machinery,  for  the  purposes  of 
mining,  and  discovers,  when  too  late,  that  the  appropriation  of 
the  water  has  already  been  made."  The  court  held  that  the 
case  does  not  fall  within  the  rule  which  obtains  as  to  surface 
streams,  nor  is  it  to  be  governed  by  analogy  therewith:  Green- 
leaf  V.  Francis,  18  Pick.  117;  Basse tt  v.  Salisbury  Mfg.  Co.,  43 


Aug.  1898.]     Crescent  Mik.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.    815 

N.  H.  569,  82  Am.  Dec.  179;  Goodale  v.  Tuttle,  29  K  Y.  459; 
Swett  V.  Cutts,  50  N.  H.  439,  9  Am.  Kep.  276;  Broadbent  v. 
Eamsbotham,  11  Ex.  602;  Eegina  v.  Metropolitan  Board  of 
Works,  3  Best  &  S.  716;  Grand  Junction  Canal  Co.  v.  Shugar,  & 
Ch.  App.  483;  Roath  v.  Driscoll,  20  Conn.  533,  52  Am.  Dec.  352; 
Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa.  St.  528,  64  Am.  Dec.  721. 

If  the  percolating  waters  which  collected  in  the  tunnel  were 
open  to  appropriation,  as  claimed  by  the  appellant,  such  appro- 
priation would  clothe  him  with  full  ownership  of  the  waters  of 
the  lake,  as  well  as  the  waters  in  the  tunnel,  and  deprive  the  de- 
fendant of  the  right  to  use  them  for  any  purpose;  and,  although 
plaintiff  had  asserted  no  dominion  over  the  percolating  watera 
of  the  mining  claim  or  tunnel,  and  had  not  interfered  with  the 
defendant's  use  thereof,  he  would  still  acquire  an  easement  in  de- 
fendant's mining  claim  to  use  the  water  thereof  as  he  saw  fit, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  defendant  did  not  object  to  an 
appropriation  of  the  water  by  him  after  it  had  left  the  tunnel 
of  the  mining  claim.  The  result  of  such  a  contention  would  ba 
that  plaintiff  would  acquire  a  right  to  compel  the  defendant,, 
who  had  developed  ^^'"^  and  gathered  the  water  into  the  tunnel 
for  his  own  purposes,  to  suffer  it  to  flow  therefrom  uninter- 
ruptedly into  the  lake  forever;  whereby  plaintiff  would  acquire 
an  easement  and  estate  in  the  defendant's  mining  claim  to  the 
extent  of  the  flow  of  the  water,  and  thus  destroy  defendant's 
power  to  develop  or  use  the  mine  for  the  pursuit  of  minerals,  or 
any  other  useful  purpose  for  which  the  water  would  be  necessary. 
Such  a  rule,  if  established,  would  at  once  become  adverse  to  the 
mining  industry  of  the  state.  If,  when  digging  a  trench,  a  miner 
should  strike  a  considerable  quantity  of  water,  and  allow  it  to 
run  down  a  canyon  until  he  could  be  prepared  to  use  it,  a 
stranger  should  be  allowed  to  appropriate  and  use,  and  there- 
after the  owner  be  compelled  to  keep  the  water  running  from 
the  tunnel  for  his  use,  the  owner  would  soon  be  compelled  to 
abandon  his  enterprise,  and  lose  the  benefits  of  his  labor  and 
the  product  of  his  land.  It  is  evident  that  such  a  rule  would  be 
unjust  as  applied  to  percolating  water;  but,  if  well  founded,  and 
applied  to  a  case  like  this,  the  estate  of  the  defendant  would  be 
encumbered,  and  held  subject  to  this  easement  of  the  plaintiff 
to  have  the  water  flow  into  the  lake  continually.  Again,  it  doea^ 
not  appear  that  the  plaintiff  ever  had  the  adverse  use  of  the 
water  in  the  tunnel,  but  took  the  water  after  it  had  left  the- 
tunnel  and  mining  claim,  and  passed  into  the  lake  upon  the  pub- 
lic domain,  and  after  defendant  had  lost  control  of  the  same. 


SI 6  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah, 

Such  possession  and  user  in  no  way  interfered  with  the  defend- 
ant or  his  property.  It  could  not  have  maintained  an  action 
against  the  plaintiff  for  such  taking  and  user  after  the  water 
passed  out  of  the  tunnel  into  the  lake,  and  no  cause  of  action 
would  have  arisen  for  such  user  against  the  plaintiff.  Having 
no  cause  of  action  against  the  plaintiff  therefor,  the  statute  of 
limitations  would  not  commence  to  run  until  a  cause  of  action 
should  accrue. 

454  In  Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  25  Pa.  St.  528,  64  Am.  Dec.  721, 
the  court  said:  "Percolations  spread  in  every  direction  through 
the  earth,  and  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  disturbing  them  without 
relinquishing  the  necessary  enjoyment  of  the  land.  Accord- 
ingly, the  law  has  never  gone  so  far  as  to  recognize  in  one  man  a 
right  to  convert  another's  farm  to  his  own  use  for  a  filter.  Such 
a  claim,  if  sustained,  would  amount  to  a  total  abrogation  of  the 

right  of  property Even  if  this  right  were  admitted  to 

exist,  the  diiiiculty  in  ascertaining  the  fact  of  its  violation,  as 
well  as  the  extent  of  it,  would  be  insurmountable.  But  it  seems 
to  be  thought  that  the  enjojonent  of  the  spring  by  the  plaintiff 
below  and  those  under  whom  he  claims,  for  the  period  of  twen- 
ty-one years,  gives  him  a  right  to  its  continued  existence,  al- 
though the  neighboring  proprietor  may  thereby  be  deprived  of 
the  chief  value  of  his  own  land.  This  depends  upon  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  enjoyment  of  the  spring  was  such  as  to  have 
invaded  his  neighbor's  rights,  so  as  to  enable  the  latter  to  main- 
tain an  action  for  the  injury.  No  man  can  be  barred  by  a  statute 
of  limitations  for  not  bringing  his  action  within  the  prescribed 
period,  until  it  is  first  shown  that  he  had  a  cause  of  action  which 
he  could  have  maintained."  As  between  plaintiff  and  third  per- 
sons, the  plaintiff,  being  the  first  person  to  divert  the  water 
after  it  left  the  tunnel,  would  have  the  right  to  its  use;  and  the 
defendant's  grantors  could  not  have  maintained  an  action 
against  the  plaintiff  to  prevent  it  from  using  the  water,  after  it 
had  permitted  the  water  to  pass  from  its  tunnel  on  its  land, 
Dor  could  the  defendant  maintain  such  action  after  it  had  ac- 
quired title  thereto.  This  is  the  basis  upon  which  it  must  be 
determined  whether  the  plaintiff  could  acquire  any  right  to  this 
water  by  prescription:  Ellis  v.  Duncan,  21  Barb.  230;  Chatfield 
V.  Wilson,  28  Vt.  49;  New  Albany  etc.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Peterson,  14 
Ind.  112,  77  Am.  Dec.  60;  ^so  Frazier  v.  Brown,  12  Ohio  St. 
294;  Trustees  v.  Youmans,  60  Barb.  316,  45  N.  Y.  362,  6  Am. 
Eep.  100;  Swett  v.  Cutts,  50  N.  H.  439,  9  Am.  Eep.  276;  Hosier 
V.  Caldwell,  7  Nev.  363;  Chase  v.  Silverstone,  62  Me.  176,  16 


Aug.  1898.]     Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     817 

Am.  Kep.  419;  Taylor  v.  Fickas,  64  Ind.  167,  31  Am.  Eep.  114; 
Coleman  v.  Chadwick,  80  Pa.  St.  81,  21  Am.  Rep.  93;  Chesley  v. 
King,  74  Me.  164,  43  Am.  Eep.  569;  Bloodgood  v.  Ayers,  108 
N.  Y.  400,  2  Am.  St.  Eep.  443,  37  Hun,  356. 

The  rule  is  that,  whenever  the  stream  is  so  hidden  in  the  earth 
that  its  course  is  not  discoverable  from  the  surface,  there  can  be 
no  such  thing  as  a  prescription  in  favor  of  an  adjacent  proprie- 
tor to  have  an  uninterrupted  flow  of  such  stream  through  the 
land  of  his  neighbor:  Haldeman  v.  Bruckhart,  45  Pa.  St.  514, 
-84  Am.  Dec.  511;  Lybe's  Appeal,  106  Pa.  St.  626,  SI  Am.  Eep. 
^42;  Buffum  v.  Harris,  5  R.  I.  243. 

It  is  clear  that,  prior  to  the  time  when  the  tunnel  was  dug 
upon  the  mining  claim  of  the  defendant,  the  water  was  perco- 
lating water,  flowing,  seeping,  or  circulating  in  minute  particles 
beneath  the  surface  thereof,  without  banks  or  defined  channels, 
And  that  its  course  was  invisible  and  unknown.  By  the  construc- 
tion of  this  tunnel,  this  percolating  water  has  become  an  arti- 
£cial  stream,  and  has  never  been  diverted  from  the  defendant's 
land,  nor  its  waters  taken  away  from  the  defendant  or  its  gran- 
tors. Under  such  circumstances,  when  percolating  waters  have 
been  gathered  into  tunnels  or  ditches,  and  allowed  to  flow  from 
the  proprietor's  land  to  the  inferior  proprietor,  and  have  been 
used  by  him  a  greater  period  of  time  than  that  allowed  by  the 
statute  of  limitations,  it  has  been  held  that  no  title  by  prescrip- 
tion has  been  gained.  Gould  on  "Waters,  page  402,  lays  down  the 
rule  that:  "Where  an  artificial  watercourse  is  made  solely  to  get 
rid  of  a  nuisance  to  mines,  and  to  enable  their  proprietors  to  get 
the  ores  lying  within  the  mineral  field  drained  by  it,  the  flow  of 
the  water  through  that  channel  is,  from  the  nature  of  the  case, 
of  a  temporary  character,  ^**  having  its  continuance  only  while 
the  convenience  of  the  mine  owners  requires  it;  and  a  user  of  the 
water  by  others  for  twenty  years,  or  a  longer  period,  affords  no 
presumption  of  a  grant  of  any  right  to  the  water  in  perpetuity": 
Wood  V.  Wood,  3  Ex.  746;  Greatrex  v.  Hayward,  8  Ex.  291;  Ark- 
wright  V.  Gell,  5  Mees.  &  W.  226;  Gould  on  Waters,  sec.  225; 
Angell  on  Watercourses,  sec.  206;  Washburn  on  Easements,  367- 
372;  Hanson  v.  McCue,  42  Cal.  306,  10  Am.  Eep.  299;  Lakeside 
Ditch  Co.  v.  Crane,  80  Cal.  181;  Southern  Pac.  E.  E.  Co.  v.  Du- 
four,  95  Cal.  615;  Pierre  v.  Fernald,  26  Me.  436,  46  Am.  Dec. 
573. 

The  case  of  Sullivan  v.  Mining  Co.,  11  Utah,  438,  relied 
upon  by  the  able  counsel  for  the  plaintiff,  rests  upon  a  different 
«tate  of  facts  from  those  disclosed  in  this  case,  and  is  not  in 

Am.  dr.  Rkp.,  Vol.  LXX.— 62 


818  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     f  Utahy 

conflict  with  the  principles  here  laid  down.  In  that  case  de- 
fendant's predecessors  in  interest  dug  a  well  upon  the  publia 
lands  of  the  United  States,  and  used  water  therefrom,  for  do- 
mestic and  other  purposes,  for  nearly  twenty  years.  Thereafter 
the  plaintiff  located  a  mining  claim,  embracing  the  well  within 
its  boundaries,  and  brought  suit  for  trespass  against  the  occu- 
pants of  the  well.  The  court  held  the  grantors  of  the  defend- 
ant having  located  the  well  on  the  public  domain  prior  to  the- 
location  of  the  plaintiff's  mining  claim,  that,  by  virtue  of  sec- 
tions 2339,  2340,  of  the  Eevised  Statutes  of  the  United  States, 
the  plaintiff  located  his  mining  claim  subject  to  the  rights  of 
the  defendant  and  its  grantors,  and  expressly  Recognized  the 
principles  here  laid  down — that  percolating  waters  belong  to  the- 
owner  of  the  soil,  and  that  the  owner  could  dig  a  well  upon  his 
own  ground,  and  thereby  dry  up  the  well,  supplied  by  percolat- 
ing waters  of  his  adjacent  neighbor,  without  liability. 

We  conclude  that  section  2780  of  the  Compiled  Laws  of  Utah 
of  1888  was  intended  to  apply  to  natural  watercourses  having 
a  natural  source  of  supply,  and  that  it  does  not  apply  to  ^^'^  per- 
colating waters  arising  in  the  land  of  the  owner,  and  carried 
through  artificial  drains,  constructed  by  the  owner,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  improving  the  property,  or  for  the  convenience  of  the 
owner.  So  long  as  such  water  remained  in  the  tunnel,  or  on 
said  mining  claim  of  the  defendant,  it  was  not  open  to  appro- 
priation by  the  plaintiff,  or  any  other  person,  except  the  defend- 
ant and  his  grantors,  and  was  the  property  of  said  defendant^ 
and  subject  to  its  ownership  and  control. 

The  second  question  for  consideration  is.  Did  the  court  err 
in  its  conclusions  of  law  and  decree  rendered  in  this  action, 
wherein  it  found  and  decreed  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled 
to  an  injunction  against  the  defendant  for  the  digging  of  the- 
trench  and  laying  and  maintaining  the  pipe  line  across  the  bar- 
ren, rocky,  and  worthless  mining  claims  of  the  plaintiff,  men- 
tioned in  the  complaint  and  findings  herein,  but  is  remitted  to- 
its  action  at  law  for  said  acts  and  damages  therefor?  In  this  case 
the  court  found  that  the  defendant  did  not  remove  the  earthy 
rock  or  soil  of  the  plaintiff's  mining  claim,  but  simply  dug  a 
trench,  and  laid  a  pipe  line  therein,  and  covered  it  with  the  ma- 
terial taken  out  in  digging  the  trench,  and  that  neither  the  soil 
nor  anything  else  was  removed  from  the  mining  claim,  and  that 
said  mining  claim  across  which  the  trench  was  dug  was  barren, 
rocky,  worthless,  uncultivated,  not  used  or  worked,  and  that  the 
pipe  line  and  the  digging  of  the  trench  did  not  injure  said  claim 


Aug.  1898.  J    Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     S19 

in  any  manner  whatever,  and  that  plaintiff  suffered  no  injury, 
and  was  not  damaged  in  any  manner,  except  nominally,  for 
such  trespass,  and  that  plaintiff  had  an  adequate  remedy  at  law 
for  the  alleged  injury.  Defendant  owned  water  necessary  to 
run  his  plant,  located  several  miles  away,  between  which  water 
and  its  mine  the  plaintiff  owned  a  strip  of  barren,  rocky,  worth- 
less, uncultivated,  *^^  unused  land,  on  a  barren  hillside,  over 
which,  as  claimed,  it  refused  to  sell  a  right  of  way,  or  permit  the 
defendant  to  run  its  pipe  line  to  its  mine.  It  does  not  appear 
that  there  was  any  other  way  of  reaching  the  mine  with  the 
water,  or  that  any  water  was  obtainable.  Without  the  water, 
one  of  the  largest  mhiing  industries  in  the  state,  employing  hun- 
dreds of  laborers,  and  producing  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dol- 
lars' worth  of  mineral  annually,  must  be  closed  down  and  cease 
operation.  The  laying  of  the  pipe  line  across  this  barren,  value- 
less land  caused  no  appreciable  injury  to  the  plaintiff.  The 
court  found  the  damages  to  be  nominal.  No  easement  could  be 
acquired  by  the  defendant  in  the  land  without  the  consent  of  the 
plaintiff.  To  restrain  the  laying  of  the  pipe  line  would  cause 
defendant  irreparable  damage,  and  destroy  and  lay  waste  a  min- 
ing industry  of  incalculable  value,  throw  out  of  employment 
hundreds  of  laborers,  and  seriously  retard  and  injure  the  people 
of  the  community  and  state  in  which  the  mine  is  located.  To 
grant  the  injunction  asked  for  would  work  a  great  and  irrepara- 
ble injury  to  the  defendant,  without  corresponding  or  any  bene- 
fit to  the  plaintiff;  while  to  refuse  it  would  injure  neither,  but 
leave  the  plaintiff  to  its  remedy  at  law,  where  it  could  obtain 
such  redress  as  the  law  should  award  it.  Under  such  circum- 
stances, the  remedy  at  law  being  complete,  the  plaintiff  should 
be  required  to  resort  to  such  remedy.  The  construction  of  this 
pipe  line  across  the  barren  waste,  under  the  circumstances  shown 
in  this  case,  was  not  an  irreparable  injury.  If  it  was  an  injury 
at  all,  it  was  but  nominal.  If  an  injury  was  done  to  the  land  by 
laying  the  pipe  line,  the  plaintiff  had  a  complete  remedy  at  law 
for  the  injury,  and  it  appears  the  defendant  is  amply  responsi- 
ble to  answer  for  the  damages.  No  peculiar,  present,  specula- 
tive, or  other  '*'*®  value  is  attached  to  the  land  crossed  by  the 
line.  Few,  if  any,  cases  can  be  found  where  a  court  of  equity 
has  interfered  by  injunction  to  restrain  a  naked  trespass,  as 
such,  without  a  showing  that  the  property  itself  had  some  pe- 
culiar value,  and  could  not  admit  of  due  recompense,  or  would 
be  destroyed  or  irreparably  injured  by  repeated  or  continued 
acts  of  trespass.    In  section  697  of  High  on  Injunctions,  it  18 


820  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah, 

said  that  the  foundation  of  the  jurisdiction  of  courts  of  equity 
to  grant  injunctions  rests  in  the  prohability  of  irreparable  in- 
jury, the  inadequacy  of  pecuniary  compensation,  and  the  pre- 
vention of  a  multiplicity  of  suits;  and,  when  facts  are  not  shown 
to  bring  the  case  within  these  conditions,  the  relief  will  be  re- 
fused. Equity  will  not,  therefore,  enjoin  a  mere^  trespass  to 
realty,  as  such,  in  the  absence  of  any  element  of  irreparable  in- 
jury. If,  therefore,  the  plaintiff  can  recover  for  the-  trespass 
compensation  equivalent  or  adequate  to  the  injury  which  it  has 
sustained,  such  injury,  in  no  sense  of  the  word,  can  be  consid- 
ered irreparable. 

All  the  adjudged  cases  fix  the  rule  to  be  idiat  the  injury  must 
"be  of  that  peculiar  nature  that  it  cannot  be  adequately  compen- 
sated in  damages  or  allowed  for  in  money.  There  must  be  some 
just,  equitable  feature  or  incident  to  take  the  case  out  of  the 
rule,  or  equity  will  not  interfere.  When  the  facts  present  no 
matter  requiring  equitable  relief,  and  the  granting  of  the  in- 
junction will  work  a  wrong  and  irreparable  injury  to  one  party, 
with  no  appreciable  benefit  to  the  other,  and  the  remedy  at  law 
is  adequate  to  do  full  justice,  the  court  should  reject  such  juris- 
diction as  not  within  its  legitimate  province.  To  hold  other- 
wise would  confound  all  principles  upon  which  equitable  juris- 
diction stands.  This  court  has  already  passed  upon  this  same 
question  in  the  case  of  McGregor  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.,  14 
Utah,  47,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  883,  and  in  Crescent  *«<>  Min.  Co.  v. 
Silver  King  Min.  Co.,  14  Utah,  67,  adversely  to  the  plaintiff. 
This  cause  grew  out  of  the  same  acts  of  alleged  trespass,  and 
were  parts  of  the  same  transaction,  with  reference  to  the  laying 
of  the  pipe  line.  In  the  case  of  McGregor  v.  Silver  King  Min. 
Co.,  14  Utah,  47,  60  Am.  St.  Eep.  883,  this  court  held  that,  un- 
der the  circumstances  disclosed,  there  was  no  just  cause  to  in- 
voke the  equitable  interference  of  a  court  of  equity  to  prevent 
a  trespass  consisting  of  laying  a  pipe  line  across  the  barren, 
rocky,  uncultivated,  worthless  land  of  the  plaintiff,  without  do- 
ing more;  and  that  in  such  case  the  plaintiff  would  be  remitted 
to  his  action  at  law  for  damages.  In  that  case,  quoting  from 
Bassett  v.  Salisbury  Mfg.  Co.,  47  K  H.  437,  adopted  and  ap- 
proved in  Thorn  v.  Sweeney,  12  Nev.  251,  the  court  held:  "The 
power  to  grant  injunctions  to  prevent  injustice  has  always  been 
regarded  as  peculiar  and  extraordinary.  It  is  not  controlled  by 
ordinary  and  technical  rules,  but  the  application  for  its  exer- 
cise is  addressed  to  the  conscience  and  sound  discretion  of  the 
court.    Ordinarily,  it  will  not  be  exercised  when  the  right  of 


Aug.  1898.]     Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     821 

the  complaiiiant  is  doubtful,  and  has  not  been  settled  at  law; 
and,  even  when  it  has  been  so  settled,  an  injunction  will  not  be 
granted  when  the  remedy  at  law  is  adequate.  It  is  not  enough 
that  an  injury  merely  nominal  or  theoretical  is  apprehended, 
even  although  an  action  at  law  might  be  maintained  for  it;  but, 
to  justify  the  interposition  of  this  summary  power,  there  must 
be  cause  to  fear  substantial  and  serious  damage,  for  which  courts 
of  law  could  furnish  no  adequate  remedy.  When  injuries  shall 
be  regarded  as  irreparable  at  law  must  depend  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case.  If  the  injury  be  trivial,  as  by 
....  raising  the  water  of  the  river  a  few  inches  upon  its  rocky 
shore,  doing  him  no  appreciable  or  serious  damage,  equity  would 
not  ordinarily  interfere  by  injunction,  "**"•  even  in  cases  where 
the  right  has  been  established  at  law;  for  the  power  is  extraor- 
dinary in  its  character,  and  is  to  be  exercised,  in  general,  only 
in  cases  of  necessity,  and  when  the  court  can  see  that  other  reme- 
dies are  inadequate  to  do  justice  between  the  parties,  and  even 
then  it  is  to  be  exercised  with  great  care  and  discretion.  If  the 
granting  of  an  injunction  would  necessarily  cause  great  loss  to 
the  defendant — a  loss  altogether  disproportionate  to  the  injuries 
sustained  by  the  plaintiff — that  fact  should  be  considered  in  de- 
termining whether  the  application  should  be  granted;  and  in 
some  cases  it  would  justly  have  great  weight.  It  has  often  been 
supposed  that,  when  the  right  has  been  established  at  law,  the 
plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  an  injunction  as  a  matter  of  course; 
and  this  misapprehension  has  arisen,  probably,  from  the  fact 
that,  in  a  large  number  of  cases,  injunctions  have  been  refused 
upon  the  express  ground  that  the  title  of  the  plaintiff  had  not 
been  established  at  law,  leaving  room  for  inference  that  if  it  had 
been  so  established  the  injunction  would  have  been  issued.  This, 
however,  is  clearly  not  the  doctrine  of  courts  of  equity,  for  they 
will  not  ordinarily  exercise  this  summary  and  extraordinary 
power,  when  substantial  justice  can  be  done  by  courts  of  law." 
The  doctrine  here  announced  is  fully  supported  by  Bigelow  v. 
Hartford  Bridge  Co.,  14  Conn.  565,  36  Am.  Dec.  503;  Wason  v. 
Sanborn,  45  N.  H.  170;  Blake  v.  Brooklyn,  26  Barb.  301;  Mur- 
ray v.  Knapp,  48  How.  Pr.  462,  62  Barb.  566;  Nicodemus  v.  Nico- 
demus,  41  Md.  537;  "Weigel  v.  Walsh,  45  Mo.  560;  Bechtel  v.  Cars- 
lake,  11  K  J.  Eq.  244;  Catching  v.  Terrell,  10  Ga.  578;  Wood- 
ing V.  Malone,  30  Ga.  980;  1  High  on  Injunctions,  sees.  483, 
697,  699,  701;  Eden  on  Injunctions,  231;  2  Story's  Equity  Juris- 
prudence, 925,  928;  Thorn  v.  Sweeney,  12  Nev.  251. 


822  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah, 

The  case  of  Uline  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  K.  E.  Co.,  101  N.  Y. 
98,  54  Am.  Eep.  661,  relied  upon  by  appellant,  arose  where  a 
private  owner  of  lots  ^*^  on  a  public  street  sought  to  recover 
damages  against  a  railroad  company  for  raising  the  grade  of  the 
street  and  sidewalks,  and  so  shaping  the  streets  and  gutters  as  to 
pour  water  therefrom  upon  the  lots  into  the  premises  and  base- 
ment of  plaintiff's  house,  thereby  flooding  the  lots  and  basement, 
BO  as  to  render  them  uninhabitable,  and  depriving  plaintiff  of  the 
rental  value  thereof,  to  his  great  and  irreparable  injury.  The 
case  of  Pappenheim  v.  Metropolitan  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  436, 
26  Am.  St.  Eep.  486,  was  brought  to  restrain  the  defendant  from 
operating  an  elevated  railroad  in  front  of  plaintiff's  premises  m 
the  city  of  New  York,  and  to  recover  damages  therefor.  The 
case  of  Wheelock  v.  Noonan,  108  N.  Y.  179,  2  Am.  St.  Eep.  405, 
was  brought  to  compel  defendant  to  remove  from  six  lots  belong- 
ing to  plaintiff  stone  and  heavy  bowlders  whi#h  defendant  had 
placed  upon  the  surface  thereof,  from  fourteen  to  eighteen  feet 
in  height,  causing  plaintiff  great  and  irreparable  damage  and  in- 
jury, and  destroying  the  rental  value  and  use  of  the  premises. 
These,  and  other  cases  cited,  present  a  state  of  facts  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  those  shown  in  this  case.  It  is  plain  that  the  ob- 
ject of  the  defendant  was  not  to  destroy  or  injure  the  plaintiff's 
property  that  could  not  readily  be  compensated  in  damages.  Its 
acts  were  not  to  destroy  or  injure  the  plaintiff's  property,  but  to 
preserve  its  own  from  destruction,  without  injury,  except  nom- 
inal, to  the  plaintiff;  and  it  is  claimed  that  any  damages  aris- 
ing therefrom  were  offered  to  be  paid. 

The  case  of  Eichards  v.  Dower,  64  Cal.  63,  relie'd  upon  by; 
plaintiff's  counsel,  materially  differs  from  the  present  case,  in 
that  the  defendant  in  that  case  was  excavating  for  a  tunnel,  and 
was  removing  the  soil  from  the  premises,  and  carrying  it  away, 
to  the  injury  of  the  inheritance.  Under  such  circumstances,  the 
injunction  was  properly  granted. 

^^^  We  find  no  error  in  the  record.  The  findings  and  judg- 
ment of  the  trial  court  are  correct.  The  judgment  of  the  dis- 
trict court  is  affirmed,  with  costs. 

Hart,  district  judge,  concurs. 


MR.  JUSTICE  McCARTY  dissented  from  that  part  of  the  deci- 
sion holding  that  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  equitable  relief  re- 
straining the  defendant  from  maintaining  Its  pipe  line  across  and 
through  plaintiff's  mining  claims,  as  It  was  evident  to  his  mind 
that  an  action  at  law  would  not  afford  the  plaintiff  a  complete  and 


Aug.  1898.]    Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  Kino  Min.  Co.     823 

adequate  remedy  for  the  wrongs  complained  of,  for  while  he  would 
in  an  action  at  law  be  entitled  to  recover  for  damage  done  prior 
to  and  up  to  the  time  of  filing  the  complaint,  yet  the  judgment 
"would  be  no  protection  against  defendant  continuing  the  trespass: 
Uline  V.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  98,  53  Am.  Rep. 
123,  54  Am.  Rep.  G61;  Pappenheim  v.  Metropolitan  Elevated  Ry. 
■oo.,  128  N.  Y.  436.  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  486.  To  deny  the  plaintiff 
equitable  relief  would  force  him  to  a  multiplicity  of  suits  or  to  the 
abandonment  of  his  property:  Uline  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
101  N.  Y.  98,  53  Am.  Rep.  123,  54  Am.  Rep.  661.  "The  right  to  in- 
junctive relief  in  cases  of  trespass,  when  the  plalntiCCa  title,  pos- 
session, and  right  of  possession  of  the  property  are  admitted  or  es- 
tablished, does  not  depend  on  the  amount  and  the  extent  of  the 
damage  done  or  suffered  in  each  particular  case,  but  depends  more 
upon  the  nature  and  character  of  the  trespass.  This  doctrine  Is 
invoked  and  followed  in  the  case  of  Richards  v.  Dower,  64  Cal.  62, 
which  was  an  action  for  an  injunction  against  the  construction  of 
a  tunnel  through  plaintiff's  lot,  and  twenty  feet  below  the  surface 
thereof.  The  court  found:  'That  said  tunnel  has  not  affected,  and 
will  not  if  completed  affect,  injuriously  or  otherwise,  the  surface 
ground  of  plaintiff's  said  lot;  that  the  driving  of  the  tunnel  was 
not,  and  will  not.  If  completed,  cause  the  plaintiff  Irreparable  In- 
jury, or  Injure  said  lot  In  any  way,  and  that  the  defendant  is  not 
insolvent.'  The  court  dissolved  the  preliminary  Injunction,  and 
ordered  judgment  for  the  defendant.  On  appeal,  the  supreme 
court  said:  'The  findings  show  that  the  tunnel  which  the  defendant 
is  constructing  through  the  plaintiff's  land  Is  of  a  permanent  char- 
acter. It  disturbs  the  plaintiff's  possession,  and.  If  permitted  to 
continue,  will  ripen  Into  an  easement.  This,  of  itself,  is  sufficient 
to  entitle  him  to  an  injunction:  Polrler  v.  Fetter,  20  Kan.  47;  John- 
son v.  Rochester,  13  Hun,  285;  Williams  v.  Railroad  Co.,  16  N.  Y. 

97,  69  Am.  Dec.  651 In  3  Pomeroy'a  Equity    Jurisprudence, 

sec.  1357,  the  learned  author  says:  'If  the  trespass  Is  continuous  In 
its  nature.  If  repeated  acts  of  wrong  are  done  or  threatened,  al- 
though each  of  these  acts,  taken  by  Itself,  may  not  be  destructive, 
and  the  legal  remedy  may,  therefore,  be  adequate  for  each  single 
act  If  It  stood  alone,  and  also  the  entire  wrong  may  be  prevented 
or  stopped  by  Injunction,  on  the  ground  of  avoiding  'a  repetition 
of  similar  actions,  ....  the  ultimate  criterion  Is  the  Inadequacy 

of  the  legal  remedy It  Is  certain  that  many  trespasses  are 

now  enjoined,  which,  If  committed,  would  fall  far  short  of  destroy- 
ing the  property,  or  of  rendering  its  restoration  to  Its  original  con- 
dition Impossible.  The  injunction  Is  granted,  not  merely  because 
the  injury  is  essentially  destructive,  but  because,  being  continuous 
or  repeated,  the  full  compensation  for  the  entire  wrong  cannot  be 
obtained  In  one  action  at  law  for  damages.'  This  doctrine  Is  sup- 
ported by  the  following  authorties:  1  High  on  Injunctions,  702; 
1  Beach  on  Modern  Equity  Jurisprudence,  sec.  2;  Richards  v.  Dower, 
64  Cal.  62;  Walker  v.  Emerson,  89  Cal.  450;  Shepard  v.  Railway 
Co.,  117  N.  Y.  442;  Mudge  v.  Salisbury,  110  N.  Y.  413;  Wheelock 


824  Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silveb  King  Min.  Co.     [Utah^ 

T.  Noonan,  108  N.  T.  179,  2  Am.  St.  Rep.  405;  Mills  v.  New  Orleans 
Seed  Co.,  65  Miss.  391,  7  Am.  St.  Kep.  671,  and  note;  Connole  v. 
Mining  Co.,  20  Mont.  523;  Williams  v.  Kailioad  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  97,  6& 
Am.  Dec.  651;  Poirier  v.  Fetter,  20  Kan.  47;  Miller  v.  Lynch,  149 
Pa.  St.  460;  Johnson  v.  Rochester,  13  Hun,  285;  Valentine  v.  Schrei- 
ber,  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  417,  3  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  235. 

WATERS— PERCOLATING  WATERS— WHAT  LAW  GOV- 
ERNS—APPROPRIATION— PRESCRIPTION.— The  principles  of 
law  which  govern  the  right  to  waters  flowing  upon  the  surface  of 
the  earth  are  inapplicable  to  waters  which  are  beneath  its  surface 
and  percolate  through  the  soil:  Gould  v.  Eaton,  111  Cal.  639,  52 
Am.  St.  Rep.  201.  Percolating  waters  are  parts  of  the  earth  itself, 
as  much  as  the  soil  and  stones,  with  the  same  absolute  right  of 
use  and  appropriation  by  the  owner  of  the  land.  Hence  a  proprietor 
of  adjoining  lands  cannot  complain  of  a  diversion  of  such  waters: 
Wheelock  v.  Jacobs,  70  Vt.  162,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  659;  Metcalf  v. 
Nelson,  8  S.  Dak.  87,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  746.  The  owner  of  land 
through  which  subsurface  water,  without  any  distinct,  definite, 
and  known  channel,  percolates  or  filters  to  the  land  of  another,  is 
not  prohibited  from  digging  into  his  land  and  appropriating  the 
water  to  any  useful  purpose  of  his  own,  though  by  so  doing  the 
water  may  be  entirely  diverted  from  the  land  to  which  it  would 
otherwise  naturally  pass:  Tampa  Water  etc.  Co.  v.  Oline,  37  Fla. 
586,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  262;  Gould  v.  Eaton,  111  Cal.  639,  52  Am.  St. 
Rep.  201.  Waters  percolating  through  the  soil  belong  to  the  owner 
of  the  freehold,  and  he  may  use  them  as  he  chooses,  free  from  any 
usufructuary  rights  in  others:  Hanson  v.  McCue,  42  Cal.  303,  10 
Am.  Rep.  299.  Prior  occupancy  of  water  percolating  in  the  earth 
gives  no  exclusive  right  as  against  owners  of  adjacent  land:  Roath 
V.  Driscoll,  20  Conn.  533,  52  Am.  Dec.  352.  A  prescriptive  right, 
therefore,  to  percolating  waters  cannot  be  acquired:  Wheelock  v. 
Jacobs,  70  Vt.  162,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  659;  Sweet  v.  Cutts,  50  N.  H. 
439,  9  Am.  Rep.  276,  and  note  thereto.  On  the  entire  question  of 
subterranean  or  percolating  waters,  see  the  monographic  notes  to 
AVheelock  v.  Jacobs,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  663-772;  and  to  Wheatley 
V.  Baugh,  64  Am.  Dec.  727-730.  It  will  be  presumed,  in  the  absence 
of  evidence,  that  a  spring  is  formed  and  fed  by  percolating  waters, 
rather  than  by  the  outbreak  upon  the  surface  of  the  earth  of  a 
subterranean  stream:  Metcalf  v.  Nelson,  8  S.  Dak.  87,  59  Am.  St. 
Rep.  746;  Tampa  Water  etc.  Co.  v.  Cline,  37  Fla.  586,  53  Am.  St 
Rep.  262. 

INJUNCTION  TO  RESTRAIN  TRESPASS.-It  is  not  usual  to 
Issue  an  Injunction  to  restrain  a  trespass.  And  the  digging  of  a 
trench,  and  the  laying  of  a  pipeline  therein,  across  plaintiff's  land, 
which  Is  rocky,  barren,  vacant,  and  comparatively  valueless.  Is  not 
such  an  irreparable  injury  as  to  justify  the  issuance  of  an  Injunc- 
tion, where  it  appears  that  the  damages,  If  any,  are  merely  nom- 
inal; that  the  defendant  Is  solvent  and  able  to  respond  in  damages; 
and  that  proceedings  have  been  taken  under  the  statute  for  con- 
demnation: McGregor  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.,  14  Utah,  47,  60  Am. 
St.  Rep.  883,  and  note  thereto.  See,  also,  Jones  v.  Concord  etc.  B. 
B.,  67  N.  H.  234,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  650. 


CASES 

IN  THB 

SUPREME   COURT 

or 

VIRGINIA. 


BURDTS    V.   BURDIS. 

[96  ViKGINIA.  81.] 

DEVISE— FAILURE  OF,  FOR  IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  PER- 
FORMANCE OF  CONDITION  PRECEDENT.— If  a  condition  pre- 
cedent is  annexed  to  a  devise  of  real  estate,  and  its  performance 
is  or  becomes  impossible,  the  devise  fails,  although  there  Is  no 
default  or  laches  on  the  part  of  the  devisee  himself. 

DEVISE— IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  PERFORMANCE  OF  CON- 
DITION SUBSEQUENT—  EFFECT  OF.— If  a  condition  subsequent 
is  annexed  to  a  devise  of  real  estate,  and  its  performance  becomes 
impossible,  without  the  fault  of  the  devisee,  the  estate  is  not  de- 
feated or  forfeited,  but  the  devisee  will  hold  the  property  by  an 
absolute  title,  as  if  no  condition  had  been  annexed  to  the  devise. 

WILLS— CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  AND  SUBSEQUENT— 
WHAT  ARE— DISTINCTION.— There  are  no  technical  words  to 
distinguish  between  conditions  precedent  and  conditions  subsequent. 
The  distinction  is  matter  of  construction.  The  words  may  indif- 
ferently make  either,  according  to  the  intent  of  the  person  who 
creates  the  condition.  If  the  language  of  the  particular  clause,  br 
of  the  whole  will,  shows  that  the  act  on  which  the  estate  depends 
must  be  performed  before  the  estate  can  vest,  the  condition  is 
precedent,  and,  unless  it  is  performed,  the  devisee  can  take  nothing. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  the  act  does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vest- 
ing of  the  estate,  but  may  accompany  or  follow  it,  and  this  can 
be  collected  from  the  whole  will,  the  condition  is  subsequent 

WILLS— CONDITIONS  SUBSEQUENT— IMPOSSIBILTY  OF 
PERFORMANCE— EFFECT  OF.— If  a  testator  devises  to  his  wife, 
for  her  life,  his  "homestead  and  five  acres  around  the  house,"  with 
the  understanding  that  his  son  will  support  and  take  care  of  her, 
and  that,  at  her  death,  the  "homestead  and  land  shall  return  to" 
the  son  "as  compensation  therefor,"  but  the  wife  of  the  testator 
dies  In  his  lifetime,  and  he  makes  no  change  in  his  will,  the  whole 
will,  taken  together,  Including  the  wish  therein  expressed  that  the 
son  shall  support  and  provide  for  his  two  sisters  as  long  as  they 
remain  single,  shows  that  the  condition  upon  which  the  son  is  to 
take  the  estate  is  a  condition  subsequent,  and  not  a  condition 

(826) 


S26  BuRDis  V.  BuEDis.  [Virginia, 

precedent,  and  its  performance  having  been  rendered  impossible 
by  the  act  of  God,  in  the  death  of  the  wife  in  the  lifetime  of  the 
testator,  the  son  holds  the  estate  by  an  absolute  title,  as  if  the 
testator  had  attached  no  condition  to  the  devise,  for  the  act  on 
which  the  estate  depends  does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vesting 
of  the  estate,  but  may  accompany  or  follow  it. 

LEGACIES— DEVISES— IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  PERFORM- 
ANCE OF  CONDITION  SUBSEQUENT— EFFECT  OF.— While 
there  is  a  difference  between  a  legacy  and  a  devise  where  the  con- 
■dition  is  precedent,  there  is  no  difference  where  the  condition  is 
subsequent;  but  in  the  latter  case  the  estate  to  which  the  condition 
is  annexed,  whether  it  is  land  or  a  money  legacy,  if  the  performance 
of  the  condition  is  rendered  impossible,  becomes,  by  that  event, 
absolute  in  the  devisee  as  well  as  in  the  legatee. 

Suit  brought  by  Burdis  against  Burdis  and  others,  in  which 
the  chief  question  involved  was  the  proper  construction  of  a  will. 
By  a  clause  of  the  will,  subsequent  to  the  devise  mentioned  in 
the  opinion,  the  testator  expressed  a  wish  that  his  son,  Albert, 
would  support  and  provide  for  his  two  sisters  as  long  as  they 
remained  single.  The  testator  survived  his  wife,  but  made  no 
change  in  his  will.  There  was  a  decree  for  the  complainant  and 
the  defendants  appealed. 

Little  &  Little,  for  the  appellants. 

No  counsel  for  the  appellee 

*^  EIELY,  J.  Joseph  Burdis  devised  to  his  wife  for  her  life 
his  homestead  and  five  acres  of  land,  with  the  understanding  that 
his  son,  Albert,  would  support  and  take  care  of  her,  and  at  her 
death  the  homestead  and  land  should  return  to  Albert  as  com- 
pensation therefor. 

The  wife  of  the  testator  died  in  his  lifetime,  and  the  matter  to 
be  determined  is,  whether  or  not  his  son,  Albert,  is  entitled,  un- 
der these  circumstances,  to  the  homestead  and  land.  This  de- 
pends upon  the  question  whether  the  condition  upon  which  he 
was  to  have  the  property  was  a  condition  precedent  to  its  vest- 
ing in  him,  or  was  a  condition  subsequent,  the  nonperformance 
of  which  would  divest  the  estate  given  to  him  by  the  will.  The 
law  is  clear  that  where  a  condition  precedent  is  annexed  to  a  de- 
vise of  real  estate,  and  its  performance  is  or  becomes  impossible, 
the  devise  fails,  although  there  be  no  default  or  laches  on  the 
part  of  the  devisee  himself:  2  Jarman  on  Wills,  10;  4  Kent's 
Commentaries,  125;  2  Minor's  Institutes,  228;  but  if  the  condi- 
tion is  subsequent,  and  its  performance  becomes  impossible,  the 
rule  is  different.  In  that  case  the  estate  will  not  be  defeated  or 
forfeited,  but  the  devisee  will  hold  the  property  by  an  absolute 


June,  1898.]  Burdis  v.  Burdis.  827 

title,  as  if  no' condition  had  been  annexed  to  the  **  devise:  2 
Jarman  on  Wills,  11;  4  Kent's  Commentaries,  130;  Eidgway  v, 
Woodhouse,  7  Beav.  437;  Collett  v.  Collett,  35  Beav.  312;  Mc- 
Lachlan  v.  McLachlan,  9  Paige,  534;  Martin  v.  Ballon,  13  Barb. 
119;  Livingston  v.  Gordon,  84  N.  Y.  140;  Merrill  v.  Emery,  10 
Pick.  507;  Parker  v.  Parker,  133  Mass.  584;  Morse  v.  Hayden, 
82  Me.  227. 

There  are  no  technical  words  to  distinguish  between  condi- 
tions precedent  and  conditions  subsequent.  The  distinction  is 
matter  of  construction.  The  same  words  may  indifferently 
make  either,  according  to  the  intent  of  the  person  who  creates 
the  condition.  If  the  language  of  the  particular  clause,  or  of 
the  whole  will,  shows  that  the  act  on  which  the  estate  depends 
must  be  performed  before  the  estate  can  vest,  the  condition  is 
precedent,  and,  unless  it  be  performed,  the  devisee  can  take  noth- 
ing. If,  on  the  contrary,  the  act  does  not  necessarily  precede 
the  vesting  of  the  estate,  but  may  accompany  or  follow  it,  and 
this  can  be  collected  from  the  whole  will,  the  condition  is  subse- 
quent: Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.  346;  Martin  v.  Ballon,  13  Barb. 
119;  4  Kent's  Commentaries,  124. 

The  words,  "with  the  understanding  that  my  son  Albert  will 
support  and  take  care  of  her,"  in  the  will  under  construction, 
which  are  relied  upon  as  constituting  a  condition  of  the  gift  to 
the  son,  are  not  annexed  thereto,  but  are  connected  with  the 
devise  to  the  testator's  wife.  The  testator  owned,  in  addition  to 
what  he  called  the  homestead,  a  tract  of  land  of  one  hundred 
and  seven  acres,  and  the  words  which  are  coupled  with  the  devise 
to  the  wife  were  manifestly  assigned  as  a  reason  for  the  devise 
to  her  of  the  homestead  and  the  five  acres  around  it,  and  not  as 
a  condition  of  the  gift  to  her,  while  the  words  "as  compensation 
therefor,"  which  are  attached  to  the  devise  to  the  son,  do  not 
constitute  so  much  a  condition  of  the  gift  to  him  as  show  the 
motive  for  it. 

But  if  the  language  referred  to  be  in  legal  effect  a  condition 
of  the  devise  to  the  son,  there  is  nothing  in  the  will  that  makes 
the  support  and  care  of  the  wife  of  the  testator  by  their  son 
Albert  necessarily  precede  the  vesting  in  him  of  the  estate  in 
**  remainder,  but  much  to  indicate  the  contrary.  The  obligk-, 
tion  relied  upon  as  a  condition  precedent  was  not  a  single  act, 
to  be  done  or  omitted  at  once,  but  a  continuing  condition,  which 
might  run  through  a  long  series  of  years,  and  require  the  per- 
formance of  many  acts. 


828  BuRDis  V.  BujRDia.  [Virginia^ 

The  support  and  care  of  the  wife  was  a  continuing  duty  as 
long  as  she  might  live.  If  she  had  survived  the  testator  she 
would  have  only  heen  forty-five  years  old  at  the  time  of  hi* 
death,  and  would  have  had,  according  to  all  haman  calculation, 
many  years  still  of  expectation  of  life.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
will  to  indicate  that  the  testator  intended  the  devise  to  the  son 
to  remain  in  "a  state  of  contingency''  during  the  many  years 
that  he  might  have  the  support  and  care  of  his  mother,  and  it 
would  be  unreasonable  to  believe,  without  an  express  direction 
or  plain  implication  in  the  will  to  that  effect,  that  he  so  intended. 
Although  he  lived  more  than  a  year  after  the  death  of  his  wife, 
he  left  his  will  unchanged.  By  it  he  also  required  his  son  to 
support  and  provide  for  his  two  sisters,  the  younger  of  whom 
was  only  fifteen  years  of  age,  as  long  as  they  might  remain  sin- 
gle, an  obligation  that  might  terminate  in  the  lifetime  of  the 
mother,  or  continue  long  after  her  death.  Taking  the  whole  will 
together,  as  should  be  done,  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  condition 
upon  which  the  testator's  son,  Albert,  was  to  take  the  estate 
was  a  condition  subsequent,  and  not  a  condition  precedent,  and 
its  performance  having  been  rendered  impossible  by  the  act  of 
God  in  the  death  of  the  wife  in  the  lifetime  of  the  testator,  Al- 
bert holds  the  estate  by  an  absolute  title  as  if  the  testator  had 
attached  no  condition  to  the  devise. 

In  Nunnery  v.  Carter,  5  Jones  Eq.  370,  78  Am.  Dec.  231,  the 
testator  devised  to  his  wife  a  tract  of  land  for  her  life,  with 
remainder  to  his  son  James.  He  also  bequeathed  to  her  certain 
slaves  and  other  personal  property  for  her  life,  and  then  "to  be 
Jiimes  Carter's,  provided  he  take  care  of  his  mother;  if  not,  to  be 
wiiose  that  does  take  care  of  her."  The  wife  in  that  case,  as  in 
the  case  at  bar,  died  in  the  lifetime  of  the  testator,  and  it  was 
contended  there,  ****  as  it  is  here,  that  the  slaves  and  other  per- 
sonal property  were  given  to  James  upon  a  condition  precedent, 
which,  being  rendered  impossible  by  the  death  of  the  tenant 
for  life,  the  property  never  vested  in  him,  but  remained  undis- 
posed of,  and  subject  to  be  distributed  as  intestate  property. 
The  court,  however,  held  that  the  condition,  "though  in  form 
and  appearance  a  precedent  one,  was,  in  reality  and  legal  effect, 
a  subsequent  condition,  and  as  such  could  not,  by  becoming  an 
impossible  one,  prevent  the  legacy  from  taking  effect."  It  is 
true  that  it  was  the  case  of  a  legacy,  and  that  the  subject  of  the 
present  controversy  is  a  devise.  "While  there  is  a  difference  be- 
tween a  legacy  and  a  devise  where  the  condition  is  precedent, 
there  is  no  difference  where  the  condition  is  subsequent;   but 


June,  189S.]  Burdis  v.  Burdis.  829 

in  the  latter  case  the  estate  to  whicfi  the  condition  is  annexed, 
whether  it  be  land  or  a  money  legacy,  if  the  performance  of  the 
condition  be  rendered  impossible,  becomes,  by  that  event,  abso- 
lute in  the  devisee  as  well  as  in  the  legatee:  2  Jarman  on  Wills, 
10;  Finlay  v.  King,  3  Pet.  346;  Martin  v.  Ballon,  13  Barb.  119. 

In  Birmingham  v.  Lesan,  77  Me.  494,  the  testator  devised  to 
his  wife  all  his  real  estate  for  her  life,  the  same  to  go  to  John 
Mehan  at  her  death,  if  any  remained,  provided  he  maintained 
and  provided  for  her  decently  from  the  proceeds  of  the  farm, 
or  otherwise;  but  if  he  failed  to  provide  for  her,  then  she  was 
empowered  to  call  on  the  selectmen  to  provide  for  her  in  her 
own  house.  The  will  also  provided  that  John  Mehan  should 
be  allowed  to  use  the  farm  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  him- 
self and  the  testator's  wife  by  farming  the  same.  It  was  held  by 
the  court  that  John  Mehan  took  the  estate  upon  a  condition 
subsequent,  but  having  failed  to  perform  the  condition,  the 
heirs,  or  residuary  devisees,  had  the  right  to  create  a  forfeiture 
by  an  entry  for  that  purpose,  although  the  will  contained  no 
clause  of  that  purport. 

There  is  no  error  in  the  decree  appealed  from,  and  the  same 
must  be  affirmed. 


Conditions  Precedent  and  Sa1)seanent— Impossibility  of  Performance.* 
Generally.— A%  to  when  a  condition  Is  precedent- and  when  subse- 
quent Is  well  stated  In  the  principal  case.  An  estate  upon  condi- 
tion Is  one  which  Is  made  to  vest,  or  to  be  enlarged,  or  defeated, 
upon  the  happening  or  not  happening  of  some  event.  The  condi- 
tion may  be  express  or  implied,  precedent  or  subsequent.  Condi- 
tions precedent  are  such  as  must  happen  before  the  estate  dependent 
upon  them  can  arise  or  be  enlarged.  Conditions  subsequent  are 
such  as,  when  they  do  happen,  defeat  the  estate:  Raley  v.  Umatilla 
Co.,  15  Or.  172,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  142.  The  general  rule  is,  that  a  con- 
dition precedent  must  be  literally  performed  before  a  right  can  ac- 
crue or  an  estate  be  vested.  Thus.  If,  In  the  case  of  a  devise,  a 
condition  becomes  Impossible  to  be  performed,  even  though  there 
Is  no  default  or  laches  on  the  part  of  the  devisee  himself,  the  de- 
vise falls,  and  even  equity  will  not  relieve.  But  the  rule  Is  diflferent 
if  a  condition  subsequent  becomes  Impossible.  In  that  case,  the 
estate  will  not  be  defeated  or  forfeited:  Martin  v.  Ballou,  13  Barb. 
119,  132.  "There  Is  a  wide  distinction,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Swayne, 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court  in  Davis  v.  Gray,  16  Wall.  203, 

•rkferenck  to  monographic  notes. 
Devises  and  conditions  In  restraint  of  marriage:  3S  Am.  Dec.  156-161. 
How  deed  may  be  avoided  for  breach  of  condition  subsequent:  44  Am.  Dec.  748- 

When  legacy  wiU  vest,  notwithstanding  failtire  to  perform  condition:  78  Am.  Dee. 


830  BuRDis  V.  BuRDis.  [Virginia 

229,  "between  a  condition  precedent,  wliere  no  title  has  vested  and 
none  Is  to  vest  until  the  condition  is  performed,  and  a  condition  sub- 
sequent, operating  by  way  of  defeasance.  In  the  former  case, 
equity  can  give  no  relief.  The  failure  to  perform  is  an  inevitable 
bar.  No  right  can  ever  vest.  The  result  is  very  different  where 
the  condition  is  subsequent,"  as  equity  can  there  relieve  against  a 
forfeiture.  So  illegal  conditions  subsequent  are  void:  Blacli  v. 
Oliver,  1  Ala.  449,  35  Am.  Dec.  38;  Scovill  v.  McMahon,  62  Conn. 
378,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  350;  and  a  contract  of  sale  executed  in  all 
other  respects  amounts  to  an  absolute  sale:  Blaclc  v.  Oliver,  1  Ala. 
449,  35  Am.  Dec.  38.  If  the  further  performance  of  a  condition 
subsequent  that  premises  should  be  used  as  a  cemetery  is  rendered 
unlawful  by  a  valid  act  of  the  legislature,  the  condition  is  thereby 
discharged  and  the  title  of  the  grantee  freed  therefrom:  Scoville  v. 
McMahon,  62  Conn.  378,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  350. 

Senseless,  repugnant,  or  nugatory  conditions  subsequent  do  not 
affect  an  instrument  by  which  a  right  is  to  accrue  or  an  estate  is 
to  vest:  Stockton  v.  Turner,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  192;  Case  v.  Dwire.  60 
Iowa,  442;  Jones  v.  Port  Huron  etc.  Thresher  Co.,  171  111.  502;  Wead 
V.  Gray,  78  Mo.  59;  Kelley  v.  Meins,  135  Mass.  231,  235.  If  a  con- 
dition is  subsequent,  and  performance  is,  at  the  time  it  is  created. 
Impossible,  or  is  afterward  rendered  impossible,  the  condition  Is 
void,  performance  is  dispensed  with,  and  the  estate  vests  absolutely, 
whether  such  impossibility  is  created  by  the  act  of  God:  Hoss  v. 
Hoss,  140  Ind.  551;  Morse  v.  Hayden,  82  Me.  227;  Parlier  v.  Parker, 
123  Mass.  584;  Burnham  v.  Burnham,  79  Wis.  557,  567;  or  of  the 
law:  Mahoning  Co.  v.  Young,  59  Fed.  Rep.  96,  16  U.  S.  App.  253,  277; 
Burnham  v.  Burnham,  79  Wis.  557,  567;  or  of  the  act  of  the  grantor: 
Elkhart  etc.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  113  Ind.  215,  218;  Burnham  v.  Burnham,  79 
Wis.  566;  Vanderslice  v.  Hanks,  3  Cal.  27,  40.  Conditions  subsequent 
In  a  deed  are  strictly  construed,  as  they  lend  to  defeat  or  destroy 
estates,  and  are  rarely  enforced  in  equity  so  as  to  defeat  an  estate 
for  a  breach  thereof:  See  monographic  note  to  Cross  v.  Carson,  44 
Am.  Dec.  744,  showing  how  a  deed  may  be  avoided  for  breach  of 
condition  subsequent:  Taylor  v.  Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Am.  Dec. 
682;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind.  323,  68  Am.  Dec.  638;  Emerson 
V.  Simpson,  43  N.  H.  475,  82  Am.  Dec.  168;  Rawson  v.  Inhabitants, 
7  Allen,  125,  83  Am.  Dec.  670;  Peden  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  73 
Iowa,  328;  5  Am.  St.  Rep.  680.  So  with  a  condition  subsequent  in 
a  will:  RIdgway  v.  Woodhouse,  7  Beav.  437,  443.  If  the  condition 
which  is  to  divest  an  estate  "becomes  Impossible,  by  the  act  of  God^ 
the  condition  Is  discharged:  McLachlan  v.  McLachlan,  9  Paige,  534. 

If  a  party  to  a  contract,  who  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  a  condi- 
tion, upon  the  performance  of  which  his  responsibility  Is  to  arise, 
dispenses  with,  or  by  any  act  of  his  own  prevents,  the  performance 
the  opposite  party  Is  excused  from  proving  a  strict  compliance  with 
the  condition:  Williams  v.  United  States  Bank,  2  Pet.  96,  102; 
Seymour  v.  Bennet,  14  Mass.  206;  Cooper  v.  Mowry,  16  Mass.  5,  7; 
Clendennen  v.  Paulsel,  3  Mo.  (230)  166.  A  party  to  a  contract,  who 
prevents  the  performance  of  any  condition,  can  neither  claim  a  bene- 


Jane,  1898.]  Burdis  v.  Burdis.  831 

fit  nor  escape  liability  from  the  failure  of  such  condition:  Dill  v.  Pope, 
29  Kan.  289.  One  "who  prevents  the  performance  of  a  condition,  or 
makes  It  impossible  by  his  own  act,  cannot  take  advantage  of  the^ 
nonperformance:  Cape  Fear  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  7  Jones,  481;  78 
Am.  Dec.  200.  It  always  excuses  the  performance  of  a  condition 
precedent  in  a  contract  that  the  performance  was  hindered  by  the 
other  party:  Camp  v.  Barker,  21  Vt.  409;  and  he  who,  by  his  own. 
act,  prevents  the  performance  of  a  condition  precedent  cannot  take 
advantage  of  its  nonperformance:  Jones  v.  Walker,  13  B.  Mon.  103, 
56  Am.  Dec.  557.  Whether  a  condition  in  a  deed  is  precedent  or 
subsequent,  if  the  act  of  the  party  who  imposed  it  makes  Its  per- 
formance impossible,  or  unnecessary,  the  condition  is  no  longer 
binding,  and  the  estate  conveyed  by  the  deed,  in  which  it  is  con- 
tained, is  discharged  therefrom:  Jones  v.  Chesapeake  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,- 
14  W.  Va.  514,  523.  But  if  the  act  of  a  party,  for  whose  benefit  con- 
ditions precedent  attach,  Is  relied  on  as  an  excuse  for  nonperfor. 
mance,  it  must  be  the  proximate  and  not  the  remote  cause  of  the- 
failure  to  perform,  and  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  render  per- 
formance impossible,  or  induce  the  belief  that  it  was  waived,  or,  if 
attempted,  would  not  be  accepted:  Brooklyn  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bledsoe, 
52  Ala.  538,  553. 

Notwithstanding  the  rule  at  law  that,  If  a  condition  subsequent 
is  possible  at  the  time  of  making  It,  and  becomes  afterward  im- 
possible to  be  complied  with,  by  the  act  of  God,  or  the  law,  or  the 
grantor,  the  estate  having  once  vested,  is  not  thereby  divested,  but 
becomes  absolute,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  enforce  such  rule- 
where  it  would  be  harsh  and  work  injustice,  especially  where  the- 
circumstances  do  not  call  for  a  severe  application  of  the  rules- 
.  of  law  upon  either  side.  Thus,  the  state  of  Texas  made  a  large- 
grant  of  lands  to  a  railroad  company  defeasible  if  certain  things- 
were  not  done  within  a  certain  time  by  the  company;  but  the  state 
plunged  into  the  Civil  War,  and,  by  prosecuting  it,  confessedly 
rendered  it  impossible  for  the  company  to  fulfill  the  conditions 
Imposed  upon  it  during  the  continuance  of  the  war.  In  other  words, 
the  performance  of  all  the  conditions  not  performed  was  prevented 
by  the  state  itself,  and  the  court,  after  the  war  was  over,  applied 
the  equitable  principle  that  the  conditions  might  still  be  complied 
with,  but  in  such  reasonable  time  as  would  put  the  parties  in  the 
same  situation,  as  near  as  might  be,  as  if  no  breach  of  condition 
had  occurred:  Davis  v.  Gray,  16  Wall.  203,  230.  Equity  may  also 
Interpose  upon  the  breach  of  a  condition  subsequent,  and  relievo 
against  a  forfeiture,  upon  the  principle  of  compensation,  where 
that  principle  can  be  applied,  giving  damages,  if  damages  should 
be  given,  and  the  proper  amount  can  be  ascertained:  Davis  v.  Gray, 
16  WaU.  203,  230;  Chipman  v.  Thompson,  Walk.  Ch.  405;  Wells  v. 
Smith,  2  Edw.  Ch.  78.  Thus,  a  court  of  equity  will  not  always 
enforce  the  forfeiture  of  a  device  for  nonperformance  of  "condition* 
subsequent.  If  the  devisee  accepts,  and  It  would  be  Inequitable 
or  Impossible  to  compel  him  to  perform  the  conditions,  a  court  of 
equity  will  award  compensation  in  damages  for  breach  of  the  con- 
ditions, if  that  is  an  adequate  remedy:  Bird  v.  Hawkins,  N.  J.  EJq.^ 
March.  1899. 


^32  BuRDis  V.  BuRDis.  [Virginia, 

Contracts.— Whether  conditions  in  a  contract  are  precedent  or 
subsequent  is  to  be  determined  by  the  intention  of  the  parties,  as 
collected  from  the  contract,  whatever  may  be  the  order  in  which 
they  are  placed,  or  the  manner  in  whiQh  they  are  expressed:  Fin- 
lay  V.  King,  3  Pet.  346.  A  right  depending  upon  a  condition  prece- 
dent does  not  accrue  unless  the  condition  is  performed,  although 
performance  becomes  impossible  by  the  act  of  God:  Mizell  v. 
Burnett,  4  Jones,  249,  69  Am.  Dec.  744;  Oakley  v.  Morton,  11  N.  Y. 
26,  62  Am.  Dec.  49;  Eldridge  v.  Rowe,  2  Gilm.  91,  43  Am.  Dec.  41; 
Kives  V.  Baptiste,  25  Ala.  382.  Thus,  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  an 
Invention  at  a  valuation  price,  to  be  fixed  by  persons  named,  is 
impliedly  cond'itional  upon  those  persons  surviving  and  making  the 
valuation.  Hence,  if  they  die  before  doing  so,  the  contract  is  ter- 
minated by  their  death,  the  valuation  stipulated  for  having  thus 
become  impossible:  Estate  of  Preston  v.  Smith,  67  111.  App.  613, 
•617,  citing  numerous  authorities  in  support  of  the  proposition  that 
contracts  for  personal  service,  which  can  only  be  performed  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  party  contracting,  are  subject  to  the  implied  con- 
dition of  his  continuing  to  live  and  to  be  in  health  to  perform  them, 
and  are  terminated  by  his  death  or  incapacity  from  illness.  Stipu- 
lations in  a  contract  are  not,  however,  to  be  construed  as  conditions 
precedent,  unless  that  construction  is  made  necessary  by  the  terms 
of  the  contract:  Deacon  v.  Blodget,  111  Cal.  416. 

One  who  prevents  the  performance  or  happening  of  a  condition 
precedent  upon  which  his  liability,  by  the  terms  of  a  contract,  is 
made  to  depend,  cannot  avail  himself  of  its  nonperformance:  Jones 
V.  "Walker,  13  B.  Mon.  163,  56  Am.  Dec.  557.  He  cannot  take  ad- 
vantage of  his  own  wrong,  and  screen  himself  from  payment  for 
what  was  done  under  the  contract:  Buffkin  v.  Baird,  73  N.  C.  283. 
If  the  performance  of  a  condition  precedent  has  been  prevented  by 
the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  may  recover,  on  a  general  count,  the 
value  of  the  services  he  has  performed:  Morford  v.  Ambrose,  3  J.  J. 
Marsh.  688,  as  upon  a  quantum  meruit:  Buffkin  v.  Baird,  73  N.  O. 
283.  The  general  rule  is,  that  there  can  be  no  recovery  upon  a 
quantum  meruit  if  a  condition  precedent  has  not  been  performed, 
but  if  the  defendant  completes  the  contract  himself,  putting  it  out 
of  the  plaintiff's  power  to  do  so,  there  may  be  a  recovery  upon  u 
quantum  meruit,  as  If  the  work  had  been  completed  by  the  plaintiff, 
but  not  In  a  workmanlike  manner:  Escott  v.  White,  10  Bush,  169. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  all  cases  where  the  condition  of  a  bond  or 
recognizance  Is  possible  at  the  time  of  making  the  condition,  and 
before  the  same  can  be  performed,  the  condition  becomes  impossi- 
ble by  the  act  of  God,  or  of  the  law,  or  the  obligee,  there  the  obli- 
gation Is  saved.  Thus,  If  compliance  with  a  sheriff's  recognizance 
to  appear  on  attachment  becomes  Impossible  by  reason  of  his  sicfe- 
ness  on  the  day  set,  and  his  subsequent  death,  nonperformance  is 
excused  and  no  action  lies:  People  v.  Manning,  8  Cow.  297,  18  Am. 
Dec.  451. 

Deeds.— It,  for  any  reason,  a  condition  precedent  In  a  deed  is,  or 
t)ecomes   Impossible  of   performance,  no    estate  vests:  Stockton  v. 


June,  1898.]  Bubdis  v.  Burdis.  833 

Weber,  98  Cal.  433,  441;  Vanhorne  v.  Dorrance,  2  Dall.  304,  317; 
Harvey  v.  Aston,  1  Atk.  376.  An  Impossible  or  Illegal  condition  In 
a  deed  Is  void,  and  the  grantee  takes  the  estate  freed  from  the  con- 
dition: Raley  v.  Umatilla  Co.,  15  Or.  172,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  142;  note 
to  Cross  V.  Carson,  44  Am.  Dec.  745;  Barksdale  v.  Elam,  30  Miss. 
•094.  A  grant  in  restraint  of  marriage  Is  void,  unless  there  Is  a  valid 
limitation  over:  Randall  v.  Marble,  G9  Me.  310,  31  Am.  Rep.  281. 
Whether  a  condition  Is  precedent  or  subsequent  does  not  depend 
upon  any  precise  form  of  words,  or  their  place  in  the  deed,  but 
must  be  determined  from  the  whole  instrument:  Rogan  v.  Walker, 
1  Wis.  527;  and  the  Intention  of  the  parties:  Shinn  v.  Roberts,  20 
N.  .T.  L.  435,  43  Am.  Dec.  63(5;  Underbill  v.  Saratoga  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
^0  Barb.  455.  An  estate  which  has  once  vested  in  a  grantee  cannot 
he  defeated  by  a  condition  subsequent  which  Is  Impossible,  Illegal, 
■or  repugnant  to  the  estate  granted:  Ricketts  v.  Louisville  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  91  Ky.  221,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  176.  Conditions  subsequent  in  a 
deed  are  good  whenever  their  performance  is  not  impossible,  or  doea 
not  afterward  b.ecome  so  by  the  act  of  God,  or  of  the  grantor,  and 
they  are  not  contrary  to  law,  nor  repugnant  to  the  deed;  otherwise 
they  are  void,  and  the  grantee  takes  an  absolute  estate:  Taylor  v. 
Sutton,  15  Ga.  103,  60  Am.  Dec.  682.  But  the  rule  that  a  condition, 
reservation,  or  exception  which  is  repugnant  to  the  granting  part 
of  a  deed  Is  null  and  void  applies  only  in  cases  where  the  repug- 
nancy Is  such  that  the  Intention  of  the  parties  cannot  be  ascertained 
from  the  whole  Instrument,  or,  If  ascertained,  cannot  be  carried  Into 
■effect  in  accordance  with  established  principles  of  law:  Bassett  v. 
Budlong,  77  Mich.  338,  18  Am.  St.  Rep.  404.  A  condition  suosequent 
In  the  form  of  a  power  of  revocation  reserved  In  a  deed  will  not 
3)6  deemed  impossible  of  execution,  on  the  ground  that  the  deed 
provides  that  the  revocation  shall  be  by  an  instrument  to  be  ac- 
knowledged and  recorded,  as  in  the  case  of  a  deed  to  land.  The  right 
of  revocation  is  not  lost  merely  because  the  grantor  has  thus  pre- 
scribed as  a  part  of  the  proceedings  by  which  the  revocation  Is  to 
be  carried  into  effect  some  formality  which  the  law  does  not  recog- 
nize. In  such  a  case,  therefore,  the  provision  that  the  revocation 
is  to  be  acknowledged  and  recorded  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  so  far 
of  the  essence  or  substance  of  the  right  as  to  defeat  it:  Ricketts  v. 
Louis,ville  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  91  Ky.  221,  34  Am.  St  Rep.  17a  If  the 
performance  of  a  condition  of  a  bond  is  prevented  by  the  omission 
of  the  obligee,  the  obligor  is  discharged:  Whitney  v.  Spencer,  4 
<Jow.  39. 

Devise.— Ab  In  other  cases,  the  question  as  to  whether  a  condition 
In  a  devise  Is  precedent  or  subsequent  depends  upon  intention,  that 
Is,  upon  whether  the  testator  Intended  that  a  compliance  with  the 
requisition  annexed  to  the  estate  devised  should 'be  a  condition  of 
Its  acquisition,  or  merely  of  its  retention:  Birmingham  v.  Lesau,  77 
Me.  494,  497;  Reuff  v.  Coleman,  30  W.  Va.  171;*  In  re  Stlckney's 
Will,  85  Md.  79,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  308.  If  real  property  Is  devised, 
subject  to  a  condition  precedent  which  becomes  Impossible  of  per- 
formance before  the  time  of  performance  arrives,  the  title  to  it  will 

Am.  8t.  Rkp.,  Vou  LXX.-^ 


834  BuRDis  V.  BuRDis.  [Virginia, 

not  vest  In  the  devisee:  See  Shockley  v.  Parvis,  4  Houst.  568;  De» 
V.  Hance,  11  N,  J.  L.  244,  257;  note  to  Nunnery  v.  Carter,  78  Am» 
Dec.  234;  Cassem  v.  Kennedy,  147  111.  660,  664;  Winthrop  v.  Mc- 
Kim,  51  How.  Pr.  323,  327,  though  it  is  otherwise  as  to  a  legacy 
subject  to  a  condition  precedent.  See  the  principal  case  and  "Lega- 
cies," infra.  If  a  device  of  property  depends  on  the  performance 
of  a  condition  precedent,  which  is  not  performed,  and  which  can- 
not be  performed,  because  of  the  intervention  of  death,  no  estate- 
vests  in  the  devisee:  Den  v.  Messenger,  33  N.  J.  L.  499.  If  a  con- 
dition subsequent,  which  is  to  divest  an  estate,  becomes  impossible^ 
as  by  an  act  of  God,  the  condition  is  discharged,  and  an  absolute 
estate  exists  as  if  no  condition  had  been  imposed:  See  the  principal 
case;  McLachlan  v.  McLachlan,  9  Paige,  534;  Parlier  v.  Parlier,  123 
Mass.  584;  Taylor  v.  Mason,  9  Wheat.  325;  Jones  v.  Bramblet,  1 
Scam.  276,  281.  Thus,  if  real  property  and  specific  personal  estate 
is  devised  on  condition  that  the  devisee  shall  provide  and  maintain 
the  son  of  the  testator  until  he  attains  his  majority,  this  is  a  gift 
on  a  condition  subsequent,  and,  If  the  son  dies  during  the  lifetime 
of  the  testator,  the  devisee  will  hold  the  property  by  an  absolute 
title,  as  if  no  condition  had  been  attached:  Morse  v.  Hayden,  82 
Me.  227. 

So,  where  a  condition  subsequent  Is  void  for  repugnancy,  the 
devisee  takes  without  condition:  Zillmer  v.  Landguth,  94  Wis.  607; 
Langdon  v.  Ingram,  28  Ind.  360,  362;  and,  if  a  condition  subsequent 
is  void  as  against  public  policy,  or  because  it  is  illegal,  the  devisee 
will  take  the  estate  discharged  of  the  condition:  O'Brien  v.  Barkley, 
28  N.  Y.  Supp.  1049.  Thus,  a  condition  subsequent  in  a  devise,  plac- 
ing a  restraint  upon  marriage,  is  null  and  void:  Smythe  v.  Smythe, 
90  Va.  638;  but  conditions  precedent  annexed  to  a  devise  must  be 
observed,  no  matter  how  restrictive  of  marriage:  Phillips  v.  Fergu- 
son, 85  Va.  509,  17  Am.  St.  Kep.  78. 

Legacies.— It  personal  property  is  bequeathed  upon  a  condition 
precedent,  which  becomes  impossible  of  performance  before  the 
time  of  performance  arrives,  the  title  vests  in  the  legatee,  upon 
the  death  of  the  testator,  unless  it  appears  that  the  performance 
of  the  condition  was  the  sole  motive  for  the  making  of  the  be- 
quest: Nunnery  v.  Carter,  5  Jones  Eq.  370,  78  Am.  Dec.  231;  Culin'» 
Appeal,  20  Pa.  St.  243;  but  where  it  appears  that  the  sole  motive 
of  making  a  devise  of  real  property  was  that  the  devisee  should 
perform  a  certain  act  as  a  condition  precedent,  the  devise  will 
lapse  upon  the  condition  becoming  impossible  of  performance,  and 
no  title  will  vest  in  the  devisee  or  his  heirs:  Lefler  v.  Rowland,. 
Phill.  Eq.  144;  Nunnery  v.  Carter,  5  Jones'  Eq.  370,  78  Am.  Dec. 
231.  There  Is  a  difference  between  a  legacy  and  a  devise  where 
the  condition  Is  precedent,  but  there  is  no  difference  where  the 
condition  Is  subsequent:  See  the  principal  case.  A  devise  of  land 
upon  a  condition  precedent  can  never  take  effect  where  the  condi- 
tion has  become.  In  any  way,  impossible  to  be  performed.  All  the 
authorities  agree  In  this;  but.  by  the  civil  law,  which  on  this  sub- 
ject haa  been  adopted  by  the  courts  of  equity,  when  a  condition 


June,  1898.]  Burdis  v.  Burdis.  835 

precedent  to  the  vesting  of  a  legacy  is  impossible,  the  bequest  Is 
single,  that  Is,  discharged  from  the  condition,  and  the  legatee  will 
be  entitled  as  If  the  legacy  were  unconditional.  An  exception  to 
this  rule  in  relation  to  legacies  prevails,  as  above  stated,  where  the 
condition  Is  the  motive,  or  as  some  authors  say,  the  sole  motive  of 
the  bequest:  Lefler  v.  Rowland,  Phill.  Eq.  143;  monographic  note 
to  Nunnery  v.  Carter,  78  Am.  Dec.  235,  on  when  a  legacy  will  vest, 
notwithstanding  a  failure  to  perform  a  condition. 

If,  however,  a  condition  subsequent  Is  annexed  to  a  legacy,  and 
the  condition  is  rendered  impossible  by  the  act  of  God,  or  otherwise, 
the  rule  is  the  same  as  In  the  case  of  a  devise  on  a  condition  subse- 
quent, and  the  estate  becomes,  by  such  event,  absolute  In  the 
legatee  as  well  as  In  the  devisee:  Se  the  prin€lpal  case;  Merrfll  v. 
Emery,  10  Pick.  507;  Morse  v.  Hayden,  82  Me.  227;  In  re  Dempsey, 
55  N.  Y.  Supp.  427,  5  Misc.  Kep.  257;  note  to  Nunnery  v.  Carter, 
78  Am.  Dec.  235;  Jones  v.  Bramblet,  1  Scam.  276,  281.  A  bequest 
made  to  executors  in  trust  to  pay  the  income  to  a  specified  charitable 
institution  so  long  as  it  maintains  a  certain  person,  and,  in  case  it 
maintains  him  for  life,  to  pay  the  principal  thereto,  is  valid  and  en- 
titles the  society  named  to  the  bequest  upon  the  performance  of  the 
condition,  though  such  person  has  been  expelled  from  the  institution 
before  the  testator's  death.  He  has  no  right  of  selection  while  the 
specified  Institution  continues  ready  to  maintain  him.  The  legacy 
is  not  bequeathed  to  him  solely,  and  he  has  only  an  interest  in  It 
to  the  extent  of  a  support  for  life,  which  consists  in  the  perform- 
ance by  the  society  of  the  obligations  required  by  the  testator's 
will.  His  right,  then,  is  not.  In  any  sense,  to  the  legacy,  but  his 
claim  Is  upon  the  society;  or,  if  it  fails  to  conform  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  will,  upon  such  other  society  as  may  be  substituted 
In  Its  place.  The  society  is  entitled  to  the  income,  and,  in  con- 
formity with  the  will,  must  maintain  such  person,  not  from  the  In- 
come derived  from  the  legacy,  but  out  of  such  funds  as  it  may  have 
from  all  sources  of  revenue.  Hence,  If  he  refuses  to  return,  after 
expulsion,  and  live  at  the  institution,  or  to  be  provided  for  else- 
where according  to  the  offer  made  to  him,  thus  rendering  it  practi- 
cally impossible  for  the  society  to  bestow  upon  him  the  benefits  In- 
tended by  the  legacy.  It  cannot  affect  Its  right  to  the  same.  Tho 
reasonable  and  true  construction  of  the  condition  of  his  support  Is, 
that  the  testator  only  Intended  that  he  should  be  maintained  there 
If  he  so  desired,  and  that  he  was  not  absolutely  bound  to  live  there. 
In  the  latter  case,  however,  it  was  not  designed  that  his  refusal, 
which  renders  a  strict  performance  Impossible,  should  deprive  the 
society  of  the  legacy.  His  maintenance  is  a  condition  to  be  per- 
formed after  the  acceptance  of  the  bequest.  It  is  a  condition  sub- 
sequent, and  when  it  becomes  impossible  to  perform  it,  the  estate 
is  not  defeated  or  forfeited,  but  continues  as  if  no  condition  was 
attached:  Livingston  v.  Gordon,  84  N.  Y.  136,  142. 

If  a  condition  is  subsequent,  the  estate  vests  In  the  donee  imme- 
diately after  the  will  takes  effect.  If  it  is  a  bequest  of  personalty, 
vhe  vesting  is  absolute.     If  it  is  a  devise  of  realty,  the  title  will 


836  BuRDTS  tJ.  BuKDis.  [Virginia, 

divest  upon  the  happening  of  the  contingency.  But  if  the  condition 
subsequent  becomes  impossible,  then  the  title  does  not  divest,  but 
becomes  absolute:  Note  to  Nunnery  v.  Carter,  78  Am.  Dec,  235. 
Thus,  if  a  testator  bequeathes  certain  property  to  K.,  on  condition 
that  K.  marries  a  daughter  of  the  testator's  sister,  T.,  and  T.  has 
no  daughter,  the  condition  is  one  subsequent,  and,  as  it  is  not 
capable  of  being  performed,  the  devise  vests  in  the  donee  at  the 
testator's  death,  and  does  not  divest:  Note  to  Nunnery  v.  Carter, 
78  Am.  Dec.  235.  A  legacy  given  to  a  person,  though  payable  at 
a  future  time,  vests  immediately,  but  if  it  is  not  given  until  a  stated 
time  in  the  future,  or,  if  time  is  annexed  not  to  the  payment  only, 
but  to  the  gift  itself,  the  legacy  does  not  vest  until  that  time. 
Hence,  If  the  legatee  dies  before  the  time,  the  gift  is  lost:  In  re 
Rogers,  94  Cal.  526.  If  a  wife,  after  providing  a  support  for  life 
for  her  husband  from  the  income  of  her  property,  and,  if  necessary, 
to  use  her  entire  estate,  bequeaths  a  certain  portion  of  the  residue 
to  his  niece,  in  consideration  of  her  care  and  maintenance  of  the 
testatrix  and  her  husband  during  their  natural  lives,  such  provision 
is  not,  in  terms,  a  condition,  but  rather  it  has  been  held,  an  expres- 
sion of  the  reason  or  inducement  for  the  legacy,  which  vests  on  the 
death  of  the  testatrix,  subject  to  be  divested  in  the  event  of  the 
entire  estate  being  required  for  the  support  of  the  husband:  Mc- 
Carty  v.  Fish,  87  Mich.  48,  58, 

An  illegal  condition  subsequent,  or  one  opposed  to  public  policy, 
or  which  is  repugnant  to  the  legacy  to  which  it  is  attached,  is  void 
and  the  legatee  takes  the  property  absolutely:  Ridgway  v.  Wood- 
house,  7  Beav,  437,  443;  In  re  Walkerly,  108  Cal.  627,  645,  49  Am, 
St,  Rep.  97,  104;  In  re  Elliot,  L.  R.  (1896)  2  Ch.  353.  Thus,  in  the 
case  of  a  present  gift,  vesting  immediately,  if  the  condition  de- 
ferring the  time  of  its  payment  is  repugnant  to  it  as  being  impos- 
sible upon  its  face,  the  condition  is  void:  In  r6  Walkerly,  108  Cal, 
627,  645,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  97,  104.  For  an  extended  discussion  of 
conditions  precedent  and  subsequent  in  restraint  of  marriage,  as 
applied  to  devises  and  legacies,  see  the  monographic  note  to  Cop- 
page  V.  Alexander,  38  Am.  Dec.  160,  on  devises  and  conditions  in 
restraint  of  marriage.  If  a  bequest  is  made  upon  condition  that  the 
legatee  shall  marry  with  the  consent  of  her  mother,  it  Is  a  condi- 
tion subsequent,  and.  If  she  marries  without  the  consent  of  her 
mother,  the  latter  being  dead  at  the  time,  the  performance  of  the 
condition  is  excused,  because  it  was  rendered  impossible  by  the  act 
of  God,  and  the  legatee  takes  a  vested  Interest:  Collett  v,  Collett,  35 
Beav,  312. 

Pardons.— A  pardon  may  Impose  any  condition  that  the  governor 
thinks  proper,  provided  It  Is  neither  immoral,  impossible,  nor  il- 
legal: State  V,  Wolfer,  53  Minn.  135,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  582;  Lee  v. 
Murphy,  22  Gratt.  789,  12  Am.  Rep.  503.  A  pardon  on  condition  that 
the  prisoner  take  up  and  maintain  his  residence  out  of  the  state 
during  the  balance  of  his  life  does  not  Impose  any  Impossible,  im- 
moral, or  illegal  condition.  Such  condition  Is  therefore  valid:  State 
V.  Wolfer,  53  Minn.  135,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  582.    The  condition  Im- 


June,  1898.]  Wilson  v.  Hundley.  837 

posed  may  be  one  precedent  or  subsequent,  and  It  lies  on  the 
grantee  to  perform  it.  If  he  does  not,  the  pardon,  in  case  of  a  con- 
dition precedent,  does  not  take  effect;  and.  In  case  of  a  condition 
subsequent,  the  pardon  becomes  null:  Flavell's  case,  8  Watts  &  S. 
197,  11)9.  A  pardon  does  not  taice  effect  if  upon  a  condition  prece- 
dent, impossible  to  be  performed:  State  v.  Mclntire,  1  Jones,  1,  59 
Am.  Dec.  56a. 


"Wilson  v,  Hundley. 

[96  Virginia,  96.] 

CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD— RIGHTS  AND 
REMEDIES  OF  PARTY  DEFRAUDED.— A  contract  Induced  by 
fraud  Is  not  void,  but  voidable  at  the  option  of  the  party  Injured 
by  the  fraud.  Upon  its  discovery  he  has,  as  a  general  rule,  the 
choice  of  two  remedies:  1.  He  may  elect  to  rescind  the  contract, 
if  he  can  restore  what  he  has  received  in  the  same  state  or  con- 
dition In  which  he  received  It,  and  sue  for  and  recover  back  the 
consideration  he  has  paid  or  given;  or,  if  he  has  not  paid  or  given 
anything,  repudiate  the  contract,  and  rely,  when  sued,  upon  the 
fraud  as  a  complete  defense;  2.  He  may  elect  to  retain  what  he 
has  received  under  the  contract,  and  bring  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  the  Injury  he  has  sustained  from  the  deceit.  By 
adopting  the  latter  course,  he,  In  effect,  affirms  the  contract,  but 
not  as  made  in  good  faith.  He  consents  to  be  bound  by  Its  pro- 
visions, but  does  not  thereby  release  or  waive  his  claim  for  damages 
arising  from  the  fraud  collateral  to  the  agreement. 

CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD— RESCISSION  OR 
AFFIRMANCE— ELECTION.— If  a  party  who  has  been  defrauded 
In  the  procurement  of  a  contract  elects,  on  discovery  of  the  fraud, 
to  affirm  the  contract,  his  election  is  final  and  conclusive.  He  has 
but  one  election  to  rescind,  and,  having  once  elected  to  affirm  the 
contract,  he  cannot  thereafter  disaffirm  It,  but  must  abide  by  the 
decision  he  has  made. 

CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD— AFFIRMANCE- 
RESCISSION— NEW  INCIDENTS  OF  SAME  FRAUD.— If  a  con- 
tract has  been  procured  by  fraud,  and  the  person  defrauded,  witli 
knowledge  of  the  substance  of  the  fraud,  elects  to  affirm  the  con- 
tract, he  cannot  subsequently,  upon  discovering  new  incidents  of 
the  same  fraud,  elect  to  rescind  the  contract.  Knowledge  of  the 
essence  of  the  fraud  puts  him  to  his  election.  The  subsequent  dis- 
covery of  a  new  Incident  in  the  fraud  does  not  confer  a  new  right 
to  rescind,  but  merely  confirms  the  previous  knowledge  of  the 
same  fraud. 

CORPORATIONS— FICTITIONS  SUBSCRIPTIONS  TO 
STOCK— VALIDITY  OF  FRAUD.— Fictitious  or  colorable  subscrip- 
tions to  stock,  made  and  used  with  the  intent  to  induce  other  per- 
sons to  subscribe,  with  the  secret  understanding  that  no  liability 
shall  attach  to  them  by  reason  of  their  subscriptions,  and  that  they 
shall  thereafter  be  allowed  to  withdraw  them,  do  not  operate  as 
a  fraud  upon  bona  fide  subscribers,  for  they  are  as  valid  and  bind- 
ing upon  the  subscribers  as  If  they  had  been  originally  made  in 
good  faith,  and  will  be  upheld  and  so  treated  by  the  courts.    Hence, 


838  Wilson  v,  Hundley.  [Virginia, 

such  subscriptions  do  not  give  a  bona  fide  subscriber  a  right  to  avoid 
his  subscription. 

JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION  TO  STOCK 
INDUCED  BY  FRAUD— ACTION  FOR  DAMAGES— INAPPLI- 
CABILITY OF  GENERAL  RULE —The  general  rule  that  a  person 
who  has  been  induced  by  fraud  to  enter  into  a  contract  pertaining 
to  goods  and  chattels  may,  upon  the  discovery  of  the  fraud,  elect 
to  retain  what  he  has  received  and  bring  an  action  to  recover  any 
damages  he  has  sustained  by  reason  of  the  fraud,  does  not  apply 
to  subscriptions  for  stock  in  a  joint  stock  company,  for  such  an  action 
is  at  variance  with  the  contract  entered  into  by  the  subscriber. 

JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION  TO  STOCK 
INDUCED  BY  FRAUD-REMEDY  OF  SUBSCRIBER  IN  AB- 
SENCE OF  RIGHT  OF  RESCISSION.— If  a  person  has  been  in- 
duced by  the  fraudulent  representations  of  an  agent  of  a  joint 
stock  company  to  take  shares  therein,  and  the  shareholder  is  de- 
barred from  a  rescission  of  his  contract  by  the  insolvency  of  the 
company,  or  from  any  other  cause,  he  is  without  remedy  against 
the  company,  and  is  left  to  his  action  against  the  agent  who  so 
induced  him  to  subscribe. 

JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION  TO  STOCK- 
NATURE  OF,  THOUGH  INDUCED  BY  FRAUD— ACTION  FOR 
DAMAGES.- A  subscription  to  the  capital  stock  of  a  joint  stock 
company  is  not  only  an  undertaking  to  the  company,  but  with  all 
other  subscribers,  and  it  is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract  between 
the  shareholders  that  they  shall  all  contribute  ratably  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  company's  debts  and  liabilities.  Hence,  a  shareholder 
who  was  induced  by  the  fraudulent  representations  of  an  agent 
of  the  company  to  take  shares  in  it,  cannot,  after  he  discovers  the 
fraud,  elect  to  retain  the  shares  and  sue  the  company  for  damages, 
as  this  would  throw  the  burden  of  the  payment  of  the  debts  and 
liabilities  on  the  other  shareholders,  who  are  as  innocent  of  the 
fraud  as  he  is. 

A  WRIT  OF  ERROR  MUST  BE  DECIDED  according  to  the 
law  as  it  was  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  rendered,  without  any 
consideration  of  subsequent  acts. 

Assumpsit  brought  by  Wilson  against  Hundley,  to  recover  the 
balance  due  on  a  stock  subscription.  The  defendant  set  up 
fraud  in  the  procurement  of  the  subscription,  and  attempted 
to  maintain  a  cross-action  against  the  company  for  damages  for 
the  deceit.  Hundley  prevailed,  and  Wilson  sued  out  a  writ  of 
error. 

B.  B.  Munford  and  S.  S.  P.  Patteson,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

James  Lyons,  George  J.  Hundley,  and  W.  W.  Henry,  for  the 
defendant  in  error. 

^  RIELY,  J.  In  the  summer  of  1890  George  J.  Hundley, 
the  defendant  in  error,  subscribed  for  500  shares  of  the  capital 
stock  of  the  Rivermont  Company,  of  the  par  value  of  $10  per 
Bhare,  to  be  paid  for  in  installments  upon  the  call  of  the  board 
of  directors.     On  August  7,  1890,  he  made  the  first  payment  of 


June,  1898.]  Wilson  v.  Hundley.  839 

$1,000,  and  on  November  24,  1890,  he  made  the  second  payment 
of  $1,000,  in  pursuance  of  the  second  call  of  $2  per  share,  but 
made  default  in  the  payment  of  the  three  remaining  calls  of 
$1,000  each. 

On  June  2,  1893,  the  company  made  an  assignment  of  all  its 
assets,  including  unpaid  subscriptions  to  its  stock,  to  William 
V.  Wilson,  Jr.,  the  plaintiff  in  error,  in  trust  for  the  benefit  of 
its  creditors,  who  brought  this  suit  to  recover  from  the  said 
Hundley  the  balance  due  on  his  subscription.  Against  its  re- 
covery he  set  up  the  defense  of  fraud  in  the  procurement  of  the 
fiubscription. 

The  fraudulent  representation  mainly  relied  upon  was  that 
Warwick  &  Carson,  the  agents  of  the  company  through  whom 
the  subscription  was  made,  represented  that  certain  persons, 
called  the  "Roanoke  Syndicate,"  had  subscribed  to  the  stock 
of  the  company  to  the  amount  of  $700,000,  which  was  nearly 
one-half  of  the  whole  amount  of  its  capital  stock  of  $1,500,000, 
which  representation  was  not  true;  that  the  "Roanoke  Syndi- 
cate" only  subscribed  absolutely  for  $150,000  of  the  stock,  and 
took  merely  an  option  on  $550,000  more  of  the  stock;  and  that 
the  defendant  did  not  learn  of  this  misrepresentation  until  after 
he  had  paid  the  first  and  second  calls  on  his  subscription. 

It  appeared  in  evidence  that  the  defendant,  having  heard 
that  the  "Roanoke  Syndicate"  had  not  subscribed  for  $700,000 
of  the  stock,  according  to  the  representation  of  Warwick  & 
Carson,  wrote,  on  January  20,  1891,  to  Charles  M.  Blackford, 
the  president  of  the  Ri Vermont  Company,  stating  what  he  had 
heard  as  to  this  matter,  inquiring  as  to  its  truth,  and  making 
*®  complaint  if  it  were  true.  The  president  replied  to  his  let- 
ter the  next  day,  and  stated  that  the  "Roanoke  Syndicate"  sub- 
scribed absolutely  for  $150,000  of  the  stock,  upon  which  they 
had  paid  as  the  calls  were  made,  and  had  "an  option  on  sev- 
eral hundred  thousand  more,"  which  had  not  yet  expired. 
Upon  the  receipt  of  the  letter  of  the  president,  the  defendant 
wrote,  on  January  22,  1891,  to  the  general  manager  of  the  com- 
pany as  follows: 

"I  wrote  Major  Blackford  that  I  had  heard  a  large  subscriber 
to  the  stock  here  say  that  the  Roanoke  people  only  took  an 
option  on  the  stock,  and  some  seemed  disposed  to  kick  on  that 
account.  Major  Blackford  responded  that  the  Roanoke  people 
had  only  taken  $150,000;  this  leaves,  I  suppose,  the  stock  taken 
only  about  $1,000,000,  and  throws  a  heavier  burden  on  us  than 
we  anticipated,  but  I  don*t  know  that  it  will  eventually  hurt  us. 


840  Wilson  v.  Hundley.  [Virginia^ 

I  hold  tliis  position,  though,  I  am  with  you  for  good  or  evil,  and 
I  mean  to  stand  by  you  to  the  best  of  my  ability  and  hold  up 
your  hands.  I  have  the  utmost  confidence  in  you  and  Captain 
Blackford.  I  have  so  far  paid  up  my  calls,  hard  as  the  time  waa 
when  the  last  one  was  made.  I  have  just  received  another  which 
I  did  not  expect,  and  which  Wan\'ick  &  Carson  say  is  earlier 
than  it  ought  to  have  been  for  us  who  came  in  later.  I  shall  do 
my  best  to  meet  it;  if  I  don't,  I  am  willing  to  pay  interest  and 
secure  it  if  required.  ...  It  was  intimated  to  us  that  this  third 
call  would  probably  not  be  made,  and  I  had  hoped  it  would  not. 
But  I  am  with  you,  and  shall  do  my  best;  I  have  faith,  too,  in 
your  ultimate  success," 

On  January  2Q,  1891,  the  defendant,  in  reply  to  a  letter  of 
the  24th  of  January,  received  from  the  general  manager,  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  "the  amount  of  stock  sold  is  $835,900, 
the  balance  is  held  in  the  treasury  to  meet  contingencies,  includ- 
ing the  one  referred  to  in  your  letter  about  R.  Syndicate/'  wrote- 
the  following: 

"And  I  can  assure  you  that  your  agents  here,  *®®  Warwick  & 
Carson,  assured  us  all  that  $700,000  had  been  taken  by  the 
Roanoke  and  Clarke  &  Co.  syndicates,  and  their  list  shown  us 
included  that  subscription,  and  it  undoubtedly  influenced  me 
and  others,  as  would  naturally  be  the  case.  Now,  you  see  tho 
difference  it  makes  is  this:  If  that  stock  had  actually  been 
taken,  this  third  call  would  not,  in  all  probability,  have  been 
precipitated  upon  us   now,  for  you   would  have   had   money 

enough I  merely  mention  these  things  to  show  you  that 

I  am  not  a  mere  grumbler,  and  I  mean  to  do  my  very  best  to 
advance  the  interest  of  the  company,  though  I  am  surprised  at 
these  heavy  calls  rapidly  made." 

On  January  29,  1891,  he  again  wrote  to  the  general  manager, 
who  had  written  to  him  on  the  27th,  and  inclosed  a  statement 
showing  how  the  moneys  received  had  been  disbursed  and  what 
the  company  still  owed,  as  follows: 

'TTours  of  the  27th,  with  inclosed  statement,  received,  for 
which  accept  my  thanks.  I  shall  use  it  to  explain  matters  ta 
our  Richmond  friends.  I  think  if  you  would  send  out  a  circular, 
though,  it  would  have  a  good  effect.  Of  course,  there  are  some 
•who  are  scared,  and  some  who  are  reckless  in  their  assertions. 
As  for  myself,  I  have  the  utmost  confidence  in  the  ability  and 
integrity  of  the  management,  and  make  this  statement  to  all 
my  friends;  and  furthermore,  if  the  enterprise  does  not  make 
money  for  us,  I  shall  lose  confidence  in  my  own  judgment.*' 


June,  1898.]  Wilson  v.  Hundley,  -  841 

I  have  quoted  thus  fully  from  the  letters  of  the  defendant  in 
error  to  show  how  unequivocally  he  elected,  after  he  had 
acquired  actual  knowledge  from  official  sources  in  the  most 
direct  and  reliable  way  of  the  falsity  of  the  alleged  representa- 
tion, to  affirm  his  contract  of  subscription. 

A  contract  induced  by  fraud  is  not  void,  but  voidable  at  the 
option  of  the  party  injured  by  the  fraud.  Upon  the  discovery 
of  the  fraud,  he  has,  as  a  general  rule,  the  choice  of  two  reme- 
die& — ^he  may  elect  to  rescind  the  contract,  if  he  can  restore  what 
he  has  received  in  the  same  state  or  condition  in  which  ****  he 
received  it,  and  sue  for  and  recover  back  the  consideration  he  has 
paid  or  given,  or,  if  he  has  not  paid  or  given  anything,  repudiate 
the  contract,  and  rely,  when  sued,  upon  the  fraud  as  a  complete 
defense;  or  he  may  elect  to  retain  what  he  has  received  under 
the  contract,  and  bring  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the 
injury  he  has  sustained  from  the  deceit.  By  adopting  the  latter 
course,  he,  in  effect,  affirms  the  contract,  but  not  as  made  in 
good  faith.  He  consents  to  be  bound  by  its  provisions,  but  does 
not  thereby  release  or  waive  his  claim  for  damages  arising  from 
the  fraud  collateral  to  the  agreement:  Whitney  v.  Allaire,  4 
Denio,  554;  1  N.  Y.  305;  Selway  v.  Fogg,  5  Mees.  &  W.  86; 
Clarke  v.  Dickson,  9Q  Eng.  Com.  L.  148;  Matlock  v.  Eeppy,  47 
Ark.  148;  Herrin  v.  Libbey,  36  Me.  357;  Bacon  v.  Brown,  4  Bibb. 
91;  Peck  v.  Brewer,  48  111.  55;  PearsoU  v.  Chapin,  44  Pa.  St.  9; 
Gifford  V.  Carvill,  29  Cal.  589;  Parker  v.  Marquis,  64  Mo.  38; 
Robinson  v.  Siple,  129  Mo.  208;  Tiffany  on  Sales,  119;  and 
Bishop  on  Contracts,  sees.  679,  685. 

If,  however,  the  party  who  has  been  defrauded,  elect,  on  the 
discovery  of  the  fraud,  to  affirm  the  contract,  his  election  is 
final  and  conclusive.  He  has  but  one  election  to  rescind,  and, 
having  once  elected  to  affirm  the  contract,  he  cannot  thereafter 
disaffirm  it,  but  must  abide  by  the  decision  he  has  made:  Bige- 
low  on  Fraud,  436;  Grymes  v.  Sanders,  93  U.  S.  55;  Dennis  v. 
Jones,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  513,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  899;  Hurt  v.  Miller,  95 
Va.  32;  and  Hudson  v.  Waugh,  93  Va.  618. 

In  Ormes  v.  Beadel,  1861,  30  L.  J.  Eq.  1,  Lord  Campbell 
eaid:  "Ko  case  can  be  found  to  establish  the  doctrine  that  if  a 
voidable  contract  is  voluntarily  acted  upon,  with  a  knowledge  of 
all  the  facts,  in  the  hope  that  it  may  turn  out  to  the  advantage 
of  a  party  who  might  have  avoided  it,  he  may  still  avoid  it, 
when,  after  abiding  the  event,  it  has  turned  out  to  his  disad- 
vantage." 


842  >  Wilson  v.  Hundley,  [Virginia, 

The  defendaDt  contended,  however,  that  he  was  not  pre- 
cluded from  repudiating  his  contract  of  subscription  by  having 
*•**  elected  to  affirm  it  after  learning  that  the  "Koanoke  Syndi- 
cate" had  only  subscribed  absolutely  to  $150,000  of  the  stock, 
-and  taken  merely  an  option  for  $550,000  more,  for  the  reason 
that  the  general  manager,  in  informing  him  of  the  real  nature 
of  the  subscription,  withheld  from  him  the  terms  of  the  option, 
■and  that  he  only  learned  of  them  some  time  thereafter  from  a 
member  of  the  syndicate,  and  discovered  the  '^bad  judgment" 
•displayed  by  the  company  in  making  such  an  agreement. 

The  substance  of  the  fraud  was  the  fact  that  the  entire  sub- 
scription of  $700,000  was  not  absolute,  as  had  been  represented, 
Mt  the  greater  part  of  it  was  merely  optional.  The  "Roanoke" 
people  had  simply  secured  the  right  to  take  $550,000  more  of 
the  stock  by  a  certain  time,  but  were  not  bound  to  do  so. 
This  was  the  important  and  material  matter.  The  defendant 
"Was  only  to  be  injuriously  affected  by  their  failure  to  elect  to 
take  it.  It  was  the  optional  nature  of  the  subscription  that 
constituted  the  fraud,  and  gave  to  the  defendant  the  right  to 
rescind  his  contract.  Knowledge  subsequently  acquired  of  the 
terms  of  the  option  was  not  the  discovery  of  a  new  fraud. 
These  were  merely  incidents  of  the  same  fraud,  and  their  dis- 
covery did  not  revive  a  right  of  rescission  that  had  been  waived 
after  the  discovery  of  the  essential  fact  that  constituted  the 
fraud.  The  subsequent  discovery  of  a  new  incident  in  the 
fraud  does  not  confer  a  new  right  to  rescind,  but  merely  con- 
firms the  previous  knowledge  of  the  same  fraud.  It  is  seldom 
that  a  party  who  is  the  victim  of  a  fraud  learns  all  its  circum- 
stances at  the  time  he  discovers  the  fraud.  It  is  the  fact  of  the 
fraud,  as,  in  this  case,  the  falsity  of  the  representation  with 
respect  to  the  subscription  of  the  "Roanoke  Syndicate,"  which 
^ves  the  right  to  avoid  the  contract,  not  the  particular  terms 
of  the  option.  These  do  not  change  the  essence  of  the  fraud, 
nor  affect  the  right  of  rescission.  It  was  not  necessary  that  the 
defendant  in  error  should  be  apprised  of  all  the  incidents  of 
the  fraud  before  he  could,  by  the  affirmance  of  his  contract, 
deprive  himself  of  the  right  to  rescind  it.  Knowledge  of  the 
*®*  fraud  itself  was  sufficient  ground  for  the  rescission  of  his 
contract,  and  equally  so  for  its  affirmance:  Benjamin  on  Sales, 
2d  Am.  ed.  by  Perkins,  sees.  452,  453;  1  Addison  on  Contracts, 
660.  312;  Campbell  v.  Fleming,  28  Eng.  Com.  L.  40,  1  Adol.  & 
Ell.  40:  Bach  v.  Tuch,  126  N.  Y.  63;  and  Max  Meadows  etc.  Co. 
V.  Brady,  92  Va.  79. 


June,  1898.]  Wilson  v.  Hundley.  843 

The  defendant  claimed  the  right  to  avoid  his  suhscription 
upon  the  further  ground  that  he  was  also  induced  to  subscribe 
by  the  representation  that  Byrd  Warwick  and  Fred,  S.  Myers, 
who  were  well-known  and  prosperous  business  men  of  the  city 
of  Richmond,  had  each  subscribed  to  the  stock  of  the  company 
to  the  amount  of  ten  thousand  dollars,  when,  in  fact,  they  had 
not  done  so,  and  their  subscriptions  were  wholly  fictitious.  In 
this  contention  he  is  not  sustained  by  the  evidence.  It  was 
proved  that  their  subscriptions  were  regular,  and  not  made 
upon  any  agreement  or  understanding  whatever  inconsistent 
■with  their  import,  though  for  some  reason  not  appearing  in 
the  record  they  were  subsequently  allowed  by  the  company  to 
withdraw  their  subscriptions. 

But  if  it  had  been  shown  that  their  subscriptions  were 
fictitious  or  colorable  only,  and  were  made  and  used  with  the 
intent  to  induce  other  persons  to  subscribe,  with  the  secret 
understanding  that  no  liability  should  attach  to  them  by  reason 
of  their  subscriptions,  or  that  they  should  thereafter  be  allowed 
to  withdraw  them,  this  could  not  have  operated  as  a  fraud 
upon  the  defendant  or  injured  him,  for  subscriptions  made  under 
such  circumstances  are,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  as  valid  and  bind- 
ing upon  the  subscribers  as  if  they  had  been  originally  made  in 
good  faith,  and  will  be  upheld  and  so  treated  by  the  courts:  2 
Thompson  on  Corporations,  sees.  1404-1406;  1  Morawetz  on 
Corporations,  sec.  107;  Taylor  on  Corporations,  sees.  105,  521. 

The  defendant  having,  by  afl&rmance  of  his  contract  of  sub- 
ficription,  precluded  himself  from  thereafter  rescinding  or  re- 
pudiating it,  the  next  inquiry  is  whether  he  could  maintain  his 
cross-action  against  the  company  for  damages  for  the  deceit. 

****  A  person  who  has  been  induced  by  fraud  to  enter  into  a 
contract  may,  upon  the  discovery  of  the  fraud,  as  we  have  seen, 
elect  to  rescind  the  contract  and  recover  back  the  consideration 
he  has  paid  or  given,  if  he  is  able  to  restore  in  an  unchanged 
state  what  he  has  received;  or  he  may  elect  to  retain  what  he 
has  received  and  bring  an  action  to  recover  any  damages  he  has 
sustained  by  reason  of  the  fraud.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  rule 
■with  respect  to  contracts  that  pertain  to  goods  and  chattels,  but 
it  has  been  laid  down  as  the  law  by  the  tribunal  of  last  resort 
in  England,  the  house  of  lords,  that  a  person  who  has  been  in- 
duced by  the  fraudulent  misrepresentations  of  an  agent  of  a 
company  to  take  shares  in  it,  cannot,  after  he  discovers  the 
fraud,  elect  to  retain  the  shares  and  sue  the  company  for 
■damages. 


844  Wilson  v.  Hundley.  [Virginia^ 

In  Houldsworth  v.  Glasgow  Bank,  L.  K.  5  App.  Cas.  317,  tlie 
distinction  between  contracts  relating  to  goods  and  chattels  and 
contracts  of  subscription  to  shares  of  stock  was  distinctly 
pointed  out,  and  it  was  there  decided,  as  was  foreshadowed  in 
the  previous  case  of  Addie  v.  Western  Bank  of  Scotland,  L.  E.  1 
Sc.  App.  146,  that  a  shareholder,  who  has  been  induced  to  pur- 
chase his  shares  by  the  fraud  of  an  agent  of  the  company,  cannot 
maintain  an  action  against  the  company  for  damages  for  the 
deceit,  so  long  as  he  is  a  member  of  the  company,  upon  the 
ground  that  such  an  action  is  at  variance  with  the  contract  en- 
tered into  by  him  with  his  fellow  shareholders  or  partners  in 
becoming  a  member  of  the  company.  The  same  principle  was 
followed  in  In  re  Addlestone  Linoleum  Co.,  L.  E.  37  Ch.  Div. 
191. 

The  effect  of  these  decisions  is,  that  if  the  shareholder  is  de- 
barred from  a  rescission  of  his  contract  by  the  insolvency  of 
the  company,  or  from  any  other  cause,  he  is  without  remedy 
against  the  company,  and  is  left  to  his  action  against  the  agent 
who  induced  him  by  the  fraudulent  representation  to  subscribe 
for  the  stock:  Benjamin  on  Sales,  6th  Am.  ed.,  sees.  705-709; 
Taylor  on  Corporations,  sec.  523;  1  Cook  on  Stock  and  Stock- 
holders, sec.  159,  note. 

****  A  subscription  to  the  capital  stock  of  a  joint  stock  com- 
pany is  not  only  an  undertaking  to  the  company,  but  with  all 
other  subscribers.  It  is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract  between 
the  shareholders  that  they  shall  all  contribute  ratably  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  company's  debts  and  liabilities.  The  amount 
which  each  pays,  or  agrees  to  pay,  for  his  stock  is,  by  his  con- 
tract of  membership,  dedicated  to  that  end.  If  a  subscriber, 
who  has  been  induced  by  fraud  to  purchase  his  shares,  elects 
after  the  discovery  of  the  fraud  to  affirm  his  contract  of  sub- 
scription, he  thereby,  in  effect,  says:  "Notwithstanding  the 
fraud  by  which  I  was  induced  to  become  a  member  of  the  com- 
pany, I  shall  still  stand  in  with  it,  and  take  my  chances.''  If  he 
could  thereafter  maintain  an  action  against  the  company  for 
damages  for  the  fraud,  which,  if  right  in  principle,  might  go  to 
the  extent  of  allowing  him  to  recover  back  by  way  of  damages 
all  that  he  had  paid  in  on  account  of  his  shares,  he  would  thereby 
recoup  his  entire  loss;  and,  notwithstanding  his  election  to  re- 
tain his  shares  and  to  continue  a  member  of  the  company,  he 
would  contribute,  in  fact,  not  one  cent  to  the  payment  of  the 
debts  and  liabilities.  The  effect,  therefore,  of  allowing  an  action 
to  be  maintained  by  a  shareholder  against  the  company  for  fraud 


June,  1898.]  Wilson  v.  Hundley.  845 

would  be  to  throw  the  burden  of  the  payment  of  the  debts  and 
liabilities  on  the  other  shareholders,  who  are  as  innocent  of  the 
fraud  as  he — a  result  which  would  be  wholly  at  variance  with 
his  contract  of  membership. 

The  defendant  in  error,  in  consequence  of  having  elected  to 
remain  a  member  of  the  company,  could  not  thereafter  main- 
tain an  action  against  it  to  recover  damages  for  the  alleged  fraud. 

Applying  the  foregoing  principles  to  the  case  before  us,  it 
follows  that  the  circuit  court  erred  in  its  ruling  upon  the  in- 
structions to  be  given  to  the  jury,  and  also  in  its  ruling  upon 
the  motion  for  a  new  trial. 

In  reaching  our  conclusion,  the  question  of  the  constitution- 
ality of  the  act  of  the  general  assembly  of  December  19,  1895 
^^  (Acts  1895-96,  p.  25),  or  of  the  act  of  December  22,  1897 
(Acts  1897-98,  p.  16),  which  was  much  argued  at  the  bar,  was 
not  involved,  and  any  discussion  of  it  would  be  inappropriate, 
€ven  if  we  could  consider  the  latter  act,  but  which  could  not  be 
done,  as  it  was  enacted  several  months  after  the  rendition  of  the 
judgment,  and  the  writ  of  error  must  be  decided  according  to 
the  law  as  it  was  at  the  time  that  the  judgment  was  rendered: 
Anderson  v.  Hygeia  Hotel  Co.,  92  Va.  687. 

The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  must  be  reversed,  the  ver- 
dict«of  the  jury  set  aside,  and  a  new  trial  awarded,  upon  which 
new  trial,  if.  the  evidence  be  the  same,  or  substantially  the  same, 
as  on  the  last  trial,  and  instructions  be  again  asked  for,  the  jury 
are  to  be  instructed  in  accordance  with  the  views  expressed  in 
this  opinion. 


CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD— RESCISSION— DAM- 
AGES.—If  a  contract  has  been  procured  from  a  person  by  fraud, 
he  may  maintain  an  action  to  recover  the  damages  sustained  by 
him  without  first  rescinding  the  contract  and  offering  to  return 
the  consideration  received  for  it.  Where  a  party  has  been  induced 
l)y  fraud  to  enter  into  an  executed  contract  for  the  purchase  of 
property,  he  may  either  rescind  and  recover  baclj  the  consideration 
paid,  or  affirm  the  contract  and  recover  damages  for  the  fraud:  Baird 
v.  Howard,  51  Ohio  St.  57,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  550,  and  note. 

CORPORATIONS— SUBSCRIPTIONS  INDUCED  BY 
FRAUD— REMEDY.— The  general  rule  that  contracts  obtained  by 
fraud  may  be  avoided  by  the  Injured  party  applies  to  subscriptions 
to  corporate  stocli:  See  monographic  note  to  PaVker  v.  Thomas, 
81  Am.  Dec.  401,  on  subscriptions  to  corporate  stock.  Fraud  in  pro- 
curing a  subscription  to  the  stock  of  a  corporation  entitles  the  sub- 
scriber to  a  release.  But  the  contract  entered  into  through  fraud 
is  voidable  merely,  and  not  absolutely  void.  It  Is  valid  and  bind- 
ing until  the  defrauded  party  elects  to  treat  It  as  void.  And  If  he 
fails  to  repudiate  it  before  the  rights  of  Innocent  third  parties  have 
Intervened,  their  equities  to  treat  it  as  valid  may  be  superior  to 


846  Foster  v.  Commonwealth.  [Virginia, 

his  claim  to  avoid  it:  See  monographic  note  to  Thompson  v.  Reno 
Sav,  Bank,  3  Am.  St.  Rep.  824,  on  the  liability  of  stockholders  to 
creditors  of  corporations  for  corporate  debts.  If  a  subscription 
for  shares  has  been  obtained  by  fraudulent  representations,  it  may 
be  annulled  by  the  subscribers  at  any  time  before  other  equities 
have  intervened:  Bosher  v.  Richmond  etc.  Land  Co.,  89  Vt.  455, 
37  Am.  St.  Rep.  879.  But  he  must  exercise  reasonable  care  and 
vigilance  in  discovering  the  fraud,  and,  in  any  case,  he  must,  upon 
discovery  of  the  fraud,  promptly  repudiate  the  purchase,  if  he  would 
avoid  his  subscription:  Virginia  Land  Co.  v.  Haupt,  90  Va.  533, 
44  Am.  St.  Rep.  939,  and  note.  One  who  has  been  induced  to  sub- 
scribe for  corporate  stock  by  fraudulent  representations  cannot 
recover  the  amount  paid  until  the  claims  of  creditors  of  the  cor- 
poration are  satisfied:  Notes  to  Bosher  v.  Richmond  etc.  Land  Co., 
37  Am.  St  Rep.  887;  Parker  v.  Thomas,  81  Am.  Dec.  401.  To  avoid 
liability,  he  should,  within  a  reasonable  time  after  discovering  the 
fraud,  and  before  the  rights  of  innocent  third  persons  have  accrued, 
rescind,  or  offer  to  rescind,  the  contract,  which  Includes  the  duty 
to  return,  or  offer  to  return,  his  stock  to  the  company:  Zang  v. 
Adams,  23  Colo.  408,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  249. 


Foster  v.  Commonwealth. 

[96  Virginia,  306.j 
RAPE— ATTEMPT  TO  COMMIT.— A  BOY  UNDER  FOUR- 
TEEN YEARS  OP  AGE  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  incapable 
of  commftting  the  crime  of  rape,  whatever  may  be  the  real  fact. 
Evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption  is  inadmissible.  He  cannot, 
therefore,  be  held  guilty  of  an  attempt  to  commit  the  offense. 

The  plaintiff  in  error  was  adjudged  to  be  guilty  of  a  felony, 
and  was  sentenced  to  imprisonment  in  the  penitentiary  for  a 
period  of  eight  years. 

E.  H.  Logan  and  W.  "W.  Ballard,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

A.  J.  Montague,  attorney  general,  for  the  commonwealth. 

**^  EIELY,  J.  This  case  presents  for  decision  the  import- 
ant question  whether  a  boy  under  fourteen  years  of  age  is  capa- 
ble under  the  law  of  committing  the  crime  of  rape,  or  of  the 
attempt  to  commit  it.  It  does  not  appear  ever  to  have  been 
passed  upon  in  this  state  by  any  court  of  last  resort. 

»<»''  In  Law  v.  Commonwealth,  75  Va.  885,  40  Am.  Rep.  750, 
it  was  stated  as  the  result  of  all  the  authorities  that  a  boy  under 
fourteen  years  of  age  who  aids  and  assists  another  person  in  the 
commission  of  the  offense  of  rape  may  be  convicted  as  principal 
in  the  second  degree,  if  it  appear  from  all  the  circumstances  of 
the  case  that  he  had  a  mischievous  discretion,  but  the  particular 


Sept.  1898.]  Foster  v.  Commonwealth.  847 

question  we  are  now  called  upon  to  decide  was  pot  involved  in 
that  case,  and,  though  adverted  to,  the  court  refrained  from  ex- 
pressing any  opinion  upon  it. 

By  the  common  law,  a  hoy  under  fourteen  years  of  age  is  con- 
clusively presumed  to  he  incapahle  of  committing  the  offense, 
whatever  he  the  real  fact.  Evidence  to  rehut  the  presumption 
is  inadmissihle:  1  Hale's  Pleas  of  the  Crown,  630;  4  Black's  Com- 
mentaries, 212;  2  Russell  on  Crimes,  9th  ed.,  1117;  2  Archhold's 
Criminal  Pleading  and  Practice,  156;  Eex  v.  Eldershaw,  3  Car. 
&  P.  366;  Rex  v.  Groomhridge,  7  Car.  &  P.  582;  Rex  v.  Phillips, 

8  Car.  &  P.  736;  Rex  v.  Jordan,  9  Car.  &  P.  118;  Rex  v.  Brimilow^ 

9  Car.  &  P.  366;  Queen  v.  Waite  (1892),  2  Q.  B.  600;  Queen  v. 
WiUiams  (1893),  1  Q.  B.  320. 

In  the  United  States  the  rule  of  the  common  law  has  not 
heen  uniformly  followed.  It  was  adhered  to  in  State  v.  Handy, 
4  Harr.  (Del.)  566;  State  v.  Sam,  60  N.  C.  293;  WUliams  v. 
State,  20  Fla.  777;  and  in  McKinney  v.  State,  29  Fla.  565,  3a 
Am.  St.  Rep.  140.  See,  also.  Commonwealth  v.  Green,  2  Pick. 
380. 

In  Williams  v.  State,  20  Fla.  777,  it  was  held"  that  as  there  was- 
no  statute  in  Florida  fixing  the  age  within  which  a  person  is^ 
capable  of  committing  the  crime  of  rape,  the  rule  of  the  common 
law  prevailed,  and  that  a  hoy  under  fourteen  years  of  age  could 
not  be  guilty  of  the  offense. 

In  some  of  the  other  states  the  rule  of  the  common  law  has^ 
been  laid  down  in  a  modified  form. 

In  Williams  v.  State,  14  Ohio,  222,  45  Am.  Dec.  536,  it  was 
held  that  an  infant  under  the  age  of  fourteen  years  is  presumed 
to  be  incapable  of  committing  the  crime  of  rape,  or  of  an 
attempt  to  commit  it;  but  that  the  presumption  may  be  rebutted 
by  proof  that  he  has  ^*®  arrived  at  puberty,  and  is  capable  of 
consummating  the  crime.  This  decision  was  made  in  1846. 
The  question  was  again  before  the  court  in  1878  in  the  case  of 
Hiltabiddle  v.  State,  35  Ohio  St.  52,  35  Am.  Rep.  592,  and  the 
rule  in  its  modified  form,  as  laid  down  in  Williams  v.  State,  14 
Ohio,  222,  45  Am.  Dec.  536,  since  it  had  stood  as  the  law  of  that 
state  for  many  years,  was  followed,  but  it  is  strongly  implied  in 
the  opinion  that  except  for  the  previous  decision  the  court 
would  have  adhered  to  the  rule  of  the  common  law. 

The  rule  in  its  modified  form,  as  adopted  in  Williams  v.  State^ 
14  Ohio,  222,  45  Am.  Dec.  536,  has  been  followed  in  New  York,. 
Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  and  Georgia:  People  v.  Ran* 
dolph,  2  Park.  C.  C.  174;  Wagoner  v.  State,  5  Lea,  352,  40  Am. 


548  Foster  v.  Commonwealth.  [Virginia, 

Sep.  36;  Heilmgin  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Ky.  457,  4  Am.  St.  Kep. 
207;  State  v.  Jones,  39  La.  Ann.  935;  Gordon  v.  State,  93  Ga. 
531,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  189.  See  State  v.  Yeargan,  117  N.  C. 
706,  36  L.  E.  Ann.,  note  203. 

The  American  text-writers  upon  criminal  law,  so  far  as  we 
have  had  access  to  them,  adhere  to  the  rule  of  the  common  law: 
Davis  on  Criminal  Law,  25,  29;  Minor's  Synonyms  of  Criminal 
Law,  73;  Wharton  on  Criminal  Law,  sec.  551;  3  Greenleaf  on 
Evidence,  sec.  215;  1  Bishop's  New  Criminal  Law,  sec.  373;  2 
Bishop's  New  Criminal  Law,  sec.  1117. 

The  last-named  author,  who  is  universally  recognized  as  one 
■of  the  ablest  and  most  philosophical  writers  upon  law  in  this 
country,  in  his  latest  work  on  criminal  law  approves  unquali- 
:fiedly  the  rule  of  the  common  law  for  the  sake  of  convenience 
and  decency,  as  well  as  for  its  justice,  and  doubts  "whether 
physical  capacity  in  boys  below  fourteen  is  sufficiently  frequent 
to  call  for  the  abolition  of  a  technical  rule  so  well  adapted  as  this 
to  prevent  those  particular  statements  of  indecent  things  which 
wear  away  the  sense  of  the  refined,  placed  by  the  Maker  in  the 
human  mind  as  a  protector  of  its  virtue":  2  Bishop's  New  Crim- 
inal Law,  sec.  1117. 

The  convention  of  May,  1776,  which  declared  our  separation 
from  England,  and  framed  the  first  constitution  of  the  state, 
ordained  that  "the  common  law  of  England,  all  statutes  or 
^**®  acts  of  parliament  made  in  aid  of  the  common  law  prior  to 
the  fourth  year  of  the  reign  of  King  James  I,  and  which  are  of  a 
general  nature,  not  local  to  that  kingdom,  together  with  the 
several  acts  of  the  general  assembly  of  this  colony  now  in  force, 
€0  far  as  the  same  may  consist  with  the  several  ordinances, 
declarations,  and  resolutions  of  the  general  convention,  shall  be 
■the  rule  of  decision,  and  shall  be  considered  as  in  full  force,  until 
the  same  shall  be  altered  by  the  legislative  power  of  this  colony": 
9  Hen.  Stat.  127,  sec.  6;  13  Hen.  Stat.  23,  c.  17;  and  1  R.  C, 
-c.  38,  40,  pp.  135,  136. 

In  the  year  1792  so  much  of  the  ordinance  of  1776  as  adopted 
the  acts  of  parliament  of  a  general  nature,  made  in  aid  of  the 
•common  law  prior  to  the  fourth  year  of  James  I,  was  repealed  by 
the  legislature;  but  that  part  of  the  ordinance  of  1776,  which 
established  the  common  law  until  it  should  be  altered  by  legis- 
lative power,  has  never  been  repealed. 

The  revisors  of  the  code  of  1849  prepared,  and  the  legislature 
adopted,  the  following  statute,  prescribing  the  force  and  effect 
to  be  given  to  the  common  law:  "The  common  law  of  England, 


€ept.  1898.]  Foster  v.  Commonwealth.  849 

fio  far  as  it  is  not  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  the  bill  of 
rights  and  constitution  of  this  state,  shall  continue  in  force 
within  the  same,  and  be  the  rule  of  decision,  except  in  those 
respects  wherein  it  is  or  shall  be  altered  by  the  general  assem- 
bl/':  Code  1849,  c.  16,  sec.  1.  And  this  is,  by  statute,  the  force 
And  effect  to  be  given  to  it  at  the  present  time:  Code  of  1887, 
fiec.  2. 

Consequently,  the  common  law  of  England,  so  far  as  it  is  not 
repugnant  to  the  principles  of  the  bill  of  rights  and  constitution 
of  this  state,  or  has  not  been  modified  by  our  written  law,  is  in 
full  force  in  this  state,  and  constitutes  the  rule  of  decision  on  all 
subjects,  whether  of  a  civil  or  criminal  nature:  See  Report  of 
revisors  of  code  of  1849,  p.  68,  note. 

Although,  by  the  terms  of  the  ordinance  of  1776,  the  common 
law  was  adopted  generally  and  without  a  qualification  ^*®  sim- 
ilar to  that  annexed  to  the  adoption  of  the  British  statutes,  yet 
it  has  always  been  considered  that  the  same  principle  governs  the 
adoption  of  the  common  law.  Such  of  its  doctrines  and  prin- 
ciples as  are  repugnant  to  the  nature  and  character  of  our 
political  system,  or  which  the  different  and  varied  circumstances 
of  our  country  render  inapplicable  to  us,  are  either  not  in  force 
here,  or  must  be  so  modified  in  their  application  as  to  adapt 
them  to  our  condition.  It  is  a  reasonable  and  substantial  com- 
pliance with  the  common  law,  "whose  peculiar  beauty  is  that  it 
adapts  itself  to  the  rights  of  parties  under  every  change  of  cir- 
cumstances," rather  than  a  literal  one,  which  is  exacted  by  its 
adoption:  1  Tucker's  Commentaries,  9;  Coleman  v.  Moody,  4 
Hen.  &  M.  20,  21;  Findlay  v.  Smith,  6  Munf.  148,  8  Am.  Dec. 
733;  Stout  v.  Jackson,  2  Rand.  147;  Stokes  v.  Upper  Appomattox 
Co.,  3  Leigh,  337. 

The  legislature,  which  is  the  representative  of  the  sovereign 
power  of  the  people,  and  specially  charged  with  the  duty  of 
making  or  amending  laws  to  meet  their  needs,  has  not  at  any 
time  enacted  any  law  changing  the  rule  of  the  common  law  with 
respect  to  the  matter  under  consideration.  The  presumption 
from  the  inaction  of  the  legislature  is  that  it  has  not  been  found 
that  the  climate  of  our  state,  or  the  habits  and  condition  of  our 
people,  require  any  change  or  modification  of  the  rule.  And,  in 
this  connection,  it  is  significant,  and  tends  to  confirm  the  pre- 
sumption from  the  inaction  of  the  legislature,  that  in  the  judicial 
history  of  the  state,  extending  over  a  period  of  more  than  a 
hundred  years,  no  case  drawing  in  question  the  rule  of  the  com- 

AM.  St.  Rkp.,  Vou  LXX.— 51 


850  Foster  v.  Commonwealth.  [Virginia, 

mon  law  in  respect  to  the  age  of  puberty  in  males  can  be  found 
in  any  court  of  last  resort  in  the  state. 

We  are  not  aware  of  any  climatic  influence  on  our  people  by 
reason  of  their  locality,  or  difference  in  their  habits  or  condi- 
tion, that  calls  for  a  modification  of  our  unwritten  laws  as  to- 
the  age  of  puberty,  even  if  we  were  satisfied  that  we  had  the 
power  to  make  it  in  view  of  the  force  and  effect  the  statute 
^**  requires  shall  be  given  to  the  common  law.  The  inconven- 
ience, if  not  absolute  inability,  of  obtaining  evidence  of  the 
puberty  of  a  boy  under  the  age  of  fourteen  and  his  capacity 
to  commit  the  crime  of  rape,  except  by  the  exposure  of  hi» 
person,  either  voluntary  or  compulsory,  and  the  questionable 
right  of  the  commonwealth  to  obtain  it  by  compulsion,  do  not 
invite  a  modification  of  the  arbitrary  rule  of  the  common  law; 
while  the  unreliable  and  unsatisfactory  evidence  of  the  capacity 
of  the  accused  to  commit  the  crime,  when  so  obtained  and 
adduced,  and  the  statement  and  discussion  of  indecent  things 
which  must  attend  its  introduction  before  the  jury,  would 
cause  us  to  hesitate  to  depart  from  a  long-established  rule, 
which  has  had  the  sanction  of  the  wisest  judges  and  under- 
gone the  test  of  years. 

The  circumstances  under  which  the  evidence  to  establish  the 
puberty  of  the  accused  in  the  case  before  us  was  obtained,  to- 
gether with  its  nature  and  doubtful  character,  are  well  calcu- 
Med  to  deter  any  modification  of  the  rule  of  the  common  law,, 
unless  made  necessary  by  the  social  condition  of  our  people,  and 
required  for  the  protection  of  virtue. 

The  accused  being  under  fourteen  years  of  age,  and  conclu- 
sively presumed  to  be  incapable  of  committing  the  crime  of  rape,- 
it  logically  follows,  as  a  plain,  legal  deduction,  thait  he  was  also- 
incapable  in  law  of  an  attempt  to  commit  it.  He  could  not  be 
held  to  be  guilty  of  an  attempt  to  commit  an  offense  which  he 
was  physically  impotent  to  perpetrate:  1  Bishop's  New  Crimi- 
nal Law,  746;  2  Bishop's  New  Criminal  Law,  1136;  2  Russell  on 
Crimes,  676;  3  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  sec.  215,  note;  State  v. 
Sam,  60  N.  C.  293,  300;  Queen  v.  Waite,  2  Q.  B.  600;  Queen  v. 
Williams,  1  Q.  B.  320. 

The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  must  be  reversed,  and  a 
new  trial  awarded  the  plaintiff  in  error,  to  be  had  in  accordance 
with  the  views  expressed  in  the  foregoing  opinion. 


RAPE— ATTEMPT    TO    COMMIT— CAPACITY    OF    DEFEND- 
ANT.—By  the  common  law,  a  boy  under  fourteen  years  of  age  can- 


Sept.  1898.]    LyNCHBURQ  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers.    851 

not  be  convicted  of  rape.  He  Is  presumed  to  be  physically  incap- 
able of  committing  the  crime.  Hence,  he  cannot  be  convicted  of 
assault  with  intent  to  commit  rape  until  the  state  proves  his  capacity 
to  commit  rape:  Gordon  v.  State,  93  Ga.  531,  44  Am.  St.  Bep.  189. 
Evidence  Is  inadmissible,  at  common  law,  to  show  that,  In  point 
of  fact,  he  can  commit  the  offense,  but,  in  some  of  our  states,  the 
presumption  of  incapacity  may  be  overcome  by  proof  that,  in  point 
of  fact,  he  has  arrived  at  the  age  of  puberty:  McKinny  v.  State, 
28  Fla.  565,  30  Am.  St  Rep.  140.  and  note. 


Lynohbueq  Perpetual  Building  and  Loan  Com- 
pany V,  Fellers. 

[96  Virginia,  337.] 

LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER-. 
SUBJECTING  LANDS  TO  PAYMENT  OF  LIEN— PREJUDICIAL 
ACT  WITH  NOTICE  OF  EQUITIES.- When  a  person  buys  part  of 
a  tract  of  land,  with  full  notice  or  knowledge  of  a  deed  of  trust  on 
the  whole  of  it,  he  must,  in  order  to  prevent  the  land  so  purchased 
from  being  subjected  to  the  payment  of  such  lien,  show  that  the 
holder  thereof  has,  with  notice  of  his  equities,  done  some  act  to  Lis 
prejudice. 

LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER— 
SUBJECTING  LANDS  TO  PAYMENT  OP  LIEN— ASSUMPTION 
OF  TRUST  DEBT— RESCISSION— BURDEN  OF  PROOF.— If  one 
executes  to  a  loan  company  a  deed  of  trust  on  the  whole  of  certain 
land  to  secure  a  loan,  and  then  sells  part  of  the  property  to  a 
church,  which  assumes  the  payment  of  the  loan,  one  who  subse- 
quently buys  another  portion  of  the  land  must,  if  he  would  prevent 
it  from  being  subjected  to  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed,  on  the  ground 
that  the  contract  to  assume  the  payment  of  the  trust  debt  has 
been  rescinded,  assume  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  loan  com- 
pany assented  to  the  rescission  of  the  contract. 

LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER— 
SUBJFKJTING  LANDS  TO  PAYMENT  OF  LIEN— ORDER  OF— 
RELEASE  OF  PRIMARY  SECURITY— EFFECT  OF.— If  a  person 
executes  a  trust  deed  to  a  loan  company  on  the  whole  of  certain 
land  to  secure  a  loan,  and  then  sells  part  of  the  property  to  a  church, 
which  assumes  the  payment  of  the  loan,  but  subsequently  sells 
other  portions  of  the  land,  at  different  times,  to  two  other  persons, 
and  then  rescinds  the  contract  by  which  the  trustees  of  the  church 
assumed  to  pay  the  trust  debt,  after  which  the  loan  company,  with 
notice  of  the  last  purchasers*  Interest  In  the  property  embraced  In 
the  trust  deed,  but  without  notice  of  such  rescission,  releases  the 
church  property  from  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed,  the  property  last 
purchased  is  not  absolutely  released  from  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed, 
but  only  discharged  from  an  amount  of  the  trust  deed  debt  equal 
to  the  value  of  the  parcel  released  so  far  as  the  proceeds  of  that 
parcel  have  not  been  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  lien,  because 
the  injury  done  to  the  last  purchaser  by  the  release  was  the  differ- 
ence between  the  value  of  the  property  released  and  what  was  ac- 
tually paid  out  of  Its  proceeds,  or  on  account  of  it,  upon  the  lien. 
That  part  of  the  land  still  owned  by  the  grantor  should  be  first 


852     Lynchburg  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers.     [Virginia, 

subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  loan  company's  debt,  and,  If  the 
proceeds  of  the  last  purchaser's  lot  is  not  sufficient  to  satisfy  that 
portion  of  the  loan  company's  debt  chargeable  upon  it,  the  next 
preceding  lot,  in  order  of  alienation,  is  liable,  and  this  lot  will  also 
be  chargeable  with  that  portion  of  the  loan  company's  debt  from 
which  the  last  purchaser's  lot  was  discharged  by  the  release  ot  the 
church  lot  from  the  lien  of  the  deed  of  trust 

LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER- 
SUBJECTING  LANDS  TO  PAYMENT  OF  LIEN— RELEASE  OP 
PRIMARY  SECURITY— GENERAL  RULE-EXCEPTION.— Ordi- 
narily, when  the  equities  of  the  various  owners  of  lands  subject  to 
a  deed  of  trust  are  unequal,  so  that  their  respective  parcels  are 
Jiable,  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  alienation,  if  the  deed  of  trust 
creditor,  having  notice  of  this  situation,  releases  a  parcel  which  is 
primarily  liable,  he  thereby  discharges  or  releases  those  parcels 
which  are  subsequently  liable,  in  the  order  of  their  several  liabili- 
ties, from  an  amount  of  the  deed  of  trust  debt  equal  to  the  value 
of  the  parcel  released;  but  this  effect  of  the  release  may  be  obviated 
by  the  conduct  of  the  parties  to  be  affected.  Thus,  if  a  whole  tract 
of  land  is  covered  by  a  trust  deed  to  secure  a  debt,  and  the  trust 
deed  creditor  releases  the  trust  deed  lien,  without  notice  of  the 
rights  and  interests  of  one  who  had  purchased  a  parcel  of  the  land 
subject  to  the  deed  of  trust,  such  purchaser  cannot  claim  the  benefit 
of  the  general  rule  where  he  had  notice  of  all  the  facts  constituting 
the  release. 

DEEDS— REGISTRY  OF,  BY  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER, 
AS  NOTICE— OBJECT  OF  REGISTRY  LAWS.— The  registry  of  a 
deed  by  a  subsequent  purchaser  is  no  notice  to  parties  who  have 
acquired  their  rights  before  the  time  when  the  deed  is  registered, 
for  registry  laws  are  not  intended  to  affect  the  holders  of  ante- 
cedent rights,  but  only  such  persons  as  are  compelled  to  search  the 
records  in  order  to  protect  their  own  interests. 

Suit  in  cliancery  brought  by  the  appellees,  M.  L.  Fellers  and 
others,  against  the  Lynchburg  Perpetual  Building  and  Loan 
Company.  The  facts  are  quite  fully  stated  in  the  opinion.  A 
part  of  Huff's  tract  of  land  was  vacant.  He  executed  the  deed 
of  trust  on  the  entire  tract  to  secure  his  debt  to  the  loan  com- 
pany, and  sold  a  vacant  lot  to  the  trustees  of  the  church,  exe- 
cuting and  delivering  to  them  a  deed  therefor.  Huff's  deed  to 
Strickler  was  not  put  of  record  until  September  8,  1891,  and  his 
deed  to  Fellers  was  put  of  record  on  June  4,  1892.  Strickler 
and  Fellers  both  paid  for  their  lots  in  full,  and  the  church  paid 
in  full  for  its  repurchase.  The  loan  company  had  no  actual 
notice  of  the  conveyance  to  Strickler.  There  was  no  direct 
proof  that  the  loan  company  had  any  knowledge  of  the  rescis- 
sion of  the  original  contract  between  Huff  and  the  trustees  of 
the  church,  but  it  was  sought  to  charge  the  company  with  such 
knowledge  by  reason  of  the  knowledge  of  John  "W.  Woods,  its 
counsel  in  Roanoake.  It  sufficiently  appeared,  however,  that 
whatever  knowledge  he  had  was  acquired  after  the  termination 
of  his  duties  in  respect  to  that  transaction,  and  in  reference  to 


Sept.  1898.]     Lynchburg  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers.     853 

a  matter  in  which  he  was  not  the  agent  of  the  company.  The 
loan  company  appealed  from  the  decree,  the  nature  of  which  ap- 
pears in  the  opinion. 

Moomaw  &  Woods,  for  the  appellant. 

Scott  &  Staples, 'Hansbrongh  &  Hall,  Josiah  Friend,  and  S. 
Hamilton  Graves,  for  the  appellees. 

33©  BUCHANAN,  J.  In  February,  1891,  W.  B.  Huff,  who 
was  the  owner  of  a  lot  ***•  of  land  in  the  city  of  Koanoke,  on 
which  there  were  three  houses,  executed  a  deed  of  trust  to  secure 
the  payment  of  the  sum  of  $2,000,  which  he  had  borrowed  from 
the  appellant.  In  July  following,  Huff  sold  and  conveyed  a 
part  of  the  lot  to  the  trustees  of  the  United  Brethren  Church 
for  $2,600.  They  paid  $600  in  cash,  and  assumed,  it  is  alleged, 
payment  of  the  debt  due  the  appellant.  At  or  about  the  same 
time  Huff  sold  and  conveyed  another  portion  of  the  lot,  with  a 
house  on  it,  to  W.  H.  Strickler,  one  of  the  trustees  of  the  church. 

In  November  of  the  same  year  M.  L.  Fellers  purchased  from 
Huff  another  portion  of  the  lot,  upon  which  the  other  two 
houses  were  located,  and  received  a  conveyance  therefor.  The 
trustees  of  the  church,  after  paying  three  monthly  instalments 
(July,  August,  and  September)  of  $42.94  each,  upon  the  debt 
secured  by  the  deed  of  trust,  notified  Huff  thait  they  could  not, 
and  would  not,  proceed  further  with  their  purchase.  Between 
that  time  and  November,  1892  (precisely  when  does  not  clearly 
appear),  Huff  and  the  church  trustees  agreed  to  rescind  the  con- 
tract between  them  for  the  sale  and  purchase  of  the  lot.  No 
reconveyance  was  made,  but  the  deed  from  Huff  to  them,  which 
had  never  been  recorded,  was  destroyed.  Prior  to  the  twenty- 
sixth  day  of  November,  1892,  Huff  agreed  to  sell  to  the  trustees 
of  the  church  a  portion  of  the  lot  embraced  in  their  first  con- 
tract, which  had  been  rescinded.  The  trustees  of  the  church 
required,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  their  purchase,  that  Huff 
should  have  that  portion  of  the  lot  released  from  the  lien  of  the 
deed  of  trust.  The  lien  was  released  by  the  appellant  by  deed 
dated  November  12,  1892,  as  to  that  portion  of  the  lot,  and  on 
the  26th  of  the  month  Huff  conveyed  it  to  the  trustees  of  the 
church. 

A  large  part  of  the  appellant's  debt  remains  unpaid,  and  the 
questions  presented  by  this  record  are,  what  property  is  liable 
for  its  payment,  and  the  order  in  which  the  property  liable 
should  be  subjected. 


854    Lynchburq  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers.     [Virginia, 

The  second,  third,  fourth,  fifth,  and  sixth  assignments  of  *** 
error  raise  substantially  the  same  question,  viz..  To  what  extent, 
if  at  all,  had  the  land  purchased  by  Fellers  been  released  from 
the  lien  of  the  deed  of  trust  by  reason  of  the  conduct  of  the 
appellant. 

The  conduct  relied  on  to  show  that  it  had  been  absolutely 
released  was  that  Huff  and  the  trustees  of  the  church  had 
rescinded  the  contract  between  them  of  July,  1891,  by  which 
the  latter  had  assumed  the  payment  of  the  debt  secured  by  the 
deed  of  trust,  and  that  this  rescission  was  with  the  assent  of 
the  appellant. 

The  burden  of  proving  that  the  appellant  had  assented  to  the 
rescission  of  the  contract  was  upon  Fellers.  He  had  purchased 
with  full  knowledge  of  the  appellant's  lien,  and,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  land  so  purchased  from  being  subjected  to  its  payment, 
it  was  necessary  for  him  to  show  that  the  appellant,  with  notice 
of  his  equities,  had  done  some  act  to  his  prejudice.  The  evi- 
dence does  show,  we  think,  that  the  appellant  had  notice  of 
Fellers'  purchase,  or  that  he  had  an  interest  in  the  land  when 
the  appellant  executed  the  release  of  November  12,  1892.  After 
his  purchase  was  made  and  the  policy  of  insurance  had  expired, 
which  had  theretofore  been  taken  out  by  Huff  on  the  property 
for  the  benefit  of  appellant,  and  as  a  further  protection  to  the 
debt  secured  by  the  deed  of  trust,  Fellers  obtained  a  new  policy 
in  his  own  name  on  the  house  on  that  portion  of  the  property 
purchased  by  him.  That  policy  was  sent  to  the  appellant  by  the 
secretary  of  the  insurance  company,  accompanied  by  a  letter 
dated  July  7,  1892,  in  these  words:  "Please  find  inclosed  fire 
insurance  policy,  $1,200,  in  renewal  of  policy  of  W.  P.  Huff, 
expired  on  the  9  th,  on  property  on  which  you  have  a  lien.  It 
was  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Fellers  that  the  houses  insured  would 
not  stand  more  insurance  than  $600  each,  and  for  that  reason 
the  amount  was  reduced."  It  is  proved  that  it  appeared  from 
Fellers'  policy  of  insurance  that  the  title  was  in  him,  and  that 
the  appellant  had  a  deed  of  trust  upon  the  property.  It  further 
appears  **^  that,  in  December,  1893,  after  the  property  had  been 
advertised  for  sale  under  the  deed  of  trust.  Fellers  went  to  the 
office  of  appellant  to  see  the  secretary  in  order  to  get  an  exten- 
sion of  time,  and  whilst  there  he  inquired  if  the  policies  of  in- 
surance had  not  expired,  thinking  that  he  had  only  taken  them 
out  for  twelve  months,  when  the  secretary  replied  that  they  had 
not;  that  they  were  three-year  policies;  went  to  his  safe  and 
took  them  out,  and  said,  "Here  are  the  policies  and  deed  of 


Sept.  1898.]    Lynchburg  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers.    865 

trust."  When  asked  if  the  appellant  knew  before  that  time 
that  he  was  a  purchaser  of  the  property,  he  replied  that  he  could 
not  say  that  it  did,  as  there  had  never  been  any  correspondence 
between  them,  but  that  the  facts  seemed  to  be  familiar  to  the 
fiecretary  when  he  (Fellers)  told  him  who  he  was. 

Unexplained,  and  the  appellant  made  no  effort  to  explain, 
them,  these  facts  show  that  the  company  must  have  known, 
when  it  released  the  church  lot  from  the  lien  of  the  deed  of 
trust,  that  Fellers  had  acquired  an  interest  in  the  property  em- 
braced in  the  deed  of  trust.  Upon  no  other  reasonable  theory 
can  its  acceptance  and  retention  of  Fellers'  policy  of  insurance 
be  explained  or  justified.  The  evidence,  however,  does  not 
show,  in  our  opinion,  that  the  appellant  was  a  party  to  or  knew 
of  the  rescission  of  the  contract  of  July,  1891,  by  which  the 
trustees  of  the  church  assumed  to  pay  the  debt  secured  by  the 
deed  of  trust.  The  circuit  court  erred,  therefore,  in  holding  that 
the  Fellers  property  was  absolutely  released  from  the  lien  of  the 
deed  of  trust.  It  was  only  discharged  from  an  amount  of  the 
deed  of  trust  debt  equal  to  the  value  of  the  parcel  released  so 
far  as  the  proceeds  of  that  parcel  had  not  been  applied  to  the 
payment  of  the  lien.  The  injury  done  to  Fellers  by  the  release 
was  the  difference  between  the  value  of  the  property  released 
and  what  was  actually  paid  out  of  its  proceeds,  or  on  account  of 
it,  upon  the  lien. 

In  the  event  the  proceeds  of  the  Fellers  lot  is  not  sufi&cient 
to  satisfy  that  portion  of  the  appellant's  debts  chargeable  upon 
**^  it,  as  hereinbefore  shown,  the  Strickler  lot  wUl  be  liable, 
being  next  in  order  of  alienation  by  Huff.  It  will  also  be 
chargeable  with  that  portion  of  the  debt  of  appellant  from 
which  the  Fellers  lot  was  discharged  by  the  release  of  the  church 
lot  from  the  lien  of  the  deed  of  trust.  Ordinarily,  when  the  equi- 
ties of  the  various  owners  of  lands  subject  to  a  deed  of  trust  are 
unequal,  so  that  their  respective  parcels  are  liable,  in  the  in- 
verse order  of  their  alienation,  if  the  deed  of  trust  creditor, 
having  notice  of  this  situation,  releases  a  parcel  which  is  pri- 
marily liable,  he  thereby  discharges  or  releases  those  parcels 
which  are  subsequently  liable  in  the  order  of  their  several  liabili- 
ties from  an  amount  of  the  deed  of  trust  debt  equal  to  the  value 
of  the  parcel  released.  But  this  effect  of  the  release  may  be 
obviated  by  the  conduct  of  the  parties  to  be  affected:  3  Pome- 
Toy's  Equity  Jurisprudence,  sec.  1226. 

In  this  case  Strickler's  conduct  has  been  such  that  he  can- 
not claim  the  benefit  of  the  general  rule.    He  was  one  of  tho 


856     LyNCHBURQ  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers.     [Virginia^ 

trustees  of  the  church  when  their  first  purchase  was  made,  when 
that  contract  was  rescinded,  when  they  made  their  second  pur- 
chase upon  the  condition  that  the  lien  of  the  deed  of  trust  upon 
it  should  be  released,  and  when  that  release  was  made.  He  was- 
an  active  participant  in  all  these  various  transactions  between 
Huff  and  the  trustees  of  the  church,  and  had  full  knowledge  of 
all  the  facts.  The  evidence  does  not  show  that  the  appellant 
had  notice  of  his  rights  or  interest  in  the  property  when  it  re- 
leased its  lien,  even  if  notice  under  the  facts  of  the  case  could 
affect  the  question.  There  is  no  pretense  that  Strickler  in- 
formed the  appellant  of  his  purchase. 

The  registry  of  his  deed  was  not  notice  to  the  appellant.  It; 
is  true,  we  think,  as  stated  by  counsel,  that  this  court  has  never 
pased  upon  that  question,  but  it  is  well  settled,  both  upon  prin- 
ciple and  authority,  that  the  registry  of  a  deed  by  a  subsequent 
purchaser  is  not  notice  to  parties  who  have  acquired  their  righta 
before  the  time  when  the  deed  is  registered.  Neither  the  lan- 
guage nor  the  policy  of  the  registry  acts  was  ^"**  intended  to 
affect  the  holders  of  antecedent  rights,  but  only  such  persons 
as  are  compelled  to  search  the  records  in  order  to  protect  their 
own  interests:  Cheeseborough  v.  Millard,  1  Johns.  Ch.  409,  414, 
7  Am.  Dec.  494;  George  v.  Wood,  9  Allen,  80,  85  Am.  Dec.  741; 
notes  to  Aldrich  v.  Cooper,  1  White  &  Tudor's  Lead.  Cas.  Eq., 
4th  Am.  from  4th  London  ed.,  307-312;  1  Jones  on  Mortgages, 
sees.  562,  372;  2  Pomeroy's  Equity  Jurisprudence,  sees.  656,. 
657,  1226. 

Neither  is  it  satisfactorily  shown  that  Judge  Woods  was  such 
an  agent  of  the  appellant  and  acquired  his  knowledge  of  Strick- 
ler*s  purchase  under  such  circumstances  as  that  his  knowledge 
would  be  notice  to  it. 

Whether  the  trustees  of  the  church,  who,  it  is  alleged,  as- 
sumed payment  of  the  appellant's  debt,  are  personally  liable  for 
it,  and,  if  so,  whether  Fellers  is  substituted  to  the  appellant's 
rights  against  them  or  to  their  rights,  if  any,  against  the  church 
property,  are  questions  which  cannot  be  passed  upon  at  this 
time.  Only  two  of  the  five  or  more  trustees  of  the  church  who 
are  charged  with  having  assumed  the  payment  of  the  appellant's 
debt  are  parties  to  this  suit.  They  are  necessary  parties,  and, 
before  any  decree  is  made  affecting  their  rights,  they  should  be 
made  parties  to  this  suit. 

We  are  of  opinion,  therefore,  that  the  decree  complained  of 
must  be  affirmed  in  so  far  as  it  fixes  the  amount  due  appellant 


Sept.  1898.]    Lynchburg  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  t.  Fellees.     857 

on  its  debt,  and  directs  the  vacant  lot  situated  on  the  southeast 
corner  of  Franklin  road  and  Day  avenue,  still  owned  by  Huff, 
to  be  first  subjected  to  its  payment,  and  that  in  all  other  respects 
the  decree  must  be  reversed,  and  the  cause  remanded  to  the  cir- 
cuit court  to  be  proceeded  with  in  accordance  with  the  views 
expressed  in  this  opinion. 

PRIMARY  FUND  FOR  PAYMENT  OP  MORTGAGE— ORDER 
OF  SALE  OF  LANDS  ALIENED  BY  MORTGAGOR.— If  the  owner 
of  mortgaged  lands  sells  portions  of  them  to  third  parties,  retain- 
ing part  of  them  himself,  unless  the  purchaser  took  cum  onere,  the 
portion  so  remaining  In  the  mortgagor  becomes  the  primary  fund 
for  the  payment  of  the  mortgage,  and  the  portions  sold  are  liable 
In  the  inverse  order  of  their  alienation:  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Stanton,  55  Minn.  211,  43  Am.  St.  Rep.  491;  note  to  Turner  v.  Flen- 
nikin,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  627.  The  mortgagee  Is  not  bound  to  inquire, 
before  releasing  a  portion  of  the  land,  whether  any  portion  has 
been  conveyed  or  encumbered  since  his  lien  attached;  but  will  re- 
tain the  right  to  have  the  land  sold  in  the  Inverse  order  of  aliena- 
tion, unless,  before  giving  the  release,  he  had  actual  or  constructive 
notice  of  such  subsequent  alienation  or  encumbrance:  Howard  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Halsey,  8  N.  Y.  271,  59  Am.  Dec.  478.  Where  two  lots  are 
mortgaged  to  secure  the  same  debt,  and  the  mortgagor  subsequently 
conveys  one  of  the  lots,  the  remaining  lot  Is  primarily  liable  under 
the  mortgage:  Gaskill  v.  Sine,  13  N.  J.  Eq.  400,  78  Am.  Dec.  105. 

IF  A  MORTGAGEE  RELEASES  PART  OF  THE  MORT- 
GAGED PREMISES  AFTER  OTHER  PARTS  HAVE  BEEN 
SOLD,  having  notice  of  the  prior  sale,  he  thereby  releases  the 
property  first  sold.  If  the  property  actually  released  by  him  Is  of 
sufficient  value  to  pay  the  mortgage  debt:  Turner  v.  Flenniken,  164 
Pa.  St.  469,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  624.  Compare  Guion  v.  Knapp,  6  Paige, 
35,  29  Am.  Dec.  741. 

THE  REGISTRY  LAW  applies  only  In  cases  where  the  Interest 
of  a  subsequent  judgment  creditor,  mortgagee,  or  purchaser,  at  the 
time  he  acts,  can  be  affected  by  want  of  notice  of  the  unregistered 
instrument.  It  was  not  Intended  to  relate  to  those  who  have  no 
concern  in  the  instrument  when  they  acquire  their  rights.  The  rec- 
ord of  a  deed  is  constructive  notice  only  as  against  subsequent  pur- 
chasers and  encumbrancers:  Note  to  Ocobock  t.  Baker,  66  Am.  St. 
Bep.  524. 


S58    New  South  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Reed.    [Virginia. 


New  South  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Eeed. 

[96  Virginia,  345.] 

JUDGMENTS  RENDERED  DURING  TERM  HAVE  EF- 
FECT FROM  FIRST  DAY  THEREOF-PRIORITY  OF  LIEN.— 
A  judgment  rendered  during  a  term  of  court  relates  back  to  the  first 
day  thereof,  and  is  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment 
debtor  from  that  time.  It  is,  therefore,  a  lien  which  has  priority 
•over  a  deed  of  trust  recorded  during  the  term,  though  the  judgment 
was  actually  rendered  after  the  deed  of  trust  was  recorded. 

APPEAL— WHAT  CANNOT  BE  FIRST  ASSERTED  ON— 
SUBROGATION.— A  claim  for  affirmative  relief,  such  as  one  to  be 
subrogated  to  the  rights  of  a  lien  creditor  not  made  in  the  court  be- 
low, cannot  be  asserted  for  the  first  time  in  the  appellate  court. 

FRAUDULENT  CONVEYANCE— A  VOLUNTARY  DEED  IS 
NOT  FRAUDULENT  AS  TO  DEBTS  AFTERWARD  CREATED. 
A  voluntary  deed  will  not  be  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  subsequent 
■creditors  of  the  grantor  where  no  fraud  is  shown;  and  creditors 
whose  debts  were  created  after  it  was  made  and  recorded  cannot 
subject  the  property  thereby  conveyed  upon  the  ground  that  it  was 
executed  in  fraud  of  their  rights. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.— IMPROVEMENTS  PUT  UPON 
THE  WIFE'S  SEPARATE  REAL  ESTATE  BY  HER  INSOLVENT 
HUSBAND,  in  fraud  of  his  creditors,  can  be  followed  by  them  on 
the  premises  where  they  are  put,  and  the  land  may  be  charged,  in 
their  favor,  with  the  value  of  such  improvements. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE^CONTROVERSY  OVER  FUNDS, 
THE  WIFE'S  SEPARATE  ESTATE,  TAKEN  BY  HER  INSOL- 
VENT HUSBAND— RIGHTS  OF  CREDITORS.— In  a  contest  be- 
tween the  creditors  of  an  insolvent  husband  and  his  wife  over  funds 
which,  at  one  time,  constituted  her  separate  estate,  but  which  she 
allowed  to  pass  Into  her  husband's  hands,  the  creditors  will  pre- 
vail, where  there  is  nothing  to  sbow  that  the  transaction  was  in- 
tended as  a  loan,  or  that  the  husband  and  wife  Intended  to  occupy 
the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  in  respect  to  such  funds. 

Suit  to  subject  certain  property  to  the  payment  of  debts. 
The  appellees,  D.  V.  Eeed  and  Margaret  0.  Reed,  his  wife,  went 
to  Roanoke,  Virginia,  in  1888,  taking  with  them  about  $300 
belonging  to  D.  V.  Reed,  the  tools  of  his  trade,  and  about 
$1,200  of  the  separate  estate  of  Mrs.  Reed,  derived  from  the 
sale  of  certain  lands  owned  by  her  in  West  Virginia.  D.  V. 
Eeed  mingled  this  money  with  his  own,  and  used  it  as  such,  with 
his  wife's  assent,  and,  shortly  after  their  arrival,  purchased  prop- 
erty, in  Roanoke,  at  the  corner  of  Luck  and  Roanoke  streets,  on 
which  he  erected  a  carriage  factory.  On  April  17,  1893,  D.  V. 
Eeed  conveyed  this  property  in  trust  to  secure  to  the  appellant, 
the  New  South  Building  and  Loan  Association,  the  payment  of 
a  debt  of  $4,500,  for  money  loaned  him.  This  deed  was  ad- 
mitted to  record  on  the  same  day.  On  December  6,  1894,  the 
property  was  sold,  under  this  deed  of  trust,  to  the  association,  for 


Sept.  1898.J    New  Sout^  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Reed.    859 

^2,500,  which  sum  was  credited  on  the  debt  due  the  association. 
At  a  term  of  the  circuit  court,  beginning  on  April  10,  1893, 
two  judgments  were  rendered  against  D.  V.  Reed— one  on  May- 
IB,  1893,  in  favor  of  the  Enterprise  Carriage  Manufacturing 
Company  for  $140.25,  and  the  other  on  May  19, 1893,  in  favor  of 
the  Ohio  Spiral  Spring  Buggy  Company,  for  $400.  Both  were 
docketed  on  May  23, 1893.  On  April  15, 1891,  George  A.  Baker 
«nd  wife  had  conveyed  to  Mrs.  Reed  a  lot  of  land  in  the  city  of 
Roanoke,  at  the  corner  of  Mountain  street  and  Franklin  road. 
The  deed  was  admitted  to  record  on  November  2,  1891.  It 
stated  a  consideration  of  $2,400,  of  which  $1,200  was  paid  in 
cash.  For  the  remainder  of  the  indebtedness,  Mrs.  Reed  as- 
sumed the  payment  of  negotiable  notes  aggregating  $600,  and 
executed  a  negotiable  note,  payable  to  Baker,  for  the  other  $600. 
All  but  about  $50  of  the  entire  consideration  for  this  property 
was  paid.  In  February,  1895,  the  two  companies  which  had 
recovered  judgments  against  D.  V.  Reed,  suing  for  themselves 
and  all  other  lien  creditors  of  D.  V.  Reed,  filed  a  bill,  in  which 
D.  V.  Reed  and  the  loan  association  were  defendants,  charging 
that  the  judgments  mentioned  were  liens  on  the  lot  at  the  cor- 
ner of  Luck  and  Roanoke  streets,  from  and  after  the  first  day 
of  the  term  at  which  they  were  rendered,  and  on  all  the  other 
real  estate  then  and  thereafter  owned  by  D.  V.  Reed,  and  that 
the  loan  association  acquired  the  property  at  Luck  and  Roanoke 
streets  subject  to  the  lien  of  the  judgments  named.  It  was 
also  charged  that  the  consideration  for  the  lot  conveyed  to  Mrs. 
Reed  by  Baker  was  paid  by  D.  V.  Reed,  who  procured  the  deed 
to  the  property  with  intent  to  hinder,  delay,  and  defraud  his 
creditors.  Further  allegations  were  made  that  Reed's  wife  had 
notice  of  his  fraudulent  intent;  that  the  deed  from  Walker  and 
wife  to  Mrs.  Reed  was  void  as  to  D.  V.  Reed's  creditors;  and 
that  the  judgments  mentioned  were  liens  upon  the  property  so 
conveyed.  The  bill  prayed  that  the  property  purchased  by  the 
loan  association  be  subjected  to  the  judgments  named;  and  that 
the  deed  from  Baker  and  wife  to  Mrs.  Reed  be  set  aside  and 
annulled,  and  the  property  attempted  to  be  conveyed  thereby 
be  subjected  to  the  pa3anent  of  D.  V.  Reed's  debts.  The  loan 
association  put  in  an  answer  which  it  prayed  might  be  treated 
as  a  cross-bill.  The  association  denied  that  the  property  pur- 
chased by  it  was  subject  to  the  judgments  mentioned,  and 
claimed  to  be  a  bona  fide  purchaser  without  notice.  It  con- 
tended that,  if  the  judgments  were  held  to  be  prior  liens  upon 
the  property  so  purchased  by  it,  D.  V.  Reed  was  the  owner  of 


860    New  South  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Reed.    [Virginia, 

other  property  which  should  first  be  subjected  to  the  payment 
of  the  judgment  liens.  The  association  joined  in  the  prayer 
of  the  bill  that  the  deed  from  Baker  and  wife  to  Mrs.  Eeed  be 
set  aside  and  annulled,  and  further  prayed  that  the  property 
conveyed  thereby  be  subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  balance 
due  it  on  its  loan  to  D.  V.  Eeed,  as  shown  above.  It  also  con- 
tended, in  the  appellate  court,  that  as  the  money  it  loaned  to 
D.  V.  Eeed  was  used  largely  in  paying  off  liens  on  the  property 
at  Luck  and  Eoanoke  streets,  it  should,  to  that  extent,  be  sub- 
rogated to  the  rights  of  such  prior  lienholders;  and  that  is  was, 
consequently,  entitled  to  priority  over  the  judgments.  The 
pleadings,  however,  did  not  set  up  this  claim,  and  it  was  not 
asserted  in  the  trial  court.  The  defendant  loan  association,  and 
others,  appealed  from  the  decree,  the  nature  of  which  appears 
in  the  opinion.  The  appellants  Nelson  &  Myers  were  creditors 
of  D.  V.  Eeed,  and  came  into  the  suit  by  petition  as  parties 
conjplainant. 

C.  A.  McHugh  and  John  M.  Hart,  for  the  appellants. 

Scott  &  Staples,  "Watts,  Eobertson  &  Kobertson,  and  Lockett 
&  Cosby,  for  the  appellees. 

348  HAEEISON,  J.  The  court  is  of  opinion  that  the  two 
judgments  asserted  in  the  original  bill  in  this  cause,  one  in 
favor  of  the  Enterprise  Carriage  Manufacturing  Company,  and 
the  other  in  favor  of  **®  the  Ohio  Spiral  Spring  Buggy  Com- 
pany, constitute  liens  upon  the  real  estate  of  D.  V.  Eeed  prior 
in  dignity  to  the  deed  of  trust  upon  said  real  estate  in  favor  of 
the  appellant  building  asociation,  dated  and  recorded  April  17, 
1893.  Both  of  these  judgments  were  rendered  at  the  April 
term,  1893,  of  the  circuit  court  for  the  city  of  Eoanoke,  which 
term  began  April  10,  1893.  The  judgments  were  rendered  after 
the  recordation  of  the  deed  of  trust,  but  they  operate  as  liens 
upon  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment  debtor  from  the  first  day 
of  the  term  of  the  court  at  which  they  were  rendered.  This  we 
have  seen  was  before  the  deed  of  trust  was  recorded,  and  hence 
judgments  rendered  at  that  term  have  priority  over  the  deed  of 
trust  recorded  during  the  term:  Code,  sec.  3567;  Hockman  v. 
Hockraan,  93  Va.  455,  57  Am.  St.  Eep.  816. 

The  court  is  further  of  opinion  that  the  appellant  building 
association  is  not  entitled  to  be  subrogated  to  the  liens  existing 
upon  the  real  estate  of  D.  V.  Eeed  at  the  time  its  loan  was 
made,  and  upon  which  said  loan  was  secured.    This  claim  for 


Sept.  1898.]    New  South  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Reed.    861 

cubrogation  is  for  affirmative  relief.  It  was  never  made  in  the 
court  below,  but  is  suggested  for  the  first  time  in  the  closing 
brief  of  counsel  for  appellant,  filed  a  few  days  before  the  case 
was  called  for  argument  in  this  court.  The  cause  was  not  con- 
ducted in  the  court  below  with  reference  to  the  contention  now 
made  as  a  means  of  relief,  and,  even  if  it  was  proper  to  allow 
parties  to  be  surprised  by  a  new  case  made  here  for  the  first 
time,  the  evidence  furnished  no  basis  for  the  relief  asked. 

The  court  is  further  of  opinion  that  the  deed  of  April  15, 
1891,  from  George  A.  Baker  and  wife,  conveying  to  Mrs.  M.  0. 
Reed  a  certain  lot  of  land  in  the  city  of  Roanoke,  on  the  comer 
of  Mountain  street  and  Franklin  road,  was  not  made  at  the  in- 
stance of  D.  V.  Reed,  the  husband  of  the  grantee,  with  intent 
to  hinder,  delay,  and  defraud  his  creditors.  The  evidence  shows 
that,  at  the  time  of  this  conveyance,  D.  V.  Reed  had  ample  prop- 
erty to  pay  his  debts,  and  that  its  execution  in  no  way  preju- 
diced any  creditor  of  D.  V.  Reed  whose  debt  existed  ^®  at  the 
time  it  was  made.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  or  circumstance 
tending  to  show  that  the  deed  in  question  was  intended  to  preju- 
dice the  rights  of  subsequent  creditors  of  D.  V.  Reed.  The 
deed  was  merely  voluntary,  and  the  appellants,  whose  debts  were 
created  after  it  was  made  and  recorded,  cannot  subject  the  prop- 
erty thereby  conveyed  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  executed  in 
fraud  of  their  rights:  Code,  sec.  2459;  Rose  v.  Brown,  11  W.  Va. 
122;  Kanawha  Valley  Bank  v.  Wilson,  25  W.  Va.  242. 

The  court  is  further  of  opinion  that  D.  V.  Reed,  having  cre- 
ated the  debts  due  to  the  appellants,  could  not  thereafter  law- 
fully divert  his  estate  to  the  payment  of  purchase  money  due 
from  his  wife  on  her  separate  real  estate,  or  to  the  cost  of  improv- 
ing said  real  estate,  leaving  his  own  debts  unpaid,  and  without 
the  means  of  payment.  It  is  well  settled  that  improvements  put 
upon  the  wife's  separate  realty  by  the  husband,  in  fraud  of  credi- 
tors, can  be  followed  by  the  creditors  on  the  premises  where  they 
are  put,  and  the  realty  can,  in  favor  of  the  creditors,  be  charged 
with  the  value  of  such  improvements.  It  would  be  contrary  to 
the  plainest  principles  of  right  and  justice  to  permit  an  insolvent 
husband  to  divert  his  means,  and  invest  it  in  improving  his 
wife's  separate  estate,  which  is  not  liable  to  his  debts,  and  thus 
defeat  the  demands  of  his  creditors:  Rose  v.  Brown,  11  W.  Va. 
122;  Kanawha  Valley  Bank  v.  Wilson,  25  W.  Va.  242;  Burt  v. 
Timmons,  29  W.  Va.  441,  6  Am.  St.  Rep.  664. 

The  contention  on  behalf  of  Mrs.  Reed  that  the  balance  of 
purchase  money  on  her  lot,  and  the  cost  of  improving  the  same. 


862    New  South  Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Reed.    [Virginia, 

was  paid  by  D.  V.  Eeed  with  separate  estate  in  his  hands  be- 
longing to  her,  is  not  sustained  by  the  evidence.  It  appears 
that  about  the  year  1888  the  proceeds  of  certain  real  estate  in 
West  Virginia  belonging  to  Mrs.  Eeed,  amounting  to  about 
$1,200,  passed  into  the  hands  of  D.  V.  Eeed,  without  anything 
to  show  that  it  was  intended  as  a  loan,  or  that  the  husband  and 
wife  intended  to  occupy  the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  in 
respect  thereto.  Under  such  circumstances  the  wife  cannot  pre- 
vail against  the  creditors  of  the  husband:  Spence  v.  Eepass,  94 
Va.  716. 

*^*  Admitting,  however,  that  D.  V.  Eeed  was  under  obliga- 
tion to  account  to  his  wife  for  this  fund,  as  debtor  to  her  separate 
estate,  it  is  shown  that  all  obligation  on  this  account  was  more 
than  discharged  by  the  conveyance  to  Mrs.  Eeed,  and  the  sub- 
sequent improvement  of  certain  real  estate  in  the  city  of  Eoan- 
oke,  not  in  controversy  in  this  case,  and  by  the  payment  for  her, 
prior  to  the  creation  of  the  debts  due  appellants,  of  a  large  part 
of  the  purchase  money  for  the  lot  in  question. 

The  court  is  further  of  opinion  that  the  record  does  not  show, 
with  sufficient  clearness  to  form  the  basis  of  a  decree,  what 
amount  was  paid  by  D.  V.  Eeed,  after  the  creation  of  the  debts 
due  to  appellants  in  discharge  of  unsatisfied  purchase  money  due 
on  the  house  and  lot  in  question  belonging  to  Mrs.  Eeed,  or 
what  sum  was  paid  by  him,  after  that  date,  in  discharge  of  the 
outstanding  cost  of  making  improvements  upon  said  lot.  The 
cause  ought  to  have  been  recommitted  to  a  commissioner,  and 
these  facts  ascertained  and  reported  to  the  court,  and,  when  cor- 
rectly determined,  a  decree  entered,  charging  the  property  in 
question  with  the  amount  thus  shown  to  have  been  diverted  by 
D.  V.  Eeed  from  the  just  claims  of  his  creditors. 

The  lower  court  having  held  that  there  was  no  charge  upon 
the  house  and  lot  belonging  to  Mrs.  Eeed,  situated  on  the  cor- 
ner of  Mountain  street  and  Franklin  road,  in  the  city  of  Eoan- 
oke,  in  favor  of  appellants,  its  decree  must  in  this  respect  be 
reversed  and  set  aside,  and  in  all  other  respects  affirmed,  and  the 
cause  remanded  to  the  Hustings  court  for  the  city  of  Eoanoke 
for  further  proceedings  to  be  had  in  accordance  with  the  views 
expressed  in  this  opinion. 

JUDGMENT  LIEN  ATTACHES,  WHEN— FIRST  DAY  OP 
TERM— PRIORITY— The  lien  of  a  Judgment,  deemed  under  the 
statute  to  have  been  entered  on  the  first  day  of  the  term  of  the 
court  at  which  It  was  recovered,  begins  with  the  first  moment  of 
the  day  on  which  It  attaches,  irrespective  of  the  hour  at  which  the 
entry  was  in  fact  made,  and  such  lien  overreaches  deeds  of  trust 


Nov.  1898.]      Snydbb  v.   Grandstaff.  86$ 

or  other  encumbrances  filed  for  record  subsequent  to  such  time,  al- 
though the  Indorsement  of  the  clerk  shows  that  the  judgment  was. 
In  fact,  entered  after  such  deeds  or  other  encumbrances  were  filed 
for  record:  Note  to  Ocobock  v.  Baker,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  523. 

APPEAI^WHAT  CANNOT  BE  FIRST  ASSERTED  ON.— A 
question  not  raised  at  the  trial  will  not  be  considered  for  the  first 
time  on  appeal:  Reich  v.  Cochran,  151  N.  Y.  122,  56  Am.  St  Rep^ 
607;  State  v.  Myers,  70  Minn.  179,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  521. 

FRAUDULENT  CONVEYANCES— VOLUNTARY  DEED.— A  vol- 
untary conveyance  is  not,  as  against  subsequent  creditors,  fraudu- 
lent or  void,  though  the  grantor  was  indebted  at  the  time  it  wa* 
executed:  Note  to  Gilliland  v.  Jones,  55  Am.  St.  Rep.  216.  A  fraudu- 
lent intent  must  be  established  to  set  It  aside  as  to  them:  Cole  v. 
Brown,  114  Mich.  396,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  491. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— INSOLVENCY  OP  HUSBAND— USB 
OF  WIFE'S  MONEY  BY  HIM— RIGHTS  OF  CREDITORS.— 
When  a  wife  having  money  in  her  own  right  gives  it  to  her  husbanck 
for  general  use,  without  any  agreement  or  expectation  that  It  is  a 
loan,  and  without  any  obligation  for  its  repayment,  the  transaction 
cannot  generally,  in  later  years,  be  made  the  means  of  protecting 
the  insolvent  husband's  property  against  his  creditors.  In  such 
cases,  the  transaction  will  generally  be  deemed  to  have  been  made- 
without  consideration,  and  for  the  purpose  of  hindering,  delaying 
or  defrauding  creditors:  Note  to  O'Brien  v.  Stambach,  63  Am.  St. 
Rep.  376. 

HUSBAND  AKD  WIFE  —  CREDITOR'S  RIGHT  TO  FOLLOW 
IMPROVEMENTS  PUT  UPON  WIFE'S  LAND  BY  HUSBAND.— 
The  creditors  of  a  husband  may  follow  additions  to  a  wife's  estate- 
made  thereon  by  the  husband  in  fraud  of  their  rights:  Trefetheiv 
V.  Lynam,  90  Me.  376,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  271.  Hence,  improvement* 
put  upon  her  real  property,  in  fraud  of  his  creditors,  can  be  followed- 
by  them  on  the  premises  where  they  are  put;  and  such  realty  can, 
in  favor  of  such  creditors,  be  charged  with  the  value  of  such  im- 
provements: Burt  T.  Tlmmons,  29  W.  V»-  441,  6  Am.  St  Eep.  664. 


Snyder  v.  Grandstapp. 

(96  ViKGlKiA,  478.] 

PLEADING— BILL  IN  EQUITY.— MULTIFARIOUSNESS: 
does  not  arise  from  the  presentation  of  dififerent  views  of  the  same- 
collocation  of  facts,  but  It  must  be  two  distinct  collocations  of  dis- 
tinct and  different  facts,  each  collocation  presenting  different  rights, 
and  calling  for  different  relief.  Hence,  a  bill  is  not  multifarious 
because  a  party  states  his  case  In  the  alternative. 

EQUITY— BILL  FOR  REFORMATION  OF  DEED— WHEN 
NOT  DEMURRABLE.— Equity  is  the  proper  forum  for  the  reforma- 
tion of  a  deed  and  a  claim,  In  a  bill  for  that  purpose,  of  a  mutual 
mistake,  prevents  the  bill  from  being  demurrable,  though  It  fall» 
to  allege  notice  to  a  purchaser  for  value.  The  complainant  must. 
It  is  true,  prove  notice  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  but  the- 
defense  that  he  had  no  notice  must  be  made  by  plea  or  answer. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— LATENT  EQUITIES-MU- 
TUAL MISTAKE.— A  PURCHASER  FOR  VALUE  is  not  affected 


864  Snydeb  v.  Grandstaff.  [Virginia, 

I 
by  any  latent  equity,  whether  by  lien,  encumbrance,  trust,  fraud, 
or  any  other  claim;  and  a  mutual  mistalie  stands  on  the  same  foot- 
ing as  any  other  equity. 

DEEDS— MARRIAGE  AS  A  VALUABLE  CONSIDERA- 
TION.— A  deed  made  by  a  man  to  his  intended  wife,  followed  by 
marriage,  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  in  consideration  of  mar- 
riage, and  is  based  on  a  valuable  consideration. 

DEEDS  UPON  CONSIDERATION  OF  MARRIAGE— VA- 
LIDITY OF.— Under  the  statute  of  Virginia,  conveyances  upon  con- 
sideration of  marriage  are  void  as  to  existing  creditors,  but  not  as 
to  those  who  claim  to  be  paramount  purchasers  under  a  wiU. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— BURDEN  OF  PROVING 
NOTICE  TO  PURCHASER  FOR  VALUE.— One  who  alleges  that 
a  purchaser  for  value  had  notice  must  assume  the  burden  of  prov- 
ing it,  and  mere  proof  of  confidential  relations  between  the  grantor 
and  the  grantee  is  insufficient. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— NOTICE  TO  PURCHASER 
FOR  VALUE— SUFFICIENCY  OF.— To  charge  a  purchaser  for 
value  with  notice,  it  is  necessary  that  the  evidence  should  establish 
notice,  either  actual  or  constructive.    Otherwise,  it  is  insufficient. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— AFFIRMATIONS  OF  TI- 
TLE.—Purchasers  for  value  have  a  right  to  rely  on  the  affirmations 
of  grantors,  and  grantoi's  are  bound  by  their  affirmations  of  title. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— VARIANCE  BETWEEN 
CONTRACT  FOR  SALE  OF  LAND  AND  DEED— PRESUMPTION 
—BURDEN.— In  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the  terms  of  an 
agreement  for  the  sale  of  land  and  a  subsequent  deed  to  it,  the 
presumption  is,  that  the  purposes  of  the  parties  were  altered,  and 
that  the  deed  expresses  the  final  and  true  agreement  between  them. 
Hence,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him  who  denies  that  the  writing 
spealcs  the  final  agreement  to  rebut  this  presumption  by  the  clearest 
and  most  satisfactory  evidence. 

EQUITY  HAS  NO  JURISDICTION  TO  CONSTRUE  MUNI- 
MENTS OF  TITLE  in  a  case  where  one  holds  adversely  to  the  in- 
strument under  which  another  claims,  whether  a  deed  or  a  will, 
for  it  is  the  province  of  courts  of  law  to  construe  instruments 
which  involve  legal  rights.  Hence,  the  party  out  of  possession  can- 
not involie  the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity  to  determine  who  has  the 
tetter  right. 

DEEDS  —  PURCHASE  BY  DEVISEES  UNDER  A  WILL  — 
•CONVEYANCE  TO  INTENDED  WIFE,  FOLLOWED  BY  MAR- 
RIAGE—RIGHTS OF  SURVIVORSHIP  VESTED  IN  WIDOW.— 
When  it  appears  that  a  whole  estate  was  devised  to  the  testator's 
three  grandchildren,  "to  be  equally  divided  between  them,  share  and 
share  alike,  but,  on  the  death  of  either  of  them  without  issue,  his 
or  her  share  should  pass  to  the  survivors  or  survivor,  and,  in  case 
all  died  without  issue,  then  to  collateral  kindred";  that  the  devisees 
afterward  apportioned  the  estate  among  themselves,  and  each,  by 
a  deed  expressly  stating  his  intention  and  desire,  conveyed  to  the 
others  all  of  his  right,  title,  and  interest  In  the  property  allotted 
to  such  other;  and  that  one  of  the  devisees,  contemplating  marriage, 
deeded  his  share  to  his  Intended  wife,  marrying  her  on  the  same 
day,  but  died  shortly  afterward,  without  issue,  or  possibility  of 
Issue,  It  must  be  held  that  all  rights  of  survivorship  In  the  other 
two  devisees  passed  by  their  deeds  to  the  deceased,  and  by  the 
latter's  deed  became  vested  In  his  widow. 


Nov.  1898.]  Snyder  v.  Gkandstafp.  865 

Suit  in  chancery  wherein  L.  A.  Snyder  and  others  were  tlie 
complainants,  and  A.  J.  Grandstaff,  and  Flora  GrandstafE,  mar- 
ried to  Joseph  V.  Snyder,  were  the  defendants.  The  defendants 
.prevailed,  and  the  complainants  appealed. 

Walton  &  Walton,  for  the  appellants. 

Barton  &  Boyd,  and  L.  Triple  tt,  Jr.,  for  the  appellees. 

*''*  CAEDWELL,  J.  This  is  an  appeal  from  a  decree  of  the 
•circuit  court  of  Shenandoah  county.  In  deciding  the  case,  the 
learned  judge  of  that  court  delivered  the  following  opinion, 
which  is  filed  with,  and  made  a  part  of,  the  record: 

"Israel  Allen  devised,  in  the  third  clause  of  his  will,  that  after 
the  death  of  his  wife,  his  whole  estate,  real,  personal,  and  mixed, 
should  pass  to  his  three  grandchildren,  L.  A.  Snyder,  Amanda 
Long,  and  Joseph  V.  Snyder,  to  be  equally  divided  between 
them,  share  and  share  alike,  but,  on  the  death  of  either  of  them 
without  issue,  his  or  her  share  should  pass  to  the  survivors,  or 
survivor,  and,  in  case  all  died  without  issue,  then  to  collateral 
3dn. 

"By  deed  dated  July  20, 1895,  L.  A.  Snyder  and  wife,  Amanda 
Long  and  husband  (Joseph  V.  Snyder  signing  the  deed  as  party 
of  the  second  part),  reciting  that,  under  the  third  clause  of  the 
will,  the  said  parties  were  entitled  to  one  equal  third  of  the 
•estate;  that  they  had  agreed  upon  a  partition  of  the  real  estate; 
that  Joseph  V.  Snyder  was  to  be  equalized  by  payment  to  him 
■of  $3,000  out  of  the  personal  estate;  that  the  said  parties  de- 
sired *to  vest  exclusive  title  to  the  several  parcels  of  land  in  the 
said  parties  to  whom  they  had  been  assigned  and  allotted  re- 
spectively,* in  consideration  of  one  dollar,  et  cetera,  conveyed 
unto  the  said  Joseph  V.  Snyder,  his  heirs  and  assigns,  'all  right, 
title,  and  interest  of  the  said  parties  of  the  first  part*  in  the  de- 
scribed property. 

"Similar  deeds  were  made  to  each  of  the  grantors  by  the  other 
two  devisees  for  the  tracts  assigned  and  allotted  to  each. 

"On  the  7th  of  April,  1896,  Joseph  V.  Snyder,  referring  to 
rthis  deed  for  description,  conveyed  the  real  estate  embraced 
therein,  in  fee  to  Flora  Grandstaff,  with  general  warranty,  and 
upon  the  expressed  consideration  of  one  dollar  cash  in  hand 
paid,  and  on  the  same  day,  and  shortly  thereafter,  intermarried 
with  her.  This  deed  was  duly  recorded  on  the  8th,  and  within 
€ome  six  weeks  thereaf terward  Joseph  V.  Snyder  died  without  is- 

AM.  St.  Rkp..  Vou  LXX.— 65 


866  Snyder  v.  Grandstafp.  [Virgin  ia^ 

sue,  or  possibility  of  issue.  His  father  is  his  ^'^^  heir,  and  A.  J. 
Grandstaff  is  his  administrator,  and  his  widow  and  father  are  hi* 
distributees. 

"L.  A.  Snyder,  Amanda  Long,  and  Lee  Long,  her  husband, 
filed  their  bill  to  December  rules,  1896,  claiming  that,  under 
the  will  of  Israel  Allen,  they  are  entitled  to  the  real  estate  by 
virtue  of  survivorship;  that  Mrs,  Flora  Snyder  withholds  posses- 
sion from  them;  that  under  a  proper  construction  of  the  dee^ 
of  20th  of  July,  1895,  they  never  parted  with  this  interest,  but 
if  such  deed  should  be  otherwise  construed,  that  it  was  executed 
under  a  mutual  mistake,  and  contrary  to  the  real  intention  of 
the  parties;  and  they  pray  that  the  same  may  be  reformed,  and 
for  general  relief.  To  this  bill  the  administrator  and  widow  are- 
made  parties.  No  claim  is  asserted  against  or  through  the  es- 
tate of  Joseph  V.  Snyder.  The  widow  demurs  to  the  bill,  and 
files  her  answer.  Depositions  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiffs  have 
been  taken,  with  intent  to  show  mistake,  and  on  the  part  of  the 
defendants  to  show  that  the  consideration  of  the  deed  to  her  was 
marriage.  In  her  answer,  after  denying  any  mistake  in  the  deed,, 
she  claims  to  be  a  purchaser  for  value  without  notice. 

"I  do  not  think  the  bill  is  multifarious,  for  parties  have  the 
right  to  state  their  case  in  the  alternative.  Multifariousness 
does  not  arise  from  the  presentation  of  different  views  of  the 
same  collocation  of  facts,  but  it  must  be  two  distinct  colloca- 
tions of  distinct  and  dift'erent  facts,  each  collocation  presenting 
different  rights,  and  calling  for  different  relief.  Equity  is  the 
proper  forum  for  the  reformation  of  a  deed,  and  I  have  reached 
the  conclusion  that  this  claim  in  the  bill  of  a  mutual  mistake 
prevents  the  bill  from  being  demurrable,  even  though  the  bill 
fails  to  allege  notice  to  a  purchaser  for  value.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  complainants  must  prove  notice  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser 
for  valuable  consideration,  but  under  the  decision  of  the  court 
of  appeals  in  Rorer  Iron  Co.  v.  Trout,  83  Va.  415,  5  Am.  St. 
Hep.  285,  the  defense  must  be  made  by  plea  or  answer.  Thia 
case  seemingly  conflicts  with  Carter  v.  Allen,  21  Gratt.  241,  on 
this  point,  but  it  is  ^'^'^  a  later  case,  and  the  views  of  the  court 
are  sustained  by  reference  to  various  authorities,  and  I  have  not 
observed  that  it  has  yet  been  overruled.  Besides,  in  the  case  at 
bar,  the  defense  is  made  by  answer;,  and  can  better  be  considered 
in  connection  with  the  evidence  than  upon  demurrer.  I  there- 
fore overrule  the  demurrer. 

"Passing  from  the  demurrer,  the  first  suggestion  is  the  ques- 
tion we  adjourned  from  the  demurrer,  namely,  assuming  that 


Nov.  1898.]  Snyder  v.  Grandstaff.  ^  867 

a  mistake  has  "been  made,  how  is  the  defendant  affected  thereby? 

"1.  A  purchaser  for  value  and  without  notice  is  not  affected 
by  any  latent  equity.  A  mutual  mistake  stands  on  the  same  foot- 
ing as  any  other  equity.  Kerr  on  Fraud  and  Mistake,  page  436, 
specifically  lays  this  down  as  to  mistake.  I  quote:  'As  against  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value  without  notice,  no  relief  can  be 
had  in  equity.'  Almost  the  same  words  are  used  in  Pomeroy  on 
Equity,  section  776.  But  the  case  of  Carter  v.  Allen,  21  Gratt. 
241,  and  on  this  point  it  is  cited  with  approval  in  Eorer  Iron 
Co.  V.  Trout,  83  Va.  415,  5  Am.  St.  Hep.  285,  is  directly  in  point. 
'The  doctrine  that  the  courts  of  equity  will  not  grant  relief 
against  bona  fide  purchasers  without  notice  has  always  been 
adhered  to  as  an  indispensable  muniment  of  title.  It  is  wholly 
immaterial  of  what  nature  the  equity  is,  whether  it  is  founded 
on  a  lien  or  encumbrance,  or  trust,  or  a  fraud,  or  any  other  claim; 
for  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  the  estate  for  a  valuable  considera- 
tion without  notice  purges  away  the  equity  from  the  estate,  in 
the  hands  of  all  persons  who  may  derive  title  under  it,  with  the 
exception  of  the  original  party  whose  conscience  stands  bound 
by  the  violation  of  his  trust,  and  meditated  fraud.'  In  Eorer 
Iron  Co.  v.  Trout,  83  Va.  415,  5  Am.  St.  Kep.  285,  the  same 
broad  doctrine  is  laid  down:  *It  cannot  be  questioned  at  this  day 
that  the  purchaser  for  value  without  notice,  actual  or  construc- 
tive, will  not  be  affected  by  a  latent  equity,  whether  by  lien,  en- 
cumbrance, or  trust,  or  fraud,  or  any  other  claim.' 

"2.  A  deed  made  by  a  man  to  his  intended  wife,  followed  by 
marriage,  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  in  consideration  ^'^^  of 
marriage,  and  is  based  on  a  valuable  consideration.  In  Sterry  v. 
Arden,  1  Johns.  Ch.  271,  Chancellor  Kent  says:  'The  marriage 
was  a  valuable  consideration,  which  fixed  the  interest  in  the 
grantee  against  all  the  world,  and  as  much  as  if  she  had  paid  an 
adequate  consideration  pecuniarily.  It  has  been  a  principle  of 
long  standing,  and  uniformly  recognized,  that  a  deed  voluntary 
or  fraudulent  in  its  creation,  and  voidable  by  a  purchaser,  may 
become  good  by  matter  ex  post  facto.  It  is  the  constant  lan- 
guage of  the  books  and  of  the  courts,  that  a  voluntary  deed  ia 
made  good  by  subsequent  marriage,  and  marriage  has  always 
been  held  to  be  the  highest  consideration  in  law.'  He  cites  for 
this  Coke  on  Littleton.  This  citation  is  quoted  with  approval 
by  the  court  in  Huston  v.  Cantril,  11  Leigh,  136,  and  in  Herring 
V.  Wickham,  29  Gratt.  628,  26  Am.  Rep.  405.  In  the  last- 
named  case,  which  is  an  exceedingly  careful  discussion  of  the 
matter  by  Judge  Staples,  Justice  Story  is  quoted  with  approval 


868  '  Snyder  v.  Grandstaff.  [Virginia, 

as  follows:  ^Marriage,  in  contemplation  of  the  law,  is  not  only 
a  valuable  consideratioii  to  support  such  a  settlement,  but  a 
consideration  of  highest  value,  and,  from  motives  of  the  sound- 
est policy,  is  upheld  with  steady  resolution.  The  husband  and 
wife,  parties, to  such  a  contract,  are  therefore  deemed,  in  the 
highest  sense,  purchasers  for  a  valuable  consideration/ 

"Judge  Tucker,  in  Huston  v.  Cantril,  11  Leigh,  136,  says: 
'Marriage,  from  the  earliest  times,  has  been  considered  in  law  a 
Yaluable  consideration.* 

"Judge  Baldwin,  in  Welles  v.  Cole,  6  Gratt.  645,  says:  'Mar- 
riage furnishes  a  valuable  consideration  for  an  agreement,  as 
much  so  as  money  paid,  or  agreed  to  be  paid.* 

"I  might  multiply  indefinitely  citations  to  show  that  a  volun- 
tary deed  before  marriage,  upon  marriage  becomes  a  deed  for 
valuable  consideration,  for  the  citations  above  made  are  from 
cases  of  this  character.  Such  undoubtedly  is  the  law,  unless  the 
code  has  changed  it.  Judge  Burks,  in  his  review  of  the  changes 
made  by  the  code,  assigns,  as  a  reason  for  the  change  made  by 
section  2459,  that  it  was  intended  to  defeat  frauds  '*''*  perpe- 
trated upon  existing  creditors  by  the  marriage  of  an  insolvent 
debtor,  accompanied  by  gifts  to  his  wife.  Herring  v.  Wickham, 
29  Gratt.  628,  26  Am.  Eep.  405,  and  Coutts  v.  Greenhow,  2 
Munf.  363,  5  Am.  Dec.  472,  furnish  instances  of  gross  injustice 
to  existing  creditors.  In  these  cases  the  man  cohabiting  with  a 
woman  for  years  in  concubinage,  becoming  involved,  conveyed  to 
her  all  his  property,  and  then  married  her.  Marriage  in  such 
extreme  instances  furnished  the  valuable  consideration,  and  the 
settlements  were  maintained,  and  just  creditors  defeated.  Actu- 
ally a  man  was  allowed  to  do  for  his  concubine  what  he  could 
not  do  had  she  been  his  lawful  wife.  In  the  transformation  of 
the  character  of  the  relationship,  she  carried  his  property  be- 
yond the  reach  of  just  obligations.  It  was  to  correct  any  repeti- 
tions of  such  an  evil  that  the  change  was  made.  This  object  is 
plainly  expressed  in  the  wording  of  the  law.  The  statute  does 
not  declare  that  such  conveyances  are  voluntary.  It  simply  de- 
clares that  conveyances  upon  consideration  of  marriage  are  void 
as  to  existing  creditors.  Complainants  present  no  claim  as  cred- 
itors; they  claim,  not  as  subsequent  purchasers,  but  as  paramount 
purchasers  under  the  will  of  Israel  Allen.  The  statute  does  not 
seem  to  make  reference  to  this  class  of  rights,  and  I  believe  the 
doctrine  applies  that  the  law  will  not  be  considered  changed 
by  statute  beyond  the  modifications  of  the  statute.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  refer  to  the  testimony  in  relation  to  the  considera- 


Noy.  1898.]  Snydeb  v.  Gkandstaff.  869 

tion  of  this  deed.  The  law  imports  that  the  consideration  was 
marriage,  and  the  parol  testimony  is  but  confirmatory  of  what 
the  law,  unaided  by  testimony,  presumes.  I  believe  the  conclu- 
sion, then,  is  inevitable,  that  Mrs.  Snyder  is  a  purchaser  for 
value. 

"3.  The  burden  is  now  on  the  complainants  to  show  that  she 
is  a  purchaser  with  notice.  This  notice  may  be  actual  or  con- 
structive. It  is  not  pretended  by  the  complainants  that  they, 
or  anybody  else,  told  this  purchaser  for  value  of  the  equity,  al- 
though some  of  them  seem  to  have  known  of  the  deed  of  Apcil 
7th,  prior  to  the  marriage  ceremony.  *****  It  is  urged  that  the 
confidential  relations  between  the  grantor  and  grantee  in  the 
deed  of  April  7th,  will  imply  that  the  grantee  received  notice. 
This  confidential  relation  was  not  held  sufiicient  in  Herring  v. 
Wickham,  29  Gratt.  628,  26  Am.  Eep.  405,  when  a  great  wrong 
was  perpetrated  on  creditors.  The  deed  itself  imports  that 
Joseph  Snyder  did  not  know  of,  or  recognize,  the  equities  of 
complainants.  Why  should  we  suppose  that  he  conveyed  a  title 
to  Flora  Grandstaff,  telling  her  that  he  had  no  such  title  to  con- 
vey? Nor  is  anything  to  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  she  was 
in  the  habit  of  passing  by  the  several  tracts  of  land.  "What  more 
natural  than  to  suppose  that  she  drew  the  natural  inference  that 
the  parties  were  in  possession  under  their  deeds?  This  is  all  the 
evidence  to  show  actual  notice.  As  to  constructive  notice,  the 
principal  point  urged  in  argument  was  the  existence  of  a  pre- 
liminary contract,  of  date April,  1895,  which  should  have 

apprised  Mrs.  Snyder  that  the  deed  of  20th  of  July,  1895,  was 
made  under  mistake.  There  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  Mrs. 
Snyder  knew  of  this  contract.  If,  by  reading  the  deed  of  the 
20th  of  July,  1895,  she  could  gather  there  was  a  contract  of  such 
date  or  character  in  existence,  it  is  more  than  I  have  been  able 
to  do,  after  careful  study.  But  suppose  that  she  did  know  of  it, 
that  every  provision  in  it  was  known  to  her,  this  does  not  prove 
that  she  did  know  the  deed  did  not  express  the  final  and  true 
agreement  between  the  parties.  On  the  contrary,  she  would 
have  a  right  to  presume  that  the  purposes  of  the  parties  were  al- 
tered, if  there  was  conflict  between  the  agreement  and  deed.  In 
Donaldson  v.  Levine,  93  Va.  472,  the  court  says:  'The  burden 
is  throughout  on  the  complainant,  who  must  rebut  the  presump- 
tion that  the  writing  speaks  the  final  agreement  by  the  clearest 
and  most  satisfactory  evidence.  It  must  not  only  appear  that 
the  parties  entertained  a  different  intention  in  the  first  in- 
stance, but  that  it  was  not  changed  at  or  before  the  execution  of 


870  Snyder  v.  Grandstafp.  [Virginia, 

the  instrument;  for  otherwise  the  legal  and  natural  inference  is, 
it  was  laid  aside  for  that  expressed  in  the  writing/  Why  should 
anyone  '*®^  be  required  to  look  behind  the  recorded  title,  and 
run  down  the  preliminary  contracts  to  discover  that  the  parties 
to  a  solemn  deed  have  made  a  mistake?  In  the  first  recital  of 
the  deed,  reference  is  made  to  the  third  clause  of  the  will,  and 
the  parties  declare  that  under  said  clause  they  are  entitled  to 
the  whole  estate.  This  is  a  mistaken  construction  of  that  clause, 
but  so  far  from  showing  that  the  parties  intended  to  convey  only 
a  limited  estate,  it  goes  strongly  to  show  that  it  was  their  inten- 
tion to  convey  the  whole  estate.  Why  recite  they  were  entitled 
to  the  whole,  if  they  intended  to  convey  only  a  part,  and  do  not 
then  use  restrictive  words?  It  is  a  principle,  too,  that  purchas- 
j  ers  for  value  have  a  right  to  rely  on  the  aflSirmations  of  grantors, 
and  grantors  are  bound  by  their  affirmations  of  title:  See  Eey- 
nolds  V.  Cook,  83  Va.  817,  6  Am.  St.  Kep.  317;  Nye  v.  Lovitt,  92 
Ya.  710. 

"I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  was  nothing  on 
the  face  of  the  deed  from  which  Mrs.  Snyder  could  have  in- 
ferred that  the  parties  thereto  had  made  a  mistake.  She  stands 
as  a  purchaser  for  value  and  without  notice,  and  has  a  right  to 
such  title  as  the  deed  of  the  20th  of  July,  1895,  conveys.  This 
renders  wholly  unnecessary  any  consideration  of  the  evidence 
as  to  whether  a  mistake  in  fact  was  made,  or  whether  it  was  such 
a  mistake  as  equity  would  correct.  It  is  certain  that  the  par- 
ties cannot  be  restored  to  the  status  quo  of  the  20th  of  July, 
1895.  The  right  of  survivorship  in  the  lands  of  the  complain- 
ants held  by  Joseph  V.  Snyder  on  that  day,  and  which,  it  is 
claimed,  he  surrendered  to  them  in  consideration  of  their  sur- 
render to  him,  was  worth  at  least  as  much  as  the  rights  they  sur- 
rendered to  him.  It  is  not  shown  there  was  anything  unrea- 
sonable in  the  exchange.  Today,  by  the  providence  of  God, 
his  right  is  worth  nothing.  Theirs,  they  claim,  is  worth  this 
$10,000  farm.  Contingencies  have  become  events.  A  reforma- 
tion is  a  revision  now.  The  altered  conditions  are  not  favorable 
for  the  interposition  of  equity,  to  say  the  least.  There  seems  to 
have  been  no  haste  about  the  deed.  Five  persons  signed  it. 
Three  ****  on  its  date  acknowledged  it  in  Shenandoah;  two  on 
the  1st  of  August,  in  the  county  of  Page,  and  it  was  not  re- 
corded until  2d  of  October. 

"Having  reached  the  conclusion  that  each  party  is  entitled  to 
stand  upon  the  deed  as  written,  I  am  in  exceeding  doubt  if  the 
province  of  the  court  of  equity  is  not  exhausted.    The  construe- 


Nov.  1898.]  Snyder  v.  Gbandstaff.  871 

tion  of  the  muniments  of  title,  whether  the  same  be  deed  or  will, 
furnishes  no  ground  of  equitable  jurisdiction.  Courts  of  law 
<;onstrue  deeds  or  wills  involving  legal  rights.  Where  there  are 
mutual  rights  under  the  same  instrument,  whether  deed  or  will, 
in  the  same  property,  courts  of  equity  often  have  jurisdiction  to 
define  and  partition,  or  otherwise  divide,  but  where  one  holds  ad- 
versely to  the  instrument,  under  which  another  claims,  there 
is  no  jurisdiction  in  equity,  whether  the  instrument  is  a  deed  or 
will,  as  a  general  rule.  Certainly  not  for  the  mere  purpose  of 
■construing  the  deed  or  will.  If  such  were  the  case,  all  a  party 
would  have  to  do  in  any  case  would  be  to  file  his  muniments  of 
title  with  his  bill,  aver  some  one  holds  adversely,  and  pray  the 
court  to  say  if  he  was  not  entitled.  The  action  of  ejectment 
would  soon  become  obsolete.  In  this  case  I  have  proceeded  on 
the  theory  that  a  purchaser  for  value  without  notice  is  protected 
against  any  equity  that  may  exist.  This  is  a  matter  of  defense. 
Again,  in  certain  contingencies,  this  widow  may  be  entitled  to 
dower.  It  has  been  decided  in  Virginia  that  widows  are  endow- 
able  in  defeasible  fees  of  this  character,  even  where  the  husband 
died  without  issue:  Jones  v.  Hughes,  27  Gratt.  560;  Medley  v. 
Medley,  27  Gratt.  568.  If  the  deed  of  the  20th  of  July  should 
be  held  not  to  pass  the  right  of  survivorship,  and  should  the 
deed  of  the  7th  of  April,  under  sections  2270  and  2271,  be  held 
no  bar  to  dower,  the  widow  in  this  case  would  be  entitled  to 
dower.  After  a  good  deal  of  hesitation,  I  think  the  court  should 
proceed  to  a  final  determination  of  the  rights  of  parties. 

"There  are  some  cases  which  hold  that  a  partition  deed  is  not 
to  be  so  strictly  construed  as  other  deeds.  This  was  decided  "**• 
prior  to  our  code,  under  the  law  which  then  seemed  to  exist,  that 
partition  between  coparceners  and  cotenants  might  be  by  parol. 
No  deed  being  necessary,  the  title  vested,  not  by  operation  of 
the  deed  of  partition,  but  by  virtue  of  the  original  grant.  The 
code  made  a  deed  necessary,  and  the  reason  no  longer  exists. 
But,  however  this  deed  is  viewed,  it  unmistakably  conveys  unto 
Joseph  V.  Snyder,  his  heirs,  and  assigns,  all  of  the  right,  title, 
and  interest  of  the  parties  of  the  first  part.  It  precedes  this 
sweeping  granting  clause  by  a  declaration  that  it  is  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  to  vest  exclusive  title  to  the  tracts  of  land  in 
the  grantee,  and  throughout  the  deed  it  wholly  discards  any 
right  of  survivorship  in  the  grantors.  There  is  no  ambiguity 
about  the  word  'all';  a  conveyance  of  'all'  is  not  a  reservation  of 
'part.'  Suppose  anyone  examined  this  deed  for  the  purpose  of 
lending  money  on  it,  would  he  not  have  been  justified  in  believ- 


872  Snyder  v.  Grandstaff.  [Virginia^ 

ing  that  the  grantors  no  longer  retained  any  interest  in  the  prop- 
erty? The  widow,  as  we  have  seen,  stands  in  this  position.  I 
am  of  the  opinion  that  the  title  of  survivorship  did  pass  under 
this  deed  to  Joseph  V.  Snyder,  and  that  by  his  deed  to  Flora. 
Grandstaff  the  same  became  invested  in  her. 

"I  think  the  court  should  refuse  relief  to  parties  careless 
enough  to  blunder,  who  received  at  the  time  full  value  for  their 
blunder,  who  have  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by 
its  correction  now,  as  against  one  who  dealt  for  a  valuable  con- 
sideration on  the  faith  of  their  recorded  deed." 

Upon  a  careful  examination  of  the  record,  we  find  that  our 
views  of  this  case  are  fully  and  clearly  expressed  in  the  opinion 
of  Judge  Thomas  "W.  Harrison,  which  this  court  adopts;  and, 
for  the  reasons  therein  given,  we  are  of  opinion  that  there  is 
no  error  in  the  decree  complained  of,  and  it  is  therefore  affirmed. 


PLEADING— BILL  IN  EQUITY— MULTIFARIOUSNESS.— No 
general  principle  in  regard  to  multifariousness  can  be  extracted 
from  the  cases.  It  must  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  court  in 
each  case:  Notes  to  Hall  v.  Henderson,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  148;  Fel- 
lows V.  Fellows,  15  Am.  Dec.  427-430.  But  a  bill  in  equity  may  b& 
framed  in  a  double  aspect,  embracing  alternative  averments  for 
relief,  provided  each  aspect  entitles  the  complainant  to  substan- 
tially the  same  relief,  and  the  same  defenses  are  applicable  to  each: 
Hall  V.  Henderson,  J14  Ala.  601,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  141. 

EQUITY  —  JURISDICTION  —  REFORMATION  OF  INSTRU- 
MENTS—MISTAKE.— A  court  of  equity  will  not  entertain  jurisdic- 
tion of  purely  legal  questions,  such  as  the  construction  of  a  deed, 
devise,  or  will:  Simmons  v.  Hendriclis,  8  Ired.  Eq.  85,  55  Am.  Dec. 
439;  Bussy  v.  McKie,  2  McCord  Eq.  23,  16  Am.  Dec.  628.  It  will- 
not  interfere  where  the  remedy  at  law  is  complete  and  adequate: 
Sherman  v.  Clark,  4  Nev.  138,  97  Am.  Dec.  5(16;  but  will  in  cases 
where  the  courts  of  law  cannot  grant  relief:  Lining  v.  Geddes,  1 
McCord  Eq.  304,  16  Am.  Dec.  606.  It  will  not  entertain  Jurisdic- 
tion of  a  cause  involving  the  title  to  land,  where  no  ground  of" 
equity  Is  alleged:  Bussy  v.  McKie,  2  McCord  Eq.  23,  16  Am.  Dec. 
628.  Mistake  in  a  written  instrument  is  a  proper  ground  for  relief 
In  equity,  and  it  may  be  reformed  to  express  the  meaning  and  In- 
tention of  the  parties:  See  monographic  note  to  Williams  v.  Hamil- 
ton, 65  Am.  St.  Rep.  481,  on  reformation  of  contracts. 

MARRIAGE  IS  A  VALUABLE  CONSIDERATION  for  a  convey- 
ance, or  other  contract— the  highest  known  to  the  law:  Nowack 
V.  Berger,  133  Mo.  24,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  663.  A  contract  of  marriage 
is  not  only  a  good,  but  a  valuable,  consideration  for  a  deed:  Prig- 
non  V.  Daussat,  4  Wash.  199,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  914,  Compare  La- 
fontain  v.  Hayhurst,  89  Me.  388,  56  Am.  St.  Rep.  430.  A  promise 
of  marriage  is  a  valuable  consideration  for  a  deed,  and,  If  the 
marriage  afterward  takes  place,  the  deed  is  valid,  so  far  as  the 
consideration  Is  concerned:  Tolman  v.  Ward,  86  Me.  303,  41  Am. 
St.  Rep.  556. 

EVIDENCE— BURDEN  OP  PROOF.— One  who  asserts  a  fact 
must  ordinarily  assume  the  burden  of  proving  it:  Foster  y.  Reld,  7S 


Dec.  1898.]  Camp  v.  Bbucb.  873 

Iowa,  205,  16  Am.  St.  Rep.  437,  and  note.  The  burden  Is  generally 
on  the  party  holding  the  affirmative:  Bowser  v.  Bliss,  7  Blackf.  344, 
43  Am.  Dec.  93. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— NOTICE.— One  who  purchases  for 
a  valuable  consideration  is  not  chargeable  with  notice,  unless  the 
circumstances  are  strong  enough  to  fix  upon  him  the  Imputation  of 
mala  fides:  Note  to  Anderson  v.  Blood,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  521.  But, 
whatever  will  put  a  purchaser  on  Inquiry  and  lead  to  knowledge 
Is  notice:  Note  to  Pleasants  v.  Blodgett,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  627. 

CONTRACTS-MERGER  OP  AGREEMENT  INTO  WRITING.— 
When  parties  reduce  their  contract  to  writing,  all  oral  negotiations 
preceding  and  accompanying  the  execution  of  the  written  contract 
are  deemed  merged  into  it,  and  the  writing  Is  the  exclusive  evidence 
between  the  parties:  Note  to  Palmer  v.  Farrell,  15  Am.  St  Rep.  714. 


Camp  v,  Bruob. 

[96  Virginia,  521.] 

CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY  OF,  IS  FATAL.— The  law  re- 
fuses to  enforce  Illegal  contracts  from  reasons  of  public  policy,  and 
it  is  Immaterial  at  what  stage  of  the  case  the  Illegality  appears. 

CONTRACTS  —  ILLEGALITY  —  WAIVER  —  FAILURE  TO 
PLEAD.— The  Illegality  of  a  contract  cannot  be  gotten  rid  of  either 
by  a  failure  to  plead  It,  or  by  agreeing  to  waive  It  in  the  most 
solemn  manner. 

APPEAL-ILLEGALITY  OF  CONTRACT  MAY  BE  FIRST 
RAISED  ON.— A  suit  in  equity  cannot  be  maintained  upon  an  Ille- 
gal contract,  although  the  defense  of  Illegality  was  not  raised  by  the 
pleadings,  or  relied  upon  In  the  trial  court.  It  may  be  made  for 
the  first  time  on  the  argument  in  the  appellate  court. 

CONTRACTS  OPPOSED  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY— JUDICIAL 
SALES— BUYING  BIDS.— The  object  in  Judicial  sales  is  to  get  the 
best  price  that  can  be  fairly  had  for  the  property.  Hence,  to  allow 
one  bidder  to  buy  off  another,  which  Is  but  a  species  of  bribery, 
and  thus  prevent  the  property  from  bringing  the  best  price,  Is  con- 
demned by  the  law,  and  the  courts  will  not  enforce  contracts 
founded  in  such  practices. 

CONTRACTS  OPPOSED  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY— JUDICAL 
SALES  — BUYING  BID  BEFORE  CONFIRMATION.— An  agree- 
ment between  the  purchaser  at  a  judicial  sale  and  another  person 
that  the  former  will,  upon  a  confirmation  of  the  sale,  sell  the  prop- 
erty to  the  latter  at  an  advanced  price  is  contrary  to  public  policy 
and  void,  because  it  tends  to  prevent  the  property  from  bringing 
the  best  nrlce. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— SALE  OF  BID  AT  AN  ADVANCE— 
CONFIRMATION.— A  court  will  never,  where  the  facts  are  known 
to  It,  confirm  a  judicial  sale,  if  the  bidder  has  sold  his  bid  at  an 
advance,  unless  the  advance  paid,  or  to  be  paid,  inures  to  the  benefit 
of  the  parties  to  the  suit. 

JUDICIAL  SALES-RIGHT  OF  COURT  TO  KNOW  ALL 
THE  FACTS— DUTY  OF  COMMISSIONER— A  commissioner  who 
makes  a  judicial  sale  is  the  agent  of  the  court,  and  should  report 


■874  Camp  v.  Bruce.  [Virginia, 

liis  information  of  facts,  particularly  as  to  tlie  buying  of  bids  before 
confirmation,  to  the  court,  as  the  court  has  a  right  to  linow  all  that 
he  knows  about  the  matter,  to  the  end  that  the  sale  may  not  be  con- 
firmed unless  it  is  proper  to  do  so. 

Suit  for  specific  performance  brought  by  the  appellants,  W.  N. 
damp  and  P.  D.  Camp,  against  the  appellee,  B.  M.  Bruce.  The 
purpose  was  to  compel  Bruce  to  convey  to  the  complainants  a 
tract  of  2,900  acres  of  land.  The  complainants  charged  that 
Bruce  had  bought  the  land  at  a  judicial  sale,  and  before  con- 
iirmation  had  sold  the  land  to  them  at  a  price  stated,  which  was 
•about  $500  in  excess  of  the  amount  which  Bruce  had  agreed  to 
pay  for  it,  and  had  agreed  that,  upon  confirmation,  he  and  his 
wife  would  unite  with  the  commissioner  and  make  them  a  deed; 
hnt  that,  by  trickery,  scheming,  and  fraud,  the  said  Bruce 
fraudulently  and  deceitfully  contrived  to  defeat  his  agreement 
with  the  complainants  by  having  an  upset  bid  put  in  for  the 
land,  for  the  benefit  and  advantage  of  himself.  On  June  11, 
1894,  Bruce  purchased  the  land  for  $2,100;  and,  after  sundry 
wpset  bids  and  resales,  he  finally  became  the  purchaser  on  July 
5,  1895,  at  the  price  of  $4,850,  which  sale  was  confirmed.  He 
had  the  property  when  this  suit  was  commenced.  The  complain- 
ants averred  their  readiness  and  willingness  to  comply  with  their 
part  of  the  contract,  and  prayed  that  Bruce  be  compelled  to  con- 
vey the  land  to  them. 

Jackson  Guy  and  J.  B.  Prince,  for  the  appellants. 

E.  H.  Eawles,  E.  E.  Boykin,  and  Neely,  Seldner  &  Warring- 
ton, for  the  appellee. 

»23  BUCHANAN,  J.  The  record  shows  that  on  the  eleventh 
day  of  June,  1894,  at  a  judicial  sale  in  the  case  of  Eanstead  v. 
Eanstead,  et  cetera,  the  appellee  purchased  a  tract  of  land  con- 
taining 2,900  acres  at  the  price  of  $2,100;  that  he  complied  with 
the  terms  of  sale  by  paying  the  cash  required  and  executing  his 
tonds  for  the  deferred  payments,  that  the  sale  was  reported  to 
the  court,  but  pending  confirmation  he  entered  into  a  written 
Agreement  with  the  appellants  by  which,  in  consideration  of  their 
assuming  payment  of  the  purchase  money  bonds  held  by  the  com- 
missioner, and  the  payment  of  $1,565,  to  the  appellee  (which  was 
$500  profit  on  his  bid),  he  sold  and  conveyed  all  his  right,  title, 
and  interest  in  the  land,  and  in  the  sale  and  purchase  thereof,  to 
the  appellants,  and  agreed  that  he  and  his  wife  would  unite  with 
the  commissioner  in  his  conveyance  of  the  land  which  he  was  di- 
rected to  ask  the  court  to  have  made  to  the  appellants.    An  up- 


Dec.  1898.]  •         Camp  v.  Bruce.  875 

set  bid  having  been  put  in,  the  sale  to  the  appellee  was  set  aside, 
and  a  resale  ordered.  After  the  land  had  been  resold  several 
times,  upset  bids  having  been  put  in  from  time  to  time,  the  ap- 
pellee finally  became  the  purchaser  at  the  price  of  $4,850,  at  a 
sale  which  was  confirmed. 

Some  months  after  the  confirmation  of  that  sale,  the  appel- 
lants filed  this  bill  to  compel  the  appellee  to  specifically  exe- 
cute **^"*  his  agreement  with  them,  upon  the  ground  that  he,  in 
violation  of  its  provisions  and  in  fraud  of  their  rights,  had  im- 
properly and  fraudulently  procured  the  upset  bid  to  be  put  in 
which  prevented  the  confirmation  of  the  first  sale  made  to  him. 

The  appellee  answered  the  bill,  and,  among  other  things,  ad- 
mitted the  execution  of  the  agreement,  and  alleged  that  he 
would  have  complied  with  its  provisions  if  the  sale  had  been 
confirmed,  but  denied  that  he  procured  the  upset  bid  to  be  put 
in  which  prevented  its  confirmation. 

The  first  question  to  be  determined  is,  whether  that  agreement 
is  one  which  a  court  of  equity  will  enforce.  If  it  be  an  illegal 
contract,  as  claimed  in  argument,  this  suit  cannot  be  maintained, 
although  that  defense  was  not  raised  by  the  pleadings,  nor  relied 
upon  in  the  circuit  court.  The  law  refuses  to  enforce  illegal 
contracts,  as  a  rule,  not  out  of  regard  for  the  party  objecting, 
nor  from  any  wish  to  protect  his  interests,  but  from  reasons  of 
public  policy.  Whenever,  therefore,  the  illegality  of  the  con- 
tract appears,  whether  alleged  in  the  pleadings  or  made  known 
for  the  first  time  in  the  evidence,  it  is  fatal  to  the  case.  That 
defect  cannot  be  gotten  rid  of  either  by  failure  to  plead  it,  or 
by  agreeing  to  waive  it  in  the  most  solemn  manner.  The  law 
will  not  enforce  contracts  founded  in  its  violation:  Fry  on  Spe- 
cific Performance,  sec.  309;  1  Story's  Equity  Pleading,  261; 
Pomeroy's  Specific  Performance  of  Contracts,  2d  ed.,  sec.  286; 
Coppell  V.  Hall,  7  Wall.  542. 

We  have  no  statute  declaring  that  contracts  like  the  one  un- 
der consideration  are  unlawful,  yet  under  the  principles  of  the 
common  law  any  contract  that  is  made  for  the  purpose  of,  or 
whose  necessary  effect  or  tendency  is  to  lessen  competition  and 
restrain  bidding  at  judicial  sales,  is  held  to  be  illegal  because  op- 
posed to  public  policy.  The  object  in  all  such  sales  is  to  get  the 
Tjest  price  that  can  be  fairly  had  for  the  property.  The  policy 
of  the  law,  therefore,  is  to  secure  such  sale  from  every  kind  of 
improper  influence.  To  allow  one  bidder  to  buy  off  another, 
which  is  but  a  species  of  bribery,  and  thus  prevent  the  property 
from  bringing  the  best  price,  is  condemned  by  •***  the  law,  and 


876  Camp  v.  Bruce.        *  [Virginia^ 

the  courts  will  not  enforce  contracts  founded  in  such  practices; 
Underwood  v.  McVeigh,  23  Gratt.  409,  428,  429;  Cocks  v.  Izard,. 
7  Wall.  559,  562;  Pry  on  Specific  Performance,  sec.  308;  Pom- 
eroy's  Specific  Performance  of  Conijracts,  sec.  283;  Greenhood  on 
Public  Policy,  183-189.  Tested  by  these  principles  the  agree- 
ment in  question  was  clearly  illegal. 

If  the  parties  had  succeeded  in  having  the  sale  confirmed  by 
the  court  and  the  appellants  substituted  as  purchasers,  in  lieu 
of  the  appellee,  at  his  bid  of  $2,100,  the  agreement  would  have 
operated  as  a  fraud  upon  the  court  and  the  parties  whose  lands 
were  being  sold  for  purposes  of  partition.  It  would  have  enabled 
the  appellee  to  put  $500  in  his  pocket  for  which  he  furnished  no 
valuable  consideration,  would  have  taken  from  the  co-owners 
that  much  of  their  inheritance  and  enabled  the  appellants  to  get 
the  property  by  buying  off  the  court's  bidder  instead  of  putting 
in  an  upset  bid,  and  taldng  the  chances  of  having  to  pay  a 
higher  price  for  it  at  a  resale.  Neither  in  this  case  nor  in  the 
case  in  which  the  land  was  sold  could  such  an  agreement  be  en- 
forced. If  the  commissioner  who  made  the  sale  in  the  case  of 
Eanstead  v.  Kanstead  had  reported  to  the  court  that,  since  the 
sale  made  by  him,  the  appellee  had  sold  his  bid  to  the  appellants 
at  a  profit  of  $500,  to  be  paid  when  the  sale  was  confirmed  (as  he 
ought  to  have  done,  for  he  wrote  the  agreement,  and  knew  all  the 
facts,  and  the  court,  whose  agent  he  was,  had  the  right  to  know 
all  that  he  knew  about  the  appellants'  dealings  with  its  bidder 
that  could  affect  the  confirmation  of  the  sale),  instead  of  merely 
reporting  that  the  appellee  desired  the  conveyance  for  the  land 
to  be  made  to  the  appellants,  the  court  would  not  have  confirmed 
the  sale  at  the  appellee's  bid  of  $2,100,  although  no  upset  bid 
had  been  put  in. 

A  court  will  never,  where  the  facts  are  known  to  it,  confirm 
a  sale  where  the  bidder  has  sold  his  bid  at  an  advance,  unless 
the  advance  paid,  or  to  be  paid,  inures  to  the  benefit  of  the  •*** 
parties  to  the  suit.  It  does  not  allow  bidders  to  trade  behind 
its  back,  and  speculate  in  that  way  on  property  which  it  is  sell- 
ing: 2  Daniell's  Chancery  Practice,  2d  ed.,  1285;  Hodder  v.  Euf- 
fin,  1  Tarn.  341. 

In  order  to  prevent  this,  it  became  the  practice  of  the  Eng- 
lish chancery  courts,  in  the  time  of  Lord  Elden  it  is  said,  to 
require  the  bidder  who  desired  the  court  to  substitute  another  in 
his  stead  to  file  an  affidavit  that  there  was  "no  underhand  bar- 
gain between  them";  lligby  v.  McNamara,  6  Ves.  616;  Vale  v. 


Dec.  1898.]  Camp  v.  Bruce.  877 

Davenport,  6  Yes.  615;  Holroyd  v.  Wyatt,  9  Jur.  1072;  2  Coll. 
C.  C.  327. 

The  rule  of  the  English  chancery  courts  upon  this  subject  is 
thus  stated  in  2  Daniel's  Chancery  Practice,  fifth  edition,  1285: 
"If,  after  becoming  the  bidder  for  an  estate,  the  purchaser  is 
desirous  of  being  discharged  from  his  contract,  and  of  substitut- 
ing another  person  in  his  stead,  the  court  will,  on  motion,  make 
an  order  to  that  effect;  he  must,  however,  support  the  motion  by 
an  affidavit  that  there  is  no  under-bargain,  for  the  new  purchaser 
may  give  the  other  a  sum  of  money  to  stand  in  his  place,  and  so 
deceive  the  court;  and  the  rule  appears  to  be  that,  if  a  purchaser 
resell  behind  the  back  of  the  court  before  the  purchase  is  con- 
firmed, the  second  purchaser  is  considered  as  a  substituted  pur- 
chaser, and  must  pay  the  additional  price  into  court  for  the  bene- 
fit of  the  estate.  When  the  highest  bidder  at  an  auction  induced 
the  auctioneer  to  accept  another  person  in  his  place,  concealing 
the  fact  that  he  had  sold  his  bargain  at  an  advance,  which  he 
received  and  absconded,  the  property  was  ordered  to  be  resold, 
reserving  all  questions  of  liability  of  the  original  or  sub- 
purchaser." 

The  English  rule  of  requiring  affidavits,  where  one  purchaser 
is  asked  to  be  substituted  for  another,  is  a  wise  one,  and  the 
agreement  sought  to  be  enforced  shows  the  necessity  for  some 
such  safeguard  in  our  practice.  It  might  be  well  for  our  courts 
in  all  such  cases,  unless  the  parties  consent  to  the  substitution, 
to  adopt  the  English  practice.  It  is  of  the  utmost  '^^'^  conse- 
c[uence  that  judicial  sales,  and  especially  sales  for  partition  where 
infants  are  generally  interested,  should  be  protected  from  prac- 
tices and  influences  which  may  prevent  the  lands  from  bringing 
the  best  price. 

The  bill  was  properly  dismissed  by  the  circuit  court,  and  ita 
decree  must  be  affirmed. 


CONTRACTS  —  ILLEGALITY  —  ENFORCEMENT— JUDICIAL 
SALES.— Courts  will  not  enforce  illegal  contracts:  Bradtfeldt  v. 
Cooke,  27  Or.  194,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  701,  and  note.  Any  agreement 
whereby  bidding  Is  checked  or  stifled  at  an  auction  or  a  Judicial 
sale  is  void,  as  against  public  policy:  Note  to  Jones  v.  Caswell,  2 
Am.  Dec.  138;  Loyd  v.  Malone,  74  Am.  Dec.  187.  Compare  Barton 
V.  Benson,  126  Pa.  St  431,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  883. 


878  Spiller  v.  Wells.  [Virginia, 


Spiller  V.  Wells. 

196  Virginia,  598.] 

JURISDICTION  —  COURTS  OF  CONCURRENT  —  WHICH 
ACQUIRES  PRECEDENCE— In  case  of  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction 
between  two  courts  having  concurrent  jurisdiction,  that  court  which 
first  acquires  cognizance  of  the  controversy,  or  obtains  possession 
of  the  property  in  dispute,  is  entitled  to  retain  it  until  the  end  of 
the  litigation,  and  should  decide  all  questions  which  legitimately 
flow  out  of  the  controversy. 

JURISDICTION— HOW  ACQUIRED— CONCURRENT  JUR- 
ISDICTION—PRIORITY—SERVICE OF  PROCESS.— Jurisdiction 
is  acquired  by  the  issue  and  service  of  process,  and,  in  case  of  con- 
flict between  courts  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  the  date  of  service 
of  the  process  determines  the  priority  of  the  jurisdiction;  but  it  i» 
an  essential  condition  in  the  application  of  this  rule  that  the  first 
suit  shall  afford  the  plaintiff  in  the  second  an  adequate  and  com- 
plete opportunity  for  the  adjudication  of  his  rights. 

MECHANIC'S  LIENS— SUIT  BY  SUBCONTRACTOR  TO 
ENFORCE— PRECEDENCE  WHERE  DIFFERENT  COURTS 
HAVE  CONCURRENT  JURISDICTION.— If  a  saibcontractor  Insti- 
tutes a  suit  in  chancery  to  enforce  a  mechanic's  lien,  and  makes 
the  general  contractor  a  party  defendant,  setting  forth  the  latter's 
recorded  lien  in  his  bill,  that  court,  notwithstanding  the  concui'- 
rent  jurisdiction  of  another  court,  acquires  jurisdiction,  and  should 
determine  the  rights  of  the  parties.  It  is  not  incumbent  on  the 
general  contractor  to  institute  a  separate  suit  in  order  to  enforce 
his  lien,  as  his  rights,  as  well  as  those  claiming  under  him  as  sub- 
contractors, may  be  fully  protected  in  the  first  suit. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— MECHANICS'  LIENS— EF- 
FECT OF  SUIT  BY  SUBCONTRACTOR.— Upon  the  institution  of 
a  suit  by  a  subcontractor  to  enforce  a  mechanic's  lien,  where  the 
general  contractor  is  made  a  party  defendant,  and  the  latter's  re- 
corded lien  Is  set  forth  in  the  subcontractor's  bill,  the  statute  of 
limitations  ceases  to  run,  not  only  as  against  the  complainant's  lien, 
but  as  against  the  lien  of  the  general  contractor  and  of  all  those 
claiming  as  contractors  under  him. 

Appeal  from  a  decree  of  the  law  and  chancery  court  of  the 
city  of  Norfolk  in  a  suit  in  chancery  wherein  the  appellees,  Wells 
and  others,  were  the  complainants,  and  the  appellants,  Spiller 
and  others,  were  the  defendants. 

George  Mcintosh,  for  the  appellants. 

Thomas  W.  Shelton  and  E.  H.  Baker  &  Son,  for  the  appellees. 

»»»  KEITH,  P.  The  facts  with  which  we  have  to  deal  are 
as  follows:  Appellants  contracted  with  Wells  to  erect  a  three- 
story  brick  building  in  the  city  of  Norfolk,  which  was  completed 
on  the  fourth  day  of  July,  1896.  On  the  thirtieth  day  of  Au- 
gust of  that  year,  Wells  perfected  his  lien  as  general  contractor 
by  filing  in  the  clerk's  office  of  the  corporation  court  of  the  city 


Jan.  1899.]  Spilleb  v.  Wellb.  819 

of  Norfolk  an  account  showing  the  amount  and  character  of  the 
work  done,  the  material  furnished,  the  prices  charged  therefor^ 
the  pa3Tiients  made,  and  balance  due,  and  a  description  of  the 
property  upon  which  he  claimed  a  lien,  all  of  which  was  duly 
recorded  by  the  clerk. 

At  rules  held  in  the  clerk*s  office  of. the  court  of  law  and 
chancery  of  the  city  of  Norfolk  on  the  first  Monday  in  January, 
1897,  "Wells  filed  his  bill  to  enforce  this  lien.  Appellants  were 
made  parties  defendant,  and  into  this  suit  came  a  number  of  per- 
sons claiming  as  subcontractors  under  the  plaintiff,  and  asking^ 
to  have  their  rights  protected. 

William  H.  Barnard,  doing  business  as  Barnard  &  Co.,  also 
filed  a  petition  in  which  he  alleges  that  J.  W.  Wells,  the  gen- 
eral contractor,  had  contracted  with  him  to  do  the  tinning,  iron 
work,  and  plastering,  and  to  furnish  the  necessary  terra  cotta 
pipe  and  work  for  draining  the  building  to  be  erected;  that 
petitioner  had  fully  complied  with  his  contract  with  Wells,  and 
had  on  the  31st  of  July,  1896,  filed  his  mechanic's  lien  upon 
the  building  in  the  clerk's  office  of  the  corporation  court  of  the 
city  of  Norfolk  for  eighteen  hundred  and  thirty-six  dollars  and 
eighty-eight  cents,  that  being  the  balance  due  to  him,  and  on. 
the  next  day  gave  notice  in  writing  to  the  owners  of  the  prop- 
erty of  the  amount  and  character  of  the  lien.  Petitioner  fur- 
ther avers  that  on  the  26th  of  December,  1896,  he  instituted  a 
suit  in  chancery  in  the  circuit  court  of  the  city  of  Norfolk 
against  Wells,  the  general  contractor,  and  the  owners  of  the 
building,  to  enforce  his  said  lien;  that  °®*  the  circuit  court 
thus  acquired  jurisdiction  of  the  suit,  of  the  parties  thereto,  and 
the  subject  matter  thereof.  On  the  28th  and  29th  of  Decem- 
ber process  in  said  suit  was  duly  executed  on  all  the  defendants, 
and  from  that  time  the  circuit  court  had  "exclusive  jurisdiction 
of  all  matters  growing  out  of  the  enforcement  of  the  mechanic's 
lien  against  the  property,  and  the  settlement  of  all  matters  in 
controversy  concerning  said  liens." 

The  prayer  of  the  petition  is,  that  the  suit  instituted  by  Wells 
in  the  court  of  law  and  chancery  of  the  city  of  Norfolk  to  the 
first  January  rules,  1897  (which  was  Monday,  the  third  day  of 
the  month),  may  be  dismissed,  or  that  he  may  be  restrained  from 
further  proceeding  therein  until  the  final  disposition  by  the  cir- 
cuit court  of  the  city  of  Norfolk  of  the  suit  instituted  by  peti- 
tioner. 

By  a  decree  entered  April  10,  1897,  the  cause  was  brought  on 
to  be  heard  upon  the  petition  of  Barnard  &  Co.  and  of  the  sub- 


SSO  Spiller  v.  Wells.  [Virginia, 

contractors,  and  tlie  petition  of  Barnard  &  Co.  was  dismissed, 
-and  the  cause  referred  to  a  commissioner  to  state  certain  ac- 
counts. The  commissioner  having  reported  in  obedience  to  this 
"decree,  a  further  decree  was  entered  on  the  1st  of  July,  1897, 
ascertaining  the  amounts  due  tlie  general  contractor  and  the 
■cuhcontractors,  and  directing  a  sale  of  the  real  estate  to  satisfy 
their  demand.  From  that  decree  appellants  appealed,  and  the 
chief  contention  is  that  the  court  erred  in  rejecting  the  prayer 
-of  the  petition  of  Barnard  &  Co. 

In  Craig  v.  Hoge,  95  Va.  275,  this  court  had  occasion  to  ex- 
amine the  law  in  relation  to  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction  between 
two  courts  having  concurrent  jurisdiction,  and  it  was  there 
held.  Judge  Eiely  delivering  the  opinion,  that  "that  court  which 
first  acquired  cognizance  of  the  controversy,  or  obtains  posses- 
sion of  the  property  in  dispute,  is  entitled  to  retain  it  until  the 
•end  of  the  litigation,  and  should  decide  all  questions  which 
legitimately  flow  out  of  the  controversy;  that  jurisdiction  is 
acquired  by  the  issue  and  service  of  process,  and,  in  ^^^  case  of 
■conflict  between  courts  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  the  date  of 
service  of  the  process  determines  the  priority  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion." It  is  further  stated  that  technical  creditor's  bills  are  ex- 
ceptions to  the  general  rule  which  pertains  to  a  conflict  of  juris- 
diction between  courts  of  concurrent  jurisdiction;  but  as  the  bills 
-before  us  are  not  creditor's  bills,  but  suits  brought  to  ascertain 
and  enforce  liens  binding  a  specific  piece  of  property,  we  need 
not  confuse  or  embarrass  the  discussion  by  further  reference  to 
this  exception.  The  rule  established  is  necessary  to  the  orderly 
and  decent  administration  of  justice.  Nothing  can  be  more 
unseemly  than  a  struggle  for  jurisdiction  between  courts;  but 
A  rule  which  rests  for  its  support  upon  considerations  of  con- 
venience, however  great,  and  of  decency,  order,  and  priority, 
however  exacting,  must  yield  to  the  higher  principle  which  ac- 
cords to  every  citizen  the  right  to  have  a  hearing  before  some 
court.  An  essential  condition,  therefore,  of  the  application  of 
the  rule  insisted  upon  as  to  priority  of  jurisdiction,  is  that  the 
first  suit  shall  afford  the  plaintiff  in  the  second  an  adequate  and 
complete  opportunity  for  the  adjudication  of  his  rights.  When 
Barnard  &  Co.  instituted  their  suit  in  the  circuit  court,  that 
court  acquired  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  of  litigation,  and 
the  parties  to  it.  Wells,  who  afterward  brought  suit  in  the  law 
and  chancery  court,  was  made  a  party  defendant.  His  case  is 
.fully  stated  in  the  bill;  that  he  was  general  contractor  for  the 
erection  of  the  building,  and   that   he   had  perfected  his  me- 


Jan.  1899.]  Spiller  v.  Wei.ls.  881 

chanic's  lien,  amounting  to  six  thousand,  seven  hundred  and 
eighty-eight  dollars  and  twenty  cents — the  precise  sum  for  which 
the  lien  is  claimed  by  Wells,  in  the  account  filed  as  an  exhibit 
with  his  own  bill.  The  lien  of  Wells,  of  course,  inures  to  the 
benefit  of  all  subcontractors,  so  that  they  can  also  be  amply  pro- 
tected in  the  circuit  court. 

While  the  suit  in  that  court  is  not  a  general  creditor's  bill, 
^nd  did  not  affect  the  statute  of  limitations  as  to  creditors  not 
named  as  parties  to  it,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  as  to  liens 
claimed  by  parties  to  it,  and  directly  involved  in  the  suit,  the 
*^*  statute  ceased  to  run  upon  its  institution.  The  work  was 
completed  on  the  4th  of  July,  1896,  and  it  was  necessary  to  sue 
within  six  months,  that  is  to  say,  on  or  before  January  4,  1897; 
but  we  are  of  opinion  that  it  was  not  incumbent  upon  Wells  to 
institute  a  separate  suit  in  order  to  enforce  his  lien,  but  that 
he,  and  those  claiming  under  him  as  subcontractors,  could  be 
iully  protected  in  the  suit  brought  by  Barnard  &  Co.,  and  that 
the  statute  ceased  to  run  as  to  the  lien  of  the  general  contractor 
from  its  institution.  If  the  stoppage  of  the  statute  by  the  suit 
in  the  circuit  court  had  not  had  effect  as  to  the  subcontractors, 
as  well  as  the  general  contractor,  their  claims  would  have  been 
barred  when  presented  in  the  suit  brought  by  Wells,  for  their 
petitions  were  not  filed  until  the  9th  of  April,  1897,  more  than 
three  months  after  the  expiration  of  the  six  months  within 
which  it  was  necessary  to  bring  suit. 

We  are  of  opinion  that  the  general  contractor  could  have 
had  complete  relief  in  the  circuit  court  which  first  acquired 
jurisdiction  over  the  subject  of  litigation  and  the  parties  to  it; 
that  from  its  institution  the  statute  of  limitations  ceased  to  run 
as  against  his  mechanic's  lien  and  all  claiming  as  contractors 
Tinder  him,  and  that,  as  a  consequence,  this  case  is  controlled  by 
the  decision  in  Craig  v.  Hoge,  95  Va.  275;  and  the  decree  of  the 
court  of  law  and  chancery  is  therefore  reversed. 


JURISDICTION— CONCURRENT— WHEN  BECOMES  EXCLU- 
SIVE.—When  the  jurisdiction  of  a  court  attaches  to  any  subject 
matter  of  jurisdiction,  although  concurrent  with  other  courts,  it 
becomes  exclusive  for  all  purposes  necessary  to  the  acomplishment 
of  the  object  of  the  suit.  When  courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction, 
that  which  first  takes  cognizance  of  the  case  has  the  right  to  retain 
it  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other:  Relsner  v.  Gulf  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  89 
Tex.  656,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  84.  As  between  courts  of  co-ordinate 
jurisdiction,  the  tribunal  issuing  process  has  exclusive  control  over 
It:  Ohapin  v.  James,  11  R.  I.  86,  23  Am.  Rep.  412;  and  any  means 
■of  acquiring  jurisdiction  is  properly  denominated  process:  Note  to 

'AM.  bT.  BKP..  VouLXX.-aft 


882  MooRB  V.  Triplett.  [Virginia, 

White  V.  Johnson,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  737.  If  two  or  more  courts  have 
concurrent  jurisdiction  over  the  same  subject  matter,  the  court  first 
acquiring  jurisdiction  by  the  service  of  process  will  retain  it,  to- 
the  exclusion  of  the  other:  Plume  etc.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Caldwell,  136- 
111.  163,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  305,  and  monographic  note  thereto  on  con- 
flicts of  jurisdiction.  See,  also.  Gay  v.  Brierfield  etc.  Iron  Co.,  94 
Ala.  303,  33  Am.  St  Rep.  122,  and  extended  note  thereto. 


MooRB  V.  Triplett. 

[96  VIEGINIA,  603.] 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— ASSUMPTION  OF  DEBTS— 
PRIMARY  LIABILITY  OF  PURCHASER.— When  a  purchaser 
assumes  the  payment  of  certain  debts  of  his  vendor,  in  considera- 
tion of  a  conveyance  of  land,  he  is  personally  answerable  therefor^ 
and,  as  between  the  vendor  and  himself,  he  is  primarily  liable  for 
Buch  debts. 

GIFTS- VALIDITY  OF,  WHERE  OBLIGATIONS  EXIST.— 
A  man  must  be  just  before  he  Is  generous.  He  cannot,  therefore^ 
make  a  valid  gift  of  his  property  and  leave  his  obligations  unsatis- 
fied or  unprovided  for. 

JUDICIAL  SALES  —  CONFIRMATION— DISCRETION.— A 
court,  in  determining  whether  or  not  it  will  confirm  a  judicial  sale, 
must,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  exercise  a 
sound  legal  discretion  with  a  view  to  fairness,  prudence,  and  a  just 
regard  to  the  rights  of  all  concerned. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— "UPSET"  BIDS— ACCEPTANCE  OF.— 
A  court  must  sell  property  at  the  best  price  obtainable.  Hence,  a 
substantial  and  well  secured  "upset"  bid  should  be  accepted,  unlesa 
there  are  circumstances  going  to  show  that  injustice  would  be  done 
to  the  purchaser  or  other  person. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— "UPSET"  BIDS— REJECTION  OF— DIS- 
CRETION.—If  land  is  sold  under  the  order  of  a  court,  and  an  "up- 
set" bid  Is  made  thereon,  the  court  must  exercise  a  sound  legal 
discretion  as  to  whether  it  will  accept  it  or  not.  A  bid  for  ten  per 
cent,  advance,  well  secured,  and  put  In  before  confirmation,  is  as- 
much  a  valid  bid  as  If  made  at  the  auction,  but  the  court  is  not 
always  bound  to  accept  it,  without  regard  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  case. 

JUDICIAL  SALES  —  "UPSET"  BIDS  — WHO  CANNOT 
MAKE,— One  who  was  a  bidder  at  a  judicial  sale,  by  himself  or 
by  an  agent,  or  who  was  present  and  had  the  opportunity  to  bid, 
will  not,  as  a  general  rule,  be  permitted  to  put  in  an  "upset"  bid. 
He  should  have  bidden  at  the  sale,  in  open  competition  with  all 
others,  what  he  was  willing  to  give  for  the  property. 

JUDICIAL  SALES-"UPSET"  BIDS— WHEN  PROPERLY 
REJECTED— CONFIRMATION.— When  a  farm,  composed  of  fer- 
tile bottom  lands  and  poor  uplands,  is  about  to  be  sold  at  a  judicial 
sale,  and  Is  laid  off  Into  parcels,  so  that  one  who  buys  a  parcel  of 
the  lowland  Is  thereby  Induced  and  willing  to  buy  upland  which 
can  be  used  advantageously  with  it,  the  court,  after  the  sale,  will 
reject  an  "upset"  bid  made  at  a  small  advance  on  only  a  part  of 
a  purchase,  where  the  effect  of  accepting  It  would  be  to  cause  th» 


Jan.  1899.]  Moore  v.  Triplett.  883 

purchaser  of  two  parcels  to  lose  one  of  them,  and  without  which 
he  would  not  want  the  other,  particularly  If  the  terms  of  the  "up- 
set" bid  preclude  a  resale  of  the  tract  in  the  manner  as  before. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— HOW  COURT  SHOULD  ACT  UPON 
REPORT.— A  court  should  so  act  upon  a  report  of  a  sale  of  prop- 
ei-ty  made  under  its  order  as  not  to  deter  or  discourage  bidders.  It 
should  so  act  as  to  induce  possible  purchasers  to  attend  such  sales, 
to  encourage  fair,  open,  and  competitive  bidding  in  order  that  the 
highest  possible  price  may  be  obtained,  and  to  inspire  confidence 
In  the  stability  of  judicial  sales.  This  is  due  not  merely  to  the 
purchaser,  but  also  to  creditors,  debtors,  and  the  owners  of  prop- 
erty which  has  to  be  sold  by  the  court. 

Three  chancery  suits  were  heard  together,  and  this  was  an 
appeal  from  several  decrees  pronounced  therein.  In  1883,  M.  M. 
Moore  borrowed  $10,000  of  Israel  Allen,  and  secured  the  same 
by  deeds  of  trust  on  portions  of  his  real  property.  On  July  11, 
1885,  he  was  largely  indebted  to  his  mother,  Mrs.  A.  M.  F. 
Moore,  on  various  accounts,  and  she  was  his  surety  for  a  large 
sum.  In  consideration  of  these  sums,  of  his  mother's  assump- 
tion of  the  payment  of  the  debt  to  Allen,  and  of  certain  other 
enumerated  debts,  he  conveyed  to  her  by  deed,  dated  July  11, 
1885,  all  of  his  real  and  personal  property,  including  that  cov- 
ered by  the  deeds  of  trust  to  Allen.  Upon  the  real  and  personal 
property  so  conveyed,  outside  of  that  covered  by  the  Allen  deeds 
of  trust,  the  creditors  of  M.  M.  Moore  had  no  lien.  His  wife  did 
not  join  in  this  deed.  On  the  same  day,  July  11,  1885,  his 
mother  deeded  the  property  conveyed  to  her  to  a  trustee  to 
furnish  a  support  for  her  son,  and  for  the  benefit  of  his  wife  and 
children,  subject,  however,  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  for 
which  she  was  answerable  for  her  son.  The  two  deeds  of  July 
11,  1885,  were  recorded  on  the  same  day,  but,  a  few  days  after- 
ward, Triplett  and  others,  creditors  of  M.  M.  Moore,  and  whose 
debts  were  not  secured,  attacked  the  two  deeds  as  fraudulent. 
Pending  this  litigation,  Allen,  who  was  a  party  to  the  suit, 
directed  his  trustee  to  make  a  sale  of  the  land  conveyed  in  trust 
to  secure  his  debts.  This  sale  was  enjoined.  The  two  causes 
were  finally  heard  together,  and  the  two  deeds  of  July  11,  1885, 
were  declared  to  be  fraudulent  and  void,  and  the  property  con- 
veyed was  held  liable  for  complainant's  debts.  The  defendants 
asked  leave  to  file  a  bill  of  review  for  errors  apparent  on  the  face 
of  the  record,  but  it  was  denied.  On  appeal  to  the  supreme  court, 
the  decree  holding  the  deeds  fraudulent  was  reversed,  and  the 
cause  was  remanded  for  further  proceedings.  It  was  contended 
on  behalf  of  Mrs.  A.  M.  F.  Moore,  and  those  claiming  under 
her,  that  her  assumption  of  her  son's  debts  waa  a  mere  personal 


884  Moore  v.  Triplett.  [Virginia, 

undertaking  on  her  part,  and  created  no  lien  on  the  land  con- 
veyed by  her,  and  no  trust  in  favor  of  the  creditors.  There  was 
a  decree  for  the  sale  of  the  land  conveyed  by  her  to  pay  the  debts 
mentioned,  and,  when  sales  of  the  property  were  reported  to  the 
court,  sundry  exceptions  were  filed  by  the  Moores  and  others. 
One  exception  was  that  substantial  "upset"  bids  had  been  filed 
on  several  of  the  tracts.  In  two  of  the  suits,  the  appellees,  Trip- 
lett and  others,  or  some  of  them,  were  the  complainants,  and  the 
appellants,  Moore  and  others,  were  the  defendants;  and  in  the 
other  suit  the  appellants  were  the  complainants,  and  some  of  the 
appellees  were  the  defendants.  The  main  controversy  on  the 
appeal  is  stated  in  the  opinion. 

James  H.  Williams  and  John  E.  Keller,  for  the  appellants. 

Barton  &  Boyd,  L.  Triplett,  Jr.,  and  Walton  &  Walton,  for 
the  appellees. 

^^"^  RIELY,  J.  This  is  the  sequel  of  the  case  of  Moore  v. 
Triplett,  reported  in  23  S.  E.  69,  decided  in  1896. 

The  main  question  involved  by  the  appeal  is  the  propriety  of 
the  decree  of  the  circuit  court  subjecting  to  the  payment  of  the 
debts  of  Israel  Allen  and  others  the  land  conveyed  by  Morgan 
M.  Moore  to  his  mother  by  the  deed  of  July  11,  1885,  and  set- 
tled by  her  by  a  cotemporaneous  deed  on  his  wife  and  children. 

The  debts  were  due  by  him,  and  assumed  by  his  mother. 
They  constituted  a  large  part  of  the  consideration  for  the  con- 
veyance to  her  of  his  land,  and  were  successfully  relied  upon 
at  the  hearing  of  the  former  appeal  to  sustain  the  validity  of 
the  said  deeds.  She  died  without  having  paid  the  debts,  and 
they  have  not  since  been  otherwise  discharged.  They  have 
remained  unpaid  from  1885  down  to  the  present  time,  upward 
of  thirteen  years.  The  debts  of  Allen  were  secured  by  prior 
deeds  of  trust  on  parts  of  the  land  conveyed  by  Morgan  Moore 
to  his  mother. 

****  By  accepting  the  conveyance  and  promising  to  pay  the 
debts,  she  became  personally  liable  for  them,  and,  as  between  her 
son  and  herself,  she  was  primarily  bound.  This  doctrine  has 
been  so  repeatedly  recognized  by  this  court  as  no  longer  to  admit 
of  question:  Willard  v.  Worsham,  76  Va.  392;  Osborne  v.  Cabell, 
77  Va.  463;  Francisco  v.  Shelton,  85  Va.  779;  Tatum  v.  Ballard, 
94  Va.  370;  Ellett  v.  McQhee,  94  Va.  377. 

The  assumpsit  by  the  mother  of  Morgan  Moore  of  his  debts 
constituting  a  part  of  the  consideration  for  the  conveyance  to 


Jan.  1899.]  Moore  v.  Triplett.  885 

her  of  his  land,  it  would  be  against  equity  and  good  conscience 
to  permit  her  to  make  a  voluntary  settlement  of  the  property 
80  as  to  protect  it  from  liability  for  the  debts,  so  assumed,  in 
the  hands  of  her  beneficiaries.  A  man  must  be  just  before  he 
is  generous.  He  cannot  make  a  valid  gift  of  his  property  and 
leave  his  obligations  unsatisfied  or  unprovided  for.  Indeed,  the 
deed  of  settlement  itself  seems  to  contemplate  the  payment  of 
the  debts  assumed  from  the  property  conveyed,  and  makes  pro- 
vision for  a  sale  of  a  part  thereof  for  that  purpose.  The  grantor 
was  apparently  in  doubt  as  to  her  right  to  make  the  settlement, 
but  expresses  her  desire  to  do  so  "as  far  as  legal  and  proper  for 
her  to  do."  The  deed  is  inartistically  drawn,  but  it  is  fairly 
plain  that  the  grantor  intended  to  provide,  in  the  deed  of  set- 
tlement ,for  the  payment,  irom  the  property  thereby  settled, 
of  the  debts  which  she  had  assumed,  in  the  event  that  they  were 
not  otherwise  paid.  There  is,  therefore,  no  error  in  the  decree 
for  the  sale  of  the  land  to  pay  the  said  debts. 

Another  assignment  of  error  was  the  refusal  of  the  court  to 
accept  the  upset  bids  put  in  on  certain  parcels  of  the  land,  and 
its  confirmation  of  the  sale  that  had  been  made  thereof. 

"Whether  a  court  should  confirm  a  report  of  sale  depends  in 
a  great  measure  upon  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case. 
In  acting  upon  the  report,  it  must  exercise  not  an  arbitrary, 
but  a  sound  legal  discretion  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances. 
It  must  be  exercised  in  the  interest  of  fairness  and  prudence, 
and  with  a  just  regard  to  the  rights  of  all  concerned.  This  is 
*"*  the  result  of  many  cases  on  the  subject:  Hudgins  v.  Lanier, 
23  Gratt.  494;  Brock  v.  Kice,  27  Gratt.  812;  Roudabush  v.  Miller, 
32  Gratt.  454;  Berlin  v.  Melhorn,  75  Va.  639;  and  Hansucker  v. 
Walker,  76  Va.  753. 

In  Todd  V.  Gallego  Mills  Mfg.  Co.,  84  Va.  577,  it  is  said:  "All 
tlie  cases  agree  that  the  court  must  sell  at  the  best  price  obtain- 
able, and  when  a  substantial  upset  bid,  well  secured  and  safe, 
for  ten  per  cent  advance,  is  put  in  before  confirmation,  it  is  as 
much  a  valid  bid  as  if  made  at  the  auction.  This  is  the  settled 
law  of  this  court,  and  will  doubtless  so  remain  until  the  legis- 
lature shall  [otherwise]  provide  by  law  as  has  been  done  by 
the  English  parliament."  This  same  language  was  quoted 
with  approval  in  Ewald  v.  Crockett,  85  Va.  299. 

The  above  statement  of  law  was  construed  by  the  counsel  of 
the  appellants  to  be  a  departure  from  the  previous  cases  and  the 
former  practice  in  this  state,  and  to  mean  that  "a  substantial 
upset  bid,  well  secured  and  safe,  for  ten  per  cent  advance,  put 


b86  MooBE  V.  Triplett.  [Virginia, 

in  before  confirmation/*  was  always  to  be  accepted,  without  re- 
gard to  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and  that  the  court  had 
no  discretion  in  the  matter.  Such  a  construction  is  a  misap- 
prehension of  the  import  of  that  decision.  The  court  in  that 
case  found  no  equitable  circumstances,  which,  in  the  exercise 
of  a  sound  legal  discretion,  called  for  a  rejection  of  the  upset 
bid.  It  was  in  amount  a  large  advance  on  the  price  obtained 
at  the  sale,  and  in  that  view  substantial.  It  was  well  secured 
and  safe.  The  creditors  whom  it  benefited  desired  its  accept- 
ance, and  the  purchaser,  as  the  court  took  pains  to  show  at 
length,  had  no  just  ground  of  complaint.  We  understand  the 
decision  in  that  case  to  mean  simply  that  a  substantial  and  well 
secured  upset  bid  should  be  accepted,  unless  there  are  circum- 
stances going  to  show  that  injustice  would  be  done  to  the  pur- 
chaser or  other  person.  That  such  was  the  purport  of  that 
decision,  and  the  understanding  of  the  judge  who  delivered 
the  opinion  of  the  court  in  that  case,  and  also  in  Ewald  v. 
Crockett,  85  Ya.  299,  is  clearly  manifested  in  the  subsequent 
case  of  ^^®  Carr  v.  Carr,  88  Va.  735,  where  he  enunciates  the 
long  and  well-established  rule  in  Virginia  that  "the  court,  in 
acting  upon  the  matter,  was  called  upon  to  act  in  the  exercise  of 
a  sound  legal  discretion  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances.  It  is 
to  be  exercised  in  the  interest  of  fairness,  prudence,  and  with  a 
just  regard  to  the  rights  of  all  concerned."  And  he  refers  to 
the  cases  decided  long  before  Todd  v.  Gallego  Mills  Mfg.  Co.,  84 
Va.  577,  to  sustain  his  declaration  of  the  practice  and  the  law 
on  the  subject  in  this  state. 

Considering  the  circumstances  of  the  case  at  bar,  and  apply- 
ing the  rule  prevailing  in  this  state,  our  conclusion  is,  that  the 
circuit  court  did  not  err  in  rejecting  the  upset  bids  and  con- 
firming the  report  of  sale  of  the  parcels  of  land  in  question. 

The  sale  took  place  under  favorable  circumstances,  was  fairly 
made,  and  there  is  not  a  suggestion  of  misconduct  or  impro- 
priety on  the  part  of  anyone. 

There  is  no  evidence  or  complaint  even  that  the  land  did  not 
sell  for  a  fair  price,  and  bring  its  market  value.  The  commis- 
sioners state  in  their  report  that  it  brought  a  good  price,  and 
recommend  the  confirmation  of  the  sale. 

The  main  upset  bid  was  put  in  by  one  who  had  an  agent  at 
the  sale,  who  bid  for  him.  It  has  been  generally  understood  by 
the  profession,  and  enforced  by  the  courts,  that  one  who  was  a 
bidder  at  the  sale,  by  himself  or  by  an  agent,  which  is  the  same 
thing,  or  was  present  and  had  the  opportunity  to  bid,  would 


Jan.  1899.]   "  Moore  v.  Tbiplett.  887 

not,  as  a  general  mle,  be  permitted  to  put  in  an  upset  "bid.  He 
must  bid  at  the  sale  in  open  competition  with  all  others  what 
he  is  willing  to  give  for  the  property.  A  different  rule  would 
have  a  pernicious  effect  upon  judicial  sales  of  property. 

The  contention  over  the  rejection  of  the  upset  bids  is  not 
made  by  the  parties  who  put  in  the  same,  but  by  the  owners  of 
the  land.  As  respects  the  rights  of  the  latter,  it  appears  that 
every  fair  means  was  resorted  to  that  was  likely  to  realize  the 
best  possible  price  at  the  sale.  It  was  advertised  in  two  of  the 
county  newspapers  for  upward  of  sixty  days,  and  the  several 
tracts  ^^^  divided  into  two  or  more  convenient  parcels  for  the 
purposes  of  the  sale.  The  parcels  were  first  offered  for  sale,  and 
then  the  tract  as  a  whole,  with  the  understanding  that  the 
largest  amount  realized  would  be  reported  to  the  court  as  the 
sale.  That  by  parcels  realized  the  largest  amount.  The  entire 
farm,  embracing  all  the  tracts  and  parcels,  with  the  exception 
of  the  mansion  house  and  fifty-four  acres  that  had  been  cried 
out  to  the  wife  of  Morgan  M.  Moore,  was  then  offered  as  a 
whole,  without,  however,  any  advance  bid  being  made  on  the 
sale  by  parcels.  The  mansion  house  and  fifty-four  acres  was 
excepted  from  the  offer  of  the  whole  farm  at  the  request  of 
Morgan  Moore.  As  stated  by  the  judge  of  the  circuit  court, 
**the  sale  of  the  land  seems  to  have  been  conducted  by  the 
commissioners  in  strict  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the 
Moores,  the  owners  of  the  land.  The  terms  of  the  sale  were 
modified  to  advance  their  interest.  The  land  was  offered  in 
such  parcels  as  they  indicated,  and  offered  as  long  and  as  often 
as  they  requested.  They  did  not  then,  nor  do  they  now,  make 
any  complaint  that  the  sale  was  not  an  open  and  fair  bidding, 
and  the  prices  obtained  were  not  all  that  could  have  been  ex- 
pected and  desired."  The  circumstances  of  the  sale  furnish 
them  no  ground  for  any  complaint. 

The  case  of  the  purchaser  would  be  very  different  if  the  upset 
bids  were  accepted.  They  were  made  on  only  a  part>of  his  pur- 
chases, and  his  other  purchases  would  stand  and  be  confirmed. 
The  farm  is  composed  of  lowlands  and  uplands.  The  bottom 
lands  are  fertile  and  productive;  the  uplands  are  poor,  and  in 
part  wild  and  uncultivated.  In  dividing  the  farm  for  the  pur- 
poses of  sale,  it  was  wisely  so  laid  off  into  parcels  that  anyone 
bujdng  a  parcel  of  the  productive  bottom  land  could  also  buy  a 
contiguous  or  conveniently  located  parcel  of  upland,  and  the  two 
be  utilized  together.  The  owner  of  the  one  would  find  it  con- 
venient and  desirable  to  own  the  other,  but  he  would  not  desira 


888  Moore  v.  Teiplett.  [Virginia^. 

to  own  any  part  of  the  upland  unless  he  could  also  own  some 
convenient  part  of  the  bottom  land.  The  purchaser,  **^*  J.  I. 
Triplett,  having  at  the  sale  first  bought  a  parcel  of  the  lowland, 
was  thereby  induced  and  willing  to  buy  upland  that  could  be 
advantageously  used  along  with  it.  The  latter,  without  the 
bottom  land,  he  did  not  want,  and  would  not  have  given  as  much 
for  it  as  he  bid,  if,  indeed,  he  had  bid  for  it  at  all.  The  upset 
bids  were  made  on  only  a  part  of  his  purchases,  and  one  of  them 
so  circumscribed  that,  if  accepted,  he  could  not  bid  on  the 
parcels  as  at  the  last  sale.  It  was  an  offer  of  an  advance  of  seven 
and  a  fraction  per  cent  on  a  parcel  of  the  bottom  land  bought 
by  him,  and  upon  another  parcel  of  like  land  bought  by  another 
person,  and  made  a  condition  that  both  parcels  be  again  offered 
as  one  tract.  The  other  upset  bid  is  a  small  advance  on  one  of 
the  parcels  of  upland  bought  by  Triplett.  If  the  upset  bids 
were  accepted,  the  effect  would  be  to  compel  him  to  take,  in  any 
event,  all  the  parcels  of  upland  except  one,  which  he  would  not 
have  purchased  at  all  if  he  had  not  first  bought  the  parcel  of 
bottom  land,  and  force  him  to  buy  not  only  it  on  the  resale,  but 
also  the  other  parcel  of  bottom  land  coupled  with  it  as  a  condi- 
tion of  the  upset  bid,  and  incur  the  risk  of  having  to  pay  an 
exorbitant  price  for  them  both.  This  would  be  eminently  un- 
fair and  unjust,  and  a  court  of  equity  will  never  put  a  judicial 
purchaser  in  such  a  situation.  The  court,  in  the  interest  of  fair- 
ness and  justice,  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  rightly  rejected 
the  upset  bids  and  confirmed  the  sales  of  the  land  as  made  by 
the  trustee  and  commissioners  under  its  decree. 

Judicial  sales  are  constantly  taking  place,  and  it  must  con- 
tinue to  be  so  as  long  as  there  are  debts  to  be  collected,  and  liens 
to  be  enforced.  Great  care  should  be  observed  that  the  practice 
of  the  court  in  acting  upon  a  report  of  sale  should  not  be  such 
as  to  deter  or  discourage  bidders,  but  such  as  to  induce  possible 
purchasers  to  attend  such  sales,  to  encourage  fair,  open  and 
competitive  bidding  in  order  that  the  highest  possible  price  be 
obtained,  and  to  inspire  confidence  in  the  stability  of  judicial 
sales.  This  is  due  not  merely  to  the  purchaser,  but  ***^  also 
to  creditors,  debtors,  and  the  owners  of  property  which  has  to  be 
Bold  by  the  court. 

There  A^ere  a  number  of  other  errors  assigned  which  related 
to  minor  matters,  such  as  the  appointment  of  the  receiver  in 
the  case,  and  the  settlement  of  his  accounts.  Due  notice  was 
given  for  his  appointment  and  no  objection  made,  and,  as  re- 


Feb.  1899.]    Weight  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank.  88& 

spects  his  accounts,  it  is  sufficient  to  say,  without  particulariz- 
ing, that  no  error  appears  in  the  action  of  the  court. 
The  decrees  appealed  from  must  be  affirmed. 


JUDICIAL  SALES— PROPER  CONDUCT  OF— DISCRETION  OP 
COURT.— Public  judicial  sales  should  be  so  conducted  as  to  produce 
as  much  as  possible  for  the  parties  in  Interest,  and  to  that  end 
full,  free,  and  fair  competition  should  be  secured:  Note  to  Herndon 
V.  Gibson,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  767.  In  judicial  sales,  the  court  is  the 
vendor,  and  It  may  confirm  or  refuse  to  confirm  a  sale  made  under 
its  order,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  judicial  discretion:  State  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Neel,  53  Ark.  110,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  185. 

JUDICIAL  SALES— ADVANCE  OR  "UPSET"  BIDS.— A  RE- 
SALE of  property  will  not  be  ordered  upon  an  offer  of  Increase  of 
price  alone,  when  the  property  has  not  been  sold  at  a  sacrifice. 
Special  circumstances,  appealing  to  equitable  considerations,  must 
always  exist,  where  the  sale  is  not  void,  to  justify  an  order  for  a 
resale:  Page  v.  Kress,  80  Mich.  85,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  504,  and  note. 
Compare  Moran  v.  Clark,  30  W.  Va.  358,  8  Am.  St.  Rep.  66;  Colonial 
etc.  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Sweet,  65  Ark.  152,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  910,  and 
note  thereto  showing  that  the  English  rule  to  open  a  sale  when- 
ever an  advance  of  ten  per  cent  on  the  former  sale  is  offered  is  not 
adopted  in  Alabama. 


Wright  v.  Independence  National  Bank. 

[96  ViRaiNIA,  728.] 

CONTRACTS— DISCHARGE  OF  FIRST  INtTORSER  BY 
AGREEMENT  FOR  INDULGENCE-PARTIES.— An  agreement 
for  Indulgence  which  will  discharge  or  release  the  first  indorser  on 
a  promissory  note  cannot  be  made  with  any  other  person  than  the 
maker  of  the  note,  or  principal  debtor. 

CONTRACTS  —  EXTENDING  TIME  TO  SECOND  IN- 
DORSER  FOR  PAYMENT  OF  NOTE  DOES  NOT  DISCHARGE 
FIRST  INDORSER  OR  SURETY.— An  agreement  between  the 
holder  of  a  negotiable  note  and  a  second  indorser  upon  it,  to  extend 
the  time  of  payment,  does  not  discharge  the  first,  though  an  accom- 
modation Indorser  from  his  liability  on  the  note,  and  furnishes  no 
defense  to  an  action  brought  against  him  by  the  holder,  as  the 
agreement  does  not  prevent  the  first  indorser  from  paying  the  debt, 
and  proceeding  at  once  against  the  maker,  or  from  exercising  any 
rights  which  a  surety  may  assert  for  his  protection  against  his 
principal. 

APPEAT^REVERSAI^ERROR  IN  GIVING  AND  REFUS- 
ING INSTRUCTIONS.— Conceding  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  giv- 
ing and  refusing  certain  instructions,  there  should  be  no  reversal 
where  the  appellate  court  can  see  from  the  whole  record  that  under 
correct  instructions  a  different  verdict  could  not  have  been  rightly 
found,  or  that  the  exceptant  could  not  have  been  prejudiced  by  the 
action  of  the  court  in  giving  the  instructions  given,  or  In  refusing 
those  which  were  rejected. 

Action  on  a  promissory  note,  brought  by  the  Independence  Na- 
tional Bank  against  Wright.    This  was  the  second  action  by  the 


€90  Wbight  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank.     [Virginia, 

same  plaintiff  against  the  same  defendant  on  tlie  same  note.  The 
first  action  had  been  dismissed,  and  it  was  claimed  by  Wright, 
the  plaintiff  in  error  in  this  action,  that  he  was  released  because 
he  had  indorsed  the  note  for  the  accommodation  of  the  maker, 
and  that  the  first  action  was  dismissed  without  his  knowledge  or 
consent,  upon  an  agreement  made  with  the  maker  of  the  note, 
for  a  valuable  consideration,  to  forbear  to  sue  for  a  definite  time. 
The  agreement  to  dismiss  was  made  with  one  B.  E.  Hughes,  vice- 
president  of  the  Traders  Bank,  which  bank  was  the  second  in- 
dorser  of  the  note.  Wright  claimed  that  Hughes  was  acting  for 
the  maker  of  the  note,  but  this  was  denied.  This  was  the  chief 
controversy  in  the  case,  and  was  decided  adversely  to  Wright, 
against  whom  a  judgment  was  rendered,  and  he  sued  out  a  writ 
of  error. 

J.  E.  Edmunds  and  J.  E.  Hughes,  for  the  plaintiff  in  error. 

John  H.  Lewis,  for  the  defendant  in  error. 

^2»  BUCHANAN,  J,  The  defense  relied  on  in  this  case  is 
that  tlie  defendant,  an  accommodation  indorser,  had  been  re- 
leased by  an  agreement  of  the  creditor  extending  the  time  for 
the  payment  of  the  writing  sued  on.  That  paper  was  a  nego- 
tiable note  made  by  W.  P.  Eoberts,  payable  to  H.  D.  Wright,  or 
order,  at  the  Traders  Bank  of  Lynchburg,  indorsed  by  Wright 
to  that  bank,  and  by  it  indorsed  to  and  held  by  the  plaintiff  as 
collateral,  with  other  notes,  to  secure  the  payment  of  a  note  due 
to  it  from  the  Traders  Bank.  After  actions  at  law  had  been 
brought  by  the  plaintiff  on  the  notes  held  by  it  as  collateral, 
including  the  note  sued  on,  the  plaintiff  made  a  verbal  contract 
with  the  Traders  Bank  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  if  the  latter 
would  curtail  or  reduce  its  note  to  the  plaintiff  to  one  thousand 
dollars,  that  it  (the  plaintiff)  would  allow  the  Traders  Bank  to 
give  a  new  note  for  that  sum,  payable  in  thirty  days,  and  dismiss 
all  the  suits  on  the  collaterals,  upon  the  payment  of  the  court 
costs  and  attorney's  fees.  The  curtailment  was  made,  the  new 
note  given,  the  costs  and  attorney's  fees  paid,  and  the  suits  dis- 
missed. 

In  the  view  we  take  of  this  case,  it  is  unnecessary  to  consider 
whether  the  agreement  made  between  the  plaintiff  and  '^^^ 
the  Traders  Bank  was 'such  an  agreement  giving  time  for  the 
payment  of  the  note  as  would  have  discharged  the  defendant 
if  the  agreement  had  been  made  with  the  maker  of  the  note, 
instead  of  the  Traders  Bank,  the  last  indorser. 


Feb.  1899.]     Wright  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank.  891 

The  defendant's  counsel  insists  that,  whilst  the  agreement 
was  made  with  the  vice-president  of  the  Traders  Bank,  he  was 
the  agent  of  the  defendant  to  have  the  suit  against  him  dis- 
missed, and  that,  under  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  agreement 
must  be  regarded  as  having  been  made  with  the  maker  of  the 
note  as  well  as  with  the  Traders  Bank.  In  this  he  is  mistaken. 
The  record  not  only  fails  to  show  that  the  maker  was  any  party 
to  the  agreement,  but  it  shows  clearly  that  he  was  not. 

The  first  question,  therefore,  to  be  considered  is,  whether  an 
agreement  for  indulgence,  which  will  discharge  or  release  the 
first  indorser,  can  be  made  with  any  other  person  tjian  the  maker 
of  the  note,  or  principal  debtor. 

In  2  Daniel  on  Negotiable  Instruments,  fourth  edition,  section 
1324,  it  is  said:  "The  agreement  for  indulgence,  in  order  to  dis- 
charge the  drawer  or  indorser,  must  be  made  with  the  maker  or 
acceptor  who  is  the  principal  debtor;  and  if  it  be  made  with  a 
third  party,  it  will  not  affect  the  drawer's  or  indorser's  rights 
or  remedies,  although  such  third  party  may  have  his  appropri- 
ate remedy  for  breach  of  the  contract  with  him." 

The  text-writers  generally,  in  discussing  the  character  of  the 
agreement  which  will  operate  as  a  discharge  of  the  indorser, 
drawer,  or  surety,  seem  to  treat  it  as  a  matter  of  course  that 
the  agreement  must  be  with  the  principal  debtor:  2  Brandt  on 
Suretyship  and  Guaranty,  sec.  342;  Baylies  on  Sureties,  240;  1 
Parsons  on  Bills  and  Notes,  238;  Edwards  on  Bills  and  Notes, 
567;  24  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  238;  5  Robinson's  Practice, 
769.  And  this  would  seem  to  be  necessarily  so  from  the  grounds 
upon  which  it  is  held  that  the  indorser,  drawer,  or  surety  is  dis- 
charged from  liability. 

The  reason  given  why  the  extension  of  time  for  payment  dis- 
charges the  indorser,  drawer,  or  surety,  is  because  the  creditor 
^*  thereby  inflicts  an  injury  on  him,  and  deprives  him  of  the 
means  of  relieving  himself,  either  by  paying  the  debt,  and  im- 
mediately proceeding  against  the  principal  (being  substituted  to 
the  creditor's  rights),  or  by  filing  his  bill  quia  timet  to  compel 
the  debtor  to  pay  the  creditor,  for  the  surety's  exoneration;  for, 
if  the  creditor  could  not  himself,  in  consequence  of  his  own 
agreement,  compel  the  principal  debtor  to  pay,  neither  could  the 
indorser,  drawer,  or  surety  who,  in  such  case,  asserts  the  riglita 
of  the  creditor  for  his  own  safety:  Norris  v.  Crummey,  2  Rand. 
333,  334;  Shannon  v.  McMullin,  25  Gratt.  212,  213;  2  Daniel 
on  Negotiable  Instruments,  sec.  1313. 


892  Wkight  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank.     [Virginia^ 

But  if  the  agreement  of  the  creditor  be  made  with  some  other 
person  than  the  principal  debtor,  what  is  there  to  prevent  the 
indorser,  drawer,  or  surety  from  paying  the  debt,  and  proceed- 
ing at  once  against  the  principal,  or  from  requiring  the  creditor 
to  forthwith  institute  suit  on  the  contract  as  provided  by  sec- 
tion 2890  of  the  Code,  or  from  filing  his  bill  quia  timet?  The 
principal  debtor,  being  no  party  to  the  agreement,  and  having 
paid  no  consideration  for  the  promise,  cannot  rely  on  it.  This 
was  the  view  taken  by  the  court  in  Frazer  v.  Jordan,  8  El.  &  B. 
303,  where  the  agreement  was  made  with  a  stranger.  In  that, 
case  it  was  said:  "We  think  that  the  doctrine  ought  not  to  be 
extended  to  the  case  of  a  contract  with  a  stranger.  The  prin- 
cipal debtor,  having  given  no  consideration  for  the  promise,  haa 
no  ground  to  complain  of  a  breach  of  it,  and  cannot  say  that 
faith  has  been  broken  with  him.  There  is  no  privity  of  contract 
with  him;  and  we  see  nothing  on  which  any  right,  either  at  law 
or  in  equity  (see  Lord  Abinger's  observations  in  Lyon  v.  Holt, 
5  Mees.  &  W.  253,  254),  for  him  to  insist  upon  such  contract, 
can  be  founded.  The  stranger  may  have  some  private  reason  of 
his  own  to  wish  for  some  indulgence  to  be  shown,  and,  if  he  has 
given  a  good  consideration,  may  be  entitled  to  damages,  nominal, 
large,  or  small,  according  to  any  legal  interest  he  may  have,  but 
surely  he  is  the  only  person  to  take  advantage  of  his  contract.** 

''^^  The  agreement  relied  on  in  this  case  having  been  made 
between  the  holder  of  the  note  (the  plaintiff)  and  the  last 
indorser  upon  it,  did  not  prevent  the  first  indorser  (the  defend- 
ant) from  paying  the  debt,  and  proceeding  at  once  against  the 
maker,  or  from  exercising  any  rights  which  a  surety  may  assert 
for  his  protection  against  his  principal.  The  agreement  did  not 
discharge  the  first  indorser  from  his  liability  on  the  note,  and 
furnished  no  defense  against  the  plaintiff's  recovery. 

The  action  of  the  court  in  giving  and  refusing  certain  in- 
fitructions  is  assigned  as  error. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  consider  that  assignment  of  error,  for  if 
it  were  conceded  that  the  action  of  the  court  was  erroneous,  as 
claimed,  it  is  immaterial,  for  under  the  facts  of  the  case,  upon 
correct  instructions,  a  different  verdict  could  not  have  been 
rightly  found  by  the  jury.  And  it  is  the  settled  rule  of  this 
court,  recognized  and  acted  upon  in  numerous  cases,  not  to 
reverse  where  the  court  can  see  from  the  whole  record  that 
under  correct  instructions  a  different  verdict  could  not  have 
been  rightly  found,  or  that  the  exceptant  could  not  have  been 
prejudiced  by  the  action  of  the  court  in  giving  the  instructions 


Feb.  1899.]     Wright  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank.  893 

given,  or  in  refusing  those  which  were  rejected:  Richmond  Ey. 
etc.  Co.  Y.  Garthright,  92  Va.  627,  629,  53  Am.  St.  Bep.  839; 
Brighthope  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  76  Va.  443,  451. 

We  are  of  opinion  tfiat  the  judgment  complained  of  is  right, 
and  that  it  should  be  affirmed. 


A  BONA  FIDE  INDORSER  IS  DISCHARGED  by  any  dealings 
between  the  holder  and  principal  debtor  which  defeat  the  in- 
dorser's  remedy  on  the  instrument,  though  It  Is  otherwise  where 
no  remedy  of  his  is  prejudiced:  Pitt  v.  Congdon,  2  N.  Y.  352,  51  Am. 
Dec.  299,  and  note  showing  what  dealings  between  the  principal 
debtor  and  the  holder  will  or  will  not  release  an  accommodation  In- 
dorser;  and  that  an  accommodation  Indorser  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a  surety.  Compare  Phoenix  Brewing  Co.  v.  Rumbarger,  181  Pa.  St. 
251,  59  Am.  St  Rep.  647. 

APPEAL  —  REVERSAL  —  HARMLESS  ERROR  —  INSTRUC- 
TIONS.—If  the  result  reached  by  the  trial  court  is  correct,  errors 
in  giving  or  denying  declarations  of  law,  or  in  giving  or  denying 
instructions,  must  be  treated  as  harmless  on  appeal:  Fox  v.  Windes, 
127  Mo.  502,  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  648.  An  instruction  stating  the  law 
too  strongly  as  against  the  defendant  does  not  entitle  him  to  a  re- 
versal, If,  under  no  proper  Instruction,  Judgment  could  have  been 
given  in  his  favor:  Lake  y.  Hancock,  88  Fla.  63,  50  Am.  St.  Bep. 
150. 


OASES 

IN  THB 

SUPREME  COURT 

09 

WISCONSIN. 


Paesons  v.  Parsons. 

[101  Wisconsin,  76.] 

JUDGMENTS  —  JUDICIAL,  DETERMINATIONS— CJOLLAT- 
ERAL  ATTACK.— A  judicial  determination  may  be  contrary  to  con- 
clusive evidence,  or  legal  evidence,  or  without  any  evidence,  yet 
not  collaterally  impeachable  for  want  of  jurisdiction. 

ADOPTION— CONSENT  OF  ABANDONING  PARENT.— 
Statute  may  authorize  the  adoption  of  a  child  without  the  consent 
of  an  absent  or  abandoning  parent,  and  adoption  proceedings  had 
thereunder,  and  completed  without  notice  to,  or  consent  of,  such 
a  parent,  are  valid. 

ADOPTION  —  STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION.  —  Adoption 
statutes  are  humane  provisions  which  look  primarily  to  the  interests 
of  children,  and  every  reasonable  intendment  should  be  Indulged  In, 
In  case  of  doubt.  In  the  line  of  promoting  that  object. 

ADOPTION— NOTICE  TO  ABANDONING  PARENT.— Un- 
der a  statute  authorizing  the  adoption  of  a  child  without  notice  to 
an  abandoning  parent,  notice  to  such  parent  is  not  requisite  to  a 
valid  determination  of  the  fact  of  abandonment  as  regards  all  other 
parties  to  the  proceedings. 

ADOPTION  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN  —  COLLATBRAIi  AT- 
TACK.— Where  a  proper  petition  has  been  filed  in  adoption  proceed- 
ings, the  court  acquires  jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  the  per- 
son who  signs  as  next  of  kin  Is  such,  and  its  determination, 
whether  based  upon  sufficient  evidence  or  not,  cannot  be  collaterally 
attacked  for  want  of  jurisdiction. 

ADOPTION-JUDGMENT  OF— ESTOPPEL  TO  ATTACK.— 
After  the  lapse  of  many  yeers,  during  which  time  the  status  of  the 
subject  of  adoption  has  been  recognized  as  legally  fixed  by  the 
judgment,  by  all  parties  to  the  proceedings,  one  of  those  parties, 
on  whose  motion  the  judgment  was  rendered,  Is  In  no  position  to 
appeal  to  equity  to  declare  It  void. 

Edward  S.  Bragg,  for  the  appellant. 

(894) 


Nov.  1898.]  Parsons  v.  Parsons.  895 

Gary  &  Forward  and  C.  A.  Forward,  for  the  respondent. 

""^  MAESHALL,  J.  This  case  turns  on  whether  the  county 
court  obtained  jurisdiction  to  make  the  order  of  adoption.  It 
is  challenged  solely  upon  the  ground  that  the  consent  of  the 
living  parent,  the  father,  was  not  given,  and  there  was  no  ad- 
judication, on  notice  to  the  absent  parent,  of  the  fact  of  aban- 
donment, nor  any  consent  given  in  place  of  that  '^^  the  alleged 
abandoning  parent  by  the  next  of  kin,  nor  by  a  guardian  or  a. 
suitable  person  appointed  by  the  court.  There  is  no  claim  but 
that  the  petition,  in  form,  complies  with  the  statute.  It  alleges 
every  fact  which  the  statute  requires,  was  made  by  the  proper 
persons,  and  was  verified  by  them.  True,  it  does  not  appear 
that  notice  was  given  to  the  father,  and,  if  that  were  requisite 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  take  any  steps  in  the  pro- 
ceedings, the  order  of  adoption  was  void.  On  this  subject  we 
are  furnished  with  a  learned  discussion  of  the  statute  and  a  cita- 
tion of  many  authorities  on  both  sides  of  the  controversy,  in 
some  of  which  the  subject  is  considered  at  great  length,  but  if 
the  statute  itself  furnishes  a  plain  solution  of  the  question  we 
have  no  need  to  go  elsewhere  to  support  it. 

The  statute  to  be  considered  is  section  4022  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  1878,  which  reads  as  follows:  **No  such  adoption 
shall  be  made  without  the  written  consent  of  the  living  parents 
of  such  child,  unless  the  court  shall  find  that  one  of  the  parents 
has  abandoned  the  child,  or  gone  to  parts  unknown."  Thus  it 
will  be  seen  that,  upon  the  fact  being  established  that  the  living 
parent  has  abandoned  his  child,  he  is  deemed  by  the  statute  to 
have  thereby  relinquished  all  parental  right  to  be  consulted  in 
respect  to  the  child's  welfare,  and  his  consent  to  the  adoption 
is  therefore  dispensed  with.  The  term  "abandon"  obviously 
means  no  more  than  neglect  or  refusal  to  perform  the  natural 
and  legal  obligations  of  care  and  support  which  parents  owe  to 
their  children.  The  fact  of  abandonment,  judicially  deter- 
mined, was  essential  to  the  jurisdiction;  not  essential  that  it 
should  be  determined  on  proper  evidence,  necessarily,  or  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  truth,  because  mere  error  in  that  regard  does 
not  affect  jurisdiction.  If  jurisdiction  be  obtained  to  determine 
a  fact,  its  determination  wrong  or  on  insufficient  or  improper 
evidence  is  immaterial  on  the  question  of  legal  right  to  proceed 
judicially  to  the  next  step.  That  is  deemed  to  be  elementary. 
Now,  that  **  the  fact  of  abandonment  was  judicially  deter- 
mined in  this  proceeding  must  be  conceded.    True,  there  wa» 


896  Parsons  v.  Parsons.  [Wisconsin, 

no  evidence,  so  far  as  appears,  but  the  verified  petition,  and  the 
Allegation  of  abandonment  was  on  information  and  belief.  That 
was  mere  hearsay,  but  that  fact  goes  merely  to  the  sufficiency  of 
proof,  which,  as  stated,  may  involve  error,  but  not  jurisdictional 
error.  A  judicial  determination  may  be  contrary  to  conclusive 
evidence  or  legal  evidence,  or  without  any  evidence,  yet  cannot 
be  impeached  for  want  of  jurisdiction:  Van  Fleet  on  Collateral 
Attack,  sec.  693,  695.  That  rule  applies  to  all  judicial  proceed- 
ings. It  has  often  been  invoked  in  proceedings  like  this.  As 
for  example  in  Van  Matre  v.  Sankey,  148  111.  536,  39  Am.  St. 
Eep.  196,  it  was  held  that  if  the  court  has  jurisdiction  to  act 
at  all,  however  erroneous  its  action,  it  must  still  stand  until  re- 
versed on  appeal. 

It  follows  that  the  only  remaining  question  on  this  branch 
of  the  case  is.  Did  the  court  have  jurisdiction  to  act  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  alleged  abandonment,  in  the  absence  of  notice,  ac- 
tual or  constructive,  to  the  parent?  That  must  be  answered  in 
the  affirmative.  When  the  proceedings  in  question  were  had, 
the  statute  did  not  require  notice,  actual  or  constructive,  to  a 
parent  who  had  abandoned  his  child.  That  was  unquestionably 
ihe  legislative  idea.  Eesort  to  rules  of  liberal  construction  is 
not  necessary  to  reach  that  conclusion.  But  if  the  statute 
would  admit  of  two  constructions,  the  result  would  be  the  same. 
We  would  feel  bound  to  repudiate  the  doctrine  of  strict  con- 
struction contended  for  vigorously  by  appellant.  The  adoption 
statute  is  a  humane  provision  which  looks  to  the  interests  of 
children  primarily.  That  is  its  controlling  idea  and  policy. 
Therefore,  every  reasonable  intendment  should  be  indulged  in, 
in  case  of  doubt,  in  the  line  of  promoting  that  object.  Other 
oourts  have  taken  the  same  view,  but,  if  it  were  otherwise,  our 
duty  to  carry  out  an  obvious  legislative  intent  would  be  the 
same.  That  the  statute  was  designed  to  enable  ^*  those  who 
are  not  blessed  with  the  love  and  society  of  children  in  the 
family  to  acquire  it  by  taking  them  into  the  family  fold  and 
giving  a  home  to  those  in  need  of  such  shelter,  protection,  and 
care,  thus  creating  mutual  obligations,  promotive  of  mutual 
happiness  and  the  moral  well-being  of  society,  is  most  clear.  It 
has  made,  and  is  making,  a  multitude  of  happy  homes,  happy 
parents,  happy  children,  and  valuable  members  of  society,  and 
no  narrow  construction  should  be  indulged  in  that  will  tend  to 
•defeat  a  result  so  obviously  intended  and  in  every  way  bo  bene- 
:ficial. 


Nov.  1898.]  Parsons  v.  Pabsons.  897 

The  conclusion  reached  as  to  the  necessity  of  notice  to  the 
■ahsent  and  abandoning  parent  is  but  affirming  what  was  clearly 
held,  inferentially,  in  Schiltz  v.  Eoenitz,  86  Wis.  31;  39  Am.  St. 
Eep.  873.  The  court  there,  while  holding  that  the  order  was 
not  conclusive  upon  the  father  on  the  fact  of  abandonment, 
who  had  no  notice  of  the  proceedings,  said  that  it  might,  how- 
■ever,  well  be  held  valid  as  to  the  child,  obviously  meaning  be- 
cause the  court  had  jurisdiction  that  far,  which,  of  course,  in- 
cluded jurisdiction  of  the  petitioner  who  commenced  the  pro- 
ceedings. That  such  was  the  intention  of  the  court,  as  under- 
stood by  the  legislative  department  of  the  government,  is  evi- 
-denced  by  the  fact  that  subsequently  a  proviso  was  added  to  the 
section  in  the  following  words:  "Provided,  that  unless  the  liv- 
ing parent  or  parents  of  a  minor  consent  to  such  adoption,  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  the  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  pro- 
ceedings, upon  the  filing  of  any  petition  for  adoption,  by  order 
to  appoint  a  time  and  place  for  hearing  such  petition  and  cause 
notice  of  such  time  and  place  to  be  given  to  such  parent  or 
parents  by  personal  service  of  said  notice  on  such  parent  or 
parents  at  least  ten  days  before  the  hearing  or  by  publication 
thereof  in  a  newspaper  at  least  three  weeks  successively  prior 
to  said  hearing,  and,  when  notice  is  duly  given  as  herein  pro- 
vided, the  parent  of  any  minor  shall  be  bound  by  the  order  of 
adoption  as  fully  as  though  he  had  consented  thereto'*:  Laws  of 
1895,  c.  18.  ®^  That  notice  to  the  parent  is  not  requisite  to  u 
valid  determination  of  the  fact  of  abandonment  as  regards  all 
other  parties  to  the  proceedings  has  been  held  in  numerous  cases 
elsewhere,  some  of  which  are  cited  in  the  briefs  of  counsel: 
Nugent  V.  Po\^ell,  4  Wyo.  173;  62  Am.  St.  Eep.  17;  Van 
Fleet  on  Collateral  Attack,  sec.  408;  Barnard  v.  Barnard,  119 
111.  92. 

It  is  further  contended  by  appellant  that  the  county  court 
did  not  have  jurisdiction,  because  consent  to  the  adoption  was 
not  given  by  the  next  of  kin.  Whether  the  person  who  signed 
as  next  of  kin  was  such  in  fact  was  one  of  the  questions  which 
the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  determine.  It  was  not  requisite  to 
jurisdiction  that  it  should  be  determined  rightly.  The  trite  say- 
ing applies,  that  every  court  has  jurisdiction  to  err  in  any  case, 
but  mere  error  in  determining  something  the  court  has  a  right 
to  determine  is  irremediable  by  challenge  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court.  That  the  county  judge  had  jurisdiction  to  deter- 
mine that  W.  S.  Russell  was  next  of  kin  to  the  adopted  child 

AM.  St  RKP.,  You  LXX.— 67 


898  Parsons  v.  Parsons.  [Wisojnsiny 

cannot  reasonably  be  questioned.  That  the  fact  was  judicially 
detennined  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  order.  True,  it  was- 
determined  by  the  verified  petition  only,  so  far  as  appears  by 
anything  in  the  proceedings,  but,  as  stated  before,  that  was  not 
material  to  the  jurisdiction.  If  determined  without  any  evi- 
dence whatever,  the  result  would  be  the  same.  No  doubt  it 
was  competent  for  the  county  judge  to  have  required  other  evi- 
dence than  the  petition,  but  he  was  not  bound  to  do  so.  If  sat- 
isfied of  the  fact  by  the  petition  itself,  whether  satisfied  rightly 
or  wrongly,  it  was  sufficient  for  the  validity  of  the  proceedings. 
The  rule  on  that  subject  was  definitely  stated  by  Mr.  Justice 
Winslow  in  Cody  v.  Cody,  98  Wis.  445,  to  the  effect  that  three- 
things  only  are  necessary  to  give  jurisdiction  in  an  action  or  pro- 
ceeding: 1.  A  tribunal  legally  organized;  2.  Jurisdiction  of  the- 
subject  matter;  3.  Jurisdiction  of  the  person;  and  these  things 
all  being  present,  jurisdiction  continues,  however  erroneous  the 
proceedings  ®*  leading  up  to  the  result  finally  obtained,  unless 
one  of  the  elements  be  in  the  meantime  lost. 

So  a  conclusion  is  reached  on  the  merits  of  the  case  that  the 
decision  of  the  circuit  court  was  right  and  must  be  affirmed. 
But  if  we  were  to  go  further,  the  result  would  not  be  otherwise. 
The  proceedings  to  avoid  the  judgment  of  adoption  are  clearly 
of  an  equitable  nature,  and  after  the  lapse  of  many  years,  during 
which  time  the  status  of  the  subject  of  adoption  has  been  recog- 
nized as  legally  fixed  by  the  judgment  of  the  county  court,  by 
all  parties  to  the  proceedings,  one  of  .those  parties  on  whose  mo- 
tion the  judgment  was  rendered  is  in  no  position  to  appeal  to 
the  equity  powers  of  the  court  to  declare  it  void.  The  plainest 
principles  of  estoppel  apply  to  the  situation.  Appellant  peti- 
tioned for  the  judgment.  It  was  entered  on  her  motion.  The 
person  most  interested,  the  child,  was  a  ward  of  the  court,  and 
its  status  for  life  was  entirely  and  irrevocably  changed  by  the 
result  of  the  proceedings  if  they  were  valid.  Their  validity  was 
recognized  by  the  appellant  till  she  became  pecuniarily  inter- 
ested in  changing  her  position.  Clearly,  she  cannot  be  aided  by 
a  court  of  equity  to  do  that  to  the  injury  of  the  person  she  was 
instrumental  in  locating  in  her  family  as  her  adopted  son. 

By  the  Court.    The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  is  affirmed. 


JUDGMENTS— COLLATERAL  ATTACK— WANT  OP  EVI- 
DENCE.—Judgments  are  presumed  to  be  founded  on  proper  and 
sufficient  evidence  and  they  cannot  be  collaterally  Impeached,  no- 
matter  how  Insufficient  the  evidence  may,  in  fact,  have  been:  Can-- 


Nov.  1898.]  HoLLMAN  V.  Platteville.  899 

non  V.  Cooper,  39  Miss.  784,  80  Am.  Dec.  101,  and  note.  A  judgment 
cannot  be  impeached  collaterally  where  it  is  founded  on  false  testi- 
mony: Dilling  V.  Murray,  6  Ind.  324.  63  Am.  Dec.  385;  nor  where 
it  is  founded  on  incompetent  evidence:  Myers  v.  McGavock,  39  Neb. 
843,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  627;  nor  where  the  judgment  is  erroneous:  Ed- 
mundson  v.  Independent  School  Dist,  98  Iowa,  639,  60  Am.  St.  Rep. 
224. 

ADOPTION— CONSENT  OF  ABANDONING  PARENT.— The 
consent  of  the  parents  of  a  child  is  not  necessary  to  its  valid  adop- 
tion by  another,  where  the  statute  upon  the  subject  is  silent  respect- 
ing the  assent  of  the  natural  parents:  Clarkson  v.  Hatton,  143  Mo. 
47,  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  635,  and  note;  Van  Matre  v.  Sankey,  148  111.  536, 
39  Am.  St.  Rep.  196,  and  monographic  note  thereto. 

ADOPTION— NOTICE  TO  PARENT.— Adoption  proceedings  In- 
stituted upon  the  application  of  the  mother,  without  notice  to  the 
absent  father,  in  which  it  is  found  that  such  father  has  abandoned 
the  child  adopted,  are  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  by  the  collat- 
eral heirs  of  the  party  adopting  such  child,  on  the  ground  of  the  ab- 
sence of  notice  to  such  father:  Nugent  v.  Powell,  4  Wyo.  173,  62  Am. 
St.  Rep.  17,  and  note. 

ADOPTION— STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION.— Statutes  author- 
izing the  adoption  of  the  children  of  other  persons  should  be  given 
a  liberal  intendment  and  operation:  Cofer  v.  Scroggins,  98  Ala.  842, 
39  Am.  St  Rep.  64,  and  note. 


HOLLMAN    V.  PlATTBVILLB. 

[101  Wisconsin,  94.] 

CEMETERIES-BURIAL,  RIGHTS— LICENSE  TO  USE 
GROUND.— One  who  enters  into  possession  of  a  lot  In  a  public 
cemetery,  improves  the  same,  and  uses  it  for  burial  purposes,  with 
the  express  or  implied  consent  of  those  who  have  control  of  the 
cemetery,  although  he  acquires  no  title  to  the  lot,  acquires  a  license 
to  use  the  same  for  burial  purposes,  which  license,  so  long  as  it 
continues,  will  support  an  action  of  trespass  for  any  Invasion  or 
disturbance  of  it,  whether  by  the  grantors  or  strangers. 

CEMETERIES— REGULATION  BY  CITY— LIABILITY  OP 
CITY  IN  DAMAGES.— A  city  given  power,  by  statute,  to  adopt 
regulations  as  to  a  public  cemetery,  and,  upon  proper  notice,  to 
compel  lotowners  or  occupants  to  comply  with  such  regulations,  is 
liable  in  damages  to  a  lot  occupant,  if,  without  having  adopted  any 
regulations,  and  without  notice  to  him,  it  invades  his  lot  and  cuts 
down  trees  which  he  has  planted  therein  in  the  improvement  there- 
of. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC  AND  CORPOR- 
ATE DUTIES— LIABILITY  ARISING  FROM  PERFORMANCE.— 
While  a  municipal  corporation  sustains  no  liability  to  one  suffering 
injury  from  the  negligent  or  imperfect  exercise  of  its  legislative  or 
governmental  powers,  the  contrary  is  true  as  respects  the  perform- 
ance and  execution  of  mere  corporate  duties.  As  respects  such  mat- 
ters, the  rule  of  respondeat  superior  applies,  and  the  city  will  be- 
come liable  for  the  act  of  its  servants  and  agents  which  it  has 
authorized  or  adopted. 


900  HoLLMAN  V.  Platteville.  [Wisconsin, 

Action  for  damages  arising  from  the  act  of  the  defendant  city 
in  removing  trees  planted  by  plaintiff  in  his  burial  lot  in  a  ceme- 
tery under  the  control  of  the  defendant.  Plaintiff  had  no  rights 
in  the  lot  other  than  those  arising  from  his  occupancy  thereof 
from  1867  to  1894,  the  year  in  which  the  injury  complained  of 
was  committed,  and  his  improvement  of  the  lot  by  fencing  it  and 
planting  the  trefes  in  question.  Appeal  from  judgment  for 
plaintiff. 

E.  E.  Bums,  city  attorney,  and  J.  W.  Murphy,  for  the  appel- 
lant. 

T.  L.  Cleary,  for  the  respondent. 

**  BAEDEEN,  J.  This  case  must  be  considered  and  deter- 
mined upon  the  certificate  of  the  circuit  judge.  The  recovery 
was  less  than  one  hundred  dollars,  and  the  case  could  only  be 
brought  here  for  ^"^  review  upon  a  certificate  of  the  trial  judge, 
pursuant  to  section  3047  of  the  Statutes  of  1898.  The  alleged 
bill  of  exceptions  sent  up  with  the  record  cannot  be  considered, 
and  should  have  been  stricken  therefrom.  As  it  appears  to  us 
from  the  statement  of  facts,  the  only  question  we  need  deter- 
mine is  whether  the  defendants  are  liable  in  damages  for  the 
cutting  of  the  trees  on  the  cemetery  lot  in  question.  As  we 
view  the  case,  it  becomes  unnecessary  to  determine  whether 
plaintiff  has  the  legal  title  to  the  lot  or  not.  He  entered  into 
possession  of  the  same  in  1867,  inclosed  it  by  a  fence,  and  planted 
the  trees  that  were  cut  down,  and,  after  the  fence  was  removed, 
has  cared  for  and  attended  to  the  lot,  "and  has  been  in  posses- 
sion of  the  same,  claiming  it  as  a  family  burial  lot,"  ever  since. 
Whether  his  right  thereto  be  considered  a  mere  privilege,  right, 
or  easement  for  the  burial  of  his  dead,  or  whether  his  rights 
have  ripened  into  absolute  title  by  adverse  possession,  it  matters 
not  for  the  purpose  of  this  case.  Some  courts  go  so  far  as  to 
hold  that  such  an  easement,  as  well  as  title  to  the  soil,  may  be 
acquired  and  perfected  by  prescription,  the  right  to  which  can- 
not be  defeated  by  the  owner  of  the  soil:  Hook  v.  Joyce,  94  Ky. 
450.  Others  say  that  where  the  interment  is  in  a  public  ceme- 
tery, when  the  parties  whose  duty  is  to  give  burial  are  not  the 
owners  of  the  soil,  they  would  have  no  higher  right  than  a  mere 
easement  or  license:  3  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  50,  and  cases 
cited.  In  any  event,  so  long  as  the  license  continued,  the  lot- 
holder  could  maintain  trespass  for  any  invasion  or  disturbance 
of  it,  whether  by  the  grantors  or  strangers:  Partridge  v.  First 


Nov.  1898.]  HoLLMAN  V.  Platteville.  901 

Independent  Church,  39  Md.  631.  A  case  which  reviews  the  au- 
thorities at  length,  and  contains  an  ample  discussion  of  the 
rights  of  lot  claimants  in  cemeteries,  is  Bessemer  etc.  Co.  v.  Jen- 
kins, 111  Ala.  135;  56  Am.  St.  Eep.  26.  It  is  there  said:  "It 
would  seem,  therefore,  to  accord  with  right  principle  and  au- 
thority, that  where  one  is  permitted  to  bury  his  dead  in  a  pub- 
lic cemetery  by  the  express  or  implied  consent  of  those  in  proper 
control  of  it,  ®®  he  acquires  such  a  possession  in  the  spot  of 
ground  in  which  the  bodies  are  buried  as  will  entitle  him  to  ac- 
tion against  the  owners  of  the  fee  or  strangers,  who,  without  his 
consent,  negligently  or  wantonly  disturb  it."  The  plaintiff, 
having  a  right  to  and  the  possession  of  the  lot  in  question,  could 
certainly  maintain  an  action  against  any  person  who  unlawfully 
disturbed  or  interfered  therewith. 

But  it  is  said  that  the  statute  (Rev.  Stats.  1878,  sec.  1439) 
gives  the  right  to  the  common  council  to  regulate  the  cemetery 
as  trustees,  and  that  their  action  in  that  regard  was  quasi  judi- 
cial, and  ought  not  to  be  interfered  with.  A  perfect  answer  to 
this  contention  is  found  in  section  1453,  which  grants  the  power 
to  require  any  "lotowner  or  occupant  to  remove,  rearrange,  re- 
build, or  repair  any  such  trees  or  shrubs  planted,  fences,  struc- 
tures, headstones,  or  monuments,  so  as  to  comply  with  such  reg- 
ulations as  they  shall  prescribe,  by  giving  reasonable  personal 
notice  in  writing  so  to  do";  and,  if  they  fail  to  do  so,  they  may 
cause  it  to  be  done,  and  recover  the  expense  thereof  from  the  per- 
son liable  to  such  duty.  This  presupposes  the  adoption  of 
proper  regulations  for  the  management  and  control  of  the  ceme- 
tery, which  seems  not  to  have  been  done  in  this  case.  Neither 
was  there  any  pretense  that  any  notice  was  given  plaintiff  to  re- 
arrange or  remove  the  trees  in  question.  The  acts  of  the  city 
were  wholly  without  the  lines  of  the  statute  and  without  legal 
justification. 

It  is  further  urged  that  the  city  was  engaged  in  an  act  for  the 
public  benefit,  in  which  it  had  no  particular  interest,  And  from 
which  it  derived  no  special  advantage  in  its  corporate  capacity, 
and  therefore  it  cannot  be  held  liable.  The  defendant  city  is  a 
municipal  corporation,  charged  wilh  certain  public  duties  in  re- 
lation to  the  state  and  the  public  generally,  as  well  as  with  obli- 
gations that  are  local  and  relate  to  the  welfare  of  its  members, 
and  the  regulation  of  its  internal  affairs.  In  the  administration 
and  execution  of  its  legislative  ®*  and  governmental  powers — 
such  powers  as  are,  in  their  very  nature,  public  and  in  aid  of  the 


902  HoLLMAN  V.  Platteville.  [Wisconsin, 

state — ^it  sustains  no  liability  to  one  suffering  injury,  if  such 
powers  are  imperfectly  or  negligently  executed:  Dillon  on  Muni- 
cipal Corporations,  sees.  965,  966.  But,  as  respects  the  per- 
formance and  execution  of  mere  corporate  duties,  the  rule  is  dif- 
ferent. "When  the  act  done  is  within  its  charter  powers  and  re- 
lates to  the  administration  of  local  or  internal  affairs,  as  distin- 
guished from  its  legislative,  discretionary,  or  quasi  judicial  du- 
ties, the  rule  of  respondeat  superior  applies,  and  the  city  will  be- 
come liable  for  the  act  of  its  servants  and  agents,  which  it  has 
authorized  or  adopted:  Dillon  on  Municipal  Corporations,  sec. 
980.  In  this  case  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  the  defend- 
ant Stephens  was  the  servant  of  the  city  and  was  acting  under 
its  authority.  The  answer  expressly  admits  that  the  acts  done 
by  him  were  done  under  the  direction  and  authority  of  the  com- 
mon council.  The  city  had  a  right  to  adopt  reasonable  regula- 
tions for  the  management  and  control  of  the  cemetery.  It  also 
had  the  power  to  enforce  its  regulations  in  conformity  to  the  law 
granting  such  power.  It  had  no  right  or  authority  to  disturb 
or  invade  the  possession  of  the  lot  held  by  plaintiff  except  in 
pursuance  of  its  statutory  authority.  Its  fault  lay  in  the  at- 
tempted exercise  of  its  statutory  powers  in  an  unlawful  manner, 
and,  having  authorized  the  act  done  and  having  adopted  the 
wrongful  act  of  its  servant,  as  appears  by  its  answer,  the  city 
must  be  held  to  respond  for  the  actual  damage  done:  Dillon  on 
Municipal  Corporations,  sec.  972;  Wilde  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La. 
Ann.  15.  See  Wilson  v.  Mineral  Point,  39  Wis.  160;  Thayer  v. 
Boston,  19  Pick.  511;  31  Am.  Dec.  157;  Squiers  v.  Neenah,  24 
Wis.  588;  Crossett  v.  Janesville,  28  Wis.  420. 

By  the  Court.     The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  is  affirmed. 


CEMETERIES  —  BURIAL  RIGHTS  —  LICENSE  TO  USE 
GROUND.— If  one  has  been  permitted  to  biiry  his  dead  In  a  public 
cemetery,  by  the  express  or  implied  consent  of  those  In  proper  con- 
trol of  it,  he  acquires  such  a  possession  in  the  spot  of  ground  In 
which  the  bodies  are  buried  as  will  entitle  him  to  maintain  an  ac- 
tion of  quare  clausum  fregit  against  the  owners  of  the  fee  or 
strangers,  who,  without  his  consent,  negligently  or  wantonly  dis- 
turb It:  Bessemer  etc.  Co.  v.  Jenkins,  111  Ala.  135,  56  Am.  St.  Rep. 
26,  and  note  thereto;  Mitchell  v.  Thorne,  134  N.  Y.  536,  30  Am.  St. 
Rep.  699.  After  one  has  purchased  a  lot  In  a  cemetery,  the  mana- 
gers thereof  have  no  right  to  abridge  his  right  of  sepulture  by  any 
unreasonable  limitations  thereon:  Mount  Morlah  Cem.  Assn.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 81  Pa.  St.  235,  22  Am,  Rep.  743. 

CEMETERIES— REGULATIONS  BY  CITY.— The  privilege  of 
burial  In  a  public  cemetery  Is  a  mere  license,  subject  to  municipal 
regulation,  and  revocable  according  to   public    necessity:  Page   v. 


Nov.  1898.]  Horp  v.  Olson.  908 

I 

Symonils,  63  N.  H.  17,  56  Am.  Rep.  481;  Austin  ▼.  Austin  City  Cem. 

Assn.,  87  Tex.  330,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  114. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS-DUTIES— LIABILITIES.  —  A 
municipal  corporation  is  not  liable  for  injuries  caused  by  the  negli- 
gence of  Its  agents  and  officers  In  the  discharge  of  duties  purely 
governmental  or  discretionary.  But  It  Is  liable  for  Injuries  caused 
by  Its  negligence  In  the  discharge  of  ministerial  or  specified  duties 
assumed  by  its  charter:  Gibson  v.  Huntington,  38  W.  Va.  177,  45 
Am.  St.  Rep.  853.  and  note.  See  the  monographic  note  to  Goddard  v. 
Inhabitants  of  Harps  well,  SO  Am.  St.  Rep.  376-413. 


HoFP  V.  Olson. 

[101  Wisconsin,  118.] 

EQUITY— ADEQUATE  LEGAL  REMEDY- PLEADING.— 
The  objection  that  the  plaintiff  In  a  suit  In  equity  baa  an  adequate 
legal  remedy  must  be  made  by  demurrer  or  answer,  and,  If  not  so 
made.  Is  deemed  waived,  and  cannot  be  raised  by  demurrer  ore 
tenus. 

EQUITY— JURISDICTION— ADEQUATE  LEGAL  REM- 
EDY.  — The  ground  upon  which  equity  refuses  to  take  cognizance  of 
a,  case  In  which  an  adequate  legal  remedy  exists  is  not  jurisdictional, 
but  merely  a  rule  of  practice,  upon  which  the  action  will  be  dis- 
missed If  the  attention  of  the  court  Is  called  to  it  at  the  proper  time 
and  In  the  proper  manner. 

EQUITY-SUFFICIENCY  OF  COMPLAINT— THREAT- 
ENED INJURY.— A  complaint  in  equity  sufficiently  shows  a  threat- 
ened unlawful  invasion  of  plaintiff's  property  rights  when  it 
alleges  that  defendant  threatens  to  tear  down  a  partition  fence  sepa- 
rating his  and  plaintiff's  property;  that  such  act  would  result  in 
Irreparable  injury  to  plaintiff,  and  that  defendant  is  Insolvent  The 
objection  that  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy  being  waived,  such 
complaint  is  sufficient  to  maintain  an  action  to  restrain  the  threat- 
ened removal  of  the  fence. 

APPEAL— OBJECTION  TO  BILL  OF  EXCEPTIONS.— The 
objection  that  a  bill  of  exceptions  was  not  properly  settled,  not  hav- 
ing been  raised  in  the  appellate  court  before  the  hearing  on  the 
merits,  cannot  be  raised  later. 

Suit  in  equity  to  restrain  defendant  from  removing  a  parti- 
tion fence  dividing  plaintiff's  and  defendant's  property.  The 
complaint  alleged  the  ownership  by  plaintiff  and  defendant  of 
adjoining  premises,  the  character  of  the  fence  as  a  partition 
fence  and  its  maintenancre  for  over  twenty  years,  the  irreparable 
character  of  the  threatened  injury,  and  the  insolvency  of  defend- 
ant. Defendant  answered  denying  the  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint, and  upon  the  issues  so  made  the  case  came  to  trial.  De- 
fendant's objection  to  the  introduction  of  evidence  because  the 
•complaint  failed  to  show  an  equitable  cause  of  action  was  sua- 


904  HoFF  V.  Olson.  [Wisconsin^ 

tained,  and  plaintiff  was  denied  leave  to  amend.    Appeal  from, 
judgment  for  defendant. 

Higbee  &  Bunge,  for  the  appellant. 

Smith  &  Griffin,  for  the  respondent. 

**®  BAEDEEN,  J.  The  reason  usually  assigned  why  a  court 
of  equity  will  not  entertain  actions  of  this  kind  is  that  the  party 
seeking  to  prevent  the  threatened  injury  has  an  adequate  remedy 
at  law.  Beach  on  Injunctions,  section  1125,  says:  "The  inade- 
quacy of  the  legal  remedy  is  the  foundation  and  indispensable 
prerequisite  for  the  interposition  of  chancery  in  such  matters,. 
for  the  obvious  reason  that  a  legal  remedy  ^^^  has  been  devised 
to  redress  such  wrongs,  and,  so  long  as  the  law  provides  an  ade- 
quate remedy,  equity  has  no  right  to  interfere."  It  is  well  set- 
tled in  this  state,  however,  that  equity  will  interfere  in  such 
cases,  and  grant  the  desired  relief,  unless  the  plaintiff's  right 
thereto  is  contested  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  practice  in 
such  cases.  If  it  appears  on  the  face  of  the  complaint  that  the 
plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  a  demurrer  may  be  in- 
terposed. If  that  fact  is  not  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  plead- 
ing, or  the  defendant  is  in  doubt  as  to  its  sufficiency  in  that  re- 
spect, advantage  of  the  insufficiency  may  be  taken  by  answer.  If 
not  so  taken  by  demurrer  or  answer,  it  is  waived.  The  defect 
cannot  be  raised  by  demurrer  ore  tonus  at  the  trial.  This  court 
has  not,  however,  been  perfectly  consistent  in  its  rulings  in  that 
regard.  In  Tenney  v.  State  Bank,  20  Wis.  152,  Chief  Justice 
Dixon  inaccurately  spoke  of  the  objection  as  one  relating  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  says:  **We  hold  that  it  is  now  too 
late  to  object  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court.  The  defendant,  by 
answering  and  proceeding  to  trial  upon  the  merits,  waived  it.  It 
is  well  settled  that  the  objection  that  the  plaintiff  has  an  adequate 
remedy  at  law  must  be  taken  in  the  first  instance  by  answer." 
In  Peck  v.  School  Dist.  No.  4,  21  Wis.  616,  he  corrected  himself. 
He  says:  "The  ground  on  which  equity  refuses  to  take  cogni- 
zance of  and  proceed  in  such  cashes,  namely,  that  the  plaintiff  ha& 
an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  is  in  no  proper  sense  jurisdictional. 
The  court  has  power  to  hear  and  determine  the  action,  and  in 
general  will  do  so,  unless  objection  in  proper  form  be  taken. 
This  may  be  by  demurrer  to  the  complaint,  when  the  objection 
appears  upon  the  face  of  it;  otherwise  by  answer.  If  not  taken 
in  one  or  the  other  of  these  forms,  it  is  waived.  ....  This 


Nov.  1898.]  HoFF  V.  Olson.        .  905 

shows  that  it  is  not  a  question  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
over  the  subject  matter  of  the  action;  for,  where  that  is  wanting, 
it  is  well  known  that  no  consent  or  waiver  of  objection  by  the 
parties  will  confer  ^^^  it.  Such  an  objection  is  never  waived, 
but  may  be  taken  at  any  time,  either  on  appeal  or  when  the 
question  of  jurisdiction  is  collaterally  involved.  The  objection 
that  the  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy  at  law  is  no  more  than 
a  rule  of  practice  in  the  court  of  chancery,  upon  which  the  ac- 
tion will  be  dismissed  if  the  attention  of  the  court  is  called  to  it 
at  the  proper  time  and  in  the  proper  manner;  and,  although  it  is 
most  frequently  spoken  of  by  courts  and  writers  as  a  question  of 
jurisdiction,  it  is  strictly  inaccurate  to  call  it  so."  This  lan- 
guage is  quoted  with  approval  in  State  v.  Circuit  Court,  98  "Wis, 
143,  where  many  decisions  are  cited  as  sustaining  the  rule  thus 
laid  down. 

On  the  point  of  whether  the  objection  might  be  raised  by  de- 
murrer ore  tenus  taken  at  the  trial,  the  decisions  in  this  court 
are  somewhat  in  confusion,  although  the  later  rulings  are  uni- 
formly against  it.  In  Stein  v.  Benedict,  83  Wis.  603,  it  was  said 
that,  "upon  a  demurrer  ore  tenus  to  a  complaint  which  is  clearly 
intended  as  a  complaint  in  equity,  the  defendant  may  avail  him- 
self of  the  objection  that  the  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy 
at  law":  Citing  Kilboum  Lodge  v.  Kilbourn,  74  Wis.  452;  Avery 
V.  Eyan,  74  Wis.  691;  Denner  v,  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  67  Wis. 
218.  These  cases  hardly  sustain  the  proposition,  inasmuch  as 
the  decision  in  each  was  based  on  a  general  demurrer  to  the  com- 
plaint. The  cases  of  Becker  v.  Trickel,  80  Wis.  484,  Sherry  v. 
Smith,  72  Wis.  339,  Pierstoff  v.  Jorges,  86  Wis.  128,  39  Am.  St. 
Rep.  881,  Sweetser  v.  Silber,  87  Wis.  102,  Meyer  v.  Garthwaite, 
92  Wis.  671,  and.Bigelow  v.  Washburn,  98  Wis.  553,  are  s(juarely 
to  the  point  that  the  objection  must  be  taken  by  answer  or  de- 
murrer, or  it  is  waived.  Stein  v.  Benedict,  83  Wis.  603,  so  far  as 
it  holds  the  contrary  doctrine,  must  be  deemed  to  be  overruled. 
In  this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  notice  Smith  v.  Oconomo- 
woc,  49  Wis.  694,  which  was  an  action  to  restrain  the  defendant 
from  removing  a  fence  and  storm  door  in  front  of  plaintiff's 
building.  This  case  was  tried  on  its  merits,  and  on  appeal  ^** 
the  judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff  was  reversed,  on  the  ground 
that  a  court  of  equity  would  not  entertain  a  suit  to  prevent  a 
threatened  trespass,  without  first  having  the  legal  right  deter- 
mined in  an  action  at  law.  The  court  evidently  overlooked  or 
ignored  the  rule  of  waiver  of   this   objection,  as   hereinbefore 


^06  HoFP  V.  Olson.  [Wisconsin, 

■etated.  The  court  has  ample  power  and  will  exercise  it  in  such 
<;ases,  unless  due  and  timely  objection  is  taken  either  by  answer 
or  demurrer.  Proceeding  to  trial  without  having  made  the  ob- 
jection in  proper  form  is  a  full  and   complete  waiver   thereof. 

The  complaint  in  suit  states  sufficient  to  show  that  the  de- 
fendant threatens  an  unlawful  invasion  of  the  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty rights.  The  fence  in  question  is  alleged  to  be  on  the  line 
between  the  parties,  and  is  a  regular  partition  fence.  In  the  . 
•absence  of  allegation  as  to  a  legal  division  of  a  line  fence,  the 
presumption  as  to  ownership  is  that  it  is  the  common  property 
■of  the  adjoining  owners.  The  fact  that  the  fence  is  a  line  fence 
makes  it  unlawful  for  either  of  the  adjoining  owners,  as  against 
the  other,  to  remove  or  tear  it  down  without  giving  notice  as  re- 
quired by  section  1400  of  the  Eevised  Statutes  of  1878:  Saylea 
V.  Bemis,  57  Wis.  315.  It  is  possible  that  the  complaint  would 
have  been  open  to  the  objection  that  the  plaintiff  had  an  ade- 
quate legal  remedy,  had  the  objection  been  taken  by  demurrer 
■or  answer.  Failing  to  do  so,  it  was  waived,  and  the  court  should 
have  proceeded  to  try  and  determine  the  case. 

The  respondent  made  the  point  that  the  objection  to  the  com- 
plaint was  sustained  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  state  facts 
eufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action.  In  answer,  we  say  that 
we  must  be  governed  by  the  bill  of  exceptions.  The  bill,  after 
reciting  that  an  objection  had  been  interposed,  says:  "But  the 
said  judge  decided  that  the  objection  was  well  taken,  and  that 
no  evidence  would  be  received  to  prove  the  issues;  and  no  evi- 
dence was  received,  under  the  rulings  of  the  court,  on  the 
ground  that  said  complaint  does  not  state  ^^^  facts  sufficient  to 
■constitute  a  cause  of  action  entitling  the  plaintiff  to  equitable  re- 
lief, but  that  it  states  a  case  for  which  the  plaintiff  has  an  ade- 
quate remedy  at  law."  This  would  seem  to  be  a  sufficient  answer 
to  this  contention.  The  facts  stated,  together  with  the  alleged  in- 
fiolvency  of  the  defendant,  are  held  to  be  sufficient  to  permit  the 
plaintiff  to  maintain  this  action,  in  view  of  the  waiver  as  before 
etated. 

The  bill  of  exceptions  bears  the  certificate  of  the  circuit  judge. 
If  the  bill  was  not  properly  settled,  then  it  was  defendant's  duty 
to  have  moved  to  strike  it  out,  or  brought  the  fact  to  the  at- 
tention of  this  court  in  some  proper  way,  before  the  hearing  on 
the  merits.  He  cannot  be  permitted  to  take  advantage  of  any 
euch  technical  error  after  he  has  permitted  the  case  to  be  called 
for  final  determination. 


Nov.  1898.]    TiDiouTE  Savings  Bank  v.  Libbey.  907 

By  the  Court.  The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  is  reversed, 
and  th"  case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  according  to 
law. 


EQUITY-REMEDY  AT  LAW— DEMURRER  ORE  TENUS.— 
When  the  subject  matter  of  an  action  Is  of  equitable  cognizance,  a 
demurrer  ore  tenus  does  not  go  to  the  point  that  the  plaintiff  has 
an  adequate  remedy  at  law,  but  only  raises  the  question  whether 
the  complaint  states  a  cause  of  action  In  equity:  Pierstoff  v.  Jorgea, 
86  Wis.  128,  89  Am.  St.  Rep.  881,  and  note. 

EQUITY— ADEQUATE  LEGAL  REMEDY— PLEADING.— If  one 
sued  in  equity  wishes  to  avail  himself  of  a  defense  that  an  adequate 
remedy  exista  at  law,  he  must  plead  it:  Lough  v.  Outerbridge, 
143  N.  Y.  271,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  712.  And  a  court  of  chancery  will 
not  refuse  to  take  jurisdiction  of  a  case  merely  on  the  ground  that 
the  complainant  has  a  perfect  remedy  at  law,  if  the  parties  have 
submitted  themselves  to  the  jurisdiction  af  the  chancellor  without 
objection:  Bank  of  .Utica  v.  Utlca,  4  Paige,  399,  27  Am.  Dec  72; 
Bank  of  Utica  v.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528,  49  Am,  Dec.  189. 

EQUITY— PLEADING— COMPLAINT.— A  complainant  must 
state  in  his  bill  every  fact  showing  him  to  be  entitled  to  the  relief 
prayed  for:  Brown  v.  Wylie,  2  W.  Va.  502,  98  Am.  Dec  781. 


TiDiouTB  Savings  Bank  v.  Libbey. 

[101  Wisconsin,  193.] 

GUARANTY-ASSIGNABILITY.— A  guaranty  la  assignable 
with  the  obligations  secured  thereby,  and  goes  with  the  principal 
obligation.  It  Is  enforceable  by  the  same  persons  who  can  enforce 
the  principal  obligation. 

GUARANTY  —  SPECIAL  AND  GENERAL  DISTIN- 
GUISHED.—A  general  guaranty  is  one  for  acceptance  by  the 
public  generally.  A  special  guaranty  Is  limited  to  the  person  to 
whom  it  is  addressed,  and  usually  contemplates  a  trust  or  reposes 
a  confidence  in  some  person.  Such  a  guaranty  may  not  be  assign- 
Able  until  the  right  of  action  has  arisen  thereon. 

GUARANTY— ASSIGNMENT  OP  PRINCIPAL  OBLIGA- 
TION.—The  transfer  of  a  note  secured  by  a  general  continuing 
guaranty  carries  with  it  the  security  which  may  be  enforced  by 
the  transferee,  though  be  took  the  note  without  knowledge  of  the 
security. 

The  text  of  the  guaranty  sued  upon  was  as  follows:  "For  and 
in  consideration  of  the  sum  of  one  dollar  to  each  of  us  in  hand 
■paid,  and  in  consideration  of  the  granting  of  credit  and  discount 
by  W.  T.  Rickards  &  Co.,  of  Chicago,  Illinois,  to  the  Parson  & 
Libbey  Company,  a  corporation  of  Chicago,  Illinois,  we,  for  our- 
selves, and  for  our  heirs,  executors,  administrators,  and  assigns, 
<io  hereby  jointly  and  severally  guarantee  to  said  W.  T.  Rick- 


908  TiDiouTE  Savings  Bank  v.  Libbey.     [Wisconsin, 

ards  &  Co.,  their  heirs,  executors,  administrators,  and  assigns, 
the  payment  of  any  and  all  indebtedness  now  due,  or  hereafter 
to  become  due,  to  said  "W.  T.  Eickards  &  Co.,  their  heirs,  execu- 
tors, administrators,  or  assigns,  growing  out  of  or  occasioned  by 
any,  or  through  any,  act  or  acts  of  the  said  Farson  &  Libbey 
Company.  It  is  further  agreed  that  such  guaranty  shall  remain 
in  full  force  and  effect  in  respect  to  all  indebtedness  or  renewals 
thereof  now  existing  or  hereafter  to  accrue,  growing  out  of  any 
and  all  transactions  originating  prior  to  the  time  a  notice  in 
writing  of  the  cancellation  of  this  guaranty,  signed  by  either  of 
the  undersigned,  shall  be  received  by  said  W.  T.  Eickards  &  Co. 
It  is  provided,  however,  that  the  undersigned  shall  not  be  liable 
under  this  guaranty  for  an  amount  to  exceed  the  sum  of  twenty 
thousand  dollars  ($20,000).  The  undersigned  hereby  waive  no- 
tice of  the  acceptance  of  the  guaranty,  and  of  the  amount  of  the 
indebtedness  existing  from  time  to  time  from  said  Farson  & 
Libbey  Company  to  said  W.  T.  Eickards  &  Co."  Appeal  from 
judgment  for  plaintiffs. 

Barbers  &  Beglinger,  for  the  appellants. 

Thompson,  Harshaw  &  Thompson,  for  the  respondents. 

*®*'  BAEDEEN,  J.  A  guaranty  is  defined  to  be  "a  separate, 
independent  contract,  by  which  the  guarantor  undertakes,  for  a 
valuable  consideration,  to  be  answerable  for  the  payment  of  some 
particular  debt,  or  future  debts,  or  the  performance  of  some 
duty,  in  case  of  the  failure  of  another  person  primarily  liable  to 
pay  or  perform";  and  it  is  said  that  such  guaranty  is  assignable, 
with  the  obligation  secured  thereby,  and  that  it  goes  with  the 
principal  obligation,  and  is  enforceable  by  the  same  persons  who . 
can  enforce  that:  Colebrooke  on  Collateral  Securities,  sec.  353; 
Ellsworth  V.  Harmon,  101  111.  274;  Claflin  v.  Ostrom,  54  N.  Y. 
581;  Stillman  v.  Northrup,  109  N.  Y.  475;  Everson  v.  Gere,  122 
N.  Y.  290;  Lane  v.  Duchac,  73  Wis.  655;  W.  W.  Kimball  Co.  v. 
Mellon,  80  Wis.  143.  The  rule  is,  that  the  transfer  of  a  note 
carries  with  it  all  security  without  any  formal  assignment  or  de- 
livery, or  even  mention  of  the  latter:  Carpenter  v.  Longan,  16 
Wall.  271;  Croft  v.  Bunster,  9  Wis.  503.  A  general  guaranty  is 
one  open  for  acceptance  by  the  public  generally.  A  special 
guaranty  is  limited  to  the  person  to  whom  it  is  addressed,  and 
usually  contemplates  a  trust  or  reposes  a  confidence  in  such  per- 
son. Such  a  guaranty  may  not  be  assignable  until  the  right  of 
action  has  arisen  thereon:  Jex  v.  Straus,  122  N.  Y.  293,  distin- 


Kov.  1898.]     TiDiouTE  Savings  Bank  v.  Libbey.  909 

gnishing  Evansville  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kaufmann,  93  N.  Y.  273;  45 
Am.  Eep.  204.  The  main  contention  of  the  defendants  in  the 
present  case  is,  that  the  guaranty  upon  which  the  action  is 
founded  is  special,  and  limited  to  W.  T.  Rickards  &  Co.,  and  was 
not  available  to  the  plaintiffs,  their  assignees.  We  do  not  think 
that  the  construction  of  the  guaranty  in  question  can  be  thus 
fairly  restricted.  We  think  that  the  guaranty,  except  as  ex- 
pressly limited  by  its  terms,  ^^"^  was  a  general,  continuing  one. 
The  defendants  executed  the  contract  of  guaranty  "in  consider- 
ation of  the  sum  of  one  dollar  to  each  of  us  in  hand  paid,  and  in 
consideration  of  the  granting  of  credit  and  discount  by  W.  T. 
Hickards  &  Co.  to  the  Farson  &  Libbey  Company,"  in  which  the 
defendants  were  jointly  and  severally  interested  as  owners  of  all 
or  of  a  large  proportion  of  the  capital  stock  thereof,  and  in 
whose  success  they  were,  and  each  of  them  was,  particularly  and 
financially  interested.  In  other  words,  they  gave  the  guaranty 
to  secure  the  indebtedness  on  which  the  action  is  founded,  for 
the  benefit  and  advantage  of  a  company  in  which  they  were 
themselves  thus  interested.  The  Farson  &  Libbey  Company 
were  anxious  to  realize  on  the  notes  in  suit;  took  the  same  to  W. 
T.  Rickards  &  Co.,  and  negotiated,  sold,  and  delivered  the  same 
to  that  company;  and  it  granted  to  said  Farson  &  Libbey  Com- 
pany credit,  discounted  such  notes,  and  paid  it  therefor  the  full 
value  and  amount  thereof,  less  interest  and  brokerage.  The 
transfer  of  these  notes  to  the  plaintiffs  carried  with  it,  by  opera- 
tion of  law,  all  securities  for  their  payment.  The  debt  is  the 
principal  thing,  and  the  securities  are  only  an  incident.  The 
transfer  of  the  former,  therefore,  carries  with  it  the  right  to 
the  securities,  and  amounts  to  an  equitable  assignment  of  them. 
No  matter  what  the  form  of  the  security  is,  whether  a  real  estate 
<jr  chattel  mortgage,  or  a  pledge  of  collateral  notes,  bonds,  or 
other  personal  property,  the  purchaser  of  the  principal  takes  with 
it  the  right  to  resort  to  these  securities;  and  this  is  so,  although 
the  assignment  or  transfer  does  not  mention  them.  The  reason 
of  this  rule,  within  all  the  authorities,  seems  to  be  that  when 
the  mortgagee  transfers  the  debt,  without  assigning  the  mortgage 
or  other  security,  he  becomes  a  trustee,  and  holds  the  security 
for  the  benefit  of  the  owner  of  the  note,  and  the  latter  may  en- 
force the  trust.  The  debtor  is  in  no  wise  injured  by  such  rule. 
He  has  agreed  that  the  security  shall  stand  for  the  payment  of 
the  debt,  and  it  is  of  *®®  no  consequence  to  him  to  whom  it  is 
paid.    He  has  to  pay  it  but  once. 


910  TiDiouTE  Savings  Bank  v.  Libbey.     [Wisconsin, 

The  guaranty  is  to  pay  any  and  all  indebtedness  to  said  W.  T. 
Eickards  &  Co.,  their  heirs,  executors,  administrators,  and  "as- 
signs," incurred  by  Farson  &  Libbey  Company.  It  is  said  that 
the  word  "assigns"  means  substantially  nothing  in  this  connec- 
tion; that  it  is  a  mere  formal  phrase.  We  cannot  so  regard  it. 
It  either  means  that  the  defendants  were  to  guarantee  this  pa- 
per in  the  hands  of  any  assignee  of  Eickards  &  Co.,  or  it  means 
absolutely  nothing.  Eickards  &  Co.  were  bankers  and  brokers. 
Their  business  was  dealing  in  commercial  paper,  both  buying 
and  selling  it,  all  of  which  defendants  well  knew.  Their  pur- 
pose in  giving  this  guaranty  was  to  give  to  the  Farson  &  Libbey 
Company  a  credit  of  twenty  thousand  dollars  with  these  brok- 
ers. It  was  perfectly  natural,  therefore,  that  the  brokers  desired 
to  have  this  paper  protected,  not  only  in  their  hands,  but  in  the 
hands  of  their  customers.  We  conclude,  therefore,  that  this 
phrase  was  an  apt  one  to  express  the  real  intention  of  the  par- 
ties, and  that  it  means  precisely  what  it  says.  Eickards  &  Co. 
hold  the  security  for  these  notes  in  trust,  and  the  purchasers  of 
the  notes  are  entitled  to  enforce  the  trust.  The  guaranty  waa 
given  for  the  payment  of  these  notes,  among  others,  and,  within 
the  rule  of  the  authorities,  it  would  seem  that  the  purchasers 
from  Eickards  &  Co.  have  the  right  to  resort  to  the  guaranty. 

The  fact  that  the  Tidioute  Savings  Bank  did  not  know  of 
the  existence  of  this  guaranty  at  the  time  it  purchased  the  City 
Sash  &  Door  Company  note  is  of  no  significance.  The  securi- 
ties pledged  for  a  debt  follow  it,  in  equity,  no  matter  how  the 
debt  be  modified  or  into  whose  hands  it  may  come.  Until  the 
debt  is  paid,  the  pledge  accompanies  it,  and  remains  for  its  pay- 
ment, and  is  available  to  all  who  may  acquire  title  thereto:  Cole- 
brooke  on  Collateral  Securities,  sec.  79;  Stearns  v.  Bates,  46 
Conn.  306.  The  guaranty  in  question  was  given  to  secure  the 
payment  of  any  and  all  indebtedness  ***®  due,  or  thereafter  to 
become  due,  to  Eickards.  &  Co.,  or  their  assigns,  "growing  out  of 
or  occasioned  by  any  or  through  any  act  or  acts  of  the  said  Far- 
son  &  Libbey  Company.''  The  defendant  used  apt  words  to 
make  the  guaranty  impersonal,  so  far  as  the  holders  of  the  debts 
60  created  are  concerned.  They  executed  and  delivered  a  con- 
tract for  all  the  debts  created  by  the  Farson  &  Libbey  Company 
to  Eickards  &  Co.  within  the  amount  limited,  which  became  an 
incident  to  each  such  debt,  and  which  passed  to  the  bank  pro 
rata,  upon  its  purchase  of  the  note,  even  though  it  may  not  have 
known  of  its  existence  at  that  time:  Keyes  v.  Wood,  21  Vt.  331; 


Nov.  1898.]       Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Ca  911 

Evertson  v.  Booth,  19  Johns.  486.  To  require  the  defendants, 
to  pay  these  notes  is  but  to  require  them  to  fulfill  their  prom- 
ise. It  entails  no  hardship  and  creates  no  obligation  beyond  th& 
plain  tenor  of  their  contract. 

The  argument  that  the  guaranty  was  personal  with  Eickards^ 
&  Co.,  as  imposing  special  trust  and  confidence  in  the  members^ 
of  that  firm,  falls  of  its  own  weight.  A  bare  reference  to  the 
paper  itself  would  seem  to  dispel  any  such  illusion.  The  case 
of  Evansville  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kaufmann,  93  N.  Y.  274,  45  Am. 
Eep.  204,  falls  far  short  of  sustaining  their  contention. 

On  the  whole  case,  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  court  meets  with 
our  entire  approval. 

The  greater  portion  of  this  opinion  was  prepared  by  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Pinney  before  his  sickness  and  resignation.  To  him  credit 
is  due  accordingly. 

By  the  Court.  The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  in  both 
cases  is  afi&rmed. 


GUARANTY— ASSTGNABILITT— RIGHT  OF  ACTION.— A  valia 
contract  of  guaranty,  Indorsed  upon  a  writing  which  la  obligatory, 
passes  by  assignment  to  the  assignee,  and  vesta  In  him  a  right  of 
action  In  his  own  name  against  the  guarantor:  KlUian  v.  Ashley,  24- 
Ark.  511,  91  Am.  Dec.  519. 

GUARANTY— ASSIGNMENT  OF  PRINCIPAL  OBLIGATION.- 
If  a  person  guarantees  the  payment  to  a  corporation  of  any  and  all 
Indebtedness  or  liability  then  or  thereafter  owing  to  It  from  an- 
other designated  person,  and  notes  subsequently  executed  by  the 
latter  to  the  former  are  assigned  by  him  together  with  all  the  se- 
curities he  may  hold  securing  any  property  or  indebtedness,  the  as- 
signee is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  guaranty,  and  may  malntala 
an  action  thereon  against  the  guarantor:  Anchor  Invest.  Co.  v.  Kirk- 
Patrick.  68  Minn.  378,  50  Am.  St  Rep.  417,  and  note. 


Gebbn  V,  Ashland  Water  Company. 

(101  Wisconsin,  25S.] 

WATER  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  DISTRIBUTINO 
POLLUTED  WATER— WARRANTY  OF  QUALITY.— A  water 
company  engaged  in  distributing  water  for  compensation  does  not 
Impliedly  warrant  the  quality  of  the  water  carried  and  distributed. 

WATER  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  DISTRIBUTING 
POLLUTED  WATER— KNOWLEDGE  OF  PERSON  USING  SUCH 
WATER.— A  water  company  which  knowingly  distributes  water 
which,  from  a  cause  not  discoverable  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
care.  Is  dangerous  for  domestic  use,  It  owes  the  duty  to  Its  custom- 
ers of  disclosing  such  danger,  and  a  failure  to  do  so  is  fraud  la 


S12  Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.       [Wisconsin, 

iaw,  rendering  the  company  liable  to  any  person  injured  thereby 
without  fault  on  his  part,  and  the  failure  of  duty  amounts  to  action- 
able negligence,  to  which  the  same  liability  is  incident.  But  if  the 
person  injured  used  the  water  with  knowledge,  actual  or  construc- 
tive, of  Its  dangerous  condition,  no  liability  attaches  to  the  com- 
pany. 

WATER  COMPANIES-LIABILITY  FOR  DISTRIBUTING 
POLLUTED  WATER— EVIDENCE  OF  SUBSEQUENT  PRECAU- 
TIONS.—In  an  action  against  a  water  company  for  the  death  of  a 
person,  occasioned  by  using  impure  water  furnished  by  it,  it  is  im- 
proper to  admit  evidence  that  greater  precautions  were  talien  by 
the  defendant,  after  the  occurrence  complained  of  to  secure  pure 
water,  than  were  taken  before. 

EVIDENCE— SITUATION  EXISTING  AFTER  INJURY 
'COMPLAINED  OF.— In  an  action  against  a  water  company  for 
death  occasioned  by  the  use  of  impure  water  furnished  by  the  de- 
fendant, it  is  error  to  admit  evidence  of  experts  as  to  tests  made 
•of  the  water  some  time  after  the  occurrence  complained  of. 

WITNESSES  —  EXPERTS  —  OPINION  EVIDENCE.  — 

Where  it  is  sought  to  recover  from  a  water  company  for  death  from 
typhoid  fever,  which  disease,  it  is  alleged,  was  communicated  to 
the  deceased  by  impure  water  furnished  by  the  defendant  company, 
expert  witnesses  should  not  be  permitted  to  give  opinions  going  to 
the  question  of  how  the  disease  was  contracted,  based  upon  the  Evi- 
dence introduced  upon  that  question,  such  evidence  being  contra- 
-dictory. 

WITNESSES  —  EXPERTS  —  PHYSICIANS  —  CAUSE  OF 
DEATH.— The  rule  that  a  physician  may  testify  as  to  the  cause  of 
•death,  from  personal  examination  or  knowledge,  extends  no  farther 
than  the  immediate  cause  of  death,  and  not  to  what  set  the  cause  in 
motion. 

EVIDENCE— OPINION  OF  WITNESSES.- In  an  action 
against  a  water  company  for  Injury  occasioned  by  the  defendant's 
furnishing  impure  water,  it  is  not  proper  to  admit  opinion  evi- 
dence as  to  the  duty  of  the  defendant  with  reference  to  testing  the 
water  supply. 

WATER  COMPANIES-LIABILITY  FOR  FURNISHING 
IMPURE  WATER— EVIDENCE.— Where  it  Is  sought  to  Impose 
upon  a  water  company  a  liability  for  Injuries  occasioned  by  Impure 
water  furnished  by  it,  it  Is  error  to  admit  in  evidence  newspaper 
■comments  generally  irrelevant  to  the  issue,  and  of  a  sort  tending 
to  prejudice  the  jury  against  the  defendant. 

WATER  COMPANIES— IMPURE  WATEI^-CONTRIBU- 
TORY  NEGLIGENCE  IN  USING.— Where  It  has  been  for  some  time 
A  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  water  furnished  by  a  water 
company  is  dangerously  impure,  it  will  be  presumed  that  a  person 
of  average  intelligence  living  in  the  community  had  notice  of  such 
fact,  and,  unless  such  presumption  is  rebutted,  he  will  be  deemed 
;guilty  of  contributory  negligence  if  he  uses  such  water. 

Action  to  recover  damages  for  the  death  of  plaintiff's  intestate 
alleged  to  have  been  caused  by  negligence  on  defendant's  part, 
in  that  it  failed  and  neglected  to  extend  its  intake  pipe  into 
■Chequamegon  bay  from  time  to  time  as  needed  to  secure  water 
free  from  sewage  contamination  as  required  by  its  contract  with 
the  municipality  of  Ashland.    It  is  claimed  that  owing  to  such. 


Nov.  1898.]       Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.  913 

breach  of  duty,  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  through  using  the  wat^r 
furnished  by  defendant,  contracted  typhoid  fever,  from  which 
lie  died.     Appeal  from  a  judgment  for  plaintiff. 

Tomkins  &  Merrill  and  Lamoreux  &  Shea,  for  the  appellants. 

Gate,  Sanborn,  Lamoreux  &  Park,  for  the  respondent. 

*^  MARSHALL,  J.  This  action  was  brought,  tried,  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury,  and  went  to  judgment,  upon  the  theory,  ap- 
parently, that  a  recovery  was  claimed  for  the  death  of  plaintiff's 
intestate  on  the  ground  of  actionable  negligence  of  defendant. 
Something  is  said  in  the  briefs  of  counsel  about  the  rule,  so 
called,  of  implied  warranty  in  the  sale  of  provisions  for  imme- 
diate domestic  use,  as  if  that  rule  might  apply  to  the  facts.  It 
is  not  necessary  to  consider  that  theory  because  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  case  was  tried  and  submitted,  as  indicated,  though 
it  is  proper,  and  deemed  advisable  as  a  guide  in  future  proceed- 
ings, to  discuss  it.  The  doctrine  of  Sir  William  Blackstone  that 
there  is  a  warranty  of  the  wholesomeness  of  provisions  sold  for 
domestic  use  by  the  buyer,  and  that  the  vendor  is  bound  to  know 
their  quality  in  that  regard  at  his  peril,  is  controverted  by  the 
vreight  of  authority  in  this  country  and  England.  Liability  for 
damages  in  the  circumstances  mentioned  is  supported,  but  on 
the  ground  of  deceit,  not  contract.  It  would  be  interesting, 
and  probably  constitute  a  valuable  addition  to  our  jurisprudence, 
to  have  the  true  nature  of  that  liability  definitely  decided  here. 
The  writer  is  not  familiar  with  any  case  where  ***  the  point  has 
been  so  presented  and  decided  that  the  result  stands  as  a  bind- 
ing adjudication  on  the  subject,  though  there  are  dicta  here  and| 
there  recognizing  the  rule  stated  by  Blackstone  as  one  prevailing 
in  this  country  generally:  Getty  v.  Eountree,  2  Pinn.  379;  54 
Am.  Dec.  138;  Williams  v.  Slaughter,  3  Wis.  347. 

There  is  a  strong  reason  for  holding  that  caveat  emptor  ap- 
plies to  the  purchases  of  provisions  for  domestic  use  the  same 
as  to  purchases  of  other  articles,  in  the  absence  of  express  con- 
tract or  of  fraud;  that  the  only  difference  is  that  the  situation 
and  relation  of  the  parties  in  the  one  case  raises  an  inference 
of  artifice,  while  in  the  other  it  does  not.  In  Emerson  v.  Brig- 
ham,  10  Mass.  197,  6  Am.  Dec.  109,  it  is  said,  in  substance,  that 
the  mistake  of  Blackstone  was  in  treating  deceit  and  fraud  as 
breach  of  implied  contract;  that  artifice  must  be  established  as 
the  foundation  of  liability,  and  without  it  no  liability  in  the 

AM.  8k.  Rkp.,  \  ou  LXX.-W 


914  Geeen  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.       [Wisconsin, 

nature  of  that  on  an  implied  warranty  exists  in  case  of  the  sale 
of  provisions  any  more  than  in  the  sale  of  any  other  article; 
that  the  sale  of  provisions  for  a  sound  price  for  immediate  con- 
sumption involves  a  representation  of  wholesomeness,  and  knowl- 
edge of  the  falsehood,  if  falsehood  there  be,  is  presumed  from 
the  nature  of  the  transaction  and  duties  growing  out  of  the 
trade;  that  the  inference  of  fraud  arises  from  the  necessities  of 
the  situation,  and  to  the  deceit  attaches  the  liability.  That  was 
affirmed  in  Winsor  v.  Lombard,  18  Pick.  57,  where  Chief  Justice 
Shaw  stated,  in  effect,  that  the  supposition  as  to  the  rule  of  im- 
plied warranty  existing  in  the  sale  of  provisions  any  more  than 
in  the  sale  of  other  articles,  is  founded  in  failure  to  distinguish 
between  a  rule  of  evi(tence  and  a  rule  of  law,  as  explained  in 
Mr.  Justice  Sewall's  opinion  in  Emerson  v.  Brigham,  10  Mass. 
197;  6  Am.  Dec.  109.  In  Moses  v.  Mead,  1  Denio,  378,  45 
Am.  Dec.  676,  Bronson,  C.  J.,  speaking  on  the  same  subject, 
said  that  the  dictum  of  Blackstone  cannot  be  supported  in  its 
full  extent;  that  the  liability  can  be  supported,  but  on  the 
ground  of  deceit,  citing  Emerson  v.  Brigham,  10  Mass.  197,  6 
Am.  Dec.  109,  with  approval,  and  distinguishing  Van  Bracklin 
V.  2««  Fonda,  13  Johns.  468,  7  Am.  Dec.  339,  a  leading  case 
often  cited  to  the  implied  warranty  theory  and  as  sustaining  the 
dictum  of  Blackstone.  A  careful  reading  of  it  shows  that  the 
sale  considered  was  with  actual  knowledge  of  the  vendor  of  the 
unwholesomeness  of  the  article.  He  was  guilty  of  a  fraud  and 
liable  on  that  ground,  and  that  was  the  real  foundation  of  the 
recovery.  See,  further,  to  the  same  effect,  Giroux  v.  Stedman, 
145  Mass.  439,  1  Am.  St.  Eep.  472,  and  Bumby  v.  Bollett,  IS 
Mees.  &  W.  644.  A  careful  examination  of  the  text-books  on 
this  subject  shows  that  the  writers  reason  along  the  line  of  Em- 
erson V.  Brigham,  10  Mass.  197,  6  Am.  Dec.  109,  and  the  other 
cases  cited:  Benjamin  on  Sales,  ed.  1892,  647;  Biddle  on  War- 
ranties, sees.  193-204;  2  Schouler  on  Personal  Property,  sec.  348; 
10  Am.  &  Eng.  Ency.  of  Law,  157. 

Courts  in  recent  years  have  not  been  inclined  to  add  new  ex- 
ceptions to  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor,  or  to  extend  those  already 
established.  It  once  applied  to  all  sales  of  personal  property, 
with  the  one  exception  of  warranty  of  title.  Many  exceptions 
have  since  been  added,  presumably  under  the  influence  of  the 
civil  law,  where  the  rule  was  caveat  venditor,  a  rule  as  harsh  to 
the  seller  as  that  of  the  common  law  to  the  buyer.  Each  ex- 
ception in  the  development  of  our  system  paved  the  way  for 


Nov,  1898.]       Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.  9J5 

another,  and  that  for  still  another,  as  the  exigencies  of  particu- 
lar situations  seemed  to  require,  in  order  to  harmonize  moral 
with  legal  obligations,  till  the  rule  itself  ceased  to  be  the  safe 
and  simple  guide  it  was  when  Justice  Popham,  in  pronouncing 
the  law  in  his  time,  said,  "If  I  have  commodities  which  are 
damaged,  whether  victuals  or  otherwise,  and  I,  knowing  them 
to  be  so,  sell  them  for  good  and  affirm  them  to  be  so,  an  action 
upon  the  case  lies  for  deceit;  and  although  they  be  damaged, 
if  I,  knowing  not  that,  affirm  them  to  be  good,  still  no  action 
lies  without  I  warrant  them  to  be  good."  That  a  more  enlight- 
ened sense  of  justice  has  softened  and  limited  that  rigorous  rule 
is  by  no  means  to  be  regretted;  but  if  a  written  system  of  laws 
is  to  be  preserved  at  all,  and  the  science  of  the  law  is  to  be  found 
*®*  therein,  so  many  exceptions  and  limitations  of  a  principle 
should  not  be  recognized  as  to  practically  obscure  it.  To  the 
one  implied  warranty  of  title,  with  which  the  rule  of  the  com- 
mon law,  as  indicated,  commenced,  has  been  added  that  in  case 
of  a  sale  by  sample,  warranty  of  general  character  where  the 
chattel  is  not  present  and.  subject  to  inspection,  warranty  of 
manufactured  goods  as  to  merchantable  quality,  warranty  that 
manufactured  goods  sold  for  a  particular  purpose  are  reasonably 
suitable  therefor,  and  perhaps  some  others.  None  of  the 
changes,  however,  have  taken  place  in  recent  times,  and  as  the 
remedy  is  ample  to  protect  against  frauds  on  the  part  of  vendors 
where  the  vendees  use  reasonable  care  in  looking  after  their  own 
interests,  our  system,  without  further  changes,  is  probably  as 
perfect  to  the  end  that  even-handed  justice  between  individuals 
may  be  guaranteed,  as  it  can  reasonably  be. 

In  the  light  of  the  foregoing,  no  reason  is  perceived  for  say- 
ing that  a  mere  distributor  of  water  for  a  compensation  should 
be  held  liable  as  a  guarantor  of  its  quality.  It  is  not  a  com- 
modity kept  for  sale  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  but  is  free 
to  everyone,  in  nature's  reservoirs,  like  light  and  air.  It  is  taken 
directly  or  indirectly  from  a  common  source  of  supply.  The  im- 
mediate source,  as  in  this  case,  is  usually  selected  in  advance 
and  fixed  by  contract,  leaving  the  mere  service  of  a  carrier  to  be 
performed,  of  taking  the  water  from  such  source  and  distributing 
it  to  the  consumers.  To  say  that  the  person  or  corporation  per- 
forming that  service  shall  be  burdened  with  an  implied  warranty 
of  the  quality  of  the  thing  carried  and  distributed,  would  be 
treating  the  transaction  as  a  sale,  strictly  so  called,  and  then  ap- 
plying an  exception  to  the  doctrine  of  caveat  emptor  not  sup- 


916  Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.      [Wisconsin, 

ported  "by  good  reason,  or  any  anthority  we  are  able  to  find,  or 
any  to  which  our  attention  has  been  called.  It  would  burden 
such  public  service  in  a  way  that  would  be  destructive  of  private 
enterprise  in  that  line,  and  render  public  enterprise  ^^'^  in  the 
same  direction  so  attended  with  dangers  as  to  discourage  a  ser- 
vice that  has  become  a  necessity  in  all  communities  of  any  con- 
siderable size,  and  which  promotes  to  a  high  degree  the  welfare 
and  happiness  of  individuals  in  communities,  great  or  small.  If 
distributors  of  water  under  public  franchises  be  held  strictly 
accountable  for  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care  not  to  place  before 
their  customers  an  unwholesome  article  under  circumstances 
liable  to  induce  persons  in  the  exQrcise  of  ordinary  care,  to  use 
it  for  drinking  or  other  domestic  purposes  in  ignorance  of  the 
dangers  attending  the  use,  and  held  liable  for  deceit  in  such 
transactions,  and  the  law  be  firmly  administered  along  thos'e 
lines,  the  safety  of  individuals,  as  affected  by  public  water  ser- 
vice, will  be  as  well  promoted  as  is  consistent  with  the  continu- 
ance of  such  service,  whether  performed  by  strictly  public  or  by 
quasi  public  agencies. 

From  the  foregoing  it  will  be  seen  that  if  a  recovery  can  be 
sustained  on  the  facts  of  this  case  at  all,  it  must  be  on  the 
ground  of  actionable  fraud  or  negligence  without  contributory 
fault  on  the  part  of  the  deceased.  If  defendant  knew,  or  from 
the  situation  ought  to  have  known,  the  water  it  was  distributing 
in  the  city  of  Ashland  was  dangerous  for  domestic  use,  from 
some  cause  not  discoverable  ordinarily  by  the  exercise  of  reason- 
able care,  it  owed  the  duty  to  its  customers  of  disclosing  that 
danger,  and  a  failure  so  to  do,  knowing  that  such  customers  were 
liable  to  use  the  water  through  ignorance  of  its  character,  waa 
a  fraud  in  law,  rendering  the  defendant  liable  to  legal  damages 
to  any  person  injured  by  such  fraud  without  fault  on  his  part, 
and  it  was  also  a  failure  of  duty  amounting  to  actionable  negli- 
gence as  well,  to  which  the  same  liability  is  incident.  The  mere 
fact,  if  it  be  a  fact,  that  it  had  been  rendered  impracticable  for 
defendant  to  procure  a  supply  of  wholesome  water  in  Chequa- 
megon  bay,  as  required  by  the  contract  with  the  city,  from  causes 
attributable  to  the  municipality,  though  constituting  *®®  a  de- 
fense against  any  action  on  its  contract  with  the  city  or  to  forfeit 
its  franchise,  does  not  excuse  knowingly  pumping  contaminated 
water  from  the  bay  and  distributing  the  same  to  customers  and 
deceiving  them  into  the  belief  that  it  was  wholesome.  But,  aa 
indicated,  though  the  conduct  of  the  defendant  be  held  wrong- 


Nov.  1898.]       Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.  917 

ful  on  the  ground  of  either  fraud  or  negligence,  if  the  deceased 
knew,  or  under  the  circumstances  ought  to  have  known,  the 
dangerous  condition  of  the  water,  yet  used  it  with  the  conse- 
quence complained  of,  no  legal  liability  thereby  attached  to  the 
defendant.  If  the  deceased  knew,  and  he  is  charged  with  knowl- 
edge of  what  a  man  of  ordinary  intelligence  under  the  circum- 
stances ought  to  have  known,  then  he  was  not  deceived,  what- 
ever may  have  been  the  conduct  of  the  defendant;  and  for  the 
same  reason  he  is  chargeable  with  contributing  to  the  result  com- 
plained of  by  his  own  want  of  care.  So,  plaintiff's  cause  of  ac- 
tion, if  any  there  be,  sounds  in  tort  however  we  may  look  at  it, 
and  knowledge,  or  its  equivalent,  on  the  part  of  the  defendant, 
.and  want  of  such  knowledge  or  equivalent  on  the  part  of  the 
deceased,  is  essential  to  legal  liability  in  the  one  case  as  well  as 
the  other,  the  only  difference  being  in  the  manner  of  establish- 
ing the  fault  of  the  deceased,  the  affirmative  of  that  being  on 
the  complainant  if  a  recovery  be  sought  on  the  ground  of  fraud, 
and  on  the  defendant  if  on  the  ground  of  actionable  negligence. 
The  distinction  between  the  two  is  exceedingly  shadowy,  and 
really  not  important  in  the  practical  application  of  principles. 

The  foregoing  discussion  and  statement  is  deemed  justified,  if 
not  called  for,  by  the  positions  taken  by  counsel.  If  some  of 
the  principles  contended  for  were  applied  on  a  new  trial  of  the 
case,  and  it  resulted  favorably  to  the  plaintiff,  the  misfortune 
of  a  reversal  might  probably  follow.  The  danger  in  that  regard 
may  be  avoided,  guided  by  what  has  been  said. 

In  considering  the  specific  errors  assigned,  it  appears  *®®  most 
logical  to  first  take  up  the  rulings  complained  of  on  the  admis- 
sion of  evidence.  First  in  order  is  that  admitting  proof  that 
greater  precautions  to  obtain  pure  water  were  taken  by  the  de- 
fendant after  the  occurrence  complained  of  than  before.  If  de- 
fendant in  fact  knew  the  water  supply  was  dangerously  con- 
taminated, the  fact  that  it  subsequently  took  means  to  correct 
the  evil,  as  we  have  seen,  is  immaterial  on  that  question, 
but  the  question  of  whether  the  water  was  impure,  and  whether 
defendant  negligently  failed  to  remedy  the  difficulty,  were 
material,  and  determinable  solely  by  the  situation  prior  to 
the  occurrence  complained  of.  What  was  done  afterward  had 
no  legitimate  bearing  on  that  question,  and  the  Jury  had  no 
right  to  draw  any  inference  therefrom.  Such  evidence  has  been 
repeatedly  condemned  by  this  and  other  courts:  Castello  v. 
Landwehr,  28  Wis.  522;  Anderson  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  87 


918  Gbeen  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.      [Wisconsin, 

Wis.  195;  Downey  v.  Sawyer,  157  Meiss,  418;  Columbia  etc.,E.  R. 
Co.  V.  Hawthorne,  144  U.  S.  202;  Baird  v.  Daly,  68  N.  Y.  547; 
Nalley  v.  Hartford  Carpet  Co.,  51  Conn.  524;  50  Am.  Rep.  47; 
Terre  Haute  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clem,  123  Ind.  15;  18  Am.  St.  Rep. 
303;  Hodges  v.  Percival,  132  111.  53;  Hudson  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  59  Iowa,  581;  44  Am.  Rep.  692;  Motey  v.  Pickle  etc.  Co., 
74  Fed.  Rep.  155. 

What  has  been  said  on  the  subject  of  evidence  of  precautions 
against  sewage  contamination  after  the  occurrence  complained 
of,  applies  to  evidence  of  experts,  received  against  defendant's 
objection,  as  to  tests  made  of  water  taken  from  the  bay  some 
time  after  such  occurrence.  For  aught  that  appears,  the  water 
may  have  been  wholesome  in  the  early  part  of  March,  1894,  and 
very  unwholesome  when  the  subsequent  tests  were  made.  'The 
evidence  shows  that  the  deceased  took  the  fever  about  the  1st 
of  March,  and  that  the  height  of  the  typhoid  fever  epidemic 
was  not  reached  till  the  last  of  that  month,  there  being  several 
hundred  persons  afflicted  in  all.  Under  the  circumstances,  suf- 
ficient time  had  elapsed  for  a  material  change  in  the  bay  water 
to  have  taken  ^"^^  place.  The  admission  of  the  evidence  was 
plainly  prejudicial  error.  True,  evidence  of  a  situation  existing 
after  an  injury,  though  a  considerable  time  may  have  elapsed, 
is  admissible  to  show  the  situation  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
injury,  if  preceded  by  prima  facie  proof  that  no  change  has  taken 
place  in  the  meantime:  Tremblay  v.  Harnden,  162  Mass.  383. 
Here  that  preliminary  proof  not  only  was  wanting,  but  there  was 
a  strong  case  to  the  contrary  made  by  the  evidence. 

It  is  further  assigned  for  error  that  the  court  allowed  opinion, 
evidence  as  to  facts  in  issue — the  evidentiary  facts  (not  for  sci- 
entific controversy)  relating  thereto  being  in  dispute — contrary 
to  the  settled  law  on  the  subject,  and  as  declared  in  numerous 
decisions  in  this  court,  and  recently  stated  in  Maitland  v.  Gil- 
bert Paper  Co.,  97  Wis.  476;  65  Am.  St.  Rep.  137.  The  follow- 
ing are  some  of  the  questions  complained  of:  "You  may  state 
whether  or  not,  in  your  opinion,  the  water  furnished  by  the 
Ashland  Water  Company  during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1894 
had  anything  to  do  with  the  typhoid  fever  epidemic  which  pre- 
vailed in  the  city  of  Ashland  during  that  time?'*  "What,  in 
your  judgment,  was  the  cause  of  the  typhoid  fever  of  which  he 
[Green]  died?"  "You  say  the  typhoid  fever,  in  this  case,  in 
your  opinion,  was  caused  by  drinking  bay  water:  Do  you  say  that 
from  the  investigations  you  made?"     All  the  questions  were  an- 


Nov.  1898.]      Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.  919 

48wered  in  the  affirmative.  The  learned  counsel  for  respondent 
€ay,  in  support  of  the  questions,  that  they  were  proper  because 
the  effect  of  evidence  produced  in  establishing  controverted 
facts,  on  which  opinions  were  given,  was  not  involved — that  such 
facts  were  not  in  dispute.  We  are  unable  to  see  the  case  that 
way..  How  can  it  be  said  the  question  was  established  beyond 
controversy  that  the  deceased  did  not  drink  other  than  bay 
water?  Let  it  be  admitted  that  up  to  within  four  days  from  the 
time  he  was  stricken  with  the  disease,  bay  water  was  used  at 
his  working  place  as  well  as  at  his  home.  ^"^^  How  can  it  be 
assumed  from  that  alone  that  he  did  not  drink  water  elsewhere 
or  come  in  contact  with  some  other  medium  whereby  the  seeds 
of  the  disease  were  taken  into  his  system?  As  to  each  of  these 
points,  if  the  evidence  was  such  as  to  remove  it  from  the  realms 
of  mere  conjecture,  certainly  it  was  not  established  in  plaintiff's 
favor  so  as  to  warrant  taking  it  from  the  jury,  and,  if  not,  cer- 
tainly the  expert  could  not  properly  pass  upon  the  evidence  in 
giving  his  opinion.  All  the  facts  on  which  the  opinions  were 
given,  except  that  Green  died  of  typhoid  fever,  and  that  prior 
to  his  taking  the  disease  he  habitually  used  bay  water  for  drink- 
ing purposes,  were  in  controversy.  It  seems  clear  that  opinions 
going  to  the  question  of  how  the  disease  was  contracted  could 
have  been  properly  elicited  only  on  hypothetical  questions,  leav- 
ing the  jury  free  to  consider  such  opinions  after  finding  from 
other  evidence  the  existence  of  the  foundation  facts  upon  which 
they  were  based. 

As  a  second  proposition,  respondent  suggests,  with  apparent 
confidence,  that  the  questions  were  proper  under  the  rule  that  a 
physician  may  testify  as  to  the  cause  of  death  from  personal  ex- 
amination or  knowledge.  That  rule  is  familiar,  but  extends  no 
further  than  the  immediate  cause  of  death,  because,  manifestly, 
that  is  the  limit  of  scientific  investigation.  Failure  to  observe 
that  test  often  leads  to  prejudicial  error.  A  competent  witness 
may  testify  as  to  whether  a  person  came  to  his  death  by  a  wound 
found  upon  the  body,  but  not  as  to  who  inflicted  it,  because,  as 
said,  he  cannot  go  beyond  the  range  of  scientific  investigation. 
This  court  said  an  expert  may  testify  that  certain  injuries  to  a 
female,  found  on  personal  examination,  may  have  been  caused 
by  a  ravishment,  but  not  that  they  were  so  caused,  and,  we  may 
add,  certainly  not  who  was  the  guilty  party:  Noonan  v.  State, 
55  Wis.  258.  These  illustrations  show  clearly  that  respondent's 
■counsel  erred  in  relying  on  the  rule  mentioned  to  sustain  the 


920  GBEifiN  V.  Ashland  Water  Co.       [Wisconsin^ 

method  of  examination  of  the  expert  resorted  to.  ^'^  That  such 
was  their  reliance  is  evident  from  the  the  fact  that  they  rounded 
out  their  examination  hy  interrogating  the  witness  as  to  whether 
he  gave  his  opinions  from  personal  examination.  Wherever  ex- 
pressions are  used  in  the  hooks  to  the  effect  that  opinion  evi- 
dence of  the  cause  of  death,  based  on  personal  examination,  is 
admissible,  they  will  readily  be  seen,  by  a  little  attention  to  the 
matter,  to  relate  solely  to  the  immediate  "cause,  not  what  set  the 
cause  in  motion. 

Opinion  evidence  was  permitted  against  objection,  as  to  the- 
duty  of  the  defendant  with  reference  to  testing  the  water  supply. 
As  to  this,  respondent's  counsel  answer  the  objectionable  parts 
of  the  evidence,  if  there  be  such,  were  not  responsive  to  the 
questions.  An  examination  of  the  record  fails  to  bear  out  that 
view.  The  questions  were:  "What,  in  your  judgment,  should 
the  water  company  do  with  reference  to  ascertaining  the  purity 
or  impurity  of  the  water?"  "How  frequently,  in  your  judg- 
ment, should  these  analyses  be  made?'*  They  seem  to  call  ver^ 
clearly  for  opinion  evidence  as  to  the  duty  of  defendants  as  re- 
gards testing  the  water  supply.  That  certainly,  if  material  at 
all,  was  a  question  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.  No  ground 
is  perceived  upon  which  the  questions  can  be  sustained.  It  was 
competent  to  show  by  opinion  evidence  that  the  quality  of  the 
water  was  only  determinable  by  certain  tests,  but  whether  legal 
duty  required  defendant  to  make  the  tests  was  certainly  not  a 
matter  for  such  evidence. 

The  appellant  further  complains  of  a  ruling,  admitting  in  'evi- 
dence an  article  published  in  an  Ashland  newspaper  about  seven, 
months  prior  to  Green's  death,  wherein  the  defendant  was 
charged  with  distributing  poisonous  water  to  its  customers  and 
requiring  the  city  to  pay  for  water  service  twice  as  much  as  was 
proper,  and  it  was  suggested  that  the  most  expeditious  method 
of  dealing  with  defendant,  in  order  to  remedy  the  evils  com- 
plained of,  was  to  annul  its  franchise  and  seize  its  property;  and 
it  was  further  suggested  that  the  ^'^^  officers  of  the  company 
should  be  prosecuted  without  leniency,  civilly  and  criminally, 
if  they  did  not  voluntarily  and  immediately  remedy  such  evils. 
There  can  be  no  justification  suggested  for  the  admission  of  that 
evidence.  We  have  a  right  to  assume  that  the  learned  counsel 
for  respondent  were  unable  to  suggest  any,  as  they  did  not  at- 
tempt to  do  60.  If  overcharges  were  made  by  the  water  com- 
pany, that  had  nothing  to  do  with  causing  the  death  of  Greei^ 


Nov.  1898.]      Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.  921 

by  typhoid  fever,  and  if  the  death  was  so  caused,  the  declaration* 
made  in  a  newspaper  in  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  water 
certainly  had  no  possible  bearing  on  that  question.  They  were 
no  more  competent  as  evidence  because  made  editorially  In  a 
newspaper  than  if  made  by  any  individual.  They  had  no  legiti- 
mate place  in  th'e  trial.  They  were  well  calculated  to  prejudice 
the  jury  against  the  defendant  and  prevent  a  fair  and  impartial 
trial  of  the  important  issues  between  the  parties  on  the  legiti- 
mate evidence  produced.  An  examination  of  the  record  show* 
that  considerable  other  evidence,  admitted  over  the  objections 
of  appellant's  counsel,  to  which  no  particular  reference  is  made 
in  their  brief,  was  irrelevant  and  prejudicial.  This  observation 
refers  to  the  proceedings  of  the  common  council  covering  a 
period  of  about  one  year  before  Green's  death  and  a  month  or 
two  afterward.  That  placed  before  the  jury  the  history  of  a 
bitter  contest  that  existed  between  defendant  and  the  city  of 
Ashland,  covering  the  period  mentioned.  It  closed  with  a  reso- 
Ition  passed  some  time  after  the  death  of  Green,  cancelling  the 
defendant's  franchise  and  directing  the  city  attorney  to  com- 
mence proceedings  to  annul  the  same  by  judicial  decree  and  to 
condemn  the  water  supply.  It  is  not  claimed  that  any  of  this 
evidence  was  admissible  for  any  purpose  except  to  show  notice 
to  the  defendant  that  it  was  claimed  by  the  city  that  the  bay 
water  was  unwholesome  for  domestic  use.  So  little  of  it  was 
relevant  for  that  purpose,  and  that  little  so  involved  with  mat- 
ter having  no  bearing  even  on  the  question  of  notice,  ^'^'*  and  so 
tending  to  prejudice  the  minds  of  the  jury  unfavorably  to  the 
defendant  and  to  prevent  a  fair  trial,  that  the  whole  should  have 
been  rejected  on  defendant's  objection. 

The  remaining  question  for  consideration  was  raised  by  the 
motion  for  a  nonsuit,  the  motion  to  direct  a  verdict,  and  the 
motion  for  a  new  trial.  All  the  rulings  may  properly  be  con- 
sidered together.  The  learned  trial  court  correctly  held  that 
the  franchise  under  which  the  defendant  operated  its  works  did 
not  require  it  to  go  outside  of  Chequamegon  bay  for  a  water 
supply.  Following  that  and  the  negligence  alleged  in  the  com- 
plaint— failure  to  extend  the  intake  pipe  to  a  point  beyond  the 
reach  of  sewage  contamination — the  court  submitted  to  the  jury 
these  questions:  "Could  the  defendant  company  have  procured 
wholesome  water  from  Chequamegon  bay  at  and  prior  to  the 
sickness  of  Green?'*  **Wa3  the  defendant  company  guilty  of 
negligence   which  was  the    proximate  cause  of   the  death  of 


S22  Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.      [Wisconsin, 

Oreen?"  "Did  defendant  know,  or  ought  it  reasonably  to  Have 
known,  prior  to  the  time  when  the  deceased  contracted  the  dis- 
ease from  which  he  died,  that  the  water  it  furnished  deceased 
was  contaminated  by  typhoid  germs?"  To  each  of  such  ques- 
tions the  jury  answered  in  the  affirmative.  Thus,  it  will  be 
€een,  the  right  of  plaintiff  to  recover  was  made  to  turn  on 
whether  defendant  negligently  failed  to  extend  its  intake  pipe 
into  pure  water  in  Chequamegon  bay.  As  heretofore  indicated, 
the  mere  fact  of  impracticability  or  impossibility  of  obtaining  a 
pure  water  supply  in  the  bay,  if  such  were  the  facts,  did  not 
legally  excuse  defendant  from  knowingly  distributing  danger- 
ously impure  water  for  domestic  consumption  under  such  cir- 
cumstances that  persons  of  ordinary  intelligence  might  probably 
use  the  same  with  dangerous  consequences.  But  as  that  was  not 
the  theory  of  the  pleaders  in  making  up  the  issues  for  trial,  or 
in  the  submission  of  their  case  to  the  jury,  the  case  will  be  con- 
sidered as  the  parties  and  the  trial  court  considered  it.  Whether 
E  judgment  ^''^  could  be  sustained  under  the  complaint  and 
findings  of  fact  against  defendant  on  the  other  theory,  is  imma- 
terial, on  account  of  the  branch  touching  defendant's  fault 
which  is  to  be  considered  hereafter. 

Does  the  evidence  warrant  the  finding  that  defendant  failed  to 
exercise  ordinary  care  to  procure  a  pure  water  supply  from  the 
bay?  That,  as  indicated,  is  the  key  to  plaintiff's  case.  We 
have  searched  the  record  from  beginning  to  end,  and  read  and 
reread  it  with  the  greatest  care,  to  find  such  evidence,  and  have 
failed.  The  point  was  raised  in  appellant's  brief  that  no  such 
evidence  exists,  and  no  reply  thereto  appears  in  the  brief  of  re- 
spondent. No  evidence  is  pointed  out  by  them  upon  which  the 
findings  can  rest.  They  evidently  turned,  if  based  on  evidence 
at  all,  on  an  unsworn  report  of  a  chemist,  based  in  part  on  an 
unverified  report  of  an  examination  made  by  Vaughn,  of  the 
Michigan  University,  of  several  samples  of  water,  one  of  which 
was  taken  from  a  point  about  one  thousand  feet  east  of  the 
breakwater,  which  point  was  about  two  miles  from  the  pump- 
ing station.  The  samples  were  selected  some  time  after  the  oc- 
currence complained  of.  The  one  east  of  the  breakwater  was 
the  only  one  found  free  from  sewage  contamination.  The  chem- 
ist who  made  the  report  did  not  place  sufficient  reliance  thereon 
to  recommend  resorting  for  a  supply  to  the  place  where,  on  the 
single  occasion,  pure  water  was  found.  He  thought  a  supply 
might  be  found  there  with  reasonable  certainty,  but  expressed  a 


Noy.  1898.]       Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.  928 

preference  for  going  outside  the  bay  entirely.  All  the  sworn 
•evidence  in  the  case  shows  that  if  pure  water  was  found  on  one 
•occasion  at  a  particular  place,  that  situation  might  or  might  not 
•continue;  that  the  bay  water  was  so  generally  contaminated  with 
sewage,  especially  in  the  spring,  that  a  safe  supply  could  not 
be  found  there  with  any  reasonable  certainty.  Dr.  Hosmer  said, 
if  there  was  no  current,  there  would  be  more  protection;  that 
toward  Washburn,  just  before  reaching  the  sewage  on  that  side 
•of  the  *^®  bay,  was  the  safest  place,  but  on  account  of  the  swing- 
ing currents  one  could  not  tell  anything  about  it;  that  empty- 
ing so  much  sewage  into  the  bay  was  sufficient  to  condemn  it 
as  a  source  of  water  supply  without  any  test.  Some  tests  were 
made  of  samples  taken  from  different  parts  of  the  bay,  one  be- 
ing near  Houghton  Point,  several  miles  from  the  pumping  sta- 
tion, that  being  the  only  one  free  from  sewage  contamination. 
One  of  the  experts  said  that  it  was  improper  to  take  water  for 
dietetic  use  from  a  body  of  water  having  no  current,  into  which 
the  sewage  of  a  city  was  drained,  unless  the  sewage  delivery  and 
the  end  of  the  intake  pipe  were  many  miles  apart.  There  is  a 
large  amont  of  evidence  of  that  character  in  the  record,  and 
nothing  to  controvert  it. 

Further,  it  is  shown  that  nearly  a  year  prior  to  the  death  of 
Oreen,  the  officers  of  the  city  and  the  officers  of  the  water  com- 
pany were  of  one  mind  as  to  the  necessity  of  going  outside  the 
bay  to  get  water  suitable  for  domestic  use.  As  early  as  Febru- 
ary, 1893,  an  official  report  was  made  to  the  common  council 
and  adopted,  to  the  effect  that  the  intake  pipe  should  be  ex- 
tended so  as  to  take  the  water  supply  from  the  lake  instead  of 
the  bay,  and  the  city  attorney  was  requested  to  draw  a  resolu- 
tion formally  directing  the  defendant  to  make  such  extension. 
In  April,  thereafter,  such  a  resolution  was  drafted  by  the  board 
of  health  and  adopted  by  the  council,  and  thereafter  an  attempt 
was  made  to  condemn  the  water  supply  and  annul  the  defend- 
ant's franchise  because  it  did  not  go  to  the  lake  with  its  intake 
pipe.  It  clearly  appears  all  though  the  proceedings  of  the  com- 
mon council,  for  nearly  a  year  prior  to  the  death  of  Green,  that 
all  parties  understood  that  the  bay  water  was  unsuitable  for 
dietetic  use.  During  all  that  time  a  contest  existed  between 
the  municipality  and  the  defendant  as  to  whether  the  latter 
•was  obliged  to  extend  the  intake  pipe  into  the  lake,  it  being 
agreed  that  water  free  from  dangerous  pollution  could  not  be 
obtained  from  the  bay. 


924  Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co.       [Wisconsin, 

277  That  being  the  situation  as  to  the  primary  parties  to  the 
contract,  the  situation  could  not  be  different  as  to  private  per- 
sons who  became  parties  thereto  by  claiming  the  benefit  of  the 
contract.  The  verdict  of  the  jury  on  the  point  here  considered 
appears  to  be  contrary  to  the  evidence,  and  if  a  recovery  on  the 
record  depends  on  that  question,  the  verdict  should  have  been 
directed  for  the  defendant,  and  the  judgment  appealed  from 
cannot  stand.  There  is  no  explanation,  it  would  seem,  of  the 
finding  of  the  jury,  consistent  with  the  theory  that  it  was  based 
on  evidence,  except  that  they  considered  that  regarding  the  fil- 
tration system,  and  did  not  mean  to  say  that  the  water  of  the 
bay,  without  treatment  by  filtration,  could  at  any  point  be  de- 
pended upon  as  a  safe  source  of  supply. 

It  is  further  contended  by  appellant's  counsel  that  the  evi- 
dence conclusively  shows  contributory  fault  of  deceased,  pre- 
cluding a  recovery.  As  before  indicated,  i£  deceased  drank 
the  bay  water  with  knowledge,  or  reasonable  means  of  knowl- 
edge, that  it  was  dangerously  polluted  with  sewage,  he  took 
upon  himself  the  risk,  and  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  whether 
recovery  be  sought  on  the  ground  of  deceit  or  negligence.  The 
jury  found  specifically  for  plaintiff  on  that  point,  yet  said  by 
another  finding  that  prior  to  the  death  of  Green  it  was  publicly 
and  widely  stated,  and  believed,  among  the  citizens  of  Ashland, 
that  the  cause  of  typhoid  fever  epidemics  in  the  city  was  the 
impure  drinking  water  furnished  by  defendant.  In  view  of  the 
fact,  which  we  deem  uncontroverted  by  the  evidence,  that  the 
water  was  impure,  and  that  such  condition  had  existed  for  a 
long  time  and  was  widely  and  commonly  known,  the  findings 
referred  to  are  inconsistent,  there  being  no  evidence  explaining 
why  the  deceased  did  not  know  of  that  which  was  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge  in  the  community  where  he  lived.  Com- 
mon knowledge  of  a  fact  raises  a  presumption  that  all  persons 
of  average  intelligence  have  notice  of  it.  That  is  elementary. 
^''^  Not  only  was  there  no  proof  to  justify  the  jury  in  saying 
the  deceased  did  not  have  reasonable  ground  to  believe  what 
they  said  was  commonly  known  and  believed,  but  there  is  much 
affirmative  evidence  to  the  contrary.  He  knew  that  the  sewage 
of  the  city  was  drained  into  the  bay,  and  that  the  defendant's 
water  supply  was  taken  therefrom.  He  was  an  intelligent,  read- 
ing, workingman.  He  took  one  of  the  city  papers  wherein  the 
ddngers  of  taking  water  from  the  bay  were  discussfed.  He  had 
typhoid  fever  in  his  family  six  months  before  he  was  stricken. 


Nov.  1898.]       Green  v.  Ashland  Water  Co,  925 

his  wife  being  the  afflicted  party.  She  was  attended  by  Dr. 
Hosmer,  one  of  plaintiff's  witnesses,  who  was  thoroughly  con- 
versant with  the  condition  of  defendant's  water  supply,  and  who 
probably  talked  with  the  deceased  on  the  subject,  as  he  did  with 
intelligent  men  generally,  it  being  a  matter  of  common  talk. 
All  these  facts  are  in  evidence.  It  is  not  deemed  advisable  to 
quote  the  evidence  at  length.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  proof  is 
overwhelming  to  the  point  that  the  bay  water  was  dangerously 
polluted  at  the  time  Green  was  stricken  with  the  fever,  and  that 
it  had  been  in  that  condition,  especially  in  the  spring,  for  several 
years;  that  the  facts  in  that  regard  were  understood  in  the  city 
generally,  and  had  been  the  subject  of  discussion  at  public  meet- 
ings and  in  the  city  council,  and  in  the  newspapers,  and  among 
the  people  for  a  long  time.  There  is  no  evidence  in  the  record 
to  rebut  the  presumption  that  the  deceased  had  notice  of  what 
was  so  commonly  known.  So  we  cannot  escape  the  conclusion 
that  the  verdict  of  the  jury  on  the  subject  of  Green's  contribu- 
tory fault  is  without  evidence  to  support  it,  and  that  the  con- 
trary is  established  by  the  evidence.  For  this  and  the  other 
reasons  mentioned  the  Judgment  appealed  from  must  be  re- 
versed. 

By  the  Court.    The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  is  reversed, 
and  the  cause  remanded  for  a  new  trial. 


WATER  COMPANIES— POT.LUTING  WATER-INCONSIS- 
TENT RIGHTS.— Two  rights,  which  are  perfectly  Inconsistent,  can- 
not be  enjoyed  together.  Thus,  a  canal  cannot  be  used  to  carry  wa- 
ter fit  for  irrigation  and  water  unfit  for  irrigation  at  the  same  time, 
for  a  use  of  it  for  one  of  the  purposes  is  an  exclusion  of  the  other: 
North  Point  Irr.  Co.  v.  Utah  etc.  Canal  Co.,  16  Utah,  246,  67  Am.  St. 
Bep.  607,  and  note. 

EVIDENCE  OP  PRECAUTION  TAKEN  AFTER  AN  ACCI- 
DENT Is  not  admissible  to  show  negligence:  Bloomlngton  v.  Legg, 
151  111.  9,  42  Am.  St.  Rep.  216,  and  note  collecting  the  cases. 

EVIDENCE— OPINIONS  OF  WITNESSES.— A  witness  may  tes- 
tlfy  as  to  the  proper  manner  of  performing  work  where  he  shows  a 
practical  a*d  actual  knowledge  of  what  was  necessary  to  be  done: 
Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  151  Pa.  St.  506,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  777. 

WITNESSES— PHYSICIANS— CAUSE  OF  DEATH.— A  physl- 
■clan  may  testify  as  to  the  cause  of  death  In  a  particular  case  where 
he  has  made  a  personal  examination,  or  the  facts  are  properly 
brought  to  his  notice  by  other  testimony,  or  by  hypothetical  ques- 
tions: See  the  extended  note  to  Hammond  v.  Woodman,  66  Am.  Dec 
234-240,  on  the  entire  question  of  exx)ert  medical  testimony. 


926  Maxwell  v.  Bank  of  New  Richmond.    [Wisconsin, 


Maxwell  v.  Bank  op  New  Eiohmond. 

[101  Wisconsin,  286.] 

ATTACHMENT— SERVICE  OF  GARNISHMENT— EFFECT 
OF.— The  service  of  garnishee  process  operates  as  an  equitable  levy 
upon  property  belonging  to  the  principal  defendant  in  the  hands  of 
the  garnishee,  which  levy  may  be  enforced  against  such  property 
in  the  hands  of  any  other  than  an  innocent  purchaser  for  value,  un- 
less such  right  of  enforcement  be  waived. 

ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— ELECTION  OF  REME- 
DIES.—Where  a  plaintiff  in  a  suit  of  garnishment,  in  which  process 
has  been  served  on  the  garnishee,  having  the  right  to  prevent  the 
garnishee  from  disposing  of  the  property  for  which  he  may  be  lia- 
ble, elects  to  consider  the  garnishee  his  debtor  and  to  take  personal 
judgment  against  him,  he  will  be  held  to  his  election,  and  cannot 
follow  the  property  or  its  proceeds. 

ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— EFFECT  OF  APPEAI> 
WITHOUT  STAY.— A  plaintiflC  in  garnishment  having  elected  to  sue 
the  garnishee  personally,  and  judgment  being  rendered  for  the  gar- 
nishee, an  appeal  from  such  judgment  does  not  operate  as  a  super- 
sedeas, or  restrain  in  any  way  the  conduct  of  the  garnishee  concern- 
ing the  property  of  the  principal  defendant  in  his  hands.  To  pre- 
serve his  equitable  lien  upon  such  property  plaintiff  must  have  it 
continued  by  special  order  of  court,  and,  such  continuance  not  being 
had,  such  lien  is  not  revived  by  a  reversal  of  the  judgment  appealed 
from.  Persons  taking  the  property  from  the  garnishee  pending  the 
appeal  take  it  free  from  such  equitable  lien. 

Action  for  money  had  and  received  by  defendant  from  Simon- 
ton,  garnishee,  pending  an  appeal  by  plaintiff  herein,  who  was 
also  plaintiff  in  the  garnishment  suit,  from  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  the  garnishee  in  a  suit  brought  to  enforce  a  personal  liability 
against  the  garnishee. 

W.  F.  McNally,  for  the  appellant. 

Baker  &  Haven,  for  the  respondent. 

288  MARSHALL,  J.  The  judgment  appealed  from  must 
be  reversed,  for  two  reasons:  1.  The~eIection  to  take  judgment 
against  the  garnishee  for  the  amount  of  plaintiffs'  claim  pre- 
cluded them  from  subsequently  following  the  property  or  the 
proceeds  thereof;  and  2.  The  equitable  lien  in  the  garnishee 
proceedings  not  being  continued  in  any  way  pending  the  appeal,. 
or  the  judgment  appealed  from  stayed,  or  the  garnishee  re- 
strained from  executing  such  judgment,  it  protected  the  gar- 
nishee defendant  as  to  anjrthing  he  did  pursuant  thereto  before 
it  was  reversed. 

True,  the  service  of  the  garnishee  process  operated  as  an 
equitable  levy  upon  the  property  in  the  hands  of  Simonton 
belonging  to  the  defendant:  Globe  Milling  Co.  v.  Boynton,  87 


Nov.  1898.]     Maxwell  v.  Bank  op  New  Richmond,  927 

Wis.  619;  Morawetz  v.  Sun  Ins.  Office,  96  Wis.  175;  65  Am.  St. 
Rep.  43.  But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  under  all  circum- 
Btances  the  plaintiffs  could  follow  either  the  property  or  thfr 
proceeds  thereof  into  the  hands  of  other  parties.  A  bona  fide 
purchaser  of  the  property  without  notice  of  the  equitable  lien 
would  take  it  discharged  of  the  encumbrance,  and  the  proceeds 
of  the  property  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder  would  be 
likewise  free  from  any  claim  of  the  plaintiff.  The  protection 
of  the  plaintiff  under  such  circumstances,  against  the  liability  of 
the  garnishee  to  dispose  of  the  property  pending  the  proceed- 
ings, is  the  right  to  a  personal  judgment  **®  against  him,  if 
that  becomes  necessary  to  protect  the  interest  of  the  plaintiff;, 
or,  if  the  garnishee  be  insolvent,  a  restraining  order  may  be  ob- 
tained in  the  proceeding,  preventing  any  disposition  of  the  prop- 
erty untn  the  further  order  of  the  court  or  the  termination  of  the 
action,  to  that  it  may  be  produced  for  the  benefit  of  the  plaintiff 
if  such  ultimately  be  the  judgment  of  the  court:  Almy  v.  Platt,. 
16  Wis.  169;  Malley  v.  Altman,  14  Wis.  22;  Sweet  v.  Oliver,  56 
Iowa,  744.  If  no  precaution  be  taken  to  prevent  the  garnishee 
from  disposing  of  the  property  for  which  he  may  be  liable,  the 
plaintiff's  reliance  must  be  wholly  on  the  statute  which  gives 
him  the  right  to  such  a  judgment  as  will  properly  protect  his- 
rights,  and  if,  in  that  situation,  he  elects  to  consider  the  gar- 
nishee as  his  debtor  and  to  take  a  personal  judgment  as  the 
price  of  his  equitable  interest  in  the  property,  the  result  is  the 
same  as  in  any  other  case  of  election  between  two  remedies. 
Once  taken,  it  fixes  the  relations 'between  the  parties,  and  the 
person  so  electing  cannot  thereafter  recall  his  act  and  take  a 
different  and  inconsistent  position:  Bank  of  Lodi  v.  Washburn 
etc.  Power  Co.,  98  Wis.  547.  Here,  unless  plaintiffs  lost  their 
right  to  hold  the  garnishee  responsible  for  the  property  of  the 
debtor  in  his  hands  by  not  controlling  its  possession  and  disposi- 
tion pending  the  appeal,  they  had  a  right  to  a  personal  judgment 
against  the  garnishee,  treating  him  as  their  debtor,  or  a  judg- 
ment treating  the  property  as  in  the  custody  of  the  court,  and  all 
persons  coming  into  the  possession  of  any  part  of  the  same,  or 
the  proceeds  thereof,  with  notice  of  the  equitable  lien  thereon, 
as  liable  to  account  therefor.  They  elected  to  take  a  personal 
judgment,  and  thereby  waived  the  right,  if  any  they  had,  te 
follow  the  property  or  the  proceeds. 

There  can  be  no  question  but  that  the  appeal  from  the  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  the  garnishee  did  not  operate  as  a  supersedeas 


S28  Maxwell  v.  Bank  of  New  Richmond.     [Wisconsin, 

or  stay  of  proceedings  "under  such  judgment,  or  ^^^  restrain  in 
-any  way  the  conduct  of  the  garnishee  defendant  concerning  the 
property  of  the  principal  defendant  in  his  hands.  Therefore,  the 
reversal  of  the  judgment  on  appeal  did  not  revive  the  equitable 
lien  upon  such  property.  The  whole  scheme  of  the  code  evinces 
clearly  the  intent  that  there  shall  be  no  stay  in  the  execution  of 
«  judgment  carried  to  this  court  for  review,  except  by  a  special 
order  to  that  effect  or  the  giving  of  a  bond  to  protect  the  respond- 
■ent,  or  both,  according  to  statutory  requirements.  Contrary  to 
the  old  practice,  it  is  expressly  provided  that  the  mere  suing  out 
of  a  writ  of  error  and  the  giving  of  a  bond  to  make  it  effectual, 
-shall  not  operate  as  a  supersedeas:  Stats.  1898,  sec.  3045.  The 
right  of  appeal  is  wholly  a  creature  of  the  statute,  and,  when 
•exercised,  cannot  have  any  greater  affect  as  a  supersedeas  than 
the  suing  out  of  a  writ  of  error.  It  is  laid  down  as  an  elementary 
principle  that  a  statutory  appeal  does  not  supersede  a  judgment 
-or  stay  its  execution  in  any  way,  except  by  compliance  with  the 
special  conditions  requisite  thereto:  2  Ency.  of  PI.  &  Pr.  333, 
and  note.  In  that  view  the  several  sections  of  the  statutes  relat- 
ing to  stays  on  appeals  were  evidently  designed  to  meet  all  situa- 
tions where  a  stay,  in  any  event,  should  be  granted.  If  there  be 
a  case  not  covered  thereby,  there  being  no  statute  prohibiting 
it,  the  trial  court,  and  this  court  as  well,  undoubedly  have  in- 
herent power  to  grant  a  stay  if  justice  requires  it,  and  to  make 
such  an  order  on  proper  terms  as  may  be  necessary  to  make  the 
final  judgment  of  the  court  effective.  In  case  of  an  appeal  from 
a  judgment  dismissing  an  attachment  or  dissolving  an  injunc- 
tion, the  statute  provides  for  continuing  the  same  pending  the 
appeal:  Stats.  1898,  sec.  3061.  Manifestly,  in  the  absence  of 
«uch  a  continuance,  the  reversal  of  the  order  would  not  revive 
the  condition  existing  at  the  time  of  its  entry  so  as  to  render  the 
then  prevailing  party  liable  for  his  conduct  in  the  meantime. 
A  judgment  against  the  ^***  garnishee  protects  him  in  comply- 
ing therewith,  and  a  reversal  of  it  on  appeal,  where  not  super- 
seded or  stayed,  is  without  prejudice  to  a  compliance  by  the 
garnishee  with  the  judgment  in  the  meantime:  Rood  on  Gar- 
nishment, sec.  215,  and  cases  cited.  And  the  same  is  true  where 
the  judgment  appealed  from  is  in  favor  of  the  garnishee.  It  dis- 
charges the  equitable  attachment  of  the  property  of  the  defend- 
ant in  the  principal  action  just  as  effectually  as  an  order  dis- 
charging an  attachment  releases  the  attached  property  from  the 
«pecific  lien  thereon  created  by  such  attachment.     To  preserve 


Nov.  1898.]     Maxwell  v.  Bank  op  New  Richmond.  929 

"the  lien,  in  either  case,  for  the  purpose  of  further  proceed- 
ings, it  must  be  continued  by  special  order  of  the  court  and  in. 
compliance  with  the  statute  governing  the  subject,  or  the  direc- 
tion of  the  court,  where  not  regulated  by  statute.  It  follows 
that  if  a  judgment  be  rendered  in  the  court  of  original  jurisdic- 
tion in  favor  of  the  garnishee,  and  the  lien  of  the  plaintiff  be  not 
continued  pending  an  appeal  or  review  on  writ  of  error,  and  the 
garnishee  treat  the  property  sought  to  be  reached  as  free  from 
the  equitable  lien  pending  the  proceedings,  and  by  reason  of  a 
reversal  of  the  judgment  the  cause  proceeds  to  a  new  trial,  he 
should  be  allowed  to  plead  the  disposition  of  the  property  while 
discharged  of  the  lien,  as  a  defense:  Webb  v.  Miller,  24  Miss. 
•C38;  57  Am.  Dec.  189. 

The  result  of  the  application  of  the  principles  stated  in  the 
foregoing  to  the  case  before  us  is  that  the  defendant  came 
rightfully  into  possession  of  the  money  received  from  Simon- 
ton,  has  a  right  to  retain  the  same,  and  that  plaintiffs  have  no 
claim  thereto  whatever.  The  judgment  in  favor  of  Simonton 
discharged  the  equitable  lien  of  plaintiffs,  and  it  was  not  revived 
by  a  reversal  of  the  judgment  to  the  prejudice  of  the  garnishee 
defendant  or  those  dealing  with  him.  The  lien  not  being  con- 
tinued pending  the  appeal,  it  was  lost  beyond  recovery  by  the 
disposition  of  the  property  pursuant  to  the  judgment  discharg- 
ing the  garnishee.  The  judgment  ^^^  of  the  trial  court  to  the 
•contrary  was  erroneous  and  must  be  reversed. 

By  the  court.  The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  is  reversed, 
and  the  cause  remanded,  with  directions  to  dismiss  the  com- 
plaint and  to  render  judgment  in  favor  of  the  defendant  for 
costs  to  be  taxed  according  to  law. 


ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— LIEN.— The  garnishment  by 
the  plaintiff  of  a  debt  due  the  defendant  creates  an  Inchoate  right 
■to  a  lien  upon  the  property  of  the  garnishee:  Montana  Nat.  Bank 
r.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  19  Mont.  586,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  532,  and 
note:  Hulley  v.  Chedlc,  22  Nev.  127,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  720. 

ATTACHMPTNT— GARNISHMENT— EFFECT  OF.— A  garnish- 
ment of  a  warehouseman,  having  personal  property  of  the  defend- 
ant In  his  possession,  charges  such  warehouseman  with  the  respon- 
sibility of  retaining  the  property  as  In  the  custody  of  the  law.  In  or- 
der that  It  may  be  applied  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  debt  on  which 
the  garnishment  was  placed:  Cooley  v.  Minnesota  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  53 
Minn.  327,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  609.  Where  a  sheriff  attaches  a  vessel 
which  passes  Into  the  hands  of  a  stranger  with  knowledge  of  the 
attachment,  the  lien  of  the  attaching  creditor  will,  in  equity,  be  al- 
lowed to  follow  the  vessel,  and  attach  itself  to  the  money  In  the 
hands  of  such  stranger,  for  which  the  vessel  was  sold  by  him:  Nor- 
•ton  V.  Hlxon.  25  111.  439.  79  Am.  Dec.  338. 
AH.  St.  Ekf.,  Vou  LXX.— 59 


930  Anderson  v.  Hayes.  [Wisconsin^ 

APPEAI^NOT  OPERATE  AS  A  SUPERSEDEAS.— An  appeal 
does  not  operate  as  a  supersedeas  and  stay  the  execution  of  a  maa- 
damus:  Plnckney  t.  Henegan,  2  Strob.  250,  49  Am.  Dec.  592. 


Anderson  v.  Hates. 

[101  Wisconsin,  538.1 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT— DANGEROUS  CONDITION 
OF  LEASED  PREMISES— LIABILITY  OF  LANDLORD.— The  les- 
sor of  premises  containing  an  elevator  which  is  dangerous,  owing  to 
a  secret  mechanical  defect,  known  to  the  lessor,  but  not  discover- 
able by  the  lessee  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  is  liable  to  em- 
ployes of  the  lessee  for  injuries  received  in  operating  the  elevator 
and  resulting  from  such  secret  defect. 

ELEVATORS  —  DEFECTIVE  —  INJURIES  RESULTING 
THEREFROM— CONSTRUCTION  OF  PLEADING.— In  an  action 
for  injuries  sustained  in  operating  an  elevator  which  contained  a- 
secret  defect  alleged  to  be  unknown  to  plaintiff,  an  allegation  that 
the  elevator  would  not  sustain  the  weight  ordinarily  and  usually 
placed  upon  it,  but  would  drop  to  the  ground,  and  was  thereby  a 
nuisance,  will  be  construed  as  meaning  that  the  elevator  was  liable 
to  fall  at  any  time  in  the  course  of  the  ordinary  and  necessary  us* 
thereof,  and  not  as  meaning  that  the  elevator  fell  whenever  used» 
so  that  all  who  used  it  must  have  known  of  the  defect. 

Action  by  employes  of  lessee  of  premises  containing  an 
elevator  against  the  lessor  for  injuries  received  while  operating 
such  elevator.    Appeal  from  judgment  for  plaintiffs. 

Boss,  Dwyer  &  Hanitch  and  George  B.  Hudnall,  for  the  ap« 
pellant. 

O'Brien  &  Vaughn  and  John  Jenswold,  Jr.,  for  the  respond- 
ent. 

'^^^  WINSLOW,  J.  These  are  actions  by  the  employes  of  a 
tenant  against  the  landlord  for  injuries  resulting,  as  it  ia- 
claimed,  from  a  concealed  defect  in  the  demised  premises,  known 
to  the  landlord,  but  not  known  by,  nor  disclosed  to,  the  tenant,^ 
nor  capable  of  being  ascertained  by  the  tenant  by  a  reasonably 
careful  examination  of  the  premises.  The  principle  is  well  set- 
tled that  a  tenant  takes  leased  premises  in  the  condition  in  which 
they  happen  to  be  when  leased,  and  that  the  landlord  is  not  lia- 
ble to  the  tenant  for  injuries  resulting  from  lack  of  repair  unless 
he  has  contracted  to  repair,  or  unless  the  defect  be  a  concealed 
one  known  to  the  landlord  and  not  disclosed  to  the  tenant  and 


Jan.  1899.]  Anderson  v,  Hayes.  931 

not  discoverable  by  the  use  of  that  degree  of  care  which  the  law 
demands;  and  it  is  equally  well  settled  that  an  employe,  servant, 
or  subtenant  of  the  tenant  has  no  greater  rights  as  against  the 
landlord  than  the  tenant  himself:  Cole  v.  McKey,  66  Wis.  500; 
57  Am.  Rep.  293.  The  rule  is  thus  stated  in  Cowen  v.  Sunder- 
land, 145  Mass.  363;  1  Am.  St.  Rep.  469:  "Where  there  are  con- 
cealed defects  attended  with  danger  to  the  occupant,  and  which 
a  careful  examination  °^*  would  not  discover,  known  to  the 
lessor,  the  latter  is  bound  to  reveal  them  in  order  that  the  lessee 
may  guard  against  them.  While  the  failure  to  reveal  such  facts 
may  not  be  actual  fraud  or  misrepresentation,  it  is  such  negli- 
gence as  may  lay  the  foundation  of  an  action  against  the  lessor  if 
injury  occurs."  The  rule  is  also  recognized  and  stated  in  2 
Wood  on  Landlord  and  Tenant,  section  381,  and  numerous  case» 
are  there  cited  in  its  support. 

We  think  the  allegations  of  the  present  complaint  bring  the 
case  within  the  rule.  The  concealed  defect  was  in  the  size  of 
the  grooves  in  the  clamp  which  held  the  rope  above  the  elevator. 
It  is  alleged  to  have  been  known  to  the  landlord  and  not  dis- 
closed to  the  tenant,  nor  discoverable  by  him  save  upon  particular 
inspection  and  examination.  This  we  take  to  mean  substan- 
tially taking  the  clamp  off  and  examining  the  size  of  the  groove, 
because  it  is  evident  that  mere  inspection  from  outside  would  not 
disclose  the  size  of  the  groove,  which  was  necessarily  closed  over 
the  rope.  We  do  not  think  that  the  rules  of  reasonable  care  go 
so  far  as  to  require  the  taking  apart  of  machinery  provided  for 
such  a  purpose. 

It  is  argued  that  the  allegation  to  the  effect  that  the  elevator 
would  not  sustain  the  weight  which  was  ordinarily  and  usually 
placed  upon  it,  but  would  drop  to  the  ground,  and  was  thereby 
a  nuisance,  must  be  construed  as  meaning  that  the  elevator  fell 
whenever  it  was  used,  and  hence  that  all  who  used  it  must  have 
known  of  the  defect.  We  do  not  regard  this  construction,  how- 
ever, as  reasonable,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  alleged 
that  the  plaintiffs  had  no  knowledge  of  the  defect  in  the  elevator 
or  of  the  dangers  in  its  use.  The  allegation  evidently  means 
that  the  elevator  was  liable  to  fall  at  any  time  in  the  course  of 
the  ordinary  and  necessary  use  thereof. 

By  the  Court.     Orders  affirmed. 

Bardeen,  J.,  took  no  part. 


932  PoBTANCE  V.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.     [Wisconsin, 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT  -  CONDITION  OF  LEASED 
PREMISES— LIABILITY  OF  LANDLORD.— At  landlord  does  not 
owe  to  a  lessee,  nor  to  the  servants  or  employes  of  the  lessee,  the 
duty  of  making  an  examination  of  the  leased  premises  before  turn- 
ing them  over  to  the  lessee,  for  the  purpose  of  determining  whether 
appliances  used  therein  axe  in  such  a  condition  that  no  injury  shall 
result  therefrom  to  the  lessee  or  his  employes  from  their  being  out 
of  repair  or  weakened  by  the  use  already  made  of  them,  where  the 
lessee,  by  reasonable  effort,  could  have  discovered  and  guarded 
against  danger  as  well  as  the  lessor:  Whitmore  v.  Orono  Pulp  etc. 
Co.,  91  Me.  297,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  229,  and  note.  But  a  landlord  is 
answerable  to  his  tenant  for  injuries  received  by  the  latter  from  hid- 
den defects  in  the  leased  premises  existing  at  the  date  of  the  lease, 
of  which  he  was  ignorant,  and  of  which  the  landlord  knew,  or  might 
have  known,  had  he  exercised  reasonable  care  and  diligence.  This 
liability  does  not  rest  upon  contract  or  warranty,  but  on  tne  obli- 
gation Implied  by  law  that  the  landlord  will  not  expose  the  tenant 
or  the  public  to  danger,  of  which  he  knows,  or  in  good  faith 
should  know,  and  which  the  tenant  does  not  know  and  cannot  ascer- 
tain by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  and  diligence:  Willcox  v. 
Hines,  100  Tenn.  538,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  770,  and  monographic  note 
thereto;  Willcox  v.  Hines,  100  Tenn.  524,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  761. 


PoRTANOE  V,  Lehigh  Yalley  Coal  Company. 

[101  WiscoKSiN,  674.] 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT-DUTY  OF  MASTER  TO  SER- 
VANT.— The  duty  of  a  master  to  his  servant  is  to  provide  him  rea- 
sonably safe  and  proper  tools,  implements,  and  apparatus  with 
which  to  work,  reasonably  competent  and  careful  coemployfis,  and 
a  reasonably  safe  place  to  work. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— DANGEROUS  EMPLOYMENT- 
DUTY  OF  MASTER— DELEGATION  OF  DUTY.— When  an  em- 
ployment Is  in  Its  nature  perilous.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  master  to 
provide  reasonable  and  necessary  precautions  and  safeguards 
against  such  perils,  and  no  delegation  of  that  duty  can  relieve  him 
from  responsibility  for  failure  to  perform  it. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— WARNING  OF  STARTING  OF 
MACHINERY- NEGLIGENCE  OF  FELLOW-SERVANT.— In  en- 
tering upon  an  employment  a  servant  assumes  the  risk  of  the  negli- 
gence of  fellow-servants,  and  if  the  master  properly  selects  such  a 
fellow-servant  to  give  warning  of  the  starting  of  machinery,  and  In- 
structs him  for  that  purpose,  he  Is  not  responsible  for  the  negligence 
of  such  servant  in  the  performance  of  such  duty,  resulting  in  Injury 
to  a  coemploy6. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— PRECAUTIONARY  REGULA- 
TIONS—ASSUMPTION OF  RISK.— A  servant  of  ten  years'  experi- 
ence In  the  unloading  of  coal  from  vessels,  who  has  worked  In  a  par- 
ticular employment  of  that  kind,  where  all  the  conditions  are  the 
usual  ones,  for  several  months,  will  be  held  to  have  assumed  any 
risk  arising  from  a  lack  of  precautionary  regulations  prescribed  by 
his  master. 

MASTER  AND  ftERVANT-FELLOW-SERVANTS.— In  un- 
loading  coal  from  a  vessel,  servants  engaged  in  the  common  under- 


Jan.  1899.]    Portance  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.  933 

taking,  under  common  direction  and  command,  with  no  right  of  con- 
trol one  over  the  other,  as  the  scraper-man,  whose  duty  It  Is  to  start 
the  machinery,  the  hatch-man,  whose  duty  It  Is  to  signal  the  start* 
Ing  of  machinery  by  the  scraper-man,  and  to  give  warning  to  ser- 
vants in  the  hold  of  the  vessel,  and  other  servants  engaged  In  the 
common  undertaking,  are  fellow-servants. 

APPEAL^EKROR— REVOKING  ORDER  OF  NONSUIT.— It 
Is  not  error  for  a  court  to  withdraw  its  order  of  nonsuit  and  direct 
a  verdict  instead,  in  an  action  for  negligence,  where  no  change  In 
the  situation  of  parties  has  intervened  and  the  Jury  has  not  been 
discharged. 

In  August,  1896,  the  defendant  was  operating  an  extensive 
coal  dock  at  the  city  of  Superior,  and  the  plaintifE  was  employed 
as  one  of  a  gang  unloading  coal  from  a  vessel.  A  man  known  as  a 
hoister  raised  the  coal  buckets  from  the  hold  of  the  vessel,  start- 
ing the  machinery  by  a  lever.  On  the  dock  a  scraper-man  oper- 
ated similar  machinery  in  emptying  the  buckets.  Among  the 
general  employes,  besides  the  plaintiff,  were  a  rigger,  who 
looked  after  the  adjustment  of  tackle,  ropes  and  other  apparatus, 
and  a  hatch-man,  who  stood  at  the  hatch  and  communicated 
between  the  men  in  the  hold  and  the  hoister  and  scraper-man, 
signalled  the  starting  and  stopping  of  machinery  by  the  latter, 
and  warned  the  men  in  the  hold  of  anything  endangering  them. 
Plaintiff,  being  injured  by  the  unexpected  starting  of  the 
machinery,  brought  suit.    Appeal  from  judgment  for  defendant. 

Alexander  Athey  and  O'Brien  &  Vaughn,  for  the  appellant. 

Boss,  Dwyer  &  Hanitch,  for  the  respondent. 

'"'®  DODGE,  J.  1.  The  duty  of  a  master  to  his  servant  is 
definite  and  clear.  It  is  to  provide  him  reasonably  safe  and 
proper  tools,  implements,  and  apparatus  with  which  to  work, 
reasonably  competent  and  careful  coemploy^s,  and  a  reasonably 
safe  place  to  work.  These  duties  being  performed,  the  result  of 
any  accident  must  be  borne  by  the  servant.  If  he  would  seek 
to  make  the  master  liable,  he  must  prove  an  omission  or  failure 
in  some  one  of  these  three  respects.  The  question,  therefore,  is 
whether  the  evidence  in  this  case — ^given  all  the  weight  to  which 
in  any  respect  it  can  be  entitled — did  establish  any  such  failure. 

There  is  no  claim  or  suggestion  that  the  machinery  or  ap- 
paratus was  defective  either  in  character  or  repair.  There  is 
no  suggestion  that  any  of  the  coemploy6s  were  lacking  in  that 
character  for  skill  and  caution  which  is  required,  nor  of  any 
lack  of  care  in  the  defendant  or  its  representative  in  their  selec- 
tion.   It  is,  however,  strenuously  argued  that  there  was  a  failure 


934  PoRTANCE  V.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.     [Wisconsin, 

in  the  defendant's  duty  to  make  the  place  of  labor  safe,  in  that 
notice  or  warning  of  the  starting  of  the  scraper  machinery  was 
not  given  to  the  plaintiff.  The  contention  of  the  plaintiff  be- 
low, and  his  principal  contention  in  this  court,  was  that  the 
master,  recognizing  the  necessity  of  providing  for  such  warning 
as  an  element  of  ^''^  safety  of  place,  had  employed  a  man 
known  as  a  hatch-tender  for  the  purpose  and  with  the  duty, 
amongst  others,  of  giving  the  warning,  and  whom  it  thereby 
constituted  its  representative  or  agent  to  perform  the  duty  of 
giving  warning  for  it,  and  that  such  hatch-tender  failed  to  per- 
form his  said  duty.  He  argues  that  this  was  a  delegation  to  the 
hatch-man  of  a  duty  resting  on  the  master,  and,  therefore,  that 
the  former's  negligence  is  imputable  to  the  latter. 

This  position  involves  a  confusion  of  ideas.  It  is  undoubt- 
edly true  that,  when  the  employment  is  in  its  nature  perilous,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  master  to  provide  reasonable  and  necessary 
precautions  and  safeguards  against  such  perils,  and  that  no 
delegation  of  that  duty  can  relieve  him  from  responsibility  for 
failure  to  perform  it.  If  injury  to  employes  is  to  be  appre- 
hended from  starting  of  machinery,  or  from  passage  of  cars,  as  in 
Promer  v.  Milwaukee  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  90  Wis.  215;  48  Am.  St.  Kep. 
905,  and  that  danger  can  be  avoided  by  reasonable  precautions 
in  the  way  of  warning  or  otherwise,  it  may  well  be  the  duty  of 
the  master  to  make  provision  and  give  direction  for  such  pre- 
cautions; but,  when  he  does  so,  he  fulfills  his  duty.  If  reason- 
able care  would  require  that  a  coemploye  be  provided  to  give 
warning,  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  master  to  provide  one; 
but,  if  he  properly  selected  and  instructed  a  competent  man  for 
that  purpose,  he  would  no  more  be  responsible  for  a  failure  of 
the  warning  through  negligence  of  such  servant  than  he  would 
for  the  results  of  the  negligence  in  performance  of  any  other 
duty  by  a  coemploye.  That  is  one  of  the  risks  assumed  by  the 
other  servants:  Dahlke  v.  Illinois  etc.  Co.,  100  Wis.  431. 

This  was  the  full  scope  of  the  decision  of  this  court  in  Promer 
V.  Milwaukee  etc.  Ky.  Co.,  90  Wis.  215;  48  Am.  St.  Rep.  905. 
The  only  point  there  decided  was  that  the  question  should  have 
been  submitted  whether  the  company  had  prescribed  sufficient 
regulations  to  guard  against  injuries  to  its  employes  from  mov- 
ing about  cars  in  its  yards:  Smith  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  '^^ 
91  AVis.  503,  505.  If  there  is  anything  in  the  opinion  in  that 
case  which  can  be  construed  as  holding  that,  after  due  and  suf- 
ficient regulation  providing  for  precautions  by  a  fellow-servant, 


Jan.  1899.]    Portancb  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.  935 

his  negligence  could  impose  liability  on  tlie  employer,  such  con- 
fitruction  is  contrary  to  the  well-settled  law  of  this  state,  and  not 
intended  in  that  case. 

The  rule  on  this  subject  is  well  expressed  and  illustrated  in 
Hartvig  v.  N.  P.  L.  Co.,  19  Or.  522:  "As  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
master  to  furnish  a  reasonably  safe  place  for  his  servant  to  work, 
at  became  the  duty  of  the  defendant  company  to  provide  such 
reasonable  rule  or  regulation  in  the  conduct  of  the  business  aa 
would  protect  the  men  while  engaged  in  their  work  at  the  foot 
■of  the  chute.  It  required  the  defendant  not  simply  to  employ 
4skillful  and  competent  agents  and  employes  in  its  service,  but  to 
adopt  rules  and  regulations  adapted  to  the  dangerous  nature  of 
the  business,  so  as  to  guard  against  accidents;  in  a  word,  to  be 
"vigilant  in  the  use  of  means,  and  in  the  adoption  of  measures,  to 
make  the  servants  reasonably  safe  in  their  employment.  To 
this  extent  the  master  assumes  the  risks,  while  the  servant  as- 
sumes the  natural  and  ordinary  risks  incident  to  the  business  in 
which  he  is  engaged,  including  those  arising  from  the  negli- 
gence of  his  fellow-servants." 

The  rule  here  announced  does  not  at  all  infringe  the  other 
well-settled  doctrine  that  in  providing  the  safe  place  to  work,  aa 
in  building  a  scaffold  or  putting  in  place  timbers  to  which 
tackle  is  to  be  attached  (Jarnek  v.  Manitowoc  etc.  Co.,  97  Wis. 
C37),  the  duty  of  the  master  is  satisfied  only  by  actual  perform- 
ance, whether  he  does  the  work  with  his  own  hands  or  through 
servants,  even  though  the  latter  may  also  afterward  work  with 
the  plaintiff  in  the  service,  depending  on  the  safety  of  such  pre- 
liminary structures  or  appliances:  See  Cadden  v.  American  Steel 
Barge  Co.,  88  Wis.  409,  417;  Smith  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  43 
Wis.  520,  526. 

In  this  case,  there  is  absolutely  no  evidence  of  any  lack  of 
*®*  precautionary  regulations  prescribed  by  the  defendant;  al- 
though, if  such  contention  were  made,  it  would  be  rendered 
immaterial  by  the  fact,  fully  apparent,  that  the  conditions  were 
all  the  usual  ones,  and  the  defendant,  a  man  of  ten  years'  expe- 
rience in  such  service,  had  worked  under  them  from  the  spring 
until  August,  and  must  be  held  to  have  assumed  any  risk  there- 
irom.  The  injury  in  this  case  resulted,  so  far  as  the  evidence 
goes,  from  the  negligence  of  the  scraper-man  in  starting  his 
machinery  without  signal  from  the  rigger,  with  whom  plaintiff 
was  working.  If,  as  plaintiff  contends,  it  also  resulted  from  the 
omission  of  the  hatch-man  to  give  warning,  no  liability  of  the 


936  PoRTANCE  V.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co.     [Wisconsin, 

defendant  results,  for  the  hatch-man,  as  also  the  scraper-man, 
were  clearly  fellow-servants  with  plaintiff,  all  engaged  in  the 
common  undertaking  of  unloading  the  coal  from  the  same  boat, 
and  under  common  direction  and  command,  with  no  right  of 
control  one  over  the  other:  Prybilski  v.  Northwestern  Coal  Ey. 
Co.,  98  Wis.  413;  Foley  v.  The  Peninsular,  79  Fed.  Eep.  972> 
Luebke  v.  Chicago  etc.  Ey.  Co.,  63  Wis.  91;  53  Am.  Eep.  266; 
Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Cheeney,  86  Ga.  278.  It  should  be  noted  in 
passing,  however,  that  much  which  is  said  as  to  the  giving  of 
notice  by  the  hatch-man  as  a  protection  to  the  plaintiff  is  mis- 
leading and  confusing.  If,  as  appears  to  be  established  by  plain- 
tiff's evidence,  the  scraper-man  started  his  machinery  without  a 
signal,  no  hatch-man,  however  vigilant,  could  give  any  effective 
warning.  The  pressing  of  the  lever  by  the  scraper-man,  and 
the  starting  of  the  rope,  to  the  injury  of  plaintiff,  were  neces- 
sarily instantaneous.  No  observation  by  the  man  at  the  hatch 
could  be  communicated  to  the  man  in  the  hold  so  quickly  as  the 
motion  was  communicated  to  the  rope.  No  matter  what  duties 
the  hatch-man  may  have  had  to  give  warning  of  danger,  they 
could  have  no  application  to  a  danger  like  this,  the  effect  of 
which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  was  as  instantaneous  as  his  ear- 
liest possible  discovery  of  it. 

2.  Error  is  alleged  because  the  court,  upon  motion  to  direct 
^^^  a  verdict  for  defendant,  first  announced,  "Nonsuit  granted," 
and  then  withdrew  that  decision  and  directed  a  verdict.  This 
was  done  practically  at  once,  before  any  change  in  the  situation 
of  the  parties  had  taken  place,  and  before  the  jury  had  been  dis- 
charged. True,  the  noon  recess  had  intervened,  but  nothing 
else.  We  can  see  no  error  in  this.  Surely,  a  moment  for  locus 
poenitentiae  must  be  allowed  courts.  It  certainly  cannot  be 
held  that  the  moment  a  judge  announces  a  conclusion  he  is  at 
once  foreclosed  from  any  further  congideration.  Nothing  is 
more  common  than  for  counsel  to  suggest  impropriety  of  some 
order  or  decision  when  announced,  and  for  the  judge  to  modify 
it.  It  would  have  been  entirely  competent  for  the  court,  after 
announcing  the  granting  of  nonsuit,  to  have  changed  his  mind, 
either  on  a  reason  suggested  by  counsel  or  one  occurring  to  him- 
eelf,  and  to  have  then  submitted  the  case  to  the  jury. 

3.  Numerous  exceptions  to  exclusion  of  questions  on  cross- 
examination  have  been  pressed  upon  our  attention  as  errors. 
We  have  examined  them  all"  carefully,  and,  while  in  one  or  two 
instances  the  restrictions  on  plaintiff*s   cross-examination  were 


Jan.  1899.]    Pobtance  v.  Lehigh  Valley  Coal  Co,  937 

Bomewhat  severe,  we  do  not  think  the  discretion  of  the  superior 
court  was  abused.  Most  of  the  excluded  questions  related  to 
matters  already  fully  covered  by  the  cross-examinations.  Others 
merely  inquired  whether  the  witness  had  already  testified  to  cer- 
tain facts.  StiU  others  were  so  worded  that  a  direct  answer 
would  be  capable  of  misconstruction.  ♦  A  question  to  Anderson, 
the  hatch-man,  as  to  whether  he  could  have  seen  a  signal  it 
given,  might  have  been  permitted,  but  its  exclusion  could  not 
prejudice  plaintiff.  He  had  testified  that  he  saw  none,  and,  if 
his  failure  was  due  to  his  negligence,  that  could  not  promote 
plaintiff's  case. 

We  discover  no  prejudicial  error,  and  no  evidence  tending  to 
prove  negligence  of  defendant. 

By  the  Court.    Judgment  affirmed. 

Bardeen,  J.,  took  no  part. 


MASTER  AND  SP]IIV ANT— GENERAL  DUTY  OF  MASTER  TO 
SERVANT.— A  master  must  use  due  care  In  supplying  his  servants 
with  safe  appliances,  and  a  safe  place  In  which  to  work.  He  can- 
not escape  liability  by  delegating  these  personal  duties  to  another: 
Ell  V.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  N.  Dak.  336.  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  621; 
Channon  v.  Sanford  Co.,  70  Conn.  .573.  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  133,  and  note; 
Kennedy  v.  Chase.  119  Cal.  637,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  153.  and  note; 
Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Maroney,  170  111.  520,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  396, 
and  note;  McMahon  v.  Ida  Min.  Co.,  95  Wis.  308;  60  Am.  St  Rep.  117, 
and  note. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— DUTY  OF  MASTER— DELEGA- 
TION OP  DUTY.— The  duty  of  a  master  to  provide  his  servant  with 
reasonably  safe  appliances  and  places  to  work  is  a  personal  one,  and 
he  cannot,  by  delegating  it  to  another,  absolve  himself  from  lia- 
bility for  its  nonperformance:  Edward  Hines  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ligas, 
172  111.  315,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  38;  Ell  v.  Northern  Pac.  R,  B,  Co.,  1 
N.  Dak.  336,  26  Am.  St.  Rep.  621. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISKS— FEL- 
LOW-SERVANTS.—A  servant  assumes  the  risk  of  the  negligence 
of  his  fellow-servants,  but  not  that  of  the  master:  Handley  v.  Daly 
Min.  Co.,  15  Utah,  189,  62  Am.  St  Rep.  916,  and  note;  Norfolk  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Houchins,  95  Va.  398,  64  Am.  St.  Rep.  791,  and  note.  The 
master  is  liable  if  the  servant  Is  Incompetent,  and  this  Is  known, 
or  should  be  known,  to  the  master:  Park  v.  New  York  Cent.  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  155  N.  Y.  215,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  663;  Chicago  etc.  R.  R.  Go.  v. 
Champion,  9  Ind.  App.  510,  53  Am.  St  Rep.  357. 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT— WHO  ARE  FELLOW-SERVANTS.— 
Fellow-servants  are  those  who  are  so  far  working  together  as  to  be 
practically  co-operating,  and  who  have  an  opportunity  to  control  or 
influence  the  conduct  of,  and  who  have  no  superiority  over,  one  an- 
other: Flannegan  v.  Chesapeake  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  40  W.  Va.  436,  52  Am. 
St.  Rep.  896,  and  note;  Moore  Lime  Co.  v.  Richardson,  95  Va.  326, 
64  Am.  St  Rep.  785,  and  note. 

MASTER  AND  SFRV  ANT— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISKS— DUTY 
OF  MASTER  TO  PROVIDE  RULES.— A  person  of  mature  years 


^33  Delafield  v.  Smith,  [Wisconsin, 

taking  employment  is  presumed  to  assume  the  hazards  thereof,  and 
his  master  is  not  liable  for  a  failure  to  instruct  him  unless  the  master 
knew,  or  had  reason  to  believe,  that  the  servant  was  ignorant  of, 
or  incapable  of  comprehending  the  dangers  of  the  service:  Petersou 
V.  New  Pittsburg  Coal  etc.  Co.,  149  Ind.  260,  63  Am.  St  Rep.  289, 
.and  note.  But  where  the  master  is  engaged  in  a  complex  business 
requiring  definite  rules  for  their  protection,  it  is  his  positive  duty  to 
.adopt  rules  for  the  protection  and  safety  of  his  employes:  Moore 
Lime  Co.  v.  Richardson,  95  Va.  326,  64  Am.  St  Rep.  785. 


Delafield  v.  Smith. 

[101  Wisconsin,  664.] 

BROKERS— SALES  IN  BROKER'S  NAME— LIABILITY  OP 
PRINCIPAL.— Where  an  agreement  between  a  broker  and  his  prin- 
■cipal  for  the  sale  of  fruit  does  not  authorize  the  former  to  make 
•contracts  of  sale  in  his  own  name,  but  makes  him  a  mere  agent  to 
sell  on  commission,  the  principal  is  not  liable  to  him  for  losses  sus- 
tained by  reason  of  the  principal's  refusal  to  ship  fruit  to  fill  such 
•contracts,  because  of  which  refusal  the  broker  purchased  fruit  at 
excessive  market  rates  to  fill  the  contracts;  but  if  the  principal  ap- 
proved such  contracts  he  is  liable  to  the  broker  for  commissiona 
thereon. 

Dunwiddie  &  Wheeler,  for  the  appellant. 

Fathers,  Jeffris  &  Mouat,  for  the  respondent. 

***  CASSODAY,  C.  J.  It  appears  from  the  record  that,  dur- 
ing the  times  mentioned,  the  plaintiffs  were  copartners,  doing 
business  as  commission  merchants  at  New  York,  Chicago,  St. 
Louis,  and  San  Francisco;  that  the  defendant  was  engaged  m 
packing  and  shipping  fruit  from  San  Francisco  to  different  parts 
■of  the  country;  that  February  7,  1890,  the  plaintiffs  and  defend- 
ant entered  into  an  agreement  in  writing,  wherein  and  whereby 
the  plaintiffs  were  made  the  sole  and  exclusive  sales  agents  for 
the  defendant  in  all  the  territory  of  the  United  States  and  Can- 
ada east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  except  Kansas  City,  and  the 
<lefendant  thereby  agreed  to  pay  them  on  all  goods  shipped  by 
the  defendant  into  such  territory,  whether  sold  by  them  or  not, 
five  per  cent  commission  on  the  selling  price  of  all  goods  shipped 
or  consigned,  and,  in  addition  thereto,  all  proper  charges  against 
Buch  goods,  such  as  freight,  cartage,  storage,  insurance,  et  cetera, 
as  well  as  interest  at  the  rate  of  eight  per  cent  per  annum  on  all 
advances  on  such  goods;  that  the  plaintiffs  therein  agreed  to  act 
as  the  defendant's  agents  in  the  sale  of  all  his  product  of  canned 


Jan.  1899.]  Delafield  v.  Smith.  939 

fruit,  and  to  make  advances  against  shipments  or  sales  to  tHe 
extent  of  seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  market  or  selling  value; 
that  guch  advances  were  to  be  made  by  their  acceptance  of  the 
defendant's  drafts  with  documents  attached,  at  ten  days*  sight; 
that,  so  far  as  the  then  present  stock  on  hand  was  concerned, 
the  advances  were  to  be  sufficient  to  liquidate  the  amount  due 
the  Bank  of  California  against  each  shipment,  provided  such 
amount  should  not  exceed  the  net  selling  value,  with  commis- 
eions  deducted;  ®®^  that  the  plaintiffs  therein  also  agreed  to  as- 
sume the  guaranty  of  payment  for  goods  after  they  had  been 
delivered  and  accepted  by  the  purchaser;  that  it  was  thereby 
mutually  agreed  that  sales  for  future  shipment  were  to  be  made 
as  the  defendant  might  direct,  he  holding  hims:elf  liable  for  all 
claims  arising  from  nondelivery,  delay  in  shipment,  difference  in 
quality,  short  weight,  or  any  other  justifiable  cause,  but  sales  of 
goods,  whether  to  arrive  or  spot,  upon  which  the  plaintiffs  might 
have  made  advances,  to  be  sold  at  their  discretion;  that  the  pro- 
ceeds of  sales  were  to  be  applied:  1.  To  the  liquidation  of  all 
charges  against  the  goods,  such  as  freight,  cartage,  storage,  in- 
surance, et  cetera,  and  the  commission  therein  provided  for;  and 
2.  To  the  liquidation  of  advances  made  by  the  plaintiffs;  that 
the  surplus  of  the  proceeds  of  any  sale  or  consignment  was  to 
be  applied  to  the  liquidation  of  the  deficit  in  others,  if  any;  that 
May  28,  1890,  the  parties  entered  into  a  new  written  agreement 
to  the  same  effect,  except  that  the  five  per  cent  commission  was 
to  be  "on  the  f.  o.  b.  San  Francisco  selling  price." 

About  January  1,  1891,  the  plaintiffs  commenced  this  action 
on  such  two  contracts,  and  the  complaint  alleged  as  a  breach  of 
such  contracts  that  the  plaintiffs  had  in  1890  entered  into  con- 
tracts for  the  sale  and  delivery  of  canned  goods  at  the  prices 
therein  specified,  to  be  furnished  by  the  defendant,  whereby  the 
plaintiffs  obligated  themselves  for  the  performance  of  such  con- 
tracts and  the  delivery  of  such  goods;  that  thereafter  the  de- 
fendant refused  to  supply  them  with  the  goods  they  had  so  sold 
and  agreed  to  deliver;  that  they  were  obliged  to,  and  did,  go  upon 
the  market  and  purchase  goods  to  fill  part  of  the  contracts  so 
made  by  them;  that,  by  reason  of  an  advance  in  price,  they  were 
obliged  to  pay  for  the  goods  so  purchased  $3,604  over  and  above 
the  amount  for  which  the  defendant  had  so  agreed  to  furnish 
them  and  at  which  he  had  directed  the  plaintiffs  to  sell;  that,  as 
to  parts  of  the  contracts  so  made  by  them  with  other  purchasers, 
^^"^  upon  such  refusals  of  the  defendant  they  settled  with  the 


940  Delafield  v.  Smith.  [Wisconsin^ 

purchasers,  and  were  obliged  to  pay,  in  such  settlements,  the  dif- 
ference in  price  between  the  market  value  at  the  time  of  set- 
tlement and  at  the  time  at  which  the  goods  should  have  been  de- 
livered, which  difference  amounted  to  $2,590;  that  they  were 
also  entitled  to  a  commission  of  five  per  cent  upon  the  selling 
price,  to  wit,  $355.75. 

The  defendant  answered  by  way  of  admissions  and  denials, 
and  alleged,  in  effect,  that  after  he  had  constituted  the  plaintiffs 
his  agents,  and  after  they  had  sold  a  large  quantity  of  goods, 
they  violated  their  agreement  by  retaining  part  of  the  proceeds 
of  the  sales  which  they  should  have  accounted  for  and  paid 
over,  and  made  unauthorized,  wrongful,  and  unlawful  charges 
and  deductions,  and  wholly  failed  to  render  any  account  for  cer- 
tain sales  made  by  them,  and  otherwise  violated  their  contract 
with  the  defendant;  that  thereupon  he  promptly  notified  them 
that  he  would  make  no  further  shipments  unless  they  fully  ac- 
counted and  paid  over  to  him  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  they  had 
wrongfully  retained;  that  upon  their  refusal  to  so  account  and 
pay  over,  and  by  reason  of  the  breach  on  their  part  of  the  agree- 
ments, he  refused  to  make  any  further  shipments  to  them.  The 
answer  further  alleged,  by  way  of  a  first  counterclaim,  that  the 
plaintiffs  had  sold  a  large  quantity  of  his  canned  goods,  and  re- 
ceived therefor  $2,619.06,  which  they  had  wrongfully  retained 
and  refused  to  pay  over;  and,  as  a  second  counterclaim,  that 
November  6,  1890,  the  plaintiffs  purchased  certain  goods  of 
him,  specified  in  the  written  agreements,  and,  after  receiving 
and  accepting  the  same,  except  150  cases  of  apricots  and  550 
cases  of  Crawford  peaches,  in  violation  of  their  written  agree- 
ments refused  to  accept,  receive,  or  pay  for  such  apricots  and 
peaches,  by  reason  of  which  the  defendant  was  damaged  in  the 
sum  of  $1,326.95.  The  plaintiffs  replied  to  each  of  the  counter- 
claims by  way  of  denials. 

668  rpijg  cause  was  thereupon  referred  to  Moses  S.  Prichard, 
Esq.,  to  hear;  try,  and  determine;  and  upon  the  trial  thereof  it 
was  stipulated  in  writing,  by  and  between  the  parties  thereto, 
in  effect,  that  the  plaintiffs  had  sold  the  fruits  mentioned  in  the 
complaint  at  the  prices  therein  stated;  that  the  defendant  had 
refused  to  deliver  the  fruit,  and  the  plaintiffs  were  obliged  to, 
and  did,  purchase  such  fruit,  and  pay  the  market  price  and 
value  thereof  to  fill  such  sales,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  sustained 
loss  on  such  sales  as  stated;  that,  as  to  the  last  five  items,  it  was 
admitted  that  the  plaintiffs  sold  the  fruits  at  the  prices  therein 


Jan.  1899.]  Dela field  v.  Smith.  941 

mentioned;  that  the  defendant  refused  to  deliver  the  fruits,  and 
that  the  plaintiffs  settled  with  the  purchasers  at  the  market 
value  at  the  time  the  delivery  was  agreed  upon  between  the 
plaintiffs  and  the  purchasers,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  paid  such 
purchasers  the  difference  between  the  price  the  goods  were  sold 
at  and  the  market  value,  in  lieu  of  the  delivery  of  the  fruit;  that 
the  plaintiffs  lost  thereby  the  amounts  stated  in  the  complaint. 

At  the  close  of  the  trial  before  the  referee,  he  found,  as  mat- 
ters of  fact,  in  respect  to  the  causes  of  action  alleged  in  the 
complaint,  in  accordance  with  such  stipulations,  and  that,  of 
such  sales  so  made  by  the  plaintiffs  as  agents  for  the  defendant, 
and  for  and  on  behali  of  the  defendant,  the  defendant  confirmed, 
approved,  and  ratified  nine  orders  therein  mentioned,  upon 
which  there  was  an  aggregate  loss  of  $3,162.50;  that  the  plaintiffs 
were  entitled  to  commissions  upon  such  orders  and  sales  so  made, 
in  the  sum  of  $6Q.  As  to  the  first  counterclaim,  the  referee  found, 
as  matter  of  fact,  in  effect,  that  the  defendant  was  entitled  to 
the  balance  upon  the  sale  of  350  cases  of  Criterion  peaches, 
shipped  September  1,  1890,  amounting  to  $395.25,  with  inter- 
est thereon  from  September  1,  1890;  that  the  defendant  was 
also  entitled  to  the  balance  due  from  the  New  York  house  of 
the  plaintiffs  of  $550.98,  with  interest  thereon  from  September 
23,  ^*^  1890;  that,  as  to  all  other  items  in  the  first  counter- 
claim, there  had  been  charges  made  by  the  defendant,  state- 
ments rendered,  balances  struck,  and  that  the  defendant  did  not 
intend  to  charge  back  any  of  them  until  after  the  commence- 
ment of  this  suit;  that  the  defendant's  account  of  all  the  re- 
charges and  the  charges  back  of  commissions,  interest,  freight, 
telegrams,  and  storage  therein  mentioned  were  made  up  by  the 
defendant  after  the  commencement  of  this  action,  and  contrary 
to  the  contracts  between  the  parties,  and  contrary  to  the  ac- 
counts rendered  by  the  plaintiffs  and  accepted  by  the  defendant; 
and  that  as  to  all  such  items  in  the  first  counterclaim,  except 
the  two  allowed,  there  was  no  intention  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant to  make  any  such  charges  against  the  plaintiffs  until 
after  the  commencement  of  this  suit;  and  that  such  items  and 
each  of  them  were  not  sustained  by  the  proofs,  and  were  contrary 
to  the  contracts;  and  that  each  of  them  was  settled  and  deter- 
mined by  the  parties  prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  action. 

As  to  the  second  counterclaim,  the  referee  found,  as  to  mat- 
ters of  fact,  in  effect,  that  the  defendant  had  orders  to  deliver 
all  goods  actually  purchased  by  the  plaintiffs  from  him;  that 


942  Delatield  v.  Smith.  Wisconsin, 

December  3,  1890,  the  plaintiffs  notified  the  defendant  that  they 
would  not  take  any  more  goods  than  they  had  already  taken; 
that  there  was  not  sufficient  proof  as  to  when  the  balance  of 
such  goods  were  sold  by  the  defendant,  what  prices  they  were 
sold  at,  what  damages,  if  any,  he  sustained,  what  the  market 
value  was  at  the  time  the  plaintiffs  received  the  goods  (if  they 
received  them  at  all),  and  that  there  was  no  basis  for  the  allow- 
ance of  any  such  counterclaim;  that  as  to  all  the  rest  of  the  sev- 
eral items  of  the  counterclaims  of  the  defendant,  except  the  two 
items  mentioned,  the  referee  disallowed  them;  that  the  plain- 
tiffs were  entitled  to  recover  such  damages,  particularly  found, 
with  interest  thereon,  amounting  to  $4-,316.85;  that  the  de- 
fendant was  entitled  to  the  reduction  of  such  claim  by  reason  of 
the  *'^®  two  counterclaims  found  in  favor  of  the  defendant, 
with  interest  thereon  as  found,  amounting  to  $1,270.26;  that 
the  balance  due  to  the  plaintiffs  May  29,  1896,  from  the  defend- 
ant, after  the  deduction  of  the  counterclaims  allowed,  was 
$3,046.59. 

As  conclusions  of  law,  the  referee  found  that  the  plaintiffs 
were  entitled  to  judgment  against  the  defendant  for  the  sum  ol 
$3,046.59,  as  of  May  29,  1896,  with  the  costs  and  disbursements 
of  this  action.  Such  findings  of  the  referee  were  fully  confirmed 
by  the  court,  and  judgment  ordered  thereon  accordingly.  From 
the  judgment  entered  thereon  accordingly  the  defendant  brings 
this  appeal. 

1.  The  theory  of  the  complaint  is  that,  under  the  agreements 
mentioned,  the  plaintiffs,  as  agents  _^of  the  defendant,  sold,  in 
their  own  names,  the  several  cases  of  fruit  therein  mentioned, 
to  be  shipped  by  the  defendant  to  the  parties  who  had  pur- 
chased the  same  of  the  plaintiffs,  at  Bay  City,  Michigan,  Charles- 
ton, "West  Virginia,  Parkersburg,  "West  Virginia,  Muscatine, 
Iowa,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  and  Defiance,  Ohio;  and  that  after  such 
contracts  of  sale  by  the  plaintiffs,  to  be  so  delivered  by  the  de- 
fendant, the  defendant,  in  violation  of  his  agreements,  refused  to 
ship  any  of  such  goods,  and  the  plaintiffs  thereby  suffered  loss. 
The  stipulation  mentioned  is  to  the  same  effect.  Undoubtedly, 
such  refusals  to  ship  the  goods  called  for  by  such  orders  as  the 
defendant  had  approved  made  the  defendant  liable  to  the  plain- 
tiffs for  the  amount  of  commissions  they  would  have  received 
had  such  goods  been  shipped.  But  the  serious  question  recurs 
whether,  under  the  agreements  with  the  defendant,  he  was  lia- 
ble to  the  plaintiffs  for  losses  on  such  contracts  of  sale  which 


J.ui.  1899.]  Delafield  v.  Smith.  945 

they  had  so  made  in  their  own  names  with  such  other  parties. 
After  careful  consideration,  we  are  constrained  to  hold  that  he- 
was  not  liable  for  such  losses.  The  agreements  with  the  defend- 
ant did  not  authorize  the  plaintiffs  to  make  contracts  of  sale  in 
their  own  names.  They  were  mere  agents  ^^"^^  or  brokers  to  sell 
on  commission  all  goods  shipped  by  the  defendant  into  the  ter- 
ritory named.  Had  the  defendant  accepted  orders  taken  by  the- 
plaintiffs  from  such  other  parties,  then,  undoubtedly,  the  de- 
fendant would  have  been  liable  to  such  other  parties  for  any 
breach  of  such  contracts  of  sale.  But  the  defendant  had  no- 
contract  relation  with  such  other  parties.  On  the  theory  of  thfr 
complaint,  the  defendant  had  no  agreement  with  the  plaintiffs- 
except  as  stated.  The  plaintiffs'  agency  was  founded  upon  and 
created  by  the  express  agreement  of  the  parties.  Under  such 
agreement,  they  were  authorized  to  represent  and  act  for  the 
defendant  in  his  business  dealings  with  third  persons  in  making 
such  sales:  Mechem  on  Agency,  sec.  1.  A  broker  is  an  agent  of 
his  employer,  and  he  differs  from  a  factor  in  that  he  does  not 
ordinarily  have  the  possession  of  the  property  which  he  is  em- 
ployed to  sell,  and  his  contracts  are  always  made  in  the  name  of 
his  employer:  Mechem  on  Agency,  sees.  13,  927;  Edgerton  v. 
Michels,  66  Wis.  130,  and  cases  there  cited.  On  the  other  hand, 
a  factor  is  intrusted  with  the  possession  of  the  goods,  and  maj 
sell  the  same  in  his  own  name:  Mechem  on  Agency,  sees.  13, 
927.  Thus,  it  is  held  that,  where  a  broker  sells  goods  without 
disclosing  the  name  of  his  principal,  he  acts  beyond  the  scope  of 
his  authority,  and  the  buyer  cannot  set  off  a  debt  due  from  the 
broker  to  him  against  the  demand  for  the  goods  made  by  the 
principal:  Baring  v.  Corrie,  2  Bam.  &  Aid.  137.  That  case  i» 
approved  by  more  recent  cases  in  England  and  this  country: 
Drakeford  v.  Piercy,  7  Best  &  S.  515,  519;  Pearson  v.  Scott,  L. 
R.  9  Ch.  Div.  198,  203;  Cooke  v.  Eshelby,  L.  E.  12  App.  Gas. 
271,  275;  Higgins  v.  Moore,  34  N.  Y.  417,  419.  In  this  last 
case  it  was  held  that  "authority  given  to  a  broker  to  sell  prop- 
erty does  not  include  authority  to  receive  payment  for  the 
same,  especially  when  the  principal  is  known  to  the  vendee.**^ 
There  is  nothing  in  the  complaint,  nor  stipulation,  nor  the  find- 
ings of  the  court,  to  indicate  that  the  agreements  of  February 
7,  1890,  and  May  28,  1890,  were  ever  ^''^  modified  or  changed. 
We  must,  therefore,  hold  that  the  plaintiffs  cannot  recover  for 
any  of  the  losses  alleged  in  the  complaint,  except  for  the  loss  of 
commissions. 


S44  Delafield  v.  Smith,  [Wisconsin. 

2.  As  to  tte  findings  of  fact  in  respect  to  the  first  counter- 
claim, we  are  constrained  to  hold  that  they  are  sustained  by 
the  evidence.  All  items  therein  mentioned,  except  the  two  al- 
lowed, appear  to  have  been  fully  settled  and  determined  by  the 
parties  before  the  commencement  of  this  action, 

3,  As  to  the  second  counterclaim,  the  court  found  that  the 
evidence  in  the  record  failed  to  furnish  any  basis  for  the  allow- 
ance of  damages  for  the  breach  alleged.  We  cannot  say  that 
such  findings  are  not  supported  by  the  evidence. 

By  the  Court.  The  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  is  re- 
versed, and  the  cause  is  remanded  with  direction  to  enter  judg- 
ment in  accordance  with  this  opinion.  In  taxing  costs,  the  de- 
fendant will  only  be  allowed  for  printing  100  pages. 

Bardeen,  J.,  took  no  part. 


BROKERS— SALE  IN  BROKER'S  NAME— A  broker  cannot 
make  a  contract  In  bis  own  name  without  the  knowledge  and  consent 
of  his  principal  that  will  bind  both  the  principal  and  the  other  con- 
tracting party,  or  render  the  principal  liable  for  commissions  or  dam- 
ages for  the  nonperformance  of  the  contract,  though  he  receives  a 
benefit  from  it:  Hass  v.  Ruston,  14  Ind.  App.  8,  56  Am.  St.  Rep. 
288.  See  the  monographic  note  to  Walker  v.  Osgood,  93  Am.  Dec. 
171. 

BROKERS— CHANGE  IN  TERMS  OF  SALE-RATIFICATION 
BY  PRINCIPAL.— Although  the  terms  of  sale  made  by  a  real  estate 
broker  differ  from  the  original  terms  agreed  upon  by  himself  and 
the  owner,  he  may  recover  his  commission.  If  the  terms  ux>on  which 
he  sells  are  accepted  by  the  owner:  McFarland  v.  Lillard,  2  Ind.  App, 
160,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  284,  and  note. 


INDEX  TO  THE  NOTES. 


ABATEMENT  of  right  of  action  for  personal  injuries  by  the  death 

of  the  person  Injured,  669,  670. 
ADMINISTRATORS    AND    EXECUTORS,   sureties  on    different 

bonds  of.  444. 
ALIMONY,  death  of  husband,  whether  terminates  wife's  right  to^ 

772. 

BAIL,  Indictment  creates  presumption  of  guilt  on  application  for, 

742. 
BANKS,  collecting,  notaries,  liability  of  for  negligence  of,  219. 
BUILDING   AND    LOAN   ASSOCIATIONS,    premiums   and    fines. 

when  may  be  exacted  by,  204,  205,  227. 

CEMETERIES,  rights  of  persons  who  have  been  permitted  to  nse 

for  burial  purposes,  902. 
OIGARETTEjS,  constitutionality  of  statutes  prohibiting  the  sale  of, 

713. 
CHARITABLE  TRUST,  construction  of  gifts  for,  793. 
CHILDREN,  adoption  of,  collateral  attack  upon  proceedings  for  the, 

899. 
CONDITIONS    SUBSEQUENT,    Impossibility   of   performance  re- 

lieves  from  necessity  of,  829,  830. 
definition  of,  829. 
forfeiture  because  of  nonperformance  of,  equity  may  prevent, 

831. 
Impossibility  of   performance  of   arising  prior   to  the   nonper^ 

formance,  832. 
impossibility  of  performance  of  arising  subsequent  to  the  con- 
tract, 832. 
Impossibility  of  performance  of  does  not  avoid  the  effect  of 

nonperformance,  829,  832. 
Illegal  are  void,  830. 
one   preventing  the    performance  of   cannot  urge   the  nonper> 

formance,  832. 
performance  of  being  made  unlawful,  nonperformance  Is  ex- 

cused,  830. 
performance  of  is  indispensable  to  the  vesting  of  the  estate,  829. 
performance  of  prevented  or  rendered  Impossible  by  the  person 

to  whom  due,  830,  831. 
right  dependent  upon  does  not  accrue  In  the  absence  of  per> 

formance,  832. 
strict  construction  of,  830. 

AM.  ar.  Kkp..  Vol.  LXX.-60        c945) 


946  Index  to  the  Notes. 

CONTRACTS,  conditions  in,  whether  are  precedent  or  8ubseq1lent^ 

tests  of,  832. 
OONTKIBUTION,  right  of  between  successive  sets  of  sureties,  443- 

4S4. 
CORPORATIONS,  directors,  notice  of  meetings  must  be  given,  783. 
stock,  conditional  subscription  for,  59. 
etocls,  lien  on  in  favor  of  the  corporation  is  enforceable  against 

a  purchaser  without  notice,  312. 
Btocliholders,  liability  of,  enforcing  in  a  foreign  state,  550. 
stockholders,  liability  of,  when  may  be  enforced  in  other  states,. 

241. 
stockholders,  liability  of,  whether  primary,  402 
subscriptions  induced  by  fraud,  when  void  of  because  of,  848. 
See  Ultra  Vires. 
COTENANCY,  adverse  possession  by  one  of  the  cotenants,  what  l8» 

193. 
COTENANTS,  adverse  title,  acquisition  of  by  one  of  several,  101. 
tax  sale,  right  of  one  to  purchase  the  interest  of  another  at,  101. 

DAMAGES,  destruction  of  property  having  no  market  value^  148^ 
fright  as  an  element  of,  302. 
municipal  corporations,  when  liable  for,  149. 
DEATH  OF  HUMAN  BEING,  abatement  of  action  for  by  the  death 

of  the  beneficiary,  685. 
abatement  of  action  for  by  the  death  of  the  wrongdoer,  685,. 

686. 
abatement  of  one  action  for  by  the  pendency  of  another,  683. 
action  for  could  not  be  sustained  at  the  common  law,  670. 
action  to  recover  for  cannot  be  sustained  unless  decedent  could 

have  recovered  for  his  injury  had  he  survived,  680. 
admiralty  courts,  when  may  enforce  liability  for  causing,  681. 
brother  or  sister  of,  when  may  recover  for,  675. 
child  dying  at  its  birth,  recovery  for  death  of,  674. 
child,  illegitimate,  neither  father  nor  mother  may  recover  for 

the  death  of,  674. 
children,  when  not  necessary  parties  to  actions  for,  678. 
children,  whether  may  recover  for  the  death  of  parent,  674. 
children,  who  may  recover  as,  679,  680, 
classification  of  statutes  creating  rights  of  action  for,  676. 
comments  upon  common  law  denying  right  of  recovery  for,  670. 
compromise  with  one  beneficiary,  whether  bars  another,  685. 
dependents,  who  are  within   the  meaning  of  statutes   ctea.tlng 

causes  of  action  for,  679. 
father  and  mother,  when  must  Join  in  actions  for  death  of  cbild» 

678. 
father's  right  to  recover  for  the  death  of  his  child,  678. 
heirs,  all  must  Join  in  actions  for,  678. 
heirs,  who  may  sue  for  as,  672. 


Index  to  the  Notes.  947 

DEATH  OF  HUMAN  BEING,  high  seas,  statutes  of  state,  whether 

may  create  liability  for  death  on,  681. 
husband  and  wife  may  not  sue  for  as  next  of  kin,  673. 
Instantaneous  death  from  Injury,  recovery  for,  676,  677. 
limitations,  statutes  of,  in  actions  for  causing,  686. 
limitations,  statutes  of,  when  begin  to  run  against  actions  for 

causing,  637. 
Lord  Campbell's  act  creating  liability  for,  672. 
marriage  of  widow  or  widower  does  not  destroy  cause  of  action 

for,  682. 
married  woman  deserted  by  her  husband  may  sue  alone  for  the 

death  of  her  child,  678. 
marine  torts,  when  create  cause  of  action  for,  681. 
minor  heirs,  who  entitled  to  sue  for  as,  674. 
mother,  wheu  not  entitled  to  sue  for  death  of  child,  674. 
negligence,  contributory,  of   decedent   precludes    recovery  for, 

684. 
next  of  kin,  who  may  maintain  suit  for  as,  673. 
none  but  persons  authorized  by  statute  may  recover  for,  675. 
parents,  dependency  on  child,  whether  necessary  to  entitle  to 

recover  for  his  death,  679.    • 
parents  of  person  tortiously  killed,  when  may  maintain  action 

for,  672. 
parties  plaintlEf  in  action  to  recover  for,  677. 
personal  representatives,  who  may  sue  as,  673. 
pleadings  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff  must  show  that  he  Is  within 

the  statutes  authorizing  recovery  for,  675. 
posthumous  children,  when  entitled  to  sue  for,  674. 
presumption  as  to  existence  of  next  of  kin,  676. 
reasons  for  common-law  rule  denying  right  to  recover  for,  671, 

672. 
recovery  by  one  beneficiary  for,  when  precludes  recovery  by 

another,  683,  684. 
release  by  decedent  in  his  lifetime,  when  does  not  preclude  re- 

covery  by  beneficiaries,  683,  684. 
release  by  personal  representatives,  whether  affects  widow  and 

next  of  kin,  685. 
release  by  widow,  whether  binds  next  of  kin,  685. 
statutes  ci-eating  liability  for  tortiously  causing,  672. 
stepchildren  cannot  sue  for  the  death  of  stepfather,  673. 
stepfather  cannot  sue  for  the  death  of  stepchild,  673. 
strict  construction  of  statutes  creating  liability  for  causing,  672. 
suit  by  one  beneficiary,  when  bars  right  of  suit  by  others,  682. 
widow,  when  may  sue  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  673. 
widower,  whether  may  maintain  suit  for  the  death  of  his  wife, 

673. 
DEED,  conditions  in  repugnant  to  the  granting  clause,  833. 
conditions  in,  whether  precedent  or  subsequent,  833. 
conditions  precedent,  impossibility  of  performance,  833. 


948  Index  to  the  Notes. 

DEFINITION  of  accident  and  of  death  by,  2iVSk 

of  condition  precedent,  829. 

of  condition  subsequent,  829. 

of  criminal  contempts,  286. 

of  estate  upon  condition,  829. 

of  ex  post  facto  laws,  286. 

of  family,  107,  108. 

of  general  laws,  488. 

of  head  of  a  family,  107,  108. 

of  ultra  vires,  158,  160. 
DEVISE,  conditions  in,  when  precedent  and  when  subsequent,  833, 

834. 
DIRECTORS,  powers  of,  783. 

DOWER,  administrator's  sale  does  not  divest,  315. 
DRUNKENNESS  as  a  defense  to  a  criminal  prosecution,  412. 

ELECJTRIC  LIGHT  CORPORATIONS,  linemen,  risks  assumed  by, 

247. 
EMINENT  DOMAIN,  change  In  use,  when  requires  payment  of  an 

additional  compensation,  556. 

conclusiveness  of  judgment  In,  40. 

pendente  lite  purchasers,  when  not  affected  by  judgment  in,  40. 
ESTOPPEL  against  asserting  the  defense  of  ultra  vires,  167-169. 
EXECUTION  SALES,  caveat  emptor  is  the  rule  of,  718. 

GARNISHMENT  of  warehouseman,  effect  of,  929. 

situs  of  debt  for  the  purposes  of,  609. 
GUARDIANS,  sureties  on  different  bonds  of,  445,  449. 

HABEAS  CORPUS,  errors  which  may  be  reached  by,  422,  423. 
HEAD  OF  A  FAMILY,  adopted  children,  adopting  parent  of  is  a, 
114. 

brother  who  maintains  his  sister,  109,  110. 

definition  of,  107. 

dependence  necessary  to  create  relation  of,  107,  108. 

guardian  of  a  minor  child  Is  entitled  to  a  homestead  as,  114. 

father  of  illegitimate  children  residing  with  him,  109. 

father  supporting  adult  daughter,  110. 

father  whose  children  do  not  reside  with  him,  108. 

husband  falling  to  support  his  family  does  not  lose  his  rights 
as,  113. 

husband  of  a  divorced  wife  retains  his  rights  as,  113. 

husband  of  a  nonresident  wife,  they  having  no  children,  108b 

husband,  though  without  children,  is  a,  108. 

marriage  not  essential  to,  107. 

mother  of  an  Illegitimate  child  Is,  113. 

obligation  to  support  Is  essential  to  the  relation  of,  10&-110L 

parent  and  child,  relation  of  Is  not  essential  to,  107. 

son  supporting  his  mother,  109. 

supporting  dependents,  when  creates  relation  of,  107,  108. 

unmarried  person  may  be  a,  109. 


Ikdez  to  the  Notes.  9^!^ 

HEAD  OF  A   FAMILY,  unmarried   person  supporting  an   Invalid 

relative,  113. 
widow  or  unmarried  woman  maintaining  children  of  a  deceased 

relative,  113. 
widower  having  neither  wife  nor  children,  110. 
wife  living  with  her  husband  and  children  cannot  be  a,  111,  112. 
wife  permanently  separated  from  her  husband,  114. 
wife  whose  husband  has  left  the  state,  114. 
HOMESTEAD,  actual  occupancy  of,  when  not  essential  to,  107. 

children  of  a  deceased  owner  cannot  claim  each  for  himself  as 

the  head  of  a  family,  115. 
head  of  a  family,  who  may  claim  as,  107-115. 
householder,  who  may  claim  as.  111,  112. 
partnership  property,  whether  may  be  claimed  as,  114,  116. 
separate  property  of  wife,  whether  may  be  dedicated  as.  111. 
widow  having  adult  children  living  with  her,  113. 
widow  having  minor  children  is  entitled  to,  112. 
widow  having  no  children,  113. 
widow  maintaining  children  of  a  deceased  sister  Is  entitled  to, 

113. 
widow  supporting  stepchildren  of  her  deceased  husband  is  en* 

titled  to,  112. 
wife,  whether  may  dedicate  as  the  head  of  a  family.  111. 
HOMICIDE,  self-defense  after  provoking  the  difficulty,  569. 

self-defense,  duty  to  retreat,  569. 
HUSBAND   AND    WIFE,  competency  of   to  testify  against  each 

other.  739. 
cross-examination  of  In  criminal  prosecutions,  739. 
supporting  by  evidence  of  prior  declarations,  730. 

INJUNCTION   against  trespass,  556. 
INNKEEPERS,  liability  of,  702. 

INSANITY,  defense  of  to  an  indictment  for  murder,  test  of  suflB- 
clency  of,  636. 
produced  by  drunlienness,  when  a  defense  to  a  criminal  prose- 
cution, 412. 
INSOLVENT  LAWS,  discharge  by,  effect  of  on  obligations  held  by 
nonresidents,  256,  258. 
foreign  corporations,  whether  bound  by  discharge  granted  under, 

256,  257. 
of  a  state,  whether  conflict  with  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States,  256. 
INSURANCE,  delivery  of  policy  without  payment  of  premium,  597. 

life,  incontestability  clauses,  validity  of,  660. 
INTERSTATE  COMMERCE,  cigarettes,  state  statutes  prohibiting 
sale  of,  713. 
original  packages,  what  are,  713. 


950  Index  to  the  Notes. 

JUDGMENTS,  against  infants,  though  Irregular,  are  not  Toldi  418, 

lien  of  against  vendor's  interest.  402. 

lien  of,  when  deemed  to  attach,  862. 

perjury  as  a  ground  for  relief  from,  371. 

relief  from  in  equity,  when  will  be  decreed,  371. 

reversal  of  does  not  destroy  the  title  of  the  purchaser,  418. 

setoff  as  against  another,  573. 
JUDICIAL  SALES,  resale,  when  will  be  ordered  because  of  Increase 

of,  889. 
JURY  TRIAL,  comments  of   counsel.  Improper,  how   to   be  urged 
upon  appeal,  507. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT,  holding  over  arises  from  leaving  the 

property  of  the  tenant  on  the  premises,  534,  535, 
holding  over  because  of  sickness  does  not  prevent  an  Implied 

renewal  of  the  lease,  533,  534. 
holding  over  creates  a  new  tenancy  at  the  election  of  the  land- 
lord, 533. 
holding  over,  effect  of  cannot  be  varied  by  any  notice  given  the 

landlord  to  which  he  does  not  assent,  535,  536. 
holding  over,  ejectment  against  tenant  guilty  of,  533. 
holding  over,  intention  of  the  tenant  Is  not  material,  534. 
holding  over,  rebutting  the  presumption  arising  from,  537. 
holding  over,  tenant  has  no  election  to  determine  whether  it 

shall  be  regarded  as  a  trespass  or  as  a  renewal  of  the  lease, 

535. 
holding  over,  using  any  part  of  the  premises  Is,  538. 
holding  over,  what  Is  a,  533-538. 
liability  of  the  former  to  the  latter  for  defects  In  the  leased 

premises,  932. 
LAWS,  general  and  special,  what  are,  488. 
LEGACY,  conditions  precedent  and  subsequent,  In  what  are,  834. 

835. 
conditions  subsequent  annexed  to,  whether  can  become  lmpo»> 

Bible  of  performance,  835. 
illegal  conditions  annexed  to,  836. 
LIBEL  AND  SLANDER,  by  words  directed  against  a  whole  family, 

756. 
must  refer  to  some  ascertainable  person,  754. 
of  a  class,  averments  essential  to  sustain  a  recovery  for,  755. 
of  a  class,  when  Justifies  a  recovery  by  an  Individual,  754,  765, 
of  a  group,  class,  or  list  of  persons,  754-757. 
of  a  nun  by  declaring  a  nunnery  to  be  a  brothel,  755, 
of  one  person  by  words  spolien  of  all,  756. 
of  one  policeman  by  words  spolcen  of  all,  766. 
of  several  in  one  publication,  756,  757. 

reviling  a  class  of  persons,  what  necessary  to  sustain  an  action, 
764. 


Index  to  the  Notes.  061 

LIMITATIONS,  part  payments  which  will  arrest  the  running  of,  310. 
LUNATICS,  care  and  custody  of  estates  of  are  vested  in  chancery, 

649. 
gales  of  property  of,  chancery,  when  has  jurisdiction  to  order* 

649. 

MARRIED  WOMAN,  homestead,  whether  may  claim  as  the  head  of 

a  family,  111,  112. 
MECHANICS*  LIEN,  claim  or  notice  of,  sufficiency  of,  787,  788. 

married  women,  property  of,  when  bound  by,  135. 
MORTGAGES,  assignment  of,  to  what  equities  subject,  82S. 

title  deeds,  deposit  of,  does  not  operate  as,  390. 
MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS,  officer,  when  answerable  for  dam- 
ages caused  by,  149. 

NAMES,  fictitious,  contracts  made  under,  329. 
NEGOTIABLE   INSTRUMENTS,  overdue,  equities  to  which  not 
subject,  142. 
parol  evidence  to  show  the  relation  of  the  parties  to,  617. 
parol  evidence  to  vary  the  effect  of  their  Indorsement,  896L 
restrictive  Indorsement,  396. 
NOTICEl,  of  powers  of  corporations,  all  persons  are  chargeable  wlth» 
176. 

PARDONS,  conditions  In,  836,  837. 

PRESUMPTION   respecting  the  laws  of  another  state,  418. 

RAILWAYS,  landowner,  when  not  estopped  to  maintain  ejectment 
against,  41. 
employes,  when  liable  for  acts  of  In  expelling  trespassers,  98. 
legislative  control  over,  364,  365. 
ultra  vires  contracts  of,  161,  162. 
vice-principal,  section  foremen,  when  are  not,  603. 
RAPE,  presumption  of  incapacity  to  commit,  whether  may  be  re* 

butted,  850. 
REMAINDERMEN    AND    REVERSIONERS,    sales    Of   property, 
when  cannot  affect  the  title  of,  579. 

SOCIAL  CLUBS,  liquors.  Intoxicating,  sales  of  by,  81. 

SPECIFIC    PERFORMANCE,  of    contracts    relating   to   personal 

property,  643. 
SURETIES,  contribution,  actions  at  law  to  enforce,  453. 

contribution,  agreements  between  different  sureties  may  destroy 

the  right  of,  450. 
contribution  among,  demand  and  notice,  whether  essential  to 

suit  to  enforce,  451. 
contribution  among,  duty  of,  from  what  results,  444,  450. 
contribution  among,  liability  cannot  as  against  either  exceed  the 

penalty  of  the  bond,  451,  452. 
contribution  among,  when  enforceable,  446,  447. 
contribution  among,  where  they  are  liable  upon  different  In- 
Btruments,  446. 


952  Index  to  the  Notes. 

SURETIES,  contribution  of,  measure  of  llabUity  as  among  one 
another,  451. 

contribution,  remedy  of  surety  in  equity  where  some  of  the 
sureties  are  insolvent,  453. 

cosureties,  all  persons  liable  for  the  same  debt,  when  are,  444. 

for  different  debts,  though  for  the  same  principal,  are  not  co- 
sureties, 447. 

of  administrators  upon  different  bonds  executed  at  different 
times,  444,  445. 

of  guardians  by  different  bonds,  445. 

on  a  second  or  renewal  bond,  446,  447. 

on  additional  bonds,  liability  of,  452. 

on  different  obligations  for  the  same  debt,  444. 

on  successive  undertaliings  on  appeal,  446. 

primary  and  secondary,  liability  of  on  administrator's  bond» 
443. 

primary,  liability  as  between  different  sets  of,  443. 

release  of  one  set,  when  releases  another,  443. 

second  sureties  on  bonds  which  extend  the  time  of  payment, 
449. 

second  sureties,  liability  of,  448. 

TELEGRAPH  CORPORATIONS,  delay  in  delivering  message,  lia- 
bility for.  211. 

ULTRA  VIRES,  accommodation  paper  Issued  by  corporations,  164. 
actions  upon  ultra  vires  contracts,  courts  refusing  to  sustain. 

171,  173. 
burden  of  proof  respecting,  160. 
conditions  upon  which  corporations  will  be  permitted  to  assert 

the  defense  of,  175. 
contracts  by  a  corporation  to  purchase  Its  own  stock,  164,  165. 
contracts   by  railways  to   employ   surgeons  to   attend  Injured 

employes,  161. 
contracts  by  railways  to  lease  a  summer  hotel,  162, 
contracts  by  railways  to  purchase  grain,  162. 
contracts  expressly  forbidden,  175. 
contracts  for  the  benefit  of  a  corporation  are  rarely  declared  to 

be,  161,  162. 
contracts  in  general  furtherance  of  the  business  of  a  corpora*^ 

Uon,  162,  163. 
contracts  of  guaranty  and  suretyship,  163. 

contracts  of  one  corporation  to  become  a  surety  of  another,  161, 
contracts  of  real  estate  corporations  to  erect  buildings,  162. 
contracts  of  real  estate    corporations    to  procure    facilities  of 

transit,  162. 
contracts  of  savings  banlcs  speculating  In  stock,  162. 
contracts  to  purchase  stock  In  another  corporation,  16B. 
contracts  to  transfer  or  lease  corporate  property,  163. 
contracts,  partial  performance,  rights  given  by,  169.  170. 


I^DKZ  TO  THE   NOTES.  95$ 

ULTRA  VIRES,  contracts  which  are  both  Immoral  and  against  pub- 
lic policy  and  ultra  vires,  169,  170. 
contracts  ^hlch  cannot  be  ratified  and  enforced,  171,  172. 
defense  of  is  never  sustained  out  of  regard  for  the  corporatloiie 

159,  160. 
definition  of,  158. 

dlfFerence  between  and  illegality,  157. 
doubt  and  confusion  respecting  the  subject,  15& 
estoppel  to  assert  defenses  of,  167-169. 

executory  contracts  are  not  affected  by  the  rule  of,  165,  166. 
executory  contracts,  defenses  of  may  be  asserted  against,  165» 

166. 
executory,  contracts  which  are,  right  of  stockholder  to  resist  en- 
forcement of,  166. 
Incidental  powers  of  corporations,  161. 
instances  of  contracts  which  are  not,  161,  162. 
lease  by  one  railway  of  its  property  to  another,  17tt, 
misuse  of  this  term,  160. 

notice  of  existence  of  facts  showing  contracts  to  be,  177,  178. 
notice  of   powers  of   corporations,  all    persons  are  chargeable 

with,  176. 
plea  of  is  not  sustainable  when  it  would  not  advance  justice, 

159. 
quantum  meruit  under  contracts  affected  by,  174^ 
ratification  of  contracts  invalid  by,  158. 
reasons  for  enforcing  law  of,  158. 
recovery  for  benefit  received  under  ultra  vires  contracts,  173, 

174. 
Btoclsholders,  when  cannot  question  contracts  because  of,  170, 

180. 
tests  of  what  contracts  are,  157,  16L 
torts,  liability  for  cannot  be  defeated  by  application  of  the  rules 

of.  159. 
who  may  raise  question  of,  178,  179. 

WATERS,  percolating,  belong  to  the  owner  of  the  soil. 
WITNESS,  wife,  cross-examination  of  when  offered  «•  a  witness 
for  her  husband,  739. 


INDEX. 


ABANDONMENT. 
See  Criminal  Law.  1,  2, 

ACCIDENT. 
See  Insurance,  7. 

ACTION. 

ACTIONS  AGAINST  STOCKHOLDERS— WHEN  TRANSI- 
TORY.—An  action  against  a  stocktiolder  of  a  corporation  organized 
under  the  laws  of  the  state  of  Kansas,  to  compel  the  payment  of  a 
debt  against  the  corporation,  is  transitory.  (Hancock  Nat.  Bank  y. 
Ellis,  232.) 

See  Contracts,  1,  2,  3;  Corporations,  2,  3;  Estates  of  Decedents; 
Executors  and  Administrators;  Husband  and  Wife,  3;  Insol- 
vency, 2;  Joint  Stock  Companies,  2,  3;  Judgment,  6;  Mandamus, 
2;  Municipal  Corporations,  1,  9;  Negligence,  8;  Railroad  Com- 
panies, 18;  Receivers. 

ADOPTION. 

1.  ADOPTION  —  STATUTORY  CONSTRUCTION.  —  Adoption 
statutes  are  humane  provisions  which  look  primarily  to  the  interests 
of  children,  and  every  reasonable  intendment  should  be  Indulged  in, 
in  case  of  doubt,  in  the  line  of  promoting  that  object.  (Parsons  v. 
Parsons,  894.) 

2.  ADOPTION-JUDGMENT  OF— ESTOPPEL  TO  ATTACK.— 
After  the  lapse  of  many  years,  during  which  time  the  status  of  the 
subject  of  adoption  has  been  recognized  as  legally  fixed  by  the 
judgment,  by  all  parties  to  the  proceedings,  one  of  those  parties, 
■on  whose  motion  the  judgment  was  rendered,  is  in  no  position  to 
Appeal  to  equity  to  declare  it  void.    (Parsons  v.  Parsons,  894.) 

3.  ADOPTION  —  PROCEEDINGS  IN  —  COLLATERAL  AT- 
TACK.—Where  a  proper  petition  has  been  filed  in  adoption  proceed- 
ings, the  court  acquires  jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  the  per- 
son who  signs  as  next  of  kin  is  such,  and  its  determination, 
'Whether  based  upon  sufilcient  evidence  or  not,  cannot  be  collaterally 
Attacked  for  want  of  jurisdiction.    (Parsons  v.  Parsons,  894.) 

4.  ADOPTION— NOTICE  TO  ABANDONING  PARENT.— Un- 
•der  a  statute  authorizing  the  adoption  of  a  child  without  notice  lo 
an  abandoning  parent,  notice  to  such  xmrent  is  not  requisite  to  a 
valid  determination  of  the  fact  of  abandonment  as  regards  all  other 
parties  to  the  proceedings.    (Parsons  v.  Parsons,  894.) 

5.  ADOPTION  —  CONSENT  OP  ABANDONING  PARENT.— 
Statute  may  authorize  the  adoption  of  a  child  without  the  consent 
of  an  absent  or  abandoning  parent,  and  adoption  proceedings  had 
thereunder,  and  completed  without  notice  to,  or  consent  of,  such 
■a  parent,  are  valid.    (Parsons  v.  Parsons,  894.) 

(95SJ 


953  Index. 

ADVERSE  POSSESSION. 
See  Cotenancy,  1-3,  7. 

AGENCY. 

1.  AGENCY— NEGLIGENCE  OF  PRINCIPAL-ERRONEOUS 
TELEGRAM.— Where  a  principal,  being  in  doubt  as  to  tlae  mean- 
ing of  a  telegram  from  his  agent  relating  to  the  matter  of  the  lat- 
ter's  agency,  requires  the  telegraph  agent  to  have  the  message  re- 
peated and  the  latter  reports  that  the  message  as  received  is  cor- 
rect, the  principal  is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law,  In  acting  upon  the  message  as  he  understands  it.  (Has- 
brouck  V.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  181.) 

2.  AGENCY  —  AUTHORITY  OF  AGENT  —  ERRONEOUSLY 
TRANSMITTED  TELEGRAM.— Where  an  agent,  sent  by  a  bank- 
ing firm  to  settle  and  adjust  a  claim  against  a  third  person,  tele- 
graphs his  principal:  "Has  stock  twelve  hundred  dollars.  Mort- 
gage on  for  fifteen  hundred  dollars.  Am  offered  note,  with  Hark- 
ness  as  surety,  for  twenty-five  hundred  dollars,  due  in  eighteen 
months,  in  full  settlement,"  and  the  telegi-am  Is  erroneously  trans- 
mitted to  read  thus:  "Have  secured  twelve  hundred  dollars  mort- 
gage on  fifteen  hundred  dollars  and  offered  note,  with  Harkness  a» 
surety,  for  twenty-four  hundred  dollars,"  et  cetera,  to  which  the 
principal  answers:  "If  twelve  hundred  mortgage  is  on  fifteen  hun- 
dred dollars  property,  accept,"  the  agent  is  justified  in  understand- 
ing that  he  is  to  accept  the  offer  of  settlement  under  the  facts  as 
he  had  stated  them,  unless  the  conditions  are  more  favorable  to 
plaintiff  than  they  would  be  with  a  twelve  hundred  mortgage  on 
a  fifteen  hundred  dollar  stock,  and  a  settlement  based  upon  and 
within  such  an  understanding  is  binding  upon  the  principal.  (Has- 
brouck  V.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  181.) 

See  Brokers;  Husband  and  Wife,  1;  Insurance,  15,  16,  20;  Limita- 
tions of  Actions,  2;  Telegraph  Companies,  8. 

ANIMALS. 

ANIMALS-KICK  FROM  A  HORSE  UPON  THE  SIDE- 
WALK-OWNER'S LIABILITY.— A  person  who  has  been  kicked 
and  injured  by  a  horse  temporarily  standing  upon  a  sidewalk,  where 
It  ought  not  to  be.  is  entitled  to  recover  therefor  without  proof 
that  the  animal  was  vicious,  and  that  the  owner  knew  It,  particu- 
larly where  the  horse  was  in  an  exceptionally  nervous  condition  In 
consequence  of  the  driver's  treatment.  In  such  a  case.  It  is,  there- 
fore, correct  to  refuse  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  defendant.  (Hardi- 
man  v.  WhoUey,  292.) 

APPEAL. 

1.  APPEAI^ERROR  FIRST  OBJECTED  TO  ON  APPEAL.— 
It  cannot  be  first  objected  to  on  appeal  that  evidence,  properly 
admissible  for  a  certain  purpose,  was  admitted  without  Instruc- 
tions limiting  Its  application  to  such  purpose,  where  no  request 
was  made  for  such  instructions.  (Hasbrouck  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co., 
181.) 

2.  APPEATv— EXCEPTION  TO  PART  OF  CHARGE.— An  ex- 
ception to  part  of  a  charge  cannot  be  made  to  apply  to  any  other 
portion  than  that  to  which  it  apparently  relates.  (Fall  Brook  Coal 
Co.  V.  Hewson,  466.) 

8.  APPE.\T^CRIMTNAL  CARES— IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO 
JURY— ILLUSTRATION— REVERSAL  OP  CONVICTION.— When 
a  city  officer  is  being  prosecuted  for  conniving  at  the  allowance  of  a 


Index,  •  957 

fraudulent  claim  against  the  city,  and  the  prosecuting  attorney. 
In  summing  up,  makes  harsh  and  unjust  statements  to  the  jury, 
not  founded  upon  evidence,  but  resting  wholly  on  his  unsupported 
declarations;  draws  vivid  pictures  of  suffering  and  want,  of  wrongs 
done  to  widows  and  their  broods  of  little  children,  with  "pinched 
and  haggard"  faces,  by  the  defendant,  and  of  a  multitude  of  people 
waiting  outside  the  courthouse  for  his  conviction;  depicts  the  hard- 
ships of  small  taxpayers;  urges  the  privations  of  the  poor  and  the 
overwhelming  Influence  of  public  opinion  against  the  defendant; 
describes  him  as  a  thief,  living  in  a  palace  on  the  proceeds  of  public 
plunder;  and  even  attempts  to  Intimidate  the  jui-y  by  telling  them 
that  they  will  commit  "the  unpardonable  sin"  unless  they  convict 
him,  there  is.  In  case  of  conviction,  presented  a  situation  In  which 
there  should  be  a  reversal,  particularly  where  the  record  shows  that 
such  statements  were  persisted  In  after  repeated  objections,  under 
the  claim,  sustained  by  the  trial  court,  that  it  was  right  to  malse 
them.     (People  v.  Fielding,  495.) 

4.  APPEALr-CRIMINAL  CASES— IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO 
JURY— REVERSAL  OF  CONVICTION.— If  a  conviction  In  a  crim- 
inal case  follows  an  improper  and  dangerous  appeal  to  the  prejudice 
of  the  jurors,  made  by  the  prosecuting  attorney,  and  it  is  reason- 
ably certain  that  his  course  brought  about  such  result,  the  judgment 
will  be  reversed  for  such  error  whenever  it  is  raised  by  a  proper 
exception.     (People  v.  Fielding,  495.) 

5.  APPEAL  — DISMISSAL  OF  CO:SIPLAINT  —  RIGHTS  OF 
PLAINTIFF.— If  the  question  as  to  whether  a  corporation  Is  an- 
fiwerable  upon  a  promissory  note,  payable  to  the  plaintiff's  order, 
otherwise  than  as  an  indorser,  is  raised  by  the  pleadings  and  proofs 
In  a  suit  upon  the  note,  and  the  complaint  is  dismissed  at  the  close 
•of  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  an  exception  talien,  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  plaintiff,  upon  his  proofs,  was  entitled  to  go  to  the 
jury,  is  open  for  review  on  appeal,  although  It  was  not  urged  on  the 
motion  to  dismiss.     (Wlthrow  v.  Slaybaclj,  507.) 

6.  APPEAI^EXAMINATION  OF  EXPERTS-HYPOTHETI- 
CAL QUESTIONS.— Whether  the  hypothesis  propounded  to  wit- 
nesses Include  the  material  facts  necessary  to  the  formation  of  an 
•opinion,  or  whether  facts  are  assumed  which  have  no  existence, 
rests  largely  in  the  knowledge  of  the  trial  judge,  and  his  rulings  "will 
be  held  conclusive  on  appeal  unless  prejudicial  error  is  affirmatively 

shown.    (Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  U25.) 

7.  APPE.\I^F1NDIXGS  OF  JUDGE  SITTING  AS  CHANCEL- 
LOR.—Findings  of  fact  made  by  a  judge  sitting  as  chancellor  will 
not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  except  for  error  which  clearly  appears. 
An  apparent  preponderance  of  testimony  against  them  Is  not  suffl- 
■cient  to  lead  to  a  reversal,  where  there  Is  testimony  which  might 
warrant  them.    (Steinmeyer  v.  Siebert,  641.) 

8.  APPEAL-INSUFFICIENT  ASSIGNMENT  OP  ERROR.— An 
assignment  of  error  alleging  error  In  the  admission  of  evidence  will 
not  be  considered,  where  it  fails  to  set  forth  the  evidence.  (Swope 
•V.  Donnelly,  637.) 

9.  APPEAI^^IMMATERIAL  ERROR.— On  appeal,  the  court  will 
not  review  the  action  of  the  lower  court  in  admitting  evidence  as 
part  of  the  res  gestae,  where  the  admission  or  rejection  of  such 
evidence  would  not  affect  the  case  or  change  the  result  (Gann  v. 
Railroad,  687.) 

10.  APPEAL— INSTRUCTIONS— FAILURE  OP  DEFENDANT 
TO  TESTIFY.— It  is  not  error  In  an  action  for  negligence  to  instruct 
the  jury  that  no  prejudicial  Inference  could  be  drawn  against  de- 


958  ■  Index. 

fendants  from  their'failure  to  testify,  where  It  does  not  appear  that 
Buch  defendants  had  facts  peculiarly  within  their  knowledge  and  not 
fully  known  to  other  witnesses.    (Weeks  v.  McNulty,  693.) 

11.  APPEAL  —  REFUSAL  TO  PERMIT  ANSWER  TO  QUES- 
TIONS.—The  refusal  of  the  trial  court  to  permit  answers  to  perti- 
nent questions  affords  no  cause  for  reversal,  unless  the  record  shows 
affirmatively  that  the  answers  would  have  been  competent. and  ma- 
terial evidence.     (Weeks  v.  McNulty,  G93.) 

12.  APPEAI^REVERSAI^ERROR  IN  GIVING  AND  REFUS- 
ING INSTRUCTIONS.— Conceding  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  giv- 
ing and  refusing  certain  instructions,  there  should  be  no  reversal 
where  the  appellate  court  can  see  from  the  whole  record  that  under 
correct  instructions  a  different  verdict  could  not  have  been  rightly 
found,  or  that  the  exceptant  could  not  have  been  prejudiced  by  the 
action  of  the  court  in  giving  the  instructions  given,  or  In  refusing 
those  which  were  rejected.  (Wright  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank, 
889.) 

13.  APPEAL— ILLEGALITY  OF  CONTRACT  MAY  BE  FIRST 
RAISED  ON.— A  suit  in  equity  cannot  be  maintained  upon  an  ille- 
gal contract,  although  the  defense  of  illegality  was  not  raised  by  the 
pleadings,  or  relied  upon  in  the  trial  court.  It  may  be  made  for 
the  first  time  on  the  argument  in  the  appellate  court.  (Camp  v. 
Bruce,  873.) 

14.  APPEAL— WHAT  CANNOT  BE  FIRST  ASSERTED  ON— 
SUBROGATION.— A  claim  for  affirmative  relief,  such  as  one  to  be 
subrogated  to  the  rights  of  a  lien  creditor,  not  made  in  the 
court  below,  cannot  be  asserted  for  the  first  time  in  the  appellate 
court.    (New  South  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Reed,  858.) 

15.  APPEAL-OBJECTION  TO  BILL  OF  EXCEPTIONS.— The 
objection  that  a  bill  of  exceptions  was  not  properly  settled,  not  hav- 
ing been  raised  in  the  appellate  court  before  the  hearing  on  the 
merits,  cannot  be  raised  later.    (Hoff  v.  Olson,  903.) 

16.  APPEAI^ERROR— REVOKING  ORDER  OF  NONSUIT.— It 
Is  not  error  for  a  court  to  withdraw  its  order  of  nonsuit  and  direct 
a  verdict  instead,  in  an  action  for  negligence,  where  no  change  in 
the-  situation  of  parties  has  intervened  and  the  jury  has  not  been 
discharged.    (Portance  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  932.) 

See  Attachment,  12;  Homicide,  6;  Instructions;  Libel,  2. 

ASSAULT. 

ASSAULT- BATTERY  UPON  PERSON  OF  UNSTABLE 
NERVES— DAMAGES.— If  a  street-car  conductor  commits  an  un- 
justifiable battery  upon  the  person  of  a  lady  passenger,  who  has 
unstable  nerves,  the  company  must  answer  for  the  actual  conse- 
quences of  the  wrong  to  her  as  she  is,  and  the  damages  cannot  be 
cut  down  by  showing  that  the  effect  would  have  been  less  upon  a 
normal  person.     (Spade  v.  Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  298.) 

See  Husband  and  Wife.  1. 

ASSIGNMENT. 

See  Corporations,  21,  24;  Guaranty,  1,  3;  Insurance,  8-10,  22,  23: 
Mortgages,  9-11. 

ASSIGNMENT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  CRBDITORSt 
See  Attachment,  1;  Dower,  2. 


Index.  95& 

ASSOCIATIONS. 

1.  ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES.— THE  CONSTITU- 
TION OP  A  BENEFIT  SOCIETY,  If  no  part  of  Its  charter,  ha» 
only  the  effect  of  a  by-law,  and  cannot  take  from  the  rightfully 
constituted  authorities  of  the  society  their  Inherent  power  to  adopt, 
from  time  to  time,  such  other  by-laws  as  Its  charter  permits  or 
necessity  requires.    (Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscher,  115.) 

2.  ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES— EFFECT  OF  BY- 
LAW.—A  by-law  of  a  benefit  society  forfeiting  claims  of  a  member 
for  suicide  Is  binding  on  one  who  joins  the  society  before  Its  passage, 
and  whose  contract  requires  compliance  with  the  by-laws  In  force 
or  "hereinafter  enacted."  (Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscher, 
115.) 

3.  ASSOCIATIONS  —  BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  —  DELEGATION 
OP  POWER.— The  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society  cannot  dele- 
gate to  a  subordinate  lodge  the  power  to  enact  a  by-law  forfeiting 
the  certificate  of  membership  and  all  claims  thereunder  of  any 
member  whose  death  results  from  self-destruction,  voluntary  or 
Involuntary,  whether  sane  or  insane.  (Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v, 
Kutscher,  115.) 

4.  ASSOCIATIONS-BENEFIT  SOCIETIES— CONSTRUCTION 
OF  CERTIFICATE.— A  certificate  of  membership  In  a  benefit  so- 
ciety which  binds  the  member  to  comply  with  all  the  laws  govern- 
ing the  endowment  rank  which  are  in  force  when  he  becomes  a 
member,  or  which  may  thereafter  be  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge 
or  the  board  of  control,  binds  him  to  comply  with  such  laws  only  as 
such  board  or  the  supreme  lodge  may  lawfully  enact  and  adopt. 
(Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Kutscher,  115.) 

5.  ASSOCIATION— BENEFIT  SOCIETY— ADOPTION  OP  BY- 
LAW.— The  adoption  by  the  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society  of  an 
unauthorized  by-law  passed  by  a  subordinate  lodge  renders  sucb 
by-law  effective,  and  binds  members  of  such  subordinate  lodge  who 
have  agreed  to  comply  with  the  by-laws  now  "in  force  or  that  may 
be  hereafter  enacted  by  the  supreme  lodge."  Supreme  Lodge  K.  of 
P.  V.  Kutscher,  115.) 

6.  ASSOCIATIONS— BENEFIT  SOCIETIES— ENACTMENT  OF 
BY-LAWS.— The  adoption  by  the  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society, 
by  a  viva  voce  vote,  of  a  by-law  passed  by  a  subordinate  lodge  or 
board  of  control  without  authority,  is  a  valid  enactment  of  such 
law,  although  the  constitution  of  such  supreme  lodge  provides  an- 
other method  of  enacting  by-laws.  The  by-law  thus  enacted  blnd» 
members  whose  contracts  require  compliance  with  all  by-laws  "now 
in  force  or  hereafter  enacted  by  such  supreme  lodge."  (Supreme 
Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe,  120.) 

7.  ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS.— THE  CONSTITUTION  OP  A 
VOLUNTARY  ASSOCIATION  is  nothing  more  than  a  by-law  whicb 
may  be  altered,  abrogated,  or  repealed  by  the  power  enacting  lt» 
unless  some  higher  rule  restrains  or  prohibits  a  change  or  repeal. 
(Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe,  120.) 

8.  ASSOCIATIONS— BY-LAWS— REPEAL.— The  valid  passage 
of  a  by-law  by  the  supreme  lodge  of  a  benefit  society  In  any  mode 
not  prolilbited  by  its  charter  or  general  law  is  necessarily  a  repeal 
of  any  other  mode  previously  prescribed  by  the  same  supreme  lodge. 
(Supreme  Lodge  K.  of  P.  v.  Trebbe,  120.) 

9.  ASSOCIATIONS  —  BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  — AMENDMENT 
OP  BY-LAWS  APPLIES  TO  WHAT  MEMBBRS.— If  a  by-law  of 
an  incorporated  beneficiary  association,  which  allows  every  member 


•960  Index. 

a,  right  to  five  dollars  a  week  if  he  becomes  disabled  during  a  period 
^f  not  exceeding  thirteen  weelis  in  each  year,  is  amended  so  as  to 
limit  his  benefits  to  one  dollar  per  weeli,  for  thirteen  weelis  of  each 
jear,  during  a  period  of  five  years,  after  he  has  received  thirty- 
nine  weelis  of  siclj  benefits,  such  amendment  applies  to  a  member 
■who,  at  the  time  of  its  adoption,  was  under  a  disability,  and  had 
been  paid  benefits  for  thirty-nine  weelis.  (Pain  v.  Societe  St.  Jean 
Baptiste,  287.) 

10.  ASSOCIATIONS  — BENEFIT  SOCIETIES  —  POWER  TO 
AMEND  BY-LAWS. — An  incorporated  beneficiary  association  has 
power  to  so  amend  its  by-laws  as  to  deprive  a  member  of  his  right 
to  future  benefits,  under  a  disability  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
amendment,  where  it  has,  without  limitation  or  restriction,  reserved 
the  power  to  amend  its  by-laws.  (Pain  v.  Societe  St  Jean  Baptiste, 
287.) 

See  Social  Clubs. 

ATTACHMENT. 

1.  ATTACHMENT  —  TRUSTEE  PROCESS  —  PROPERTY  IN 
HANDS  OF  ASSIGNEE  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  CREDITORS.— If  a 
debtor  conveys  machinery,  supplies,  and  stocli  on  hand  in  a  shoe 
factory,  and  boolj  accounts,  to  an  assignee  In  trust  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors,  and  creditors  do  not  become  parties  to  the  deed,  the 
property,  in  the  hands  of  the  assignee,  is  subject  to  trustee  process, 
though  nothing  has  been  done  about  taking  possession  of  It,  for  the 
title  has  passed,  as  between  the  parties  to  the  deed,  and  the  aS' 
signee  or  trustee  has  the  immediate  right  of  possession.  (Avery  v. 
Monroe,  250.) 

2.  ATTACHMENT— FALSE  AFFIDAVIT.— An  attachment  based 
•on  a  false  afl3davit  of  the  nonresidence  of  the  debtor  is  void.  (Ger- 
man Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautter,  371.) 

3.  ATTACHMENT— JUDGMENT  BY  CONSTRUCTIVE  SER- 
VICE—ATTACK UPON.— If  plaintiff  in  attachment  seizes  a  resl- 
•dent's  property  as  that  of  a  nonresident,  and  sells  it  under  a  judg- 
ment rendered  upon  constructive  service,  the  judgment  defendant 
«may,  in  the  absence  of  an  appearance  in  that  suit,  attack  such 
Judgment  in  subsequent  suit  by  him,  wherein  the  attachment  plain- 
tiff Invokes  such  judgment  as  a  defense,  and  show  that  it  is  void 
for  the  reason  that  at  the  time  of  the  Inception  of  the  attachment 
•fiult  and  judgment  he  was  a  resident  of  the  state  and  then  therein. 

This  may  be  done  although  the  record  in  the  attachment  suit  Is  regu- 
lar on  its  face.    (German  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kautter,  371.) 

4.  ATTACHMENT  SALES— TITLE  OF  PURCHASER-COL- 
LATERAL ATTACK.— A  purchaser  at  execution  sale  of  the  real 
property  of  a  nonresident  defendant  taken  under  attachment  ac- 
quires a  title  not  subject  to  collateral  attack  in  another  action, 
although  the  publication  of  notice  preceding  the  judgment  in  the 
attachment  proceeding  was  Irregular  and  might  have  been  attacked 
therein.     (Brown  v.  Bose,  379.) 

5.  ATTACHMENT  —  WHEN  NONRESIDENT  MAT  BE 
CHARGED  AS  GARNISHEE— JURISDICTION.-The  courts  of  a 
state  can  charge  a  nonresident  debtor,  transiently  within  their  juris- 
diction, as  garnishee,  If  he  has  In  his  possession  money  or  property 
•of  the  defendant,  or  If  he  has  contracted  to  pay  money  or  deliver 
property  within  such  jurisdiction.     (Balk  v.  Harris,  606.) 

6.  ATTACHMENT  —  GARNISHMENT  —  JURISDICTION.  —  A 
-court  enteitaining  a  garnishment  must  have  some  jurisdiction  ovor 


Index.  961 

the  thing  garnished,  and,  where  the  garnishee  Is  a  nonresident,  has 
In  his  hands  no  property  belonging  to  the  principal  debtor,  and  owes 
him  nothing  payable  within  that  state,  the  jurisdiction  Is  defeated. 
<Balk  V.  Harris,  60G.) 

7.  ATTACHMENT  —  NONRESIDENT  GARNISHEE  —  JURIS- 
DICTION.—As  a  general  rule,  the  courts  of  a  state  cannot,  by  tbelr 
service  of  process  upon  an  inhabitant  of  another  state  transiently 
within  their  jurisdiction,  charge  such  person  as  garnishee.  (Balk 
V.  Harris,  606.) 

8.  ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT-JURISDICTION  OF  AC- 
TION.—Since  an  attachment  is  in  effect  a  proceeding  by  the  prin- 
cipal debtor  in  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  garnishee,  the 
action  must  be  brought  where  the  garnishee  resides,  for  It  Is  there 
that  his  creditor  must  have  sued  him.    (Balk  v.  Harris,  606.) 

9.  ATTACHMENT-GARNISHMENT— SITUS  OP  DEBT.— In 
North  Carolina,  the  situs  of  a  debt  for  purposes  of  an  attachment 
Is  where  the  debtor  resides.     (Balk  v.  Harris,  606.) 

10.  ATTACHMENT— SERVICE  OP  GARNISMENT— EFFECT 
OP.— The  service  of  garnishee  process  operates  as  an  equitable  levy 
upon  property  belonging  to  the  principal  defendant  in  the  hands  of 
the  garnishee,  which  levy  may  be  enforced  against  such  property  In 
the  hands  of  any  other  than  an  Innocent  purchaser  for  value,  unless 
such  right  of  enforcement  be  waived.    (Maxwell  v.  Bank,  926.) 

11.  ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— ELECTION  OP  REME- 
DIES.—Where  a  plaintiff  in  a  suit  of  garnishment,  in  which  process 
has  been  served  on  the  garnishee,  having  the  right  to  prevent  the 
garnishee  from  disposing  of  the  property  for  which  he  may  be  liable, 
«lects  to  consider  the  garnishee  his  debtor  and  take  personal  judg- 
ment against  him,  he  will  be  held  to  his  election,  and  cannot  follow 
the  property  or  its  proceeds.    (Maxwell  v.  Bank,  926.) 

12.  ATTACHMENT— GARNISHMENT— EFFECT  OP  APPEAL 
WITHOUT  STAY.— A  plaintiff  In  garnishment  having  elected  to  sue 
the  garnishee  personally,  and  judgment  being  rendered  for  the  gar- 
nishee, an  appeal  from  such  judgment  does  not  operate  as  a  super- 
sedeas, or  restrain  In  any  way  the  conduct  of  the  garnishee  concern- 
ing the  property  of  the  principal  defendant  In  his  hands.  To  pre- 
serve his  equitable  lien  upon  such  property  plaintiff  must  have  It 
continued  by  special  order  of  court,  and,  such  continuance  not  being 
had,  such  lien  is  not  revived  by  a  reversal  of  the  judgment  appealed 
from.  Persons  taking  the  property  from  the  garnishee  pending  the 
appeal  take  It  free  from  such  equitable  lien.  (Maxwell  t.  Bank, 
«26.) 

See  Insolvency,  3. 

AWARD. 
See  Eminent  Domain,  1,  6. 

BAIL. 

1.  BAIL  IN  CAPITAL  CASE— BURDEN  OP  PROOP.^On  an 

application  by  habeas  corpus  for  ball  In  a  capital  case,  the  burden 
to  establish  the  fact  that  the  proof  Is  evident  is  upon  the  state  and 
oot  upon  the  relator,  to  prove  the  contrary.  (Ex  parte  Newman, 
740.) 

2.  BAH^ACCUSED,  WHEN  ENTITLED  TO.— Unless  the  case 
Is  a  capital  one  and  the  proof  Is  evident  of  this  fact,  and  unless  the 
proof  is  evident  that  the  prisoner  is  guilty  of  a  capital  crime,  he 

AM.  Sn  Kir.,  Vol.  LXX  — «1 


962  Index. 

Is  entitled  to  ball,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  prosecution  to 
show  that  he  Is  not  so  entitled.    (Ex  parte  Newman,  740.) 

BANKRUPTCY. 

BANKRUPTCY— EFFECT  OF  FEDERAL  STATUTE  UPON 
STATE  INSOLVENCY  PROCEEDINGS.— The  United  States 
bankruptcy  law  of  July  1,  1898,  supersedes  all  state  laws  In  regard 
to  insolvency  from  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  statute.  Hence 
insolvency  proceedings  commenced  in  the  state  courts  after  the  pas- 
sage of  that  law  are  unauthorized.  (Parmenter  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Hamil- 
ton. 258.) 

BANKS  AND  BANKING, 

1.  BANKS  AND  BANKING— SELECTION  OP  NOTARY— POW- 
ERS OF  NOTARIES.— In  Iowa,  giving  notice  to  indorsers  of  a  pro- 
tested Instrument  is  made  a  part  of  the  official  duty  of  the  notary 
making  the  protest,  and  a  collecting  bank  acts  prudently  In  Intrust- 
ing to  a  notary  the  giving  of  such  notice.  (First  Nat  Bank  v.  Ger- 
man Bank,  216.) 

2.  BANKS  AND  BANKING— SELECTION  OF  NOTARY— LIA- 
BILITY FOR  HIS  NEGLIGENCE.— A  bank  to  which  a  draft  to 
Bent  by  another  bank  for  collection  Is  not  liable  to  the  latter  for  the 
negligence  of  a  notary  public  prudently  selected  by  the  former  ta 
protest  the  draft  for  nonpayment,  which  negligence  consisted  In  the 
failure  of  the  notary  to  ascertain  the  residence  of  the  person  who 
Indorsed  the  draft  to  the  sender  bank,  or  to  notify  him  of  the  dis- 
honor of  the  draft.  This  rule  is  not  changed  by  the  fact  that  the 
notary  was  also  assistant  cashier  of  the  collecting  bank.  (First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Bank,  216.) 

3.  BANKS  AND  BANKING— COLLECTIONS— NEGLIGENCE 
OF  NOTARY.— Where  one  bank  makes  another  bank  Its  agent  for 
the  collection  of  a  draft,  it  impliedly  authorizes  It  to  employ  a 
notary,  if  necessary,  to  protest  the  draft,  and  if,  through  the  notary's 
negligence,  collection  of  the  draft  is  prevented,  in  the  absence  of 
reasonable  prudence  on  the  part  of  the  collecting  bank  In  the  selec- 
tion of  a  notary,  such  collecting  bank  Is  not  liable  for  the  notary's 
negligence,  but  the  sender  bank  must  seek  Its  remedy  against  th» 
notary.    (First  Nat  Bank  t.  German  Bank,  216.) 

BATTERY. 
See  Assault 

BBJNEFIT  SOCIETIES. 
See  Associations. 

BONDS. 

BONDS— COUPONS  OR  INTEREST— NATURE.— Coupons  at- 
tached to  bonds,  being  for  Interest  to  become  due  on  such  bonds,  are 
a  part  of  them  and  partake  of  their  nature.  (Broadfoot  y.  Fayette* 
vUle,  610.) 

Bee  Fraud;  Limitations  of  Actions,  8;  Municipal  Corporation,  14^  15; 

Sureties.  1. 

BRIBERY. 
Bee  Municipal  Corporations,  7. 


Index.  963 

BROKERS. 

BROKERS-SALES  IN  BROKER'S  NAME-LIABILITY  OP 
PRINCIPAL.— Where  an  agreement  between  a  broker  and  his  prin- 
cipal for  the  sale  of  fruit  does  not  authorize  the  former  to  make 
contracts  of  sale  in  his  own  name,  but  makes  him  a  mere  agent  to 
sell  on  commission,  the  principal  Is  not  liable  to  him  for  losses  sus- 
tained by  reason  of  the  principal's  refusal  to  ship  fruit  to  fill  such 
contracts,  because  of  which  refusal  the  broker  purchased  fruit  at 
excessive  market  rates  to  fill  the  contracts;  but  If  the  principal  ap- 
proved such  contracts  he  is  liable  to  the  broker  for  commissiona 
thereon.    (Delafield  v.  Smith,  938.) 

BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS. 

1.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-USURY— PREMI- 
UMS.—A  statute  authorizing  building  and  loan  associations  to  col- 
lect premiums  from  borrowing  members  for  the  right  of  precedence 
in  taking  loans,  and  that  these  premiums  so  paid,  taken  with  the 
legal  rate  of  interest,  shall  not  be  construed  as  making  the  loans 
usurious,  contemplates  good-faith  bidding  of  premiums  for  the  right 
of  precedence.  "Where  the  monthly  payments  of  premiums  and  In- 
terest together  exceed  the  legal  rate  of  Interest,  and  payments  made 
by  a  member  are  designated  as  premiums  merely  as  a  device  to 
evade  the  law  against  usury  instead  of  being  paid  in  good  faith  to 
secure  a  loan,  the  loan  is  usurious.    (Wilcoxen  v.  Smith,  220.) 

2.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— INSOLVENCY- 
RIGHTS  OF  BORROWING  AND  NONBOBROWING  MEMBERS. 
In  case  of  the  insolvency  of  a  building  and  loan  association,  and  a 
liquidation  of  its  affairs,  there  should  be  an  equitable  distribution  of 
Its  assets  less  Its  liabilities.  Borrowing  members  are  only  entitled 
to  be  credited  with  the  actual  value  of  their  shares,  although  by  the 
by-laws  of  the  association  and  under  the  terms  of  their  loans  they 
are  entitled  to  the  book,  or  withdrawal,  value  of  such  shares.  Such 
provisions  in  the  by-laws  and  terms  of  the  loans  contemplate  a  going 
concern,  and  do  not  apply  when  the  association  has  become  insolvent 
and  Is  in  the  process  of  final  liquidation.    (Wilcoxen  v.  Smith,  220.) 

3.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS  —  RIGHTS  OF 
MEMBERS— PLEDGING  STOCK  AS  SECURITY  FOR  LOAN. 
Where  the  articles  of  incorporation  and  by-laws  of  a  building  and 
loan  association  provide  for  loans  to  shareholders  on  the  security 
of  their  shares  of  stock,  shareholders  do  not  cease  to  be  members 
of  the  association  by  pledging  their  shares  for  loans.  (Wilcoxen  v. 
Smith,  220.) 

4.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— INSOLVENCY- 
RIGHTS  OF  BORROWING  MEMBERS— CREDIT  FOR  VALUE 
OF  SHARES.— Where  a  building  and  loan  association  is  insolvent,- 
and  its  affairs  are  In  process  of  liquidation.  It  will  be  presumed.  In 
the  absence  of  proof,  that  borrowilng  members  are  entitled  to  have 
credited  upon  their  debts  to  the  association  the  book  value  of  their 
shares.  The  burden  of  proof  is  upon  one  who  would  rebut  this  pre- 
sumption to  show  the  actual  value  of  such  shares.  (Wilcoxen  v. 
Smith,  220.) 

5.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS  —  USURIOUS  IN- 
TEREST AND  PREMIUMS— APPLICATION  TO  MEMBER'S 
CREDIT.— Usurious  Interest  and  premiums  paid  to  a  building  and 
loan  association  by  a  borrowing  member  should  be  applied  to  the 
credit  of  such  member  as  deductions  from  the  amount  of  his  loan. 
(Wilcoxen  v.  Smith,  220.) 


964  Index. 

6.  BTJILDTNG  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— AMOUNT  RE- 
COVERABLE FROM  MEMBERS— STATUTORY  CONSTRUC- 
TION.—A  statute  fixing  the  amounts  that  may  be  Included  in  the 
recovery  by  a  building  and  loan  association  from  a  borrower  should 
be  construed  as  fixing  the  maximum  amount  of  recovery,  and  not 
as  preventing  the  association  from  contracting  to  receive  a  less 
amount.    (Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt,  197.) 

7.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USURY— EXAC- 
TION OF  PREMIUMS.— A  building  and  loan  association  author- 
ized by  statute  to  receive  "pi-emiums  bid  by  members  for  the  right 
of  precedence  in  taking  loans,"  has  no  authority  to  exact  from  the 
borrower,  where  there  is  no  competition,  an  arbitrary  sum  In  ad- 
dition to  the  interest  on  his  loan,  where  the  whole  amounts  to  more 
than  legal  interest.    (Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt,  197.) 

8.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS-USURY— INTER- 
EST UPON  FAQE,  RATHER  THAN  AMOUNT,  OF  LOAN.— A 
building  and  loan  association,  having  deducted  from  a  loan  to  a 
member  a  sum  sufficient  to  pay  expenses  incidental  to  maliing  the 
loan,  which  are  properly  charged  to  the  borrower,  may  compute 
legal  interest  upon  the  face  of  the  loan  instead  of  the  amount  ac- 
tually received  by  the  borrower  without  making  the  transactioa 
usurious.     (Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt,  197.) 

9.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— EXORBITANT 
FINES.— One  who  purchases  stock  in  a  building  and  loan  associa- 
tion is  held  to  a  knowledge  of  the  terms  of  his  membership,  and 
will  not  be  heard  later  to  complain  of  the  imposition  of  reasonable 
fines  for  defaults  in  payments,  which  fines  arfe  authorized  by  statute. 
(Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt,  197.) 

10.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— LOANS  TO 
MEMBERS— PROPER  DEDUCTIONS.— A  building  and  loan  asso- 
elation  may  retain  from  loans  made  to  members  a  sum  sufficient 
to  cover  the  cost  of  examining  abstract,  appraiser's  fee,  recording 
mortgage,  and  expenses  of  management.  (Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn. 
V.  Heidt,  197.) 

11.  USURY-STATUTORY  CHANGES— RETROACTIVE  EF- 
FECT.—The  privilege  of  pleading  usury  pertains  only  to  the  remedy 
and  may  be  taken  away  by  statute  as  to  contracts  entered  Into 
before  the  enactment  of  the  statute,  nor  does  such  a  statute  impair 
vested  rights  when  enacted  pending  an  appeal  from  a  decree  In  favor 
of  a  member  of  a  building  and  loan  association  on  a  plea  of  usury, 
made  to  avoid  the  enforcement  of  a  contract  between  himself  and 
the  association.    (Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Heidt,  197.) 

12.  BUILDING  AND  LOAN  ASSOCIATIONS— USURY-CON- 
STITUTIONAL LAW.— The  legislature  may  exempt  transactions 
between  building  and  loan  associations  and  their  members  from  the 
operation  of  the  law  against  usury.  (Iowa  Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v. 
Heldt,  197.) 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF. 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF— PRESUMPTION.— Where  a  railroad 
commission  has  taken  any  action  under  a  statute,  every  presump- 
tion Is  in  favor  of  the  action,  and  the  burden  is  upon  the  party  com- 
plaining to  show  that  such  action  was  contrary  to  law.  (Jacobson 
V.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  358.) 

See  Bail,  1;  Habeas  Corpus,  4;  Interstate  Commerce,  6;  Liens,  4; 
Telegraph  Companies,  4;  Vendor  and  Purchaser,  2,  8. 


Index.  965 

CARRIERS. 

1.  A  COMMON  CARRIER  IS  ONE  WHO,  by  virtue  of  his  call- 
Ing,  undertjikes,  for  compensation,  to  transport  personal  property 
from  one  place  to  another  for  all  such  as  may  choose  to  employ  him, 
and  everyone  who  undertakes  to  carry  for  compensation  the  goods 
of  all  persons  Indifferently  Is,  as  to  liability,  to  be  deemed  a  common 
carrier.     (Jacobson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 

2.  CARRIERS,  COMMON— WHO  ARE.— Truckmen,  wagoners, 
cartmen,  and  porters  who  undertake  to  carry  goods  for  hire  as  a 
common  employment  in  a  city,  or  from  one  town  to  another,  are 
common  carriers,  although  carrying  Is  not  the  exclusive  business  of 
the  parties.    (Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 

3.  CARRIERS,  COMMON— TRUCKMEN,  WHO  MOVE  HEAVY 
MACHINERY.- If  persons  advertise  themselves  as  general  truck- 
men, their  particular  specialty  being  the  moving  of  heavy  machin- 
ery, and  they  keep  and  maintain  for  this  purpose  a  large  number 
of  trucks  and  horses,  and  the  necessary  help  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  business,  there  is,  in  an  action  against  them  for  damages  caused 
by  injury  to  such  machinery,  during  its  transportation,  no  eri'or  In 
the  refusal  of  the  trial  judge  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  defend- 
ants are  not  common  carriers.  The  circumstance  that  the  defend- 
ants have  no  regular  tariff  of  charges  for  their  work,  but  that  a 
special  price  Is  fixed  by  agreement,  does  not  change  the  relation. 
The  necessity  for  a  different  charge  In  each  case  arises,  of  course, 
out  of  the  difference  in  labor  In  handling  articles  of  great  bulk.  The 
charge  In  each  case  may  be  proportioned  to  the  risk  assumed  and 
commensurate  with  the  carrier's  responsibility  as  such.  (Jackson 
etc  Works  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 

See  Negligence,  2, 

CAVEAT  EMPTOR. 
See  Elxecution,  1. 

CEMETERIES. 

1.  CEMETERIES-BURIAL  RIGHTS— LICENSE  TO  USD 
GROUND.— One  who  enters  Into  posseslson  of  a  lot  In  a  public  ceme- 
tery, Improves  the  same,  and  uses  it  for  burial  purposes,  with  the 
express  or  implied  consent  of  those  who  have  control  of  the  ceme- 
tery, although  he  acquires  no  title  to  the  lot,  acquires  a  license  to 
use  the  same  for  burial  purposes,  which  license,  so  long  as  it  con« 
tlnues,  will  support  an  action  of  trespass  for  any  invasion  or  dis- 
turbance of  it,  whether  by  the  grantors  or  strangers.  (Hollman  v. 
Platteville,  899.) 

2.  CEMETERIES— REGULATION.  BY  CITY— LIABILITY  OF 
CITY  IN  DAJIAGES.— A  city  given  power,  by  statute,  to  adopt 
regulations  as  to  a  public  cemetery,  and,  upon  proper  notice,  to  com- 
pel lotowners  or  occupants  to  comply  with  such  regulations,  is  liable 
in  damages  to  a  lot  occupant,  if,  without  having  adopted  any  regu- 
lations, and  without  notice  to  him,  it  invades  his  lot  and  cuts  down 
trees  which  he  has  planted  therein  in  the  improvement  thereof, 
(HoUman  ▼.  Platteville,  899.) 

CHARITABLE  TRUST. 
See  WUls,  8,  9,  10. 

COLLATERAL  ATTACK. 
See  Adoption,  3;  Attachment,  4;  Judgment,  10,  18. 


966  Index. 

CONDITIONS. 
See  Devise,  2,  7-0. 

CONFESSIONS. 
See  Criminal  Law,  12-14. 

CONFLICT  OF  LAWS. 
See  Bankruptcy. 

CONSIDERATION. 
See  Deeds,  2,  3;  Husband  and  Wife,  4;  Municipal  Corporations,  20. 

CONSTITUTIONS. 

CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  — LOCAL  OPTION.— A  constitu- 
tional provision  giving  tlie  legislature  authority  to  enact  laws  with 
regard  to  the  adoption  of  local  option  by  the  people  Is  exclusive  of 
any  other  method  to  be  pursued  by  the  legislature  for  dealing  with 
the  question,  especially  so  far  as  the  same  territory  is  concerned 
where  local  option  has  been  adopted.    (Ex  parte  Brown,  743.) 

See  Mandamus,  1, 

CONTEMPT. 

1.  CONTEMPT— INSTITUTION  OF  PROCEEDINGS  FOR,  BY 
COURT— NEWSPAPER  PUBLICATIONS.— When  It  comes,  in  any 
manner,  to  the  Icnowledge  of  the  presiding  justice  of  a  court  that 
articles  are  published  in  a  newspaper  circulated  in  the  place  where 
the  court  Is  held,  which  are  calculated  to  prevent  a  fair  trial  of  a 
cause  then  on  trial  before  the  court,  the  court,  of  its  own  motion, 
can  institute  proceedings  for  contempt.  (Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth. 280.) 

2.  CONTEMPT— CORPORATION  —  FINE  —  EXECUTION.— The 
proper  method  of  collecting  a  fine  imposed  upon  a  cori>oration  for  a 
contempt  of  court  is  by  a  levy  of  an  execution  issued  by  the  court. 
(Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  280.) 

3.  CONTEMPT— CORPORATION— LIABILITY.— An  Intent  may 
be  Imputed  to  a  corporation  in  criminal  proceedings,  and  It  may, 
therefore,  be  held  answerable  for  a  criminal  contempt  of  court. 
(Telegram  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  280.) 

4.  CONTEMPT  —  CORPORATION  —  NEWSPAPER  PUBLICA- 
TION OF  FACTS,— It  is  a  contempt  of  court  for  a  newspaper, 
printed  by  a  corporation  and  circulated  In  the  place  where  a  trial  Is 
had,  pending  the  trial,  to  publish  statements  of  facts,  evidence  of 
which  Is  not  competent  at  the  trial,  and  which  Is  not  Introduced 
thereon.  If  they  are  so  made  that  it  Is  liliely  that  the  presiding  jus- 
tice and  the  jurors  will  read  them  during  the  trial,  and  their  natural 
and  probable  effect  will  be  to  improperly  Influence  the  justice  and 
the  jury  In  the  determination  of  the  cause.  (Telegram  etc.  Co.  v. 
Commonwealth,  280.) 

5.  CONTEMPT  —  CORPORATION  —  NEWSPAPER  PUBLICA- 
TION.—The  publication  of  an  article  In  a  newspaper,  printed  by  a 
corporation  and  circulated  In  the  place  where  a  trial  is  had,  pending 
the  trial,  which  concerns  the  cause  on  trial,  and  which  Is  calciilnted 
to  prejudice  the  jury  In  the  cause,  and  prevent  a  fair  trial,  Is  a 
criminal  contempt  of  the  court  trying  the  cause,  for  which  the  cor- 
poration may  be  held  answerable.  (Telegram  etc.  Co.  r.  Common- 
wealth, 280.) 


Index.  967 

CONTRACTS. 

1.  CONTRACT  FOR  BENEFIT  OP  THIRD  PARTY-RIGHT 
OP  ACTION  FOR  BREACH.— The  beneficiaries  of  a  contract,  who 
furnish  the  consideration  money  of  the  contract,  can  maintain  an 
action  for  damages  caused  by  its  breach.  (Gorrill  v.  Water  Supply 
Co.,  598.) 

2.  CONTRACT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  THIRD  PARTY  — ^IIGHT 
OP  ACTION.— One  not  a  party  or  privy  to  a  contract,  but  who  Is  a 
beneficiary  thereof,  Is  entitled  to  maintain  an  action  for  Its  breach. 
<GorrllI  V.  Water  Supply  Co.,  598.) 

3.  CONTRACT  FOR  BENEFIT  OP  THIRD  PARTY— BENE- 
FICIARY ONE  OP  A  CLASS— ACTION.— One  not  a  party  to  a  con- 
tract,  but  who  is  a  beneficiary  thereof,  Is  entitled  to  maintain  an 
action  for  Its  breach,  even  when  he  Is  only  one  of  a  class  of  persons, 
If  the  class  Is  sufficiently  designated.  (Gorrill  v.  Water  Supply  Co., 
698.) 

4.  CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION  OF  PROMISES.— It  Is  S 
rule  of  law,  as  well  as  of  ethics,  that  where  the  language  of  a  prom- 
isor may  be  understood  In  more  senses  than  one.  It  Is  to  be  Inter- 
preted In  the  sense  In  which  he  had  reason  to  suppose  It  was  under- 
stood by  the  promisee.    (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

5.  CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION  OF.— If  It  be  left  in  doubt 
"Whether  given  words  were  used  In  an  enlarged  or  a  restricted  sense, 
other  things  being  equal,  that  construction  should  be  adopted  which 
is  most  beneficial  to  the  promisee.    (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

6.  CONTRACTS-DISCHARGE  OP  FIRST  INDORSER  BY- 
AGREEMENT  FOR  INDULGENCE— PARTIES.— An  agreement 
for  Indulgence  which  will  discharge  or  release  the  first  Indorser  on 
a  promissory  note  cannot  be  made  with  any  other  person  than  the 
maker  of  the  note,  or  principal  debtor.  (Wright  v.  Independence 
Nat.  Bank,  889.) 

7.  CONTRACTS— EXTENDING  TIME  TO  SECOND  IN- 
DORSER FOR  PAYMENT  OP  NOTE  DOBS  NOT  DISCHARGE 
FIRST  INDORSER  OR  SURETY.— An  agreement  between  the 
holder  of  a  negotiable  note  and  a  second  Indorser  upon  It,  to  extend 
the  time  of  payment,  does  not  discharge  the  first,  though  an  accom- 
modation Indorser  from  his  liability  on  the  note,  and  furnishes  no 
■defense  to  an  action  brought  against  him  by  the  holder,  as  the 
agreement  does  not  prevent  the  first  Indorser  from  paying  the  debt, 
and  proceeding  at  once  against  the  maker,  or  from  exercising  any 
rights  which  a  surety  may  assert  for  his  protection  against  his 
principal.    (Wright  v.  Independence  Nat.  Bank,  889.) 

8.  CONTRACTS  —  ILLEGALITY  —  WAIVER  —  FAILURE  TO 
PLEAD.— The  Illegality  of  a  contract  cannot  be  gotten  rid  of  either 
by  a  failure  to  plead  It,  or  by  agreeing  to  waive  it  in  the  most 
solemn  manner.    (Camp  v.  Bruce,  873.) 

9.  CONTRACTS— ILLEGALITY  OF,  IS  FATAL.— The  law  re- 
fuses to  enforce  illegal  contracts  from  reasons  of  public  policy,  and 
It  is  Immaterial  at  what  stage  of  the  case  the  illegality  appears. 
(Camp  V.  Bruce,  873.) 

10.  CONTRACTS  OPPOSED  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY-JUDICIAL 
SALES— BUYING  BIDS.— The  object  in  Judicial  sales  Is  to  get  the 
best  price  that  can  be  fairly  had  for  the  property.  Hence,  to  allow 
one  bidder  to  buy  off  another,  which  Is  but  a  species  of  bribery,  and 
thus  prevent  the  property  from  bringing  the  best  price,  is  con- 
demned by  the  law,  and  the  courts  will  not  enforce  contracts  founded 
4n  such  practices.    (Camp  v.  Bruce,  873.) 


Index. 

11.  CONTRACTS  OPPOSED  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY— JUDICIAI> 
SALES  — BUYING  BID  BEFORE  CONFIRMATION.— An  agree- 
ment between  the  purchaser  at  a  judicial  sale  and  another  person 
that  the  former  will,  upon  a  confirmation  of  the  sale,  sell  the  prop- 
erty to  the  latter  at  an  advanced  price  is  contrary  to  public  policy 
and  void,  because  it  tends  to  prevent  the  property  from  bringing 
the  best  price.    (Camp  v.  Bruce,  873.) 

12.  "CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD— AFFIRMANCE- 
RESCISSION— NEW  INCIDENTS  OF  SAME  FRAUD.— If  a  con- 
tract has  been  procured  by  fraud,  and  the  person  defrauded,  with 
knowledge  of  the  substance  of  the  fraud,  elects  to  affirm  the  con- 
tract, he  cannot  subsequently,  upon  discovering  new  incidents  of 
the  same  fraud,  elect  to  rescind  the  contract.  Knowledge  of  the 
essence  of  the  fraud  puts  him  to  his  election.  The  subsequent  dis- 
covery of  a  new  incident  in  the  fraud  does  not  confer  a  new  right 
to  rescind,  but  merely  confirms  the  previous  knowledge  of  the  same 
fraud.     (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 

13.  CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD-RESCISSION  OR 
AFFIRMANCE— ELECTION.— If  a  party  who  has  been  defrauded 
in  the  procurement  of  a  contract  elects,  on  discovery  of  the  fraud, 
to  affirm  the  contract,  his  election  is  final  and  conclusive.  He  has 
but  on  election  to  rescind,  and,  having  once  elected  to  affirm  the  con- 
tract, he  cannot  thereafter  disaffirm  it,  but  must  abide  by  the  de- 
cision he  has  made.    (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 

14.  CONTRACTS  PROCURED  BY  FRAUD— EIGHTS  AND 
REMEDIES  OF  PARTY  DEFRAUDED.— A  contract  induced  by 
fraud  is  not  void,  but  voidable  at  the  option  of  the  party  injured 
by  the  fraud.  Upon  its  discovery  he  has,  as  a  general  rule,  the 
choice  of  two  remedies:  1.  He  may  elect  to  rescind  the  contract. 
If  he  can  restore  what  he  has  received  in  the  same  state  or  condi- 
tion in  which  he  received  it,  and  sue  for  and  recover  back  the  con- 
sideration he  has  paid  or  given;  or,  if  he  has  not  paid  or  given 
anything,  repudiate  the  contract,  and  rely,  when  sued,  upon  the 
fraud  as  a  complete  defense;  2.  He  may  elect  to  retain  what  he 
has  received  under  the  contract,  and  bring  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  the  injury  he  has  sustained  from  the  deceit.  By  adopting 
the  latter  course,  he,  in  effect,  affirms  the  contract,  but  not  as  made 
in  good  faith.  He  consents  to  be  bound  by  Its  provisions,  but  does 
not  thereby  release  or  waive  his  claim  for  damages  arising  from 
the  fraud  collateral  to  the  agreement.    (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 

See  Appeal,  13;  Corporations,  4,  5,  7,  8;  Executors  and  Administra- 
tors; Guardian  and  Ward,  2,  4,  5;  Insurance,  13,  14;  Municipal 
Corporations,  3-10;  Names;  Statute  of  Frauds,  1;  Waterworks 
and  Water  Companies,  1, 

CORPORATIONS. 

1.  A  CORPORATION  HAS  ITS  DOMICILE  In  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  state  which  created  it,  and,  as  a  consequence,  has  no  domi- 
cile anywhere  else.    (Bergner  etc.  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus,  251.) 

2.  CORPORATIONS  —  ACTION  BY  A  FOREIGN  CORPORA- 
TION—DISCHARGE OF  INSOLVENT  AS  A  BAR.— A  discharge 
under  the  insolvency  laws  of  Massachusetts  does  mot  discharge  a 
debt  due  from  the  Massachusetts  debtor  to  a  corporation  of  an- 
other state,  having  Its  principal  place  of  business  In  the  latter  state, 
although  It  has  a  place  of  business  in  Massachusetts,  and  a  license 
under  the  laws  of  that  state,  and  has  complied  with  Its  laws  regu- 
lating foreign  corporations  doing  business  there,  respecting  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  person  upon  whom  process  may  be  served.  (Bergner 
etc  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dreyfus,  251.) 


Index.  96» 

3.  CORPORATIONS  —  STOCKHOLDERS  -  LIABILITY  TO 
CREDITORS— TRANSITORY  ACTION.— The  liability  of  a  stock- 
holder in  a  corporation  organized  under  the  laws  of  the  state  of 
Kansas  for  the  debts  of  the  corporation  is  several,  and  may  be  en- 
forced \>y  an  action  against  him  in  any  court  of  general  jurisdiction 
In  the  state  where  personal  service  of  process  can  be  made  upon  the 
stockholder.     (Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis,  232.) 

4.  CORPORATIONS— CONTRACT  FOR  STOCK  SUBSCRIP- 
TION—CONSTRUCTION.— A  contract  made  to  Induce  stock  sub- 
scriptions, whereby  the  promisors  agree  to  repurchase  the  stock 
at  the  end  of  three  years,  upon  receiving  thirty  days'  notice  that  the 
subscriber  desires  to  return  the  stock,  is  conditional,  and  liability 
thereunder  does  not  exist  in  favor  of  a  particular  promisee,  unless, 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  tlie  expiration  of  the  three  years, 
the  thirty  days'  notice  Is  given  by  him  to  the  promisors  of  his  elec- 
tion to  carry  the  stock  no  longer.    (Rogers  v.  Burr,  50.) 

5.  CORPORATIONS— STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS— CONTRACTT 
OF  GUARANTY— CONSTRUCTION.— If  joint  promisors,  to  induce 
stock  subscriptions,  guarantee  the  payment  of  eight  per  cent  divi- 
dends to  subscribers  for  thi-ee  years,  and,  at  the  expiration  of  that 
time,  on  receiving  a  specified  notice,  to  purchase  the  stock  at  Its 
par  value,  the  guaranty  as  to  the  dividends  is  unconditional  and 
binding  without  notice,  and  covers  a  period  of  three  years,  although 
the  guaranty  as  to  purchasing  the  stock  becomes  inoperative  for 
want  of  notice.    (Rogers  v.  Burr,  50.) 

6.  CORPORATIONS  —  STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS  —  STATUTE 
OF  FRAUDS.— It  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  a  contract  of 
subscription  to  shares  of  stock  In  a  manufacturing  corporation  that 
it  be  reduced  to  writing.  Shares  of  stock  In  joint  stock  companies 
are  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds.    (Rogers  v.  Burr,  50.) 

7.  CORPORATIONS  —  STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS  —  VALIDITY 
OF  GUARANTY— CONSIDERATION.— If  a  number  of  persons,  in 
order  to  induce  another  to  subscribe  to  the  capital  stock  of  a  manu- 
facturing corporation  in  which  they  are  all  Interested,  execute  a 
joint  agreement  guaranteeing  the  payment  of  an  annual  dividend 
of  eight  per  cent  for  three  years  on  such  stock  to  subscriber  who 
take  enougii  stock  for  the  successful  organization  of  the  corporation, 
and  also  agreeing  that  if,  at  the  expiration  of  such  three  years,  the 
holders  of  such  stock  do  not  desire  to  carry  it  any  longer,  "we 
hereby  agree,  with  thirty  days'  notice  from  any  or  all  of  them,  to 
pay  each  holder  par  value,  or  fifty  dollars,  for  each  share  of  stock 
held  by  them,  their  heirs  or  assigns,"  such  agreement  of  guaranty 
Is  valid  and  based  upon  a  sufl5cient  consideration,  where  the  guar- 
antors are  residents  of  the  town  in  which  the  manufacturing  cor- 
poration Is  to  be  located,  are  interested  in  its  growth  and  develop- 
ment, and  Jointly  Interested  with  the  subscribers  in  the  furtherance 
of  the  undertaking.    (Rogers  v.  Burr,  50.) 

8.  CORPORATIONS— STOCK  SUBSCRIPTIONS-CONSTRUC- 
TION OP  CONTRACT.— If  several  persons,  in  order  to  Induce  a 
promisee  to  subscribe  for  stock,  jointly  agree  to  buy  such  stock 
back  at  the  end  of  three  years,  upon  receiving  a  specified  notice 
from  the  promisee  of  his  election  to  sell,  notice  to  one  or  more 
joint  promisors  of  an  election  by  the  promisee  to  sell  his  stock  is  not 
notice  to  the  others,  and  this,  though  one  of  them,  as  agent  for  the 
others,  has  procured  stock  subscriptions  under  the  contract  (Rogers 
V.  Burr,  50.) 

9.  CORPORATIONS  —  LIABILITY  OF  STOCKHOLDERS- 
COUNTERCLAIM.— In  an  action  by  a  stockholder  of  an  insolvent 
corporation  to  enjoin  an  execution  sale  of  real  estate   which   has 


y70  Index. 

Seen  purchased  by  Mm  from  the  members  of  a  firm  against  whom 
the  defendant  has  recovered  the  judgment  on  which  the  execution 
issued,  an  answer  charging  that  all  the  stockholders  of  such  cor- 
poration are  liable  for  the  payment  of  the  debt  on  which  the  judg- 
ment is  based  and  asliing  that  they  be  brought  in  and  required 
to  pay  does  not  set  up  a  counterclaim.    (Wehn  v.  Fall,  397.) 

10.  CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— RIGHTS  OF  CREDIT- 
ORS—LIABILITY OF  STOCKHOLDERS.— A  creditor  of  an  insol- 
vent and  dissolved  corporation  must  first  exhaust  his  legal  rem- 
edy against  it,  before  he  can  sue  to  obtain  satisfaction  of  his  claim 
against  a  stocliholder  who  nas  come  into  possession  of  corporate  as- 
€ets.     (Wehn  v.  Fall,  397.) 

11.  CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY-LIEN  OF  CREDITOR 
ON  ASSETS.— A  creditor  of  an-  insolvent  corporation  does  not  ac- 
■quire  any  specific  lien  on  its  assets,  and  cannot  proceed  against  one 
having  possession  of  such  assets  without  first  reducing  his  claim  to 

judgment.    (Wehn  v.  Fall,  397.) 

12.  CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY.— CREDITORS  of  an  In- 
solvent corporation  must  first  obtain  judgment  on  their  claims  be- 
fore attempting  to  reach  property  transferred  by  the  corporatioo 
in  fraud  of  their  rights.     (Wehn  v.  Fall,  397.) 

13.  CORPORATIONS— BUSINESS  NOT  AUTHORIZED  BY  AR- 
TICLES OF  INCORPORATION— LIABILITY  OF  STOCKHOLD- 
ERS.—The  mere  fact  that  a  corporation  has  done  some  business 
outside  that  authorized  by  its  articles  does  not  render  the  stock- 
holders, as  such,  liable  for  its  corporate  debts,  to  the  amount  of 
stock  owned  or  held  by  them,  although  the  stockholders  would  be 
80  liable,  under  the  state  constitution,  if  such  business  had  been  au- 
thorized by  its  articles.  (Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turner  Co., 
334.) 

14.  CORPORATIONS,  CHARACTER  OF  —  HOW  DETER- 
MINED.—At  least  in  the  absence  of  a  fraudulent  attempt  to  evade 
the  law,  the  articles  of  incorporation  are  themselves  the  sole  cri- 
terion to  ascertain  the  purpose  for  which  the  corporation  was 
formed.    (Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turner  Co.,  334.) 

15.  CORPORATIONS— POWERS— DUTIES  OF  THIRD  PER- 
SONS.—Strangers  or  third  persons  are  presumed  to  know  the  law  of 
the  land,  and  are  bound,  when  dealing  with  corporations,  to  know 
the  powers  conferred  by  their  charters.  (Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Frisk-Turner  Co.,  334.) 

16.  CORPORATIONS,  MANUFACTURING— WHEN  ARTICLES 
OF  INCORPORATION  DO  NOT  AUTHORIZE  THE  COx\DUCT- 
ING  OF  A  MERCANTILE  BUSINESS.— The  buying  and  selling  of 
ready-made  clothing  is  purely  a  mercantile  business,  and  is"  un- 
authorized by  the  articles  of  incorporation  of  a  manufacturing  cor- 
poration permitting  "the  transaction  of  all  business  necessary 
and  incidental  to  such  manufacture  and  sale  of  clothing."  (Nicollet 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turner  Co.,  334.) 

17.  CORPORATIONS— CONSTRUCTION  OF  ARTICLES  OP 
INCORPORATIONS— MANUFACTURING.— A  corporation,  whose 
articles  of  Incorporation  state  that  "its  business  shall  be  the  manu- 
facturing of  clothing  of  every  description,  and  the  sale  of  clothing 
so  manufactured,  and  the  transaction  of  all  other  business  neces- 
sary and  incidental  to  such  manufacture  and  sale  of  clothing,"  is  a 
manufacturing  corporation  within  the  meaning  of  article  10,  sec- 
tion 3,  of  the  Minnesota  constitution.  (Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk- 
Turner  Co.,  334.) 


Index.  971 

18.  CORPORATIONS  —  DEFINITIONS.  —  "AN  INCIDENTAI, 
POWER  is  one  that  Is  directly  and  immediately  appropriate  to  tlie 
execution  of  tlie  specific  power  granted,  and  not  one  that  has  a 
slight  or  remote  relation  to  it."  (Nicollet  Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turner 
Co.,  334.) 

19.  CORPORATIONS— POWERS.— A  corporation  possesses  only 
those  properties  which  the  charter  of  its  creation  confers  upon  it, 
either  expressly,  or  as  incidental  to  its  very  existence.  (Nicollet 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Frisk-Turner  Co.,  334.) 

20.  CORPORATIONS  —  NOTICE  —  KNOWLEDGE  OF  PRESI- 
DENT.—A  coi-poration  cannot  be  charged  with  the  knowledge  of 
its  president,  when  such  knowledge  was  obtained  before  he  be- 
came president,  or  when  he  is  acting  in  his  own  interest  and  behalf. 
<Dorr  V.  Life  Ins.  C.  Co.,  308.) 

21.  CORPORATIONS  —  ASSIGNMENT  OF  STOCK— EFFECT 
ON  LIEN  OF  THE  CORPORATION.— An  assignment  or  sale  of  cor- 
poration stock,  to  a  person  ignorant  of  a  statutory  lien  thereon  held 
by  the  corporation,  will  not  discharge  the  lien.  (Dorr  v.  Life  Ins. 
C.  Co..  309.) 

22.  CORPORATIONS-STATUTORY  LIEN  ON  STOCK.— When, 
by  general  law,  a  lien  is  given  to  a  corporation  upon  the  stock  of 
a.  stockholder  in  the  corporation  for  his  indebtedness  to  it,  that 
lien  is  valid  and  enforceable  against  all  the  world,  unless  it  has 
been  waived,  surrendered,  or  lost  in  some  sufficient  manner.  (Dorr 
V.  Life  Ins.  C.  Co.,  308.) 

23.  CORPORATIONS  —  TRUST  COMPANY— PRESUMPTION 
OF  CAPACITY.— In  the  absence  of  specific  restriction  in  its  charter, 
a  trust  company  having  general  power  to  "execute  trusts  of  every 
description"  must  be  presumed  to  have  corporate  capacity  to  act  as 
committee  of  a  lunatic.    (Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Garis,  644.) 

24.  CORPORATIONS  —  STOCKHOLDER'S  LIABILITY  —  EN- 
FORCEMENT OF  IN  ANOTHER  STATE.— An  assignee  of  an  in- 
solvent corporation  of  another  state,  appointed  therein  and  author- 
ized by  the  law  thereof  to  maintain  any  suit  which  the  corporation 
could  have  maintained,  may  maintain  an  action  in  another  state 
against  all  the  original  stockholders  residing  therein  to  enforce  their 
common-law  contractual  liability  to  pay  the  subscription  price  of 
their  stock  and  to  compel  them  to  contribute  their  pro  rata  share  of 
the  indebtedness  of  the  corporation  to  the  extent  of  their  unpaid 
etock  subscriptions.  This  remedy  exists  independently  of  the  pro- 
Tisions  of  the  statute  of  the  former  state.    (Stoddard  v.  Lum,  541.) 

25.  CORPORATIONS— STATUTORY  ACTION  TO  RECOVER 
DEBT  OF  DIRECTORS  WHERE  COMPANY  FAILS  TO  FILE  AN 
ANNUAL  REPORT.— In  a  suit  wherein  it  Is  sought  to  charge  the 
defendants,  as  directors  of  a  corporation,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions 
of  a  statute,  which  provides  that,  in  case  of  failure  to  file  an  annual 
report,  "all  the  directors  thereof  shall  be  jointly  and  severally  liable 
for  all  the  debts  of  the  corporation  then  existing,  and  for  all  that 
shall  be  contracted  before  such  report  shall  be  made,"  the  plaintiff 
must.  In  order  to  succeed,  prove  either  that,  at  the  time  of  default 
in  filing  the  annual  report,  the  debt  in  suit  existed,  or  that  it  was 
contracted  before  the  report  was  filed.    (Withrow  v.  Slayback,  507.) 

26.  CORPORATIONS— FAILURE  TO  FILE  ANNUAL  REPORT 
—ACTION  FOR  DEBT— ABANDONMENT  OP  BUSINESS  AS  A 
DEFENSE.— If  a  statute  makes  the  directors  of  a  corporation  an- 
swerable for  its  existing  debts,  and  those  contracted  before  the  com- 
pany makes  an  annual  report,  It  is  no  defense  to  an  action  brought 
to  charge  them  with  corporate  debts  by  virtue  of  the  company's 


972  Index. 

failure  fo  file  a  report  that  the  company  had  ceased  to  exist,  by 
abandoning  its  business  and  turning  over  its  property  to  its  cred- 
itors, before  the  time  for  filing  the  report,  If  it  is  shown  that  such 
transfer  did  not  embrace  all  of  its  property,  and  that  the  company 
continued  to  exercise  acts  of  absolute  ownership  over  other  omitted 
property,  and  subsequently  filed  a  report  of  full  payment  of  its  cap- 
ital stock,  as  well  as  two  annual  reports.  (Withrow  v.  SlaybacR, 
507.) 

27.  CORPORATIONS— FAILURE  TO  FILE  ANNUAL  REPORT 
—DIRECTOR'S  LIABILITY— INDORSEMENT  OF  NOTE  BY  COR- 
PORATION AND  PAROL  PROOF  OF  COMPANY'S  LIABILITY. 
If  the  superintendent  and  an  oflicer  of  an  incorporated  company 
signs  a  promissory  note  given  in  payment  of  a  preceding  Indebted- 
ness due  by  the  company,  which,  by  its  treasurer,  indorses  the  note, 
and  the  payee  seelis  to  charge  the  directors  of  the  corporation  with 
the  debt  for  having  failed  to  file  an  annual  report,  under  a  statute 
which  malies  them  answerable  for  all  debts  existing  or  contracted 
before  the  annual  report  is  made,  and  the  directors  seek  to  avoid 
liability  by  standing  on  a  strict  contract  of  indorsement,  and  insist- 
ing tliat  they  are  only  contingently  answerable  when  the  note  Is 
due  and  the  indorser  charged,  and  that  protest  was  after  the  time 
of  the  filing  of  the  report,  the  plaintiff  should  be  permitted  to 
show,  by  parol  evidence,  the  real  transaction— that  the  corporation 
was,  in  reality,  the  principal  debtor,  and  that  the  company  was, 
therefore,  answerable  to  the  plaintiff  before  the  default  in  filing  the 
report  was  cured.    ("Withrow  v.  Slayback,  507.) 

28.  CORPORATIONS  —  MEETINGS  —  WANT  OF  NOTICE.— A 
meeting  of  the  directors  of  a  corporation  held  without  notice  to  ab- 
sent directors,  or  the  existence  of  such  an  emergency  as  excuses 
notice  to  them,  renders  the  business  transacted  at  such  meeting 
void.    (Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  773.) 

29.  CORPORATIONS  —  MEETINGS  —  PRESUMPTION  AS  TO 
REGULARITY.— If  it  appears  that  a  special  meeting  of  the  directors 
of  a  corporation  was  held  and  that  a  quorum  was  present,  It  must 
be  presumed  that  due  notice  of  the  meeting  was  given  and  that 
all  steps  necessary  to  constitute  It  a  regular  and  valid  meeting  were 
taken.    (Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  773.) 

30.  CORPORATIONS— INSOLVENCY— TRUST  DEED.— The  in- 
solvency of  a  corporation  at  the  time  a  trust  deed  is  authorized  and 
executed  by  it  does  not  alone  render  the  instrument  void.  (Singer 
V.  Salt  Lake  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  773.) 

3L  CORPORATIONS— TRUST  DEED— EXECUTION  OF.— If  a 
committee  is  authorized  by  the  board  of  directors  of  a  corporation 
to  procure  a  loan  for  it  and  the  officers  who  execute  a  trust  deed 
to  secure  such  loan  are  expressly  authorized  to  do  so  by  the  board 
of  directors  and  the  by-laws  of  the  corporation,  the  validity  of  the 
deed  cannot  be  assailed  on  the  ground  that  it  Is  not  signed  by  the 
president  and  secretary  of  the  cprporation.  (Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  etc. 
Mfg.  Co.,  773.) 

32.  CORPORATIONS— TRUST  DEED— DIRECTOR  DEALING 
WITH  CORPORATION.— If,  In  the  execution  of  a  trust  deed  by 
a  corporation,  there  is  an  entire  absence  of  want  of  good  faith, 
fraud  and  collusion  and  the  corporation  is  a  going  concern,  a  stock- 
holder or  director  is  not  prohibited  from  dealing  with  it.  In  such 
case  the  mere  fact  that  a  director  furnished  a  portion  of  the  money 
does  not  vitiate  the  trust  deed  given  to  secure  the  loan.  Contracts 
made  by  a  corporation  with  its  oflScers  are  not  void  per  se,  but  will 
be  carefully  scrutinized  in  equity  and  set  aside,  If  not  made  In  the 
utmost  good  faith.    (Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  773.) 


Index.  973 

S3.  CORPORATIONS  —  MEETINGS  —  NOTICE.— As  a  general 
rule,  notice  must  be  given  in  some  way  to  all  directors  of  the  meet- 
ings of  the  board,  where  the  by-laws  and  rules  of  the  corporation 
do  not  provide  the  time  and  place  of  meeting,  in  order  to  render 
them  valid.  To  this  rule  there  are  exceptions,  as  where  such  an 
<'mergency  exists  as  Justifies  immediate  action  on  the  part  of  the 
board,  and  the  giving  of  notice  to  all  the  members  is  not  practicalile, 
or  where  a  director  secretes  himself  in  order  to  prevent  a  meeting, 
or  is  beyond  the  reach  of  notice.  (Singer  v.  Salt  Lake  etc.  Mfg.  Co., 
773.) 

34.  CORPORATIONS— MEETINGS— PRESUMPTIONS  AS  TO 
REGULARITY.— If  meetings  of  a  legally  constituted  board  of  di- 
rectors have  been  held,  and  business  within  the  scope  of  and  pur- 
suant to  the  purposes  for  which  the  corporation  was  organized  has 
been  transacted,  the  presumption  Is,  that  such  meetings  were  regu- 
larly called,  convened,  and  held  for  the  transaction  of  such  business, 
and  the  onus  probandl  is  upon  him  who  maintains  the  contrary  to 
allege  and  prove  that  they  were  not  so  called  and  held.  (Singer  v. 
Salt  Lake  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  773.) 

35.  CORPORATIONS.— THE  RESIDENCE  OF  A  CORPORA- 
TION Is  the  state  of  Its  creation.    (Turcott  v.  Railroad,  661.) 

36.  CORPORATIONS  — FOREIGN  — FILING  OF  CHARTEBr- 
CONSTRUCTION  OF  STATUTE.— The  purpose  of  a  statute  requiP- 
Ing  foreign  corporations  doing  business  within  the  state  to  file  and 
register  their  charters,  is  to  enable  them  to  do  business,  own  or 
acquire  property,  and  be  enable  to  sue,  but  not  to  exempt  them 
from  suit  If  they  disregard  the  statute  or  to  estop  them  from  mak- 
ing defense  if  so  sued.    (Turcott  v.  Railroad,  661.) 

37.  CORPORATIONS  —  FICTITIOUS  SUBSCRIPTIONS  TO 
^TOCK— VALIDITY  OF  FRAUD.— Fictitious  or  colorable  subscrip- 
tions to  stock,  made  and  used  with  the  intent  to  Induce  other  per- 
sons to  subscribe,  with  the  secret  understanding  that  no  liability 
shall  attach  to  them  by  reason  of  their  subscriptions,  and  that  they 
shall  thereafter  be  allowed  to  withdraw  them,  do  not  operate  as 
a  fraud  upon  bona  fide  subscribers,  for  they  are  as  valid  and  bind- 
ing upon  the  subscribers  as  if  they  had  been  originally  made  in 
good  faith,  and  will  be  upheld  and  so  treated  by  the  courts.  Hence, 
such  subscriptions  do  not  give  a  bona  fide  subscriber  a  right  to  avoid 
his  subscription.     (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 

See  Action;  Appeal,   5;  Contempt,  2-5;  Evidence,  8,  7;  Insurance, 
1,  2;  Limitations  of  Actions,  9,  10;  Municipal  Corporations,  12L 

COTENANCY. 

1.  COTENANCY- ADVERSE  POSSESSION  BETWEEN  CO- 
TENANTS— NOTICE.— In  order  that  exclusive  possession  of  the 
land  of  the  cotenancy  by  one  cotenant,  accompanied  by  hostile  acts 
and  claims  of  ownership,  may  amount  to  an  ouster  of  his  cotenant, 
such  acts  and  declarations  must  be  known  to  the  latter.  Actual  no- 
tice must  be.  shown,  but  it  may  be  by  circumstantial  evidence 
<Casey  v.  Casey,  190.) 

2.  COTENANCY  —  ADVERSE  POSSESSION— EVIDENCE.— To 
prove  adverse  possession  by  one  cotenant  of  the  land  of  the  co- 
tenancy, his  declarations  claiming  sole  ownership  are  admissible 
in  evidence  though  not  made  in  the  presence  of  his  cotenant  (Casey 
V.  Casey,  190.) 

3.  COTENANCY— ADVERSE  POSSESSION  BETWEEN  CO- 
TENANTS.— Exclusive  occupancy  by  one   tenant  in   common,   ae- 


974  Index. 

companled  by  acts  and  declarations  of  sole  ownership,  If  known 
to  his  cotenant,  will  amount  to  ouster  so  that  his  possession  may 
ripen  into  title.    (Casey  v.  Casey,  190.) 

4.  COTENANCY— DUTY  OF  COTENANT  TO  PAY  TAXES.-A 
widow  entitled  to  unassigned  homestead  and  dower  in  property  on 
which  she  resides,  and  holding  with  her  children  in  cotenancy,  is 
bound,  in  order  to  protect  their  common  interest,  to  contribute  to- 
ward the  taxes  upon  a  private  alley  constituting  part  of  the  com- 
mon property.     (Goralslci  v.  Kostuslii,  98.) 

5.  COTENANCY— PRIVATE  ALLEY.— Owners  of  lots  abutting 
upon  a  private  alley,  established  for  their  common  benefit  and  ap- 
purtenant to  each  lot.  have  a  unity  of  possession  and  are  cotenants 
therein.    (Goralslsi  v.  Kostuslii,  98.) 

6.  COTENANCY— TAX  TITLES.— While  cotenants  remain  in  the 
actual  possession  of  the  common  property  and  maintain  the  unity 
of  possession  by  actual  common  use,  neither,  as  against  his  fel- 
low tenants,  by  purchasing  a  tax  title  upon  the  common  premises 
can  obtain  a  title  that  is  not  subject  to  the  election  of  the  cotenants, 
within  a  reasonable  time,  to  avail  themselves  of  the  purchase  by 
contributing  their  proper  proportion  to  reimburse  the  purchasing 
tenant.    (Goralslii  v.  Kostuslji,  98.) 

7.  COTENANCY— RIGHTS  OF  WIDOW  OF  ONE  COTENANT 
—SECURING  ADVERSE  TITLE.— Where  one  of  two  cotenants 
dies,  the  dower  interest  of  his  widow  in  the  land  of  the  cotenancy 
brings  her  within  the  general  rule  that,  where  one  Is  Interested  with 
another  in  an  estate,  an  implied  obligation  arises  to  sustain  the 
common  interest,  and  she  cannot  acquire  and  set  up  an  adverse  title 
to  deprive  the  other  cotenant  of  his  interest  as  by  purchasing  the 
property  at  a  sheriff's  sale  had  under  proceedings  to  collect  arrears 
In  ground  rent.    (Enyard  v.  Enyard,  623.) 

See  Devise,  1;  Homestead,  2. 

COUNTERCLAIM. 
See  Corporations,  8. 

COUNTIES. 
See  Schools. 

COURTS. 

COURTS  —  PRESUMPTION  AS  TO  JURISDICTION.-A 
county  court,  with  a  clerk  and  seal,  is  a  court  of  record.  Hence,  If 
it  enters  a  judgment  upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judg- 
ment, upon  which  an  action  is  brought  in  another  state,  such  court 
will  there  be  presumed  to  have  been  a  court  of  general  Jurisdiction. 
(Van  Norman  v.  Gordon,  304.) 

See  Criminal  Law,  4;  Interstate  Commerce,  1;  Jurisdiction;  Muni- 
cipal Corporations,  4. 

CRIMINAL  LAW. 

1.    CRIMINAL  LAW— ABANDONMENT  OF  CHILD.— Under  a 

Statute  providing  that  "If  any  father  shall  willfully  and  voluntarily 
abandon  his  child,  leaving  it  in  dependent  and  destitute  condition, 
he  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  in  order  to  constitute  the  of- 
fense of  abandonment,  there  must  be  an  actual  desertion,  followed 
by  a  refusal  to  support,  and  the  absence  of  either  of  such  elements 
prevents  the  offense  from  being  made  out.    (Gay  v.  State,  68.) 


Index.  97& 

2.  CRIMINAL  LAW— ABANDONMENT  OF  CHILD.-If,  after 
a  completed  act  of  desertion,  a  father  has  been  convicted  under  a 
statute  mailing  It  a  misdemeanor  for  "any  father  to  willfully  and 
voluntarily  abandon  his  child,  leaving  it  in  a  dependent  and  desti- 
tute condition,"  there  can  be  no  new  act  of  abandonment  until  a  re- 
turn to  the  discharge  of  the  parental  obligation,  and  no  new  offense- 
of  abandonment  until  such  a  return,  followed  by  another  act  of  de- 
sertion, and  this  although  the  original  abandonment  Is  willfully  and 
voluntarily  continued  and  the  child  remains  dependent  and  destitute. 
(Gay  V.  State,  G8.) 

3.  CRIMINAL  LAW  —  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION  — 
WAIVER.— If  a  person  accused  of  crime,  on  being  arrested  and 
brought  before  an  examining  magistrate,  voluntarily  pleads  guilty, 
he  thereby  waives  his  right  to  a  preliminary  examination.  (Latimer 
V.  State,  403.) 

4.  CRIMINAL  LAW— PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION.— DIS- 
TRICT COURTS  ARE  WITHOUT  JURISDICTION  to  try,  on  In- 
formation, one  accused  of  crime,  except  he  be  a  fugitive  from  jus- 
tice, unless  he  has  first  been  accorded  the  privilege  of  a  prelimin- 
ary examination  or  has  waived  that  privilege.  (Latimer  v.  State, 
403.) 

5.  CRIMINAL  LAW— A  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION  Is  a 
right  accorded  and  a  privilege  granted  by  law  to  everyone  accused 
of  crime;  but  It  Is  privilege  which  the  accused  may  waive.  (Latimer 
V.  State,  403.) 

6.  CRIMINAL  LAW.— A  PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION  Is^ 
In  no  sense  a  ti'ial  of  a  person  accused  of  crime.  It  Is  not  even 
necessary  that  the  person  charged  with  a  crime,  on  being  brought 
before  a  magistrate,  should  be  asked  to  plead,  or  that  be  should 
plead.    (Latimer  v.  State,  403.) 

7.  CRIMINAL  LAW— PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION.— The 
object  of  a  preliminary  examination  Is  to  ascertain  whether  the 
crime  charged  has  been  committed,  and,  if  so,  whether  there  Is- 
probable  cause  to  believe  that  the  accused  committed  It  (Latimer 
V.  State,  403.) 

8.  CRIMINAL  LAW— DRUNKENNESS  AS  DEFENSE.- While 
voluntary  Intoxication  Is  not  of  Itself  a  complete  defense  for  one 
who  Is  charged  with  the  commission  of  an  offense,  yet  evidence 
that  the  accused  was  Intoxicated  when  It  Is  alleged  he  committed 
the  crime  is  admissible  as  a  circumstance  tending  to  show  that  the 
act  of  the  accused  was  not  premeditated,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  and  determining  the  status  and  condition  of  his  mind 
at  that  time.    (Latimer  v.  State,  403.) 

9.  CRIMINAL  LAW— EVIDENCE— GOOD  CHARACTER.— Pre- 
vious good  character  of  the  accused  In  a  criminal  case  is  a  fact 
which  he  Is  entitled  to  have  submitted  for  the  consideration  of  the 
jury,  precisely  as  any  other  circumstance  favorable  to  him,  without 
any  disparagement  by  the  court.    (Latimer  v.  State,  403.) 

10.  CRIMINAL  LAW— PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION— REC- 
OGNIZANCE.—If  an  accused,  on  being  brought  before  the  examin- 
ing magistrate,  waives  his  right  to  a  preliminary  examination,  or 
pleads  guilty  to  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged,  the  magis- 
trate should  recognize  him  to  appear  In  the  district  court,  and  en- 
ter upon  his  docket  the  proceedings  that  actually  occur,  and  a  duly 
certified  transcript  of  this  record  filed  In  the  oflBce  of  the  clerk  of 
the  district  court  Invests  that  court  with  Jurisdiction  to  try  the  ac- 
cused on  information  for  the  crime  with  which  he  was  accused  be-^ 
fore  the  examining  magistrate.    (Latimer  v.  State,  403.) 


S76  Index. 

11.  CRIMINAL  LAW— DRUNKENNESS  AS  DEFENSE.— If  an 
xicciised  was  so  drunk  at  the  time  he  is  alleged  to  have  committed 
the  crime  chai'ged  as  to  render  him  unconscious  of  his  act,  incapa- 
ble of  controlling  his  will,  and  forming  and  entertaining  a  felonious 
intent,  his  intoxication  is  a  defense.     (Latimer  v.  State,  403.) 

12.  CRIMINAL  LAW— CONFESSIONS— ADMISSIBILITY  OP 
VOLUNTARY  STATEMENTS.— Voluntary  statements  made  by  a 
man  of  ordinary  intelligence  and  education  to  police  officers  after 
bis  arrest,  not  as  evidence  nor  as  the  result  of  an  examination  in  a 
Judicial  proceeding,  afthoush  reduced  to  writing  and  verified  by  him, 
are  admissible  in  evidence  on  tne  trial  of  the  crime  for  which  h6  was 
arrested,  if  not  induced  by  any  promise,  threat,  or  improper  influ- 
ence, although  he  was  not  informed  by  those  to  whom  he  made  the 
statements  that  they  might  be  used  against  him  on  his  subsequent 
trial.     (People  v.  Kennedy,  557.) 

13.  CRIMINAL  LAW— CONFESSIONS.— TEST  OP  ADMISSI- 
BILITY of  the  statement  of  a  person  accused  of  crime,  whether 
made  in  the  course  of  judicial  proceedings  or  not,  is  whether  it  is 
made  voluntarily,  and  that  must  be  determined  by  its  nature  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  is  made.    (People  v.  Kennedy,  557.) 

14.  CRIMINAL  LAW  —  CONFESSIONS  IMPROPERLY  OB- 
TAINED—ADMISSIBILITY.— If  peace  officers,  by  covert  threats, 
doubtful  and  uncertain  promises,  acts  of  intimidation,  or  other 
questionable  means,  procure  incriminating  statements  from  per- 
sons under  arrest,  and  subsequently  charged  with  crime,  they  are 
Inadmissible  against  them.     (People  v.  Kennedy,  557.) 

15.  AN  INDICTMENT  FURNISHES  NO  PROOF  that  an  accused 
is  guilty  of  a  capital  crime,  much  less  that  he  is  guilty  of  a  capital 

•crime  of  which  the  proof  is  evident.    (Ex  parte  Newman,  740.) 

See    Appeal,    3,    4;  Bail;  Habeas    Corpus,    1,    2;  Homicide;  Rape; 
Trial,  4,  6,  7;  Witnesses,  12. 

DAMAGES. 

1.  DAMAGES-MEASURE  OF,  FOR  FALSE  REPRESENTA- 
TIONS IN  SALE  OF  BOND.— The  measure  of  damages,  in  an  ac- 
tion for  false  representations  in  the  sale  of  a  bond,  is  the  difference 
between  the  actual  value  of  the  bond,  at  the  time  of  purchase,  and 
its  value  if  it  had  been  what  it  was  represented  to  be,  secured  as 
represented.  Subsequent  events  may  be  considered  in  arriving  at 
the  two  values,  at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  though  they  show  the 
market  value  of  the  bond  to  have  been  worthless.  (Whiting  v.  Price, 
^62.) 

2.  DAMAGES— MEASURE  OF— DESTRUCTION  OF  PROP- 
ERTY HAVING  NO  MARKET  VALUE.— For  the  destruction  of 
household  goods  and  wearing  apparel  having  no  recognized  market 
value,  the  measure  of  damages  is  their  actual  value,  which  may  be 
determined  by  evidence  of  their  original  cost,  the  extent  of  their  use, 
And  their  condition  at  the  time  of  destruction.  (McMahon  v.  Du- 
buque, 143.) 

3.  DAMAGES— MEASURE  OF— DESTRUCTION  OF  DWELL- 
ING-HOUSB.— The  measure  of  damages  for  the  destruction  of  a 
dwelling-house  by  fire  is  its  actual  and  not  necessarily  its  market 
value.     (McMahon  v.  Dubuque,  143.) 

4.  DAMAGES— IN.TURY  TO  HEAVY  MACHINERY  THROUGH 
.NEGLIGENCE  OF  TRUCKMEN— PUTTING  IN  CONDITION  FOR 
USE.— If  truckmen,  in  moving  a  large  and  heavy  machine  for  plan- 
ing Iron,  negligently  break  and  injure  it,  the  expense  of  restoring  it 
to  a  condition  for  uses  is  a  proper  element  of  damage,  in  an  action 


Index.  977 

for  such  Injury,  for  It  is  plain  that  the  machine  Is  not  an  article 
that  the  plaintiff  can  procure  in  the  market  at  any  time.  Hence,  IC 
that  item  of  expense  alone  exceeds  the  verdict,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
-consider  or  discuss  other  items  admitted  in  evidence  upon  the  ques> 
tlon  of  damages.    (Jaclcson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 

See  Assault;  Railroad  Companies,  17;  Telegraph  Companies,  3,  6; 
Waterworks  and  Water  Companies,  1. 

DEATH. 
See  Negligence,  8. 

DEBT. 
See  Corporations,  26;  Taxation;  Vendor  and  Purchaser,  L 

DECISIONS. 

DECISIONS  OF  SISTER  STATES— WEIGHT  OF.— In  a  case 
of  first  impression  in  a  state,  the  decisions  in  other  states  have 
only  persuasive  authority,  and  the  consideration  to  which  the  rea- 
soning therein  is  entitled.    (Gorrell  v.  Water  Sup.  Co.,  598.) 

DEEDS. 

1.  DEEDS— RECITALS  IN  AS  TO  PAYMENT— EVIDENCE  TO 
CONTRADICT.— Although  It  is  always  competent  to  contradict  the 
recital  in  a  deed  as  to  the  amount  paid,  in  an  action  involving  the 
recovery  of  the  purchase  money,  or  as  to  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages in  an  action  upon  the  covenants  in  the  deed,  it  is  not  com- 
petent to  contradict  the  acknowledgment  of  a  consideration  paid, 
in  order  to  affect  the  validity  of  the  deed  in  creating  or  passing  a 
title  to  the  estate  thereby  granted.    (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

2.  DEEDS— MARRIAGE  AS  A  VALUABLE  CONSIDERA- 
TION.—A  deed  made  by  a  man  to  his  intended  wife,  followed  by 
marriage,  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  in  consideration  of  mar- 
riage, and  is  based  on  a  valuable  consideration.  (Snyder  v.  Grand- 
staff,  863.) 

3.  DEEDS  UPON  CONSIDERATION  OF  MARRIAGE— VA- 
LIDITY OF.— Under  the  statute  .of  Virginia,  conveyances  upon  con- 
sideration of  marriage  are  void  as  to  existing  creditors,  but  not  as 
to  those  who  claim  to  be  paramount  purchasers  under  a  will.  (Sny- 
-der  V.  Grandstaff,  863.) 

4.  DEEDS— PURCHASE  BY  DEVISEES  UNDER  A  WILL- 
CONVEYANCE  TO  INTENDED  WIFE,  FOLLOWED  BY  MAR- 
RIAGE—RIGHTS OF  SURVIVORSHIP  VESTED  IN  WIDOW.— 
When  it  appears  that  a  whole  estate  was  devised  to  the  testator's 
three  grandchildren,  "to  be  equally  divided  between  them,  share  and 
share  alike,  but,  on  the  death  of  either  of  them  without  issue,  his 
or  her  share  should  pass  to  the  survivors  or  survivor,  and.  In  case 
all  died  without  issue,  then  to  collateral  kindred";  that  the  devisees 
afterward  apportioned  the  estate  among  themselves,  and  each,  by 
a  deed  expressly  stating  his  Intention  and  desire,  conveyed  to  the 
others  all  of  his  right,  title,  and  Interest  in  the  property  allotted 
to  such  other;  and  that  one  of  the  devisees,  contemplating  marriage, 
deeded  his  share  to  his  intended  wife,  marrying  her  on  the  same 
day,  but  died  shortly  afterward,  without  issue,  or  possibility  of 
Issue,  it  must  be  held  that  all  rights  of  survivorship  in  the  other 
two  devisees  passed  by  their  deeds  to  the  deceased,  and  by  the 
latter's  deed  became  vested  in  his  widow.  (Snyder  v.  Grandstaff, 
£63.) 

AM.  St.  Kkp..  Vol.  LXX.-«3 


973  Index. 

5.  DEEDS— REGISTRY  OF,  BY  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER, 
AS  NOTICE— OBJECT  OF  REGISTRY  LAWS.— The  registry  of  a 
deed  by  a  subsequent  purchaser  is  no  notice  to  parties  who  hav& 
acquired  their  rights  before  the  time  when  the  deed  is  registered,. 
for  registry  laws  are  not  intended  to  affect  the  holders  of  ante- 
cedent rights,  but  only  such  persons  as  are  compelled  to  search  the 
records  in  order  to  protect  their  own  interests.  (Lynchburg  Perpetual 
etc  Co.  V.  Fellers,  851.) 

See  Corporations,  30-32;  Fraudulent  Conveyance;  Liens. 

DEFINITIONS. 
"Common  carrier."     (Jaclison  etc.  Worlis  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 
Conditions  precedent  and  subsequent.    (Burdis  v,  Burdis,  825.) 
"General  guaranty."     (Tidioute  S.  Bank  v.  Libbey,  907.) 
"Incidental  power."    (Nicollet  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Frisk-Turner  Co.,  334.> 
"Malice."    (Brown  v.  Brown,  574.) 
"Original  package."     (Austin  v.  State,  703.) 
"Special  guaranty."    (Tidioute  S.  Bank  v.  Libbey,  907.) 

DEPOSIT  OF  TITLE  DEEDS. 
See  Mortgages,  7,  8. 

DESCENT. 

DESCENT— ILLEGITIMATE  CHILD  AS  AN  HEIR.— Under 
the  statutory  law  of  Massachusetts,  an  illegitimate  child  is  the  heir 
of  his  mother;  but  at  common  law  he  could  not  be  an  heir,  even  of 
his  mother.     (Hayden  v.  Barrett,  295.) 

DEVISE. 

.  1.  DEVISE  —  CONSTRUCTION  —  COTENANCY.  —  A  will  by 
which  land  is  devised  to  specified  legatees,  to  have  and  to  hold  la 
common  for  a  home  and  support  so  long  as  they  remain  together, 
and  should  one  or  more  leave  they  can  take  such  as  given  them 
Individually  in  this  will,  but  have  no  share  or  control  of  this  that  I» 
given  in  common  without  the  consent  and  signature  of  those  that 
remain  on  the  place,"  with  restriction  on  the  right  of  either  to  alien- 
ate  or  lease  any  part  of  the  land  without  the  consent  of  all,  con- 
stitutes such  legatees  cotenants  in  the  lands  devised,  with  a  con- 
dition subsequent  that  the  whole  must  be  used  for  the  support  of 
such  of  the  legatees  as  choose  to  remain  on  the  place.  (Harrison 
v.  Harrison,  60.) 

2.  DEVISE  — RE.TECTION  OF  CONDITION  INCAPABLE  OF 
PERFORMANCE.— A  devise  of  land  to  specified  legatees,  "to  have 
and  to  hold  In  common  for  a  home  and  support  as  long  as  they 
remain  together,  and  should  one  or  more  leave  they  can  take  such 
as  given  them  individually  in  this  will,  but  have  no  share  or  control 
of  this  that  is  given  in  common,  without  the  consent  and  signature 
of  those  that  remain  on  the  place,"  imposes  a  condition  subsequent 
that  the  whole  land  be  used  for  the  support  of  such  legatees  as 
choose  to  reside  thereon,  but  if  such  condition  becomes  Incapable  of 
performance,  It  must  be  rejected  and  the  devise  held  to  be  absolute. 
Hence,  If  one  of  the  legatees  Is  forced  to  remove  from  the  land  by 
the  cruel  treatment  of  another,  the  former  is  entitled  to  his  share 
of  the  estate,  and  the  full  and  absolute  use  thereof  freed  of  the 
condition.  He  is  also  entitled  to  the  immediate  possession  of  his- 
■hare  of  the  estate,  and  can  exorcise  the  right  of  partition  or  seek 
any  other  remedy  afforded  to  a  cotenant  (Harrison  v.  Harrison,. 
60.) 


Index.  979 

8.  DEVISE— REMAINDER  TO  PERSONS  NOT  IN  ESSE— 
JUiaSDICTION— SALE  OF  PROPERTY.— Where  property  is  de- 
vised for  life,  with  a  remainder  over  to  persons  not  in  esse,  the  life 
tenant  still  living,  a  court  has  no  power  to  order  a  sale  of  the  prop- 
erty, because  there  can  be  no  one  before  the  court  to  represent  the 
Interest  of  the  remaindermen,    (i'ancey's  Case,  577.) 

4.  DEVISE  — GENERAL  REMAINDER  —  REMAINDERMEN 
BE[<'ORE  THE  COURT-JURISDICTION-SALE  OF  PROPERTY. 
Where  property  is  devised  for  life,  with  a  general  remainder  over 
in  which  there  is  no  element  of  survivorship,  a  court  may  order  a 
sale  of  the  property  where  all  the  remainderjnen  living  are  before 
it,  since  the  remaindermen  represent  a  class,  and  those  who  may 
afterward  be  born  are  concluded  by  the  action  of  the  court  upon 
those  of  the  same  class.    (Yancey's  Case,  577.) 

5.  DEVISE  — REMAINDERMEN  — SALE  OP  PROPERTY  — 
TITI/E  OF  PURCHASER.— When  property,  which  is  devised  for 
life  with  a  general  remainder  over,  is  sold  under  an  order  of  court, 
all  the  remaindermen  living  being  before  the  court,  the  purchaser 
will  acquire  a  good  title  against  afterborn  children  of  the  life  ten- 
ant.   (Yancey's  Case,  577.) 

6.  DEVISE— REMAINDER  TO  UNDETERMINED  PERSONS— 
JURISDICTION— SALE  OF  PROPERTY.— Where  property  is  de- 
vised for  life,  with  a  remainder  over  to  "such  children  as  should 
be  living  at  the  death  of  the  life  tenant,"  a  court  has  no  power  to 
order  a  sale  of  the  property,  for  until  the  death  of  the  life  tenant 
it  could  not  be  linown  who  would  talie.    (Yancey's  Case,  577.) 

7.  LEGACIES— DEVISES— IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  PERFORM- 
ANCE OF  CONDITION  SUBSEQUENT— EFFECT  OF.— While 
there  is  a  difference  between  a  legacy  and  a  devise  where  the  con- 
dition is  precedent,  there  is  no  difference  where  the  condition  is 
subsequent;  but  in  the  latter  case  the  estate  to  which  the  condition 
is  annexed,  whether  it  is  laud  or  a  money  legacy,  if  the  performance 
of  the  condition  is  rendered  impossible,  becomes,  by  that  event, 
absolute  in  the  devisee  as  well  as  in  the  legatee.  (Burdis  v.  Burdis, 
825.) 

8.  DEVISE— IMPOSSIBILITY  OF  PERFORMANCE  OP  CON- 
DITION SUBSEQUENT—  EFFECT  OF.-If  a  condition  subsequent 
is  annexed  to  a  devise  of  real  estate,  and  its  performance  becomes 
Impossible,  without  the  fault  of  the  devisee,  the  estate  Is  not  de- 
feated or  forfeited,  but  the  devisee  will  hold  the  property  by  an 
absolute  title,  as  if  no  condition  had  been  annexed  to  the  devise. 
(Burdis  v.  Burdis,  825.) 

9.  DEVISE— FAILURE  OF,  FOR  IMPOSSIBILITY  OP  PER- 
FORMANCE OF  CONDITION  PRECEDENT.— If  a  condition  pre- 
cedent is  annexed  to  a  devise  of  real  estate,  and  its  performance 
is  or  becomes  impossible,  the  devise  fails,  although  there  is  no 
default  or  laches  on  the  part  of  the  devisee  himself.  (Burdis  v.  Bur- 
dis, 825.) 

See  Deeds,  4. 

DOMICILE. 
See  Corporations,  1,  85. 

DOWER. 

1.    DOWER.  STATUTORY  — WHEN  SUBJECT  TO  PAYMENT 

OF  HtlSBAND'S  DEBTS.— In  Minnesota,  the    widow's    statutory 

one-third  in  the  real  estate  of  her  husband  is    "subject,  in  its  Just 

proportion  with  the  other  real  estate,  to  the  payment  of  such  debts 


980  Index. 

of  the  deceased  as  are  not  paid  from  the  personal  estate."    (Merrill 
V.  Security  Trust  Co.,  312.) 

2.  DOWER— ASSIGNMENT  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  CREDITORS. 
Where  a  married  man  executes,  under  the  insolvent  law,  an  as- 
signment of  all  his  nonexempt  property  for  the  benefit  of  credit- 
ors (his  wife  not  joining),  the  assignee's  title  to  the  real  estate 
assigned  is  not  subject  to  the  wife's  inchoate  right.  (Merrill  v.  Se- 
curity Trust  Co.,  312.) 

3.  DOWER— ESTATE  OF— NATURE.— The  statutory  dower  of 
a  widow  is  not  treated  as  a  lien  upon  land,  but  as  an  interest  in  it. 
It  is  an  estate  given  by  the  intestate  laws.    (Enyard  v.  Enyard,  623.) 

DRUNKENNESS. 
See  Criminal  Law,  8,  11. 

EJECTMENT. 
See  Railroad  Companies,  6i. 

ELECTION. 
See  Attachment,  11;  Contracts,  13. 

ELECTRIC  COMPANIES. 

ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPANIES-INJURY  TO  LINEMAN 
—ACTION— IMMATERIAL  EVIDENCE.— A  lineman  who  was  in- 
jured while  in  the  employ  of  an  electric  lighting  company  by  a  de- 
cayed pole  brealiing  below  the  surface  of  the  ground,  and  falling 
—upon  him  while  he  was  at  worli  upon  it,  cannot  maintam  an  action 
against  the  company  for  the  injury  without  showing  that  the  com- 
pany was  negligent;  and  this  is  not  done  by  proof  that  the  company 
failed  to  inspect  the  pole  before  the  accident.  Such  evidence  is  im- 
material, for  the  company  owed  him  no  duty  to  inspect  it.  On  the 
contrary,  in  any  case  where  the  apparent  age  of  the  pole  was  such 
as  to  make  it  probable  that  it  was  not  strong  enough  to  sustain  a 
man  worlving  upon  it,  due  care  on  the  part  of  the  lineman  would  re- 
quire him  to  examine  it  Just  below  the  surface  of  the  ground  before 
risking  himself  upon  it.    (Mclsaac  v.  Northampton  Elec.  L.  Co.,  244.) 

See  Master  and  Servant,  1,  2. 

ELEVATORS. 

ELEVATORS  —  DEFECTIVE  —  INJURIES  RESULTING 
THEREFROM— CONSTRUCTION  OF  PLEADING.- In  an  action 
for  injuries  sustained  in  operating  an  elevator  which  contained  a 
secret  defect  alleged  to  be  unljnown  to  plaintiff,  an  allegation  that 
the  elevator  would  not  sustain  the  weight  ordinarily  and  usually 
placed  upon  it,  but  would  drop  to  the  ground,  and  was  thereby  a 
nuisance,  will  be  construed  as  meaning  that  the  elevator  was  liable 
to  fall  at  any  time  In  the  course  of  the  ordinary  and  necessary  use 
thereof,  and  not  as  meaning  that  the  elevator  fell  whenever  used, 
so  that  all  who  used  it  must  have  known  of  the  defect.  (Anderson 
T.  Hayes,  930.) 

EMINENT  DOMAIN. 

1.  EMINENT  DOMAIN.— THE  AWARD  OP  APPRAISERS 
In  condemnation  proceedings  operates  as  a  judgment  between  the 
parties,  and  Is  governed  by  the  same  rules  that  are  ordinarily  ap- 
plied to  judgments  of  courts.  Such  an  award,  or  a  verdict  and 
judgment  on  appeal  therefrom,  has  the  same  force  as  an  ordinary 


Index.  981 

judgment  rendered  by  a  court  of  competent  Jurisdiction.  It  Is  con- 
clusive ui>on  the  parties  and  privies,  but  is  not  binding  upon  sti'au- 
gers.     (Cbarlestou  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

2.  EMINENT  DOMAIN.— A  RAILROAD  COMPANY,  by  con- 
demnation proceedings,  acquires  whatever  Interest  the  person 
against  whom  such  proceedings  are  had  has  In  the  land,  and  no 
more.    (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

3.  EMINENT  DOMAIN-INTEREST  ACQUIRED  BY  RAIL- 
ROAD COMPANY.— A  railroad  company  which  constructs  Its  road 
over  land,  the  title  to  which  is  not  fixed  and  determined,  acquires 
the  interest  of  all  those  with  whom  it  deals  by  negotiation  or  against 
whom  It  proceeds  by  condemnation,  but  takes  the  risk  of  other 
persons  making  claims  in  the  future,  whether  they  are  left  out  of 
the  negotiations  or  proceedings  by  mistake  or  from  necessity. 
(Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

4.  EMINENT  DOMAIN-CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS 
ARE  NO  MORE  THAN  A  COMPULSORY  SALE  of  all  the  owner's 
interest  in  the  property,  and  no  one  can  be  thus  compelled  to  sell 
who  is  not  a  party  to  the  judgment  rendered  by  the  tribunal  which 
is  erected  for  this  purpose.    (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

5.  EMINENT  DOMAIN— JURISDICTION.— ONE  WHO  CAN- 
NOT BE  AND  IS  NOT  NOTIFIED,  is  not  bound  by  the  award  or 
judgment.    (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

6.  EMINENT  DOMAIN— CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS— 
CONCLUSIVENESS  AGAINST  UNKNOWN  OWNERS.-If  the  con- 
dition of  the  title  to  property  at  the  time  of  condemnation  proceed- 
ings is  such  that  notice  cannot  be  given  to  all  interested,  notice 
to  such  as  are  definitely  known  to  be  Interested  Is  not  suflicient  to 
deprive  of  their  rights  others  whose  Identity  is  unknown,  but  whose 
interest  in  the  property  Is  ascertainable.  (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Hughes,  17.) 

7.  EMINENT  DOMAIN-CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS— 
CONCLUSIVENESS  OF— LIFE  ESTATE  AND  REMAINDER.— If, 
at  the  time  condemnation  proceedings  were  had,  there  were  two 
estates  in  the  property,  one  a  life  estate,  and  the  other  a  contingent 
remainder,  the  fact  that  it  was  impossible  to  ascertain  the  persons 
who  would  eventually  take  as  remaindermen  does  not  authorize 
the  conclusion  that  the  interest  of  such  remainderman  was  acquired 
by  proceedings  against  the  life  tenant,  who  cannot  be  held  to  rep- 
resent them.    (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

8.  EMINENT  DOMAIN— ESTOPPEL^CONDEMNATION  PRO- 
CEEDINGS against  the  assignee  of  a  life  tenant,  to  whom  the 
entire  amount  awarded  as  damages  has  been  paid,  cannot  be  pleaded 
in  bar  of  the  right  of  the  remainderman  in  the  same  property  to 
have  compensation  for  his  interest  after  the  termination  of  the  life 
estate.    (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

9.  EMINENT  DOMAIN.— THE  LEGISLATURE  CANNOT  AU- 
THORIZE permanent  and  substantial  injury  to  private  property 
without  making  compensation.  (Garvey  v.  Long  Island  B.  B.  Ck)., 
550.) 

See  Railroad  Companies,  23. 

EQUITY. 

1.  EQUITY  — DISCOVERY  OP  LUNATIC'S  PROPERTY  — 
SCOPE  OF  PRELIMINARY  IN.TUNCTION.— Under  a  bill  In  equity 
brought  by  the  committee  of  a  lunatic  against  the  latter's  husband 
for  the  discovery  of  property  of  the  lunatic  kept  by  the  husband  in 


982  Index. 

a  box  In  a  safe  deposit  company,  a  preliminary  injunction  should 
go  no  farther  than  is  necessary  for  the  protection  and  enforcement 
of  the  lunatic's  rights  to  property  in  such  box,  and  should  not  in- 
fringe upon  defendant's  right  to  talie  therefrom  property  belong- 
ing to  him  and  not  claimed  by  the  committee.  (Equitable  Trust  Co. 
V.  Garis,  644.) 

2.  EQUITY— JURISDICTION— SPECIFIC  PERFORMANCE.— 
The  rule  that  equity  will  not  entertain  jurisdiction  to  decree  sne- 
cific  performance  respecting  goods,  chattels,  stocks,  and  other  things 
of  a  merely  personal  nature,  is  limited  to  cases  where  compensa- 
tion in  damages  will  furnish  a  complete  remedy.  Where  the 
wrong  is  a  betrayal  of  confidence,  equity  will  decree  restitution, 
which  may  be  enforced  specifically  against  the  wrongdoer.  (Stein- 
meyer  v.  Siebert,  &41.) 

3.  EQUITY— JURISDICTION— DISCOVERT  OF  LUNATIC'S 
PROPERTY.— The  committee  of  a  lunatic  is  the  proper  party  to 
maintain  a  bill  in  equity  against  the  lunatic's  husband  for  the  dis- 
covery and  delivery  of  possession  of  muniments  of  title,  negotiable 
securities,  and  personal  property,  belonging  to  the  lunatic's  estate 
and  in  the  possession  of  the  husband,  where  the  latter  denies  her 
title,  or  there  is  reason  to  apprehend  that  he  will  treat  such  prop- 
erty adversely  to  her  interest.    (Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Garis,  644.) 

4.  EQUITY— ADEQUATE  LEGAL  REMEDY— PLEADING.— 
The  objection  that  the  plaintiff  in  a  suit  in  equity  has  an  adequate 
legal  remedy  must  be  made  by  demurrer  or  answer,  and,  if  not  so 
made,  is  deemed  waived,  and  cannot  be  raised  by  demurrer  ore 
tenus.     (HofiC  v.  Olson,  903.) 

5.  EQUITY  — JURISDICTION  — ADEQUATE  LEGAL  REM- 
EDY. —The  ground  upon  which  equity  refuses  to  take  cognizance  of 
a  case  in  which  an  adequate  legal  remedy  exists  is  not  jurisdictional, 
but  merely  a  rule  of  practice,  upon  which  the  action  will  be  dis- 
missed if  the  attention  of  the  court  is  called  to  it  at  the  proper  time 
and  In  the  proper  manner.     (Hoff  v.  Olson,  903.) 

6.  EQUITY  —  SUFFICIENCY  OF  COMPLAINT  —  THREAT- 
ENED INJURY.— A  complaint  in  equity  sufficiently  shows  a  threat- 
ened unlawful  invasion  of  plaintiff's  property  rights  when  it 
alleges  that  defendant  threatens  to  tear  down  a  partition  fence  sepa- 
rating his  and  plaintiff's  property;  that  such  act  would  result  in 
irreparable  injury  to  plaintiff,  and  that  defendant  is  insolvent.  The 
objection  that  plaintiff  has  an  adequate  remedy  being  waived,  such 
complaint  is  sufficient  to  maintain  an  action  to  restrain  the  threat- 
ened removal  of  the  fence,    (Hoff  v.  Olson,  903.) 

7.  EQUITY  HAS  NO  JURISDICTION  TO  CONSTRUE  MUNI- 
MENTS OF  TITLE  in  a  case  where  one  holds  adversely  to  the  in- 
strument under  which  another  claims,  whether  a  deed  or  a  will, 
for  it  is  the  province  of  courts  of  law  to  construe  instruments 
which  involve  legal  rights.  Hence,  the  party  out  of  possession  can- 
not Invoke  the  aid  of  a  court  of  equity  to  determine  who  has  the 
better  right.    (Snyder  v.  Grandstaflf,  863.) 

8.  EQUITY— BILL  FOR  REFORMATION  OF  DEED— WHEN 
NOT  DEMURRABLE.— Equity  Is  the  proper  forum  for  the  reforma- 
tion of  a  deed  and  a  claim.  In  a  bill  for  that  purpose,  of  a  mutual 
mistake,  prevents  the  bill  from  being  demurrable,  though  It  fails 
to  allege  notice  to  a  purchaser  for  value.  The  complainant  must, 
It  is  true,  prove  notice  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  but  the 
defense  that  he  had  no  notice  must  be  made  by  plea  or  answer. 
(Snyder  v.  Grandstaff,  863.) 

See  Intervention;  Judgment,  3-5;  Pleading. 


Index.  983 

ESTATES. 

ESTATES-ESTIMATE  OF  VALUE— LIFE  ESTATE.-The 
Talue  of  a  life  estate  should  be  estimated,  not  iu  the  light  of  its  ac- 
tual duration  as  subsequently  developed,  or  the  rents  received  in 
that  time,  but  at  its  value  at  the  time  of  purchase,  estimated  ac- 
■cording  to  the  rules  usually  adopted  in  estimating  the  value  of  life 
estates.    (Gonce  v.  McCoy,  714.) 

See  Devise,  3-6;  Eminent  Domain,  7;  Estates  of  Decedents;  Insane 

Persons,  2. 

ESTATES  OP  DECEDENTS. 

ESTATES  OF  DECEDENTS— ASSETS  DISPOSED  OP  BY 
SOLE  HEIll-RECOVERY  BY  ADMINlSTKATOK.— Where,  be- 
fore an  administrator  is  appointed  of  an  estate,  against  which 
there  are  no  debts  proved  or  to  be  proved,  a  sole  heir  and  distri- 
butee malies  an  equitable  assignment  of  all  her  interest  and  the 
Interest  of  the  estate  in  certain  personal  property,  such  assign- 
ment is  binding  upon  an  administrator  subsequently  appointed  on 
the  petition  of  such  sole  heir  and  distributee,  and  he  cannot  re- 
cover the  property  disposed  of.    (Cooper  v.  Hay  ward,  330.) 

ESTOPPEL. 

1.  ESTOPPEL.— Where  one,  by  his  willful  or  fraudulent  con- 
duct, causes  another  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  certain  facts, 
who  Is  thereby  induced  to  act  on  the  belief,  and  does  so  in  good 
faith,  and  parts  with  his  money  in  reliance  fbereon,  the  former 
Is  estopped  from  denying  the  existence  of  such  facts.  (MoCfett  v. 
Parker,  319.) 

2.  ESTOPPEI^NECESSITY  TO  PLEAD.— Where  a  party  has 
an  opportunity  to  plead  an  estoppel,  and  voluntarily  omits  to  do  so, 
but  goes  to  the  issue  on  the  facts,  he  thereby  waives  the  estoppel, 
and  the  jury  Is  at  liberty  to  find  according  to  the  facts  of  the  case. 
(Bear  v.  Commissioners,  586.) 

3.  ESTOPPEI.—PI>EADING— DEMURRER.— Where  the  advan- 
tage might  have  been  taken  of  an  estoppel  by  means  of  a  demurrer, 
and  the  party  fails  to  so  take  advantage  of  It,  he  will  be  held  to 
have  waived  the  estoppel.    (Bear  v.  Commissioners,  586.) 

See  Adoption,  2;  Eminent  Domain,  8;  Insurance,  12;  .Tudgment,  20, 
21;  Mechanic's  Lien,  3;  Mortgages,  10;  Railroad  Companies, 
7. 

EVIDENCE. 

1.  EVIDENCE— FOREIGN  LAW-QUESTION  OP  PACT.— If 
the  evidence  of  foreign  law  consists  of  reports  of  Judicial  decisions, 
the  question  of  what  the  law  is  becomes  one  of  fact,  where  the 
decisions  are  conflicting,  or  where  Inferences  of  fact  must  be  drawn. 
(Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.   Ellis,  232.) 

2.  EVIDENCE— FOREIGN  LAW— QUESTION  OP  LAW.— If 
the  evidence  of  foreign  law  consists  entirely  of  statutes  or  reports 
of  Judicial  decisions,  the  construction  and  effect  of  the  statutes 
-and  decisions  are  usually  for  the  court  alone.  (Hancock  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Ellis,  232.) 

3.  EVIDENCE— THE  LAWS  OF  ANOTHER  STATE  are  facta 
to  be  proved.     (Hancock  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ellis,  232.) 

4.  EVIDENCE— PRESUl^fPTION  AS  TO  LAW  OF  ANOTHER 
STATE.— The  law  of  another  state  on  a  subject  Involved  in  litigation 


984  Index. 

is  presumed  to  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  state  In  which  the  litiga- 
tion is  being  carried  on.    (Melton  v.  Atlsinson,  416.) 

5.  EVIDENCE— NOTE  INDORSED  BY  OOIIPORATION— HIS- 
TOK~Y  OF  INDEBTEDNESS— PAROL.— If  the  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  on 
a  promissory  note,  of  which  he  is  the  payee,  seelis  to  charge  the 
directors  of  a  corporation  upon  a  contract  of  indorsement  made 
"by  the  corporation  when  the  note  was  executed,  parol  evidence  of 
the  history  of  the  indebtedness,  which  resulted  in  the  note,  should 
be  received  and  submitted  to  the  jury.  (Witherow  v,  Slayback,^ 
507.) 

6.  EVIDENCE  — CONTRACT  OF  INDORSEMENT  —  INTEN- 
TION.—PAROL  EVIDENCE  is  admissible,  as  between  the  immedi- 
ate parties  to  a  contract  of  indorsement,  to  ascertain  their  intention; 
all  the  facts  and  circumstances  which  tooli  place  at  the  time  of  the 
transaction  may  thus  be  shown.  (Witherow  v.  Slayback,  507.) 

7.  EVIDENCE— NOTE  INDORSED  BY  CORPORATION— 
PAROL  PROOF  THAT  COMPANY  IS  PRINCIPAL  DEBTOR. 
The  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  on  a  promissory  note,  of  which  he  is  the 
payee,  and  which  is  indorsed  by  a  corporation,  through  its  treas- 
urer, has  a  right  to  show,  if  he  can,  by  parol  evidence,  to  the  satis- 
faction of  a  jury,  that  the  corporation  is  really  his  principal  debtor 
in  the  transaction.    (Witherow  v.  Slayback,  507.) 

8.  EVIDENCE- REASONABLE  CERTAINTY— STRONG  PROB- 
ABILITIES.—A  proposition  is  reasonably  certain  when  It  is  suj)- 
ported  by  the  strong  probabilities.    (People  v.  Fielding,  495.) 

9.  EVIDENCE  — JUDICIAL  NOTICE  —  DELETERIOUS  NA- 
TURE  OF  CIGARETTES.— A  court  may  take  judicial  notice  that 
cigarettes  possess  no  virtue,  are  inherently  bad,  and  wholly  noxious 
and  deleterious  to  health.    (Austin  v.  State,  703.) 

10.  EVITtENCE— ADMISSIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST— TESTI- 
MONY IN  SIMILAR  CASE.— Where,  in  the  course  of  a  trial  in  an 
action  for  negligence,  plaintiff  is  permitted  to  read  to  the  jury  por- 
tions of  cross-examination  of  the  defendant.  In  a  former  trial  in- 
volving identical  questions,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  admissions 
by  defendant  against  his  interest,  defendant  should  be  allowed  to 
read  the  entire  examination  in  chief  to  the  jury.  (Weeks  v.  Mc- 
Nulty,  693.) 

11.  EVIDENCE— SITUATION  EXISTING  AFTER  INJURY 
COMPLAINED  OF.— In  an  action  against  a  water  company  for 
death  occasioned  by  the  use  of  impure  water  furnished  by  the  de- 
fendant. It  Is  error  to  admit  evidence  of  experts  as  to  tests  made 
of  the  water  some  time  after  the  occurrence  complained  of.  (Green 
V.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

12.  EVIDENCE— OPINION  OF  WITNESSES.— In  an  action 
against  a  water  company  for  injury  occasioned  by  the  defendant's 
furnishing  impure  water.  It  Is  not  proper  to  admit  opinion  evi- 
dence as  to  the  duty  of  the  defendant  with  reference  to  testing  the 
water  supply.    (Green  v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

See  Appeal,  1,  8,  9;  Cotenancy,  2;  Criminal  Law,  9,  12-15;  Deeds, 
1;  Electric  Companies;  Homicide,  3,  4,  6,  11,  12,  14-17;  Innkeep- 
ers, 2;  Insurance,  15;  Negotiable  Instruments,  5-7;  Presumptions; 
Railroad  Companies,  3,  12,  13;  Rewards;  Telegraph  Companies^ 
7;  Waterworks  and  Water  Companies,  6;  Wills,  6,  7. 

EXECUTION. 
1.    EXECUTION  — SALES  — CAVEAT  EMPTOR.-In  execution 
and  judicial  sales  of  land,  except  In  special  cases,  there  is  no  war- 


Index.  985 

ranty  of  title  or  quality,  but  the  rule  of  caveat  emptor  applies,  and 
the  purchaser  gets  virtually  nothing  but  the  quit-claim  title  of  the 
debtor  defendant.    (Gonce  v.  McCoy,  714.) 

2.  EXECUTION— SALES— JUDGMENT  CREDITOR  AS  PUR- 
CHASER—DEFECT OF  TITLE.— A  judgment  creditor  who  bids 
the  amount  of  his  judgment  on  land  and  thus  satisfies  it  is  not  en- 
titled to  have  the  satisfaction  vacated  and  the  judgment  reinstated 
because  he  only  obtained  a  life  estate  In  the  land,  when  he  believed 
he  was  getting  a  fee  simple  estate,  and  bought  under  that  belief. 
If  he  obtains  any  beneficial  interest  by  his  purchase,  he  is  not  en- 
titled to  such  relief.     (Gonce  v.  McCoy,  714.) 

Seo  Attachment;  Contempt,  2. 

EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS. 

EXECUTORS  AND  ADMINISTRATORS— CONTRACTS- 
ACTION  ON  i'ROMISSORY  NOTE  FOR  BENEFIT  OF  AN- 
OTHER.—Where  a  promissory  note  is  talien  in  the  name  of  one 
party  for  the  benefit  of  another,  the  administrator  of  the  payee  may 
maintain  an  action  on  it.     (Cooper  v.  Hayward,  330.) 

See  Estates  of  Decedents. 

EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS. 
See  Statutes,  1-8. 

FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS. 
See  Damages,  1. 

FINDINGS. 
See  Appeal,  7. 

FOODS. 
See  Police  Power,  2-4. 

FRAUD. 

1.  FRAUD-FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  IN  SALE  OF 
BOND— RELYING  ON  REPRESENTATIONS-QUESTION  FOR 
JURY.— In  an  action  for  false  representations  in  the  sale  of  a  bond, 
where  it  appears  that  the  defendant  referred  the  plaintiff  to  the 
sources  of  his  information,  and  advised  the  plaintiff  to  consult  the 
persons  named,  the  question  as  to  whether  he  ought  to  have  done 
so  may  depend  on  circumstances,  and  it  is  not  improper  to  leave  it 
to  the  jury.     (Whiting  v.  Price,  262.) 

2.  FRAUD— FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  IN  SALE  OF 
BOND— RETURN  OF  BOND.— In  an  action  for  false  representa- 
tions in  the  sale  of  a  bond,  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  return 
the  bond  to  the  defendant.     (Whiting  v.  Price,  262.) 

3.  F'RAUD  —  ACTION  FOR  FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  IN 
SALE  OF  BOND— WHAT  WILL  SUPPORT.— Although  a  certain 
bond  of  an  electric  light  company  states  that  payment  thereof  is 
"secured  by  a  first  mortgage  on  all  the  property,  rights,  and  fran- 
chises of  said  company  (present  and  future  acquired),"  a  representa- 
tion made,  in  selling  the  bond,  that  It  was  secured  by  a  mortga?e 
of  real  estate  of  the  value  of  half  a  million  dollars,  will  support  an 
action  for  false  representations,  where  It  appears  that  the  company 
owned  no  real  estate  and  that  the  bond  was  not  secured  by  a  mort- 
gage of  real  estate.     (Whiting  v.  Price,  2C2.) 


^86  Index. 

See  Contracts,  12-14;  Corporations,  37;  Insurance,  22;  Joint  Stock 
Companies;  Judgment,  5;  Municipal  Corporations,  8;  Bape, 
1.  2. 

FRAUDULENT  CONVEYANCES. 

FRAUDULENT  CONVEYANCE— A  VOLUNTARY  DEED  IS 
NOT  FRAUDULENT  AS  TO  DEBTS  AFTERWARD  CREATED. 
A  voluntary  deed  will  not  be  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  subsequent 
•creditors  of  the  grantor  where  no  fraud  is  shown;  and  creditors 
whose  debts  were  created  after  it  was  made  and  recorded  cannot 
subject  the  property  thereby  conveyed  upon  the  ground  that  it  was 
■executed  in  fraud  of  their  rights.  (New  South  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Reed, 
«58.) 

GARNISHMENT. 

Bee  Attachment,  5-12. 

GIFTS. 

GIFTS-VALIDITY  OF,  WHERE  OBLIGATIONS  EXIST.- 

A  man  must  be  just  before  he  is  generous^  He  cannot,  therefore, 
inalie  a  valid  gift  of  his  property  and  leave  his  obligations  unsatis- 
fied or  unprovided  for.    (Moore  v.  Triplett,  882.) 

GUARANTY. 

1.  GUARANTY— ASSIGNABILITY.— A  guaranty  Is  assignable 
with  the  obligations  secured  thereby,  and  goes  with  the  principal 
obligation.  It  is  enforceable  by  the  same  persons  who  can  enforce 
the  principal  obligation.    (Tidioute  Sav.  Bank  v.  Libbey,  907.) 

2.  GUARANTY  —  SPECIAL  AND  GENERAL  DISTIN- 
GUISHED.—A  general  guaranty  is  one  for  acceptance  by  the 
public  generally.  A  special  guaranty  is  limited  to  the  person  to 
whom  it  is  addressed,  and  usually  contemplates  a  trust  or  reposes 
&  confidence  in  some  person.  Such  a  guaranty  may  not  be  assign- 
able until  the  right  of  action  has  arisen  thereon.  (Tidioute  Sav. 
Bank  v.  Libbey,  907.) 

3.  GUARANTY— ASSIGNMENT  OF  PRINCIPAL  OBLIGA- 
TION.—The  transfer  of  a  note  secured  by  a  general  continuing 
guaranty  carries  with  it  the  security  which  may  be  enforced  by 
the  transferee,  though  he  took  the  note  without  knowledge  of  the 
security.     (Tidioute  Sav.  Bank  v.  Libbey,  907.) 

See  Corporations,  5,  7. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD. 

1.  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD  —  MISAPPROPRIATION  OP 
FUNDS.— If  an  unauthorized  purchase  is  made  by  a  guardian  with 
the  funds  of  his  ward,  the  guardian,  and  all  other  persons  who, 
with  a  knowledge  of  such  illegal  use,  participate  in  the  conversion 
of  such  money,  are  liable  to  the  ward.    (Howard  v.  Cassels,  44.) 

2.  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD.— RATIFICATION  by  a  ward,  by 
claiming  the  fruits  of  his  guardian's  unauthorized  Investment,  pre- 
cludes a  denial  of  the  vendor's  right  to  proceed  against  the  property 
purchased  according  to  the  contract  to  recover  the  balance  due.  The 
ward  must  adopt  and  ratify  the  whole  contract  or  none  of  it.  (How- 
ard V.  Cassels,  44.) 

3.  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD— PARTIES.— If  a  testamentary 
guardian  enters  Into  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of  land,  pays  part 
of  the  purchase  money  with  the  funds  of  his  minor  wards,  and  gives 
a  note  in  his  representative  capacity  for  the  balance,  such  wards 


Index.  987 

are  not  necessary  parties,  and  cannot  complain  that  they  are  not 
made  parties  to  a  suit  by  the  vendor  to  recover  on  such  note.  (How- 
ard V.  Cassels,  44.) 

4.  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD— RATIFICATION  OF  UNAU- 
THORIZED CONTRACT.— If  a  guardian  enters  Into  an  unauthor- 
ized contract  for  the  purchase  of  land,  pays  part  of  the  purchase 
money  with  the  funds  of  his  ward,  and  gives  a  note  In  his  represen- 
tative capacity  for  the  balance,  the  ward  cannot  claim  the  fruits 
of  such  contract,  and  deny  the  right  of  the  vendor  to  proceed  against 
the  property  for  the  balance  of  the  purchase  money.  If  the  ward 
ratifies  the  illegal  act,  such  ratification  relates  to  the  contract  of 
purchase,  and  he  must  ratify  the  contract  as  an  entirety.  He  can- 
not take  the  part  only  which  is  favorable  to  him,  but  he  must  also 
take  that  other  part  which  makes  the  land  liable  for  the  balance  of 
the  purchase  money.    (Howard  v.  Cassels,  44.) 

5.  GUARDIAN  AND  WARD  — CONTRACT  FOR  PURCHASE 
OF  LAND— PARTIES.— If  a  contract  for  the  purchase  of  land  en- 
tered into  by  a  testamentary  guardian,  under  which  part  of  the 
purchase  price  Is  paid  with  funds  of  his  wards.  Is  authorized  by 
law  or  the  terms  of  the  will,  the  guardian,  as  the  legal  representa- 
tive of  the  wards.  Is  the  only  necessary  party  to  a  suit  by  the  vendor 
to  recover  the  balance  of  the  purchase  price,  and  judgment  against 
him  binds  the  property  of  the  wards  in  his  hands,  and.  If  such  con- 
tract Is  not  within  the  power  of  the  guardian  to  make.  It  binds  him 
in  his  individual  capacity  only,  and  does  not  bind  the  property  of 
the  wards.    (Howard  v.  Cassels,  44.) 

HABEAS  CORPUS. 

1.  HABEAS  CORPUS— REVIEW  OF  ERRORS.— Habeas  cor- 
pus Is  not  an  appropriate  proceeding  to  review  mere  errors  and  Ir- 
regularities in  a  judgment  of  an  Inferior  court  In  a  criminal  case. 
<In  re  Fanton,  418.) 

2.  HABEAS  CORPUS.— AN  EXCESSIVE  SENTENCE  Imposed 
by  a  court  having  jurisdiction  is  merely  erroneous  and  not  void, 
and  habeas  corpus  does  not  lie  on  behalf  of  the  convicted  prisoner 
to  obtain  relief  therefrom.  His  remedy  Is  by  writ  of  error.  (In  re 
Fanton,  418.) 

3.  HABEAS  CORPUS— VOID  JUDGMENT.— If  a  person  Is  re- 
strained of  his  liberty  by  virtue  of  an  absolutely  void  judgment,  he 
may  be  discharged  on  habeas  corpus,  but  the  judgment  must  be 
Told  and  not  merely  erroneous.    (In  re  Fanton,  418.) 

4.  HABEAS  CORPUS— BURDEN  OF  PROOF.— Although  the 
fitatute  gives  the  relator  the  right  to  open  and  close  the  argument 
In  a  habeas  corpus  proceeding,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow,  nor 
follow  at  all,  that  the  burden  of  proof  Is  upon  him.  (Ex  parte  New- 
man, 740.) 

HEIRS. 

See  Wills,  5. 

HOMESTEAD. 

1.  HOMESTEADS.— RIGHTS  OF  CREDITORS  as  to  property 
occupied  by  their  debtor  as  his  homestead,  after  filling  a  bill 
to  cancel  a  previous  satisfaction  of  their  judgment  to  enjoin 
the  sale  of  the  property  and  subject  It  to  such  judgment,  attach 
from  the  date  of  the  decree  and  not  from  the  time  of  the  filing 
of  the  bill,  if  the  court  does  not  cancel  the  satisfaction  of  the 
judgment,  but  enters  a  money  decree  and  directs  execution  to  issue. 
(Wike  V.  Garner,  102.) 


988  Index. 

2.  HOMESTEADS— COTENANT'S  EIGHT  TO.— An  undivided 
Interest  in  land,  accompanied  by  the  exclusive  possession,  manage- 
ment, and  control  in  consideration  of  maintenance  of  liis  cotenant, 
is  sufficient  to  support  a  right  of  homestead  in  the  occupying  co- 
tenant.     (Wike  V.  Garner,  102.) 

3.  HOMESTEADS— HEAD  OF  FAMILY— WHO  IS.— A  bache- 
lor brother  residing  on  premises  with  his  two  sisters,  who  are  de- 
pendent upon  him  for  support,  is  a  householder  having  a  family, 
of  which  he  is  the  head  and  entitled  to  a  homestead  exemption. 
(Wike  V.   Garner,   102.) 

4.  HOMESTEADS  — OCCUPANCY  WITHIN  REASONABLB 
TIME.— If  a  person  buys  a  lot  for  a  home,  and  erects  a  house 
thereon,  a  creditor  cannot  acquire  a  lien  on  the  property,  if,  withia 
a  reasonable  time,  the  purchaser  moves  on  the  property  and  oc- 
cupies it  as  a  homestead.    (Wike  v.  Garner,  102.) 

HOMICIDE. 

1.  HOMICIDE— MURDER  IN  FIRST  DEGREE.— A  deliberate 
and  premeditated  intention  to  kill,  followed  by  the  killing  of  a  hu- 
man being,  completes  the  crime  of  murder  in  the  first  degree.  (Peo- 
ple v.  Kennedy,  557.) 

2.  HOMICIDE— SELF-DEFENSE.— Before  one  can  justify  +he 
taEing  of  human  life  in  self-defense  he  must  show  that  there  was 
reasonable  ground  for  believing  that  he  was  in  great  peril,  that  the 
killing  was  necessary  for  his  escape,  and  that  no  other  safe  means 
was  open  to  him.  When  one  believes  himself  about  to  be  attacked 
by  another,  and  to  receive  great  bodily  harm,  it  is  his  duty  to  avoid 
the  attack,  if  in  his  power  to  do  so;  and  the  right  of  attack  for  the 
purpose  of  self-defense  does  not  arise  until  he  has  done  everything 
in  his  power  to  avoid  its  necessity.    (People  v.  Kennedy,  557.) 

3.  HOMICIDE— MURDER— SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCK— 
If  the  evidence  shows  that,  after  an  encounter  between  the  deceased ' 
and  the  defendant,  the  latter  obtained  a  knife  in  a  spirit  of  revenge, 
and,  after  being  warned  not  to  return,  did  return  with  intent  to 
kill  the  deceased,  and  thereupon  killed  him,  the  jury  is  justified  in 
finding  that  the  killing  was  done  with  premeditation  and  delibera- 
tion, and  that  the  defendant  is  guilty  of  murder  in  the  first  degree. , 
(People  V.  Kennedy,  557.) 

4.  HOMICIDE— MURDER— SUFFICIENCY  OF  PROOF.— If 
the  proof  justifies  a  jury  in  finding  that  the  homicide  was  inten- 
tional and  resulted  from  sufficient  deliberation  and  premeditation 
to  warrant  a  verdict  of  murder  in  the  first  degree,  the  appellate 
court  will  not  interfere  with  the  determination  upon  the  facts.  (Peo- 
ple V.  Kennedy,  557.) 

5.  HOMICIDE-MURDER^MOTIVE.— Evidence  showing  that 
there  had  been  a  personal  encounter  between  the  deceased  and  the 
defendant,  and  that  the  latter,  humiliated  by  his  defeat  and  In- 
spired by  a  spirit  of  revenge,  returned  to  the  place  of  the  first  affray 
and  made  a  second  attack,  which  was  fatal,  is  sufficient  to  justify 
the  jury  in  finding  that  the  defendant  had  a  motive  for  the  com- 
mission of  the  crime.    (People  v.  Kennedy,  557.) 

6.  HOMICIDE— MURDER— REVIEW  OF  EVIDENCE.-It  is 
not  within  the  province  of  the  appellate  court.  In  reviewing  a  judg- 
ment of  death,  to  review  or  determine  controverted  questions  of  fact 
arising  upon  conflicting  evidence.  The  jury  is  the  ultimate  tribunal 
In  such  cases,  and  with  its  decision  the  appellate  court  may  not  in- 
terfere, unless  it  reaches  the  conclusion  that  Justice  has  not  been 
done.    (People  y.  Kennedy,  557.) 


Index.  989 

7.  HOMICIDE-DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY.— Whether  the  Insan- 
ity be  general  or  partial,  in  order  that  it  may  excuse  homicide,  the 
degree  of  it  must  be  so  great  as  to  have  controlled  the  will  of  its 
subject  and  to  have  taken  from  him  the  freedom  of  moral  action. 
(Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  625.) 

8.  HOMICIDE— DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY.— MERE  MORAL 
OBLIQUITY  OF  PERCEPTION  does  not  constitute  insanity  excus- 
ing a  person  from  punishment  for  his  deliberate  act,  nor  does  a 
mere  perversion  of  the  moral  sense,  nor  does  an  individual  belief  as 
to  right  and  wrong,  however  sincere,  constitute  a  delusion,  or  a 
phase  of  insanity,  excusing  homicide.  (Commonwealth  v.  Wireback, 
«25.) 

9.  HOMICIDE  —  DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY  —  SANITY  PRE- 
SUMED.—If  the  defendant  In  a  prosecution  for  homicide  was  sane 
shortly  lefore  and  shortly  after  the  act  of  murdei-,  the  presumption 
Is  of  sanity  at  the  time  of  the  act,  which  presumption  could  only  be 
rebutted  by  showing  some  special  frenzy  or  madness,  connected  with 
the  act,  which  at  the  instant  irresistibly  impelled  the  defendant  to 
commit  it.    (Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  625.) 

10.  HOMICIDE-DEFENSE  OF  INSANITY— REQUISITE  DE- 
CREE OF  PROOF.— If  one  accused  of  homicide  alleges  Insanity  as  a 
defense,  he  must  establish  it  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence,  or  the 
presumption  of  insanity  which  the  law  raises  stands  unshaken.  Tbo 
law  recognizes  no  middle  ground  of  doubt  of  sanity  reducing  murder 
otherwise  in  the  first  degree  to  murder  in  the  second  degree.  (Com- 
monwealth V.  Wireback,  625.) 

11.  HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE  AS  TO  INSANITY-OPINION  OF 
WITNESSES.— The  opinion  of  a  witness  as  to  the  insanity  of  the 
defendant  in  a  prosecution  for  homlr-lde  Is  inadmissible,  no  founda- 
tion therefor  having  been  laid.  But  it  is  competent  for  witnesses 
who  have  stated  their  opportunities  for  observing  defendant  to  tes- 
tify whether  or  not  they  had  noticed  anything  in  his  conduct  or  con- 
versation indicating  insanity.    (Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  625.) 

12.  HOMICIDE— WIFE  OF  THE  ACCUSED  AS  A  WITNESS- 
EVIDENCE  TO  SUPPORT  HER.— If  the  defense  to  murder  Is  In- 
sulting words  and  conduct  by  the  deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the 
accused  which  she  communicated  to  him,  and  to  which  she  has 
testified,  it  is  error  to  exclude  the  testimony  of  witnesses  to  estab- 
lish the  fact  that,  before  the  homicide,  she  had  stated  to  them  the 
facts  as  testified  to  by  her.  Such  testimony  is  admissible  to  sup- 
port her,  and  to  show  that  her  husband  believed  her  statements 
and  committed  the  homicide  in  consequence  thereof,  when  the  the- 
ory and  evidence  on  behalf  of  the  prosecution  is  to  the  effect  that 
her  testimony  was  prompted  by  an  improper  motive  and  was  re- 
cently fabricated  solely  to  aid  in  the  defense  of  the  husband.  (Jones 
T.  State,  719.) 

13.  HOMICIDE  —  WIFE  AS  WITNESS  —  CROSS-EXAMINA- 
TION.—If,  upon  the  trial  of  a  husband  on  a  criminal  charge,  his 
"Wife  as  a  witness,  on  direct  examination,  should  swear  to  facts  in- 
jurious to  him,  he  cannot  complain,  but  her  cross-examination  must 
be  confined  to  the  matter  elicited  upon  the  examination  In  chief. 
Everything  which  Is  legitimate  for  the  purpose  of  testing  her  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts  sworn  to,  her  bias  or  prejudice,  or  any  matter 
that  legitimately  goes  to  discredit  her.  Is  admissible  on  cross-ex- 
amination, but  if  the  prosecution  leaves  the  matter  testified  to  on 
the  examination  in  chief  and  proposes  to  prove  independent  crim- 
inative facts  against  the  accused,  this  is  not  cross-examination,  and 
the  wife  then  becomes  a  witness  for  the  prosecution.  Her  exami- 
nation must  then  stop,  because  she  canuot  become  a  witness  against 
Ler  husband.     (Jones  v.  State,  719.) 


990  Index. 

14.  HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE-STATEMENTS  OF  DECEASED 
—HEARSAY.— If  the  defense  to  murder  is  insulting  conduct  by  the 
deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the  accused,  the  testimony  of  a  wit- 
ness, that,  subsequently  to  the  alleged  insulting  conduct,  he  saw  a 
woman  in  the  otfice  of  the  deceased,  and  that  the  latter  informed 
him  that  she  was  the  wife  of  the  accused,  is  hearsay  and  inadmis- 
sible.   (Jones  V.  State,  719.) 

15.  HOMICIDE— MURDER— EVIDENCE  OF  REPUTATION 
OF  DECEASED.— If  the  defense  to  murder  is  insulting  conduct  of 
the  deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the  accused,  which  she  has  com- 
municated to  him,  the  bad  general  reputation  of  the  deceased,  as 
well  as  his  general  reputation  as  a  man  of  unchaste  and  lecherous 
habits  toward  women,  is  admissible  in  evidence  upon  the  issue  as 
to  whether  the  accused  believed  the  information  received  from  his 
wife  and  acted  thereon,    (Jones  v.  State,  719.) 

16.  HOMICIDE— EVIDENCE— RES  GESTAE.— If  the  defense  to 
murder  is  insulting  conduct  by  the  deceased  toward  the  wife  of  the 
accused,  and  she  has  testified  as  to  such  conduct  and  to  communi- 
cating it  to  her  husband,  and  that  he  and  deceased  were  friendly 
until  she  made  such  communication,  the  prosecution  cannot  prove 
by  her,  as  part  of  the  res  gestae,  on  cross-examination,  matters  re- 
lating to  the  disposition  of  her  property,  deceased's  connection  there- 
with, or  the  squandering  of  her  property  by  her  husband.  (Jonea 
V.  State,  719.) 

17.  MURDER— INSULTING  CONDUCT  TOWARD  WIFE-EVI- 
DENCE.—If  the  defense  to  murder  is  insulting  conduct  by  the  de- 
ceased toward  the  wife  of  the  accused,  he  may  prove,  as  original 
evidence,  that  prior  to  the  homicide  his  wife  communicated  a  state- 
ment of  the  insulting  conduct  toward  her  to  the  witness,  who  in 
turn  communicated  it  to  the  husband.    (Jones  v.  State,  719.) 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE. 

1.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— ASSAULT,  IN  WIFE'S  ABSENCH, 
BY  HUSBAND,  WHO  IS  HER  AGENT— WIFE'S  LIABILITY.— 
A  married  woman  is  civilly  answerable  for  personal  injuries  in- 
flicted, not  in  her  presence,  upon  a  third  person,  by  her  husband^ 
while  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  authority  as  her  agent.  (Shane 
V.  Lyons,  261.) 

2.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— UNITY  OF,  TO  AID  ENFORCE- 
MENT OF  COVENANT  FOR  WIFE'S  BENEFIT.— The  common- 
law  unity  of  husband  and  wife  survives  for  the  purpose  of  aiding' 
the  wife  to  enforce  a  covenant  for  her  benefit  made  by  her  hus- 
band, and  which  equity  and  good  conscience  approve.  (Buchanan 
V,  Tilden,  454.) 

3.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE  — PROMISE  TO  HIM  FOR  HER 
BENEFIT— WIFE'S  RIGHT  OF  ACTION  ON.— If  an  heir-at-law 
and  next  of  kin  of  one  who  died  testate  desires  to  contest  a  be- 
quest., in  the  will,  of  a  large  amount  of  property,  which,  if  Invalid, 
would'  fall  to  the  next  of  kin,  but  has  no  means  to  conduct  the  liti- 
gation, and  obtains  a  loan  of  money,  for  the  purpose,  from  a  man 
whose  wife  has  an  equitable  interest  in  the  suit,  by  reason  of  her 
adoption  by  a  relative  of  the  testator,  upon  a  promise  to  the  huff- 
band  that.  In  case  of  success,  the  contestant  will  pay  to  the  wife 
the  sum  of  fifty  thousand  dollars,  the  wife  Is  entitled  to  recover 
on  the  contract,  where  the  contestant  succeeds  in  obtaining  the 
fund  for  the  next  of  kin,  whether  the  mere  relation  of  husband 
and  wife  would  alone  constitute  a  sufficient  consideration  to  en- 
able her  to  maintain  the  action,  for  her  equities  are  such,  when 


Index.  991 

considered  In  connection  with  the  duty  of  her  husband  to  provide 
for  her  future,  and  with  the  fact  that,  with  that  purpose  in  view» 
the  money  was  procured  for  the  contestant  to  institute  and  pur- 
sue the  necessary  litigation  to  secure  the  fund  to  which  her  equities 
related,  that,  all  taken  together,  they  are  sufficient  to  sustain  her 
action.    (Buchanan  v.  Tilden,  454.) 

4.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— CONSIDERATION  FOR  COVE- 
N.-X-NT  ON  BEHALF  OF  WIFE.— It  is  not  the  full  measure  of  the 
legal  and  moral  obligations  imposed  upon  a  husband  by  the  com- 
mon law  simply  to  provide  for  his  wife  the  necessaries  of  life,  8ucl> 
as  food,  raiment  and  shelter,  but  it  is  his  duty,  if  opportunity  offers, 
to  make  provision  for  her  against  that  day  when  he  may  be  in- 
capacitated by  disease  or  removed  by  death;  and  this  obligation  is 
one  that  a  court  will  recognize  as  a  sufficient  consideration  to  sup- 
port a  covenant  on  her  behalf.    (Buchanan  v.  Tilden,  454.) 

5.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— RIGHT  OF  PARENT  TO  ADVISE 
MARRIED  CHILD.— In  cases  of  unhappiness  and  disagreement* 
between  a  married  couple,  the  law  recognizes  the  right  of  a  parent 
to  advise  the  son  or  daughter;  and  when  such  advice  is  given  In 
good  faith  and  results  In  a  separation,  the  act  does  not  give  the 
injured  party  a  right  of  action.    (Brown  v.  Brown,  574.) 

6.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— PARENT  AND  CHILD— ADVICE 
TO  CHILD— MALICE.— The  malice  necessary  to  be  alleged  and 
proved  against  a  parent  for  advising  his  married  child  to  abandon, 
his  wife  or  her  husband,  is  not  alone  such  malice  as  must  proceed 
from  a  malignant  and  revengeful  disposition,  but  that  it  would  be 
sufficient  to  prove  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  jury  that  the  parent'* 
action  was  taken  without  proper  investigation  of  the  facts,  or  where 
the  advice  was  given  from  recklessness  or  dishonesty  oif  purpose, 
the  law  presuming  malice  from  such  conduct  in  actions  of  this- 
nature.    (Brown  v.  Brown,  574.) 

7.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE— LIABILITY  OF  PARENT  FOR 
ADVISING  MARRIED  CHILD  TO  ABANDON  HUSBAND  OR 
WIFE.— Before  a  parent  can  be  held  liable  "in  damages  for  advis- 
ing his  married  child  to  abandon  his  wife,  or  her  husband,  the  con- 
duct of  the  parent  should  be  alleged  and  proved  to  be  malicious. 
(Brown  v.  Brown,  574.) 

8.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE  —  CONTROVERSY  OVER  FUNDS, 
THE  WIFE'S  SEPARATE  ESTATE,  TAKEN  BY  HER  INSOL- 
VENT HUSBAND— RIGHTS  OF  CREDITORS.— In  a  contest  be- 
tween the  creditors  of  an  insolvent  husband  and  his  wife  over  funds 
which,  at  one  time,  constituted  her  separate  estate,  but  which  she 
allowed  to  pass  Into  her  husband's  hands,  the  creditors  will  pre- 
vail, where  there  Is  nothing  to  show  that  the  transaction  was  in- 
tended as  a  loan,  or  that  tLe  husband  and  wife  Intended  to  occupy 
the  relation  of  debtor  and  creditor  in  respect  to  such  funds.  (New 
South  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Reed,  858.) 

9.  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE.— IMPROVEMENTS  PUT  UPON 
THE  WIFE'S  SEPARATE  REAL  ESTATE  BY  HER  INSOLVENT 
HUSBAND,  In  fraud  of  his  creditors,  can  be  followed  by  them  on 
the  premises  where  they  are  put,  and  the  land  may  be  charged,  in 
their  favor,  with  the  value  of  such  Improvements.  (New  Soutli 
B.  &  L.  Assn.  y.  Reed,  858.) 

See  Witnesses,  12. 

ILLEGITIMACY. 
Bee  Descent;  Wills,  S. 


592  Index. 

INDICTMENT. 
See  Criminal  Law,  15;  Bape,  2. 

INFANTS. 
See  Judgment,  11-14. 

INJUNCTION. 

INJUNCTIONS— WHEN  NOT  GRANTED.— If  the  facts  pre- 
■sent  no  matter  requiring  equitable  relief,  and  the  granting  of  an  in- 
junction will  work  irreparable  injury  to  one  party  with  no  appre- 
ciable benefit  to  the  other,  and  the  remedy  at  law  is  adequate  to 
do  full  justice,  the  court  should  refuse  to  issue  an  injunction  as 
■not  within  its  legitimate  jurisdiction.  (Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver 
King  Min.  Co..  810.) 

See  Equity,  1;  Trespass. 

INNKEEPERS. 

1.  INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE— INJURY  TO  GUEST  BY 
FIRE.— No  presumption  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  an  innkeeper 
arises  where  a  guest  loses  his  life  in  a  fire  originating  in,  and  de- 
stroying the  premises.  To  make  the  innkeeper  liable  in  such  a 
•case  it  must  be  shown  that  his  negligence  was  the  proximate  cause 
of  the  fire  and  the  consequent  injuries.    (Weeks  v.  McNulty,  693.) 

2.  INNKEEPERS— NEGLIGENCE  IN  FAILING  TO  PROVIDE 
FIRE-ESCAPES  —  MUNICIPAL      ORDINANCE— EVIDENCE.-In 

an  action  against  an  Innkeeper,  based  upon  his  negligence  in  failing 
to  provide  his  premises  with  fire-escapes,  as  required  by  city  ordi- 
nance, resulting  in  the  death  of  plaintiff's  decedent,  it  is  not  error  to 
exclude  the  violated  ordinance  from  evidence  where  no  causal  con- 
nection between  the  violation  of  the  ordinance  and  the  injuries  com- 
plained of  is  shown.    (Weeks  v.  McNulty,  693.) 

3.  INNKEEPERS— LIABILITY— GENERAL  RULE.— The  gen- 
eral rule  of  law  governing  the  liability  of  an  innkeeper  is,  that  he 
is  not  an  insurer  of  the  person  of  his  guest  against  injury,  but  his 
obligation  is  merely  to  exercise  reasonable  care  that  his  guests  may 
•not  be  Injured  by  anything  happening  through  the  innkeeper's  negli- 
gence.   (Weeks  v.  McNulty,  693.) 

INSANE  PERSONS. 

1.  INSANE  PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION  '  OF  LUNATIC'S 
ESTATE— DISBURSEMENTS— NOTICE  TO  NEXT  OF  KIN.- 
Before  ordering  disbursements  from  a  lunatic's  estate  upon  peti- 
tion of  the  committee,  notice  should  be  given  to  the  next  of  kin,  or 
parties  standing  in  close  relation  to  the  lunatic.  (Equitable  Trust 
•Co.  V.  Garis,  644.) 

2.  INSANE  PERSONS— ADMINISTRATION  OF  ESTATES  OF. 
It  Is  the  duty  of  a  court  In  administering  the  estate  of  an  Insane 
person  to  keep  expenses  within  reasonable  bounds,  to  sacrifice  the 
estate  only  when  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  make  It  neces- 
sary, and  to  see  to  it  that  the  future  comfort  of  the  lunatic  shall 
be  made  as  secure  as  possible.    (Equitable  Trust  Co.  v.  Garis,  644.) 

3.  INSANE  PERSONS— POWERS  OF  COMMITTEE— EFFECT 
OF  APPEAL  FROM  ORDER  OF  COMMITMENT.— An  appeal  from 
an  order  of  commitment  entered  In  lunacy  proceedings  does  not 
oust  or  suspend  the  committee  of  a  lunatic  from  Its  functions,  nor 
relieve  it  of  the  duty  to  guard  the  lunatic's  property.    Such  com- 


Index.  993 

«atttee  may  still  sue  In  equity  for  the  discovery  and  deliverance  of 
property  of  the  lunatic  held  by  an  unauthorized  person.  (Equitable 
Trust  Ck).  V.  Garis,  G44.) 

4.  INSANITY— OPINIONS  OP  NONEXPERTS.-Intimate  ac- 
quaintances of  a  person  whose  sanity  Is  the  subject  of  investiga- 
tion and  who  have  been  close  observers  of  his  conduct,  though  not 
<^}mpetent  as  experts,  when  they  can  instance  acts  indicating  men« 
tal  derangement,  are  competent  to  give  their  opinions  as  to  the 
canity  or  Insanity  of  such  person.    (In  re  Christensen,  794.) 

See  Equity,  1,  3;  Homicide,  7-11;  Witnesses,  10. 

INSOLVENCY. 

1.  INSOLVENCY— CREDITOR— COLLATERAL  SECURITY.— 
The  rule  that  a  creditor  of  an  Insolvent,  having  collateral  8uffl> 
■clent  to  satisfy  a  part  only  of  his  debt,  is  entitled  to  prove  the 
whole  of  his  claim,  and  cannot  be  required  to  allow  credit  for  any 
collections  made  after  the  date  of  the  insolvency,  does  not  apply 
where  the  insolvent's  liability  is  that  of  indorser  upon  negotiable 
notes,  which  it  discounted  to  a  third  party,  .his  liability  becoming 
fixed  subsequent  to  the  insolvency,  and  where  there  is  no  indebt- 
edness independent  of  the  notes.  (Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Macfar- 
lane,  352.) 

2.  SUBROGATION— INSOLVENCY— RIGHT  OF  ACTION  OP 
HECEIVER.— The  receiver  of  an  insolvent  indorser  has  a  right  of 
action  against  the  original  obligors  upon  the  paper,  upon  the  pay- 
ment of  a  dividend  to  the  creditor  holder;  and  upon  full  payment, 
the  estate  of  the  insolvent  is  subrogated  to  all  of  the  creditors' 
rights  as  against  prior  parties.  (Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Macfar- 
lane,  352.) 

3.  INSOLVENCY— ATTACHMENT— EFFECT  ON  RIGHTS  OP 
•CREDITOR.— A  proceeding  In  attachment,  unnecessary  to  protect 
the  creditor  as  to  money  of  an  insolvent  debtor  In  the  creditor's 
hands,  will  not  affect  the  creditor's  right  to  prove  the  balance  of 
his  claim,  and  to  share  in  the  distribution  of  the  Insolvent's  estate. 
(Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Macfarlane,  352.) 

4.  INSOLVENCY  — NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— RIGHTS 
OP  HOLDER  AGAINST  INSOLVENT  INDORSER.— The  holder  of 
-a  note  or  bill  indorsed  by  an  insolvent  need  not  enforce  its  col- 
lection, as  against  parties  primarily  liable,  before  he  can  make  a 
claim  upon  the  Insolvent  estate.  Nor  is  he  required  to  surrender 
up  the  obligation  as  a  condition  to  participating  in  dividends.  In 
the  absence  of  statute  he  may  proceed  against  the  insolvent  estate, 
-and  also  against  the  other  parties  to  the  obligation,  until  his  debt 
is  fully  collected.     (Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Macfarlane,  352.) 

5.  INSOLVENCY  — NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  CLAIM 
OF  HOLDER  AGAINST.  INSOLVENT  INDORSER.— Where  the 
.  holder  of  a  bill  or  note  applies  to  prove  his  debt  against  the  estate 

of  an  Insolvent  surety,  any  sura  actually  received  in  payment  from 
another  party  to  the  obligation  must  be  deducted  from  the  amount 
to  be  proved.  The  sum  actually  remaining  unpaid  must  be  the  basis 
upon  which  the  dividend  Is  to  be  computed.  (Mercantile  Nat  Bank 
T.  Macfarlane,  352.) 

See  Building  and  Loan  Associations,  2,  4;  Corporations,  2,  10-12,  30; 
Husband  and  Wife,  8,  9. 
▲m.  St.  rv..  Vol.  LXX.-63- 


994  Index. 

INSTRUCTIONS. 

1.  INSTRUCTIONS  —  IMMATERIAL  ERROR.  —  Erroneous  Ii> 
Btruetions  as  to  the  interpretation  to  be  given  a  doubtful  telegram^ 
when  without  prejudice,  are  not  ground  for  reversal.  (Hasbrouck 
V.  Western  Union  T.  Co.,  181.) 

2.  INSTRUCTIONS— ERRONEOUS  SUBMISSION  TO  JURY 
OF  MATTER  OP  LAW.— It  is  harmless  error  for  the  court  to- 
submit  to  the  jury  the  question  of  interpretation  of  a  tele- 
gram conferring  certain  authority  upon  an  agent,  when,  from  th& 
verdict  rendered,  it  is  apparent  that  the  interpretation  adopted  by 
the  jury  gave  to  the  telegram  the  meaning  which,  as  a  matter  of 
law,  was  proper.    (Hasbrouck  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  181.) 

3.  INSTRUCTIONS— REVIEW  ON  APPEAL.— In  determining 
whether  an  instruction  given  in  a  trial  for  homicide  was  erroneous 
and  prejudicial,  it  should  be  considered  not  only  with  what  precede* 
and  follows  it,  but  in  view  of  the  idea  being  elucidated.  (Common- 
wealth V.  Wireback,  625.) 

See  Appeal,  2,  10,  12;  Trial,  1,  5;  Witnesses,  6, 

INSURANCE. 

1.  INSURANCE  COMPANIES— ULTRA  VIRES-POLICY  FOR- 
BIDDEN BY  STATUTE.— Where  a  mutual  insurance  company 
issues  a  policy  which  it  is  prohibited  by  law  to  issue,  the  policy  i» 
illegal  and  void,  and  the  fact  that  premiums  have  been  paid  thereon, 
and  used  by  the  company,  will  not  estop  it  from  pleading  ultra 
vires  as  a  defense  to  a  suit  upon  the  policy.  (In  re  Assignment 
Mut.  Guar.  Ins.  Co.,  149.) 

2.  INSURANCE  COMPANIES-POWERS— ASSURED  MUST 
TAKE  NOTICE  OF.— One  who  takes  out  a  policy  in  a  mutual  in- 
surance company  which  the  latter  has  no  power  under  its  charter 
to  make  must  take  notice  of  the  laws  of  the  state  and  the  articles 
of  incorporation  adopted  thereunder,  and  cannot  recover  upon  tli& 
policy  unless  enabled  to  do  so  upon  the  ground  of  estoppel.  (In  rfr 
Assignment  Mut.  Guar.  Co.,  149.) 

3.  INSURANCE  COMPANIES— MUTUAL— WHO  ARE  NOT 
MEMBERS.— One  who  Insures  his  property  in  a  mutual  company 
In  a  stated  amount,  for  a  specific  premium  does  not  become  a  mem- 
ber of  the  company  so  as  to  be  liable  for  future  assessments.  (In  re- 
Assignment  Mut.  Guar.  Ins.  Co.,  149.) 

4.  INSURANCE  COMPANIES— MUTUAI^-WHEN  DO  NOT- 
BECOME  STOCK  COMPANIES.— A  mutual  insurance  company  or- 
ganized  under  a  statute  authorizing  an  association  of  persons  mak- 
ing mutual  pledges  and  giving  valid  obligations  to  each  other  for 
their  own  insurance  on  the  assessment  plan,  does  not  become  a 
stock  company  by  the  issuance  of  shares  to  the  subscribers  of  a  guar- 
anty fun-d,  which  shares  are  secured  by  obligations  of  the  holders^ 
and  are  subject  to  assessment  from  time  to  time  to  meet  any  de- 
ficiency that  might  arise  in  the  advancements,  assessments,  and 
pledges  made  to  pay  losses  and  expenses.  Therefore  it  cannot  do 
business  on  the  stock  plan,  cannot  write  a  policy  for  a  fixed  amount, 
accept  premiums  as  such,  nor  declare  dividends.  (In  re  Assign- 
ment Mut.  Guar.  Ins.  Co.,  149.) 

5.  INSURANCE  COMPANIES  —  MUTUAL  —  LIABILITY  OF 
MEMBERS  TO  A  PERSON  ILLEGALLY  INSURED.— While  thfr 
ofllcors  or  directors  of  a  mutual  insurance  company  may  be  held  in- 
dividually liable  for  a  wrong  done  to  a  person  to  whom  they  have- 
issued  an  Illegal  and  void  policy,  no  liability  for  such  wrong  caa 


Indbx.  995 

be  enforced  against  the  members  of  the  company  as  partners.    (In 
re  Assignment  Mut.  Guar.  Ins.  Co.,  149.) 

6.  INSURANCE  — ACCIDENT  — DEATH  BY  — RUPTURE  OP 
ARTERY.— Where  the  death  of  an  Insured  was  due  to  the  rupture 
of  an  artery  it  will  not  be  considered  as  the  result  of  accident  where 
In  the  circumstances  attending  the  rupture,  there  Is  no  evidence  that 
anything  was  done  or  occurred  which  the  insured  had  not  toreseen 
or  planned,  except  the  rupture  and  Its  consequences.  (Feder  v. 
Iowa  State  etc.  Assn.,  212.) 

7.  INSURANCE— ACCIDENT— WHAT  IS.— While  it  may  be 
true  that  an  accident  is  an  event  which  takes  place  without  one's 
foresight  or  expectation,  and  is  undesigned,  it  is  not  true  that  every 
unforeseen,  undesigned,  and  unexpected  event  is  an  accident.  A 
result  whicli,  though  not  designed,  foreseen,  or  expected,  is  yet  the 
natural  and  direct  effect  of  acts  voluntarily  done,  or  of  conditions 
voluntarily  assumed,  cannot  be  said  to  be  accidental.  (Feder  v.  Iowa 
State  etc.  Assn.,  212.) 

8.  INSURANCE.  LIFE— POLICY  OF,  MAY  BE  ASSIGNED  TO 
ONE  HAVING  N"0  INSURABLE  INTEREST.— A  valid  policy  of 
life  insurance  is  assignable.  Hence,  if  a  policy  Is,  in  good  faith 
and  not  for  the  purpose  of  assignment,  taken  out,  either  by  the  in- 
sured himself,  or  by  another,  who  has  an  insurable  interest  in  his 
life,  it  may  be  lawfully  assigned  to  one  who  has  no  insurable  in- 
terest In  the  life  of  the  insured,  and  the  assignee  may,  therefore, 
enforce  collection  of  the  full  amount  of  the  policy  from  the  com- 
pany, where  the  assignment  is  general  and  absolute.  (Steinback  v. 
Diepenbrock,  424.) 

9.  INSURANCE,  LIFE— CONTRACT  OF,  AND  ITS  ASSIGN- 
MENT—CONSTRUCTION—INTENTION —  WAGERING  POLICY. 
The  intention  of  the  parties  procuring  a  life  insurance  determines 
its  character.  Hence,  if  one  should  take  out  such  a  policy  to  him- 
self, and  at  once  assign  it  to  a  person  having  no  insurable  interest? 
In  his  life,  the  courts  would  unhesitatingly  declare  in  accordance 
with  the  facts,  reading  the  policy  and  the  assignmept  together,  as 
forming  part  of  one  transaction,  for  the  purpose  of  frustrating  a 
wagering  policy.    (Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock,  424.) 

10.  INSURANCE.  LIPE^-POLICY  OF— RIGHT  TO  ASSIGN- 
FAILURE  OF  HEALTH.— A  person  whose  life  is  insured  is  not 
deprived  of  the  right  to  realize  on  his  policy,  by  its  assignment, 
whenever  his  necessities  press  him,  because  of  a  failing  condition 
of  health.     (Steinback  v.  Diepenbrock,  424.) 

11.  INSURANCE-POSSESSION  OF  POLICY.— Possession  of  an 
Insurance  policy,  at  the  death  of  the  insured,  makes  out  a  prima 
facie  case.     (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

12.  INSURANCE— PAYMENT  OF  PREMIUM— RECITALS  IN 
THE  POLICY— ESTOPPEL.— The  acknowledgment  in  the  policy  of 
the  receipt  of  the  premium  estops  the  company  to  test  the  validity 
of  the  policy  on  the  ground  of  nonpayment  of  the  premium.  (Ken- 
drick V.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

13.  INSURANCE— RECITALS  OF  PAYMENT  IN  THE  POLICY 
—WHEN  A  MERE  RECEIPT.— In  so  far  as  a  recital  in  an  Insur- 
ance policy  ot  the  payment  of  premium  is  a  mere  receipt  for  money, 
it  is  only  prima  facie  like  other  receipts,  and  will  not  prevent  an 
action  to  recover  the  money  if  not  in  truth  paid.  (Kendrick  v.  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

14.  INSURANCE  —  RECITALS  OF  PAYMENT  IN  THE  POI^ 
ICY— WHEN  PART  OP  CONTRACT.— In  so  far  as  a  recital  in  an 
insurance  policy  of  the  payment  of  premium  is  a  part  of  the  con- 


996  Index. 

tract  of  insurance,  it  cannot  be  contradicted  by  parol  to  invalidate 
the  contract,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  in  procuring  the  delivery  of 
the  policy.     (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

15.  INSURANCE— INSTRUCTIONS  TO  AGENTS— EVIDENCE 
AGAINST  THE  COMPANY.— The  instruction  to  agents  that  if  the 
premium  was  paid  more  than  thirty  days  after  due  there  must  be  a 
health  certificate  is  evidence  against  the  company  that  credit  or 
indulgence  on  payment  was  allowable.  (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co., 
592.) 

16.  INSURANCE  — INSTRUCTIONS  TO  AGENTS  NOT  BIND- 
ING ON  THE  INSURED.— The  instruction  to  agents  that  after 
thirty  days'  delay  in  the  paj'ment  of  premium  a  health  certificate 
is  required  is  not  binding  on  the  insured,  who  may  rely  upon  the 
provision  in  the  policy  itself  that  the  payment  must  be  made  "dur- 
ing life."    (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

17.  INSURANCE— CONSTRUCTION  OF  POLICY.— The  uniform 
rule  of  construction  of  insurance  policies  is,  that  if  reasonably  sus- 
ceptible of  two  constructions,  that  one  will  be  adopted  which  is 
more  favorable  to  the  insured.     (Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

18.  INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY.— Where  a  pol- 
icy of  life  insurance  provides  that  after  one  year  from  its  inception 
it  shall  be  incontestable  if  the  premiums  are  paid,  such  policy  can- 
not be  contested  by  the  insurer,  after  a  year  has  elapsed,  on  the 
ground  of  fraud  in  obtaining  the  policy,  and  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  suit  is  brought  upon  the  policy  by  the  assured's  represen- 
tatives or  any  bona  fide  assignee  of  the  assured.  (Clement  v.  In- 
surance Co.,  650.) 

19.  INSURANCE  —  LIFE  —  INCONTESTABLE  CLAUSE— WA- 
GERING TRANSFER.— An  incontestable  clause  in  a  polioy  of  life 
insurance  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  aid  a  transferee  thereof  who,  by 
means  of  an  unauthorized  and  illegal  transfer,  commenced  before, 
S.nd  consummated  after,  the  policy  issued,  to  recover  thereon. 
Such  clause  does  not  preclude  inquiry  into  the  transfer  and  the 
right  of  the  transferee  to  take  under  the  policy,  and  if  the  transfer 
is  a  wagering  transfer  the  transferee  cannot  recover.  (Clement  v. 
Insurance  Co.,  650.) 

20.  INSURANCE  —  LIFE  —  PAYMENT  OF  PREMIUMS  TO 
AGENT— PROOF.— Where  a  policy  of  life  Insurance  provides  that 
premiums  thereon  may  be  paid  to  an  agent  producing  a  receipt 
therefor  signed  by  the  president  or  other  named  oflScers  of  the 
company,  the  payment  of  premiums  is  sufficiently  established  in  a 
suit  on  the  policy,  by  evidence  that  they  were  paid  to  one  held  out 
as  a  general  agent  of  the  company  who  delivered  a  receipt  signed 
by  the  president  when  the  payment  was  made.  (Clement  v.  In- 
surance Co.,  650.) 

21.  INSURANCE— LIFE— INSURABLE  INTEREST— WAGER- 
ING POLICY.— One  who  takes  out  a  policy  upon  the  life  of  another 
paying  the  premiums  therefor  himself  must  have  an  insurable  in- 
terest in  the  life  of  that  other,  or  the  policy  will  be  a  mere  wager 
policy  upon  which  the  party  to  whom  it  was  Issued  cannot  recover. 
(Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.,  650.) 

22.  INSURANCE— LIFE— INCONTESTABILITY— FRAUD  OF 
ASSIGNEE.— Where  a  policy  of  life  Insui-ance  provides  that  It 
shall  be  incontestable  by  the  company  after  one  year  If  the  premi- 
ums are  paid,  and  suit  is  brought  thereon  by  a  transferee  of  the 
policy,  after  the  lapse  of  such  time,  the  premiums  being  paid,  the 
Insurer  may,  nevertheless,  defend  upon  the  ground  that  the  plain- 
tiff is  not  a  transferee  in  good  faith,  and  that  the  transfer  was  a 


Index.  997 

mere  evasfon  of  the  rule  against  wagering  policies,  and  evidence  In 
support  of  such  defense  Is  admissible.  (Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.. 
650.) 

23.  INSURANCE  —  LIFE  —  ASSIGNMENT  —  INSURABLE  IN- 
TEREST.—When  a  policy  of  life  Insurance  has  once  been  issued 
to  a  beneficiary  legally  entitled,  he  may  assign  or  transfer  it  to  an- 
other who  has  no  insurable  interest,  the  transfer  or  assignment 
must  be  in  good  faith,  and  not  a  mere  colorable  evasion  of  the  pro- 
vision in  regard  to  w.agering  contracts  and  in  order  to  validate  or 
legalize  the  same.    (Clement  v.  Insurance  Co.,  650.) 

INTERSTATE  COMMERCE. 

1.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— JURISDICTION  OP  STATE 
AND  FEDERAL  COURTS— CONNECTING  RAILROADS.- Where 
the  putting  in  of  a  connecting  switch  at  the  intersection  of  two 
railroads  for  the  purpose  of  transfering  cars  from  one  road  to  the 
other,  is  of  some  benefit  both  to  interstate  and  state  trafllc,  the 
state  and  the  federal  courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  the 
matter,  and,  in  disposing  of  the  case,  they  may  take  into  considera- 
tion the  whole  necessity  resulting  from  the  whole  benefit  which  will 
accrue  to  all  classes  of  commerce.  (Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  358.) 

2.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— STATE  REGULATIONS— SI- 
LENCE OF  CONGRESS.— The  rule  that  the  silence  of  congress  in 
relation  to  articles  confessedly  suited  for  commerce  is  to  be  talien 
as  legally  equivalent  to  its  declaration  that  the  transportation  of 
those  articles  into  the  states  shall  be  free  and  unrestricted,  has  no 
application  to  articles  of  doubtful  commercial  quality.  (Austin  v. 
State,  703.) 

3.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— ORIGINAL  PACKAGE— BAS- 
KET CONTAINING  CIGARETTE  PACKAGES.— Where  a  num- 
ber of  pacliages  of  cigarettes  containing  ten  cigarettes  each  are 
shipped  from  one  state  to  another  in  a  basket,  the  basket  Is  an 
original  package  within  the  Interstate  commerce  act  The  presence 
or  absence  of  covering  to  the  basket  is  immaterial  to  the  question 
whether  or  not  the  basket  Is  an  original  package,  and  It  is  of  no 
importance  that  the  basket  Is  owned  by  the  transporting  carrier. 
(Austin  V.  State,  703.) 

4.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— ORIGINAL  PACKAGE— DEFI- 
NITION.—An  original  package,  as  applied  to  Interstate  or  Inter- 
national commerce,  is  a  package,  bundle,  or  aggregation  of  goods, 
put  up  in  whatever  form,  covering,  or  receptable  for  transporta- 
tion, and  as  a  unit  transported  from  one  state  or  nation  to  another. 
(Austin  V.  State,  703.) 

5.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— STATE  REGULATION— CON- 
STITUTIONALITY—BURDEN  OB'  PROOF.— The  burden  Is  upon 
a  person  who  assails  a  state's  restrictive  or  prohibitory  statute  as 
an  unwarranted  interference  with  interstate  commerce,  to  show 
that  the  particular  article  Involved  is  a  legitimate  subject  of  com- 
merce.    (Austin  V.  State,  703.) 

6.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE-REGULATION  BY  STATES— 
CIGARETTES.— Cigarettes  are  not  legitimate  articles  of  commerce, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  congressional  regulation  to  the  contrary,  a 
state  statute  may  prohibit  the  importation  and  sale  of  cigarettes 
within  the  state.  Such  a  statute  is  not  In  contravention  of  that 
clause  of  the  federal  constitution  which  inhibits  state  regulation 
of  Interstate  commerce.    (Austin  v.  State,  703.) 


998  Index. 

7.  INTERSTATE  COMMERCE— LEGITIMATE  COMMODI- 
TIES—CONGRESSIONAL TAXATION  OF  CIGARETTES.— Con- 
gress,  by  imposing  a  revenue  tax  upon  cigarettes,  does  not  recog- 
nize them  as  proper  commercial  commodities.    (Austin  v.  State,  703.) 

Set  Police  Power,  8. 

INTERVENTION. 

INTERVENTION  IN  EQUITY.— One  who  Intervenes  In  a  suit 
In  equity,  and  prays  for  relief,  both  legal  and  equitable,  is  bound 
to  admit  and  provide  for  all  the  equitable  rights,  claims,  and  de- 
mands justly  belonging  to  the  adversary  party,  and  growing  out  of, 
or  necessarily  Involved  in,  the  subject  matter  of  the  controversy. 
(Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

INTOXICATING   LIQUORS. 
8ee   Constitutions;   Police   Power,  5,  7;   Social  Clubs. 

JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES. 

1.  JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION  TO  STOCK 
INDUCED  BY  FRAUD— REMEDY  OF  SUBSCRIBER  IN  AB- 
SENCE 0¥  RIGHT  OP  RESCISSION.— If  a  person  has  been  in- 
duced by  the  fraudulent  representations  of  an  agent  of  a  joint 
stock  company  to  take  shares  therein,  and  the  shareholder  Is  de- 
barred from  a  rescission  of  his  contract  by  the  insolvency  of  the 
company,  or  from  any  other  cause,  he  Is  without  remedy  against 
the  company,  and  is  left  to  his  action  against  the  agent  who  so 
Induced  him  to  subscribe.    (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 

2.  JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES— SUBSCRIPTION  TO  STOCK 
INDUCED  BY  FRAUD— ACTION  FOR  DAMAGES— INAPPLI- 
CABILITY OP  GENERAL  RULE,— The  general  rule  that  a  person 
who  has  been  induced  by  fraud  to  enter  into  a  contract  pertaining 
to  goods  and  chattels  may,  upon  the  discovery  of  the  fraud,  elect 
to  retain  what  he  has  received  and  bring  an  action  to  recover  any 
damages  he  has  sustained  by  reason  of  the  fraud,  does  not  apply 
to  subscriptions  for  stock  in  a  joint  stock  company,  for  such  an  action 
Is  at  variance  with  the  contract  entered  Into  by  the  subscriber. 
(Wilson  V.  Hundley,  837.) 

3.  JOINT  STOCK  COMPANIES— SUBSCTRIPTION  TO  STOCK- 
NATURE  OF,  THOUGH  INDUCED  BY  FRAUD— ACTION  FOR 
DAMAGES.- A  subscription  to  the  capital  stock  of  a  joint  stock 
company  is  not  only  an  undertaking  to  the  company,  but  with  all 
other  subscribers,  and  it  Is  of  the  essence  of  the  contract  between 
the  shareholders  that  they  shall  all  contribute  ratably  to  the  pay- 
ment of  the  company's  debts  and  liabilities.  Hence,  a  shareholder 
who  was  Induced  by  the  fraudulent  representations  of  an  agent 
of  the  company  to  take  shares  in  It,  cannot,  after  he  discovers  the 
fraud,  elect  to  retain  the  shares  and  sue  the  company  for  damages, 
as  this  would  throw  the  burden  of  the  payment  of  the  debts  and 
liabilities  on  the  other  shareholders,  who  are  as  Innocent  of  the 
fraud  as  he  Is.    (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 

JUDGMENT. 

1.  JUDGMENTS— LIEN  OF— VENDOR  AND  VENDEE— AP- 
PLICATION OF  PAYMENTS.— The  mere  docketing  of  a  judgment 
against  the  vendor  of  land  is  not  notice  of  the  lien  to  a  purchaser 
In  possession  under  a  contract  of  sale,  and  payments  subsequently 
made  by  him  to  the  judgment  debtor,  pursuant  to    the    contract. 


I^DEX.  999 

without  actual  notice  of  the  judgment,  are  valid  as  against  Ita  Uen 
upon  the  land.    (Wehn  v.  Fall,  307.) 

2.  JUDGMENTS— LIEN  OP— VENDOR  AND  VENDEE— AP- 
PLICATION OF  PAYMENTS.— A  judgment  against  a  vendor  of 
land,  who  retains  the  legal  title  under  a  contract  of  sale,  attaches  as 
a  Hen  to  such  land,  and,  as  against  the  vendee  In  possession  with 
actual  notice,  may  be  enforced  to  the  extent  of  the  unpaid  pur- 
chase money.    (Wehn  v.  Fall,  397.) 

3.  JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY.— If  a  judgment  is 
based  upon  perjured  evidence  of  a  successful  party  given  at  the 
trial,  while  the  defeated  party  has  a  good  defense  which  he  was 
prevented  from  presenting  by  reason  of  such  perjui-y,  and  without 
being  guilty  of  negligence  has  exhausted  all  his  ordinary  legal 
remedies  for  vacating  such  judgment,  equity,  In  a  proper  proceed- 
ing, may  vacate  the  judgment  and  grant  the  defeated  party  a  new 
trial.    (Munro  v.  Callahan,  36G.) 

4.  JUDGMENTS  — RELIEF  IN  EQUITY  —  PERJURY  —  MIS- 
TAKE.—A  court  of  equity  cannot  vacate  a  judgment  on  account  of 
any  innocent  mistake  or  want  of  recollection  on  the  part  of  the 
successful  party  or  his  witnesses,  nor  even  on  account  of  the  per- 
jury of  other  witnesses  in  the  case.    (Munro  v.  Callahan,  366.) 

5.  JUDGMENTS— RELIEF  IN  EQUITY— FRAUD.— A  court  of 
•«quity  cannot  vacate  a  judgment  after  the  term  at  which  It  was 
rendered,  and  grant  the  defeated  party  a  new  trial  for  fraud  prac- 
ticed upon  him,  except  when  such  fraud  was  practiced  In  connec- 
tion with  the  trial.     (Munro  v.  Callahan,  366.) 

6.  JUDGMENTS  OF  SISTER  STATEJ-ACTION  UPON— PRE- 
SUMPTIONS.—In  nn  action  upon  a  judgment  of  a  sister  state,  en- 
tered upon  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  the  pre- 
sumption Is,  that  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  enter  It,  and  that  the 
proceedings  were  regular  and  according  to  the  laws  of  that  state. 
(Van  Norman  v.  Gordon,  304.) 

7.  JUDGMENT  CONFESSED  UNDER  WARRANT  OF  AT- 
TORNEY—ILLUSTRATION -"FAITH  AND  CREDIT"  IN  AN- 
OTHER STATE.— If  a  person  signs  a  promissory  note,  executing, 
at  the  same  time,  a  warrant  of  attorney  to  confess  judgment,  and  a 
Judgment  of  a  court  of  record  In  an  action  upon  the  note  Is  entered, 
under  such  warrant  by  the  confession  of  an  attorney  of  such  court, 
who  was  requested  to  appear  by  the  attorney  named  In  the  war- 
rant, such  judgment  Is  entitled  to  full  faith  and  credit  In  another 
state,  if  an  action  Is  brought  upon  It,  though  such  appearance  in  the 
former  state  was  really  in  the  plalntifTs  Interest,  where  there  Is  no 
charge  of  fraud,  no  appearance  of  Irregularity,  and  what  was  done 
in  confessing  jrdgment  came  within  the  terms  of  the  warrant  of  at- 
■tomey.    (Van  Norman  v.  Gordon.  304.) 

8.  JUDGMENT,  THOUGH  CONFESSED  UNDER  WARRANT 
OP  ATTORNEY.  IS  ENTITLED  TO  "FAITH  AND  CREDIT"  IN 
ANOTHER  STATE.— A  judgment  of  a  court  of  one  state  Is  entitled 
to  full  faith  and  credit  In  other  states  where  the  court  which  ren- 
dered It  had  jurisdiction  to  render  such  a  judgment.  If  It  had, 
then  the  fact  that  It  Is  a  judgment  by  confession,  under  a  warrant 
of  attorney.  Is  Immaterial.  Such  judgments,  when  rendered  by 
courts  having  jurisdiction  of  the  cause  and  the  parties,  have  all  the 
qualities.  Incidents,  and  attributes  of  other  judgments.  (Van  Nor- 
man V.  Gordon,  304.) 

9.  JUDGMENTS— SETOFF  OF.— A  judgment,  to  be  available  as 
a  setoff,  must  be  a  valid  subsisting  obligation,  final  in  its  nature, 
Bence,  judgments  cannot  be  set  off  against  each  other  where  one  of 


1000  Index. 

them  Bas  been  appealed  from  and  the  appeal  is  still  pending  and 
undetermined.    (De  Camp  v.  Thomson,  570.) 

10.  JUDGMENTS— JUDICIAL  DETERMINATIONS— COLLAT- 
ERAL ATTACK.— A  judicial  determination  may  be  contrary  to  con- 
clusive evidence,  or  legal  evidence,  or  without  any  evidence,  yet 
cannot  collaterally  be  impeached  for  want  of  jurisdiction.  (Parsons 
V.  Parsons,  894.) 

11.  JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS.— If  infant  defendants  in 
a  case  have  been  regularly  summoned,  the  failure  to  appoint  a 
guardian  ad  litem  is  error  only,  and  does  not  render  void  the  judg- 
ment entered.     (Manfull  v.  Graham,  412.) 

12.  JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS— VACATING.— Under  a 
statute  providing  that  "it  shall  not  be  necessary  to  reserve  in  a 
judgment  or  order,  the  right  of  an  infant  to  show  cause  against 
It  after  his  attaining  full  age,  but  in  any  case  in  which,  but  for 
this  section,  such  reservation  would  have  been  proper,  the  infant, 
within  one  year  after  arriving  at  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  may 
show  cause  against  such  judgment,"  the  infant  does  not,  on  hi» 
arriving  at  majoi-ity,  have  an  absolute  right  to  have  the  judgment 
set  aside,  but  only  to  show  cause  against  it,  and  does  not  extend 
that  right  beyond  the  cases  mentioned,  and  under  such  statute  an 
infant  is  not  entitled  to  a  day  in  court  after  reaching  his  majority 
to  show  cause  against  a  judgment  ordering  a  sale  of  his  lands. 
(Manfull  V.  Graham,  412.) 

13.  JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS— VACATING.— An  orig- 
nal  action  to  vacate  an  erroneous  judgment  against  an  infant  can-, 
not  be  maintained  without  showing  a  good  defense  to  the  first 
action  and  judgment.     (Manfull  v.  Graham,  412.) 

14.  JUDGMENTS  AGAINST  INFANTS— VACATING.— Under 
section  602  of  the  code  of  Nebraslia,  an  infant,  against  whom  an 
erroneous  judgment  has  been  entered,  may  have  it  set  aside,  pro- 
vided his  disability  does  not  appear  in  the  record  nor  the  error  in 
the  proceedings,  but,  if  these  facts  appear,  his  remedy  is  by  writ 
of  error.    (Manfull  v.  Graham,  412.) 

15.  JUDGMENTS  RENDERED  DURING  TERM  HAVE  EF- 
FECT FROM  FIRST  DAY  THEREOF— PRIORITY  OF  LIEN.— 
A  judgment  rendered  during  a  term  of  court  relates  back  to  the  first 
day  thereof,  and  is  a  lien  upon  the  real  estate  of  the  judgment 
debtor  from  that  time.  It  Is,  therefore,  a  lien  which  has  priority 
over  a  deed  of  trust  recorded  during  the  term,  though  the  judgment 
was  actually  rendered  after  the  deed  of  trust  was  recorded.  (New 
South  B.  &  L.  Assn.  v.  Reed,  858.) 

16.  JUDGMENTS— WHEN  MAY  BE  VALIDATED.— If  a  court 
has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of  the  person, 
and  some  essential  step  Is  omitted  which  the  legislature  has  the 
right  to  dispense  with,  it  may  validate  the  judgment  qv  decree, 
notwithstanding  the  omission  or  irregularity.  (In  re  Christensen, 
794.) 

17.  JUDGMENTS-JURISDICTION.- If  a  statute  purporting  to 
confer  jurisdiction  is  void,  no  intendment  of  law  or  presumption 
of  fact  can  be  made  in  favor  of  the  Jurisdiction.  (In  re  Christen- 
sen, 794.) 

18.  JUDGMENTS— WHEN  VOID— COLLATERAL  ATTACK.— 
A  judgment  pronounced  by  a  tribunal  having  no  authority  to  de- 
termine the  matter  in  Issue  is  necessarily  and  incurably  void,  and 
may  be  shown  to  be  so  in  any  collateral  or  other  proceeding  In 
which  it  Is  drawn  In  question.    (In  re  Christensen,  794.) 


Index.  1001 

19.  judgments— void  cannot  be  validated.-a  judg- 
ment or  decree  which  is  absolutely  void  cannot  be  validated  or  con- 
firmed by  subsequent  legislation.     (In  re  Christensen,  794.) 

20.  JUDGMENTS.— ESTOPPEL  CANNOT  BE  BASED  on  a  void 
Judgment  or  decree.    (In  re  Christensen,  794.) 

21.  JUDGMENTS  AS  ESTOPPEL.— If  the  court  has  Jurisdiction 
of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit  and  of  the  parties,  and  the  decree 
or  judgment  may  be  reversed  or  set  aside  for  error  or  Irregularity, 
and  the  defendant  waives  his  right  to  have  this  done  by  executing 
or  accepting  It,  he  is  estopped  from  denying  its  binding  effect,  but. 
If  such  judgment  is  void  for  any  reason,  he  is  not  estopped.  (In  re 
Christensen,  794.) 

See  Adoption,  2;  Attachment,  3;  Habeas  Corpus,  3. 

JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 
See  Evidence,  9. 

JUDICIAL  SALES. 

1.  JUDICIAL  SALES— TITLE  OF  PURCHASER.— The  title  of 
a  stranger  derived  through  sale  under  judgment  is  not  subject  to 
defeat  by  the  subsequent  vacation  of  such  judgment.  (Manfull  v. 
Graham,  412.) 

2.  JUDICIAL  SALES-"UPSET"  BIDS— WHEN  PROPERLY 
REJECTED— CONFIRMATION.— When  a  farm,  composed  of  fer- 
tile bottom  lands  and  poor  uplands,  is  about  to  be  sold  at  a  judicial 
sale,  and  is  laid  oflf  into  parcels,  so  that  one  who  buys  a  parcel  of 
the  lowland  is  thereby  induced  and  willing  to  buy  upland  which 
can  be  used  advantageously  with  it,  the  court,  after  the  sale,  will 
reject  an  "upset"  bid  made  at  a  small  advance  on  only  a  part  of 
a  purchase,  where  the  effect  of  accepting  it  would  be  to  cause  the 
purchaser  of  two  parcels  to  lose  one  of  them,  and  without  which 
he  would  not  want  the  other,  particularly  if  the  terms  of  the  "up- 
set" bid  preclude  a  resale  of  the  tract  in  the  manner  as  before. 
(Moore  V.  Triplett,  882.) 

3.  JUDICIAL  SALES  — HOW  COURT  SHOULD  ACT  UPON 
REPORT.— A  court  should  so  act  upon  a  report  of  a  sale  of  prop- 
erty made  under  its  order  as  not  to  deter  or  discourage  bidders.  It 
should  so  act  as  to  Induce  possible  purchasers  to  attend  such  sales, 
to  encourage  fair,  open,  and  competitive  bidding  in  order  that  the 
highest  possible  price  may  be  obtained,  and  to  inspire  confidence 
in  the  stability  of  judicial  sales.  This  is  due  not  merely  to  the 
purchaser,  but  also  to  creditors,  debtors,  and  the  owners  of  prop- 
erty which  has  to  be  sold  by  the  court.    (Moore  v.  Triplett,  882.) 

4.  JUDICIAL  SALES  —  "UPSET"  BIDS  —  WHO  CANNOT 
MAKE.— One  who  was  a  bidder  at  a  judicial  sale,  by  himself  or 
by  an  agent,  or  who  was  present  and  had  the  opportunity  to  bid, 
will  not,  as  a  general  rule,  be  permitted  to  put  in  an  "upset"  bid. 
He  should  have  bidden  at  the  sale,  in  open  competition  with  all 
others,  what  he  was  willing  to  give  for  the  property.  (Moore  v. 
Triplett.  882.) 

5.  JUDICIAL  SALES— "UPSET"  BIDS— REJECTION  OF— DIS- 
CRETION.—If  land  Is  sold  under  the  order  of  a  court,  and  an  "up- 
set" bid  is  made  thereon,  the  court  must  exercise  a  sound  legal 
discretion  as  to  whether  It  will  accept  It  or  not.  A  bid  for  ten  per 
cent,  advatfce,  well  secured,  and  put  In  before  confirmation,  is  as 
much  a  valid  bid  as  If  made  at  the  auction,  but  the  court  Is  not 
always  bound  to  accept  it,  without  regard  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  case.    (Moore  v.  Triplett,  882.) 


1002  Index. 

6.  JUDICIAL  SALES— "UPSET"  BIDS-ACCEPTANCE  OF.— 
A  court  must  sell  property  at  the  best  price  obtainable.  Hence,  a 
substantial  and  well  secured  "upset"  bid  should  be  accepted,  unless 
there  are  circumstances  going  to  show  that  injustice  would  be  done 
to  the  purchaser  or  other  person.    (Moore  v.  Triplett,  882.) 

7.  JUDICIAL  SALES  — CONFIRMATION  — DISCRETION.— A 
■court,  in  determining  whether  or  not  it  will  confirm  a  judicial  sale, 
must,  under  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  exercise  a 
€Ound  legal  discretion  with  a  view  to  fairness,  prudence,  and  a  just 
regard  to  the  rights  of  all  concerned.    (Moore  v.  Triplett,  882.) 

8.  JUDICIAL  SALES  — RIGHT  OF  COURT  TO  KNOW  ALL 
THE  FACTS— DUTY  OF  COMMISSIONER.— A  commissioner  who 
makes  a  judicial  sale  is  the  agent  of  the  court,  and  should  report 
his  information  of  facts,  particularly  as  to  the  buying  of  bids  before 
confirmation,  to  the  court,  as  the  court  has  a  right  to  know  all  that 
he  knows  about  the  matter,  to  the  end  that  the  sale  may  not  be  con- 
firmed unless  it  is  proper  to  do  so.    (Camp  v.  Bruce,  873.) 

9.  JUDICIAL  SALES  — SALE  OF  BID  AT  AN  ADVANCE- 
CONFIRMATION.— A  court  will  never,  where  the  facts  are  known 
to  it,  confirm  a  judicial  sale,  if  the  bidder  has  sold  his  bid  at  an 
advaiKe,  unless  the  advance  paid,  or  to  be  paid,  inures  to  the  benefit 
of  the  parties  to  the  suit.    (Camp  v.  Bruce,  873.) 

See  Attachment,  4;  Contract,  10,  11;  Devise,  3-6;  Execution. 

JURISDICTION. 

1.  JURISDICTION  —  COURTS  OF  CONCURRENT  —  WHICH 
ACQUIRES  PRECEDENCE.— In  case  of  a  conflict  of  jurisdiction 
l)etween  two  courts  having  concurrent  jurisdiction,  that  court  whicn 
first  acquires  cognizance  of  the  controversy,  or  obtains  possession 
of  the  property  in  dispute,  is  entitled  to  retain  it  until  the  end  of 
the  litigation,  and  should  decide  all  questions  which  legitimately 
flow  out  of  the  controversy.    (Spiller  v.  Wells,  878.) 

2.  JURISDICTION— HOW  ACQUIRED— CONCURRENT  JUR- 
ISDICTION—PRIORITY— SERVICE  OF  PROCESS.— Jurisdiction 
Is  acquired  by  the  issue  and  service  of  process,  and,  in  case  of  con- 
flict  between  courts  of  concurrent  jurisdiction,  the  date  of  service 
of  the  process  determines  the  priority  of  the  jurisdiction;  but  it  is 
an  essential  condition  in  the  application  of  this  rule  that  the  first 
suit  shall  afford  the  plaintifiC  in  the  second  an  adequate  and  com- 
plete opportunity  for  the  adjudication  of  his  rights.  (Spiller  v.  Wells, 
«78.) 

See  Attachment,  5-8;  Courts;  Criminal  Law,  4;  Devise,  3,  4,  6;  Equity, 
2-7;  Interstate  Commerce,  2;  Judgment,  17;  Marriage  and  Di- 
vorce, 6;  Mechanic's  Lien,  7. 

JURY. 
See  Trial,  2. 

LACHES. 
See  Mortgages,  1,  2,  4,  fl. 

LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. 
1.    LANDLORD    AND    TENANT— DEFECTIVE    PREMISES- 
LANDLORD'S  LIABILITY  TO  TENANT'S  GUESTS.-If  a  land- 
lord maintains  outside  steps  and  a  platform  for  the  use  in  common 
of  tenants  of  different  parts  of  the  building,  and  a  visitor  to  one 


Index.  1003 

of  the  tenants,  expressly  invited  by  the  tenant  to  come  on  a  par- 
ticular day  for  a  particular  purpose,  is  Injured  by  a  defect  In  the 
platform  while  passing  over  it,  the  landlord  is  answerable,  for  the 
visitor  was  using  the  platform  in  the  tenant's  right.  (Coupe  v. 
Piatt,  293.) 

2.  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT— HOLDING  OVER— WHAT 
NECESSARY  TO  CONSTITUTE —A  holding  over  by  a  tenant  after 
the  expiration  of  his  lease  for  a  year,  so  as  to  render  him  liable  for 
another  year's  rent,  must  be  by  such  voluntary  act  that  the  law  im- 
plies a  contract  on  his  part,  or  leasing  of  the  premises  for  another 
year.  Such  Implication  does  not  arise  from  his  act  due  to  any  stress 
of  circumstances  which  involves  peril  to  his  life,  or  that  of  some 
member  of  his  family.    (Herter  v.  Mullen,  517.) 

3.  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT-HOLDING  OVER— OMISSION 
TO  SURRENDER  PREMISES,  WHAT  EXCUSES.— The  failure  of 
the  tenant  to  surrender  the  premises  upon  the  expiration  of  his  term 
is  excused  when  rendered  impossible  by  act  of  God,  unavoidable 
accident,  or  stress  of  circumstances  imperiling  his  life,  or  that  of 
some  member  of  his  family,  so  far  as  his  liability  to  pay  rent  for 
another  term  is  involved  by  his  holding  over  under  such  circum- 
stances.   (Herter  v.  Mullen,  517.) 

4.  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT— HOLDING  OVER— RETEN- 
TION OF  POSSESSION  CAUSED  BY  SICKNESS.— If  a  tenant 
by  the  year,  intending  to  surrender  the  premises  at  the  end  of  his 
term,  is  obliged  to  retain  a  room  in  the  leased  house  for  a  short 
period  of  time  after  his  lease  expires  in  order  to  avoid  the  peril  of 
exposing  a  sick  member  of  his  family  to  danger  or  death,  this  is  not 
a  holding  over  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  that  if  the  tenant 
holds  over  the  landlord  may  continue  the  lease  and  recover  rent  for 
another  year.    (Herter  v.  Mullen,  517.) 

5.  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT— DANGEROUS  CONDITION 
OF  LEASED  PREMISES— LIABILITY  OF  LANDLORD.— The  les- 
sor of  premises  containing  an  elevator  which  is  dangerous,  owing  to 
a,  secret  mechanical  defect,  known  to  the  lessor,  but  not  discover- 
able by  the  lessee  In  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  is  liable  to  em- 
ployes of  the  lessee  for  injuries  received  in  operating  the  elevator 
and  resulting  from  such  secret  defect.    (Anderson  v.  Hayes,  930.) 

LARCENY. 

LARCENY.— HOUSE— WHAT  IS.— A  Structure  eight  feet 
blgh,  stationary.  Inclosed  with  wire  and  covered  with  shingles,  and, 
maintained  for  the  safekeeping  of  birds  and  fowls,  is  a  house  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  defining  larceny  from  a  house  or  any  build- 
ing.    (Williams  v.  State,  82.) 

LEGACY. 
See  Devise,  7. 

LEGISLATURE. 

LEGISLATURE— POWER     TO     TAX— LIMITATION.—  Th© 

legislative  power  of  taxation  is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  it 
must  not  be  exercised  to  impair  the  obligation  of  contracts.  (Broad- 
foot  V.  Fayettevllle,  610.) 

See  Eminent  Domain,  8;  Judgment,  16;  Municipal  Corporations,  16; 
Police  Power,  4,  7:  Railroad  Companies,  8,  9;  Statutes,  7. 


1004  Index. 

LIBEL. 

1.  LIBEL  OF  A  CLASS.— A  publication  charging  the  street-car 
conductors  of  a  certain  city  with  being  pimps,  and  that  they  would 
sell  the  virtue  of  their  sisters  for  a  drink,  is  libelous  per  se.  (Jones 
V.  State,  751.) 

2.  LIBEL.— RECOGNIZANCE  ON  APPEAL  which  recites  that 
the  defendant  "stands  charged  with  the  offense  of  libel,"  is  suffi- 
cient.    (Jones  V.  State,  751.) 

3.  LIBEL  OF  A  CLASS.— It  is  a  violation  of  the  Texas  statute 
to  libel  any  sect,  company,  or  class  of  persons  without  naming  any 
person  in  particular  who  may  belong  to  such  class.  (Jones  v.  State, 
751.) 

LIENS. 

1.  LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  — SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER  — 
SUBJECTING  LANDS  TO  PAYMENT  OF  LIEN— PREJUDICIAL 
ACT  WITH  NOTICE  OF  EQUITIES.— When  a  person  buys  part  of 
a  tract  of  land,  with  full  notice  or  knowledge  of  a  deed  of  trust  on 
the  whole  of  it,  he  must,  in  order  to  prevent  the  land  so  purchased 
from  being  subjected  to  the  payment  of  such  lien,  show  that  the 
holder  thereof  has,  with  notice  of  his  equities,  done  some  act  to  his 
prejudice.    (Lynchburg  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers,  851.) 

2.  LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER  — 
SUBJECTING  LANDS  TO  PAYJfENT  OF  LIEN— ORDER  OF— 
RELEASE  OF  PRIMARY  SECURITY— EFFECT  OF.— If  a  person 
executes  a  trust  deed  to  a  loan  company  on  the  whole  of  certain 
land  to  secure  a  loan,  and  then  sells  part  of  the  property  to  a  church, 
which  assumes  the  payment  of  the  loan,  but  subsequently  sells 
other  portions  of  the  land,  at  different  times,  to  two  other  persons, 
and  then  rescinds  the  contract  by  which  the  trustees  of  the  church 
assumed  to  pay  the  trust  debt,  after  which  the  loan  company,  with 
notice  of  the  last  purchasers'  interest  in  the  property  embraced  in 
the  trust  deed,  but  without  notice  of  such  rescission,  releases  the 
church  property  from  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed,  the  property  last 
purchased  is  not  absolutely  released  from  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed, 
but  only  discharged  from  an  amount  of  the  trust  deed  debt  equal 
to  the  value  of  the  parcel  released  so  far  as  the  proceeds  of  that 
parcel  have  not  been  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  lien;  because 
the  injury  done  to  the  last  purchaser  by  the  release  was  the  differ- 
ence between  the  value  of  the  property  released  and  what  was  ac- 
tually paid  out  of  its  proceeds,  or  on  account  of  it,  upon  the  lien. 
That  part  of  the  land  still  owned  by  the  grantor  should  be  first 
subjected  to  the  payment  of  the  loan  company's  debt,  and,  if  the 
proceeds  of  the  last  purchaser's  lot  is  not  sufl!icient  to  satisfy  that 
portion  of  the  loan  company's  debt  chargeable  upon  it,  the  next 
preceding  lot,  in  order  of  alienation,  is  liable,  and  this  lot  will  also 
be  chargeable  with  that  portion  of  the  loan  company's  debt  from 
which  the  last  purchaser's  lot  was  discharged  by  the  release  of  the 
church  lot  from  the  liep  of  the  deed  of  trust.  (Lynchburg  Perpetual 
etc.  Co.  V.  Fellers,  851.) 

3.  LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER  — 
SUBJECTING  LANDS  TO  PAYMENT  OF  LIEN— RELEASE  OF 
PRIMARY  SECURITY— GENERAL  RULE— EXCEPTION.— Ordi- 
narily, when  the  equities  of  the  various  owners  of  lands  subject  to 
a  deed  of  trust  are  unequal,  so  that  their  respective  parcels  are 
liable,  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  alienation,  if  the  deed  of  trust 
creditor,  having  notice  of  this  situation,  releases  a  parcel  which  Is 
primarily  liable,  he  thereby  discharges  or  releases  those  parcels 


Index.  1005 

which  are  subsequently  liable,  In  the  order  of  their  several  liabili- 
ties, from  an  amount  of  the  deed  of  trust  debt  equal  to  the  value 
of  the  parcel  released;  but  this  effect  of  the  release  may  be  obviated 
by  the  conduct  of  the  parties  to  be  affected.  Thus,  If  a  whole  tract 
of  land  Is  covered  by  a  trust  deed  to  secure  a  debt,  and  the  trust 
deed  creditor  releases  the  trust  deed  lien,  without  notice  of  the 
rights  and  interests  of  one  who  had  purchased  a  parcel  of  the  land 
subject  to  the  deed  of  trust,  such  purchaser  cannot  claim  the  benefit 
of  the  general  rule  where  he  had  notice  of  all  the  facts  constituting 
the  release.    (Lynchburg  Perpetual  etc.  Co.  v.  Fellers,  851.) 

4.  LIENS  — TRUST  DEED  —  SUBSEQUENT  PURCHASER  — 
SUB.TKCTINa  L.\NDS  TO  PAYMENT  OF  LIEN— ASSUMPTION 
OP  TRUST  DEBT— RESCISSION-BURDEN  OF  PROOF.— If  one 
executes  to  a  loan  company  a  deed  of  trust  on  the  whole  of  certain 
land  to  secure  a  loan,  and  then  sells  part  of  the  property  to  a 
<"hurch,  which  assumes  the  payment  of  the  loan,  one  who  subse- 
quently buys  another  portion  of  the  land  must.  If  he  would  prevent 
It  from  beluff  subjected  to  the  lien  of  the  trust  deed,  on  the  ground 
that  the  contract  to  assume  the  payment  of  the  trust  debt  has 
been  rescinded,  assume  the  burden,  of  proving  that  the  loan  com- 
pany assented  to  the  rescission  of  the  contract.  (Lynchburg  Per- 
petual etc.  Co.  V.  Fellers,  851.) 

See  Corporations,  11,  21,  22;  Judgment,  1,  2,  15;  Marriage  and  Di- 
vorce, 4. 

LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS. 

1.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS.— PART  PAYMENT  OF  A 
DEBT,  In  order  to  take  a  case  out  of  the  statute,  must  be  made 
voluntarily  by  the  debtor  sought  to  be  charged  with  the  effect  of  it, 
or  by  some  one  authorized  by  him  to  make  a  new  promise  on  his 
behalf.    (Wolford  v.  Cook,  315.) 

2.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT— CREDI- 
TOR AS  AGENT  OF  DEBTOR.— A  creditor  cannot  be  made  the 
agent  of  the  debtor  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  an  act  done  by  him 
operate  as  a  new  promise  to  himself.    (Wolford  v.  Cook,  315.) 

3.  LIMIATIONS  OF  ACTIONS  —  PART  PAYMENT  —  PRO- 
CEEDS OF  COLLATERAL  SECURITIES.— Where  collateral  secu- 
rity has  been  given  by  a  debtor  to  his  creditor,  under  an  agreement 
that,  If  necessary,  the  creditor  should  sell  the  collateral  and  apply 
the  proceeds  on  his  debt,  the  subsequent  sale  of  such  collateral  and 
the  application  of  the  proceeds  on  the  debt,  to  which  the  del)tor 
made  no  objection,  will  not  operate  as  a  part  payment  at  the  date 
■of  the  receipt  of  such  proceeds,  so  as  to  Interrupt  the  operation  of 
the  statute  of  limitations.     (Wolford  v.  Cook,  315.) 

4.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT— GIVING 
ADDITIONAL  SECURITY.— If  a  debtor,  in  the  absence  of  any 
<;ircumstance8  tending  to  rebut  the  inference  of  an  implied  prom- 
ise to  pay  the  whole  debt,  gives  new  and  additional  security  for 
the  payment  of  the  debt,  the  proceeds  of  which  when  collected  to 
be  applied  on  the  debt.  It  will  operate  as  a  part  payment  sufficient 
to  take  It  out  of  the  statute.  (Wolford  v.  Cook.  3ir.) 

5.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— PART  PAYMENT— PA  Y- 
TklENT  IN  GOODS.— It  Is  not  necessary,  for  the  purpose  of  Inter- 
rupting the  statute,  that  the  part  payment  should  be  in  actual 
money.  A  payment  in  goods  may  be  sufficient  for  that  purpose. 
(Wolford  V.  Cook,  315.) 

6.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS  — WHAT  WILL  STOP  RUN- 
NING   OF    STATUTE.— The  statute  of  limitations  ceases  to  run 


1006  Index. 

against  a  claimant  whose  po  <ver  to  Institute  his  suit  has  been  taken 
away  by  statute,  whether  r.uch  exception  is  contained  in  the  act  of 
limitation  or  not.    (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteviile,  610.) 

7.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— WHAT  WILL  STOP  RUN- 
NING OF  STATUTE.— The  general  rule  is,  that  when  the  statute  of 
limitations  once  begins  to  run  no  subsequent  happening  or  event 
can  obstruct  its  course.    (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteviile,  610.) 

8.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— COUPONS  ATTACHED  TO 
BONDS.— The  statute  of  limitations  which  applies  to  bonds  applies 
to  coupons  attached  thereto,  wnen  such  coupons  are  for  interest 
to  become  due  on  the  bonds.    (Broa-^foot  v.  Fayetteviile,  610.) 

9.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS— ABSENCE  FKOM  STATE- 
CORPORATIONS.— A  statute  providing  for  the  suspension  of  the 
running  of  the  statute  of  limitations  during  the  absence  of  a  "per- 
son" from  the  state  applies  to  a  corporation,  and  requires  such  ab- 
sence as  will  prevent  service  of  process.    (Turcott  v.  Railroad,  661.) 

10.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS  — ABSENCE  FROM  THE 
STATE— FOREIGN  CORPORATIONS.— A  foreign  corporation,  do- 
ing business  within  a  state,  and  having  there  agents  upon  whona 
process  may  be  served,  is  not  absent  from  the  state  within  the  mean- 
ing of  a  statute  suspending  the  running  of  the  statute  of  limita- 
tions in  favor  of  a  person  out  of  the  state,  though  it  has  failed  to 
file  and  register  its  charter  as  required  of  foreign  coi^orations  do- 
ing business  within  the  state  beiore  giving  them  the  rights  of  do- 
mestic corporations.     (Turcott  v.  Railroad,  661.) 

11.  LIMITATIONS  OF  ACTIONS  —  MECHANICS'  LIENS-EF- 
FECT OF  SUIT  BY  SUBCONTRACTOR.— Upon  the  institution  of 
a  suit  by  a  subcontractor  to  enforce  a  mechanic's  lien,  where  the 
general  contractor  is  made  a  party  defendant,  and  the  latter's  re- 
corded lien  is  set  forth  in  the  subcontractor's  bill,  the  statute  of 
limitations  ceases  to  run,  not  only  as  against  the  complainant's  lien, 
but  as  against  the  lien  of  the  general  contractor  and  of  all  those 
claiming  as  contractors  under  him.    (Spiller  v.  Wells,  878.) 

See  Mortgages,  3,  4. 

LOCAL  OPTION. 
See  Constitutions. 

MALICE. 
See  Husband  and  Wife,  6,  7;  Tortl. 

MARKET  VALUE. 
See  Damages,  2. 

MANDAMUS. 

1.  MANDAMUS  TO  COMPEL  COUNTY  COMMISSIONERS 
TO  LEVY  TAX-CONSTITUTION.-Under  a  constitutional  pro- 
vision prohibiting  any  tax  from  being  levied  by  any  county,  city, 
or  town,  except  for  the  necessary  expenses  thereof,  unless  by  a  vote 
of  the  majority  of  the  qualified  voters  therein,  before  mandamus 
can  be  Issued  to  compel  the  board  of  commissioners  of  a  county  to 
levy  a  tax  to  pay  a  judgment  against  the  commissioners,  the  plaln- 
tlCf— judgment  creditor— must  show  affirmatively  by  the  record  or 
other  competent  evidence  that  the  consideration  of  the  debt,  upon 
which  the  judgment  was  obtained,  was  of  such  a  character  as  to 
fall  under  the  head  of  ordinary  or  necessary  county  expenses.  (Bear 
V.  Commissioners,  586.) 


Index.  1007 

2.  MANDAMUS— NATURE— crviL  ACTION.-Mandamua  is  In 
the  nature  of  a  civil  action,  and  Is  commenced  by  summons,  and 
the  pleadings  and  the  practices  are  the  same  as  are  prescribed  for 
the  conducting  of  civil  actions.    (Bear  v.  Commissioners,  586.) 

8.  MANDAMUS— NATURE.— Mandamus  Is  in  the  nature,  both 
of  an  execution  and  of  a  clvU  action.    (Bear  v.  Commissioners,  586.> 

See  Municipal  Corporations,  13. 

MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE. 

1.  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY— SECURITY.— If 
there  is  danger  that  a  divorced  husband  may  dispose  of  his  property 
by  conveyance  or  squander  it,  so  that  nothing  will  remain  upon 
which  the  decree  of  divorce  providing  for  alimony  or  the  support 
of  minor  children  can  operate,  the  court  may  require  him  to  fur- 
nish security  for  its  performance.    (Murphy  v.  Moyle,  767.) 

2.  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY  AFTER  DEATH 
OP  HUSBAND.— Whether  a  divorced  wife  and  minor  children,  or 
any  of  them,  are  entitled  to  have  the  payment  of  alimony  or  money 
for  their  support  continue  after  the  death  of  the  divorced  husband 
depends  on  the  nature  and  terms  of  the  decree  of  divorce.  (Murphy 
V.  Moyle,  767.) 

3.  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY  AFTER  DEATH 
OP  HUSBAND.— A  decree  In  a  divorce  suit  granting  an  absolute 
divorce  and  providing  that  the  mother  shall  have  the  care  and  cus- 
tody of  the  minor  children,  and  the  father  shall  pay  a  certain  sum 
monthly  toward  their  support  during  their  minority,  is  not  dis- 
charged nor  annulled  by  the  death  of  the  father.  Its  performance- 
may  be  enforced  thereafter  out  of  his  estate.  (Murphy  v.  Moyle, 
767.) 

4.  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— ALIMONY— SECURITY— EX- 
FORCEMENT  OF  LIEN.— If  a  court,  in  granting  an  absolute  di- 
vorce, decrees  that  a  husband  shall  pay  a  certain  sum  per  month 
toward  the  support  of  his  minor  children,  and  makes  such  obliga- 
tion a  lien  upon  part  of  his  property,  it  may  foreclose  the  lien  upoii) 
failure  of  payment,  and  its  power  to  do  this  is  not  affected  by  the 
death  of  the  father;  and  if  the  proceeds  are  Insufficient  to  satisfy 
the  claim,  it  may  enforce  payment  of  the  balance  out  of  the  estate. 
(Murphy  v.  Moyle,  767.) 

5.  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE  —  PROCEEDINGS  FOR  DI- 
VORCE ARE  JUDICIAL  IN  THEIR  NATURE,  and  should  be  had 
in  courts  of  justice  under  constitutions  conferring  Judicial  power 
on  those  tribunals.  A  divorce  cannot  be  granted  lawfully  except 
for  sufficient  cause,  upon  proof  and  with  notice  to,  or  the  appear- 
ance of,  the  party  complained  of.    (In  re  Christensen,  7M.) 

6.  MARRIAGE  AND  DIVORCE— WANT  OP  JURISDICTION. 
A  decree  of  divorce  granted  without  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  mat- 
ter or  of  the  person,  without  cause  stated  and  without  proof,  I»- 
absolutely  void.    (In  re  Christensen,  794.) 

MASTER  AND  SERVANT. 

1.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPA- 
NIES—DUTY TO  LINEMEN.— An  electric  light  company  does  not 
owe  to  a  lineman,  whose  business  It  is  to  work  upon  poles  on  which 
the  company's  wires  are  suspended,  the  duty  to  Insiwct  Its  poIe» 
below  the  surface  of  the  ground  to  ascertain  whether  they  are  de- 
cayed, and  to  Inform  him  of  that  fact  if  such  Is  found  to  be  the 
case.    (Mclsaac  v.  Northampton  Elec.  L.  Co.,  244.) 


1008  Index. 

2.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ELECTRIC  LIGHT  COMPA- 
NIES AND  LINEMBX— ASSUMPTION  OP  RISKS— POLES.— 
When  a  lineman  enters  the  service  of  an  electric  light  company  for 
the  purpose  of  working  upon  poles  on  which  the  company's  wires 
are  suspended,  he  assumes  the  risk  that  a  pole  of  uncertain  age 
may  break  and  fall  when  a  lineman  is  working  upon  it,  if  he  does 
not  take  measures  to  ascertain  its  condition  before  going  upon  it. 
(Mclsaac  v.  Northampton  Elec.  L.  Co.,  244.) 

3.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT  —  DUTY  OF  MASTER  —  SAFE 
APPLIANCES.— The  duty  to  furnish  proper  and  safe  appliances  is 
that  of  the  common  master,  and  injury  caused  by  their  absence 
<jannot  be  attributed  to  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant.  (Troxler 
V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  5S0.) 

4.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— CONTINUING  NEGLIGENCE 
OF  MASTER-CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE  OF  SERVANT.— 
Where  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  is  a  continuing  negligence, 
there  can  be  no  contributory  negligence  which  will  discharge  the 
master's  liability.     (Troxler  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  580.) 

5.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— NEGLIGENCE  PER  SE— FAIL- 
URE TO  USE  SAFE  APPLIANCES  IN  GENERAL  USE.— When 
safer  appliances  have  been  invented,  tested,  and  have  come  into 
general  use,  it  is  negligence  per  se  for  the  master  to  expose  his 
servant  to  the  hazard  of  life  or  limb  from  antiquated  and  defective 
appliances  which  have  been  generally  discarded  by  the  intelligence 
and  humanity  of  other  employers.  (Troxler  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  580.) 

6.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— ASSUMPTION  OF  RISK.— Dan- 
ger from  a  bank  or  wall  of  earth  falling  is  one  open  to  common  ob- 
servation, and  a  servant  engaged  in  excavating  a  ditch  who,  know- 
ing that  he  is  exposed  to  such  danger,  continues  to  work,  assumes 
the  risks  and  is  not  entitled  to  recover  for  injuries  sustained. 
<Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  6G6.) 

7.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— DANGEROUS  EMPLOYMENT- 
DUTY  OF  MASTER— DELEGATION  OF  DUTY.— When  an  em- 
ployment  is  in  its  nature  perilous,  it  Is  the  duty  of  the  master  to 
provide  reasonable  and  necessary  precautions  and  safeguards 
against  such  perils,  and  no  delegation  of  that  duty  can  relieve  him 
from  responsibility  for  failure  to  perform  it.  (Portance  v.  Lehigh 
Val.  Coal  Co.,  932.) 

8.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— DUTY  OF  MASTER  TO  SER- 
VANT.—Tlie  duty  of  a  master  to  his  servant  Is  to  provide  him  rea- 
sonably safe  and  proper  tools,  Implements,  and  apparatus  with 
which  to  work,  reasonably  competent  and  careful  coemploy6s,  and 

ti  reasonably  safe  place  to  work.    (Portance  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co., 
932.) 

9.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT-FELLOW-SERVANTS.— In  un- 
loading coal  from  a  vessel,  servants  engaged  in  the  common  under- 
taking, under  common  direction  and  command,  with  no  right  of  con- 
trol one  over  the  other,  as  the  scraper-man,  whose  duty  It  Is  to  start 
the  machinery,  the  hatch-man,  whose  duty  It  Is  to  signal  the  start- 
ing of  machinery  by  the  scraper-man,  and  to  give  warning  to  ser- 
vants in  the  hold  of  the  vessel,  and  other  servants  engaged  in  the 

common  undertaking,  are  fellow-servants.    (Portance  v.  Lehigh  Val. 
■Coal  Co..  932.) 

10.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— PRECAUTIONARY  REGULA- 
TIONS—ASSUMPTION OF  RISK.— A  servant  of  ten  years'  experi- 
•ence  In  the  unloading  of  coal  from  vessels,  who  has  worked  In  a  par- 
ticular employment  of  that  kln<-|.  where  all  the  conditions  are  the 
usual  ones,  for  several  months,  will  be  held  to  have  assumed  any 


Ijjdkx.  1009 

risk  arising  from  a  lack  of  precautionary  regulations  prescribed  by 
his  master,     (Portauce  v.  Leliigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  932.) 

11.  MASTER  AND  SERVANT— WARNING  OF  STARTING  OP 
MACHINERY— NEGLIGENCE  OF  FELLOW-SERVANT.— In  en- 
tering upon  an  employment  a  servant  assumes  the  risk  of  the  negli- 
gence of  fellow-servants,  and  if  the  master  properly  selects  such  a 
fellow-servant  to  give  warning  of  the  starting  of  machinery,  and  in- 
structs him  for  that  purpose,  he  is  not  responsible  for  the  negligence 
of  such  servant  in  the  performance  of  such  duty,  resulting  in  injury 
to  a  coemployS.  (Portance  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal  Co.,  932.) 
See  Railroad  Companies,  13,  14,  25-27. 

MECHANIC'S  LIEN. 

1.  MECHANICS'  LIENS— FLATS  AS  ONE  BUILDING.— Flats 
built  on  adjacent  lots  belonging  to  the  same  owner  are  one  build- 
ing, for  the  purpose  of  a  mechanic's  lien,  although  the  division  wall 
rises  above  the  roof,  and  there  are  separate  entrances,  if  they  are 
erected  as  one  structure,  under  one  contract,  at  the  same  time, 
heated  with  one  furnace,  and  a  porch  extends  across  the  entire  rear 
of  the  structure  with  one  continuous  and  unbroken  roof.  (Bastrup 
V.  Prendergast,  128.) 

2.  MECHANICS'  LIENS  — WANT  OF  DESCRIPTION  OP 
PROPERTY  IN  CONTRACT.— The  mere  omission  of  a  description 
or  designation  of  the  property  in  a  building  contract  cannot  defeat 
a  mechanic's  lien  otherwise  established  when  the  notice,  or  claim  of 
lien,  filed  for  record  properly  describes  the  property,  and  all  of  the 
Interested  parties  understood  what  property  was  referred  to  In  the 
contract,  and  the  material  was  furnished  and  the  building  erected 
upon  that  understanding.    (Bastrup  v.  Prendergast,  128.) 

3.  MECHANICS'  LIENS— ESTOPPEL  AGAINST  WIFE.— If  a 
wife,  with  knowledge  that  her  husband  has  made  false  representa- 
tions as  to  the  ownership  of  property  and  has  contracted  in  his 
own  name  for  the  erection  of  buildings  thereon,  assists  in  procur- 
ing the  work  to  be  done  under  the  contracts,  without  disclosing  to 
the  contractor  her  title  to  the  property,  which  is  of  record,  she  is 
estopped  to  assert  her  title  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  a  mechan- 
ic's lien  arising  out  of  such  contract.     (Bastrup  v.  Prendergast,  128.) 

4.  MECHANICS'  LIENS— ESSENTIAL  AVERMENTS  OMIT- 
TED from  the  notice  of  a  mechanic's  lien  cannot,  in  an  action  to 
foreclose  the  lien,  be  supplied  by  averments  In  the  complaint  or  by 
extrinsic  evidence.     (Morrison  v.  WiUard,  784.) 

5.  MECHANICS'  LIEN  —  NOTICE  — SUFFICIENCY  OF.  — A 
notice  of  mechanic's  lien  which  fails  to  show  that  the  material  was 
furnished  for  the  construction  of  the  building  in  question,  or  that 
any  portion  of  the  material  was  used  in  the  construction,  or  pur- 
chased for  the  purpose  of  constructing  the  building  referred  to  in 
the  notice  of  lien,  and  which  also  fails  to  show  the  terms,  time 
given,  and  conditions  of  the  contract,  and  which  contains  no  state- 
ment, except  inferentially,  as  to  what  the  contract  was,  how  much 
lumber  was  purchased,  what  price  was  agreed  to  be  paid  for  it, 
whether  it  was  purchased  or  delivered  for  the  purpose  of  construct- 
ing the  building  in  question,  or  whether  it  was  ever  used  therein, 
is  insufficient  and  void.    (Morrison  v.  Willard,  784.) 

6.  MECHANICS'  LIENS  — NOTICE  — ESSENTIALS  OP.  — A 
notice  of  mechanic's  lien  must  contain  and  set  out,  as  far  as  the 
claimant  is  able  to  ascertain  and  disclose  it,  the  contract  between 
the  owner  and  contractor,  so  that  the  price,  terms,  and  conditions 

AM.  St.  E«p.,  Vou  LXX.-04 


1010  Index. 

of  tlie  contract  may  be  known  as  affecting  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  subcontractor  and  others  interested.  Otherwise,  the  notice 
is  insufficient  and  void.     (Morrison  v.  Willard,  784.) 

7.  MECHANICS'  LIENS  — SUIT  BY  SUBCONTRACTOB  TO 
ENFORCE— PRECEDENCE  WHERE  DIFFERENT  COURTS 
HAVE  CONCURRENT  JURISDICTION.— If  a  subcontractor  insti- 
tutes a  suit  in  chancery  to  enforce  a  mechanic's  lien,  and  malces 
the  general  contractor  a  party  defendant,  setting  forth  the  latter's 
recorded  lien  in  his  bill,  that  court,  notwithstanding  the  concur- 
rent jurisdiction  of  another  court,  acquires  jurisdiction,  and  should 
determine  the  rights  of  the  parties.  It  is  not  incumbent  on  the 
general  contractor  to  institute  a  separate  suit  in  order  to  enforce 
his  lien,  as  his  rights,  as  well  as  those  claiming  under  him  as  sub- 
contractors, may  be  fully  protected  in  the  first  suit  (Spiller  v. 
Wells,  87a) 

See  Limitations  of  Actions,  11. 

MISTAKE. 
See  Vendor  and  Purchaser,  8. 

MORTGAGES. 

1.  MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION— LACH- 

ES.— An  equitable  right  to  redeem  from  a  foreclosure  sale  may  be 
lost  by  laches  unless  asserted  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  before 
the  situation  of  the  parties  has  changed,  and  the  rights  of  others 
have  intervened,  or  improvements  have  been  made.  (Wallier  v. 
Warner,  85.) 

2.  MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION— LACH- 
ES.— Whether  an  equitable  right  to  redeem  from  a  foreclosure  sale 
has  been  lost  by  laches  must  be  determined  with  reference  to  the 
date  of  the  amended  petition  praying  redemption,  when  the  original 
petition  seeks  to  establish  a  fee  simple  title  in  the  complainant. 
(Walker  v.  Warner,  85.) 

3.  MORTGAGES— PAYMENTS— LIMITATIONS.— The  effect  of 
payments  upon  a  mortgage  debt  must  be  determined  by  the  stat- 
ute in  force  at  the  time  they  were  made,  with  reference  to  the  toll- 
ing of  the  statute  of  limitations,  although  the  mortgage  was  exe- 
cuted prior  to  such  time.    (Walker  v.  Warner,  85.) 

4.  MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION— LACH- 
ES —  LIMITATIONS.  —  In  determining  whether  there  has  been 
laches  in  exercising  a  right  of  redemption  from  a  mortgage  fore- 
closure, a  court  of  equity  is  not  necessarily  controlled  by  the  per- 
iod of  limitations  as  fixed  in  actions  at  law.  A  delay  for  a  much 
less  time  than  that  prescribed  by  the  statute  of  limitations  may, 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  be  held  to  be  laches, 
and  a  bar  to  the  right  of  redemption.    (Walker  v.  Warner,  85.) 

5.  MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION  BY 
GRANTEE  OF  MORTGAGOR.— By  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage,  sale 
of  the  premises,  and  master's  deed  thereunder,  the  legal  title  be- 
comes vested  in  the  grantee,  leaving  nothing  Ln  the  mortgagor  or 
his  grantee  to  whom  he  has  conveyed  before  the  commencement 
of  the  foreclosure  proceeding,  but  to  which  the  latter  is  not  made 
a  party,  except  the  right  of  redemption,  which  must  be  asserted  Id 
a  court  of  equity.    (Walker  v.  Warner,  85.) 

6.  MORTGAGES  —  FORECLOSURE  —  REDEMPTION— LACH- 
ES. —  An  equity  of  redemption  from  a  mortgage  foreclosure 
cannot  be  enforced  when  all  parties  have  supposed  that  the  fore- 


Index.  1011 

■closure  was  good,  and  the  bolder  of  the  equity  of  redemption  has 
abandoned  the  premises  and  all  claim  to  them,  never  paying  any 
taxes  or  offering  to  redeem,  until  after  a  series  of  years,  when  the 
pix)perty  had  passed  through  many  hands  and  had  become  valuable. 
(Walker  v.  Warner,  85.) 

7.  MORTGAGES-DEPOSIT  OF  TITLE  DEEDS.— A  mortgage 
Attempted  to  be  made  by  the  deposit  of  title  deeds  cannot  be  en- 
forced, although  the  loan  secured  by  such  deposit  has  been  actually 
received  by  the  depositor.    (Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller,  381.) 

8.  MORTGAGES— DEPOSIT  OF  TITLE  DEEDS.— A  mortgage 
cannot  be  created  by  the  deposit  of  title  deeds  without  a  writing,  as 
such  mortgage  is  contrary  to  the  statute  of  frauds  and  the  record- 
ing acts.    (Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller,  381.) 

9.  MORTGAGE  GIVEN  WITHOUT  CONSIDERATION  TO  DE- 
FRAUD CREDITORS— RIGHTS  OF  ASSIGNEE.— Where  a  mort- 
gage is  given  without  consideration,  to  defraud  creditors,  the 
^ishoiTest  mortgagor  is  equitably  estopped  from  claiming  that  there 
was  no  consideration  for  the  mortgage,  as  against  a  purchaser  in 
good  faith,  for  value,  and  without  notice.    (MofCett  v.  Parker,  319.) 

10.  MORTGAGES  — USURY  — GRANTEE  ASSUMING  MORT- 
GAGE—ESTOi'PEL.— A  vendee  who  accepts  a  conveyance  of  land 
subject  to  a  mortgage  thereon,  and  containing  a  covenant  wiieieby 
such  vendee  assumes  and  agrees  to  pay  said  mortgage,  is  estopped 
from  asserting  that  the  obligation  secured  thereby  is  usurious. 
(Scanlan  v.  Grimmer,  326.) 

11.  MORTGAGES— RIGHTS  OF  ASSIGNEE— EQUITIES  OF 
THIRD  PARTIES.— A  mortgage  has  none  of  the  privileges  of  ne- 
gotiable paper,  but  is  a  mere  chose  in  action.  Hence,  an  assignee 
thereof  takes  it  subject  to  any  defense  that  exists  between  the  origi- 
nal parties,  unless  they  are  equitably  estopped  by  their  acts,  or 
otherwise,  from  asserting  it  as  against  the  assignee;  but  the  as- 
signee does  not  take  it  subject  to  any  equities  of  third  parties  of 
which  he  has  no  notice.    (Moffett  v.  Parker,  319.) 

12.  MORTGAGES  — DEFENSE  AGAINST  MORTGAGEE.  — A 
mortgagor  in  a  real  estate  mortgage,  given  without  consideration 
to  defraud  creditors,  may  enjoin  Its  foreclosure  by  the  mortgagee. 
^MofCett  V.  Parker.  319.) 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 

1.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— ENFORCEMENT  OF  VAC- 
CINATION ORDINANCE— LIABILITY  FOR  DAMAGES.— A  mu- 
nicipal corporation  Is  not  liable  to  a  citizen  who  may  sustain  dam- 
age on  account  of  impure  vaccine  matter  administered  to  him  by  the 
officer  or  agent  of  such  corporation  in  the  enforcement  of  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  citizens  of  the  city  to  submit  to  vaccination. 
<Wyatt  v.  Rome,  41.) 

2.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  ARE  NOT  LIABLE  FOR 
THE  NEGLIGENCE  OF  ITS  OFFICERS  or  agents  In  executing 
sanitary  regulations  adopted  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the 
spread  of  contagious  disease.    (Wyatt  v.  Rome,  41.) 

3.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SDWER  CONTRACT - 
POWER  OF  CITY  COUNCIL  TO  WAIVE  COMPLIANCE  WITH. 
If  the  charter  of  a  city  does  not  make  all  details  in  the  construc- 
tion of  sewers  the  basis  of  the  consent  of  property  owners,  but 
leaves  such  details  to  the  common  council,  that  body  has  power  to 
waive  the  performance  of  any  of  the  requirements  of  a  sewer  con- 
tract   Hence,  after  part  of  the  work  under  a  sewer  contract  has 


1012  Index. 

been  done,  but  not  in  conformity  with  the  contract,  the  commott 
council  may,  before  the  completion  of  the  work,  so  modify  the  con- 
tract as  to  malie  it  conform  with  the  worli  already  done,  leaving- 
the  remaining  portion  of  the  work  to  be  constructed  according  to 
the  terms  of  the  original  contract,  without  modification.  (Weston 
V.  Syracuse,  472.) 

4.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
WHAT  ACT  IS  ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  NOT  LEGISLATIVE- 
POWER  OF  COURTS.— If  a  contract  for  the    construction    of   a 

-  sewer  is  modified  by  a  city  council,  by  resolution,  the  action  taken 
by  such  resolution  is  not  a  legislative  act,  but  an  administrative 
one,  and  is  not  free  from  direct  review  or  collateral  attack  in  the 
courts.     (Weston  v.  Syracuse,  472.) 

5.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
CERTIFICATE  OF  CITY  ENGINEER— SUFFICIENCY  OF.— If 
part  of  the  work  under  a  sewer  contract  has  been  done,  but  not  iu 
conformity  with  the  specifications,  and  the  city  council  passes  a 
resolution  modifying  the  contract  so  as  to  make  it  conform  to  the 
work  already  done,  a  requirement  in  the  contract  that  the  con- 
tractor shall  obtain  the  city  engineer's  certificate  of  compliance 
with  the  contract  as  a  prerequisite  to  payment,  is  satisfied  by  a 
certificate  that  the  work  done  before  the  resolution  complies  with 
the  contract  as  modified,  while  the  remainder  complies  with  It,  as 
unmodified.    (Weston  v.  Syracuse,  472.) 

6.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  DEFENSE  TO  CON- 
TRACTOR'S SUIT— WHAT  MAY  BE  INTERPOSED.— That  which 
a  taxpayer  can  accomplish  for  the  protection  of  a  city,  by  a  suit 
xmder  the  "taxpayer's  act,"  the  officers  of  the  city,  whose  duty  it 
is  to  protect  its  property  from  waste  and  injury,  may  bring  about 
by  a  defense  to  an  action  brought  by  a  contractor  to  recover  on  a 
contract  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  or  other  local  inprovement. 
(Weston  V.  Syracuse,  472.) 

7.  ESTOPPEL  AGAINST  CITY— SEWER  CONTRACT— BRIB- 
ERY—KNOWLEDGE  OF  OFFICERS.— A  city  is  not  estopped  by 
the  conduct  of  its  officers  from  denying  the  validity  of  a  resolu-. 
lion  passed  by  the  city  council,  modifying  a  contract  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  sewer,  alleged  to  have  been  brought  about  by  bribery, 
where  it  does  not  appear  that  the  ofllcers  of  the  city  knew  of  the 
alleged  bribery  at  the  time  of  the  several  acts  which  the  plaintiff 
relies  upon  to  create  an  estoppel.    (Weston  v.  Syracuse,  472.) 

8.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  — SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
RESOLUTION  MODIFYING  IS  VITIATED  BY  FRAUD  AND 
CORRUPTION— INVALIDITY  OF,  AS  A  DEFENSE.- A  resolution 
passed  by  a  city  council,  modifying  a  contract  for  the  construc- 
tion of  a  sewer  can,  if  adopted  by  means  of  fraud  and  corruption, 
be  declared  of  no  effect  by  the  courts;  and  the  invalidity  of  the 
resolution  Is  a  good  defense,  on  the  part  of  the  city,  to  an  action 
brought  by  the  contractor,  especially  if  he  was  a  guilty  participant 
In  the  fraud.    (Weston  v.  Syracuse.  472.) 

9.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT  — 
CONTRACTOR'S  RIGHT  OP  ACTION  FOR  BREACH  OF.— If  a 
city  contracts  for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  or  other  local  Im- 
provement, provision  being  made  In  the  contract  that  no  payment 
shall  be  made  until  the  cost  has  been  collected  by  a  special  assess- 
ment, and  the  work  is  done  according  to  the  contract  as  originally 
executed,  or  as  lawfully  modified,  the  contractor  is  entitled  to  main- 
tain an  action  against  the  city  for  breach  of  contract  where  the 
latter  ignores  the  plaintiff's  rights  in  the  premises,  not  only  by  re- 


Index.  1013 

fusing  to  make  the  assessment,  but  by  repudiating  the  contract, 
and  entering  into  an  agreement  with  others  for  reconstructing  a 
portion  of  the  sewer.    (Weston  v.  Syracuse,  472.) 

10.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  SEWER  CONTRACT 
WITH— REMEDIES  TO  ENFORCE  PAYMENT.— If  a  city  con- 
tracts for  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  or  other  local  Improvement, 
and  the  only  way  provided  for  payment  Is  through  a  special  as- 
sessment. It  Is  the  duty  of  the  city  to  collect  the  assessment  and 
turn  over  the  proceeds  to  the  contractor;  and,  if  it  does  not  pro- 
ceed with  reasonable  diligence  to  do  so,  he  may  and  should  pro- 
ceed by  mandamus  to  compel  such  action  on  its  part;  but.  If  the 
city  disables  itself  from  performing  the  contract  by  some  act  which 
renders  the  assessment  void  and  uncollectible,  or  if  it  refuses  to 
perform  the  contract,  then  the  contractor's  remedy  against  the  city 
Is  by  action  for  breach  of  the  contract.    (Weston  v.  Syracuse,  472.) 

11.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  ORDINANCES  —  DEAL- 
ING IN  OLD  RAGS.— A  city  ordiuance  which  forbids  the  business  of 
collecting,  storing,  and  dealing  in  old  rags,  old  papers,  or  other  such 
refuse  material,  within  the  thiclily  settled  portions  of  the  city,  ex- 
cept when  conducted  by  licensed  persons,  is  reasonable  and  valid..' 
(Commonwealth  v.  Hubley,  242.) 

12.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  — NEGLIGENCE  — WORK 
DONE  FOR  PRIVATE  CORPORATE  BENEFIT.— Where  a  city, 
having  been  empowered  to  improve  its  streets  and  assess  the  cost 
of  improvements  to  abutting  owners,  owns  and  operates  a  steam 
roller  and  retains  compensation  for  rolling  streets  when  macadam- 
ized, its  liability  for  injuries  resuting  from  fire  started  through  the 
negligent  operation  of  the  roller  Is  similar  to  that  of  an  Individual 
engaged  In  doing  the  same  worlt.  It  cannot  escape  such  liability  by 
pleading  that  the  worli  was  done  for  the  public  benefit  (McMahon . 
T.  Dubuque,  143.)  ( 

13.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— TAXATION— MANDAMUS 
TO  COMPEL.— Where  statutes  have  been  passed,  abrogating  or  re- 
stricting the  power  of  taxation  delegated  to  a  municipality  upon  the 
faith  of  which  contracts  were  made  with  her,  and  upon  the  continu- 
ance of  Mhich  alone  they  can  be  enforced,  a  party  interested  may 
by  mandamus  compel  the  exercise  of  that  power  as  if  no  legislation 
had  ever  been  attempted.    (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville,  610.) 

14.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— BONDS— POWER  TO  TAX 
FOR  PAYMENT  OF.— Where  the  resource  for  the  payment  of  the 
bonds  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  the  power  of  taxation  existing 
when  the  bonds  were  Issued,  any  law  which  withdraws  or  limits  the 
taxing  power  and  leaves  no  adequate  means  for  the  payment  of  the 
bonds,  is  forbidden  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  Is 
null  and  void.    (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville,  610.) 

15.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATION  —  BONDS  —  PAYMENT  BY 
NEW  CORPORATION— STATUTE  PROHIBITING.— Where  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  has  Issued  bonds,  and  before  their  payment  its 
charter  has  been  repealed  and  a  new  corporation  formed,  a  statute 
which  prohibits  the  levying  of  taxes  for  the  payment  of  the  bonds 
by  the  new  corporation  Is  invalid  and  cannot  be  regarded.  (Broad- 
foot v.  Fayetteville,  GIO.) 

16.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— REMEDIES  OF  CRED- 
ITORS—POWER OF  LEGISLATURE.— The  remedies  of  a  creditor 
for  the  enforcement  of  his  debt  assumed  by  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, which  existed  when  the  contract  was  made,  must  be  left  unim- 
paired by  the  legislature;  or.  If  they  are  changed,  a  substantial 
«auivalent  must  be  provided.    (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville,  610.) 


1014  Index. 

17.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— REPEAL  OF  CHARTER- 
EFFECT  ON  DEBTS.— Debts  due  from  a  municipal  corporation  are 
not  extinguished  by  tlie  repeal  of  its  charter,  and  still  exist  not- 
withstanding that  repeal.     (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville,  610.) 

18.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  —  LIABILITY  OF  NEW 
CORPORATION  FOR  DEBTS  OF  OLD.— When  the  old  charter  of  a 
municipal  corporation  is  repealed  and  a  new  one  is  granted,  upon 
which  latter  are  bestowed  by  law  all  the  benefits  and  property  of 
the  old,  the  burden  of  the  old  must  be  borne  by  the  new;  where  the 
benefits  are  taken,  the  burdens  are  assumed.  (Broadfoot  v.  Fayette- 
ville, 610.) 

19.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— WHEN  A  NEW  CORPO- 
RATION IS  THE  SUCCESSOR  OF  AN  OLD  ONE.— Where  the  old 
charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  has  been  repealed,  and  a  new 
one,  creating  a  new  corporation,  has  been  granted,  the  new  cor- 
poration, embracing  the  same  territory,  the  same  inhabitants  and 
the  same  taxable  property,  Is  considered  as  the  successor  of  the  old. 
(Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville,  610.) 

20.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— LIABILITY  OF  SUCCES- 
SOR OF  OLD  CORPORATION— CONSIDERATION.— The  founda- 
tion on  which  the  liability  of  a  new  municipal  corporation  for  the 
debts  of  the  old  rests,  is  that  the  new  corporation  embraces  the 
same  territory,  the  same  corporators,  the  same  taxable  property^ 
and  has  received  the  property  of  the  old  corporation  without  con- 
sideration; and  for  these  benefits  must.  In  return,  bear  the  bur- 
dens of  the  old  corporation.     (Broadfoot  v.  Fayetteville,  610.) 

21.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 
—STATUTES  PROHIBITING  PAYMENT  OF  DEBTS  OF  OLD 
CORPORATION. — A  statute  expressly  prohibiting  a  municipal  cor- 
poration from  assuming  the  debts  of  its  predecessor,  or  from  pay- 
ing any  part  of  them,  is  unconstitutional.  (Broadfoot  v.  Fayette- 
ville, 610.) 

22.  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS— PUBLIC  AND  CORPOR- 
ATE DUTIES— LIABILITY  ARISING  FROM  PERFORMANCE.— 
While  a  municipal  corporation  sustains  no  liability  to  one  suffering 
injury  from  the  negligent  or  imperfect  exercise  of  its  legislative  or 
governmental  powers,  the  contrary  is  true  as  respects  the  perform- 
ance and  execution  of  mere  corporate  duties.  As  respects  such  mat- 
ters, the  rule  of  respondeat  superior  applies,  and  the  city  will  be- 
come liable  for  the  act  of  Its  servants  and  agents  which  it  bas- 
authorlzed  or  adopted.    (Hollman  v.  PlattevlUe,  899.) 

—  See  Cemeteries,  2. 

MURDER, 
See  Homicide. 

NAMES. 

1.  NAMES,  CONTRACT  UNDER  ASSUMED-IDENTITY.- A 
person,  not  engaged  in  a  fraudulent  or  criminal  pui-pose,  may  enter 
into  a  contract  under  any  name  he  may  choose  to  assume.  All  that 
the  law  looks  to  is  the  Identity  of  the  Individual,  and  when  that 
is  established  the  act  will  be  binding  upon  him  and  upon  others. 
(Scanlan  v.  Grimmer,  320.) 

2.  NAMES,  CONTRACT  UNDER  ASSUMED-KNOWLEDGB 
OF  OTHER  PARTY.— A  contract  entered  Into  under  an  assumed 
name  is  binding,  even  though  the  other  parties  thereto  were  in- 


Index.     *  1016 

duccd  to  believe  that  the  assumed  name  was  the  person's  real  name, 
and  though  such  parties  were  opposed  to  entering  Into  a  transac- 
tion with  the  person  himself.  (Scanlan  v.  Grimmer,  326.) 

NEGLIGENCE. 

1.  NEGLIGENCE.— ALTHOUGH  A  PERSON  IS  BOUND  TO 

USB  ORDINARY  CARE  to  protect  himself  against  the  known  dan- 
gers of  his  situation,  he  need  not  exercise  care  to  protect  himself 
against  an  intentional  Injury  by  another  of  which  he  has  no  no- 
tice.    (Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King,  93.) 

2.  NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING  OF  HEAVY  MA- 
CHINERY—COMMON CARRIERS.— It  Is  not  material,  In  any  action 
against  truckmen  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  to  heavy  ma- 
chinery, which  they  have  been  employed  to  transport,  whether  the 
defendants  are  answerable  as  common  carriers,  where  the  case  la 
tried  and  submitted  to  the  jury,  not  upon  the  theory  that  the  de- 
fendants are  liable  as  insurers  of  the  safety  of  the  property,  but 
upon  the  theory  that  they  were  negligent  In  unloading  the  machine, 
and  thus  caused  the  Injuries.  It  was  not,  therefore,  prejudicial  to 
the  defendants  for  the  trial  court  to  refuse  to  charge  that  they  were 
not  common  carriers.    (Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 

3.  NEGLIGENCE— TRUCKMEN— MOVING  OF  HEAVY  MA- 
CHINERY—LIABILITY.— If  truckmen  are  employed  to  transport  a 
large  and  heavy  planing  machine,  used  for  planing  Iron,  they  must 
use,  at  least,  ordinary  diligence  and  care,  and  are  answerable  if 
they  negligently  break  and  seriously  Injure  the  machine  while  un- 
loading it.     (Jackson  etc.  Works  v.  Hurlbut,  432.) 

4.  COMPARATIVE  NEGLIGENCE.- The  doctrine  of  compara- 
tive negligence  has  never  been  recognized  In  Minnesota.  (Fonda  v. 
St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

6.  NEGLIGENCE— STANDARD  OF  DUTY.— A  person  cannot, 
by  the  adoption  of  private  rules,  fix  the  standard  of  his  duty  to 
others.    (Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

6.  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE— POWER  OF  DEFEND- 
ANT TO  AVOID  CONSEQUENCES  OF  PLAINTIFF'S  NEGLI- 
GENCE.—The  doctrine  that  a  plaintiff  may  recover  If  the  defend- 
ant might,  by  the  exercise  of  care,  have  avoided  the  consequences 
of  the  plaintiff's  negligence.  Is  only  applicable  to  cases  in  which  the 
plaintiff's  negligence  preceded  that  of  the  defendant.  But  when 
the  negligence  of  the  two  persons  is  contemporaneous,  and  the  fault 
of  each  operates  directly  to  cause  the  injury,  neither  can  recover 
from  the  other.    (Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

7.  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE— WILLFUL  ACT  OF  DB- 
FENDANT.— Where  the  defendant's  acts  are  willful  and  Inten- 
tional, the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff,  if  any.  Is  no  longer  deemed 
In  law  a  proximate  cause  of  the  Injury.  (Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry. 
Co.,  341. 

8.  NEGLIGENCE— ACTION  FOR  DEATH  OF  HUSBAND- 
RELEASE  BY  HUSBAND.— A  settlement  and  adjustment  of  a  claim 
for  pex'sonal  injuries  made  by  a  deceased  huslmnd  in  his  lifetime 
bars  an  action  by  his  widow  for  his  death  resulting  from  such  In- 
juries.   (Brown  v.  Electric  Ry.  Co.,  666.) 

See  Animals;  Banks  and  Banking,  2,  3;  Damages,  4;  Innkeepers, 
1.  2;  Landlord  and  Tenant,  1.  5;  Master  and  Servant.  4,  5,  11; 
Municipal  Corporations,  2;  Railroad  Companies,  11.  19,  20,  22, 
27;  Telegraph  Companies,  4,  5,  6;  Waterworks  and  Water  Com- 
panies, 5. 


1016  •    Index. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS. 

1.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— NOTICE  THAT  NOTES 
ARE  HELD  AS  COLLATERAL.— The  mere  fact  that  negotiable 
notes  indorsed  in  blank  by  the  payee  are  overdue  is  not  sufficient  to 
charge  a  bank  advancing  money  thereon  to  the  holder  with  con- 
structive notice  that  the  notes  are  held  merely  as  collateral  security. 
(Young  Men's  C.  A.  etc.  Co.  v.  Rockford  Nat.  Bank,  135.) 

2.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  — PURCHASE  OF  OVER- 
DUE NOTES  INDORSED  IN  BLANK— PROTECTION  AGAINST 
THIRD  PARTIES.— A  bank  advancing  money  to  the  holder  of 
overdue  negotiable  notes  indorsed  in  blank  by  the  payee  without 
notice  that  they  are  held  as  collateral  security  is  protected  against 
latent  equities  in  third  parties.  (Young  Men's  C.  A.  etc.  Co.  v. 
Rockford  Nat.  Bank,  135.) 

3.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS— WHAT  WORDS  DO  NOT 
BIND  ONE  AS  AN  INDORSER.— The  words,  "Estate  of  Jona.  D. 
Wheeler,  Henry  P.  Wing,  Executor,"  Indorsed  on  a  promissory  note, 
mean  "Estate  of  Wheeler  by  Wing,"  and  do  not  bind  Wing  by  con- 
tract. Wing's  estate  is  not,  therefore,  liable  upon  such  an  indorse' 
ment.    (Grafton  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wing,  303.) 

4.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENT  —  EVI- 
DENCE.—If  commercial  paper  is  indorsed  in  blank,  parol  evidence 
Is  admissible  to  show  that  the  terms  of  the  agreement  between  the 
parties  are  other  and  different  from  those  which  arise  by  presump- 
of  law.    (United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer,  390.) 

5.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENT  — EVI- 
DENCE.—A  certificate  of  deposit  indorsed  for  collection  for  the 
account  of  the  indorser  is  a  restrictive  indorsement  which  vests  no 
general  property  in  the  paper  in  the  indorsee,  but  makes  him  merely 
a  collection  agent;  and  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  that 
the  transfer  of  the  title  was  intended  to  be  absolute.  (United  States 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer.  390.) 

a.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  INDORSEMENT  —  EVI- 
DENCE.—A  restrictive  indorsement  to  commercial  paper  unam- 
biguous in  its  terms,  cannot  be  contradicted  or  explained  by  parol 
evidence.    (United  States  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geer,  390.) 

7.  NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS  —  RELATION  OP  IN- 
DORSER AND  HOLDER.— The  relation  of  an  indorser  and  a  holder 
of  negotiable  paper  is  analogous  to  that  of  a  principal  and  surety. 
(Mercantile  Nat.  Bank  v.  Macfarlane,  352.) 

See  Contracts,  6,  7;  Evidence,  5-7;  Executors  and  Administrators; 
Insolvency,  4,  5. 

NONSUIT. 
See  Appeal,  16. 

NOTARIES  PUBLIC. 

NOTARIES  PUBLIC— OPFICIAL  SEAL.— A  notary  public  Is 
required  to  attach  his  official  seal  to  his  official  acts,  and  his  certifi- 
cate, unauthenticated  by  the  impression  of  such  seal,  Is  void.  (Wel- 
ton  v.  Atkinson.  416.) 

See  Banks  and  Banking. 


Index.  1017 

NOTICE 

See  Corporations,  20,  28,  33;  Cotenancy,  1;  Deeds,  5;  Eminent  Do- 
main, 5;  Insane  Persons,  1;  Liens,  1;  Mechanic's  Lien,  5,  6; 
Negotiable  Instruments,  1;  Telegraph  Companies,  1;  Vendor 
and  Purchaser,  3,  5. 

NUISANCE. 

See  Railroad  Companies,  24. 

OCCUPANCY. 
See  Homestead,  4. 

ORIGINAL  PACKAGE. 
See  Interstate  Commerce,  3,  4. 

PARENT  AND  CHILD. 
See  Descent;  Husband  and  Wife,  5-7;  Wills,  B. 

PARTIES. 
See  Guardian  and  Ward,  3;  Negotiable  Instruments,  4, 

PAYMENT. 

PAYMENT-EFFECT  OP  PRESCRIBING  WAY  OF.— If  a 
■way  of  payment  Is  prescribed  by  statute,  or  by  contract,  that  way 
must  be  strictly  pursued.    (Weston  v.  Syracuse,  472.) 

See  Deeds,  1;  Insurance,  12-14;  Judgment,  1,  2;  Limitations  of  Ac- 
tions, 1-5;  Mortgages,  3. 

PERCOLATING  WATERS. 
See  Waters  and  Watercourses,  1-8. 

PERJURY. 
See  Judgment,  4. 

PHYSICIANS  AND  SURGEONS. 
See  Witnesses,  15. 

PLEADING. 

PLEADING— BILL  IN  EQUITY.— MULTIFARIOUSNESS 
does  not  arise  from  the  presentation  of  different  views  of  the  same 
collocation  of  facts,  but  it  must  be  two  distinct  collocations  of  dis- 
tinct and  different  facts,  each  collocation  presenting  different  rights. 
And  calling  for  different  relief.  Hence,  a  bill  is  not  multifarious 
because  a  party  states  his  case  in  the  alternative.  (Snyder  v.  Grand- 
staff,  863.^ 

See  Contracts,  8;  Elevators;  Equity,  4,  6,  8;  Estoppel,  2,  8. 

POLICE  POWER. 

1.  POLICE  POWER— PROTECTION  OF  PUBLIC  HEALTH- 
DEALING  IN  OLD  RAGS.— As  the  business  of  collecting,  storing, 
and  dealing  in  old  rags,  old  papers,  and  like  material,  may  be  dan- 
gerous to  the  health  of  the  community,  it  is  proper  that  trust- 
worthy persons  only  should  be  permitted  to  carry  It  on.  When  the 
interests  of  individuals  conflict  with  the  rights  of  the  public,  the 
individual  interest  must  yield  to  the  paramount  right  (Common- 
wealth V.  Hubley,  242.) 


1018  Index. 

2.  FOODS— ADULTERATION  OF.— An  indictment  charging  the 
manufacture  and  offer  for  sale  of  an  adulterated  article  of  food 
must  allege  the  article  with  which  it  is  adulterated,  under  a  statute 
which  malies  any  article  of  food  criminally  adulterated  "if  any  sub- 
stance or  substances  has  or  have  been  mixed  with  it  so  as  to  reduce 
or  lower  or  injuriously  affect  its  quality  or  strength,  or  if  any  in- 
ferior or  cheaper  substance  or  substances  have  been  substituted 
wholly  or  in  part  for  the  article."    (Dorsey  v.  State,  762.) 

3.  FOODS— ADULTERATION  OF— POWER  TO  REGULATE.— 
A  statute  providing  that,  if  certain  named  wholesome  and  nutritious 
articles  of  food  are  mixed  or  intermingled,  the  product  must  be  la- 
beled, showing  the  component  elements  thereof,  and  punishing  a 
failure  to  so  label,  is  valid,  but  a  statute  which  embraces  all  arti- 
cles of  food  or  drink,  without  naming  any,  and  makes  the  mixture 
of  any  articles  of  food,  however  nutritious,  without  labeling  the 
product,  an  offense,  is  too  .ceneral  in  its  terms  and  cannot  be  en- 
forced.   (Dorsey  v.  State,  762.) 

4.  FOODS— ADULTERATION  OF— POWER  TO  PROHIBIT.— 
Under  the  police  power  of  the  state,  the  legislature  may  legally  pass 
an  act  stating  in  distinct  terms,  as  to  any  article  of  food  or  drink, 
that  if  any  person  shall  adulterate  such  article,  naming  it,  with 
any  other  substance,  without  labeling  it,  he  shall  be  guilty  of  an 
offense;  but  it  is  not  competent  to  make  criminal  the  mixing  or 
mingling  of  articles  of  food  which  are  wholesome  and  nutritious 
and  absolutely  prohibit  the  sale  thereof.    (Dorsey  v.  State,  762.) 

5.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  — POLICE  POWER  — KEEPING 
INTOXICATING  LIQUORS.— The  keeping  of  liquors  in  his  posses- 
sion by  a  person  whether  for  himself  or  another,  unless  he  does  sa 
for  the  illegal  sale  thereof,  or  for  some  other  improper  purpose, 
cannot  injure  or  affect  the  health,  morals,  or  safety  of  the  public. 
Hence  a  statute  prohibiting  such  keepiug  in  possession  is  not  a 
legitimate  exercise  of  the  police  power,  but  it  is  an  abridgement 
of  the  privileges  and  immunities  of  the  citizen,  without  any  legal 
justification,  and  therefore  void.    (Ex  parte  Brown,  743.) 

6.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— POLICE  REGULATIONS.— The 
state  may  interfere  under  Its  police  power  to  prohibit  the  keeping 
of  property  injurious  to  the  lives,  health,  and  comfort  of  all  per- 
sons, but  It  Is  not  authorized,  under  the  guise  of  a  police  regulation, 
to  Invade  the  fundamental  privileges  and  interfere  with  the  full 
enjoyment  by  the  citizen  of  his  recognized  property  rights,  and  if  a 
statute  purporting  to  have  been  enacted  to  protect  the  public  health, 
the  public  morals,  or  the  public  safety  has  no  real  or  substantial  re- 
lation to  those  subjects,  It  Is  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  so  adjudge. 
(Ex  parte  Brown,  743.) 

7.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  —  POLICE  POWER  —  INTOXI- 
CATING LIQUORS.— An  attempt  by  the  legislature  to  make  the 
keeping  of  liquor  by  one  citizen  for  another  in  a  local  option  terri- 
tory, whether  in  a  house,  tent,  or  anywhere  else,  and  whether  for 
a  consideration  or  without,  a  crime,  or  an  attempt  on  the  part  of 
the  legislature  to  make  it  criminal  for  a  person  who  may  be  the 
owner  or  proprietor  of  any  building,  in  local  option  territory,  to 
solicit  or  take  and  order  for  another  person  for  Intoxicating  liquors, 
to  be  sent  or  delivered  to  the  proprietor  or  owner  of  such  house  for 
the  person  giving  such  order,  is  without  authority  of  law,  as  viola- 
tive of  the  citizen's  fundamental  right  to  use  his  own  property  a& 
he  pleases,  not  Injuring  another  person,  and  it  is  not  competent  for 
the  legislature,  under  its  power  of  police  regulation,  to  Impair  the 
legal  ownership  and  holding  of  one's  property,  either  by  himself 
or  by  another  person.    (Ex  parte  Brown,  743.) 


Index.  1019 

8.  police  poweit-regulation  by  states  of  inter- 
STATE COMMERCE.— Every  state  has  the  right  under  Its  re- 
served police  power  to  prohibit  the  importation  and  sale  of  all  ar- 
ticles inherently  unworthy  of  commerce  and  unfit  for  the  use  of 
Its  people,  and,  In  the  absence  of  congressional  action  to  the  con- 
trary, the  determination  by  a  state  legislature  that  an  article  of 
doubtful  commercial  quality  is  not  a  legitimate  article  of  commerce. 
Is  conclusive.    (Austin  v.  State,  703.) 

9.  POLICE  POWER  —  MANUFACTURE  AND  SALE  OF 
CIGARETTES.— A  state  statute  prohibiting  the  sale  of  cigarette* 
manufactured  within  the  state,  is  valid  as  an  Internal  police  regu- 
lation.   (Austin  V.  State,  703.) 

PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATION. 
See  Criminal  Law.  3-7,  10. 

PRESCRIPTION. 
See  Waters  and  Watercourses,  2. 

PRESUMPTION. 

PRESUMPTION  —  SUPPRESSION  OF  EVIDENCE.  —  The 
presumption  arising  from  the  spoliation  or  suppression  of  evidence- 
that  it  would,  if  produced,  be  unfavorable  to  the  party  destroying: 
or  suppressing  it,  is  not  limited  to  the  case  of  documentary  evi- 
dence is  the  exclusive  possession  and  control  of  the  party.  (Fonda 
V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

See  Burden  of  Proof;  Corporations,  29,  34;  Courts;  Evidence,  4; 
Homicide,  9;  Judgment,  6;  Rape,  4;  Statutes,  21;  Vendor  and 
Purchaser,  2;  Witnesses,  6. 

PRIVATE  WAYS. 
See  Cotenancy,  5. 

PROCEDURE. 
See  Statutes,  2. 

PROCESS. 
See  Jurisdiction,  2. 

BAILROAD  COMPANIES. 

1.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS.— A 
person  stealing  a  ride  on  a  railroad  train  is  a  trespasser  and  gain* 
no  rights;  but  It  is  the  duty  of  the  railroad  company  and  its  em- 
ployes not  to  injure  him  willfully  or  intentionally.  (Illinois  Central 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  King,  93.) 

2.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS  — 
LIABILITY  FOR  ACT  OP  BRAKEMAN.— A  railroad  company  1» 
liable  for  the  willful  act  of  its  brakeman  within  the  scope  of  his 
authority  in  putting  a  trespasser  off  Its  train.  (Illinois  Central  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  King,  93.) 

3.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  TRESPASSERS— EVI- 
DENCE OF  WILLFULNESS.— Evidence  that  a  brakeman  pulled  a 
person  who  was  stealing  a  ride  on  a  railroad  train  from  under  thfr 
train  while  It  was  in  motion,  and  manifested  his  feeling  and  will- 
ingness to  Inflict  needless  injury  by  cursing  him  and  throwing  a 


1020  Index. 

stone  at  him,  is  evidence  that  the  act  of  the  brakeman  was  willful. 
<Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King,  93.) 

4.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  LIABILITY  FOR  WILLFUL. 
INJURY  TO  TRESPASSER.— The  negligence  of  a  trespasser  in  talk- 
ing a  position  under  the  cars  to  steal  a  ride  upon  a  train  is  not  an 
Issue  in  an  action  to  recover  for  injury  received  while  he  was  be- 
ing dragged  from  such  position  by  the  willful  act  of  a  braliemau 
while  the  train  was  in  motion.  (Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King, 
«3.) 

5.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— ENTRY  ON  LAND— RIGHT  TO 
IMPROVEMENTS.— If  a  railroad  company  lawfully  enters  upon 
land  under  conveyance  from  a  tenant  for  life,  and  malies  improve- 
ments necessary  to  its  business,  it  has  a  right,  upon  abandoning 
the  premises  at  the  expiration  of  the  life  estate,  to  remove  such 
improvements,  and,  if  it  continues  in  possession  thereafter,  the  value 
of  such  improvements  should  not  be  considered  in  assessing  the 
damages  to  which  the  remainderman  is  entitled.  The  amount  which 
the  latter  is  entitled  to  recover  is  the  marljet  value  of  the  property 
at  the  time  the  life  estate  terminated,  with  interest,  the  value  of 
such  improvements  placed  on  the  property  at  the  expense  of  the 
company  and  necessary  to  its  business  not  being  considered  In  ascer- 
taining such  market  value.     (Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

6.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  ENTRY  ON  LAND  —  EJECT- 
MENT.—If  a  railroad  company  enters  upon  land  and  constructs  its 
road  either  with  the  consent  of  the  owner  or  without  lawful  author- 
ity, and  the  landowuer  acquiesces  in  the  appropriation  of  the  prop- 
erty to  a  great  public  use  until  it  has  become  a  necessary  component 
part  of  the  property  acquired  by  the  railroad  to  perform  its  public 
■duties,  the  landowner  must  be  held  to  have  waived  his  right  to 
retalie  the  property  in  ejectment,  and  must  be  remitted  to  such  other 
remedies  for  the  wrong  done  him  as  will  not  interfere  with  the 
Tights  of  the  public  to  have  the  railroad  maintained  and  operated. 
(Charleston  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  17.) 

7.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— ENTRY  ON  LAND  BY  CON- 
SENT—ESTOPPEL AGAINST  LANDOWNER.— If  a  railroad  com- 
pany enters  upon  land  with  the  consent  of  the  owner,  or  under 
license  from  him,  and  the  property  thus  talien  possession  of  becomes 
such  a  component  part  of  its  railroad  that  to  surrender  its  possession 
would  interfere  seriously  with  the  interests  of  the  company  or  of 
the  public,  the  landowner,  though  entitled  to  compensation  for  his 
property,  is  estopped  from  asserting  against  the  company  the  legal 
title  to  the  property  by  an  action  of  ejectment.  (Charleston  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hughes,  17.) 

8.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— LEGISLATIVE  POWERS  OVER 
—REASONABLE  REGULATION.— The  property  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  dedicated  to  a  public  use,  and  the  legislature  has  the  power 
to  regulate  that  use  in  a  reasonable  manner,  unless  the  charter  of 
the  railroad  company  expressly  protects  it  from  such  regulation. 
The  compelling  of  intersecting  lines  to  put  in  a  connecting  switch 
is  a  reasonable  regulation.  (Jacobson  v.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
-358.) 

9.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES-LEGISLATIVE  POWER  OVER. 
The  legislature  has  the  power  to  compel  a  common  carrier  to  do 
business  in  the  ordinary  and  usual  way,  and  therefore  may  compel 
such  Interchange  of  cars  as  incidental  to  the  business  for  which 
the  company  was  chartered.  (Jacobson  y.  Wisconsin  etc.  B.  B.  Co., 
258.) 


Index.  1021 

10.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES  — INCIDENTAL  POWERS.— As 
Incidental  to  the  operation  of  Its  road,  a  railroad  company  has  the 
power  to  Interchange  cars  with  other  connecting  companies.  (Jacob- 
son  V.  Wisconsin  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  358.) 

11.  STREET  RAILWAYS— CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE- 
WANTON  CONDUCT  OP  MOTORMAN.— A  plaintiff  may  recover 
of  a  street  railway  company,  notwithstanding  that  he  might  have 
negligently  placed  himself  in  a  place  of  danger,  if  the  conduct  of 
the  motonnan  In  running  him  down  was  wanton  and  willful,  or  If, 
after  discovering  the  plaintiff  in  a  place  of  danger  In  time  to  have 
prevented  the  injury  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care,  he  failed 
to  do  so.    (Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

12.  STREET  RAILWAYS  —  EVIDENCE— GENERAL  INOOM7 
PETENCY  OF  MOTORMAN.— Evidence  of  the  general  Incompe- 
tency of  a  motorman,  based  on  the  observations  of  witnesses  who 
had  seen  him  operate  his  car  on  prior  occasions,  is  inadmissible  to 
establish  negligence  at  the  time  of  the  accident.  (Fonda  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ry,  Co.,  341.) 

13.  STREET  RAILWAYS— MASTER  AND  SERVANT— EVI- 
DENCE—RULES  Or'  COMPANY.— The  private  rules  of  a  master 
regulating  the  conduct  of  his  servants  in  the  management  of  his 
own  business.  Intended  only  for  the  guidance  of  his  servants,  al- 
though designed  for  the  protection  of  others,  are  not  admissible  in 
evidence  to  establish  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  master.  (Fonda 
V.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

14.  RAILROADS-COUPLING  OF  CARS— ASSUMPTION  OP 
RISKS— LIABILITY  FOR  INJURY.— If  one  railroad  receives  a  cap 
from  another  railroad,  with  a  drawbar  different  in  make  and 
height  from  that  which  it  uses  itself,  and  an  experienced  man  is 
ordered  to  couple  the  cars  together  by  a  link  and  pin,  but  he  is 
crushed  between  the  sills  of  the  cars  while  attempting  to  make  the 
connection,  because  one  drawbar  slides  over  the  other,  the  railroad 
company  is  not  answerable  for  the  injury,  because  the  difference 
in  height  was  an  obvious  risk  assumed  by  the  plaintiff.  (Ellsbury 
V.  New  York  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  248.) 

15.  RAILROADS— STREET-CARS— RISK  ASSUMED  BY  PAS- 
SENGER^EXPELLING  DRUNKEN  MAN.— A  passenger  upon  a 
street-car  assumes  the  risk,  when  he  takes  passage,  of  the  conse- 
quences of  a  lawful  and  reasonable  act  of  the  conductor  in  expelling 
a  drunken  man  from  the  car.    (Spade  v.  Lynn  etc,  R.  R.  Co.,  298.) 

10.  RAILROADS— STREET-CARS— OBLIGATION  TO  NERV- 
OUS PASSENGERS.— The  obligation  of  a  street  railway  company 
toward  a  passenger  cannot  be  increased  simply  by  his  notifying  the 
notifying  the  conductor  that  he  has  unstable  nerves.  (Spade  v. 
Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  298.) 

17.  RAILROADS— STREET-CARS— DAMAGES  FOR  FRIGHT 
CAUSED  BY  EJECTING  DRUNKEN  PASSENGER.— If  the  con- 
ductor of  a  street-car,  in  ejecting  a  drunken  man  therefrom,  jostles 
against  another  drunken  man,  who  falls  upon  a  lady  passenger, 
and  the  injury  from  the  fall  is  slight,  though  she  suffers  physical 
Injury  from  fright  caused  by  the  fall  and  the  rest  of  the  occurrences, 
she  can  recover,  if  at  all.  only  for  the  fright  caused  by  the  inad- 
vertent battery,  and  not  for  that  attributable  to  the  general  disturb- 
ance.   (Spade  V.  Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  298.) 

18.  RAILROADS  —  STREET-CARS  —  UNAVOIDABLE  ACCI- 
DENT  TO  PASSENGER  IN  E.TECTING  DRUNKEN  MAN- 
RIGHT  OF  ACTION.— If  due  care  is  used  In  expelling  a  drunken 
man  from  a  street-car,  an  unavoidable  battery  committed  on  a  pas- 


1022  Inde^ 

cenger's  person,  during  the  process,  by  the  conductor's  jostling  an- 
other drunken  man,  who  falls  upon  the  passenger,  seems  not  to  be 
actionable.     (Spade  v.  Lynn  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  298.) 

19.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE  PER  SEr-FAIL- 
URE  TO  USE  SELF-COUPLING  DEVICES.— Failure  ot  a  railroad 
company  to  equip  its  freight-cars  with  modern  self-coupling  devices 
is  negligence,  per  se.    (Troxler  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  580.) 

20.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— DUTY  TO  USE  SAFE  APPLI- 
ANCES IN  GENERAL  USE.— The  employes  of  a  railroad  company 
and  the  traveling  public  alike  have  a  right  to  be  protected  against 
any  dangers  which  can  be  avoided  Dy  the  adoption  of  safety  appli- 
-ances  which  have  been  tested  by  experience  and  which  have  come 
.into  general  use.     (Troxler  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  580.) 

2L  RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  SAFE  APPLIANCES  —  DE- 
FENSE OF  POVERTY.— If  an  appliance  is  such  that  the  railroads 
€hould  have  it,  the  poverty  of  the  company  is  no  sufficient  excuse 
for  not  having  it.    (Troxler  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.,  580.) 

22.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES  —  FAILURE  TO  USE  SELF- 
COUPLING  DEVICES— NEGLIGENCE  OF  EMPLOYE.— Where  a 
railroad  company  fails  to  equip  its  freight-cars  with  modern  self- 
•coupling  devices,  and  an  employ^  Is  injured  in  coupling  cars  by 
hand,  the  company  is  liable,  whether  such  employs  was  negligent 
In  thfe  manner  of  making  the  coupling,  or  not.  (Troxler  v.  Southern 
Ry.  Co.,  580.) 

23.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURY  TO  PRIVATE  PROP- 
ERTY—COMPENSATION.— If  the  convenience  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany requires  a  change  in  its  terminal  yard,  so  that  what  has  been 
■done  in  one  part  thereof  with  one  kind  of  appliances  without  in- 
jury to  private  property,  when  done  in  another  part  with  another 
kind,  inflicts  serious  injury  upon  the  buildings  on  adjoining  land,  it 
becomes  the  duty  of  the  company  to  acquire  the  right  to  thus  vir- 
tually use  the  neighboring  property  either  by  purchase  or  through 
the  power  of  eminent  domain.  (Garvey  v.  Long  Island  R.  R.  Co., 
650.) 

24.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES-INJURY  TO  PRIVATE  PROP- 
ERTY—NUISANCE.— A  statute  simply  authorizing  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  construct  and  operate  a  steam  surface  railroad  does  not 
•confer  power,  either  express  or  implied,  to  construct  and  use,  with- 
out making  compensation,  a  turntable  in  its  terminal  yard  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  dwelling-houses  on  private  property,  so  as  to 
seriously,  continuously,  and  permanently  injure  such  premises  and 
impair  their  enjoyment.  Such  construction  and  use  of  a  turntable 
is  a  nuisance  which  may  be  enjoined.  (Garvey  v.  Long  Island 
K.  R.  Co.,  550.) 

25.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES-INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS-AS- 
SUMPTION OF  RISKS.— A  section  hand  who  continues  to  use  a 
hand-car,  the  brake  on  which  he  knows  to  be  dangerously  defec- 
tive, assumes  the  risk  arising  from  such  defect  and  cannot  recover 
for  injuries  resulting  therefrom.    (Gann  v.  Railroad,  687.) 

26.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS— 
FELLOW-SERVANTS.— While  a  section  foreman  and  his  subordi- 
nates generally  occupy  the  position  of  vice-principal  and  servants 
as  to  each  other,  yet  such  foreman  may  become  the  fellow-servant 
of  his  subordinates  during  the  performance  of  work  properly  that 
of  a  fellow-servant,  as  by  handling  the  brake  on  a  hand-car  used 
by  the  section  gang.  While  engaged  In  such  work  the  principal  Is 
not  liable  for  injuries  resulting  to  a  member  of  the  section  gang 
from  the  foreman's  negligence.    (Gann  v.  Railroad,  687.) 


Index.  1023 

27.  RAILROAD  COMPANIES— INJURIES  TO  SERVANTS- 
SAFE  APPLIANCES— NEGLIGENCE  OF  SECTION  FOREMAN. 
In  the  matter  of  providing  safe  appliances  for  the  use  of  his  sub- 
ordinates, a  section  foreman  bears  to  such  subordinates  the  rela- 
tion  of  a  vice-principal,  and  for  his  negligence  in  this  regard  the 
company  Is  liable.     (Gann  v.  Railroad,  687.) 

See  Eminent  Domain,  2,  3;  Interstate  Commerce,  1. 

RAPE. 

1.  RAPE— FRAUD  IN  PERSONATING  HUSBAND.— In  order 
to  constitute  the  crime  of  rape  by  fraud  in  personating  the  hus- 
band the  defendant  must  resort  to  some  device  or  stratagem,  some 
artifice  or  tricli,  intending  to  deceive  the  prosecutrix  and  make  her 
believe  that  he  is  her  husband,  and  the  effect  of  siich  stratagem 
must  also  be  to  deceive  and  Impose  on  her  and  malie  her  believe 
that  he  is  her  husband  at  the  time  the  act  Is  committed,  and  by 
this  means  gain  her  consent  to  the  copulation.    (Payne  v.  State,  757.) 

2.  RAPE-FRAUD  IN  PERSONATING  HUSBAND-INDICT- 
MENT.—An  indictment  which  charges  a  rape  by  fraud  In  person- 
ating the  husband  must  allege  that  the  injured  female  Is  a  married 
vroman,  and  not  the  wife  of  the  defendant;  and  while  It  Is  not 
necessary  to  allege  the  name  of  the  husband.  It  is  the  better  prac- 
tice to  do  so.     (Payne  v.  State,  757.) 

3.  RAPE— BY  FORCE— PERSONATING  HUSBAND.— If  a  man 
begins  the  act  of  copulation  with  a  married  woman  while  she  Is 
asleep,  and  upon  awalieuing  she  maizes  no  resistance,  believing  him 
to  be  her  husband,  the  crime  may  be  rape  by  force,  but  not  by 
fraud.    (Payne  v.  State,  757.) 

4.  RAPE— ATTEMPT  TO  COMMIT.— A  BOY  UNDER  FOUR- 
TEEN YEARS  OF  AGE  is  conclusively  presumed  to  be  Incapable 
of  committing  the  crime  of  rape,  whatever  may  be  the  real  fact. 
Evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption  Is  inadmissible.  He  cannot, 
therefore,  be  held  guilty  of  an  attempt  to  commit  the  offense.  (Fos- 
ter y.  Commonwealth,  846.) 

RECEIVERS. 

RECEIVERS— FOREIGN— SUITS  BY.— The  right  of  a  re- 
ceiver to  bring  suits  In  a  foreign  Jurisdiction  to  enforce  a  liabil- 
ity arising  under  the  law  of  the  state  of  his  appointment  cannot 
be  conferred  upon  him  absolutely  by  his  order  of  appointment,  but 
can  arise  only  through  an  exercise  ot  comity  between  states,  and 
«uch  exercise  will  be  denied  where  it  would  be  In  contravention  of 
the  rights  of  citizens  and  opposed  to  equity.  (Wyman  v.  Eaton,  193.) 

See  Insolvency,  2. 

BECOGNIZANOa 

See  Libel,  2.  ; 

EECORDINO. 
See  Deeds.  S. 

RELEASE. 

RELEASE— IGNORANCE  OF  CLAIM.— A  party  cannot  re- 
lease a  claim  of  which  he  had  no  knowledge,  and  of  the  existence 
of  which  he  had  always  been  fraudulently  kept  in  ignorance. 
(Cooper  v.  Hayward,  330.) 

See  Negligence.  8. 


1024  Index. 

REMAINDER. 
See  Devise,  8-6;  Eminent  Domain^  7. 

RESCISSION. 
See  Joint  Stock  Companies. 

REWARDS. 
REWARDS— EVIDENCE  TO  PROVE  OFFER— COPY  OP 
GOVERNOR'S  PROCLAMATION.— To  prove  the  offer  of  a  reward 
for  the  arrest  of  a  person,  a  copy  of  the  governor's  proclamation, 
duly  certified  by  the  secretary  of  state,  vrith  whom  the  original  is 
deposited,  is  admissible  in  evidence.  (McPeek  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co., 
205.) 

SALE. 

See  Fraud. 

SCHOOLS. 
SCHOOLS— SCHOOL  FUNDS— LIABILITY  OF  COUNTY.— 
School  orders  issued  by  the  school  committee  upon  the  treasurer  of 
the  county  board  of  education,  under  the  North  Carolina  laws  in 
force  in  1886,  were  payable  out  of  the  school  fund  only,  and  were 
not  a  valid  charge  upon  the  public  funds  of  the  county.  (Bear  v. 
CommisisonerSj  586.) 

SENTENCE. 

See  Habeas  Corpus,  2. 

SERVICE. 
See  Attachment,  3,  10. 

SETOFF. 

1.  SETOFF-CLAIMS  MUST  BE  MUTUAL  AND  DUB.— Claims 
or  demands  sought  to  be  set  off  must  not  only  be  mutual  to  the 
extent  that  they  are  owing  by  each  to  the  other,  but  they  must 
be  due  and  payable,  and,  therefore,  a  claim  not  due  cannot  be  set 
ofif  against  one  that  may  be  presently  enforced.  (De  Camp  v.  Thom- 
son, 570.) 

2.  SETOFF— DISCRETION  OF  COURT  IN  ALLOWING.— The 
question  whether  a  setoff  should  or  should  not  be  decreed,  rests  In 
the  discretion  of  the  court  to  which  the  application  is  made,  and 
is  not  subject  to  review.  Such  relief  should  be  admininistered  In 
all  cases  upon  such  equitable  terms  as  will  promote  substantial 
justice,  unless  the  absolute  right  is  created  by  statute,  or  otherwise 
firmly  established.    (De  Camp  v.  Thomson,  570.) 

See  Judgment,  9. 

SITUS  OF  DEBT.     ' 
See  Attachment,  9;  Taxation. 

SOCIAL  CLUBS. 

1.  SOCIAL  CLUBS— TIPPLING-HOUSE.— A  social  club  which 
furnishes  Intoxicating  liquors  to  its  members  only,  to  be  drunk  by 
them  on  the  premises  where  sold,  is  a  tlppling-house  within  the 
■  meaning  of  a  statue  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of  tippling-houses 
on  Sunday.    (Mohrman  v.  State,  74.) 


Index.  1025 

2.  SOCIAL  CLUBS— TIPPLING-nOUSE.— Although  the  selling 
and  drinking  of  liquor  in  a  social  club  Is  merely  Incidental  to  the 
main  purposes  of  the  club,  it  is  none  the  less  a  tippling-house  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  on  the  Sab- 
bath day  of  houses  where  liquor  is  furnished  and  drank.  (Mohrman 
V.  State,  74.) 

3.  SOCIAL  CLUBS  —  TIPPLING-HOUSE  —  LIABILITY  OP 
MANAGER.— The  manager  of  a  social  club,  who  is  also  a  member 
and  officer  therein,  and  who  exercises  general  superintendence  over 
a  bar  therein  from  which  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold.  Is  amenable 
to  a  statute  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of  tippllng-houses  on  Sun- 
day.    (Mohrman  v.  State,  74.) 

SPECIFIC  PERFORMANCE. 
See  Equity,  2. 

STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS. 

1.  STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS  — ORAL  CONTRACT.— A  court  of 
equity  cannot  make  valid  a  contract  void  under  the  statute  of 
frauds,  under  pretense  of  aiding  an  imperfect  attempt  to  execute 
a  contract.     (Bloomfield  State  Bank  v.  Miller,  381.) 

2.  STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS.— An  exception  to  the  statute  of 
frauds  taking  out  of  its  operation  estates  arising  by  act  or  opera- 
tion of  law  does  not  Include  a  case  where  the  creation  of  the  estate 
depends  solely  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  a  contract. 
(BlQomfleld  State  Bank  v.  Miller,  381.) 

See  Corporations,  6. 

STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS. 
See  Limitations  of  Actions. 

STATUTES. 

1.  STATUTES.— A  PENAL  STATUTE  IS  EX  POST  FACTO 
where  it,  In  relation  to  the  oflfense  or  Its  consequences,  alters  the 
situation  of  the  party  accused  of  the  crime  to  his  disadvantage;  a» 
where  the  penalty  is  increased,  or  the  accused  is  deprived  of  sub- 
stantial rights  or  privileges  to  which  he  was  entitled  as  the  law 
stood  when  the  offense  was  committed.  (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth, 
266.) 

2.  STATUTES— EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS— PROCEDURE- 
PRISON  DISCIPLINE.— Statutes  which  relate  to  procedure  or 
penal  administration  or  prison  discipline  are  not,  as  a  general  rule, 
objectionable  as  l>elng  ex  post  facto,  though  passed  after  ihe  of- 
fense, even  where  the  effect  may  be,  In  the  last  two  instances,  to  en- 
hance the  severity  of  the  confinement.  (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth, 
266.) 

3.  STATUTES— EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS— CREDITS  FOB 
GOOD  BEHAVIOR.— A  statute  which  gives  a  convict  a  right  to  de- 
ductions for  good  behavior,  thus  practically  shortening  his  term  of 
imprisonment,  cannot  be  construed  merely  as  a  measure  of  prison 
discipline  or  regulation,  and  therefore  liable  to  change  from  time  to 
time,  as  the  legislature  may  see  fit,  without  interfering  with  any 
rights  on  the  part  of  the  convict.    (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth,  266.) 

4.  STATUTES  — EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS  —  INTEmFERING 
WITH  CREDITS  FOR  GOOD  BEHAVIOR.— If  the  effect  of  good 
conduct,  on  the  part  of  a  prisoner,  under  existing  laws,  Is  to  shorten 

Ax.  St.  Ekp.,  VoU  LXX.-65 


1026  Index. 

his  term  of  Imprisonment,  and  to  give  him  a  right  to  his  discharge 
at  the  expiration  of  the  shortened  term,  a  subsequent  statute  which 
has  the  efifect  of  taliing  away  the  right  of  deduction  for  good  beha- 
vior, or  which  interferes  with  it  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  convict,  is 
clearly  ex  post  facto,  because  it  practically  lengthens  the  sentence 
which  was  provided  by  law  for  the  ofCense  at  the  time  when  it  was 
committed.    (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth,  266.) 

5.  STATUTES.— A  CRIMINAL  STATUTE  IS  TO  BE  CON- 
STRUED PROSPECTIVELY,  to  apply  to  sentences  for  offenses 
committed  after  it  took  effect.     (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth,  266.) 

6.  STATUTES— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— A  law  cannot  be  con- 
stitutional in  some  cases  and  unconstitutional  In  others  involving 
like  circumstances  and  conditions.  If  it  is  unconstitutional  as  to 
any  it  is  unconstitutional  as  to  all.  (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth, 
266.) 

7.  STATUTES— EX  POST  FACTO  LAWS.— THE  LEGISLA- 
TURE  cannot,  upder  the  guise  of  laws  relating  to  procedure  or 
prison  discipline  or  penal  administration,  take  away  or  Interfere 
with  any  substantial  right  or  privilege  which  was  secured  to  a  party 
by  the  law  as  it  was  when  the  offense  was  committed.  (Murphy  v. 
Commonwealth,  266.) 

8.  STATUTES.— THE  TERM  "EX  POST  FACTO"  applies  only 
to  penal  or  criminal  matters.    (Murphy  v.  Commonwealth,  266.) 

9.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  —  PAYMENTS  TO  DRAFTED 
MEN  BY  TAXATION.— A  statute  which  empowers  and  directs  the 
supervisors  of  several  counties,  upon  a  petition  of  the  majority  of 
the  taxpayers,  to  raise  by  ordinary  taxation  the  money  needed  to 
pay  to  any  drafted  man  who  served  personally  In  the  Civil  War, 
or  paid  commutation  money,  or  to  his  heirs  a  specified  sum  of  money, 
with  interest  for  a  period  of  years,  is  void  as  being  beyond  the  tax- 
ing power  of  the  legislature,  and  as  being  In  violation  of  a  state 
constitution  forbidding  any  county,  city,  town,  or  village  to  give 
any  money  to  or  in  aid  of  any  Individual,  or  to  Incur  any  Indebted- 
ness except  for  county,  city,  town,  or  village  purposes.  (Bush  v. 
Board  of  Supervisors,  538.) 

10.  WAGES— PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— CONSTRUC- 
TION OF  STATUTE— SALARY.— The  word  "wages,"  In  a  statute 
giving  a  preference  to  "the  wages  of  the  employfis,  operatives,  and 
laborers"  In  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  conveys  the  idea,  in  Its  appli- 
cation to  laborers  and  employfis,  of  subordinate  occupation  which 
Is  not  very  remunerative.  Such  a  statute  is  not,  therefore,  designed 
to  give  a  preference  to  the  salaries  and  compensation  due  to  officers 
and  employes  of  a  corporation  occupying  superior  positions  of  trust 
or  profit.    (Matter  of  Stryker,  489.) 

11.  WAGES-PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— LIMITATION 
UPON  WORD  "EMPLOYES.'— In  determining  what  claims  shall  be 
preferred,  under  a  statute  which  gives  a  preference  to  "the  wages 
of  the  employes,  operatives,  and  laborers"  of  corporations  in  the 
hands  of  a  receiver,  the  general  and  comprehensive  word  "employes" 
must  be  limited  by  the  more  specific  words,  "operatives  and  labor- 
ers."   (Matter  of  Stryker,  489.) 

12.  WAGES— PREFERENCE  TO  CLAIMS  FOR— CONSTRUC- 
TION OF  STATUTE.— A  statute  giving  a  preference  to  "the  wages 
of  the  employ6s,  operatives,  and  laborers"  of  corporations  In  the 
hands  of  a  receiver  is  intended  to  limit  the  preference  to  the  par- 
ticular class  whose  claims  would  be  properly  expressed  by  the  use 
of  the  word  "wages."     (Matter  of  Stryker,  489.) 


Index.  1027 

13.  STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION— ANALOGOUS  WORDS.— 
"Wlien  two  or  more  words  of  analogous  meaning  are  employed  to* 
«etber  in  a  statute,  they  are  understood  to  be  used  in  their  cognate 
sense,  to  express  the  same  relations  and  to  give  color  and  expression 
to  each  other.    (Matter  of  Strylcer,  489.) 

14.  STATUTES— GENERAL  LAW— ILLUSTRATION— WORK- 
MEN'S UNION  LABEL  ACT.— An  "act  for  the  better  protection 
of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  registration  of  labels,  marks,  names, 
brands,  or  devices  covering  the  products  of  such  labor  of  associa- 
tions or  unions  of  workingmen  or  women,"  where  there  is  nothing 
in  It  limiting  its  provisions  to  any  particular  locality  of  the  state, 
or  to  any  designated  association  or  union  of  workingmen  or 
women,  is  not  a  local  or  private  law,  but  a  general  one,  and  does 
not,  therefore,  contravene  a  constitutional  provision  that  the  legis- 
lature shall  not  pass  a  private  or  local  bill  granting  any  exclusive 
privilege  or  franchise.     (Perkins  v.  Heert,  483.) 

15.  STATUTES  —  GRANT  OP  EXCLUSIVE  PRIVILEGE  — 
STATE  POLICY.— If  a  state  constitution  authorizes  a  grant, through 
legislative  action,  of  an  exclusive  privilege.  It  must  be  deemed  to 
be  In  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  state.    (Perkins  v.  Heert,  483.) 

16.  STATUTES— ACT  HAVING  BUT  ONE  SUB.TECT  EX- 
PRESSED IN  ITS  TITLE— ILLUSTRATION.— One  subject  only  la 
mentioned  In  the  title  of  an  act  entitled,  "An  act  for  the  better 
protection  of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  registration  of  labels,  marks, 
names,  brands,  or  devices  covering  the  products  of  such  labor  of 
associations  or  unions  of  workingmen  or  women,"  and  that  Is  the 
better  protection  of  skilled  labor  by  the  registration  of  labels,  et 
cetera,  covering  the  products  of  such  labor.    (Perkins  v.  Heert,  483.) 

17.  STATUTES  NOT  CONTRARY  TO  PUBLIC  POLICY- 
WORKMEN'S  UNION  LABEL  ACT— CONSTITUTIONALITY.— 
Aji  "act  for  the  better  protection  of  skilled  labor,  and  for  the  regis- 
tration of  labels,  marks,  names,  brands,  or  devices  covering  the  pro- 
ducts of  such  labor  of  associations  or  unions  of  workingmen  or 
women"  Is  not  unconstitutional  and  void,  for  the  reason  that  It  Is 
contrary  to  public  policy.  In  that  It  unjustly  discriminates  In  favor 
of  the  labor  of  members  of  associations  or  unions  as  against  that  of 
nonunion  workmen.     (Perkins  v.  Heert,  483.) 

18.  STATUTES— GRANT  OF  EXCLUSIVE  PRIVILEGES  UN- 
DER GENERAL  LAW.— An  exclusive  privilege  or  franchise  is  au- 
thorized, If  obtained  under  general  laws,  where  the  state  constitu- 
tion authorizes  the  legislature  to  pass  general  laws,  under  which 
such  a  privilege  or  franchise  may  be  granted.  (Perkins  v.  Heert, 
483.) 

19.  WAGES— PREFERENCE  OP  CLAIMS  POR-SALARIED 
PERSONS  WHO  CANNOT  CLAIM.— Under  a  statute  which  gives 
a  preference  to  "the  wages  of  the  employ6s,  operatives,  and  labor- 
ers" of  corporations  in  the  hands  of  a  receiver,  the  claims  of  those  In 
the  employ  of  an  insolvent  manufacturing  company,  such  as  a  clerk 
and  bookkeeper,  the  superintendent,  shop  foreman,  and  a  draftsman, 
all  under  salaries  ranging  from  one  hundred  to  two  hundred  and 
twenty-five  dollars  per  month,  are  not  entitled  to  preference  as 
claims  for  wages.     (Matter  of  Stryker,  489.) 

20.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW— TITLE  OP  ACT.— An  act  known 
as  the  "cold  storage  act,'*  and  entitled,  "an  act  to  define  and  prevent 
cold  storage  In  a  local  option  county,  precinct,  city,  town,  or  sub- 
division of  a  county,  and  to  affix  a  penalty  for  running,  keeping,  or 
maintaining  them  in  such  county,  city,  or  town,  or  subdivision,  sufll- 
ciently  embraces  the  subject-matter  of  the  act,  and  Is  not  within 


1028  Index. 

a  constitutional  provision  Invalidating  laws  where  the  substance  of 
the  act  Is  not  embraced  in  the  title.    (Ex  parte  Brown,  743.) 

21.  STATUTES  —  PRESUMPTION  OP  CONSTITUTIONAL- 
ITY.—All  intendments  are  in  favor  of  the  constitutionality  of  every 
statute  passed  with  requisite  form  and  ceremony.  (Austin  v.  State, 
703.) 

22.  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW.  —  THE  TERRITORIAL  LAW  of 
Utah  so  far  as  it  purported  to  confer  general  common-law  and  chan- 
cery jurisdiction  on  probate  courts  is  void.    (In  re  Christensen,  794.) 

See  Adoption,  1,  4,  5;  Banljruptcy;  Building  and  Loan  Associationa, 
6,  11,  12;  Corporations,  36;  Deeds,  3;  Descent;  Dower,  1,  3;  In- 
terstate Commerce,  5,  6;  Larceny;  Libel,  3;  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions, 15,  21;  Police  Power,  3,  6,  8,  9. 

STREET  RAILWAYS. 
See  Railroads,  15-18. 

SUBROGATION. 
See  Appeal,  14;  Insolvency,  2. 

SURETIES. 

1.  SURETIES— APPEAL  BONDS  AND  BAIL— PRIMARY  LIA- 
BILITY—ILLUSTRATION— RELEASE  OF  SURETIES— REIM- 
BURSEMENT.—If  the  plaintiff  in  a  civil  action  obtains  an  order 
for  the  arrest  of  the  defendant,  who  is  discharged  upon  giving  bail, 
and  the  action  results  in  a  judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  whereupon 
undertakings  on  appeal  are  given,  one  to  the  general  term,  and  the 
other  to  the  court  of  appeals,  with  conditions  that  the  sureties  in 
each  case  will  pay  the  amount  of  the  judgment  and  costs  in  the 
event  of  an  affirmance,  the  plaintiff,  in  the  event  of  an  affirmance 
at  the  general  term  and  of  a  judgment  for  costs  in  the  court  of  ap- 
peals, cannot,  where  he  collects  from  the  general  term  sureties  the 
whole  amount  due  him,  except  on  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the 
court  of  appeals,  recover  thereafter  from  the  bail,  either  for  hia 
own  benefit  or  that  of  a  general  term  surety,  anything  more  than 
the  amount  due  on  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the  court  of  appeals, 
and  not  even  that  if  he  has  released  the  court  of  appeals  stireties; 
and,  if  he  recovers  the  amount  of  the  judgment  for  costs  in  the 
court  of  appeals,  from  the  bail,  the  latter  will  have  the  right  of  re- 
imbursement from  the  court  of  appeals  sureties.  (Culliford  v.  Wal- 
ser,  437.) 

2.  SURETIES— DIFFERENT  SETS  OF,  INCLUDING  BAII^ 
ORDER  OF  LIABILITY.— As  between  different  sets  of  sureties 
who  undertake  to  secure  the  same  debt^  although  in  different  stages 
of  legal  proceeuings,  tlie  primary  liability  rests  upon  the  last  set; 
and  bail,  being  sureties,  are,  therefore,  within  the  same  rule.  (Cul- 
liford V.  Walser.  437.) 

See  Contracts.  7. 

TAXATION. 

TAXATION— SITUS  OF  A  DEBT.— The  situs  Of  a  debt  for 
purposes  of  taxation,  and  usually  for  all  purposes,  is  with  the 
creditor.    (Balk  v.  Harris,  606.) 

See  Legislature;    Mandamus,    1;    Municipal    Corporations,  13,  14; 

Statutes,  9. 


Index.  1029 

TAX  TITLE. 
See  Cotenancy,  Q. 

TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES. 

1.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— NOTICE  OF  IMPORTANCH 
OF  MESSAGE.— In  an  action  for  damages  occasioned  by  the  delay 
of  a  telegraph  company  in  delivering  a  message,  extrinsic  evidence 
Is  admissible  to  show  that  the  company  had  notice  of  the  Import- 
ance of  the  message,    (McPeek  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  205.) 

2.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  NONDE- 
LIVERY OF  MESSAGE.— The  liability  of  a  telegraph  company  to 
the  sendee  of  a  message  for  damages  resulting  from  a  delay  In 
delivery  is  not  one  arising  from  contract,  but  Is  based  upon  its 
negligence  In  the  performance  of  a  duty  In  Its  public  capacity  as  a 
common  carrier  of  messages.    (McPeek  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  205.) 

3.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— DAMAGES  FOR  DELAY  IN 
DELIVERY  OF  MESSAGE— LOSS  OF  REWARD.— Where  a  per- 
son has  laid  a  plan  for  the  capture  of  a  fugitive  from  justice  with  a 
view  to  obtaining  the  reward  offered  therefor,  and  has  notified  a 
telegraph  agent  that  he  Is  expecting  a  telegram  of  great  importance 
to  the  success  of  his  plan,  and  the  agent  knows  that  prompt  de- 
livery of  such  message  will  be  necessary,  the  telegraph  company 
will  be  liable  In  damages  to  the  amount  of  such  reward  if  the  agent's 
delay  In  delivery  of  the  message  frustrates  the  sendee's  plan.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  agent  have  actual  notice  of  the  offer  of  the 
reward,  he  being  charged  with  knowledge  that  such  offer  might  be 
made.    (McPeek  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  205.) 

4.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— NEGLIGENCE  IN  DELIV- 
ERY  OF  MESSAGE— BURDEN  OF  PROOF.— In  an  action  against 
a  telegraph  company  for  the  loss  of  a  reward  offered  for  the  capture 
of  a  fugitive  from  justice,  which  loss  Is  alleged  to  have  resulted 
from  the  negligence  of  the  defendant  in  delivering  a  certain  tele- 
gram, the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  the  question 
whether  or  not  such  loss  resulted  from  the  negligence  alleged  is  for 
the  jury.     (McPeek  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  205.) 

5.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  NONDE- 
LIVERY OF  MESSAGE— OFFICE  HOURS.— An  agent  of  a  tele- 
graph company  undertaking  to  deliver  a  message  outside  of  ofl3ce 
hours  is  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  agency,  and  the  company 
Is  liable  for  his  failure  to  exercise  reasonable  diligence.  Whether 
or  not  such  diligence  was  exercised  Is  a  question  for  the  jury.  (Mc- 
Peek V.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  205.) 

6.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— DELAY  IN  DELIVERING 
MESSAGE— MEASURE  OF  DAMAGES.— A  person  Injured  by  the 
-delay  of  a  telegraph  company  In  delivering  a  message  to  him  is 
not  limited  In  his  recovery  to  such  damages  as  might  reasonably 
have  been  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties,  but  recovery 
may  be  had  for  all  the  Injurious  results  which  flow  therefrom,  by 
ordinary  natural  sequence,  without  the  Interposition  of  any  other 
negligent  act  or  overpowering  force.  (McPeek  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,* 
205.) 

7.  TELEGRAPH  COMPANIES— ACTION  FOR  ERRONEOUS 
TRANSMISSION  OF  MESSAGE— EVIDENCE.— In  an  action 
against  a  telegraph  company  for  damages  resulting  from  a  con- 
tract entered  Into  In  reliance  upon  an  erroneously  tr-insmltted  mes- 
sage, the  plaintiff  Is  properly  allowed  to  testify  that  the  contract 
In  question  would  not  have  been  entered  into  except  for  such  error 


1030  Index. 

on  the  part  of  the  defendant.    (Hasbrouck  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.r 
181.) 

8.  TELEGKAPH  COMPANIES— DAMAGES  FOR  ERRONE- 
OUSLY TRANSMITTED  MESSAGE— DUTY  OF  PLAINTIFF  TO 
RESCIND  CONTRACT  ENTERED  INTO  IN  RELIANCE  UPON.— 
Where  a  principal  has  been  influenced  through  the  erroneous 
transmission  of  a  telegram  from  his  agent  to  authorize  the  latter 
to  enter  into  a  contract  of  settlement  with  the  former's  creditor 
which  he  would  not  have  authorized  except  for  such  erroneous 
transmission,  he  is  not  bound  to  talie  steps  to  rescind  the  contract 
before  bringing  suit  against  the  telegraph  company  for  damages 
BufCered.    (Hasbrouck  v.  Western  U.  T.  Co.,  181.) 

See  Agency. 

TORTS. 

TORTS- -"MALICE-DEFINITION.-The  term  "malice.*'  a» 
applied  to  torts,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  which  must  pro- 
ceed from  a  spiteful,  malignant,  or  revengeful  disposition,  but  a 
conduct  injurious  to  another,  though  proceeding  from  an  Ill-regu- 
lated mind  not  sufficiently  cautious  before  it  occasions  an  Injury  to 
another.     (Brown  v.  Brown,  574.) 

TRESPASS. 

1.  TRESPASS— INJUNCTION  AGAINST.— If  strong  and  ag- 
gravated instances  of  continuing  trespass  are  shown,  which  must 
necessarily  result  in  substantial  damages  to  plaintiff's  property  that 
are  in  no  way  offset  by  benefits,  a  permanent  injunction  may  be 
issued,  although  the  amount  of  damages  is  not  fixed.  (Garvey  v. 
Long  Island  R.  R.  Co.,  550.) 

2.  TRESPASS— INJUNCTION  AGAINST.— If  one  who  owns 
valuable  mining  property  and  a  water  supply  at  a  considerable  dis- 
tance therefrom  digs  a  trench  and  inserts  a  pipe  line  therein  under 
the  surface  of  worthless,  uncultivated,  and  unused  land  of  another 
from  his  water  supply  to  his  mine,  covering  the  trench  with  the  ma- 
terial taken  out,  and  not  causing  the  landowner  any  damage  except 
nominal,  the  latter  is  not  entitled  to  an  injunction  restraining  the 
trespass,  when  it  appears  that  to  restrain  the  laying  of  the  pipe 
line  would  cause  irreparable  damage  to  the  mine-owner  and  de- 
stroy a  large  industry  without  any  benefit  to  the  landowner.  In 
such  case,  the  remedy  at  law  being  adequate  the  landowner  must  be 
required  to  resort  to.  such  remedy  for  the  recovery  of  damages  at- 
tending the  trespass.  (Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Oo.^ 
810.) 

See  Railroad  Companies,  1-4. 

TRIAL. 

1.  TRIATv-ERRONEOUS  INSTRUCTIONS.— It  Is  not  ground 
for  reversal  of  a  judgment  that  an  instruction  assumes  as  proven 
a  fact  established  by  the  evidence  without  contradiction.  (Illinois 
Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  King,  93.) 

2.  TRIAIv-IMPANELING  .JURY- EXAMINATION  ON  VOIR 
DIRE.— In  Impaneling  a  jury  In  a  trial  for  homicide,  defendant's 
counsel  should  not  be  allowed,  in  the  examination  of  jurors  on  their 
voir  dire,  to  ask  them  whether  defendant's  failure  to  testify  In  hi» 
own  behalf  would  prejudice  him  in  their  minds.  (Commonwealth 
V.  Wireback,  625.) 


Index.  1031 

3.  TRIAL— REFUSAL  OF  COURT  TO  SUBMIT  ISSUES.— 
Where  every  phase  of  a  defendant's  contention  could  be  and  waa 
presented  without  prejudice  under  the  Issue  submitted  by  the 
court,  tbe  refusal  to  submit  other  issues,  though  asked,  is  not  error. 
(Kendrick  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  592.) 

4.  TRIAL— CRIMINAL  CASES-OB.TECTION  TO  GENERAL 
COURSE  PURSUED  BY  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY.— If  a  prose- 
cuting attorney,  in  a  criminal  case,  persists,  after  repeated  objec- 
tions, in  making  improper  statements  during  his  address  to  the 
jury,  and  such  objections  go  to  the  general  course  pursued  by  him, 
no  further  objection  or  exception  is  necessary  after  the  court  sanc- 
tions such  course,  pronouncing  it  "perfectly  proper."  (People  v. 
Fielding,  495.) 

5.  TRIAI^IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO  JURY— CURING  OF 
ERROR.— INSTRUCTIONS  to  the  jury  do  not  always  neutralize, 
either  as  a  matter  of  law  or  fact,  the  effect  of  improper  remarks  la 
their  presence.    (People  v.  Fielding,  495.) 

6.  TRIAL-CRIMINAL  CASES— ARGUMENT— PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY— DUTY  OF.— The  prosecuting  attorney,  in  a  criminal 
case,  represents  the  majesty  of  the  people,  and,  having  no  respon- 
sibility, except  fairly  to  discharge  his  duty,  should  put  himself  un- 
der proper  restraint,  and  should  not,  in  his  remarks  before  the  jury, 
go  beyond  the  evidence  or  the  bounds  of  a  reasonable  moderation. 
If  he  lays  aside  the  impartiality  that  should  characterize  his  ofl3clal 
action  to  become  a  heated  partisan,  and  by  vituperation  of  the  pris- 
oner and  appeals  to  prejudice  seeks  to  procure  a  conviction  at  all 
hazards,  he  ceases  to  properly  represent  the  public  interest.  (People 
V.  Fielding,  495.) 

7.  TRIAL  — CRIMINAL  CASES  —  IMPROPER  APPEAL  TO 
JURY— CORRECTION  OF  ERROR.— When  a  prosecuting  attorney, 
in  a  criminal  case  makes  improper  statements  in  his  address  to 
the  jury,  and  the  court  seeks  to  correct  them,  the  correction  should 
be  as  broad  as  the  error,  and  cover  substantially  the  same  ground. 
It  should  be  clear  and  specific  enough  to  repel  the  presumption  of 
injury.    Otherwise,  the  error  is  not  cured.    (People  v.  Fielding,  485.) 

See  Homicide,  13. 

TRUCKMEN. 
See  Carriers,  2,  3;  Negligence,  2,  8. 

TRUSTS. 
See  Wills,  8-10. 

**UPSET"  BIDS. 
See  Judicial  Sales,  2,  4-6. 

USURY. 
Bee  Boilding  and  Loan  Associations,  1,  6,  7,  8b  lit  12. 

VALUE. 
See  Estates. 

VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER. 

1.  VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— ASSUMPTION  OF  DEBTS- 
PRIMARY  LIABILITY  OF  PURCHASER.— When  a  purchaser 
assumes  the  payment  of  certain  debts  of  his  vendor,  in  considera- 


1032  Index. 

tion  of  a  conveyance  of  land,  he  is  personally  answerable  therefor, 
and,  as  between  the  vendor  and  himself,  he  is  primarily  liable  for 
such  debts.     (Moore  v.  Triplett,  882.) 

2.  VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— VAEIANCB  BETWEEN 
CONTRACT  FOR  SALE  OF  LAND  AND  DEED— PRESUMPTION 
— BURDEN. — In  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  the  terms  of  an 
agreement  for  the  sale  of  land  and  a  subsequent  deed  to  it,  the 
presumption  is,  that  the  purposes  of  the  parties  were  altered,  and 
that  the  deed  expresses  the  final  and  true  agreement  between  them. 
Hence,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him  who  denies  that  the  writing 
speaks  the  final  agreement  to  rebut  this  presumption  by  the  clearest 
and  most  satisfactory  evidence.     (Snyder  v.  GrandstafC,  863.) 

3.  VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— BURDEN  OF  PROVING 
NOTICE  TO  PURCHASER  FOR  VALUE.— One  who  alleges  that 
t  purchaser  for  value  had  notice  must  assume  the  burden  of  prov- 
ijg  it,  and  mere  proof  of  confidential  relations  between  the  grantor 
and  tlie  grantee  is  insufficient.    (Snyder  v.  Grandstafif,  863.) 

4.  VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— AFFIRMATIONS  OF  TI- 
TLE.—Purchasers  for  value  have  a  right  to  rely  on  the  affirmations 
of  grantors,  and  grantors  are  bound  by  their  affirmations  of  title. 
(Snyder  v,  Grandstaff,  863.) 

5.  VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— NOTICE  TO  PURCHASER 
FOR  VALUE— SUFFICIENCY  OF.— To  charge  a  purchaser  for 
value  with  notice,  it  is  necessary  that  the  evidence  should  establish 
notice,  either  actual  or  constructive.  Otherwise,  It  is  insufficient. 
(Snyder  v.  Grandstafif,  863.) 

6.  VENDOR  AND  PURCHASER— LATENT  EQUITIES— MU- 
TUAL MISTAKE.— A  PURCHASER  FOR  VALUE  is  not  affected 
by  any  latent  equity,  whether  by  lien,  encumbrance,  trust,  fraud, 
or  any  other  claim;  and  a  mutual  mistake  stands  on  the  same  foot* 
Ing  as  any  other  equity.    (Snyder  v.  Grandstafif,  863.) 

See  Judgment,  1,  2. 

VOLUNTARY   ASSOCIATIONS. 
See  Associations,  7. 

WAGES. 

WAGES-APPLICATION  OF  TERM— SALARY— FEB.— The 
word  "wages"  is  applied,  in  common  parlance,  specifically  to  the 
payment  made  for  manual  labor,  or  other  labor  of  a  menial  or  me- 
chanical kind,  as  distinguished  from  salary,  and  from  fee,  each  of 
which  denotes  compensation  paid  to  professional  men.  (Matter  of 
Stryker,  489.) 

See  Statutes,  10-12,  19. 

WARRANTY. 
See  Waterworks  and  Water  Companies.  4. 

WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES. 

1.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  — PERCOLATING 
WATER,  so  long  as  it  remains  in  an  artificial  tunnel  or  mining 
claim  of  the  proprietor  of  the  land.  Is  not  open  to  appropriation  by 
another.    (Crescent  Mln.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.,  810.) 

2.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  —  PERCOLATING 
WATERS.— PRESCRIPTIVE  RIGHT  TO.— Whenever  percolating 
water  is  so  hidden  in  the  earth  that  its  course  is  not  discoverable 


Index.  1033 

from  the  surface,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  prescription  In 
favor  of  an  adjacent  proprietor  to  have  an  uninterrupted  flow  of 
such  stream  through  the  land  of  his  neighbor.  (Crescent  MIn.  Co.  v. 
Sliver  King  Min.  Co.,  810.) 

3  WATERS  AND  WATERCOUKSBS  — PERCOLATINO 
WATER.— A  PERSON  MAY  LAWFULLY  DIG  A  WELL  on  his 
own  land,  though  thereby  he  destroys  the  subterranean,  undefined, 
percolating  water  of  his  adjoining  neighbor's  spring,  and  no  action 
can  be  maintained  therefor.  (Crescent  Mln.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min. 
Co.,  810.) 

4.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  —  PERCOLATING 
WATER.— If  water  percolates  through  and  under  the  surface  of  the 
earth  upon  the  land  of  one  person  and  comes  to  the  surface  just 
before  it  empties  Itself  upon  the  land  of  another,  the  owner  of  such 
land  has  no  right  to  demand  that  such  percolation  shall  continue. 
(Crescent  Mln.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.,  810.) 

5.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  — PERCOLATING 
WATER— APPROPRIATION.— Percolating  water,  after  passing  in- 
to an  underground  artificial  tunnel,  and  not  naturally  flowing  from 
or  Into  a  natural  stream  with  a  well-defined  channel,  banks,  and 
course,  is  not  subject  to  appropriation  by  another  while  It  remains 
In  the  tunnel  upon  the  owner's  land;  but  If  the  water  Is  allowed 
to  flow  Into  an  artificial  lake  upon  public  land  It  is  then  subject 
to  appropriation.  The  appropriator  does  not,  however,  thereby  ac- 
quire an  easement  in  the  tunnel  nor  a  prescriptive  right  to  have  the 
water  flow  from  the  tunnel  into  the  lake  uninterruptedly  and  con- 
tinuously, although  he  has  continually  used  the  water  of  the  lake 
for  a  long  period  of  years.  (Crescent  Mln.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Mln. 
Co.,  810.) 

6.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  — PERCOLATING 
WATER.— APPROPRIATION.— The  ordinary  rules  of  law  apply- 
ing to  the  appropriation  of  surface  streams  do  not  apply  to  perco- 
lating waters  and  subterranean  streams  with  undefined  and  un- 
known courses  and  banks.  (Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Sliver  King  Mln. 
Co.,  810.) 

7.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  — PERCOLATING 
WATER  which  has  been  gathered  in  artificial  tunnels  or  ditches 
and  allowed  to  flow  from  the  proprietor's  land  to  an  Inferior  pro- 
prietor, and  has  been  used  by  him  a  greater  period  of  time  than  that 
allowed  by  the  statute  of  limitations,  does  not  become  his  by  pre- 
scriptive title.    (Crescent  Min.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min,  Co.,  810.) 

8.  WATERS  AND  WATERCOURSES  — PERCOLATING 
WATER.— The  owner  of  the  soil  Is  entitled  to  the  waters  percolat- 
ing through  It.  Such  water  Is  not  subject  to  appropriation  until 
It  leaves  his  land.    (Crescent  Mln.  Co.  v.  Silver  King  Min.  Co.,  810.) 

WATERWORKS  AND  WATER  COMPANIES. 

1.  WATER  COMPANIES— BREACH  OP  CONTRACT— NATU- 
RAL AND  PROXIMATE  RESULT— DAMAGE  BY  FIRE  TO 
TAXPAYER,— Where  a  party  undertakes  to  furnish  water  In  such 
mode  and  quantity  that  it  may  be  used  to  extinguish  fires  In  the 
city  In  which  it  is  to  be  supplied,  damages  sustained  by  a  citizen 
and  taxpayer  by  the  destruction  of  buildings,  by  the  failure  to  so 
furnish  water,  is  a  natural  and  proximate  consequence  of  such 
breach  of  the  undertaking.    (Gorrill  v.  Water  Supply  Co.,  598.) 

2.  WATER  COMPANIES  — LIABILITY  FOR  DISTRIBUTING 
POLLUTED  WATER— EVIDENCE  OF  SUBSEQUENT  PRECAU- 
TIONS.—In  an  action  against  a  water  company  for  the  death  of  a 


1034  Index. 

person,  occasioned  by  nslng  Impure  water  famished  by  It,  it  Is  Im- 
proper to  admit  evidence  that  greater  precautions  were  taken  by 
the  defendant,  after  the  occurrence  complained  of  to  secure  pure 
water,  than  were  taken  before.    (Green  v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

3.  WATER  COMPANIES  —  LIABILITY  FOR  DISTRIBUTING 
POLLUTED  WATER— KNOWLEDGE  OF  PERSON  USING  SUCH 
WATER.— A  water  company  which  knowingly  distributes  water 
which,  from  a  cause  not  discoverable  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
care,  is  dangerous  for  domestic  use,  it  owes  the  duty  to  Its  custom- 
ers of  disclosing  such  danger,  and  a  failure  to  do  so  Is  fraud  in 
law,  rendering  the  company  liable  to  any  person  injured  thereby 
without  fault  on  his  part,  and  the  failure  of  duty  amounts  to  action- 
able negligence,  to  which  the  same  liability  is  Incident.  But  if  the 
person  injured  used  the  water  with  knowledge,  actual  or  construc- 
tive, of  Its  dangerous  condition,  no  liability  attaches  to  the  com- 
pany.   (Green  v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

4.  WATER  COMPANIES  —  LIABILITY  FOR  DISTRIBUTING 
POLLUTED  WATER— WARRANTY  OF  QUALITY.— A  water 
company  engaged  In  distributing  water  for  compensation  does  not 
impliedly  warrant  the  quality  of  the  water  carried  and  distributed. 
(Green  v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

6.  WATER  COMPANIES  —  IMPURE  WATER  —  CONTRIBU- 
TORY NEGLIGENCE  IN  USING.— Where  It  has  been  for  some  time 
a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  water  furnished  by  a  water 
company  is  dangerously  impure.  It  will  be  presumed  that  a  person 
of  average  intelligence  living  In  the  community  had  notice  of  such 
fact,  and,  unless  such  presumption  is  rebutted,  he  will  be  deemed 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence  if  he  uses  such  water.  (Green 
v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

6.  WATER  COMPANIES— LIABILITY  FOR  FURNISHING 
IMPURE  WATER— EVIDENCE.— Where  It  Is  sought  to  Impose 
upon  a  water  company  a  liability  for  injuries  occasioned  by  impure 
water  furnished  by  it,  it  is  error  to  admit  in  evidence  newspaper 
comments  generally  Irrelevant  to  the  issue,  and  of  a  sort  tending 
to  prejudice  the  jury  against  the  defendant.  (Green  y.  Ashland  W. 
Co.,  911.) 

WILLS. 

1.  WILLS  —  EXECUTION  —  PROOF  OF  — ATTESTING  WIT- 
NESSES.—Where  a  will  Is  signed  by  the  testator's  making  his  mark, 
and  the  subscribing  witnesses  are  dead  or  beyond  the  Jurisdiction 
of  the  court,  proof  of  their  handwriting  is  a  compliance  with  the 
law  as  to  due  execution;  and  it  need  not  be  proved  that  the  testator 
had  the  will  read  over  to  him,  or  was  Informed  of  its  contents,  before 
he  signed  It.    (Scott  v.  Hawk.  228.) 

2.  WILLS— EXECUTION— PUBLICATION.— In  the  execution 
of  a  will,  nothing  more  than  compliance  with  the  statute  Is  neces- 
sary, and  publication  is  not  necessary  unless  made  so  by  statute. 
(Scott  V.  Hawk,  228.) 

3.  WILLS-SIGNATURE-TESTATOR'S  MARK.— Where  a  tes- 
tator, being  unable  to  write  his  signature  to  his  will,  makes  his 
mark  Instead,  the  will  so  executed  Is  "signed"  within  the  meaning 
of  the  law.    (Scott  v.  Hawk,  228.) 

4.  WILLS— SIGNING  WITH  MARK.— Where  a  testator  signed 
his  will  by  making  his  mark,  It  Is  not  essential  to  the  valid  execu- 
tion of  the  will  that  his  name  be  written  by  one  of  the  attesting 
witnesses.    (Scott  y.  Hawk,  228.) 


Index.  1035 

b.   wills— illegitimate    child    as    an    "heir    by 

BLOOD."— An  Illegitimate  child  Is  the  "heir  by  blood"  of  his  mother 
within  the  meaning  of  a  will  wherein  the  term  "heirs  by  blood"  Is 
used,  where  It  plainly  appears  that  the  testator  Intended  by  the  use 
of  that  term  to  indicate  those  persons  whose  relationship  was  by 
some  tie  of  consanguinity;  and  to  exclude  all  others,  such  as  hus- 
band, wife,  or  adopted  children.    (Hayden  v.  Barrett,  295.) 

6.  WILLS— DECLARATIONS  OF  TESTATOR  AS  EVIDENCE. 
Wliere  a  will  Is  attacked  on  the  ground  of  forgery,  declarations  of 
the  testator  as  to  his  intentions  are  admissible  for  the  purpose  of 
corroboration,  but  such  evidence  is  not  sufficient  either  to  establish 
the  execution  of  the  will  or  to  overcome  the  testimony  of  the  sub- 
scribing witnesses.     (Swope  v.  Donnelly,  637.) 

7.  WILLS— DECLARATIONS  OP  TESTATOR— NOT  PROP- 
ERLY ADMISSIBLE.— Where  the  Issue  is  whether  or  not  a  will 
purporting  to  have  been  executed  on  a  certain  day  Is  a  forgery, 
declarations  of  the  testator  that  a  will  with  which  he  was  satisfied 
was  in  existence  two  months  before  that  day,  also  an  expression  of 
intention  made  by  him  five  years  before  that  time,  are  irrelevant  and 
inadmissible.     (Swope  v.  Donnelly,  637.) 

8.  WILLS  —  CHARITABLE  TRUST  —  DESIGNATION  OP 
TRUSTEE.— If  a  testator,  after  providing  for  certain  beneficlariea 
in  his  will,  declares  therein  that  "after  the  death  of  each  one  I  de- 
sire that  my  executors  shall  make  over  to  the  presiding  bishop  of 
the  Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints  the  half  of  my  es- 
tate from  which  that  wife's  Income  was  derived.  The  presiding 
bishop  shall  receive  It  In  trust  and  expend  the  annual  Income  ac- 
cording to  his  discretion,  for  the  benefits  of  the  members  of  the 
Church  of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints,"  the  will  clearly 
designates  such  presiding  bishop  as  trustee  and  sufficiently  do- 
scribes  the  beneficiaries  under  the  will.    (Staines  v.  Burton,  788.) 

9.  WILLS— CHARITABLE  TRUSTS.— A  bequest  by  will  to  the 
presiding  bishop  of  a  certain  church,  in  trust,  to  expend  the  annual 
income,  according  to  his  discretion,  for  the  benefit  of  the  members 
of  such  church,  "whether  It  be  for  public  schools,  parks,  watering 
cities,  acclimatizing  foreign  plants,  or  anything  else  whereby  the 
members  may  be  benefited,  creates  a  charitable  use  or  trust,  and  is 
not  within  the  rule  against  perpetuities.    (Staines  v.  Burton,  788.) 

10.  WILLS— CHARITABLE  TRUSTS— CONSTRUCTION.— If  a 
charitable  Intent  appears  on  the  face  of  a  will,  but  the  terms  used 
are  broad  enough  to  allow  the  fund  being  applied  either  In  a  lawful 
or  unlawful  manner,  the  gift  must  be  supported,  and  Its  application 
restrained  within  the  bounds  of  the  law.    (Staines  v.  Burton,  788.) 

11.  WILLS— CONDITIONS  SUBSEQUENT— IMPOSSIBILITY 
OP  PERPORMANCE— EFFECT  OP.— If  a  testator  devises  to  his 
wife,  for  her  life,  his  "homestead  and  five  acres  around  the  house," 
with  the  understanding  that  his  son  will  support  and  take  care  of 
her,  and  that,  at  her  death,  the  "homestead  and  land  shall  return  to" 
the  son  "as  compensation  therefor,"  but  the  wife  of  the  testator 
dies  in  his  lifetime,  and  he  makes  no  change  In  his  will,  the  whole 
will,  taken  together,  including  the  wish  therein  expressed  that  the 
son  shall  support  and  provide  for  his  two  sisters  as  long  as  they 
remain  single,  shows  that  the  condition  upon  which  the  son  Is  to 
take  the  estate  is  a  condition  subsequent,  and  not  a  condition 
precedent,  and  its  performance  having  been  rendered  Impossible 
by  the  act  of  God,  In  the  death  of  the  wife  In  the  lifetime  of  the 
testator,  the  son  holds  the  estate  by  an  absolute  title,  as  If  the 
testator  had  attached  no  condition  to  the  devise,  for  the  act  od 


1036  Index. 

which  the  estate  depends  does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vesting 
of  the  estate,  but  may  accompany  or  follow  It.  (Burdis  t.  Burdis, 
«25.) 

12.  WILLS— CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  AND  SUBSEQUENT— 
WHAT  ARE— DISTINCTION.— There  are  no  technical  words  to 
■distinguish  between  conditions  precedent  and  conditions  subsequent. 
The  distinction  is  matter  of  construction.  The  words  may  indif- 
ferently malte  either,  according  to  the  intent  of  the  person  who 
creates  the  condition.  If  the  language  of  the  particular  clause,  or 
■of  the  whole  will,  shows  that  the  act  on  which  the  estate  depends 
must  be  performed  before  the  estate  can  vest,  the  condition  is 
precedent,  and,  unless  it  is  performed,  the  devisee  can  talie  nothing. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  the  act  does  not  necessarily  precede  the  vest- 
ing of  the  estate,  but  may  accompany  or  follow  it,  and  this  can 
be  collected  from  the  whole  will,  the  condition  is  subsequent.  (Bur- 
dis V.  Burdis,  825.) 

See  Devise. 

WITNESSES. 

1.  WITNESSES— TESTIMONY  OP  EXPERTS.— In  an  action 
for  damages  occasioned  by  fire  ignited  from  sparl£S  escaping  from  a 
road-roller  engine,  it  beiug  alleged  that  the  defendant  was  negligent 
in  failing  to  provide  such  engine  with  a  sparli  arrester,  expert  wit- 
nesses, in  testifying,  may  be  allowed  to  exhibit  a  model  of  a  loco- 
motive engine  to  the  jury  to  illustrate  the  use  of  a  spark  arrester, 
^nd  to  indicate  how  it  could  be  applied  to  the  roller-engine  in  ques- 
tion, but  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  use  such  models  for  any  fur- 
ther purpose.     (McMahon  v.  Dubuque,  143.) 

2.  WITNESSES— MATTERS  OP  OPINION.— In  determining 
the  condition  of  a  house  at  the  time  of  its  destruction,  whether  or 
not  it  was  in  good  repair,  a  witness  may  describe  the  house  In  de- 
tail, but  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  testify  whether  or  not  the 
house  was  in  good  repair,  such  testimony  being  merely  an  opinion. 
(McMahon  v.  Dubuque,  143.) 

3.  WITNESSES— IMPEACHING  ONE'S  OWN.— A  party  cannot 
«how  inconsistent  statements  made  by  his  own  witness  for  the  pur- 
pose of  impeaching  him.    (Fall  Brooli  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson,  466.) 

4.  WITNESSES— OFFER  OF— WHEN  COMPLETE.— A  person 
Is  not  made  a  witness  so  as  to  burden  the  party  calling  him  with 
the  necessity  of  supporting  his  character  to  the  end  of  the  trial, 
until  he  is  called,  sworn,  and  some  material  question  is  asked  and 
xinswered.    (Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.  v.  Hewson,  4G6.) 

5.  WITNESSES— OFFER  OF— IMPEACHMENT.— If  a  party 
calls  a  witness,  but  excuses  him  after  he  Is  sworn,  but  before  any 
material  question  is  asked,  he  is  not  afterward  precluded  from  Im- 
peaching his  credibility  by  contradicting  him,  where  the  witness 
gives  material  testimony  for  the  other  side.  (Fall  Brook  Coal  Co. 
V.  Hewson,  466.) 

6.  WITNESS,  FAILURE  TO  CALL  —  PRESUMPTION  —  IN- 
STRUCTIONS.—The  om'ssion  of  the  defendant  to  call  Its  motorman 
as  a  witness,  though  available,  will  justify  the  court  In  Instructing 
the  jury  that,  in  weigliing  the  evidence  introduced,  they  are  at 
liberty  to  Indulge  in  the  presumption  that  the  testimony  of  the 
motorman,  if  Introduced,  would  not  have  been  favorable  to  the  de- 
fendant's cause.     (Fonda  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.,  341.) 

7.  WITNESSES-RULING  OUT  QUESTIONS  CALLING  FOR 
AN  OPINION.— A  question  which  calls  for  nn  opinion  of  the  wlt- 
nrss  In  regard  to  iho  legal  efTect  of  a  contract  Is  properly  ruled  out. 
^Mclsaac  v.  Northampton  Elec.  L.  Co.,  244.) 


Index.  1037 

8.  WITNESSES.— IMMATERIAL  QUESTIONS  asked  of  a  wit- 
ness are  properly  ruled  out  (Mclsaac  v.  Northampton  Elec.  L.  Co., 
244.) 

9.  WITNESSES— EXAMINATION  OF— STRIKING  OUT  AN- 
SWER.—A  witness'  answer  which  Is  not  responsive  to  the  question 
may  rightly  be  stricken  out.  (Mclsaac  v.  Northampton  Elec.  L.  Co., 
244.) 

10.  WITNESSES— EXPERTS— QUESTION  OF  SANITY— PENI- 
TENTIARY WARDEN.— Where  the  prisoner's  Insanity  Is  set  up  In 
defense  of  d  prosecution  for  homicide,  and  expert  testimony  Is  given 
in  support  of  such  plea,  together  with  evidence  of  acts  and  declara- 
tions of  the  defendant  tending  to  show  insanity,  a  penitentiary 
warden  who,  through  a  long  period  of  service,  has  had  opportunity 
to  study  criminals,  is  competent  to  testify  that  very  many  prisouera 
feigned  insanity  and  delusions,  and  that  some  had  deceived  him  and 
physicians.     (Commonwealth  v.  Wireback,  625.) 

11.  WITNESSES  —  CROSS-EXAMINATION  —  MAKING  ONE 
PARTY'S  OWN  WITNESS.— When  the  matter  elicited  from  a  wit- 
ness in  his  examination  in  chief  is  departed  from,  or  when  the  facts 
sought  to  be  established  on  cross-examination  are  not  pertinent  or 
germane  to  those  elicited  in  the  examination  in  chief,  the  witness 
becomes  the  witness  of  the  party  attempting  to  prove  such  matter. 
(Jones  V.  State,  719.) 

12.  WITNESSES  — COMPETENCY  — WIFE  IN  CRIMINAL 
CASE.— A  wife  can  be  a  witness  for  her  husband,  but  not  against 
him,  and  the  state  in  a  criminal  case  has  the  right  to  cross-examine 
her  pertaining  to  the  facts  sworn  to  by  her  on  direct  examination. 
When  the  state  leaves  the  matter  elicited  in  the  examination  In 
chief,  and  attempts  to  prove  independent  material  facts  by  her,  it 
makes  her  its  witness  and  a  witness  against  her  husband  against 
his  objection.  This  cannot  be  legitimately  done.  To  permit  it  is  re- 
versible error.    (Jones  v.  State,  719.) 

13.  WITNESSES— IMPEACHMENT.— If  a  witness  is  attacked  by 
showing  that  he  has  testified  corruptly,  or  has  recently  fabricated 
his  testimony,  he  can  be  supported  by  proof  that  that  he  had  at  a 
prior  time  made  the  same  statements,  before  any  motive  could  have 
existed.    (Jones  v.  State,  719.) 

14.  WITNESSES— EXPERTS— OPINION  EVIDENCE.- Where 
It  is  sought  to  recover  from  a  water  company  for  death  from  typhoid 
fever,  which  disease,  it  is  alleged,  was  communicated  to  the  deceased 
by  impure  water  furnished  by  the  defendant  company,  expert  wit- 
nesses should  not  be  permitted  to  give  opinions  going  to  the  ques- 
tion of  how  the  disease  was  contracted,  based  upon  the  evidence 
Introduced  upon  that  question,  such  evidence  being  contradictory. 
(Green  v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

15.  WITNESSES  —  EXPERTS  —  PHYSICIANS  —CAUSE  OP 
DEATH.— The  rule  that  a  physician  may  testify  as  to  the  cause  of 
death,  from  personal  examination  or  knowledge,  extends  no  farther 
than  the  immediate  cause  of  death,  and  not  to  what  set  the  cause  in 
motion.    (Green  v.  Ashland  W.  Co.,  911.) 

See  Appeal,  6,  10;  Evidence,  12;  Homicide,  11-13 jinsane  Persons,  4; 

WUI9,  1. 

WRITS. 

A  WRIT  OP  ERROR  MUST  BE  DECIDED  according  to  the 
law  as  it  was  at  the  time  the  judgment  was  rendered  without  anj 
consideration  of  subsequent  acts.    (Wilson  v.  Hundley,  837.) 


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